S.O.E. HISTORY
12
Vol. 1

ARCHIVES

HS7/17

S 251

FILE NUMBER	SUBJECT
HISTORY 12 volume 1	HISTORY OF JEDBURGHS
VOLUME	IN EUROPE 1942 - 1944
FROM 1945	
TO	

HISTORY OF JEDBURGHS IN EUROPE

Foreword. This History of the Allied Teams, known under the code name JEDBURGH, trained and used to support and lead Resistance on the return to Europe of the Allied Armies in 1944, has been divided into ten Parts.

Part I. deals with the Origins of the Jedburgh Scheme, and with the Development of Planning in connection with it throughout 1942 and 1943.

Parts II. and III. deal with the Formation of these Teams, the Qualifications required in volunteers for the work, and the Training undergone by Officers and N.C.O's selected.

Part IV. is a short Summary of the "MITCHELL" Plan - a plan intended to assist the Reception of these Teams among the Resistance forces - but one that was never actually implemented.

Parts V., VI., VII. and VIII. cover the period of active operations commenced in June 1944.

Part V. gives a short Summary of the Command under whose control the Operational Reserve of Jedburgh Teams were employed.

Part VI. outlines the ways in which Jedburghs were employed in France in support of Operations OVERLORD and DRAGOON, and should be read in conjunction with Map at Appendix X.B.

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Part VII. outlines the Plans made for use of Jedburghs in Belgium.

Part VIII. covers Jedburgh activities in Holland.

Part IX. deals with Preparations made for Despatch of these Teams to the field, the conditions under which Final Briefing was given, and the Equipment provided.

Part X. summarizes the Achievements of these Teams and shows details of the Numbers Despatched to different areas, their Losses, and Honours and Rewards.

Attention is drawn to the Map at Appendix X.B., showing the Area in which each Team worked and the Date of their Arrival in the Area.

An attempt has been made to assess the Value of their efforts, and the assistance given to the Allied Armies, and to point out the difficulties encountered, and the lessons learned.

31 August 1945.

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I. ORIGINS AND OBJECTS

CD's Military Deputy 1942

In May 1942, Brigadier C. McV. Gubbins - (~~now Major General~~) - discussed with the D.C.G.S. Home Forces and C.C.O. suggestions for implementing the role of Special Operations Executive in connection with future Anglo-American operations in North West Europe. as he then was

S.O.E's role was, at this time, laid down by the Chiefs of Staff in a directive C.O.S.(42) 133(O) dated 12 May 1942,[x] which divided the task into two phases.

Phase I. Co-operation during initial assault.

S.O.E. will, by the organization and arming of patriot forces, take action generally against the enemy's rail and signal communications, air personnel, etc.

Phase II. Tasks after Landing.

S.O.E. will provide guides for British troops, will enrol personnel for use as guards of vital points and labour parties ..... and will also organize raiding parties capable of penetrating behind the German lines.

The organization of patriot groups for sabotage and action against German communications and personnel in France, Belgium and Holland had already commenced, and S.O.E. was endeavouring to contact larger organizations which were known to exist in a loose form in occupied territories.

From the paper discussed by Brigadier Gubbins in the talks referred to above, the following paragraphs contain the germ of the idea from which the Jedburgh scheme developed:

"As and when the invasion commences, S.O.E. will drop additional small teams of French speaking

/personnel

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personnel carrying arms for some forty men each. The role of these teams will be to make contact with local authorities or existing S.O.E. organizations, to distribute the arms, to start off the action of the patriots, and, most particularly, to arrange by W/T communication the dropping points and reception committees for further arms and equipment on the normal S.O.E. system. Each Team will consist of one British Officer, one W/T operator with set and possibly one guide."

By June 1944, when invasion took place, the "guide" referred to above had become on Officer of the country concerned, the "British Officer" had become a representative of S.H.A.E.F. - i.e. either British or American - but the idea of a Team of three remained, and the vital W/T link with Base still stood. The paper continued:

"At first sight, on the information at present available, it would seem that the first flight of teams should be dropped at the time of invasion up to the extreme limit of the intended bridgehead, with others extending on the right flank into Brittany.*/ This latter area appears to be a special task which requires separate consideration."

"In the later phases of the operations, further teams will be dropped ahead of our advancing troops to act in similar manner ....."

By July 1942, the code name "JEDBURGH" had been allocated to these Teams, and the following excerpts from Report of a Meeting at G.H.Q. Home Forces, attended by B.G.S.(Plans), Colonel Sheetz, U.S.A., and M.G.* 2 on

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* 1. NOT. Operation "Overlord" but limited operations to secure bridgeheads, such as "ROUND UP" and "WET BOB"

2. Lt. Col L.C.F. Nash, staff officer to Brigadier Gubbins.

18 July 1942, indicates the lines on which planning was being carried out.*

"1. It was agreed that planning up to date has not been carried out in sufficient detail to decide exactly where Jedburghs will be required, or in what numbers.

2. In general it was decided:

a) That one group would probably be required in the area MONTREUIL - ST. POL - AMIENS - RIVER SEINE to DIEPPE, where it would be particularly important to interfere as far as possible with the German communications ..... etc.

b) A further group might be required in the area of CAEN.

c) A third group might be required in connection with the diversion in BRITTANY.

3. It was agreed with Colonel Sheetz that the Jedburghs should be provided on the basis of 50% by the British and 50% by the U.S."

For planning purposes SOE were required to work on the basis that Invasion might take place any time after the late summer of 1943).

~~(It must be borne in mind that at this stage it was expected that the invasion of Europe would take place in 1943.)~~

On 22 July 1942, additional information obtained made it possible to define the role of Jedburghs as follows:

a) "A total of 70 teams will be required who will be dropped to make contact with local authorities or existing S.O.E. organizations, in order to distribute arms, start off the action of the patriots, and to arrange by W/T the dropping points and reception committees for the receipt of further arms and equipment. It is probable that these teams will

* See note #1 on previous page.

/be

be required to organize the patriots so as to be able to interfere as far as possible with all means of communication the Germans are likely to be employing in certain areas."

b) "50% of the teams will be composed of British personnel and 50% of U.S. personnel. All teams will operate in either British or U.S. uniform."

Meetings were held at this stage between the various departments of SOE concerned to examine the

Steps were also taken to explore the possibilities of obtaining suitable personnel for this work. During August, a number of officers and other ranks were interviewed, but very few were found to have the right qualities. The conclusion was reached that without special priority it would not be possible to get the right men.

[illegible] main training, and was able to concentrate on the task of assisting the initial assault by operating behind the enemy's lines.

In September 1942, a meeting was held at G.H.Q. Home Forces to discuss the organization for planning operations requiring joint action by the R.A.F., S.O.E. and Airborne Troops in support of major operations planned by the Combined Planning Staff for the Combined Commanders. Nothing however became of this as Airborne Troops became absorbed in other interest and the officer enquired to work with he bol-Wash never was available.

By the end of 1942, the plans for the use of Jedburgh Teams may, therefore, be summarized as follows:

a) Personnel. Equal numbers of British and American personnel consisting of Officers and W/T operators.

b) Employment. To assist the main landing of Allied Forces on the continent by action behind the enemy lines:

i) By contacting local patriot groups and existing organizations to give incentive to guerilla action directed against the enemy lines of communication, personnel,

/etc.

etc., and to distribute arms.

ii) By W/T communication to arrange dropping points and reception committees for the receipt of further arms and supplies.

iii) In giving assistance to airborne forces by contact with patriot organizations and knowledge of local conditions.

*

1943

In the spring of 1943, S.O.E. co-operated with Regular troops in a large scale Army Exercise - Exercise "SPARTAN". For the purpose of this History, the main interest in this

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The Conception of Jedburghs as evolved and contemplated in 1942 was limited by the background of Resistance as it existed then. Arms were negligible in quantity; contacts and communications were few and in many places non-existent. If Resistance is to be directed and coordinated at all it would be necessary to send in Jedburghs as part of the invasion plan with the task of organising and directing the population into groups. Only later as the Resistance organisations and contact with them developed did it become possible to consider putting wide scale plans into Operation without Jedburgh helps. It was then that Jedburghs came to be regarded as an Operational reserve.

second-in-command, who may or may not be an Officer, and a wireless operator, at selected points behind the enemy lines in the path of the Allied advance. These parties would be followed by arms for the local population and W/T sets for communication with S.O.E. Headquarters in England and S.O.E. Staffs at Allied Headquarters. Points at which parties would be dropped will be ones which will be likely to fall into Allied

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ii) By W/T communication to arrange dropping points and reception committees for the receipt of further arms and supplies.

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*

1943

In the spring of 1943, S.O.E. co-operated with Regular troops in a large scale Army Exercise - Exercise "SPARTAN". For the purpose of this History, the main interest in this Exercise is to show how far the Jedburgh scheme was tried out.

A meeting was held on 18 December 1942 and the following excerpts from the Agenda (ADL/481 of 16 December 1942) [x] indicate the lines on which it was proposed to work.

ADL/481 Para. 4.

The Extent to which the Jedburgh Scheme can be tried out.

a) Summary of the Jedburgh Scheme.

This scheme involves the dropping of a number of small parties consisting of a British Officer, a second-in-command, who may or may not be an Officer, and a wireless operator, at selected points behind the enemy lines in the path of the Allied advance. These parties would be followed by arms for the local population and W/T sets for communication with S.O.E. Headquarters in England and S.O.E. Staffs at Allied Headquarters. Points at which parties would be dropped will be ones which will be likely to fall into Allied

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hands within a period of from 48 to 72 hours of the parties being dropped. The role of the Jedburgh parties will be to organize resistance among the local inhabitants in such a way as to render assistance to the Allied advance, or for selected coups de main.

b) Co-operation with the R.A.F.

It is unlikely that it will be possible on this Exercise to drop Jedburgh parties from aircraft. It may, however, be possible for Jedburgh parties to mark out and indicate to the R.A.F. grounds suitable for dropping stores, and the practicability of this should be considered.

c) Introduction of Personnel

It should be possible to introduce Jedburgh parties at given points behind the enemy lines, and the extent to which this can be done should be considered together with the best way of putting the parties into operation.

d) Communications

It would appear quite possible to operate Signal communications between Jedburgh parties and S.O.E. staffs at formation Headquarters. The extent to which this should be done, together with the degree of contact which can be maintained with S.O.E. Headquarters in London, must be worked out.

e) Local Groups

It is doubtful how far the co-operation of local groups can be depicted; but it is suggested that little value will be obtained from the Exercise if they are not represented on the ground. It is

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obvious that Jedburghs will be unable to organize villagers. It is doubtful whether they would be able to utilize the local Home Guard. It is possible, however, that suitable personnel could be found from S.O.E. or Army sources or Auxiliary Units.

At a preliminary meeting held at G.H.Q. Home Forces on 24 December 1942, it was accepted that S.O.E. should participate in Exercise "SPARTAN" along the lines indicated above - and that 12 Jedburgh Teams should take part - and a meeting on 19 January 1943 (Plans/312/656) prepared a Draft letter for despatch (see Appendix I.A.) for issue by G.H.Q. Home Forces to Lieutenant General McNaughton, G.O.C. 1st Canadian Army, commanding the "British" forces, and to the Battalion nominated to provide personnel to take part as "Local Groups" - (Appendix I.B.) The code name BOYKIN was later allotted to describe those representing S.O.E. 'agents' taking part in "SPARTAN".

Training of personnel and detailed planning of the Jedburgh part in "SPARTAN" went on during January and February 1943. Personnel for Teams were found from within S.O.E. and by the Fighting French and the Belgians. The idea of Jedburghs was sold to the French, Belgian and also indirectly to the Dutch including teams of foreign nationality. The Exercise commenced on 5 March 1943 and terminated on 12 March 1943. All the 11 Teams available were sent out by 0900 hours on 11 March, and every Team contacted and joined up with its group - representing local patriots, and were in varying degrees successful in carrying out the tasks for which they were briefed - demolitions, prevention of demolitions, attacks on Headquarters, dislocation of lines of communication and general guerilla warfare.

Attached at Appendix I.C. is a copy of Plans/312/195

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The most important conclusions reached, as far as the

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a)

Further results of this Exercise were:-

(a) That the French and Belgians were persuaded of the value of Jedburghs

(b) The attachment to SOE's Exercise Spartan staff of Majors Canfield and Stacey Lloyd of OSS ensured that the Americans also were properly indoctrinated in the idea, imbued them with enthusiasm and made it possible for them to put the project to Washington and ultimately recruit the necessary personnel.

e) Most important - It was realized that in order to secrete their containers, set-up W/T set, etc.,

(c). To discover how far it was feasible to send a Jedburgh team to demolish a target like a bridge having only such information about it as can be gained from a study of maps, air photos and possibly a knowledge of local engineering practice. There was at the time much loose talk about sending a Jedburgh team to demolish a bridge at X. Dachshund proved that one needed to know a great deal about the target if one was to have a chance of success and that Jedburghs ought not to be sent off to attack conjectural or little known targets.

of 6 April 1943, which was prepared as a result of experience gained during "SPARTAN".

The most important conclusions reached, as far as the development of the Jedburgh scheme is concerned, were:

a) That either the Commander or the second-in-command should be of the nationality of the country in which the Team is to operate. This entailed recruitment of French, Belgian and Dutch personnel.

b) The whole Team are soldiers and wear uniform.

c) If possible, Team should be dropped to an area where S.O.E. agents are ready to receive them.

d) The Team is allotted one or more tasks to further the military plans, and dropped, together with a suitable scale of arms, etc. near to their operational area.

e) Most important - it was realized that in order to secrete their containers, set-up W/T set, etc., at least 72 hours would usually elapse between the time at which the Commander approves a task, and that at which the Jedburgh could start to operate, and that, therefore, tasks of immediate tactical importance should not normally be allotted to Jedburghs. *

As a corollary to this, it was appreciated that the small Jedburgh team would be most effective in conjunction with local groups. In the German forward areas, the local inhabitants would be under strict surveillance, and that local groups would be more likely to be forthcoming in areas well back from the German front line.

This conclusion implies that the use of Jedburgh Teams was now becoming rather more 'strategic' than was at first foreseen. The Teams would be required to operate for

/German

~~German lines for~~ some considerable period before signal being overrun by Allied Troops, communication being maintained throughout, so that fresh orders, supplies, etc. could be sent to the field and dropping points arranged. The importance of the guerilla warfare they could organize and lead was apparent, and they should be despatched to dislocate the enemy's lines of communication and attack his Headquarters and installations in the rear rather than to undertake tasks of immediate tactical importance.

Attached at Appendix I.D. is a Diagram (issued as Appendix C. to Plans/312/997 of 18 March 1943) showing the proposed S.O.E. Communications lay-out in the event of re-invasion of the Continent - including the Jedburgh link. Also attached, at Appendix I.E., is a summary of "Tasks for Jedburghs" (issued as Appendix E. to Plans/312/997 of 18 March 1943).

It was also agreed that coup de main targets could be better and more quickly attacked by a number of well disciplined, fit and trained paratroops than by the small Jedburgh Team, but that, on the other hand, where results might depend on observation or action night after night, the Jedburgh Team - covered by the "local group", who could pursue their normal occupations in the daytime - was the better weapon to use and the more likely to survive the required length of time. What was required of the Jedburgh Team was to provide:

a) W/T operator and set.

b) Special arms and equipment and the knowledge of how to use them.

c) Leadership for patriot forces - if local leaders were lacking.

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The organization of these Jedburgh Teams as a post D-Day reserve in the hands of S.O.E. now became the subject of detailed planning within S.O.E. and between S.O.E. and outside authorities. Both SOE and OSS had a hard struggle to recruit the necessary personnel and only succeeded after the approval of GHQ Home Forces and the C.G. ETOUSA had been obtained.

This included investigation into the best methods of equipping, training and recruiting these Teams.

Exercise "DACHSUND" was set by M/T and carried out by personnel of Stations IX. and XII.:

a) To discover how far a Jedburgh Team, assisted by a local group, is likely to be able to demolish a bridge without previous reconnaissance, and

b) To find out whether the standard Jedburgh container, used on Exercise "SPARTAN", is likely to be the most suitable available from the technical point of view.

(c). *

As a result, some alterations in the standard equipment were suggested. "Dachshund" was a good exercise and an interesting example of cooperation between SOE, MT and the General Staff.

In September 1943, it was decided that training of Jedburgh personnel should commence on 1 January 1944 and that one school should be set up to accommodate 300 students, and 150 - 200 permanent staff.

The decision to have a separate school for Jedburghs was made mainly on security grounds. It was considered that for their own safety, in case of capture, the Jedburghs should not be associated, or associate themselves, with the organization known to the enemy as S.T.S. The cover name of "Allied Commando School" was decided on, and it was also to be known as M.E. 65 - not S.T.S. 65. After a thorough search by the Properties Section, Milton Hall, Peterborough, was decided on as the most suitable premises for M.E. 65, and this was taken over with effect from 1 November 1943.

ME 65 was a joint British/American establishment, although at the time of its inception the American representation was slight.

/On

On 10 September 1943, a general directive on the requirements of the training of Jedburghs was issued, (This is attached at Appendix I.F. Ref. DRA/1246 of 10 September 1943) to enable the Training and Signals sections to work out detailed programmes and establishments.

On 12 October 1943, ADE issued a directive on Jedburgh Procedure (attached at Appendix I.G. Ref. ADE/900 of 12 October 1943). This set out the general procedure to be followed when the decision should be made by ADE that to implement an existing policy, or carry out action demanded by the Army, the despatch of a Jedburgh Team would be required.

The DR/JED Section was set up at S.O.E. Headquarters in London to work out details with the appropriate sections in S.O.E. of organization for despatch, equipment to be carried and arms and containers to be taken, administration and pay of personnel, requirements of the signal plans and equipment, and recruitment.

It was decided that all Officers should go before the 205 Selection Board at Stodham Park, Liss. This Board was not empowered to fail American personnel, but they were to be subjected to exactly the same tests as British Officers and graded accordingly:

A - Outstanding

B - Good

C - Fair

D - Indifferent

and the Board, in making their reports, were instructed freely to record their opinion as to the suitability of a candidate for the work of a Jedburgh. (For further details of recruitment see Chapter 2, Section 3 "Organization of a Team.")

/Exhaustive

Brigadier E.E. Mockler-Ferryman, CBE, MC, director of the London Group, covering operations in North West EUROPE

Exhaustive tests carried out by the Signals Section resulted in the building of a specially designed Receiver and Transmitter, which came to be known as the Jed Set. This consisted of a transmitter driven by a special hand generator, together with a midget communication receiver which worked from dry batteries.

Performance: Limit of Range - 600 miles.
Transmission possible only in daylight.
Reception possible at all times.

Weight: Entire equipment with one spare battery - 30 lbs.
Extra batteries - 3 lbs each.

This would give a life of 60 working hours for each station.

Suitable codes were also being worked out for the use of Jedburghs in the field.

It was decided that all British personnel were to receive Pay and Allowances from Army funds, this being considered preferable from a security point of view and less complicated in the event of any member of a Team becoming a casualty. The pay of Jedburghs of other nationalities was the responsibility of the authorities of the country concerned. It was later arranged that British personnel, regardless of rank, should also receive 5/- per day "Special Pay" from secret sources, in order to bring their rate of pay more into line with the higher rates received by their comrades of other nationalities who were being paid as "Agents", and the normally higher rate of the Americans.

As a summary of all this detailed planning throughout 1943, a paper on Jedburghs prepared jointly by S.O.E./S.O. and the SO Branch of OSS, London,

/was

was circulated to all concerned by AD/E on 20 December 1943 (attached at Appendix I.H. Ref. ADE/603 of 20 December 1943).

Recruitment of personnel commenced in the latter half of 1943 and throughout December 1943 the first candidates were drafted to the 205 Selection Board. Training commenced on 1 January 1944 (see below).

Conclusions

The original conception of the composition of a Jedburgh Team and its function had changed by the time the scheme came to be implemented in one or two vital respects.

a) Personnel. The Teams were to consist now of two Officers - one British or American, and one National of the Country.

b) Employment.

i) The principal function of the Team was now planned to be liaison with the Resistance groups, to convey to them the orders of the High Command, and act as a focus for local resistance.

ii) As a general rule, it was foreseen that they would not be dropped in the immediate area of the bridgehead, but well behind the enemy lines, and in areas where there were known to be actual or potential resistance elements - to organize, equip and instruct these groups in the use of arms and stores, provide W/T communication, and, where necessary, leadership.

Their role was not now to be primarily for coups de main, nor for use for tasks of immediate tactical importance -

/but

but one involving more knowledge of the characteristics of the patriot forces, more tact and powers of leadership - and aimed principally at making the fullest use of the Underground forces to assist the main Allied landing.

This final conception of the composition and function of a Jedburgh Team was that on which recruiting and training were based, and in the main, they were finally employed for the purposes outlined.

II. FORMATION OF JEDBURGH TEAMS

A. Type of Officer

The Jedburghs being intended to form a reserve of trained personnel to be at the disposal of ~~AD/E~~ and ADE/US to carry out tasks in support of military operations as requested by S.H.A.E.F., or to give support to Resistance forces already in the field in execution of such tasks - the type of Officer required was mid-way between the Agent type and the "coup de main" type. An Officer able to adjust himself to conditions of clandestine warfare for a period, if necessary, and acquainted with the potentialities of the clandestine Resistance forces, but also an Officer accustomed to commanding men in action, of some administrative ability, and able to organize and lead, if necessary, a military operation involving a small number of men and designed to attack a specific objective or harass enemy troop movements within a specified area.

B. Qualifications required.

The qualifications required in an Officer recruited to carry out the Jedburgh role can, therefore, be summarized as follows:

a) A good general knowledge of the history of the Resistance forces of the country to which he was to be sent, and an interest in their potentialities and the best uses to which they could be put.

b) A solid groundwork of military training and tactics, involving the deployment of small numbers of men (equivalent of a Company).

c) A good knowledge of small arms and the ability to instruct in the use and maintenance

/of

of rifle, sten, pistol and certain A/Tk. weapons.

d) A general knowledge of explosives and their uses for demolition purposes.

e) A working knowledge of the language of the Country.

f) A working knowledge of wireless and of code and cypher.

It was intended that much of the knowledge indicated above should be imparted during training, and in recruitment of Jedburgh Officers the "qualities" ~~sort~~ sought, rather than actual "qualifications" were:

a) Ability to mix well with others, particularly with other Nationalities, and a general intelligent sympathy with the problems of other Nations, with particular regard to the way these would affect the military situation.

b) Ability to take a quick and intelligent grasp of any situation that might arise, and to make a decision as to best course of action to pursue.

c) The ability to absorb information and learn what was required within a reasonably short period of training.

d) A.1. physical fitness, and ability to endure possibly extremely hard conditions, and the necessity for continual vigilance and frequent movement, probably mostly by night.

e) The ability to command and lead others and to pass on knowledge gained in training to those who might later come under his command.

C. Organization of a Team

In order to be able to fit in best with the requirements of "OVERLORD", the majority of Officers were recruited with

/a

a view to work in France. War Establishment allowed for 60 British Officers and 40 W/T operators (see Appendix II.A. Ref. 79/W.E./8499(S.D.3.) of 24 February 1944). (The two G.S.O.II. vacancies shown on the War Establishment were not allocated to operational personnel.) It was aimed to recruit an equal number of American Officers and W/T operators, and about 100 French Officers. It was also estimated that six Dutch and six Belgian Officers would be required. It was thus designed to create a reserve of 75 Jedburgh Teams for France, six for Holland and six for Belgium, with some 10 - 12 teams in reserve and to allow for possible casualties and failures during training. Each recruit went before a Students Assessment Board for testing and grading as to suitability for the work (see Appendix II.B. Example of S.A.B. Report). For each quality a student would be marked + or - by the Board, and finally assessed as Grade A., B., C. or D. No Class D. students were accepted for training, and the majority of those accepted were graded A. or B.

The composition of each Team was to be two Officers and one W/T operator - holding the rank of Serjeant, if British or American, and S/Lieutenant, if French. ~~Of the two Officers of a Team, one was to represent S.H.A.E.F. (i.e. either British or American)~~ The British or American Officer of the Team was to represent S.H.A.E.F. and the other to be a National of the Country in which the Team was to work - to represent the armed forces of that Country fighting with the Allies, and to provide direct contact with the underground forces, when they were called upon to take an active part in military operations. (These Officers were ~~to be equal in~~ and were directly responsible to S.F. Headquarters, and to the appropriate Subordinate HQ of S.H.A.E.F.) This differed from the original conception. Both of equal standing

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For this reason, every effort was made, when the Teams were formed, to allow Officers to choose with whom they would work, and all advanced training was done working as a Team and with the W/T operator with whom they would go to the field.

The chief qualification required of a W/T operator was, above all, that he should be good at his job. It was realized that upon the system of communications might depend the success or failure of the work of a Team. The operator was also required to be physically fit, and beyond that to be as generally useful as possible in the handling of weapons and any other matters in which he might be called on to take part when not actually engaged in working his set.

D. Actual Material found to meet Requirements

a) British Officers. Many of these were volunteers for special work, recruited from S.O.E. sources in the Middle East, trained for work in the Balkans, but who/owing to the change in the political situation were now redundant. These Officers returned to the U.K. to go before the S.A.B. in December/January 1944. The majority of these Recruits were accepted for training. Others were recruited from among S.O.E. training instructors and Staff Officers, and some from other military formations as a result of a Circular sent out by War Office Personnel Branches to all formations of U.K. other than those in 21 Army Group; but the majority were recruited from S.O.E. sources.

b) American Officers. Recruited by OSS/SO and also subject to the S.A.B. tests. The Board was

/composed

composed of both British and American Officers and was located at S.T.S. 3.

c) French Officers. It was found difficult to recruit sufficient numbers of French Officers from the resources at the disposal of B.R.A.L. in the U.K. At one time, it appeared that the success of the scheme was jeopardized by the failure of the French to produce a sufficient number of Officers in time to undergo training and get to know their British and American comrades. For this reason, in February 1944, Major Turquet and a representative of O.S.S. went to North Africa to interview and select volunteers for this work from the French Colonial forces, and a good response was obtained - the Officers thus recruited being of an almost uniformly high standard of training and character.

d) Belgian and Dutch Officers. These were selected by the authorities of the countries concerned, and were subject to the same Assessment Board.

e) Wireless Operators. No Belgian or Dutch operators were recruited. It was aimed to recruit 40 British, 40 American and 12 French - the latter in such small proportion owing to the shortage of trained French personnel.

The material found during the course of recruitment resulted, after training, in the formation of about 60% Teams graded as first class, 25% Teams reaching a good average performance on final exercises, and 15% Teams of slightly less high standard, and to whom Tasks of first grade importance would not be allotted unless in

/emergency.

emergency.

These final results speak for themselves as to the success of method of recruiting and selection outlined above.

III. TRAINING

General.

As has been stated, training commenced in the first week of January 1944. The object of the training was to develop in the students the qualifications outlined above and initially to produce individual Officers trained in general military principles up to the standard of Company Commanders - with, at the same time, a sufficient knowledge of clandestine work and the possibilities of Resistance activities. Subsequently, the object was to produce a Jedburgh team, trained both as individuals and as a team, and capable of co-ordinating and controlling Resistance activities in any area to which they might be assigned.

The Basic Programme.

(Syllabus of Training, Six Weeks Course, attached in detail at Appendix III.A.) This was laid down on the lines indicated in ADE/603 Paras. 15 and 16 of 20 December 1944, and based on the normal Para-military programme that had been taught to students passing through S.T.S. (ADE/603 attached at Appendix I.H. to Part I.) It commenced in January 1944 at three schools - each of which represented the nucleus of one Company. (These Companies were purely for training and administrative purposes, and consisted of approximately sixty Officers in each.) At this stage, the W/T operators were receiving their training at the Signals Schools. This stage of the training lasted between six and eight weeks, and during it a move was made to M.E. 65, where all Companies were finally assembled by the second week of February. (The fact that M.E. 65 was not ready for students at the commencement of

/their

their training was regrettable, and made the co-ordination of the training programmes and the administration a more difficult task.)

The detailed programme included the following subjects:

a) Parachute Training. All students went through the course at S.T.S. 51 during the early stages of their training, and each man completed three jumps, and later schemes included training jumps made under conditions as like to operational conditions as possible.

b) Demolitions. General principles, and the handling of all types of equipment which might be used in the field.

c) Weapon Training. (Pistol, Sten, Bren and Rifle). A greater proportion of periods were devoted to this subject than in the normal para-military course, as it was considered essential that each Officer should not only be expert in the use of such weapons, but also be able to teach members of the Maquis how to handle them.

d) Map Reading. Normal map reading principles were taught with extra emphasis laid on cross country marches by day and night. In most cases this was a "refresher", as most Officers were already trained in this subject.

e) P.T. and Silent Killing. Special stress was laid on endurance training by cross country runs, etc.

f) Minor Tactics. At this stage, training was given in the handling of small groups, based on the British Army Section, but covering work of a more specialized nature such as raids on enemy Headquarters, Coups de Main attacks, etc.

/This

This training was designed to fit in with instruction in fieldcraft, appreciation and planning of attacks and the issue of orders. Much importance was attached to the ability of students to plan their own attack, after reconnaissance made by themselves, as it was foreseen that in the Field, most of the decisions as to attacks would have to be taken on the Jedburgh's own responsibility.

Thus, at the end of six weeks, students were capable of planning and executing operations by small groups in the field, using the standard equipment available.

During all this time, and even at later stages in the Training, new students, (the greatest proportion of them being Frenchmen from North Africa, the recruitment of whom is referred to elsewhere) were arriving. Consequently, these Officers had to receive special instruction to enable them to reach the same standard as the students who had been there since the start of the Course.

At the end of the first six weeks, additional subjects were included in the training. These covered Reception Committee work, Study of the German Army; and the first "Jed Talks" from people newly returned from the field were also given. A list of the lectures given is attached at Appendix III.B., and also attached is a summary of Speech made by Brigadier Mockler-Ferryman to all students on 10 March 1944, outlining the tasks they might be called on to perform (see Appendix III.C.). These Jed Talks were designed to give a picture of operations and conditions in the field. Two examples were:

a) A talk on an operation in Greece involving the blowing up of a large bridge, and

b) A talk on conditions and organizations of some of the Maquis groups in France, illustrated

/by

by a film taken mostly in the Haute Savoie and Massif Central.

Officers from Headquarters also visited the school to lecture on particular aspects of operations, and to explain the planning and administration on this side of the Channel, and the execution on the other side.

Although, in general, the basic training was completed at the end of two months, certain subjects in which continual practice was necessary, such as Weapon Training, P.T., and practical demolitions, were included in the programme right up to the time when Teams were being sent on operations.

Advanced Training.

From the end of February 1944, training took on a new aspect. It was now designed to train students up to the level of Company Commanders, and to begin operating as Teams. After observation on schemes, provisional "teaming up" took place, and students were given an opportunity of finding out if their Team would be likely to work successfully. More advanced individual training was given, but Teams now attended lectures together as a Team (including the W/T operator). The new subjects taught included Foreign Weapons and ammunition - an Officer who was expert in these was attached to the Staff of the School for a long period - and many Jedburgh Officers later commented on how useful this part of their training proved in practice, as a high percentage of their Maquis groups were equipped with captured enemy weapons.

Other subjects were Mines, "S" phone and Eureka, and the Landing and Reception of Dakota and Lysander aircraft; the use of A/Tank Weapons, including P.I.A.T. and Bazooka,

/and

Postage.

But see also page 4 of chapter EMPLOYMENT

Total of

101 Edinburgh Teams

8 from U.K in support of Overlord.

51 from North Africa " "

20 from North Africa in Support of landing in S of France

teams from U.K to Holland

5/6th June 44

Hodgkinson 28/29 Baker 44

and firing the .30 calibre U.S. Carbine (with which students were eventually issued for operations), and the handling of 2-inch mortar and the U.S. Army Garand Rifle.

Morse, Coding and Ciphering, and the use of the Jed W/T Set were also taught, but this was a large subject and will be described in detail later.

Miscellaneous instruction also covered an agent's work in the field, and "living off the land" (see Memorandum attached at Appendix III.D.) with practical demonstrations of killing animals, etc., and for schemes students were issued with the "Rations" with which they were later provided for operations.

This advanced training and the making up of Teams who were given opportunities of working together on schemes, was carried out up to the time of "D"-Day, at which time the majority of students were actually taking part in a large scale scheme in the area of Leicester. (Attached at Appendix III.E. is a summary of these Schemes and the subjects they were designed to teach.)

During these Schemes, the usual practice was for the unit to be divided into:

a) Partisans

b) Gestapo

c) Jedburgh Teams

the latter operating in what was intended to be their future role. Students were given the opportunity of handling a number of men, from a small group to a Company, during operations, such as coups de main attacks, ambushes and reception committees. The Schemes and Exercises usually lasted from one week to ten days and everything was done to simulate conditions in the field as realistically as possible, by using the Home Guard as "enemy" and by making the Jedburghs

/live

live on such resources as they had with them. Also, owing to distances involved, a great many forced marches by day and night were included, such as might result from counter measures by German troops.

In the case of the Teams training for Holland, a special fortnight's course in small boat work was arranged at Group A. as part of their advanced training, and the students also spent a week at Dutch Headquarters to get an overall picture of conditions in Holland.

Signals Training

This Section is to be written by an Officer of the Signals Section, by order of D/SIGS.

Observations on Jedburgh Training.

The chief difficulties encountered at the outset were that not only were students of different Nationalities, but also of different arms of the Service, and of different stages of experience. Some had already had combat experience, or were highly trained Infantry Officers; others had not had much experience, or had come from Arms where infantry training was not given much consideration. As Jedburghs, all students were treated and trained on the same level. This produced some misunderstanding, and a lack of enthusiasm on the part of some students who considered their time was being wasted. Also, some misunderstanding was caused through attempts to regiment the students as a body when the essence of their work was to be one of individual initiative and resource.

These difficulties were overcome during the later stages by a certain amount of re-organization, and the advanced schemes and exercises gave experienced Officers a chance to use their knowledge and impart it to others.

/It

It has been suggested that even greater attention should have been paid to infantry instruction, as reports from the field and actual experience of the Teams showed that the training and handling of troops in combat was one of the most important aspects of Jedburgh work. Also, it has been suggested that even more stress should be laid on training in foreign weapons and mines, as - as was foreseen to a certain extent - guerillas frequently have to provide themselves with weapons from enemy sources, and also are often in a position to interfere with enemy mindfields.

Physical fitness and stamina, both from a mental and morale point of view, was proved to be of vital importance. Guerilla leaders most undoubtedly should be capable of marching great distances under adverse conditions, and training both of mind and body should work to this end.

In spite of the difficulties of finding the exact and effective training to fit the Jedburghs to cope with every problem that could arise in the field, it is fair to say that in the final result, the training, in general, was proved successful by the amount and quality of the work achieved.

If the training in itself could not produce a student capable of accurate and lightning decisions in every situation that arose, it did at least give each man a practical approach to problems, and this added to the fact that students were, in a sense, 'hand-picked' and selected by the S.A.B. for their keenness and commonsense, and to the fine spirit which undoubtedly existed at M.E. 65 during the later stages of training, proved its value time and again.

/Perhaps

The selection of a Commandant capable of commanding the respect of students of mixed nationality and widely differing military knowledge, was an exceedingly difficult and important task. The appointment of Lt.-Col. F.V. Spooner, a well-trained and experienced regular officer with years of tradition behind him, nearly jeopardised the success of the project. He was replaced by Lt.-Col. Musgrave, a British officer who combined the qualities which appealed to the spirited individualists the men were encouraged to be with an invaluable store of knowledge of work behind enemy-lines, gained while serving as a Chindit.

The Second-in-Command was American; Major H.W. Fuller filled this post until he became a member of a Jedburgh team and was succeeded by Major McLallen,

Perhaps more than anything the continued stress laid on simulating actual conditions in the field during schemes and exercises paid dividends. This, and the technical efficiency of each man in the use of his weapons, combined with physical fitness, resulted in the building up of a great and calm confidence among the Jedburghs, both in themselves and in their Team. This eliminated largely in action that dangerous period of "acclimatization" between the start of an operation and becoming "au fait" with the local conditions.

Attached at Appendix III.F. are Nominal Rolls of all Students who completed the Jedburgh training.

M.E. 65.

This was a unique and experimental establishment. It was both a Training and a Holding School for Jedburghs, and was run by a combined British/American Command and Staff. The Officer Commanding was British (Lieutenant Colonel Spooner, and later, Lieutenant Colonel Musgrave). The Second-in-Command was American (Major Fuller - succeeded by Major McLallen). The Administration was in the hands of a British Adjutant, assisted by an American administrative Officer and a British Quartermaster. The Instructional Staff was both British and American. In addition, B.R.A.L. provided four French Officers as Interpreters.

This set-up naturally had its difficulties and teething troubles, but these were discussed at Conferences and overcome by a real desire on all sides to make the experiment succeed. That it did so in the main is shown by the desire often expressed by both Staff and Students to maintain the spirit of this Establishment, and that those who took part in this experiment may not lose touch with one another. The majority of the British personnel

/involved

involved and also of the French, have later volunteered for service under similar conditions, and the same command, in the Far East, and many of the American personnel also wished to carry on, and parted with regret on all sides. Attached at Appendix III.G. is a copy of promulgated War Esbablishment for M.E. 65.

DR/JED Section and its Function.

The DR/JED Section was set up at S.F. Headquarters to work under the command of DR and to provide a link between the Jedburgh School and S.F. Headquarters. It consisted of a British Lieutenant Colonel, with an American Major (DR/JED.US), a Staff Captain (A. & Q.) and six "Briefing Officers" - two British, two American and two French. (Owing to the fact that the French were not fully integrated until after D-Day, the French Briefing Officers were not posted to DR/JED Section at the outset.) (Attached at Appendix III.H. is Nominal Roll of DR/JED Section as at D-Day, 6 June 1944.)

The Section provided a channel between M.E. 65 and the Administrative Sections of S.O.E. and O.S.S. for all matters concerned with the direction of personnel, stores and equipment, provision of lecturers from Headquarters, etc., and was responsible to DR for indicating the general lines on which operational training should be carried out. This had been originally planned, etc. through MT (see ADE/900 attached at Appendix I.G.). Though the Instructors at M.E. 65 were selected and provided by MT, the School was not under the direction of the Training Section.

When the period of training was over and Jedburghs became operational, it was to DR/JED that a request for a Team for a specific Task was made by DR, and DR/JED, in consultation with O.C. M.E. 65, selected the Team for the

/Task,

Task, issued a "Warning Order" (see Appendix III.J.), allocated a Briefing Officer and arranged with the Country Section(s) concerned for preparation of the Brief, etc.

The DR/HED Briefing Officer was then responsible, in consultation with AL Section, for the despatch of this Team, and ensuring that the Team had all the necessary equipment.

It was also the function of the Briefing Officer to brief the Team, and be prepared to answer any questions that arose during the course of this Briefing.

DR/JED Section had at its disposal a house - 46, Devonshire Close, - to which Teams under orders for the field were despatched from M.E. 65 with all personal equipment. On arrival at the Briefing House, the Team came under the charge of the Briefing Officer, and were accommodated there until their departure for the field.

A Briefing Room was arranged, and a store of maps laid in before operations commenced, in order that the conditions for Briefing should be as favourable as possible. In actual practice the House proved far too small. The number of Teams in London for Briefing at one time was often greater than had been foreseen; personnel had to be accommodated elsewhere, and as it was impossible to brief more than one Team at a time in the Briefing Room, parties overflowed on to stairs and in bedrooms, and it was often extremely difficult to find anywhere quiet to work. In view of the vital work these Teams were to undertake, this was a grave drawback. The Briefing Officers and Country Section Officers were overworked, and the desired atmosphere of calm, and time in which to answer questions and check equipment was not always obtained.

When the command of operations in France was transferred to E.M.F.F.I., the DR/JED Section continued to form a link

/between

between M.E. 65 and General Koenig's Headquarters for all matters concerning Jedburgh Teams for operations in France (though continuing under command of S.F. Headquarters for metters concerning Belgium and Holland). Owing to the confusion that of necessity arose in many quarters on the transfer of command, the function of DR/JED Section became even more vital, as though the command was French, all matters of supply or re-supply, transport and W/T communication continued under British/ American control.

IV. MITCHELL PLAN.

While the training and formation of Jedburgh Teams was proceeding at M.E. 65, S.O.E./ So ~~Headquarters~~, in conjunction with B.R.A.L., organized a Mission - known as Mission ECLAIREUR - to organize Reception Committees, parachute grounds and safe houses for Jedburgh Teams. The plan on which this Mission was to work was known as the MITCHELL PLAN. It was intended primarily to arrange to use the Maquis groups in the area in which it was considered most probable that Jedburgh operations would be required, for the selection of grounds for parachute operations, and training personnel for reception committees. Secondarily, the Mission was to create independently of all pre-existing Resistance organizations, a framework of people to seek out safe houses and parachute grounds for the use of Jedburgh Teams.

The man chosen for this Mission was a Frenchman - Jean Millet - and he left the U.K. with a woman radio operator on the night of 2/3 March 1944. A further radio operator was held at Millet's disposal in the U.K. and was despatched to the field at his request on 5 April 1944. A Map is attached at Appendix IV.A. indicating the area in which Millet was to arrange for dropping grounds and Reception Committees to be prepared.

Millet returned to the U.K. on 9 April 1944 to report on his Mission. He had succeeded in contacting PONTCARRAL, Delegate of the Comité d'Action, from which the Maquis organization took its orders. PONTCARRAL undertook to collect the information and to look for the necessary personnel to carry out the first part of the plan. Millet, himself, visited the regions of the Ardennes,

/Aube

Aube and Yonne, and he reported that there appeared to be a large number of 'refractaires' (escapees from work in Germany) living a clandestine life, with whom contact already existed, or could be made, so as they could co-operate with military action after "D"-Day.

PONTCARRAL was to undertake the formation of 100 - 120 groups of 100 men divided into parties of six or ten and drawn from men belonging to the different resistance movements, and a small staff was set up with whom Millet worked out the practical details. (Millet's Note on this part of the work is attached at Appendix IV.B.) Over and above the formation of these 100 groups, it was decided to choose 100 parachute grounds in the vicinity of the assembly points of these groups, and to select Reception Committees from among the members of the groups themselves. The Comité d'Action undertook to have the plan completed by 15 May 1944.

As regards the second part of his Mission - to create a framework of safe houses and dropping grounds independently of existing organizations - Millet contacted various friends who had not been compromised by former activities. He chose one as leader, to whom he gave the name of "MONTESQUIEU" and divided the area into three Regions under him. These Regions were entrusted to a priest, known to us as "XAVIER", and to "CARLOS" and "EMILE".

On his return, Millet left his two radio operators installed with contact with PONTCARRAL and KLEBER and others arranged through an agent "FERDINAND". (The woman operator was later arrested and taken to Germany. She was liberated in the course of the American advance and returned to the U.K. in May 1945.)

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In order to assure the prospective holders of safe houses and members of reception groups of his "bona fide", and that the plan was organized on orders from London, a series of "Mitchell phrases" were arranged and sent out on B.B.C. programmes at definite intervals, or on request from the field.

Millet was careful throughout his Mission not to disclose to PONTCARRAL, or others, that the areas in which they were asked to make these arrangements were the areas with which we were mainly concerned, ~~and so~~ ××

×× It was not, of course, possible to disclose to Millet the area of the intended Allied bridgehead and the zone indicated to him for his mission was, of necessity, a wide one.

The Mitchell Plan was never, in fact, implemented as the manner in which operations developed rendered this unnecessary. If, as had been anticipated, the Germans had carried out a purge of Resistance just before D-day, or if Resistance had been severely crippled in certain vital areas, the safe-houses and reception groups prepared by Millet would have proved invaluable.

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but from the beginning of 1944 the London Group of SOE and SO Branch of OSS had been working as a fully integrated staff, known as SOE/SO.

7240/Ops of 23 March 1944 x included the

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SFHQ was represented at SHAEF, at Army Group and Army HQ by SF Staffs. The staffs at Army HQ were capable, when necessary, of detaching components to work with lower formations. These staffs maintained direct W/T communication with SFHQ and through it the requirements of the Allied Commanders were rapid communicated to SFHQ in London. At the same time SFHQ was able, through their staffs, to keep the military headquarters properly informed of the Resistance situation. A Daily Conference was held at 1030 hours, when a resumé of events of the last 24 hours was given, ~~and~~ operational decisions made by one of the Joint Commanders, and the requirement of the field and the military Commanders were considered.

EMPLOYMENT

The general manner in which it was proposed to employ Jedburgh Teams has been indicated in Part I. These Teams formed an operational reserve of trained personnel to be used to establish liaison with and to re-inforce existing Resistance Groups or to organize newly formed Resistance Groups to carry out directives issued by S.H.A.E.F. or 21 Army Group, or to implement an existing policy.

a) Special Force Headquarters

Special Force Headquarters came into being as such on 1 May 1944, * S.H.A.E.F. directive to SOE/SO, Ref. SHAEF/17240/Ops of 23 March 1944 x included the order that "operation OVERLORD is the supreme operation for 1944," and that all efforts would be concentrated towards its success. For this reason, the bulk of Jedburgh Teams were intended for use in France, in support of this supreme operation. Para. 35a of this directive stated: "As a general reserve for use in connection with invasion operations on France and the Low Countries, SOE/SO will recruit, train and hold ready 70 Jedburgh teams to operate in the agreed manner."

This directive was amended by SHAEF/17240/13/Ops of 10 May 1944 as follows: "For 'SOE/SO' or 'SOE/SO Headquarters, London' read 'Special Force Headquarters' throughout."

Special Force Headquarters was commanded by Brigadier Mockler-Ferryman and by Colonel J. Haskell (O.S.S.). It was a fully integrated British/American Headquarters, and included those sections of S.O.E.

/and

x MUS/716. (Copy No. 22)
MUS/705/770 of 9 May 1944.
SHAEF/17100/40/Ops. of 18 April 1944.

and The SO Branch of O.S.S. concerned with operational areas under the command of General Eisenhower.

S.F. H.Q. was represented at S.H.A.E.F. and H.Q. 21 Army Group by S.F. Staffs with formations (Corps) in the field. Through these channels, directions of the High Command were received at S.F. H.Q. The decision as to by which of the means at his disposal these directions were to be implemented, was the responsibility of Brigadier Mockler-Ferryman, or, in his absence, of Colonel Haskell. Their directions were usually issued after the S.F. Headquarters War Room Conference ~~held at 1000 hours daily.~~

If ~~intelligence~~ information from the field reported a ~~gave information of~~ Maquis groups in need of leadership, organization or supplies, no further directive was required, as it was the existing policy that SOE/OSS should organize and control Resistance Groups, and, therefore, a decision could be taken to send a Jedburgh Team and/or supplies to such a Group by Brigadier Mockler-Ferryman or his representative.

b) Etat Major des Forces Françaises de l'Intérieure

x SHAEF/17245/6/5/Ops(A) of 2 June 1944 and its Appendix vested the Command of the F.F.I. in the Commander-in-Chief, French Forces in Great Britain (General Koenig), acting under the Supreme Commander. General Koenig's command was to be exercised through operational directives issued by him to F.F.I. through S.F. H.Q., S.F. H.Q. being responsible to the Supreme Commander for co-ordination and maintenance of all

/resistance

x French Integration - Filed ADE/Reg.

resistance within the Supreme Commander's sphere.

Command of the F.F.I. passed to General Koenig with effect from 6 June 1944.

Many deliberations ensued directed towards the setting up of a Tripartite Staff through which General Koenig could best exercise his command. This "considerable experiment in integration" presented proportionate problems - the command was French, but the matters of supply, maintenance and wireless communication remained a British and American responsibility. The machinery of S.F. H.Q. continued to function until this Tripartite Staff could be set up.

SHAEF/17240/13/Ops(C) of 31 July 1944 was written partly for political reasons and attempted to clarify the ~~laid down the~~ responsibilities of E.M.F.F.I.

This was a combined French/British/American Headquarters commanded by General Koenig.with deputies Major General Redman and Colonel Haskell. This was now the command upon whose decisions operations in connection with French Resistance depended, though S.F. H.Q. remained in being and controlled operations in all other countries concerned.

The Jedburgh Section was actually transferred to the command of E.M.F.F.I., as the majority of Jedburgh Teams were employed in France; but, as far as Jedburgh operations to Belgium or Holland were concerned, S.F. H.Q. was still the responsible Command.

c) <u>Special Projects Operation Centre</u>

G.3 SPOC had been formed as a combined Headquarters,

/controlling

controlling resistance in the South Zone of France. It was formed from the S.O.E. Algiers Mission, the O.S.S. Algiers Detachment, and the Algiers French Resistance leaders. G.3 SPOC worked in very close liaison with S.F. H.Q. London ~~and~~ but was under the control of Allied Force Headquarters. The latter were responsible for Operation DRAGOON (Invasion of Southern France by 7th Army) and were under the overall direction of S.H.A.E.F.

Fifteen Jedburgh Teams were sent to Algiers for use by G.3 SPOC in support of DRAGOON. An additional 10 teams were later sent to Algiers; the intention being that they should be briefed and despatched from Algiers on behalf of S.F. H.Q. in support of OVERLORD. This was considered necessary because the short summer nights caused considerable areas of central and southern France to be out of aircraft range from the U.K. but within range of aircraft based in North Africa. The wireless communications of these 10 teams were designed to work to London. Subsequent events made it necessary to use only five of these Teams in support of OVERLORD, the remaining five were put at the disposal of G.3 SPOC and used in support of DRAGOON, with communications working to Algiers.