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FILE NUMBER	SUBJECT
HISTORY 12 volume 2	HISTORY OF JEDBURGHS IN EUROPE
VOLUME	
FROM ±943	
1944 TO	

VI. FRANCE

Jedburghs and OVERLORD Plan

S.H.A.E.F. directive to General Koenig SHAEF/17245/6/5/2/Ops(A) of 15 June 1944 [x] dealt with the particular assistance required from the F.F.I. in support of OVERLORD. The Strategic Requirements were that operations by Resistance should be directed to delaying the concentration of enemy forces in the bridgehead area in the following manner:

a) "By impeding the movement of his reserves to the battle zone.

b) By disrupting enemy lines of communication in rear areas.

c) By compelling the enemy to maintain large forces in his rear areas for the purpose of containing resistance."

Part II. of this directive gave the priority task of fostering active resistance adjacent to the bridgehead and in Brittany so as to:

a) "Initially prevent or delay the movement of enemy formations to the battle area.

b) At a later date, ... to render maximum assistance to the Allied advance into the Brittany peninsula."

The secondary task was to delay the movement of enemy reserves from other parts of France to the battle area and for that purpose to concentrate on fostering resistance in the areas adjacent to vital railways. (These railways were shown in accordance with the Railway Interdiction Plan on Map 'MA' attached to the directive.)

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x French Integration - filed with ADE/Reg.

(a) Brittany in liaison with S.A.S.

In order to prepare for the Allied advance into the Brittany peninsula, two SAS parties were despatched on 5/6 Jun to establish bases to which further airborne reinforcements could be sent and from which raids could be made on enemy troop movements. Three days later a Jedburgh Team was sent to each of these bases to effect liaison between the SAS and local Resistance elemen This had the effect of stirring up a considerable body of Resistance, whose existence had hitherto been unknown to the Germans.

As indicated -----

The directive concluded, "The Supreme Allied Commander of the Mediterranean Theatre is being informed of these priorities and will ensure that appropriate action is taken by the S.F. Headquarters organization in the Mediterranean area to implement this directive with regard to Southern France."

In all areas concerned, Jedburgh Teams were used - among other means - to carry out these requirements of S.H.A.E.F. For detailed task and achievements of each particular Team, see Summaries attached at Appendix X.A. and refer to Team files.[x] Attached at Appendix X.B. is a Map showing all Jedburgh Teams despatched to France from June - December 1944.

a) Brittany in liaison with S.A.S.

insert — As indicated in Para. 8 of SHAEF/17245/6/5/2/Ops(A) of 15 June 1944, referred to above, General Koenig was ~~directed~~ ordered to direct his efforts primarily towards fostering active resistance in areas adjacent to the bridgehead and in Brittany.

Appreciations were made at end of June 1944 of the Resistance Situation in Brittany, and on 5 July 1944, E.M.F.F.I. drew up a plan for operations of further Jedburgh Teams in Brittany.[xx]

On 8 July 1944, 21 Army Group issued a scheme for implementation concerning the employment of F.F.I., S.F. and S.A.S. forces in 21 Army Group's sphere of action. Resistance and S.A.S. activities in Brittany were in direct support of 21 Army Group for the expansion of the lodgement area.[xxx]

/Lieutenant

x With ARCHIVES

xx FFI/109/MOof 5 July 1944 (C.2.)

xxx 21 A.Gp./20671/G(Plans) of 8 July 1944. C.2. Bigot Operations to Brittany.

~~Lieutenant Colonel Saunders took action with E.M.F.F.I.~~, EMFFI undertook
In accordance with this paper, to ensure that no large scale overt action by organized resistance took place in Brittany until required by 21 Army Group, but that potential Resistance should be built up, and considerable amount of minor sabotage carried out, and preparations made for Resistance to come into the open to assist the rapid occupation of Brittany when the word was given. The target date by which preparations for overt action should be completed was 1 August 1944.

The attached Map (Appendix VI.A.) shows the approximate areas of Jedburgh and S.A.S. bases which were established prior to the break through to AVRANCHES, and the Maquis groups they controlled.

The S.A.S. group WASH, in area South West of GUINGAMP, was despatched on 5/6 June 1944 and reinforced by Jedburgh FREDERICK on 9/10 June 1944, and Jedburgh GEORGE I. was sent to DINGSON on ~~9/10 June 1944~~ the same night to assist in organizing Resistance personnel; but the S.A.S. base was attacked on 18 June 1944 and Jedburgh GEORGE I., with the Resistance chiefs, had to withdraw to LOIRE INFERIEURE. WASH was also attacked on 12 June 1944, and dispersed; but FREDERICK remained in the area and re-established contact with Resistance Groups.

The progress made throughout June and July is shown by a study of the appreciation of the Resistance Situation in Brittany as at 29 July 1944 [x] FFI/362/Ops and the attached Map. Para. III. sets out the position of the Jedburgh Teams.

/E.M.F.F.I.

x In 1015. France - Planning for Brittany. (AD/E Reg.)

E.M.F.F.I. organized a Headquarters for Resistance in Brittany, to be ready to go to the field as soon as the signal for overt action in support of Third U.S. Army should be given. [x] EMFFI Op. Order No. 22 of 1 August 1944 and No. 27 of 3 August 1944. This was known as Mission "ALOES" and was under command of Colonel Eono. Attached to the Mission were Jedburgh Teams RONALD, DANIEL, DOUGLAS and ALEC to provide liaison links for the Mission. The signal for action "LE CHAPEAU DE NAPOLEON EST-IL TOUJOURS A PERRÉS GUIREC" was sent out on 2 August 1944 through the B.B.C.

After the break through, Colonel Eono was attached to General Deligne at RENNES for all matters pertaining to the F.F.I. Deligne was General Koenig's authorized representative. General Koenig authorized the employment of the F.F.I. in Brittany as combat and maintenance forces under General Patton, and a plan was drawn up by 11th S.F. Detachment, Headquarters Third U.S. Army, G-3 Section, for the use of Resistance in Brittany - on 10 August 1944. [xx]

Numerous general reports were received of aid and support given by the F.F.I.

For the methods adopted by Jedburgh Teams to contact and organize Resistance groups, of the vicissitudes encountered by respective Teams, and details of their achievements in their respective areas, it is necessary to refer to the Team files [xxx] containing signals to and from the field and reports made on return. It is hard to assess the value of

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x Relevant Jedburgh Team files - with ARCHIVES

xx 1015 A. - Filed with AD/E Reg.

xxx With ARCHIVES

the contribution they made towards the general magnificent assistance given by Brittany Resistance as a whole and in conjunction with S.A.S.; but it was estimated that the contribution of their combined efforts saved the use of at least one Division in the Brittany campaign.

(Cannot Substantiate)

The containing of the enemy troops at LORIENT and BREST was carried out by the F.F.I. and as the Map shows, Jedburgh Teams were with these groups, providing them with leadership, organization, communication, and a means of obtaining arms.

The work of the earliest Teams in the field - FREDERICK and GEORGE - paid big dividends. (Refer to the Reports of these two Teams for the areas which they controlled and for details of the work which they carried out.) x

Enemy columns were attacked on the move, isolated garrisons were contained or destroyed, and bridges and other vital installations protected, with the exception of the port installations at BREST, for the protection of which Jedburgh HORACE had been trying to obtain and distribute arms to the 5,000 sédentaires he had contacted.

Hospital installations were also set up under Jedburgh supervision, and mopping up in areas by-passed by the speed of the Allied advance was organized by them with the groups they controlled. As a result of the occupational tasks and mopping up operations undertaken by Resistance in Brittany, the "Third U.S. Army was able to turn to the East with its main forces, thus closing the Southern Arm of the great pincers on the German forces in Normandy." xx

/b)

x With ARCHIVES

xx History of E.M.F.F.I.

b) Southern France in support of DRAGOON

The work which 7th Army required of French Resistance in support of their landing in the South was set out in a paper from 7th Army to G.3. SPOC (Ref. X.1264 of 26 July 1944, which was attached as Appendix A. to S.H.A.E.F. Directive to General Koenig (SHAEF/17240/24/Ops/(C) dated 7 August 1944)). x

The main task was to prevent German troop movements on roads and railways set out in the attached map (see Appendix VI.B.).

In telegram AFHQ/55456 (? 85456), A.F. H.Q. gave SPOC the additional task of closing the Pyrenees frontier to German troops attempting to escape from France. Instructions were at once sent to Jedburgh Team BUGATTI on these lines and Team CHRYSLER was also given a similar task when his work on communcations in the Carcasonne Gap had come to an end. The attached map (see Appendix VI.B.), which shows both the priority road and rail routes and the position of the relevant Jedburgh Teams, illustrates the manner in which G.3. SPOC used Jedburgh Teams, among other resources, to implement these instructions.

Conclusions on the success of the scheme from an operational stand point may be drawn as follows:

The Jedburghs used in Southern France were dropped to extensive and well organized resistance groups and with them fulfilled their primary roles of liaison, training, leadership in guerilla operations and the provision of W/T communications. A number of these Teams were dropped to reinforce existing Allied Missions whose leaders have spoken highly of the assistance which they received from the Teams who

/worked

x Filed in AMP.100 - with ARCHIVES

worked with them.

A factor limiting the effectiveness of their work was the great shortage of air lift which prevented Algiers supplying their requests for arms and ammunition on anything approaching a generous scale. Some

* the premature development of Resistance may well result in its extermination before it can be really useful. The rising in S.E. France nearly proved disastrous and would have done so had the Germans had more time in which to deal with it.

useful work in making the passage from France into Spain for German troops considerably more difficult, which was, after all, their primary role.

The campaign in the south was so quickly over that many of the plans which had been so carefully laid, were obsolete almost before they could be implemented. Many members of the Teams and many resistance leaders have argued that they should have been infiltrated weeks if not months earlier. As events turned out, it ~~would probably~~ might have been better had they been despatched sooner, but it must be borne

* and the difficulties of delivering arms to distant areas during the short summer nights

proved weak.

ii) Bring leadership to groups decapitated by arrests and.

iii) Bring assistance to areas of tactical

/importance

worked with them.

A factor limiting the effectiveness of their work was the great shortage of air lift which prevented Algiers supplying their requests for arms and ammunition on anything approaching a generous scale. Some criticism has been directed against several of the Teams in the extreme south west who became involved in local politics. It was probably inevitable that Teams in this area, which lacked effective indigenous leadership and saw practically no fighting whatsoever, should become involved in local politics. They were neither briefed nor equipped to take part in them. Too much emphasis need not, however, be laid on this element of criticism because the Teams in any case accomplished useful work in making the passage from France into Spain for German troops considerably more difficult, which was, after all, their primary role.

The campaign in the south was so quickly over that many of the plans which had been so carefully laid, were obsolete almost before they could be implemented. Many members of the Teams and many resistance leaders have argued that they should have been infiltrated weeks if not months earlier. As events turned out, it might have been better had they been despatched sooner, but it must be borne in mind that also essential to retain in Algiers a reserve of trained men who could be used to:

i) Strengthen Resistance where it had proved weak.

ii) Bring leadership to groups decapitated by arrests and.

iii) Bring assistance to areas of tactical

/importance

importance where the Allied advance was held up.

As it turned out, none of these necessities arose, but they had to be provided for none the less.

Jedburghs employed in the South of France undoubtedly rendered material assistance to French Resistance in the following:

i) Interference with enemy communications, both in the bringing up of reinforcements and the evacuation of the retreating army.

ii) Jedburgh Teams SCION, CHLOROFORM and GRAHAM were concerned with Groups protecting the flanks of General Butler's troops who were pushing with such rapidity up the route Napoleon to GRENOBLE. In this connection, it will probably be remembered that French Resistance elements held the Alpine valleys leading to Italy for a matter of weeks before they were relieved by regular troops. Jedburgh Teams NOVOCAINE, SCEPTRE, EPHEDRINE and CHLOROFORM were in this area.

iii) The liberation of South-West France, to many parts of which regular Allied troops never penetrated at all.

iv) Jedburgh Teams BUGATTI and CHRYSLER, who were placed in the neighbourhood of the Spanish frontier, helped to close the Pyrenees border to escaping Germans.

v) The harassing of enemy columns which were attempting to escape from the South East in a North Easterly direction to the BELFORT and ORLEANS gaps. (Thus directly in support of

/the

the Allied Armies which had landed in the North.)

The Commander of the Task Force estimated the contribution of Resistance as a whole in support of DRAGOON as the equivalent of four to five Divisions.

c) North East France, and the task of delaying the move of enemy troops to the bridgehead.

It will be recalled that S.H.A.E.F. directive to General Koenig - SHAEF/17245/6/5/2/Ops(A) of 15 June 1944 - gave as a secondary task to the fostering of Resistance in Brittany, the task of delaying the movement of enemy reserves from other parts of France to the battle area. This task applied from the commencement of OVERLORD to the approaches to the bridgehead from the North and North East - the territory lying to the North and East of a line running as follows:

River Seine from Le Havre to Paris.

Paris to Vierzon.

Vierzon eastwards to the Swiss frontier.

Plans for the development of Resistance in this area were drawn up and submitted to E.M.F.F.I. under x MUS/1005/1762 of 8 August 1944. This paper outlined the activities so far carried on in this area towards this task, and the lines along which Resistance should be developed. It was not considered possible to contemplate the dropping of Jedburghs of S.A.S. in the heavily defended Pas de Calais area, or other areas where air delivery was very difficult. In these areas, owing to lack of arms, and in heavily

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x 1005. France - Planning - N. and N.E.

built up areas, Resistance was bound to remain clandestine, and it was not considered that the arrival of a Jedburgh of S.A.S. team in uniform would be advantageous. In the event the few Teams that were sent to reinforce Resistance in the North were volunteers to work in civilian clothes, Jedburgh AUBRY was despatched to Seine et Marne on 11/12 August 1944 and worked clandestinely in the South Eastern outskirts of Paris, instructing in sabotage and small arms, training and keeping the vital railways in that area out nightly. As had been foreseen, the first overt action of this Resistance group resulted in its complete dispersal, and the death of the French Officer of the Team.

Movement in this Northern Zone was closely controlled. Jedburgh AUGUSTUS, who was despatched to Resistance Groups in AISNE on 15/16 August 1944, also had to live clandestinely, and finally was wiped out, after contacting Allied troops, when attempting to return through the lines to continue harassing actions in the German rear.

Jedburgh ALFRED in OISE also had to work in civilian clothes, but was more fortunate.

As the Allied advance drew near, the Jedburgh Teams and Resistance Groups were sometimes assigned protective roles. For instance, ALFRED was instructed to protect certain bridges over the OISE; ARNOLD to protect bridges over the MARNE; ARCHIBALD was near vital crossings of the MOSELLE; BERNARD and BENJAMIN were on the MEUSE.

/It

It must be emphasized that the Jedburgh Teams formed part of an operational reserve of trained personnel. Where the work of interfering with rail and telecommunications could be carried out by existing Resistance Groups, there was nothing to be gained in committing this reserve. On the other hand, there was a good deal to be lost by encouraging clandestine Resistance to take overt action before the time was ripe, inviting heavy repressive action from the enemy in areas it was vital to him to control, and risking the break up of the Resistance Groups.

For this reason, the Teams that were sent to North and North Eastern France were not despatched far ahead of the Allied Armies. Many of them complained that they arrived in the field too late to accomplish much before being overrun or to give maximum assistance to the Allied ground forces; but the object of their arrival was to reinforce only where vitally needed and when overt action was likely to be successful, and not precipitant.

It will be seen from the Map at Appendix X.B. that the DIJON-PARIS routes to the ORLEANS gap were also covered by Jedburgh Teams sent to Maquis groups in this area, to contribute to delaying the approach of enemy reinforcements moving up to the battle area.

Not only could these Teams organize action to harass the movement of enemy reinforcements, but also much damage was caused to retreating enemy columns, and undoubtedly the speed of the Allied advance was uncraased by overt actions fought by Resistance Groups immediately ahead of Allied troops in which towns and

/villages

villages were liberated and held sometimes for days against the Allied arrival. (The most notable example of such action is PARIS itself.) Owing to the presence of organized Resistance forces, the Allied troops could then pass on leaving mopping up operations and patrolling to be carried out by the Resistance. In this work, Jedburgh Teams played their part, in their respective areas.

d) <u>East France, the Vosges and Ardennes, Doubs and Jura</u>

The problems presented here differed somewhat from those of North and North Eastern France. These areas were splendid Maquis country, wooded and mountainous, and not built up like the Northern plain. On the other hand, the problem of air supply was difficult during the short summer nights. Again, therefore, the Jedburgh 'reserve' was held back; it was no good putting Teams into the field to organize Resistance Groups for guerilla action, when it was not possible to supply them with arms.

Jedburgh Teams to these areas were despatched after the operations of the Seventh Army in the South had begun. The role of Resistance was two-fold - to prevent approach of enemy reinforcements to the battle areas, both in North and South, and to harass the retreat of the enemy towards the BELFORT Gap. Teams were in positions to assist Resistance Groups to interfere with North/South communication lines CHALONS-sur-SAONE/LYONS. Teams BRIAN and BASIL controlled escape routes over the Swiss frontier. The VOSGES and HAUTE SAONE departments were thickly congested with German troops. Team JACOB, dropped with S.A.S. near EPINAL - S.A.S. Base LOYTON - to help organize

/Resistance

Resistance, all became casualties. Team GREGORY, who was sent with an S.A.S. Mission - Mission ETOILE - to provide liaison and a W/T link, also had both Officers seriously wounded in an ambush. Teams JIM, DOUGLAS II. and TIMOTHY accompanied a Mission known as Mission ORGEAT - similar to Mission ALOES - to provide wireless communications. Resistance in VOSGES, in particular, menaced the enemy's communications through BELFORT and EPINAL, and when these became vital, Teams JACOB, ALASTAIR, NICHOLAS, HENRY and GODFREY were sent to give it impetus and reinforcement, and to assist in organizing resistance.

The organization carried out by Jedburgh Teams produced useful recruits for the advancing French Armies of Leclerq and Tassigny, and whole battalions of the F.F.I. became incorporated with the regular troops.

e) Indre and Central France

[x] An appreciation of the Potentialities of French Resistance in Eastern, Central and Southern France, made on 13 June 1944, stated "In the centre and south of France, overt resistance has flared up on a considerable scale, resulting in many areas of fighting between the German forces of occupation and the patriots, and in certain cases, in a degree of control of considerable regions by the Resistance Movement."

Here was a different proposition from the North, where, except for Brittany, overt action by Resistance

/could

x Ref. MUS/800/1153 of 13 June 1944.
1000. A. - France - Planning - General

could not be encouraged. Teams sent to this area had far more opportunity of fulfilling a full scale Jedburgh role of liaison, organization and leadership in guerilla actions.

In June 1944, Resistance had flared up in the Departments of HAUTE VIENNE - DORDOGNE, INDRE, CANTAL.[x] Their activities lay right across the routes from the South to ORLEANS and the area of the bridgehead and, in accordance with the S.H.A.E.F. Railway Interdiction Plan, these lines were kept consistently cut. The first Jedburgh Teams sent to their assistance were HUGH - on 5/6 June 1944, and HARRY on 6/7 June 1944. These were followed by HAMISH, JULIAN, IAN, IVOR and ALEC and by Mission ISAAC, which included two British Jedburghs. These Teams took over groups at first contacted by HUGH, whose area was too thickly covered by Resistance Groups for one Team to deal with its organization. By constant guerilla activity, large numbers of enemy forces were kept occupied, and prevented from reinforcing the northern battle zone. Resistance forces south of the LOIRE covered the right flank of the American Army in their drive to PARIS, and prevented German withdrawal from the south to the north east. Due to this, 18,000 enemy troops marched North from POITIERS to surrender at BEAUGENCY on 17 September 1944.[xx] A large part in the negotiations for this surrender, and prevention of incidents in the course of the march, was played by Jedburgh Teams JULIAN, IVOR and ALEC. Owing to

/their

x Ref. MUS/800/1153 of 13 June 1944.
1000. A. France - Planning - General.

xx SHAEF, G-3 Division(Main), GCT 370. 2-5 Ops C.
"Report on S.O.E. Operations in Supreme Commander's Sphere." Pages 5 and 6.

their excellent relations with the Resistance Groups, and liaison with the American Army, they were in a position to give valuable assistance.

Resistance was also active further south in CREUSE, HAUTE VIENNE and the CORREZE. Teams LEE and ANDY were concerned with Resistance Groups harassing communications converging on LIMOGES. Team JAMES, in the CORREZE, worked in conjunction with an Allied Mission to co-ordinate and organize Resistance (Mission TILLEUL). Team ALEXANDER in CREUSE sent unexpected and valuable information on one of the German V-weapons,[x] which later proved to concern the V.4.

f) South-West France

In a paper[xx] MUS/1000/1564 of 24 July 1944, the Plans Section of SFHQ, which at the time was doing planning work on behalf of ~~Lieutenant Colonel Saunders outlined to~~ E.M.F.F.I, outlined the action likely to be required from Resistance in South West France.

The launching of invasion from the South, and the calling out of Resistance in Brittany, together with the American Third Army's break-through in the North, was likely to threaten the German forces in the South West with isolation. Resistance in this area should, therefore, be called on for a maximum effort in support of both OVERLORD and DRAGOON, to prevent the withdrawal of these forces, and to assist the Resistance Groups in Central France to prevent a link up between German forces from the South West with those retreating through TOURS, BOURGES and ORLEANS, towards the battle area in the North.

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x See Team Report ALEXANDER - with ARCHIVES

xx Filed in MUS. 1000. A. - France - Planning - General. (AD/E Reg.)

A certain part of the action called for from Resistance in the South West has been covered in the part of this paper dealing with the support given to DRAGOON. It should be noted here that the Teams shown on Map at Appendix X.B. in GERS and TARN et GARONNE, were four of the Teams despatched to the field from North Africa, but with W/T communication working to London. These were Teams MILES, MARTIN, MARK and JOHN. These Teams were despatched on 16/17 August 1944 to give added impetus to Resistance in the South West, in checking of enemy movements in area of BORDEAUX/TOULOUSE railway and TOULOUSE/LIMOGES routes, the latter directly in support of OVERLORD.

Actually, as has been stated, Resistance in the South West carried out the liberation of many towns and villages to which Allied regular troops never penetrated. Teams MARTIN and MILES were concerned in the battle for the liberation of MONT DE MARSAN, for example.

g) Special Missions

As a direct outcome of contacts made by Jedburghs with Resistance in France, attention should be drawn to a special Mission carried out by Team JUDE to assist in training of the New French Army. This was to the Ecole des Cadres, at SAINT-GENIS-LAVAL (RHONE). By arrangement between Major General Gubbins with Le Chef de l'Echelon Liquidateur de l'EMFFI [x] as the result of requests for this Team's assistance, Team JUDE was sent back to France

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x Ref. CMcVG/7374 of 31 October 1944.
See Team file JUDE - with ARCHIVES.

in November 1944 to be on the Staff of this School for a period of six weeks. Details of the training they organized are given in their Report. x

Similarly Team SIMON, who formed part of a seaborne Mission to the SABLES D'OLONNE on 28 September 1944, remained in France at the request of General de Larminat until the middle of November 1944, carrying out work of training the F.F.I. Team QUENTIN also did similar work until the end of January 1945, and Team HAROLD also remained in the ST. MAIXENT area until the middle of December 1944. Attached at Appendix VI.C. is copy of a letter from General de Larminat, expressing his appreciation of the assistance given by these Teams in organization and training of the F.F.I., who, now that the main battle had moved eastward, were containing the German forces still holding out in the BORDEAUX area.

This work of training the new French Army, the majority of whose recruits had already seen action with the Resistance forces, is evidence of the excellent relations established between the Jedburgh Teams and those to whose assistance they were sent. The importance attached to the liaison aspect of their work throughout their training was thereby justified, as well as by their successful co-operation with Resistance, while actually in the face of the enemy. It is not always the fact that partnerships that have proved successful in time of emergency, prove stable and enduring once the

/emergency

x See Team file JUDE - with ARCHIVES

emergency is past. It is to be hoped that the success of the Jedburgh scheme in this respect may augur well for the future relations of the Allies.

VII. BELGIUM

In the event no Jedburgh Teams were despatched to Belgium, Owing to the speed of the Allied advance, this operational reserve was not required.

Plans were made for the use of three Teams in connection with an Airborne landing to be made early in September under command of Lieutenant General Browning, and the Teams were actually briefed for this operation - known as Operation "LINNET". [x]

Their task was to be to form Liaison Missions representing S.F. Headquarters to contact Belgian Resistance, and advise the Commander of the possibilities of Resistance for carrying out specific tasks in support of his operations. They were also to provide a W/T link between the Airborne force and S.F. Headquarters.

These plans were later adapted in support of the Airborne operation to the ARNHEM/NIJMEGEN area in HOLLAND, but this will be dealt with in Part VIII. of this paper.

The Airborne operation to Belgium did not take place, and the Jedburgh Teams were not required.

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x RE Order de Mission for S.F. Liaison Missions. Operation "LINNET" - circulated under T/BE/2140 of 2 September 1944 - filed in MUS/1501 - with AD/E Reg.

VIII. HOLLAND

General

The uses to which Jedburgh Teams could be put in Holland differed from those in France in several important respects. There was no Maquis, owing to the nature of the terrain and the comparative smallness of the area of operations. This meant that - except when used in conjunction with Airborne forces as will be shown later - the Jedburgh Mission was of a more clandestine nature, and the arrival of Allied Officers in uniform was a source of danger to the Resistants, rather than an impetus. Opportunities for guerilla action were fewer also, as it was difficult for the Resistants to gather unobserved. A protective role could be assigned to them in some cases (see Operation GAMBLING, for example [x]) but opportunities to harass enemy troop movements were fewer and more hazardous. On the other hand, much detailed and vital intelligence was gathered and passed on to our troops, and the essential characteristic of all Jedburgh Missions - to establish contact and maintain liaison between Allied forces and Resistance forces - remained, both when the Mission was of a clandestine nature, or when the Teams were dropped with Airborne forces with the express purpose of establishing this liaison.

Altogether, seven Jedburgh Teams were despatched to Holland. For details of their tasks and achievements see Appendix X.A.

a) Team DUDLEY was dropped on 11/12 September 1944 on a clandestine Mission to contact the Resistants of the Raad Van Verzet (Resistance

/Council)

x Filed under Jedburgh "MISSIONS" No. 34D. - with ARCHIVES

Council) in the ALMELO area. In general, this was in the nature of a Reconnaissance mission; to provide guides and general intelligence and to build up the Resistance organization ahead of the Canadian advance.

b) Four Teams were despatched with Airborne forces on operation MARKET to the ARNHEM/NIJMEGEN area. These Teams went in uniform attached to Headquarters and other formations, and their Mission was to provide liaison between the Airborne forces and the Resistance groups known to be in the area, with the object of organizing these groups to provide labour squads, intelligence and guides within the area of the airhead. Also within a radius of 20 kilometres outside the airhead, they were to instruct the Resistants to interfere with enemy columns advancing towards the airhead, and beyond that, as far as possible, to preserve fuel dumps for the use of Second Army and harass German attempts at withdrawal across Holland.

c) Teams DICING and GAMBLING.

These Teams also were briefed with Airborne forces, in the particular task of liaison with Resistance forces, to protect the bridges over the APELDOORN CANAL ahead of the Canadian advance. Team GAMBLING dropped north of APELDOORN on 3 April 1945. DICING met with no reception and had to return, and eventually went in with paratroops to the area of DEVENTER on 7 April 1945 in support of the Canadian advance north to GRONINGEN.

/The

The hazardous nature of this work in Holland is demonstrated by the fact that two members of Team DUDLEY

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The Groups thus formed and armed were later, were to prove of considerable assistance during the make campaigns of 1945 and earned high praise from his the Military Commanders. men

OLLE,

DEVENTER and IJSSEL line ~~were procured, and~~ overlays ~~completed~~ of all troops, supply dumps, lines of communication, etc. [x]

The results of Airborne operation MARKET are outside the scope of this paper; but Jedburgh Team EDWARD with the Headquarters, through his Resistance contacts [xx] provided the bulk of intelligence received.

As an outcome of this operation, Team CLARENCE (later known as STANLEY II. and with the wounded U.S. Officer replaced by a British Officer) remained in the NIJMEGEN area to provide liaison with the patriots and assist in their organization and training.

Team GAMBLING reported that the bridges south of APELDOORN were too heavily defended for Resistance to be able to undertake to protect them, but did undertake to hold those north of the town. This did not coincide with the plans of the Canadian First Army, who advanced to APELDOORN; so from this point of view, the Mission may be said to have failed, but much useful work was done in organizing the Resistance forces, and maintaining W/T contact with England.

/The

x See Team Report DUDLEY - with ARCHIVES

xx See Team Report EDWARD - with ARCHIVES

The hazardous nature of this work in Holland is demonstrated by the fact that two members of Team DUDLEY did not survive (see "CASUALTIES" - Appendix X.C.); but before the Mission became disintegrated, 1,200 men were armed, stores of arms collected for enough more to make a total of 3,800 men, and with an Allied advance this number could have been increased to 12,000 - 15,000 men in the area OVERIJSSEL. The Team also procured details of defences of ZWOLLE, DEVENTER and IJSSEL line ~~were procured, and~~ completed overlays ~~completed~~ of all troops, supply dumps, lines of communication, etc. x

The results of Airborne operation MARKET are outside the scope of this paper; but Jedburgh Team EDWARD with the Headquarters, through his Resistance contacts xx provided the bulk of intelligence received.

As an outcome of this operation, Team CLARENCE (later known as STANLEY II. and with the wounded U.S. Officer replaced by a British Officer) remained in the NIJMEGEN area to provide liaison with the patriots and assist in their organization and training.

Team GAMBLING reported that the bridges south of APELDOORN were too heavily defended for Resistance to be able to undertake to protect them, but did undertake to hold those north of the town. This did not coincide with the plans of the Canadian First Army, who advanced to APELDOORN; so from this point of view, the Mission may be said to have failed, but much useful work was done in organizing the Resistance forces, and maintaining W/T contact with England.

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x See Team Report DUDLEY - with ARCHIVES

xx See Team Report EDWARD - with ARCHIVES

The British Officer of DICING was captured on landing. The W/T operator and the Dutch Officer, however, remained in the area, and ~~though not able to achieve anything of great note~~ while not achieving anything spectacular, did useful work.

It will be noted from Appendix X.A. that several Dutch Officers and one N.C.O., who were members of these Jedburgh Teams, had not been trained as Jedburghs (see Appendix III.F.). They were all members of the Royal Netherlands Army:

Captain M.J. Knottenbelt

Captain. Ruysch Van Dugteren

Lieut. Dubois

Sergeant Fokker

IX. DESPATCH

A. From the U.K.

Arrangements made for Despatch of a Team were laid down in a directive "Special Force Headquarters Operational Procedure" issued on 12 May 1944 (Ref. ADE/372). This is attached at Appendix IX.A., and the points contained in paper 2. "Procedure for the Despatch of Jedburgh Teams" established the drill which was followed almost exactly in every case.

Some of the directions contained in this paper have already been referred to above in the Section headed "DR/JED Section and its function". But for the sake of clarity, it is worth while mentioning one or two points again in connection with the arrangements for despatch of a Team.

Firstly, once the task had been allotted and the Team selected by O.C. M.E. 65, in conference with DR/JED, taking into consideration the particular qualifications most required for the work in view, and also whether any Officers had local knowledge of the area to which the Team was to be sent, the Team, with all its personal equipment was sent to the Briefing House, 46, Devonshire Close, for final briefing. (At Appendix IX.B. see list of equipment carried by each man.) As has been pointed out, this house was far too small. The chronological records of Teams despatched, attached as Appendix X.A. to Section X. of this History, show how many Teams went on the same date, or on consecutive days. There were, at times, as many as 12 Teams in London to be briefed and despatched. Owing to bad weather, or lack of information from the field, the departure of a Team

/was

was sometimes delayed. The events proved, therefore, that more accommodation and an increased number of Briefing Officers should have been provided.

The Operation Order (the pro-forma for which is attached at Appendix IX.C.), which was issued by D/R - and later 3ième Bureau of E.M.F.F.I. - indicated the Country Section - or the Zone of E.M.F.F.I. - responsible for compilation of the detailed Brief. The information required to be given in this Brief covered all available known details of enemy troops in the area, and a forecast of the movements that might be expected to develop. Also, all information possible was given on the Resistance elements in the area, their approximate numbers, state of preparedness, and personal details concerning the local leaders and organizers with whom the Jedburghs were to make contact, and to whose assistance they were being sent. In every case, where the despatch of a Jedburgh Team was ordered, there were known to be Resistance elements in the area, and where the information concerning these elements was scanty, the Team was instructed to send back details of their numbers, state of preparedness and immediate requirements, as soon as possible after establishing contact.

Whenever possible, aerial photographs of the neighbourhood of the dropping point were provided with the Brief, and the Team was briefed on the maps with which they were equipped for the field.

The final briefing in Signals was given by a Signals Officer and covered final details of codes and ciphers, explanation of the Signal Plan allotted to the Team, allocation of B.B.C. Action Messages and issue of codes and cipher equipment. [This section is to be written

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an Officer of the Signals Section by order of D/SIGS.]

When the Country Section or Zone responsible had prepared the Brief, the DR/JED Briefing Officer was responsible for delivering this and the Operation Order to the Team. Through him, they could ask for any additional information they might require, and it was his duty to ensure that they fully understood the task required of them, and to see that they were provided with necessary maps and money. The money provided for the use of each Team was 250,000 French francs - an allowance of 100,000 francs for each Officer, and 50,000 francs for each W/T Operator. Belgian Teams were allotted 250,000 francs. Dutch Teams took 5,000 Dutch gulders. This was to cover any immediate need that might arise in the field, and was to be accounted for on completion of the operation.

The store of maps held at Devonshire Close covered the most likely areas of France, Belgium and Holland in the series G.S.G.S. 4250 and G.S.G.S. 4471, G.S.G.S. 4081 4040, 4249 and 4416, 4427 and 4238. (Scales of 1 : 250,000, 1 : 100,000, 1 : 80,000 and 1 : 50,000). The Michelin Series were also provided for every area, and each individual Jedburgh was also given a copy of the M.I.9. "Escape" Map on silk.

The Briefing Officer also made sure, during the briefing of the Team, that they knew the details of the Containers they were taking. Attached at Appendix IX.D. is a list showing the "Standard Jedburgh Load", and details of contents of the usual 15 containers taken. These were designed to arm approximately 100 men as a nucleus of the Jedburgh's groups, and were the result of long consideration and many conferences.

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The allocation of aircraft was the responsibility of AL Section. When the date, time and place of the sortie was known, the Briefing Officer accompanied the Team to the aerodrome and waited there until they emplaned. Here again, the shortage of Briefing Officers became apparent, as, owing to weather or other causes, such as aircraft unserviceable, the operation was sometimes postponed after the Team had arrived at the aerodrome. Meanwhile, the Briefing Officer was probably required at Headquarters to brief another Team, and Briefing Officers found themselves with three or four Teams on their hands. In cases of emergency, it was sometimes possible to call on Conducting Officers from Country Sections - or from those at the disposal of E.M.F.F.I. 6ième Bureau.

From the nature of the Brief required to be given to each Team to enable them to understand fully the object and nature of their task, it will be understood how vitally important it was that the Officers of the Country Sections who prepared the Briefs, and the DR/JED Officers who delivered them to the Teams should keep in touch with the full operational picture. This information was available in the War Room at S.F. Headquarters, where wall maps were kept hourly up to date on information received from S.H.A.E.F. and telegrams from the field, and all S.O.E. controlled Resistance Groups, Special Missions in the field, and Jedburgh Teams were shown in relation to the known positions of enemy and Allied troops. In addition, sitreps were issued by the War Room twice daily, outlining recent events and reporting latest intelligence received. The main difficulty experienced by the DR/JED Briefing Officers was the fact that they

/were

were so often away from Headquarters in the course of their work that they got out of touch with the current operational picture. This difficulty was even more acute after the move to E.M.F.F.I. in August 1944.

When a Team had been actually despatched, the DR/JED Section was responsible for notifying the War Room of date of despatch, area of dropping ground and outline of Mission. This was done in the form of an amendment to the Kardex, which had been completed before D-Day in respect of all Jedburgh Officers and Operators, giving their personal description and a security phrase for identification should they be overrun by Allied troops. When the War Room received notification from DR/JED of the departure on operations of a Jedburgh Team, the S.F. Staffs were notified that the individuals of the Team were now in the field and of the area in which it would be probable that they should be located on the advance of the Allied forces.

Re-Supply of Teams

One of the chief complaints received from Jedburghs in the field and referred to in reports made on their return, was that their requests for further supplies of arms and ammunition to be dropped to them frequently went unanswered. It was undoubtedly a cause for complaint and the causes of the failure to comply with all the requests are twofold:

a) The requests were too numerous for the air-lift SFHQ ⊗

⊗ and, in the case of those from areas where contact with the enemy was unlikely, ~~could~~ ice to had to be rejected in accordance with the existing SHAEF policy. :s not

/fully

were so often away from Headquarters in the course of their work that they got out of touch with the current operational picture. This difficulty was even more acute after the move to E.M.F.F.I. in August 1944.

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a) The requests were too numerous for the air-lift at the disposal of ~~S.O.E.~~ SFHQ ⊗ ~~to deal with.~~

b) After the transfer of operations in France to the command of E.M.F.F.I., the French Officers responsible for the conduct of operations did not

/fully

fully understand the workings of the machine which had been set up at S.F. Headquarters to take note of such requests, and make necessary arrangements for re-supply. These arrangements entailed securing the agreement of the Air Ministry to the dropping point suggested by the Jedburgh. This often had to be altered - for reasons such as enemy flak or other conditions unknown to the Jedburgh - and entailed further delay and telegrams to the field for alternative D.Zs. The requisite containers had to be ordered from the Packing Station and air-lift arranged. The machine continued to function owing to its having gained a certain momentum by August, but ~~it is unfortunate~~ by the time EMFFI moved, but was further hampered by the inexperience of the French officers who had not been fully integrated with SHAEF before D-Day and many of whom ~~s of~~ ~~to~~ ~~with~~ ~~ture.~~ ~~were, many of them did not speak sufficiently~~ good English to understand some of the Jedburgh cables. Though this seems a fantastically elementary point, it is, nevertheless, one that caused some difficulty and delay.

In many cases, the Organizers in the field, to whom the Jedburghs were assigned, tended to regard these Teams mainly as agents for getting arms from England, and when their requests failed to produce results, the prestige of the Jedburghs decreased accordingly. In defence of those on this side, it must be pointed out that, though one of the chief functions of a Jedburgh Team, it was never intended to be supreme, and all Teams were warned that

/the

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the air-lift at our disposal was limited and had heavy commitments, and no absolute guarantee of constant supplies could be given. In defence of those in the field, whose complaints were so bitter, it will be appreciated how difficult it is to maintain the morale of troops who are short of arms, and even for a Commander to maintain his own morale, when he sees opportunities for action against enemy troop movements slipping from his reach, owing to the failure of his own Headquarters to comply with his urgent requests for the means wherewith to take action.

B. From North Africa

Altogether 25 Jedburgh teams were despatched from North Africa: of these, 15 were transferred on 2 May 1944, a further 10 on 27 June 1944.

S.P.O.C., in conjunction with A.F. H.Q., was responsible for the employment, and naturally, despatch and re-supply of the first 15: the second draft of Jedburghs, however, were despatched to North Africa, (in accordance with x MUS/845/1170 dated 15 June 1944, and SHAEF/17240/3/Ops(A)) for employment in support of OVERLORD. As the areas for which they were destined were out of range of U.K. based aircraft at that time of year, S.P.O.C. was made responsible for their briefing and despatch by Algiers based aircraft, while S.F. H.Q. provided the employment and the details of specific tasks and destinations. Of these 10 teams, five were finally transferred entirely to S.P.O.C.

It is only necessary here to indicate at what points the methods of despatch used, and the problems engendered, differed, for these two sets of Jedburghs, from those employed by London.

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Once it was decided to despatch a Team to a given area, in support of DRAGOON, the S.P.O.C. equivalent of DR/JED Section itself (Major J. Champion and Lieut. Todd, F.A.N.Y.), drawing on the information the Country Section could give, compiled the Brief.

The Team selected by the Section was alerted, prepared, briefed in and despatched from Camp W., the Jedburgh base training camp. There was no equivalent to 46, Devonshire Close.

While the Team was being given a preliminary briefing on maps of the target area, and target intelligence briefs had been provided by O.S.S., particularly on road, rail and telecommunications, a suitable ground was pinpointed by the Air Operations Section, and mounted through the F. Country Section, which also provided passwords, safe houses, etc.

The final Brief compiled by the Section covered the usual ground: i.e. Order of Battle, Resistance elements in the area, personalities, target intelligence, topography. The drill involved in obtaining code names, pinpoints, maps, money, kit and details of the container load was substantially the same. S.P.O.C. was S.F. H.Q. in miniature. Ordres de Mission were signed by General Cochet, General Koenig's counterpart in the A.F. H.Q. area. As in London, Target Intelligence Officers, Country Section Officers and Signals Briefing Officers were brought in to do separate technical Briefs. Aerial photographs were also provided.

Once the ground was mounted, the Team briefed and standing by, the task of the Section was to establish and to maintain for the Operation a high priority on the Air Programme: this was reconsidered day by day. There were

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heavy demands from the Country Section, Jedburghs and O.G's on the same extremely inadequate number of aircraft.

On the day on which the operation was pronounced 'on' by the Air Force, the Team was warned at 0900 hours and transport to the airfield arranged. The Conducting Officer, who had nothing to do with briefing, checked the personal readiness and the security of the members of the Team, and after the Operational meal at 5 o'clock, accompanied them to the aerodrome, some 30 miles away, saw them into the plane, and waited to accompany them back to camp again if the sortie were unsuccessful. In the event of a successful sortie, the Section informed Signals and also the War Room.

It will be seen that the problems which arose were rather different from those encountered in London:

a) While the smaller scale on which everything was conducted made it easier for the Briefing Officer to keep in touch with the operational picture, and while the use of a separate Conducting Officer left the Briefing Officer free to brief, he was responsible for re-supply and signal traffic and much of the administrative detail in his capacity as an Officer of the Section. Moreover, while it was convenient that Camp W. should combine the function of base training camp, holding school and briefing house, it cannot have been entirely advisable to house under the same roof teams returned from unsuccessful sorties or held up by weather or lack of air-lift, teams being briefed, and teams not yet briefed.

b) The question of re-supply and of air-lift, as in England, was a source of much complaint.

S.P.O.C. itself, as well as the Section, commented on the inadequate number of aircraft allocated by M.A.A.F. to the dropping and re-supply of agents, Jedburghs and O.G's. Lack of aircraft alone often prevented the departure of a fully briefed Team expected by the field. Bad weather, and a low priority, often combined to hold a Team up for as much as a month. Once in the field, the Teams' demands for re-supply had to be considered via-à-vis demands from the Armée Secrete, Missions, O.G's and other bodies. There was a noticeable disproportion between the number of Teams put into the field and the power to re-supply them and make their orders effective. This disproportion was most evident in the A.F. H.Q. area. Jedburghs complained, not only of insufficient re-supply, but also of badly packed or unsuitable material. They asked for arms for immediate use, and depended on their reception to maintain their prestige and the morale of their Maquis, and it is understandable that when arms were not received, or when received by neighbouring Missions and not by them, their prestige suffered accordingly.[x]

c) There was a certain amount of friction between the Jedburgh and the Country Section on the question of the equality of status of Missions and Jedburghs. As this affected the problem of priority for despatch and re-supply, it was of some consequence and was clarified in H.Q. 270, dated 8 August 1944, a Memorandum confirming that despatch of Jedburgh did not depend upon a request from a Mission.

/d)

x Refer Reports of Jedburgh Teams QUININE, DODGE and BUGATTI (with ARCHIVES).

d) The system of using two different names, one allocated by London and one by Algiers, for the same ground appears to have caused difficulties in mounting operations. Some Teams controlled by Algiers worked in areas outside the range of Algiers re-supply, and within range of U.K. based aircraft; but as W/T communications for the Teams worked solely to Algiers, it was not often possible (except in the case of QUININE) to make use of U.K. re-supply.

e) One of the major problems encountered in North Africa was the disposal of the 10 Teams which were flown out on 27 June 1944, under the orders of S/F. H.Q. and later of E.M.F.F.I., to be briefed and despatched by S.P.O.C. The Section considered itself unable to undertake this further briefing; orders of an explicit nature for the disposal of the Teams were not immediately forthcoming, and the morale of the Teams concerned suffered. The disadvantages attached to the dual role of Camp W. were made particularly evident. Finally, in August 1944, after some delay, briefs were prepared in London following the usual pro forma, grounds were mounted and the necessary information requested from the field, and an extra Briefing Officer (Ensign Park, F.A.N.Y.) went to North Africa charged with the briefing and despatch of five of the Teams: the other five were handed over to S.P.O.C. for A.F. H.Q. employment. The five London controlled Teams had W/T contact with London only, a fortunate arrangement as Algiers communications

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were being used to the full, and London was responsible for their re-supply, an equally necessary measure. It was, however, unfortunate that they were dependent on Algiers air-lift for their despatch, as this was grossly overstrained. The Briefs were, moreover, necessarily slightly out of date, and although the information in them was supplemented by S.P.O.C. (e.g. Order of Battle, Target Intelligence), communication with circuits in the field via London was slow.

X. SUMMARIES and CONCLUSION

A. Summaries. Teams Despatched.

The total number of Jedburgh Teams despatched to the field was 101.

Of these, 68 Teams were despatched from the U.K. to France in support of Operation OVERLORD. (Eleven of these were attached to larger Allied Missions or Resistance Headquarters, to provide W/T communication, and liaison with Resistance.)

Five Teams were despatched from North Africa also in support of OVERLORD.

Twenty Teams were despatched from North Africa in support of the landing in the South of France - Operation DRAGOON.

Eight Teams were despatched from the U.K. to Holland.

Records are attached at Appendix X.A. giving the Code names of each Team, Names and Nationalities of individual members, an Outline of their Mission, and a short summary of their achievements. The Map attached at Appendix X.B. indicates the areas of France in which the Teams worked - though this is only an indication, as in few cases was it desirable or possible for a Team to remain static, and each Team moved throughout a fairly wide area. The dates of arrival in France are shown in red.

Casualties

It is impossible to arrive at any estimate of the numbers of casualties inflicted on the enemy. In

/guerilla

guerilla warfare, it is seldom possible to remain in the area after a battle. Many of the Team reports give no mention of numbers of enemy dead or wounded, though in some accounts of specific engagements numbers are given, and it is worthy of note that in almost every case the losses suffered by the enemy were heavier than those among the Maquis fighters.

Among the personnel of Jedburgh Teams themselves, casualties were as follows:

Killed	11 Officers	(4 British 2 U.S.) (3 French 2 Dutch)
	5 N.C.O's	(3 U.S. 2 British)
Wounded	20 Officers	(8 French 4 U.S.) (7 British 1 Dutch)
	1 N.C.O.	(1 British)
Prisoners of War	3 Officers	(2 U.S. 1 British)
	1 N.C.O.	(1 British)
Missing	1 N.C.O.	(1 U.S.)

Details of the names of those who became casualties, and of dates and places of the incidents are given in Appendix X.C.

Honours and Rewards

No attempt has been made in this History to record individual acts of gallantry or endurance. That these were many is proved by a study of the Team reports; but attached at Appendix X.D. is a full list of citations made as the result of Jedburgh operations. Those underlined in red show Honours and Rewards that have been awarded to date (30 August 1945).

/B.

B. Conclusions

On 13 July 1945, S.H.A.E.F. G-3 Division (Main) issued a paper[x] prepared at the request of the British Chiefs of Staff "to assess the value to the Supreme Commander of the operations of the Special Operations Executive in his sphere." On the basis of this assessment, an attempt must be made to conclude in what measure Jedburgh Teams contributed to the results achieved by Resistance as a whole.

Firstly, there is one point that must be given its full value. It must be appreciated that the presence among the Resistance fighters of Allied Officers, in uniform, and carrying letters signed by General Koenig appointing them his representatives, was a tremendous tonic to the morale of these Maquis troops. Over and over again, Team reports comment on the great welcome they received, and the unfailing support they were given. At last the Resistants felt they were recognised, and the presence of a Jedburgh Team gave them assurance that they would also be supported.

In almost every case, Jedburgh Teams were sent to support Resistance groups already known to exist, and in varying stages of organization, sometimes completely clandestine, sometimes already engaged in overt action. The Teams brought to these groups W/T communication with London - a means of obtaining arms, and orders to co-ordinate their activities with the main Allied plans of campaign. The Teams, being trained in sabotage and guerilla warfare, were able to train and lead the Resistance Groups in these activities.

The S.H.A.E.F. paper referred to above summarizes four types of activity which paid military dividends as follows:

/a)

x SHAEF G-3 Division (Main) GCT 370.2-5 Ops(C)

a) "Railways. These proved to be the most vulnerable targets for attack, resulting in an appreciable delay in the arrival of enemy divisions in the beachhead area ....."

Jedburgh Teams played their part in organizing Resistance to carry out this work, both by instruction and example - notably on the lines running from the South West north through Indre and Central France, those running West from DIJON and BELFORT, and the railways of South France and Brittany.

b) "Diversions. Harassing guerilla tactics in outlying districts induced the increased use and dispersion of protective and internal security troops as well as the use of field forces for punitive expeditions."

The presence and authority of Jedburgh Teams frequently restrained Resistance groups from taking overt action before the time was ripe. When the time came, whole areas were controlled and often finally liberated by Resistance without assistance from the Allied Liberation Armies. In the area South of LOIRE, Resistance may be said to have formed a screen between the American Army driving towards PARIS and the East. So effective was this screen that 20,000 Germans admitted themselves cut off and surrendered - marching North from POITIERS to surrender to the Americans at BEAUGENCY on the LOIRE. In the keeping of this "Screen" and in the negotiations for surrender which followed, Jedburgh Teams were notably involved.

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c) "Prevention of Demolitions. Although only a small percentage of prepared plans could be carried out, we reaped such a rich harvest from the few which were effective, that the overall effort was warranted."

The few protective tasks carried out by Jedburghs concerned mainly river crossings. The big job of protecting the Harbour installations at BREST was one of the plans that could not be carried out - though Jedburgh HORACE was prepared to undertake it had arms been supplied.

d) "Manpower for the A.E.F. Immediately on liberation, disciplined and equipped forces were available for military, para-military and information duties."

Here the Jedburgh Teams played a large part. Not only did they help to organize whole battalions of the F.F.I. to join the advancing armies of General de Lattre and General Leclerc; but they provided liaison links between Resistance and the Allied forces, and were able to contact the advanced units of the latter and organize Resistance, in accordance with their plans, to carry out protective patrols on the flanks, screen their advance posts, and 'mop up' behind the fast moving spearheads and protect lines of communication. In addition, the authority the Jedburgh Team had established in a district, enabled them to keep order among the civil population, and prevent premature demonstrations, ill-considered reprisals against collaborators, or trouble between

/different

different political groups. Training schools for Officers were organized, and Jedburghs acted as Instructors on Courses run for the new recruits for the new French Army.

As outlined in Part I. of this paper, the final conception of the function of a Jedburgh Team on the basis of which detailed planning and training was carried out for N.W. Europe was to form a part of a reserve of trained personnel:

a) to provide liaison with Resistance Groups.

b) to organize, equip, and, if necessary, lead these groups, and

c) to provide them with W/T communication with London.

The bulk of these Teams, as had been foreseen, was employed in France. This was made possible by the fact that French Resistance was already highly developed, and the nature of the terrain had made it possible for numerous Maquis groups to carry on a clandestine existance. In the event the liaison aspect of the Jedburghs' work entailed not only liaison with, and between, various Resistance Groups, and London by W/T, but also, in many cases, the Teams provided a link between Airborne Forces and Resistance Groups (notably in Holland), and also between Resistance Groups and Allied ground troops.

Here it seems pertinent to mention one of the difficulties encountered, one that arose when the Mission entailed working in liaison with S.A.S. The presence of S.A.S. in an area and their activities, often provoked repressive action by the enemy and the disruption of Resistance Groups, and hampered the Jedburghs in their work of organization and preparation. In an area where

/overt

>x Here too, should be mentioned the desirability of an early understanding between Jedburghs and SAS. That this understanding was lacking is mainly due to the fact the SAS employed on Overlord arrived on the scene at the last minute fresh from their successes in Italy and the Desert with no conception of the nature of French Resistance. Had they been able to get an early indoctrination in the Jedburgh principle and the Resistance organisation, a greater cooperation would have been possible.

Against this must be weighed the risk that the early arrival of the Dedburgh team might have brought about a premature rising of Resistance forces and ~~its~~ their extermination before the appointed time for the SAS to be sent in and overt action to start. To judge the timing of despatch of a Dedburgh team in these circumstances must always be difficult and it is well to remember the afore-mentioned argument when considering the criticisms which have been made in this respect.

overt action is not yet required, it is suggested that the Jedburgh Team should be sent in first, and the S.A.S. sent when the time for open aggression arrives. For example, had Team GEORGE been sent to the Morbihan ahead of S.A.S. "DINGSON", the results achieved might have been infinitely greater instead of bordering at one time on disaster. On the other hand, the presence of these highly trained troops in open warfare proved of inestimable value and encouragement, and S.A.S. could carry out protective roles, or tasks of immediate tactical importance, which the Jedburgh Team and its Resistance Groups was both too lightly armed and too untrained to undertake.

The task of organization and equipment raises two other points of difficulty which were encountered. First, many Teams complained that they were sent into the field too late to carry out the work of organization. This may have been so as events turned out, but one argument must be stressed in answer to their complaints; that is, that the Jedburgh Teams were an operational 'reserve'. Too many could not, therefore, be committed in the early stages. Had events not moved so well for the A.E.F. after the break-out, and had the Germans been able to form a line on the SOMME, the decision to hold back a certain number of Teams would have been considered justified. As it was, unquestionably more could have been achieved by some of the Jedburghs, had they gone in earlier; but it would not have been right to reckon on the Allied advance being as rapid as it eventually proved.

/The

but, it is felt that, had the potential value of French Resistance been more accurately calculated and apprec the airlift at our disposal might have been greater. From the point of view of operating the Jedburghs, it would hav been very much better had it been possible for the Fren to be fully integrated from the start and thus conform with the requirements of SHAEF and the organisation which existed to meet those requirements.

The second difficulty was equipment. The majority of Teams complained that their requests for arms and supplies went unanswered, or were answered too late. Some of the reasons for this have been dealt with in Part IX. - Resupply of Teams. The lessons to be learned are that the Teams should have been more fully briefed in the limitations of the air-lift at the disposal of ~~S.O.E.~~ SFHQ; but, above all, it must be admitted that, owing to mistrust, the potential value of French Resistance was miscalculated and under-estimated. Had complete confidence been felt, the air-lift at our disposal might have been greater; but, even more important, the command would have been joint French/British/American from the start, the French would have been fully in the picture on requirements of S.H.A.E.F. and the organization to meet those requirements, and the confusion resulting from changing the Headquarters organization "in mid-stream" would not have arisen. Where the blame lies - if 'blame' there should be - or whether the miscalculation could have been avoided, is not within the scope of this paper.

It remains only to comment on one other useful aspect of the work of Jedburgh Teams - that is the provision of guides for Allied gound troops and information on enemy dispositions. Though provision of intelligence was not a primary role of Jedburghs, and Resistance was not trained for the work or given any intelligence responsibility, the Jedburghs had a sound basis of military training, and were able to send messengers to meet the Allied advance units with useful information. Liaison was often established with G-2 and much useful work done, information services being set up at their request. Outstanding and

/exceptional

(a) The flexibility of the Jedburgh principle made it applicable to the changing situation from 1942 to 1945, from being the sole means of organising groups to an operational reserve of highly-trained specialists, later as means of cooperation with Airborne Forces and finally their adaption to meet the requirements of operations in Burma.

(b) The military training and background of the Jedburghs proved a valuable asset in the later stages of the campaign in N.W. Europe when the ordinary agent, trained for clandestine work, was often unsuited by temperament and experience to deal with the situations which developed when contact was made with Allied or Enemy troops.

exceptional examples are Team GEORGE's passage through the lines with plans of the U-boat pens at ST. NAZAIRE and the coast defences of LOIRE INFERIEURE, and the information on V-4 brought by Team ALEXANDER; but the majority of Teams, when overrun, were in a position to add to the knowledge of the advancing troops concerning the situation immediately ahead.

To conclude, it may fairly be said that the Jedburgh experiment in Inter-Allied co-operation succeeded: (a) (b) (c) Unity of command - by sympathetic liaison work - training, organization, equipment, leadership and successful W/T communications were all brought to Resistance by Jedburgh Teams, in a greater or lesser degree, according as opportunity occurred. Perhaps the outstanding examples of the use to which these Teams should be put, may be found in INDRE and CENTRAL FRANCE - where the Maquis guerilla forces of Resistance became an Army of Liberation - and in BRITTANY. Here the conditions for guerilla warfare were generally ideal - the enemy was contained for a period but not impelled to bring up reinforcements (in accordance with the directions of 21 Army Group, as reinforcements would have increased the difficulties of eventual liberation of the area); arms were supplied on a generous scale, and well distributed by the Jedburghs; and when the Signal was given, Resistance rose as one man - their efforts co-ordinated and directed by the Jedburgh Teams in their midst.

Appendix I A

Draft Letter for Issue by G.H.Q. to
Lieut. General MCNAUGHTON

MOST SECRET

G.H.Q. EXERCISE "SPARTAN" - PARTICIPATION OF "JEDBURGH"

1. To assist in the Allied invasion of the Continent, a scheme called the "JEDBURGH" scheme has been evolved to enlist and co-ordinate the help of the local inhabitants behind the GERMAN lines.

It is intended that this scheme shall be tried out during G.H.Q. Exercise SPARTAN, in March, 1943.

2. (a) Under this scheme, JEDBURGH parties, each consisting of an officer, a second-in-command, and a wireless operator with a suitable set, are dropped from the air behind enemy lines on the direction of Allied Army and Corps Commanders. Attached to Formation Headquarters is a very small additional staff to assist the Commanders in this connection.

(b) Together with these JEDBURGH parties are dropped containers of small arms, explosives, etc., for the use by 35 men.

(c) The Officer-in-Charge of the JEDBURGH party, on reaching the ground, proceeds either to a man who is known through secret sources to be a militant patriot or otherwise to some local dignatory such as the Mayor, and requests him to produce 35 courageous locals to assist in Military operations.

(d) The local group so organised carries out tasks ordered by the Allied Formation Commander, and for which suitable equipment will have been dropped, such as sabotaging enemy communications, eliminating enemy traffic control personnel, etc., etc.

(e) If the conditions are such that it is possible to increase this first 35 men to a total of up to 100, the JEDBURGH party both informs Allied Formation H.Q. to this effect and arranges dropping places for the reception on the following night of supplementary arms and equipment for 65 men.

(f) Since these local groups will have neither ammunition nor food for protracted operations, JEDBURGH parties are only dropped in such localities as are expected to be reached by Allied forces within the ensuing 48 to 72 hours.

3. W/T COMMUNICATIONS.

With the W/T sets that can be dropped with the JEDBURGH parties, direct communication between these parties and the despatching Formation H.Qs may not always be possible.

These wireless sets are, therefore, designed to work to a station in the U.K. from which other wireless sets are able to communicate directly to specially provided additional signal sections with despatching formations in the field.

4. The Section of the War Office charged with the development of the JEDBURGH scheme is M.O.I.(S.P.)

5. EXTENT OF PARTICIPATION IN EXERICSE "SPARTAN"

In Exercise "SPARTAN" it is intended that the JEDBURGH scheme shall be tried out to the following scales:-

(a) JEDBURGH Parties. Up to a total of 12, available only to the "BRITISH side.

(b) Local Groups. Reference paragraph 2 (d) above. G.H.Q. is nominating a Battalion from outside your Army to provide the local groups.

(c) Additional Staffs M.O.1.(S.P.) is providing additional staffs for your Formation Headquarters as follows:-

Army H.Q.....	One GSO I, One GSO III, One Clerk
Two Corps H.Q.	Each, ONE GSO II, One GSO III, One Clerk.
Up to five Divisional H.Q.	Each, One GSO III.

(d) Special Signal Sections. M.O.1.(S.P.) is providing one for Army H.Q. and one each for two Corps H.Q., besides the signallers with the JEDBURGH parties and for the Home Station.

6. The above particulars are here only given in outline. It is the intention that an officer (Lt.Colonel M.A.W. ROWLANDSON, R.A.) and possibly a small party from M.O.I. (S.P) shall visit you and explain to you and, if you so wish, to your Army and Corps Commanders and selected Staff Officers. the whole question in greater detail.

It is requested that you will state a convenient date, time and place for this visit.

7. It is emphasised that the JEDBURGH scheme and the responsibility of M.O.1.(S.P.) for its development are MOST SECRET, and details should, therefore, be communicated to the minimum number of selected officers.

rc ri Appendix I B.

Draft letter for issue by G.H.Q. to the Battalion nominated to provide "Local Groups".

SECRET

..... .Battalion will participate in G.H.Q. Exercise "SPARTAN",.....Mar 43 to.....Mar 43 in a special role.

In general terms, the Battalion will be required to provide several self-contained parties each of from 35 to 100 men, to represent courageous inhabitants of "German" occupied territory prepared to operate in the "Allied" cause behind the "German" lines if suitable occasion arises.

As well as providing these parties and their transport, the Battalion will be required to find Umpires for them.

The Battalion will NOT be required otherwise to participate in the Exercise.

The above instructions are only given in outline. It is intended that an officer from the War Office (M.O.1.(S.P.)), Lt.Colonel M.A.W. ROWLANDSON, R.A., shall visit the battalion and explain the scheme in full detail.

It is requested that you will suggest a suitable time and place for this visit.

The participation in Exercise "SPARTAN" of "local groups" operating behind the "Enemy" lines is to be regarded as MOST SECRET and discussion will be confined to the minimum number of selected officers.

Appendix IC.

COPY.

MOST SECRET & PERSONAL.

PLANS/312/195

6 April 1943.

To:- B.G.S. (Plans),
G.H.Q. Home Forces.

From:- M.O.1. (S.P.),
War Office.

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1. On the 19th of March I saw General MORGAN, at ST. PAUL's, and told him that, after our experiences in exercise SPARTAN, we were preparing a paper outlining how the activities of resistance groups on the Continent might be co-ordinated to help an invasion of N.W. EUROPE.

He discussed with me some of the points to be included in the paper, and advised me to send a single copy to you, in the first instance, to serve as a basis for further planning.

2. Herewith, therefore, is our paper, and I shall be grateful if you will let me know whether you approve it in principle, as a basis for detailed planning, which I think should start as soon as possible.

If you do so approve, Lt.Col. M.A.W. ROWLANDSON R.A., one of my G.S.Os I, will be available to you whenever you wish.

There have been "run off" a few further copies of the paper, in case you wish them sent to any other branches at G.H.Q. or a copy to be issued to your G.S.O.I.

3. In planning for the actions of resistance groups, questions of security inevitably arise, particularly when the time comes to inform Commanders and their staffs in broad outline of the assistance that they may receive from these sources.

The official title of this organisation is, as you know, "The Special Operations Executive" (S.O.E.). The organisation is, however, a secret one and in order to prevent the enemy tracing our various activities (which cover a very wide field) back to a common "control" our various branches operate under separate "covers" and the name S.O.E. is never used save with bodies like the Chiefs of Staff and J.P.S. who are concerned with our activities as a whole. The name by which we are known in our dealings with Army authorities is that of a War Office section - M.O.I. (S.P.).

We propose, therefore, and hope you will agree, that in all communications with your H.Q. we should be known as M.O.1. (S.P.), address as above, and that your staff should use a similar description in their dealings with lower formations. Members of your immediate staff who are concerned with directives from the Chiefs of Staff will, of course, have to know that S.O.E. and M.O.1,(S.P) are identical.

4. One further security point:- It is most important to prevent the enemy learning the identity of the central

control/

M.O.1 (S.P.) is officially known as a section charged with special planning. It will, of course, be necessary for staff officers to know that this section is, in fact, charged with liaison arrangements with the resistance groups. We are, however, anxious that there should be no express mention of the fact that it is we ourselves who are controlling these groups. I should be glad, therefore, if the emphasis could be kept upon the liaison feature without specifying too precisely whether it is we or the Allied Governments who are in direct touch with these groups.

(Signed) C.McV. Gubbins
Major General.

(PLANS/312/195) 6 Apr 43

MOST SECRET.

CO-ORDINATION OF ACTIVITIES BEHIND THE ENEMY LINES WITH THE ACTIONS OF ALLIED MILITARY FORCES INVADING N.W. EUROPE

Outline M.O.1.(S.P.) Proposals, reviewed after Exercise "SPARTAN"

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1. In accordance with directives issued by the Chiefs of Staff, and with a later letter sent by the Chiefs of Staff to Allied Governments in this country in July 1942, action has been and is being taken to organise resistance groups in the occupied territories of Europe, and to arm and equip them for action behind the enemy's lines in the event of an Allied invasion of the Continent. The body charged with this function is War Office, M.O.1. (S.P.).

2. This preparatory work has been in hand now for some time in all the occupied territories of Western and Central Europe, with a greater or less degree of success depending upon such factors as distance, weather conditions, morale of the people, Gestapo activity, etc.

3. The type of organisation which is being created also necessarily varies in accordance with the particular conditions in each country. This paper deals only with FRANCE, BELGIUM, and HOLLAND, where an Allied invasion is most likely to take place, and excludes Scandinavia and Central Europe.

4. In those three countries, i.e. FRANCE, BELGIUM, and HOLLAND, the organisation aims at producing a number of semi-independent resistance groups of limited strength, varying from 20 to 150 men each, armed, equipped and trained, and available to carry out such specific tasks as may be ordered when the time for action arrives. There is no question of the creation of large secret armies which will operate by formations: neither the nature of the terrain nor the activities of the Gestapo would permit, except possibly in the mountainous regions of S.E. FRANCE.

5. For successful action on, or subsequent to, D-day, the following is essential for each resistance group:-

(a) W/T communication with ENGLAND.

(b) Adequate arms and equipment.

(c) Clear and definite orders or instructions.

(d) Adequate leadership.

(e) Preparation for replenishment of supplies generally.

It will certainly be almost impossible to deliver a wireless set before D-day to each resistance group; even were it possible, it is patent that some of these sets would be discovered or out of action at the required moment. Similarly it will not be possible to deliver a full supply of arms to

every resistance group prior to invasion. Trained W/T operators of the requisite nationality will not be available in the numbers required. Thus, though some of the resistance groups will be self-contained and ready for action on D-day, it is obvious that others, to be effective, will require a last minu e stiffening and reinforcement.

6. This necessitates a reserve of personnel, of special arms, and of W/T sets available in ENGLAND for despatch by air where required. Another important function of this reserve will be as a weapon in the Commander's hand which can be directed at a moment's notice to meet any particular eventuality. It is contended that this reserve should consist of several "JEDBURGH" teams, each of three, i.e. a British officer (speaking the language, though not necessarily bilingual) a W/T operator, and an officer or N.C.O. of the relevant country. The functions of this team, when required by a resistance group, will be as under:-

(a) to provide the leadership and/or to direct operations in the direction required;

(b) to establish and maintain W/T communication;

(c) to bring a last-minute addition of arms and explosives (an adequate amount for 35 men forms a convenient half-load for a Halifax);

(d) To arrange for the dropping of further supplies on subsequent nights.

7. It is essential that these teams receive training in their role; which involves not only guerilla fighting and parachuting, but knowledge of many special devices and weapons, and of special types of W/T sets and codes. They should, before being sent into action, have an intimate knowledge of the situation of the resistance groups to which they are being sent. All this training can be arranged.

8. As regards resistance groups who already have well-established W/T communication prior and up to D-day, they may or may not require last-minute reinforcement. In an case, however, these groups will, in addition, be in the position to give excellent tactical intelligence on enemy formations in their area or passing through as soon as the invasion begins.

9. A good proportion of all these groups have already received training in the arms and weapons they have received or are awaiting, by means of instructors sent out to them for the purpose. In the same way, they have received some training in the operational roles which, pending the issue of definite instructions, they might expect to be called upon to perform. These roles include:-

(a) demolition of bridges and culverts,

(b) mining of roads and road traps,

(c) diverse types of booby traps,

(d) incendiarism with various forms of special devices,

(e) sabotage of railway communications and rolling stock,

(f) guerilla warfare with stens, revolvers, hand grenades, etc.

10. The importance of secrecy in all work in connection with resistance groups, including the selection, training, and equipment of JEDBURGHS, of the special signal detachments, and other personnel involved, must be paramount. This is more particularly the case in that certain of the Jedburgh teams may be despatched to operate in civilian cohtes, depending on the situation at their destination, and on the roles they are given, etc. Others of the personnel will be specialists who have already spent a period of reconnaissance, etc., in the countries concerned.

E X E R C I S E S P A R T A N

11. Exercise SPARTAN was used to try out the employment of resistance groups in conditions resembling as closely as possible these of an actual invasion, and to endeavour to discover the most suitable operational roles, equipment, arms, communications, etc.

Use was made of the two types of groups, i.e.:-

(a) <u>The groups with well-established communications and not in need of reinforcement</u>.

These were known as BOYKINS. In view of the shortage of troops to represent resistance groups, these were NOT given an operational role, but were told to report what they could of enemy movements, order of battle, etc. They were represented by a small party of 2 or 3 men.

(b) <u>The groups requiring reinforcement</u>.

To these a team of three JEDBURGHS was sent, comprising an officer, an N.C.O. and a W/T operator and ' set. Their operational orders and instructions emanated from Army Headquarters, and were sent by special signal channels using special W/T sets, or the team was 'briefed' before departure.

12. Six BOYKIN groups and eleven groups "requiring reinforcement were established behind the enemy's lines. Eleven JEDBURGH teams were parachuted to the latter groups during the course of the Exercise, and wireless communication opened up as rapidly as possible. BOYKINS already possessed satisfactory W/T communications when the Exercise opened.

BOYKIN activity was, for security and other reasons, purposely restricted to the passing of information. Groups to which JEDBURGHS were dropped were exercised in the execution of certain specific operations ordered at various times by Army H.Q., the necessary instructions being taken by the actual JEDBURGH team by means of a 'briefing' before their departure, or sent by the special W/T channels to the groups concerned.

13. The results of the Exercise SPARTAN, as far as BOYKINS and JEDBURGHS were concerned, were of considerable interest, and did not in all cases correspond with preconceived ideas on their employment.

In brief, they may be stated as follows:-

(a) BOYKINS (in their limited role of information and reconnaissance of targets)

(i) The information received was of much greater value than had been anticipated, both in volume and in accuracy; as these teams are not trained in 'intelligence', no important information had been expected. At appendix A are examples of really important messages which were received from them at Army H.Q.

(ii) These groups, when overrun by our own forces in their advance, were able to give valuable additional information by interrogation at formation H.Qs., but they were not in all cases 'picked up' in time or, in one or two cases, at all.

(b) Groups with JEDBURGHS

Eleven JEDBURGH teams were despatched to join up with eleven resistance groups, taking with them a W/T set, additional arms, etc., packed in the containers in which they were would have been delivered if sent by air. They were briefed before despatch on the tasks as ordered by Army H.Q. which they were to undertake.

The primary tasks given to the JEDBURGHS WERE:

Demolitions	5
Prevention of demolitions	3
Attack on H.Q.	1
Dislocation of L of C	2

In every case secondary tasks were given of general guerilla activities against small enemy administrative detachments, against staff cars, D.Rs, solitary vehicles etc. As the Exercise was circumscribed in time and area, the actual targets were tactical rather than strategical.

Results

(i) Every JEDBURGH team successfully contacted and joined up with its group. The conditions were, to some extent, artificial.

(ii) Three teams were badly, and three extremely well commanded. The badly led teams induged in pitched battles in which, although they did not fulfil their primary task, their high scale of S.M.G. and the fact that they were opposed by L of C. troops resulted in their inflicting on the enemy casualties disproportionate to their own. The well led teams fulfilled their primary tasks and inflicted some casualties on the enemy by guerilla methods without having to fight any pitched battle and without losing their own men and equipment. Details are shown in Appendix B.

(iii) Owing to the special W/T sets that have to be employed, and the special wireless lay-out, it was found in SPARTAN that 48 hours were normally required between the Commander's orders for an operation and the arrival of the resistance group on its target. Under actual service conditions it is considered that at least 72 hours should be allowed. (See specimen timetable at Appendix C.)

Therefore tasks of an immediate tactical significance should not be undertaken by the JEDBURGH method. JEDBURGHS must be used well back behind the enemy's front.

(iv) The JEDBURGH W/T communications did not always work satisfactorily, probably owing to insufficient care in the selection of the site and erection of the aerial or inability to use a favourable site owing to danger of discovery.

14. Staff and Signal requirements for the operation and control of resistance groups

The co-ordination of the operations of resistance groups with those of regular military forces requires:-

(a) The presence on formation H.Qs. of staff officers to advise on employment, give direction and exercise control.

(b) The provision of special signal detachments with the same formation H.Qs., as normal signal apparatus and methods can not be used for communication with resistance groups.

15. The staff officers concerned must have had experience in the organisation of resistance groups, should if possible know personally some of their personnel (during training in ENGLAND, etc.), and must have studied most carefully the possibilities of the various groups with which they will be concerned.

The scale of allotment of these additional staff officers is a matter for urgent consideration. From the experience of SPARTAN, particularly as concerns the role of resistance targets, it seams clear that the main requirement is at Army H.Q. in the field, as follows:-

M.O.1. (S.P.) Section :

One G.S.O.1.	For liaison with B.G.S., G.S.O.1.(Ops) and (Int), for forward planning, and for ensuring the proper working of his staff officers in collaboration with the Branches at Army H.Q.. (including the warning of the C.E. of impending demolitions by agents or JEDBURGH teams).
Two G.S.Os.3 (Ops)	For working out detailed requirements for JEDBURGHS, for following up their movements and preparing their subsequent instructions. For preparing detailed instruction on the operational role of agents.
Two G.S.Os.3 (I.a).	For feeding into the normal I staff information received from agents and JEDBURGHS.
One G.S.O. 3 (I.b)	For assisting the normal I (b) staff to counter German penetration into Patriot Forces and "local groups" overrun by our advance.

For these officers there is needed a proportionate scale of clerks. transport, drivers, etc.

There must be a special Signal Section permanently attached to Army H.Q.

Until Army H.Q. proceeds to the field, the above Section will be working with Army H.Q. in ENGLAND.

The composition of the detachment required at Supreme H.Q. (or G.H.Q.) has not yet been considered in detail. Since, however, Supreme H.Q. will be in telephone communication with the H.Q. of the Organisation in LONDON, it is felt that only a small detachment headed by a Brigadier would be required.

16. In addition to the above, it is thought that the following should be provided at Army H.Q. :-

(a) One M.O.1.(S.P.) team of one G.S.O.2 and one G.S.O.3, with a small Signal Section, and a fair scale of clerks, drivers, and transport, to be available for attachment to any isolated Corps, such as an Armed Corps sent out on a wide envelopment or a Corps charged with establishing the initial bridgehead.

(b) A pool of, say, four Liaison Officers, with clerks and transport, for despatch to forward Divisions and Brigades to pick up, and make immediate use of, personnel of resistance groups when overrun by our advance. Obviously the use that can be made of them, whether for information or operational purposes. These Liaison Officers should be selected from those who have been in touch with 'trainees' in this country or in the field.

17. Summary of lessons

(a) Resistance Groups, porperly equipped and boldly led, can be an effective complement to regular military forces in operations in occupied territories.

(b) Where such groups are still lacking in arms, equipment, W/T, etc., on D-day, they can be rendered more effective by parachuting to them at the final moment of invasion (or subsequently as required) leaders, liaison personnel, W/T operators and acts, arms, etc. (JEDBURGH teams).

(c) In view of the necessarily considerable time-lag between the decision by the Army Commander to attack some particular target, these groups should be used well back behind the enemy's front, and NOT for close tactical tasks. This policy is strengthened by the fact that a group, once launched, is difficult to control; if, therefore, it is employed tactically, there is danger of confusion.

(d) The most suitable roles are:-

(i) Attacks on communications of all kinds, e.g.

Demolition of bridges
Prevention of demolition of bridges
Cutting of railways
Attacks on rolling stock
Cutting of telecommunications

(ii) As a secondary task, general guerilla warfare by attacking staff cars, D.Rs, vehicles, etc.

(iii) Creation of confusion and alarm by:-

Spreading of rumours
Removal of signs
Erection of false signs, e.g."Unexploded bomb - diversion via X"
Many other passive means.

N.B.,

It must be remembered that resistance groups cannot usually undertake the destruction of large bridges, rail or road, with any certainty owing to the amount of explosives required, unless special stores are dropped to them.

(e) W/T communications worked by small special units at formation H.Q. with special sets can provide adequate communication, if planning is carefully thought out.

(f) Resistance groups, well established, should be able as an indirect task to provide good intelligence of a strategical or even tactical nature.

(g) The employment of resistance groups can, within certain limits, be adequately directed and controlled from Army H.Q. by the addition of :-

a small M.O.1.(S.P.) Staff and special Signal unit, plus a small reserve for use with Corps and Division if necessary.

17. Conclusion.

It is suggested that the method of employment and comtrol of resistance groups formulated in this paper be accepted and, if so, that general approval be given to the provision of the necessary personnel and stores so that planning may commence immediately.

APPENDIX A

EXERCISE "SPARTAN."

EXAMPLES OF IMPORTANT INTELLIGENCE MESSAGES

RECEIVED AT ARMY H.Q. FROM "BOYKINS"

(ref para 13 (a) (i))

Date recd	From Agent in Area	Message	Comments
3 Mar	BANBURY	80 Vehs and 60 tks marked red white diamond in BANBURY &	Indicated 42 Armed Div.
4 Mar	BEDFORD	Large convoy incl Inf, A.F.Vs, and Arty, marked with white square, blue circle and red diamond passed SHEFFORD moving WEST. BEDFORD H.Q. discovered but not identified.	Indicated 42 Armed Div.
5 Mar	AYLESBURY	Bridges at 337213 and 320243 demolished. 1930 hrs 4 Mar 12 pieces heavy arty from TRING to WENDOVER. No tks in my area.	No Armed fmn in the AYLESBURY area. Valuable infm about bridge demolition.
7 Mar	STONY STRATFORD	Many tk tracks through Deer Park: tks still between WHITTLEBURY and LUFFIELD ABBEY marked Panda 52. 77 Bty (6 pdrs) along avenue 1055 to 1195. 74 Bty in STOWE PK and 76 Bty (25 pdrs) at VICTORIA COTTAGE 1860, all marked Panda.	This placed 9 Armed Div, of which trace had been lost by 2nd Army.
8 Mar	BANBURY	1600 hrs 7 Mar at 947487 Carriers and A.Tk guns of 42 Div. Brs at 943491 and 971533 demolished. 1630 hrs 7 Mar at 971533, moving SOUTH, 100 lorries, 24 med guns and 6 Befors marked 42 Div. Recce units of 42 Div at 963531 and 547562. Units of same Div in area BODICOTE, FRITWELL, NORTH ASHTON. Brs at 909606,908617 and 907516 demolished.	Indicated 42 Armed Div. Valuable infm about bridge demolition.
10 Mar	NORTHAMPTON	Brs at 092788, 149756 and 176779 prepared for demolition and under guard, 24 tks on transporters passed through NORTHAMPTON towards WEEDON.	Valuable infm about bridges.
11 Mar	BEEFORD	H.Q. in BEDFORD withdrew. Brs in BROMHAM and TURVEY ready for demolition. Red diamond tps are in TURVEY.	Indicated move of Army H.Q. Valuable infm about bridges.

JEDBURGHS

APPENDIX D

SCHEDULE OF TIMINGS, AREAS OF OPERATION, AND RESULTS

CODE NAME	TIME OF ARRIVAL IN FIELD	AREA OF OPERATION	MILES BEHIND ENEMY LINES	TIME OVERRUN	TIME PICKED UP	DURATION OF STAY IN FIELD	DEMOLITION OR PRESERVATION OF BRIDGES	CASUALTIES INFLICTED	VEHS CAPTURED DESTROYED OR DISABLED	OTHER DISRUPTION CAUSED	CASUALTIES SUFFERED
HACKNEY	0215/6	AYLESBURY	25	0800/8	NOT	2½ days	One br protected from demolition.	4	17 lorries	-	-
HAMPSTEAD	0030/6	CHINNOR Nr. THAME	20	1120/7	NOT	1½ days	One culvert blown	-	-	3 convoys M/T stopped by dem. 2 turned back	-
DEPTFORD 1	0100/7	RADWAY (N.W. of BANBURY)	35	1300/9	1800/9	2½ days	-	5	2 lorries 2 M/Cs	-	-
KENSINGTON	2130/7	ST. NEOTS	40 - 45	NOT	-	4½ days	One br preserved from demolition & subsequently blown	66	30 lorries	REME wkshp? Sigs HQ attacked. Lines cut.	2
LAMBETH & PADDINGTON	2030/7 2130/8	TEMPSFORD	40-45 40	NOT	-	4½ days 3½ days	-	at least 120	70 unspecified	-	Approx 70
HOLBORN	2300/8	CASTLE ASHBY (nr. NORTHAMPTON)	30	NOT	-	3½ days	-	60	8 lorries 2 cars 47 M/Cs 1 carrier 5 tanks	Br. dem. Stopped R.A. Regt. Div H.Q. attacked	Approx 18
STEPNEY	2300/9	BEDFORD	25	NOT	-	2½ days	One Br and two culverts blown	17	2 lorries 2 cars	Traffic dislocated	1
FINSBURY	2100/9	NEWPORT - PAGNELL	15	1800/11	1200/12	2 days	One Br and three culverts blown	10	1 lorry	-	-

/cont. .....

CODE NAME	TIME OF ARRIVAL IN FIELD	AREA OF OPERATION	MILES BEHIND ENEMY LINES	TIME OVERRUN	TIME PICKED UP	DURATION OF STAY IN FIELD	DEMOLITION OR PRESERVATION OF BRIDGES	CASUALTIES INFLICTED	VEHS CAPTURED DESTROYED OR DISABLED	OTHER DISRUPTION CAUSED	CASUALTIES SUFFERED
CHELSEA	2030/10	ORWELL (Mr. ROYSTON)	35	NOT	-	1½ days	One br blown	3 definite (unspecified 10 - 20)	1 lorry	Rd blocked	35 (10 of these dispersed)
DEPTFORD 2	2230/10	SHEFFORD.	10	NOT	-	1½ days	-	80 (Fd dressing Stn., incl MO i/c, Capt)	1 car 1 M/C M/T of RASC Workshop M/T of Fd. Dressing Station	-	12
TOTALS								375	59 Lorries 5 cars 50 M/Cs 1 carrier (Bren) 5 Tks (Covenanters) 70 unspecified vehs 3 RASC Workshops 200 approx.		138

(PLANS/312/195) APPENDIX C.

SAMPLE TIMETABLE FOR JEDBURGH OPERATIONS

(Ref para 13 (b) (III))

D.1 Day 2000 hrs...Comd in the field, or Supreme Comd in ENGLAND, approves projected operation.

On receipt of these requirements, M.O.1. (S.P.) in ENGLAND must :-

Collate intelligence about local conditions, state of resistance groups, etc., in the selected area.
Agree suitable dropping points with R.A.F.
Pick JEDBURGH teams.
Pack into containers suitable arms and equipment.
Prepare Signal Plans.
Brief the JEDBURGH team.
Etc., Etc.,

Night D.2/D.3.. JEDBURGH teams are dropped in the chosen area.
Contact is made with a patriot prepared to raise a "Local Group" of the required strength.
JEDBURGH personnel and containers are hidden.
W/T comn is established.

Night D.3/D.4..... Local Group assembles. is issued with arms and equipment, is instructed in its use, and is organised to carry out the tasks.
While the JEDBURGH 2nd-in-Comd undertakes these duties, the Comd, with a local guide, reconnoitres his task.

Night D.4/D.5..... JEDBURGHS and Local Group move out to undertake the task.

NOTE. Normally the JEDBURGHS will have to remain hidden during daylight. The Local Group may well disperse by day to their usual avocations.


I D.

(PLANS/312/997)

Diagram showing a proposed S.O.E. Communications Layout in the event of a re-invasion of the Continent, and at a stage when Army H.Q. have been established

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NOT TO SCALE



LEGEND

S.O.E. H.Q., Agents, establishments, etc....

Existing Comns. W/T

Line

Comns to be set up W/T

Line

(PLANS/312/997)

COPY. I E

TASKS FOR JEDBURGHS

A. TO HINDER THE ENEMY.

1. Interference with Enemy L of C.

(a) Removal of, or interference with, Road Signs.
(b) Destruction of Petrol Pumps.
(c) Laying of Tyre Bursters camouflaged as small stones,etc., or in dung.
(d) Sniping at drivers at long range.
(e) Felling of trees across roads.
(f) Erection of unguarded road obstacles and fire from unguarded Pill Boxes.
(g) Interference with water supplies.
(h) Opening and jamming of swing bridges, etx.
(i) Interference with electrical supplies by attacks on transformers, switching gear, pylons.
(j) Interference with gas supply.
(k) Opening of flood gates, dams, etc.
(l) Demolition of bridges on L of C which are already prepared for demolition, provided it does not interfere with advance of own tps.

2. Interference with Enemy Railways

(a) Attacks on Locos.
(b) De-railing charges.
(c) Interference with signals.

3. Sabotage of Enemy Aircraft.

(a) Attacks on Planes.
(b) Attacks on Supplies.
(c) Attacks on Pilots when off duty.

4. Interference with Enemy Signals

(a) Cutting of lines and removal of large sections.
(b) Secret cuts in lines.
(c) Cutting and incorrect joining of cables,
(d) Felling of telephone poles across roads.
(e) Tight wires neck high for D/Rs.
(f) Sniping D/Rs with silent Sten.

5. Liquidation of Enemy Commands and Staff

(a) Ambush of staff cars.
(b) Silent killing of unaccompanied staff officers.
(c) [illegible]
(c) Attacks on enemy H.Qs, particularly small ones.

6. Interference with Enemy Vehicle and Ordnance Repair and Replacement Facilities.

(a) Attacks on L.A.D's and Base workshops.
(b) Removal of all small tools from civilian Garages.
(c) Destruction of Parks of Reserve vehicles.

7. Interference with Enemy Supplies

(a) Destruction of Bomb and Shell Dumps.
(b) Destruction of Rations by fire or contamination with paraffin.
(c) Stealing of Rations.

(d) Destruction of Petrol and Oil Dumps.

8. General

(a) Substitution of H.E. for normal propellants in ammunition dumps, thus not only damaging enemy guns but making the whole dump suspect.
(b) Laying of Booby Traps in Reserve Line Pill Boxes.
(c) Premature firing of MacNaughton Tubes if used by enemy.

B. TO HELP OUR TROOPS.

1. Collection of Intelligence and Target Indication

(a) Reports of enemy movements.
(b) Reports on location of H.Qs and supply dumps.
(c) Setting of Target-marking flares for our bombers.
(d) Ploughing of land to point out important Targets.

2. Provision of Local Guides

3. Prevention of Final Demolitions

I F.

TO: MS and MT — DRA/1246

FROM: D/RA — 10.9.43.

---

1. The object of this instruction is to enable you to work out a training programme and an establishment for JEDBURGH training which will be carried out at a school to be formed. Training will be completed by 1st April, 1944.

2. You are referred to the Partisan Leaders' Handbook and the M.T.P. on guerilla warfare, and AD/E has asked me to stress that in considering any training programme. you will bear in mind that however sound a plan may be it will be of no avail unless the personnel are:-

a) Physically fit
b) Well disciplined
c) Well trained in tactics and the use of their weapons
d) Completely confident in their weapons
e) Of high morale - the will to win and the belief that they will win.

3. The object of Jedburgh operations is to enable G.H.Q. through S.O.E. to exercise direct communication with and control over Resistance Groups in the field. The type of operation on which a JEDBURGH team may be despatched, therefore, falls into four main headings:-

a) Coup-de-main
b) Protective
c) Liaison
d) Guerilla

All teams will be capable of proceeding on a parachute operation covering any one or more of these tasks.

4. <u>The Coup-de-Main and Protective Roles</u>.

At least one member of every team will be an expert on demolitions and the disconnection of demolition charges. The leader will have a good knowledge of demolition.

All members of a team, particularly the leader, will be well versed in field craft: be able to recognise enemy uniforms and vehicles from those of the Allies.

The leader and 2 i/c will be trained in German methods of demolition and withdrawal, in order that, in the protection role. he may assess the correct moment for elimination of their demolition parties and disconnection of charges.

5. <u>Liaison</u>.

All leaders and 2 i/c will be trained in memorising situation reports and orders and instructions, in order that as little as possible need be committed to paper.

All members of a team, other than W/T operators, will be capable of instructing resistance groups in the use of small arms and demolition charges.

6. <u>Guerilla</u>

All members of a team will be able to differentiaite between Allied and enemy personnel and equipment: be skilled in map

reading. field craft and the compass: will know how to drive vehicles: how to start fires: how to plan an ambush: how to erect road blocks, trip wires, etc: how to carry out attacks on H.Q's, telecommunications and rail communications, and how to organise communications within a resistance group.

7. General.

All leaders and 2 i/c's will be trained in giving orders in the concise clear military method. All teams will be fully conversant with the latest methods of "reception committees": will know how to drop blind with containers: will be completely accustomed to work by night, and will be capable of elementary cooking to enable them to subsist on the country.

All teams will be conversant with the general history of resistance movements and with the spirit and conditions in which they will find partisans.

No instruction in military intelligence in the field will be given, other than instructing teams in making factual reports of enemy movements, i.e. teams will report what they see but will make no deductions.

8. W/T operators

(a) One operator will be allotted to each team. It is impossible to determine at this stage in which area operations will take place. Operators will therefore be required to work from any part of France.

(b) They will communicate direct with the base station in England.

(c) As a general rule teams will be dropped in country districts, but on occasions they may be dropped in the vicinity of industrial areas: also those dropped in country districts, may find their way into industrial areas. You will therefore have to cater for transmission from both industrial and country districts.

(d) Operators will not operate within the immediate vicinity of each other as teams will normally work at least 10 miles apart.

(e) All lateral communications will be through the base station.

(f) It will be necessary for M.S. to work out a crack signal system with MT and D/RA.

(g) If possible those who during training do not reach the required standard will be persevered with in order that in the event of an operator casualty in the field, they can act as a reserve in the team in at least the transmission of crack signals.

9. Standard to be obtained

Finally I am instructed by A/DE to state that he wishes the standard of training of JEDBURGHS to be of the highest quality: and he states that their mission being a dangerous one it is essential that the risk is lessened by ensuring that every man of overy team is "word perfect" and therefore confident in the success of his task.

I G.

ADE/900

12 Oct 43

To: AD/M, D/R, MT, MS, AL,
D/B, MG, F, RF, N, T, EU/P.
Copies to: C.D., K/AIR.P, D/PLANS,
D/S, MP, L/WAD.

From: AD/E

JEDBURGH PROCEDURE

1. In order to ensure uniformity of thought on Jedburgh operations and the handling of Jedburgh teams, I am circulating this memorandum regarding the operational and administrative control.

2. Jedburgh teams are designed to serve as a reserve in the hands of SOE/OSS H.Q. in London, to undertake post D-Day tasks in conformity with military requirements. They are so constituted as to be able normally to bring to existing Resistance Groups any leadership, communications, fresh orders, or appropriate arms and equipment that may at the time be required. Therefore, teams will generally be infiltrated to areas where resistance is known to be active, either to reception or blind. On occasions it may be necessary to infiltrate to an area where elements of resistance are unknown. In such cases the composition of the team may have to be increased to enable it to carry out its task without assistance.

3. Control of teams will be exercised by S.O.E./OSS in London and communications with Jedburgh W/T operators in the Field will be through the base station in England. Requests for tasks from S.F. Detachments attached to Army H.Q. will be passed to Army Group H.Q. who submit demands to S.O.E./O.S.S. in London.

4. To implement an existing policy, or to carry out special action demanded by the Army, a decision will be made as to whether an order to existing organisations in the Field is sufficient, or whether a Jedburgh team will be necessary.

5. If a Jedburgh team is to be despatched, the general procedure will be that I will decide:

(a) Whether the team will be received by a Reception Committee. This will depend on Country Section reports as to the state in the Field in the area at that time.

(b) What should be the composition of the team? Although the basic operational unit is three men (Leader, Second-in-Command and W/T Operator), the nature of the task may necessitate an increase.

(c) What night it will be necessary to despatch the team selected.

(d) What type of transportation is required, and whether transportation is available.

6. The following details will then be arranged by the Officers concerned:-

(a) Warn the School, or other holding establishment,

/that a team

that a team for the task (specifying task) will be despatched on a certain night (specifying night). As much information as possible will be given in this warning order. If the warning is given in the early afternoon, despatch may take place the same night. A warning order will also have to be sent to S.F. Detachments.

(b) Arrange packing of containers. D/B, DR/A, AL/C will have previously worked out standard colls to cover all types of operations, thus enabling the Packing Station to provide containers with - x colls - y colls according to the nature of the task. Warning will be sent to the Packing Station as soon as possible.

(c) Write the operation order.

(d) Despatch an Officer to the School with the operation order to brief the team selected by the School. The Briefing Officer will take to the School any maps required and any information, photographic or otherwise, available.

7. It is impossible to hazard the rate of despatch, but we must take our worst case and be prepared to operate with a high percentage of our teams in the Field at the same time. It can be said that it is unlikely that more than five teams will operate on any one front. In explanation of the work "front" it is pointed out that if the Pas de Calais is considered as one front, Brittany, Normandy and the Vosges will each be considered as a separate front.

8. Jedburgh teams may on rare occasions be used tactically in roles such as bridge protection, but will always be dropped strategically. This means that a tactical task can only be carried out provided the team is dropped well ahead of the time at which it is requested that the task will be carried out. They will lie up during that time reconnoitring and studying their task.

9. Jedburgh W/T Operators will be allotted two skeds a day, one in the morning and one in the evening. This allows instructions to be sent in the evening and report on the night's activities to be received next morning.

10. During the training period DR/A will be the Staff Officer who will ensure that the training being carried out at the School meets Jedburgh commitments. He will, therefore, be responsible for keeping MS, MT, and the Commandant informed as to anticipated operational requirements and as to the position in the Field in so far as it may effect training.

I H.

AD/E/603

20th December 1943.

To: Colonel HASKELL.
D/R (5 copies). AL.
MT (3 copies). MS (3 copies).
D/F. ADM. MG.
Comdt. M.E.65. DR/J. DRJ/US.
D/CE. DR/US. DR/C. D/CR.
DR/P. MG/A. MGA/US. AL/C.
DB. DDB. MT/US. Major EMBRY.
DR/M. DR/M.1.

From: AD/E.

JEDBURGHS

The attached paper on JEDBURGHS, which has been prepared jointly by S.O.E./S.O., is circulated to all concerned.

Attention is drawn to Appendix "A" in which the action to be taken by those responsible is specified in detail.

Copies to: A/CD. V/CD.
AD/N. AD/Z.
AQ. A/D.
D/PLANS. D/S.
AMX (2 copies).
EU/P.

AD/E/603 20th December 1943.

J E D B U R G H S

OBJECT.

1. To define the role of JEDBURGHS in support of operations for the invasion of NORTH-WEST EUROPE: to summarise the steps which have been, or remain to be, taken to enable them to perform this role: to lay down by whom and by what date the necessary action is to be taken.

OPERATIONAL ROLE.

2. General Purpose.

It has been decided that 70 JEDBURGH teams, with necessary reinforcements, will provide the strategic reserve with which S.O.E./S.O. can create and control offensive action behind the enemy lines on and after D-Day where existing communications, leadership, organisation or supplies are inadequate, or to carry out such additional specific tasks as are demanded by the military situation.

3. Composition of Teams.

JEDBURGH teams will normally consist of three men, of whom at least one will be a native of the country in which the team is to operate. Teams will consist of a leader, a second-in-command, both of whom will normally be officers, and one wireless operator.

4. Employment.

a). The principal function of JEDBURGH teams is that of liaison with Resistance Groups. Leaders and seconds-in-command of teams should have a sound working knowledge of the language of the country so that they can give instruction and orders where necessary. It is NOT the intention that JEDBURGH teams will necessarily usurp the authority of local leaders, but it is felt that the arrival of Allied soldiers, in uniform, behind the enemy lines, will have a marked effect on patriotic morale and that these teams, representing as they do the Allied High Command, will act as a focus for local resistance.

b). As a general rule, JEDBURGH teams will be sent only to those areas where there are known to be actual or potential resistance elements. Their functions will vary according to the nature of the group to which they are sent and may include any or all of the following:-

i). Organisation of a group for guerrilla activity.

ii). Equipping a group.

iii). Giving instruction in the use of arms and stores.

iv). Communicating special orders.

v). Leading a group in operations against the enemy.

vi). Providing W/T communication.

c). The preservation of vital points for the use of the Allied armies is envisaged as a possible secondary task for JEDBURGH teams and the forces under their control, to be undertaken, if opportunity arises, when the withdrawal of the enemy brings them into the front line.

d). The despatch of a JEDBURGH team to an area where nothing whatever is known of potential resistance elements is a shot in the dark which will be rarely taken, unless:-

i). The task is one of high priority, and

ii). The team includes at least one member who knows the district intimately.

e). The despatch of JEDBURGHS in larger groups to undertake coup-de-main operations is another rare use to which specially trained JEDBURGHS, selected for their aptitude for this type of task, may be put, if the target is considered of sufficient importance. In this case, teams may be augmented so that, if necessary, they can carry out their task without assistance.

f). Operational Zone.

The intention is that JEDBURGHS should begin their operations well behind the enemy lines. No exact limit of distance can be given. It can be stated generally that their mission will be a strategic one and that their function will, at first, be to harass the enemy in depth. The advance of Allied troops will, of course, bring JEDBURGH parties nearer to the German front lines, when, if still effective, they will be available for tactical tasks.

g). Clothing.

i). JEDBURGH teams will normally arrive in the field in uniform. The possibility of occasional exceptions to this rule cannot be excluded at this stage of planning. It can, however, be said that no individual will be required to go into the field in plain clothes unless he volunteers to do so.

ii). The wearing of uniform behind the enemy lines, while affording a measure of protection in the event of capture, undoubtedly adds somewhat to the chances of it. JEDBURGHS who find the wearing of uniform interferes with the performance of their task in the field, may, therefore, choose to change into plain clothes provided by the local inhabitants, and to accept the risks entailed. It should be made clear that there is nothing dishonourable in such a course.

h). It is NOT intended that JEDBURGHS will act as intelligence agents. In the course of their operations they will, however, keep their eyes open and pass back to H.Q. S.O.E./S.O. any information of military value, particularly as regards enemy troop movements and locations of headquarters. JEDBURGHS will be trained to report what they see, but they will not draw deductions.

5. Tasks.

The following are the main tasks on which Jedburgh teams and the forces under their control are likely to be employed, together with the priority allotted to them for training purposes:-

Priority allotted for training purposes	No.	Task
A	1	Rail cutting.
	2	Attacks on enemy and enemy used road vehicles, including transport parks.
	3	Misdirection and dislocation of road traffic.
	4	Delaying and dislocating movement of Panzer Divisions.
B	1	Destruction of telecommunications.
	2	Liquidation of enemy Commands and Staff.
	3	Interference with enemy supplies (military dumps only - food, ammunition, petrol).
	4	Neutralising Luftwaffe.
C	1	Destruction of electric power points used for military purposes.
	2	Demolition of minor bridges, or major bridges already prepared for demolition by the enemy.
	3	Prevention of final demolitions.
	4	Observing and reporting enemy positions, headquarters, military dumps, installations.
D	1	Attacks on railway installation, e.g. round houses, turntables, etc.
	2	Attacks on railway engines and rolling stock, without causing lasting damage.

The following targets will NOT be attacked by Jedburghs:-

1. Industrial targets.
2. Public utility undertakings, other than electric power used for military purposes.
3. Shipping.
4. Demolition of major bridges not already prepared for demolition by the enemy.
5. Lasting damage to engines and rolling stock.

OPERATIONAL MACHINERY.

6. Position of JEDBURGHS within the Framework of Allied Overall Plan.

As stated above, JEDBURGHS will constitute S.O.E./S.O.'s reserve. As such, they must be employed with reference to the requirements of the military forces operating on the CONTINENT. These requirements will be communicated to S.O.E./S.O. Headquarters in LONDON by the S.F. Staffs working with military formations in the field, and on occasions through S.O.E./S.O. Liaison Officers at S.A.C.

7. Function of S.O.E./S.O. Headquarters.

It will be the function of H.Q. S.O.E./S.O. LONDON, as the body concerned with the general co-ordination and direction of resistance behind the enemy lines, to decide whether, in order to fulfil military requirements as indicated by S.F. Staffs, it is necessary to send a JEDBURGH team; and if so, they will prepare the necessary orders and make all consequential arrangements.

8. Procedure for Despatching JEDBURGHS.

The procedure for despatching JEDBURGHS has been outlined in the attached paper AD/E/900 dated 12th October 1943. DR/J, DRJ/US, DR/P, MG/A and MG/US will consider this outline, work out the necessary details, and carry out trials. They will report with recommendations to AD/E by 31st January 1944. They will keep in close touch with the equipment committee set up under para.23.

9. Transportation.

JEDBURGH teams will normally be dropped by parachute at pre-arranged spots. This type of operation is a difficult one and its chances of success are estimated at one in two under present conditions. An appreciation of the effect of post D-Day conditions, as regards the air situation, on these chances is urgently required. A/L and AD/M will be responsible for the preparation of this appreciation, in consultation with COSSAC.

10. Arrangements for Reception and Contact.

a). A directive will be issued on this subject as soon as the appreciation called for under para.9 has been prepared.

b). In the meantime, D/R will arrange for contact to be made with all Maquis areas so that they can be prepared for the possible reception of stores and men in uniform.

c). AL will inform DR/J and DRJ/US of the production situation in regard to Eurekas, and every effort will be made, through Country Sections, to place Eurekas in the field.

11. Communications.

JEDBURGHS will be in direct communication with S.O.E./S.O. main station in ENGLAND. A standard set for the use of JEDBURGHS in the field has been designed. MS is requested to confirm that it will be available in sufficient quantity to meet training and operational requirements.

12. Recovery of JEDBURGHS.

a). JEDBURGH teams are in no sense suicide squads, but valuable units whose recovery is an integral part of the S.O.E./S.O. plan.

b). JEDBURGHS are sent to local resistance elements to fight with them, and their task is to continue inflicting damage and loss on the enemy as long as they possibly can.

c). When the JEDBURGH team is of the opinion that it can no longer continue to function, it will first report to Headquarters asking for orders. The party will then be ordered to proceed to a safe house, to attempt to make its way through to our lines, or to remain in hiding, as the case may be. Should W/T communication be broken down a decision must be taken by the leader on the spot.

d). D/F will appoint an officer forthwith to attend to the possibility of exfiltrating JEDBURGHS on D/F lines. D/R.J will make special arrangements with M.1.9. as may be advised by D/F.

PERSONNEL.

13. The following table shews the distribution by nationalities required to make up the round total of one hundred JEDBURGH teams which will be available by D-Day. It is not expected that the figures given will be rigidly adhered to.

Appointment	British	U.S.	French	Belgian	Dutch	Totals
Leaders and 2 1/C's	50	50	82	9	9	200
W/T Ops.	35	50	15	-	-	100
Totals	85	100	97	9	9	300

14. Records.

a). The official military records of U.S. JEDBURGH personnel will be kept at O. S. S. H.Q. LONDON.

b). D/CR is requested to arrange with DR/C for the keeping of military records of British personnel.

c). DR/J and DRJ/US will arrange with the representative of the Allied French, appointed under para. 27 below, the keeping of military records of French personnel.

d). Dossiers will be kept at the JEDBURGH School, with up-to-date duplicates in the custody of DR/J and DRJ/US at S.O.E./S.O. H.Q. These dossiers will contain, in regard to each of the JEDBURGH personnel, such information as training reports, language qualifications, aptitude for special tasks, special knowledge of country, etc.

e). Consolidated training and operational reports will be kept at the War Room, Norgeby House.

TRAINING.

15. Schools.

a). Training for W/T operators will be at S.T.S.54 until 1st February 1944, and thereafter at MILTON HALL.

b). Training for leaders and seconds-in-command will take place at MILTON HALL, PETERBOROUGH.

16. Training Programme.

a). Duration and Target Date.

Training at the JEDBURGH School will begin on 1st January 1944. All teams will be fully trained by 1st April 1944.

b). Training Periods at the JEDBURGH School.

The general training programme is divided into two sections - six weeks basic training and six weeks operational training. At the end of the first month, parties of fifty will proceed to S.T.S.51 for parachute training, which will consist of three jumps per man. Additional jumps will be made during the operational training period. The W/T operators will join the School on 1st February 1944 and will undergo general training from that time onwards. In addition to general training, they will continue with specialised W/T training, under instructors to be provided from MS Section.

c). Subjects to be Taught during Basic Training.

All leaders and seconds-in-command will be given instruction in the following subjects:-

i). Demolition.

ii). Physical training.

iii). Map reading and fieldcraft.

iv). Weapon training - British, American, German and French small arms.

v). Appreciations and orders.

vi). Tactics:-
Guerrilla tactics.
German tactics.

vii). Reception Committee work.

viii). Anti-tank mines.

ix). Street fighting.

x). Motor cycle and car driving. (Low priority.)

xi). Intelligence training, with special reference to recognition of German uniforms, A.F.V's and German military organisation.

Training will, throughout, be related to the directive on JEDBURGH tasks contained in para.5.

In addition to the above subjects, some instruction in the following additional subjects will be given to all JEDBURGH leaders and seconds-in-command:-

i). General history of resistance movements in NORTH-WEST EUROPE since 1940.

ii). An outline of the way in which resistance groups can assist in an invasion.

iii). General lectures on the function of JEDBURGHS.

iv). First aid.

v). Practical wireless training for non-operators.

vi). The geography of FRANCE and the LOW COUNTRIES.

vii). Observation and memory training.

d). General.

Every effort should be made to ensure that by D-Day the British and American leaders and seconds-in-command have a sound working knowledge of the French language and a general idea of the background of French life at the present time. The above instructions will also be borne in mind in making up the teams that will operate in HOLLAND and BELGIUM. Details of the training programme will be worked out by MT, in consultation with all concerned and will be submitted to AD/E and Colonel Haskell by 23rd December 1943.

e). Operational Training.

During this period, teams will be trained as units, and operations that may be carried out in the field will be rehearsed under conditions as realistic as possible. Preparation of schemes will be the responsibility of the Commandant. DR/J and DRJ/US will be responsible for keeping the Commandant informed of likely operational requirements, and for arranging the participation of JEDBURGHS in S.F. schemes.

17. Co-ordination of Signal Training.

In addition to the instructors already provided on the W.E. of the JEDBURGH School, MS is requested to nominate an officer who will be responsible for the co-ordination of all signal training at the JEDBURGH School from 1st February 1944, and for the working out of all signal plans for JEDBURGH exercises.

18. Training Stores.

MT will be responsible for obtaining the necessary quantities of stores, which will be held at the JEDBURGH School.

19. Standing Orders at the JEDBURGH School.

The Commandant will prepare general Standing Orders and submit them to AD/E, through MT, by 23rd December 1943.

20. Joining Instructions.

These will be drafted by MT, in conjunction with D/R.J and DRJ/US.

21. Grouping of Teams.

The Commandant will submit recommendations through MT for the grouping of teams and selection of team leaders. The following factors should be taken into account:-

a). At least one member of a team must be a native of the country to which the team is going.

b). Any intimate local knowledge of parts of WESTERN EUROPE by students.

c). Personalities and aptitudes.

Members of a team, as soon as it is made up, should work together as far as possible in all matters, and should operate as a team in collective training.

22. Reserve of Highly Skilled Saboteurs.

The Commandant will take note of the JEDBURGH teams which shew particular aptitude for sabotage. These teams will undergo a short course at St.XVII after the completion of their normal training. MT will prepare, in consultation with DSR and D/R, a suggested syllabus for a course lasting either seven or fourteen days, proposals for which will be submitted to AD/E by 31st December 1943. The Commandant will forward a statement shewing the particulars of teams earmarked for this purpose by 15th March 1944.

EQUIPMENT.

23. A committee, composed of the following, will deal with all questions of equipment for JEDBURGHS. Progress reports will be rendered through Regional Heads to AD/E on 1st January 1944, and thereafter fortnightly.

Composition of Committee:-

DR/J
DRJ/US
AL/C
DD/B
MT/US
Major EMBRY

24. Equipment will be considered under the following headings:-

a). Personal.

To include all kit carried on the man, including weapons. The provision of personal equipment for British, American, French and Dutch personnel will be considered separately where necessary, in consultation with the Country Sections concerned, but it is desirable that equipment should be standardised as far as possible for all JEDBURGHS. A scale of personal equipment for JEDBURGHS will be submitted to AD/E and Colonel Haskell by 1st January 1944.

b). Stores.

The normal practice will be for fifteen standard type containers to be dropped with each JEDBURGH team. The number of each type of container will be decided at the same time as the operation order is prepared.

c). Signals.

The committee, in conjunction with MS, will be responsible for seeing that the wireless set supplied is suitable and is available in sufficient quantity to give a reserve of 100 per cent. for training purposes only.

25. Provision and Storage of Operational Equipment.

a). At the School.

All personal equipment will be held at the School. The Committee will arrange to have the full scale collected and delivered by 1st March 1944. The Commandant will arrange for the holding of this equipment at the School.

b). At the Packing Station.

The Committee will arrange that the necessary number of containers of each type is held ready packed at the Packing Station as from 1st March 1944.

CO-ORDINATION AND LIAISON.

26. Co-ordination.

DR/J and DRJ/US will be jointly responsible for the co-ordination of all action which is required to be taken to enable JEDBURGHS to be in a position to perform their role on D-Day. In carrying out this task, they will work in close touch with all officers who are required to take action under the terms of this paper. They will keep AD/E and the head of S.O. informed regularly as to progress and will submit a joint fortnightly progress report to them, through D/R and DR/US respectively.

27. French Liaison.

D/R and DR/US will arrange with the Allied French for a suitable French officer to be nominated as the French representative on all matters relating to JEDBURGHS. This officer will work closely with DR/J and DRJ/US and should, therefore, hold a similar rank to them.

28. Liaison Link.

DR/J and DRJ/US will act jointly as the liaison link between the JEDBURGH School and H.Q. S.O.E./S.O. LONDON. All communications dealing with JEDBURGHS will be addressed to them in the first instance, and they will deal with all general administrative and training matters through MT.

COVER.

29. Object.

To provide:-

a). A cover story for the training of JEDBURGHS in this country.

b). A cover story for use by JEDBURGHS in the event of capture in the field.

30. a). It has been decided that "Allied Commandos" will be the official cover in this country for MILTON HALL, and that the School will be designated "M.E.65".

b). The intention is that JEDBURGH students, who are drawn from external sources, will be kept in ignorance, so far as is possible, of the various alternative titles of S.O.E./S.O. It will not be possible or desirable to conceal from them the existence of organisations through whom subversive activity in occupied Europe is controlled. They will, however, be discouraged from seeking to know more than they are told about these organisations.

31. DR/J and DRJ/US, in consultation with D/CE, will consider the general question of cover stories for JEDBURGHS in the field, with particular reference to the possibility of false "ordres de missions", and will report on this by 15th January 1944.

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APPENDIX "A"

SUMMARY OF ACTION TO BE TAKEN UNDER THE TERMS OF THIS PAPER

Section Region etc.	Summary of Action Required	Date (Where applic.)	Ref. para.
D/R	To arrange for contact to be made with all Maquis areas. To render progress report to AD/E.	Before 1 Feb.	10(b)
	To arrange with the Allied French for a suitable French officer to be nominated as the French representative on all matters relating to JEDBURGHS. (In conjunction with DR/US.)	Before 23 Dec.	27
AL	To prepare an appreciation on ground and air conditions in N.W.Europe on and after D-Day, in consultation with COSSAC. (In conjunction with ADM.)	Before 15 Jan.	9
	To inform DR/J and DRJ/US of the production situation in regard to Eurekas.	Before 23 Dec.	10(c)
MT	To submit training programme for basic training period at JEDBURGH School to AD/E and Colonel Haskell.	Before 24 Dec.	16(d)
	To confirm that the necessary quantities of training stores are held at the JEDBURGH School.	Before 1 Jan.	18
	To draft Joining Instructions.	Before 23 Dec.	20
	To submit a syllabus for a course lasting either 7 or 14 days for JEDBURGH personnel earmarked as sabotage experts.	Before 1 Jan.	22
MS.	To confirm that the necessary number of wireless sets will be available to meet training and operational requirements of JEDBURGHS.	Before 23 Dec.	11
	To nominate an officer for the co-ordination of all signal training at the JEDBURGH School, and for the working out of all signal plans for JEDBURGH exercises.	Before 1 Jan.	17
D/F	To appoint an officer to attend to the possibility of exfiltrating JEDBURGHS. A statement of possibilities to be given to AD/E, through D/R.	Before 15 Jan.	12(d)

Section Region Etc.	Summary of Action Required	Date (Where applic.)	Ref. para.
ADM	To prepare an appreciation on ground and air conditions in N.W. Europe on and after D-Day, in consultation with COSSAC. (In conjunction with AL.)	Before 15 Jan.	9
Commandant, M.E.65.	To prepare a dossier for each student to include training reports, language qualifications, aptitudes for special tasks, special knowledge of country, etc., and to forward copies of these to DR/J. This will be kept currently up-to-date.		14(d)
	To submit recommendations for the grouping of teams and selection of team leaders.	Before 1 Feb.	21
	To earmark teams for additional training in sabotage.	Before 15 Mar.	22
	To prepare for the holding of personal equipment (operational) at the School.	Before 1 Mar.	25(a)
	To submit to AD/E, through MT, general Standing Orders at the JEDBURGH School.	Before 23 Dec.	19
DR/J and DRJ/US.	To arrange for the participation by JEDBURGHS in S.F. schemes, and in particular, in the exercise 13-18 March.		16(e)
	To arrange with the French representative for the keeping of military records.	Before 1 Jan.	14(c)
	To keep consolidated training and operational reports at the War Room, Norgeby House.		14(d)
DR/J, DRJ/US and D/CE	To examine the question of JEDBURGH cover and to report to AD/E.	Before 15 Jan.	31
DR/US.	To arrange to keep military records of U.S. JEDBURGH personnel at O.S.S. H.Q.		14
D/R and DR/US.	To arrange with the Allied French for a suitable French officer to be nominated as the French representative on all matters relating to JEDBURGHS.	Before 23 Dec.	27
DR/C and D/CR.	To arrange for the keeping of military records of British personnel.		14(b)

Section Region etc.	Summary of Action Required	Date (Where applic.)	Ref. para.
DR/J, DRJ/US, DR/P, MG/A, MGA/US.	To work out the necessary details of procedure for despatching JEDBURGHS. Report to be sent to AD/E.	Before 1 Feb.	3
DR/J, DRJ/US, ALC, DDB, MT/US, Major Embry.	To prepare a scale of operational equipment (personal).	Before 1 Jan.	24(a)
	To confirm with MS that there will be sufficient wireless sets to meet training and operational requirements.	Before 1 Jan.	24(c)
	To collect and deliver full scale of personal equipment (operational).	Before 1 Mar.	25(a)
	To confirm that sufficient stores to cover the whole JEDBURGH operation are available at the Packing Station.	Before 1 Mar.	25(b)

ADE/900

12 Oct 43

To: AD/M, D/R, MT, MS, AL,
D/B, MG, F, RF, N, T, EU/P.
Copies to: C.D., K/AIR.P, D/PLANS,
D/S, MP, L/WAD.

From: AD/E

JEDBURGH PROCEDURE

1. In order to ensure uniformity of thought on Jedburgh operations and the handling of Jedburgh teams, I am circulating this memorandum regarding the operational and administrative control.

2. Jedburgh teams are designed to serve as a reserve in the hands of SOE/OSS H.Q. in London, to undertake post D-Day tasks in conformity with military requirements. They are so constituted as to be able normally to bring to existing Resistance Groups any leadership, communications, fresh orders, or appropriate arms and equipment that may at the time be required. Therefore, teams will generally be infiltrated to areas where resistance is known to be active, either to reception or blind. On occasions it may be necessary to infiltrate to an area where elements of resistance are unknown. In such cases the composition of the team may have to be increased to enable it to carry out its task without assistance.

3. Control of teams will be exercised by S.O.E./OSS in London and communications with Jedburgh W/T operators in the Field will be through the base station in England. Requests for tasks from S.F. Detachments attached to Army H.Q. will be passed to Army Group H.Q. who submit demands to S.O.E./O.S.S. in London.

4. To implement an existing policy, or to carry out special action demanded by the Army, a decision will be made as to whether an order to existing organisations in the Field is sufficient, or whether a Jedburgh team will be necessary.

5. If a Jedburgh team is to be despatched, the general procedure will be that I will decide:

(a) Whether the team will be received by a Reception Committee. This will depend on Country Section reports as to the state in the Field in the area at that time.

(b) What should be the composition of the team? Although the basic operational unit is three men (Leader, Second-in-Command and W/T Operator), the nature of the task may necessitate an increase.

(c) What night it will be necessary to despatch the team selected.

(d) What type of transportation is required, and whether transportation is available.

6. The following details will then be arranged by the Officers concerned:-

(a) Warn the School, or other holding establishment,

/that a team

that a team for the task (specifying task) will be despatched on a certain night (specifying night). As much information as possible will be given in this warning order. If the warning is given in the early afternoon, despatch may take place the same night. A warning order will also have to be sent to S.F. Detachments.

(b) Arrange packing of containers. D/B, DR/A, AL/C will have previously worked out standard colls to cover all types of operations, thus enabling the Packing Station to provide containers with - x colls - y colls according to the nature of the task. Warning will be sent to the Packing Station as soon as possible.

(c) Write the operation order.

(d) Despatch an Officer to the School with the operation order to brief the team selected by the School. The Briefing Officer will take to the School any maps required and any information, photographic or otherwise, available.

7. It is impossible to hazard the rate of despatch, but we must take our worst case and be prepared to operate with a high percentage of our teams in the Field at the same time. It can be said that it is unlikely that more than five teams will operate on any one front. In explanation of the work "front" it is pointed out that if the Pas de Calais is considered as one front, Brittany, Normandy and the Vosges will each be considered as a separate front.

8. Jedburgh teams may on rare occasions be used tactically in roles such as bridge protection, but will always be dropped strategically. This means that a tactical task can only be carried out provided the team is dropped well ahead of the time at which it is requested that the task will be carried out. They will lie up during that time reconnoitring and studying their task.

9. Jedburgh W/T Operators will be allotted two skeds a day, one in the morning and one in the evening. This allows instructions to be sent in the evening and report on the night's activities to be received next morning.

10. During the training period DR/A will be the Staff Officer who will ensure that the training being carried out at the School meets Jedburgh commitments. He will, therefore, be responsible for keeping MS, MT, and the Commandant informed as to anticipated operational requirements and as to the position in the Field in so far as it may effect training.

WW7

R.831.

APPENDIX IIB.

JEDBURGH BOARD REPORT.

STUDENT NO..... NAME.....

COURSE NO..... AGE.....RANK.....

DATE..... TYPE OF COMMISSION.....

NATIONALITY..... ARM OF SERVICE.....

UNIT.....

PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE

MILITARY TRAINING.....	OVER 2 YRS.	UNDER 2 YRS.
ACTIVE SERVICE.....	YES	NO
UNDERGROUND EXPERIENCE...	YES	NO
W/T EXPERIENCE.....	YES	NO
JUMPING.....	YES	NO

BOARD GRADING

INTELLIGENCE GRADING

KNOWLEDGE OF FRENCH

JOB RECOMMENDATION.

SPECIAL QUALITIES

1.	His civilian record is impressive.....	+	0	-
2.	He will be a good fighting soldier.....	+	0	-
3.	He will make a good organiser.....	+	0	-
4.	He can command others.....	+	0	-
5.	He will be popular with his associates.....	+	0	-
6.	He has a personality which will impress others.	+	0	-
7.	He is considerate of others.....	+	0	-
8.	He will cooperate well.....	+	0	-
9.	He is tactful.....	+	0	-
10.	He has stability of temperament.....	+	0	-
11.	He is thoroughly reliable.....	+	0	-
12.	He has a good sense of discipline.....	+	0	-
13.	He will retain a steady morale throughout.....	+	0	-
14.	He has self-confidence.....	+	0	-
15.	He can take decisions decisively.....	+	0	-
16.	He will have enthusiasm for the work.....	+	0	-

SPECIAL QUALITIES.

17. He has plenty of personal initiative.....+ 0 -

18. He is capable of acting independently.....+ 0 -

19. He welcomes responsibility.....+ 0 -

20. He is capable of assuming responsibility.....+ 0 -

21. He is an aggressive active type.....+ 0 -

22. He has good planning ability.....+ 0 -

23. He is a very practical sort of man.....+ 0 -

24. He is a man of the world.....+ 0 -

25. He will be determined and will persevere.....+ 0 -

26. He is clear-thinking.....+ 0 -

27. He uses his intelligence to best advantage....+ 0 -

28. He is fond of risk and adventure.....+ 0 -

29. He has good physical stamina.....+ 0,-

30. He is physically agile.....+ 0 -

31. His motivation is sound.....+ 0 -

32. He is a man of integrity.....+ 0 -

GENERAL REMARKS.

PRESIDENT
JEDBURGH BOARD.

II 19.

COPY.

THE WAR OFFICE,
LONDON,
S.W. 1.

79/W.E./8499(S.D.3) 24th February, 1944.

CONFIDENTIAL

Sir,

War Establishment - Military Establishment No.71.
(not an Army Establishment)
(W.E. No. VIII/652/1)

I am directed to forward herewith copies of the above quoted War Establishment.

Printed copies of this establishment will not be issued.

I am,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

(Signed) B.Wheeler. Major G.S.

for Major-General,
Director of Staff Duties.

(M.962/10)

The Officer i/c.,
R.Signals Records.

M.S. 1.(a)	1	M.P.2.(b)	9
M.S.1(B)	2	A.G. 5.(Mob)	2
Library	2	A.M.D.3.	1
C.2. (c) (A.F.D.)	1	Q.(A.E.)1	1
C.7.	2	Q.(Stats)	1
F.2. (b)	1	Q.(M)2(c)	1
F.6.	2	W.S. 14	1
M.O.1.(S.P.(Lt.Col.) Dibley)	15	The Commandant, (Central Census), C.O.D.Chilwell	1
S.D.1.	1		
S.D.3.	10		
S.D.4.	1		
S.P.3.	1		
A.G.(Stats)	2		

Notified in A.C.Is 1st March, 1944
Effective date 1st January, 1944. VIII/652/1

C O N F I D E N T I A L

MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT NO. 71.

(Not an Army establishment)

WAR ESTABLISHMENT

79/W.E./3499/(S.D.3)

Personnel

Lieutenant-colonels	7
General staff officers, 2nd grade	2
Majors	20
Captains	20
Subalterns	13
Total, officers	62
R.Signals -	
Operators. wireless and line (sergeants)	40
Total, other ranks	40
Total, military establishment No.71.	102

(M.962/10)

III A.

SYLLABUS OF TRAINING. 6 WEEKS COURSE.

Subject	Hours
Unarmed Combat	12
Demolitions	39
Weapon Training	54
Map Reading	37
Fieldcraft	27
Minor Tactics	22
Appreciation and Orders	9
M Reception Committee Work	10
M Anti-Tank Mines	10
Recognition of Enemy units	10
Parachute Training	24
Signalling	18
First Aid	4
Physical Training	42
French	42
Indoor Exercise	42 ½ hr. periods
Recreational Training	60
No. of Periods used	462
No. of Periods available	462

(420 full periods, 42 ½ hour periods).

UNARMED COMBAT

Syllabus of 10th May, 1943, and Addenda divided into 12 periods of one hour each.

Dummies: Instructors will see to it that dummies, in full repair, are properly set up in readiness for each lesson requiring their use.

Period No.		Hours
1.	Preliminary talk by instructor (omit if students have already received instruction). Demonstrate:- Side of hand blows. How to kick, and use of knee. Open-hand chin-jab, in combination with use of knee. Blows with head and elbows. Finger-tip (or knuckles) jabs. (Boxing blows may be taken for granted). Students to practise each blow on the dummies after the Instructor.	
	Instructor shows & students practice releases from:- Wrist hold, one hand. do. two hands. Throat do. one hand. do. two hands. Body do. from the front, arms free. do. arms pinioned. do. rear, arms free do. arms pinioned Come-along hold. Police hold (when held by the collar, with one arm forced up the back). For this period, students should be paired off in equal heights.	1
2.	Students to practise, under close supervision, all the blows taught in 1st period. Use the dummies.	
	Repetition of 1st period but students will be paired off in unequal sizes.	1
3.	Crowd Fighting. Explanation of its purpose. Demonstration by Instructor. Students practise subsequently, first time slowly, second time quicker.	
	Knife Fighting. Preliminary talk & demonstration by Instructor. Students to practise, under close supervision, on the straw-filled dummy. Finish the period by repetition of Crowd Fighting (half-minute by each student) at speed.	1
4.	Killing a Sentry. (one attacker only). (a) Attacker armed with a knife. (b) Attacker unarmed. For this period, it will be unnecessary for the "sentry" to wear a steel helmet & carry a rifle. Only the methods described in the Syllabus (page 6, Section 6, paras 1 & 2) will be employed.	1

		Hrs
Period No. 4 (contd)	Finish the lesson by repetition of Crowd Fighting (half-minute by each student) at speed.	
	Killing a Sentry. Repetition of above except that this time the "sentry" will wear a German steel helmet and carry a rifle. If sufficient time remains finish by Crowd Fighting, (half-minute by each student) at speed.	1
5	Tying up & gagging a prisoner. Demonstration by Instructor. Subsequently students are paired off and practise what they have just seen. There will not be time for more than half the class to do the actual tying up and gagging. Instructors will see to it that the necessary materials - cord, bandages, ling - are in readiness beforehand, sufficient for each man of half the class.	1
	Tying up & gagging a prisoner. Repetition of above, except that students who were then tied up and gagged will this time do the tying up and gagging.	
6	Killing a Sentry (two attackers). "Sentry" ready (nailed boots, steel helmet and carrying a rifle). Practice students in Method (b) as per Addendum to Syllabus (Attacking a Sentry)	1
	Disarming, tying up, gagging and removing a Sentry. (Two attackers). "Sentry" ready, (nailed boots, steel helmet, and carrying a rifle). Practise students in Method (a) as per Addendum to Syllabus (Attacking a Sentry).	
7	Disarming. Demonstrate and practise students in MethodsA and B of Syllabus (p.7, sect.6, para.4), i.e., from the front. Finish the period by Crowd Fighting (half minute by each student) at speed.	1
	Disarming. Demonstrate and practise students in MethodsA and B of Syllabus (p.7 & 8, sect. 6, para. 4) i.e., from the rear). Finish the period by Crowd Fighting (half-mimte by each student) at speed.	
8	1.Disarming a man holding up someone else. (see Syllabus p.8, sect.6). 2.Spinal Dislocator. (see Syllabus p.6 & 7, sect. 6, para.3). 3.Searching a prisoner, if you are armed. (see Syllabus p.8, sect. 6, para.5). Merely an explanation by the Instructor. 4.Taking a prisoner away, if you are armed. (see Syllabus p.8, sect.6, para.6).Merely an explanation by the Instructor. 5.Defence against a downward blow, two methods. (see Syllabus, p.8, sect.6,para.8)	1
	Mutual instruction in 1st period (blows). Finish the period by Crowd Fighting (half-minute by each student) at speed.	

Period No.		Hours
9	Mutual instruction in 1st period (releases). Finish the period by Crowd Fighting (half-minute by each student) at speed. Mutual instruction: Knife fighting. Spinal Dislocator. Disarming. Defence against a downward or sideways blow	1
10	At Instructor's disposal. Suggestions:- Practise individuals in the methods in which the Instructor has observed them to be backward. Answer questions. Show why some of the conventional holds are not taught, demonstrating objections, counters and means of escape.	1 ½
	Bayonet Defences. Show method described on p.9 of Syllabus. Remainder of time at Instructor's disposal. Suggestions:- Improve backward students. Fire unexpected questions at students - "What would you do under such and such circumstances?" "What would you do if I attacked in this manner?" "How would you get out of this hold (and why should you be so foolish as to let me get it)?"	1
11	Revision and practice of killing or capturing and gagging a sentry. Do it under varying circumstances. Vary the manner in which the sentry carries his rifle. Never fail to carry the sentry out of the way when killed or captured. Try it with two sentries and four attackers. Impress on students the necessity for speed, silence & practised co-operation. Point out the circumstances under which it would be foolish to attack a sentry at all.	1
12	Practise all the above (11th period) <u>in the dark</u>. Aim at tying up and gagging a sentry in under 2½ minutes.	1

W.

DEMOLITION SYLLABUS

Period No.	L or P	Description	Hours
1	Lecture	Introduction to Demolitions, the explosives, means of detonation and initiation	1
2	Lecture	Preparation of a charge and water-proofing of firing system	1
3	Practical	Firing small charges	2
4	Lecture	Scope of explosives; quantities required	1
5	Practical	Firing cutting charges in metal	2
6	Practical	Use of detonating fuse; linking of charges	1
7	Lecture	Standard charges	1
8	Lecture	Grid placing of charges	1
9	Practical	Making up standard charges	2
10	Practical	Firing standard charges	2
11	Practical	Making up and placing standard charges in the dark	2
12	Practical	Test	2
13	Lecture	The Rail Charge	1
14	Practical	Making up and placing the rail charge	1
15	Lecture	Railway sabotage - Derailments - Line blowing - Breakdown equipment - signal equipment	1
[illegible]	Lecture	Railway sabotage - rolling stock - locomotives - marshalling yards	1
17	Lecture	The time pencil	1
18	Lecture	Incendiaries	2
19	Lecture	Incendiarism	2
20	Practical	Incendiaries	2
21	Lecture	Sabotage of Stores - Food, Ammunition and petrol	1
22	Lecture	Sabotage of road transport - vehicles - Bridge destruction	1
23	Practical	Use of standard charges on cast iron, girders	2
24	Practical	Making up and placing of standard charges	2
	Practical	Test (written)	4
			39

DEMOLITION SCHEMES

1. Simple scheme involving making up of small charge in dark, and cutting metal (after Period 5).

2. Simple scheme involving making up standard charges in the dark - Linking them - Grid placing, and firing (after Period 11).

3. Scheme involving general Railway sabotage, including derailment, and time pencil (after Period 17).

4. Scheme involving the destruction of a food, ammunition, a petrol dump by incendiarism (after Period 21).

5. Scheme involving the sabotage of Road Transport including an attack on a small bridge (after Period 22).

WEAPON TRAINING SYLLABUS

Period No.	Weapon	Type of Practice	No. of Rounds.	Time in Hours
1	Pistols	Stripping & Manipulation	-	1
2	.22	Pistol practices 1 & 2 (Recruit & bobbers)	12	2
3	.22	Pistol practices 3,4 & 5. (Bobbers in light, dark and light)	18	2
4	Sten	Manipulation & Stripping	-	1
5	Sten	Introduction to firing & practices 1 & 2 (recruit and bobbers)	15	2
6	.32	Pistol practices 6 & 7 (bobbers in light and entering a room)	12	2
7	Sten	Practices 3 & 4 (Bobbers in light & bad light)	12	2
8	.22	Pistol practice 8 & 9. (long range positions firing up)	18	2
9	Rifle	Aiming & firing instructn.		1
10	Sten	Practices 5,6 & 7. Speed-ing up. Outdoor stalk. Demonstrate spray.	23	2
11	.22	Pistol practice 10. Firing up.	6	
	.32	Pistol practice 11. Attack in the open	12	2
12	Bren L.M.G.	Introduction. Mechanism. Care & cleaning.	-	1
13	Grenades	Mechanism & cleaning	-	1
14	Sten	Practice 8. Stalk	14	2
15	.32	Pistol practice 12. Outdoor stalk	14	2
16	Bren L.M.G.	Loading & unloading. Holding, aiming & firing	-	1
17	Rifle	Practices 1 & 2. (Target 100 yds. Grouping 5, Application 5)	10	2
18	Grenades	Throwing practice with dummies. Cleaning & exam-ination of live grenade	-	1
19	.22	Pistol practice 13. House fighting	26	2
20	Bren L.M.G.	L.A.& stoppage. Use of lever	--	1

Period No.	Weapon	Type of Practice	No. of Rounds.	Time in Hours
21	Sten	Practice 9. Stalk	17	2
22	Grenades	Same as period 18.	-	1
23	.22	Pistol practice 14.	12	
	.32	House Fighting	10	2
24	Bren	Practices 1 & 2 Clam. (Application 100 yds Ref. Fig.2 V.R. 50 200 yds attack at single figure, attack at group)	25	2
25	Sten	Practice 10. Stalk	14	2
26	Grenades	Live throwing	2	2
27	Rifle	Practice 3. Ref. targets Fig.2. Range varying 50 to 200 yds advancing to cover)	20	2
28	Sten	Practice 11. (Stalk & attack on sentry. Attack on guard room)	14	2
29	.22	Pistol practice 15. Night house fighting	28	2
30	Grenades	Live throwing	3	2
31	All weapons.	General talk. Applictn. of methods to operation. Care of arms. Rendering weapons ineffective for enemy use.		1
32	All weapons	Practical & theoretical test		2
			54	

MAP READING SYLLABUS

Period No.	L or P	Description	Hours
1	Lecture	Maps; their uses; what to look for on a map; conventional signs	2
2	Lecture	Co-ordinates	1
3	Lecture	Scales & R.F.	2
4	Practical	Scales & R.F.	1
5	Lecture	Reliefs and Contours, slopes and gradients. Section drawing	2
6	Practical	Reliefs and Contours, slopes and gradients. Section drawing	1
7	Lecture	Setting a map - Finding north	1
8	Practical	Setting a map - Finding north	2
9	Lecture	Bearings - use of protractor	1
10	Lecture	Compass bearings; back bearing, conversion to ord from grid bearings. Resection and intersection	2
11	Practical	Using a compass	1
12	Practical	Resection and intersection	1
13	Practical	Map Reading Exercise combining all above lessons	4
14	Lecture & Practical	Enlargement	2
15	Lecture	Route Reports	1
16	Practical	Exercise involving route reports	4
17	Lecture	Field Sketching	1
18	Practical	Field Sketching	1
19	Lecture	Foreign Maps	2
20	Practical	Final Test (written)	4
			37

MAP READING SCHEMES

1. Scheme involving Co-ordinates, scales, bearings, compass (after period 11, to work in with Demolition scheme 3)

2. Scheme involving Enlargements, Route reports, Field sketching (after Period 18 to work in with Demolition Scheme 5)

F I E L D C R A F T

Period No.	L or P	Description	Hours
1	Lecture & Demonstration.	Principles of Fieldcraft.	2
2	Lecture	Movement across ground by day & night. Crossing of obstacles.	1
3	Lecture	Concealment & camouflage proper	1
4	Demonstration	ditto	2
5	Lecture	Scouting & patrolling general	1
6	Lecture	Day recce patrol	1
7	Lecture	Day fighting patrol	1
8	Lecture	Night recce patrol	1
9	Lecture	Night fighting patrol	1
10	Demonstration	F.C. 6,7,8 and 9	2
11	Practical	Individual stalk	2
12	Practical	Night fighting patrol (by day wearing night glasses)	2
13	Practical	Night fighting patrol (by day wearing night glasses)	2
14	Demonstration	Students prepare demonstration on given subject	2
15	Demonstration	ditto	2
16	Lecture	Report writing. Message form	1
17	Lecture	Report writing. Tabular reports	1
18	Practical	Report writing. Message form and tabular	2
			27

General Note.

Night training in Fieldcraft is to be gained by adding Fieldcraft on to the Demolition and Map Reading schemes.

MINOR TACTICS

Period No.	L or P	Description	Hours
1	Lecture	Minor Tactics - where a patrol differs from a tactical operation	1
2	Lecture	Raiding parties - probable formations - Orders - Control - Dealing with personnel at the objective	1
3	Demonstration.	Raid	3
4	Practical.	Large-scale raid by stnts.	3
5	Lecture	Ambush	1
6	Demonstration.	Ambush	2
7	Lecture	House fighting	1
8	Demonstration.	House fighting	1
9	Practical	House fighting	2
10	Practical	Ambush	2
11	Lecture	Street fighting	1
12	Demonstration.	Street fighting	2
13	Practical	Street fighting	2
			22

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APPRECIATION AND ORDERS

Period No.	L or P	Description	Hours
1	Lecture	The principle of a successful operation. Information and appreciation	1
2	Practical.	Written appreciation by students from information given	1
3	Lecture	Operational orders	1
4	Practical	Sand table. Verbal appreciation & written orders	2
5	Practical	Sand table. Written appreciation and verbal orders	2
6	Practical	Sand table. Verbal appreciation and verbal orders	2
			9

General Note.
This is an extremely important part of the students training, and practice should be gained by making all students make a written appreciation and order for every scheme set.

121

Reception Committee Training.

Period No.	Lecture or Practical	Description	Hours
1	Lecture	Method by which Men and Material are despatched. How to lay out a reception.	1
2	Lecture	Action to be taken after the Men and/or Materials have been dropped	1
3	Practical	Reception of Men and Stores (using a torch). Burial and disposal	2
4	Lecture	Contents of Containers (General)	1
5	Lecture	Contents of Container Special to our job	1
6	Practical	Packing and unpacking H.2 cell, Explosive, and H.6, Sten.	1
7	Practical	Packing and unpacking H.21, H.8, and H.5 cells	1
8	Practical	Packing and unpacking C.1 and C.3 cells	1
9	Practical	Packing and unpacking C.6, C.9, C.Spec. Cells	1
			10

Anti-Tank Mines.

This syllabus will be drawn up later.

Recognition of Enemy Units.

Period No.	Lecture or Practical	Description	Hours
1	Lecture	The Nazi Party and its organisation	1
2	Lecture	Organisation of German Police Services	1
3	Lecture	German Military Police - German Military Security Police - German Intelligence Service	1
4	Lecture	German Army.1.General Organisation	1
5	Lecture	German Army 2. Infantry	1
6	Lecture	German Infantry. Light Weapons	1
7	Lecture	German Armoured Division	1
9	Lecture	German Heavy Weapons	1
10	Lecture	German Armoured Vehicles	1
			10

Parachute Training.

Periods	Lecture or Practical	Description	Hours
1 - 24	Practical	Progressive Training on all apparatus. (Not to include water jumping).	24

Signalling.

Periods	Lecture or Practical	Description	Hours
1 - 18	Practical	Progressive training aiming at a standard of 12 w.p.m. sending and receiving.	18

First Aid.

To be left in the hands of the Medical Officer.

Physical Training.

Daily periods to include the use of the obstacle course, rope work, and a certain number of Nerve Tests.

French.

To be undertaken by the best French speaker. Those who are backward are to be encouraged to use their spare time to polish the subject up.

Indoor Exercise.

A daily period of a quarter of an hour to help train the student's memory and impress on him the value of attention to detail. All his senses are to be trained, and some problems must be set which make him use several senses at the same time. Examples of the type of exercise to be set are attached.

Recreational Training.

Two afternoons a week any Wednesday and Saturday.

LECTURES.

MAJOR BINGHAM.

Subject: "Intelligence from the Field".

S/O WOLLASTON

Subject: "Procedure for Mounting Air Operations"

WING COMMANDER VERITY.

Subject: "Air Operations from the R.A.F. angle".

F/LT. BARTER

Subject: "Experiences on Operations".

MAJOR DE GUELIS

Subject: "Corsican Operations".

MAJOR TICE

Subject: "Procedure at Aerodrome".

MAJOR REID

Subject: "Duties of Packing Station"."

MR. MARKS

Subject: "Codes and Cypher".

"JEROME"

Subject: "Organisation and Living conditions in the Maquis"- illustrated by a film taken in France.

Appendix III (C)

10th March, 1944.

ROLE OF JEDBURGHS

Summary of the speech by
Brigadier E.E. Mockler-Ferryman
to Jedburgh students on 24th February, 1944.

INTRODUCTION.

1. This paper is intended to give some general idea of the tasks which Jedburghs may be called upon to perform in the Field.

2. When they go to the Field they will be implementing the plan of the Allied High Command in the countries concerned, France primarily, but also Holland and Belgium.

3. Their function will be strategic from the point of view of the Allied High Command in that they will operate some distance behind the lines, and their role, once they get into the Field, is likely to be of some duration. However, the actual tasks carried out will be of a tactical nature. They will go into the Field with the object of operating with Resistance Groups, French Belgian or Dutch, as the case may be. The French, Belgian and Dutch officers are therefore of particular importance as key men of their respective teams. These officers will carry the chief responsbility of linking up the Jedburgh team with the Resistance Group.

ROLE OF JEDBURGHS.

4. In paras. 5 to 11 below is given an outline of the role Jedburghs may be expected to carry out. It can only be general at this stage, as developments in the military plans will doubtless lead to modifications from time to time. Nor, in fact, will it be possible to allocate definite tasks to teams until the last moment. Teams must therefore be fit and fully trained, so that they may be capable of undertaking any tasks which may be required of them.

5. The Jedburgh role, once the team is in touch with resistance elements, can be roughly divided into three headings:

(a) Liaison

(b) Organisation

(c) Leadership.

In many cases all these roles will be combined in one, but for clarity they are treated separately.

6. LIAISON.

A team of Jedburghs might be sent out to an existing group which might be either in a Maquis area, or any Resistance Groups whose activities it is necessary to co-ordinate from here. In this case, the essential function would be:-

(a) To represent the Allied High Command and pass on orders received from London.

(OVER)

From this it will be seen that out of the three roles described above - Liaison, Organisation and Leadership, the degree in which the last two will arise will vary greatly, but the first one - Liaison - which is the most important one of all, will always exist.

UNIFORM.

13. It is considered that the value of Jedburghs will be very much greater if they drop in uniform. Later, in the field, it may be advisable temporarily or permanently to wear civilian clothes. But no one will be ordered to wear plain clothes unless he is willing.

SELECTION AND DESPATCH.

14. The tasks for Jedburghs will be largely requested by Military Commanders in the Field.

15. Jedburgh teams will be selected for tasks in accordance with their known qualifications and the special aptitudes which they have revealed during training.

16. Jedburghs will only be despatched to the Field when the task is suitable and cannot be carried out as well by any other means.

ACTION ON COMPLETION OF TASK.

17. When the task for which the Jedburgh was sent to the field is completed, the team will remain with the Resistance Group concerned, in order to cause the maximum harm to the enemy.

18. If, through casualties or heavy concentration of enemy troops in the area, the Resistance Group is broken up, the Jedburgh team, if in communication with London, will report the situation and request further orders. If communication with London has broken down, there are three courses open to the Jedburgh team:-

(a) To get in touch with other Groups to see whether they can help, while trying to re-establish communication with London.

(b) To remain at a "hide", which has already been reported to London, until overrun by Allied troops and picked up by a liaison officer from an S.O. or S.F. detachment.

(c) To withdraw by a clandestine route.

The course to be adopted will depend on the situation, but the Jedburgh will stay as long as there is useful work to be done.

III D.

RESTRICTED

LIVING OFF THE LAND

A MEMORANDUM ON THE MORE VALUABLE AND COMMON WILD FOODS OF EUROPE

Prepared by Surgeon Commander G. Murray Levick, R.N.
on the instructions of the Director of Naval Intelligence.

The obtainable food is described under the two headings ANIMAL and VEGETABLES:

ANIMAL FOODS

All animals of the European continent are edible. Men should be impressed with the importance of forgetting old prejudices when they are faced with the necessity of eating anything they can get hold of. Moreover, they may discover that many animals so far neglected or despised as food are, in fact, good, tasty food when prejudice is forgotten. For example, people who like raw oysters are horrified at the idea of eating raw snails, although these are just as good food, just as tasty and much cleaner feeders than oysters because they live on wholesome foliage.

All animals may be eaten raw or cooked. Animal food is rather more wholesome and digestible when eaten raw than when cooked.

The above facts should be driven home before reading the following details because it is so important to sink all prejudice and every consideration excepting the bed-rock necessity of getting food somehow in order to keep going, and the right frame of mind must be created at the outset. All objections to wholesome food are hysteria.

Owing to their high food value when compared with most vegetable foods, small animals, even two or three snails or some frogs' legs are worth collecting for adding to a meal of boiled leaves or roots. But the finding of animal food in quantity is uncertain, whereas vegetable food, especially wild plants is virtually certain.

1. RATS & MICE (rats et souris). Both are palatable meat. Rats cooked in a stew might be mistaken for chicken. Skin them, "gut" them and boil in a mess tin: rats about 10 minutes, mice 5 minutes. Either can be cooked with dandelion leaves for a stew. Be sure to include the livers.

2. BIRDS are all edible. Moorhens or coots may be found in ponds. The former are palatable, the latter tough and unpalatable but nevertheless good food.

3. FROGS (grenouilles). The flesh of all frogs is delicate and wholesome, but most of the meat is on the hind legs.

4. SNAILS (escargots). All of these are a real delicacy; can be eaten in two ways: (a) raw by cracking the shell and withdrawing the snail, (b) dropping them into boiling water for 5 minutes and pulling out the cooked snail with a pin.

5. DOGS AND CATS. Providing so much food, they are worth some trouble in capture by friendly advances. The liver is the most valuable part. Either animal stewed with edible leaves will provide an excellent meal.

/6. GRASS SNAKES AND LIZARDS

6. GRASS SNAKES AND LIZARDS (serpents et lesards) are palatable. To eat the snakes, cut off the heads, skin them (easily done) and boil for ten minutes.

7. HEDGEHOGS (herissons) would be a lucky find (in dry ditches). Turn them on their backs, tickle the body lightly with a stick or the fingers. It will then poke out its head and neck which can be severed by a stroke of a knife. Skin and cook as para 5.

8. EELS (anguilles) might be found in ponds or deep sluggish streams.

9. COARSE FISH - ditto.

10. HORSE meat closely resembles beef.

VEGETABLE FOODS

Men who have to subsist on vegetable foods such as cabbages and other green stuff and especially wild vegetables, must realise that owing to their comparatively poor food value, large quantities must be eaten to obtain sufficient calories. On the other hand, owing to their high vitamin and mineral value, edible leaves are very wholesome food and provide much bulk so that they satisfy the appetite. "Short commons" on this form of diet may result in better health and strength than an equal shortage of the richer foods.

A considerable part of each day must be devoted to gathering and eating the foliage if it has to be eaten raw. Animals who subsist on it spend the greater part of their waking hours in eating, and the welfare of men living on the wild vegetation of a country will largely depend on the time they are able to set aside for this purpose, including the preparation as well as the consumption of the food. Men in hiding should therefore take every opportunity for collecting food and take it to their hide-outs for preparation and eating. An average cabbage, weighing two lbs, if eaten raw cannot be chewed and swallowed in under half an hour, and at least nine cabbages would be needed.

A. CULTIVATED VEGETABLES

It makes no difference to health whether these are eaten raw or lightly cooked, but the advantage of cooking is that they can be eaten quickly. A cooked cabbage can be eaten in five minutes. Cabbages, cauliflowers, broccoli etc. are tender after 5 minutes boiling (carrots and potatoes a few minutes longer). There is a valuable hint regarding these vegetables. The stalks are usually left in the ground after the heads have been cut off. The stalks (racines) of last winter's vegetables are valuable. If the outer rind is stripped off with a knife, the centre will be found to be fleshy and excellent food, raw or cooked. Many of these stalks may be found in cottage gardens. All the cultivated roots may be eaten raw. The leaves of all the root vegetables, excepting potatoes are first class food, especially turnips. Peas and beans are the most valuable of all the vegetables.

B. WILD VEGETABLES

This is a more serious subject than A. It is most important for the men to recognise the chief edible plants and have some idea as to which provide the best food. Many, such as the grasses, have only a minute quantity of food available through human digestion because their food material is enclosed in cellulose which our digestion cannot dissolve. But by searching in grass fields,

/ditches etc,

ditches etc, several nutritious vegetables are commonly found.

1. STINGING NETTLES (ortie brulante) when young and light green in colour, after six minutes boiling, are a tasty and wholesome vegetable, rather like spinach. One minute boiling entirely removes the sting. Older nettles would require longer boiling. The food value of nettles is very high (see below).

2. CLOVER (trefle) which is not a grass, has a soft and rather fleshy leaf which can be chewed and swallowed rapidly. Most ordinary pastures contain clumps of it. The food value is probably about the same as an equal weight of dandelion. It has not the effect of stimulating the kidneys which is found in the dandelion.


3. BRACKEN FERN (fougere). The young, curly shoots, before they become upright, may be eaten lightly boiled, like asparagus. The roots of bracken are rich food but they must be dug down deep to get the whole root out. Should be boiled till tender.

4. SOW THISTLE (laiteron) - Sonchus oleraceus. Of all the edible wild plants, the sow thistle takes first place as a sustaining food. In many countries of Europe it is boiled for the table and its disuse in this country can only be due to ignorance of its qualities. Both the leaves and its thick succulent roots are delicacies. The fleshy part at the junction of leaves and root resembles the core of the Jerusalem artichoke. For the purpose of these directions its greatest recommendation is its plentiful occurrence throughout the fields, gardens and ditches of Europe. Eaten raw it is rather like lettuce, and the root is palatable.

Men could live well for a considerable period on this vegetable alone. For this reason it is most important for men to recognise it at a glance - therefore two photographs are attached. The larger print shows the size of the root in the older plant. The food analysis is shown in the table of food values. The weed flowers with a yellow blossom. Five to 8 minutes boiling is ample.

5. DANDELION (pis en lit). This is a well known vegetable. The leaves are used for salads. The food value is high (see below). The roots may also be eaten. The French name indicates the effect of this plant upon the kidneys. It is due to an alkaloid called taraxicin. If the leaves and roots are boiled for ten minutes and the water poured away, some of the taraxicin will have gone and the bitter taste of the plant much reduced. Owing to the certainty of finding this plant in large quantities and to its good food value, it must be regarded as one of the most important of the wild vegetable foods. The roots are at times very thick and fleshy. When many of the leaves are eaten raw, the palate becomes accustomed to the bitter taste which is then less noticeable. The stimulating effect upon the kidneys need cause no anxiety.

6. ARROWHEADS (sagittaria sagittifolia). This plant, which forms large leaves, is found in marshy country. It has a tuberous root like a potato and a white flower. Follow the root down. The tuber is at its end. Called in China "Anti-famine herb".



7. MUSHROOM. Well known by its pink or brown under gills. A description of other edible fungi is omitted owing to the danger of mistakes in identification.

8. CORN. The ripe "ears" should be broken off and rubbed between the hands. The husks can then be removed by blowing on them in the cupped hands; the grain will remain in the hands.

9. FRUITS. Apples, pears, plums etc. can be eaten in moderation if unripe. They are valuable for the starch they contain. If over-ripe they are still wholesome and need not be feared. A slight mould on the over-ripe fruit need not cause anxiety. It is a penicillin and quite harmless.

10. HIPS & HAWES are valuable food and may be found in the hedges in and after August.

11. YEWS. Although the foliage is poisonous the berries are wholesome food.

CATCHING ANIMALS

Small birds and Mice. By far the best implement is the little "break back" mouse trap obtainable at any ironmongers. The structure can be concealed by sprinkling short pieces of dry grass (taking care to leave the spring free) and it should be baited with biscuit crumbs for sparrows and other finches, but for blackbirds and thrushes a large live worm impaled on the trigger is much the best bait. Being very light, the trap should be anchored to a peg in the ground with a piece of string.

Eels and coarse fish. The former are the more valuable and easily caught in sluggish streams. Requirements are a roach hook mounted on gut and a short length of fine fishing line. A stick can be cut for a rod. The hook should be baited with a worm and allowed

/to

to sink to the bottom. The line can be hitched round a small piece of stick to act as a float, and attached so as to allow the required depth.

For fish, the float should be so adjusted that the bait is just off the bottom. Special tackle for catching pike could not be included in the men's equipment. Great care should be taken of the hook and gut - it may become precious.

Rabbits and rats. Snares set in the runs are best under the circumstances. For those who have not set snares, a demonstration is needed. One or two ready made snares without the pegs might be worth including in the equipment.

Snails may be found by "combing" hay fields with the fingers. They will be found on the stalks of the grass or on the ground. Standing hay is a rich finding ground for snails.

Crayfish may be found by thrusting the hand into their holes at water level in streams with muddy banks.

VALUES OF VEGETABLE FOODS

	grams Protein	grams Fat	grams Carbohydrate	Calories
1 lb nettles	25.00	3.17	41.28	293
1 lb dandelion	12.25	3.17	39.92	236
1 lb sow thistle	4.89	?	29.94	139
1 lb cabbage	6.35	0.91	21.77	121

(NOTE): The calorie value of the sow thistle is probably higher than the figure given because the fat, which has not yet been estimated, is omitted.

Shell-fish of the sea shores. All these shell-fish are edible. Muscles, cockles, winkles and "razor fish" can all be eaten raw. The commonest shell-fish of the rocks are the limpets. These are very tough when raw, but when chopped up and boiled with just enough water to cover them they are quite edible and are good food. Sea Urchins are very palatable.

SEA WEEDS

In case of necessity these should not be neglected. The commonest is the "bladder weed". This is tough and unattractive but when boiled in two waters becomes edible.

Ulvas (long ribbon-weeds) are quite edible. They may be eaten raw, but are better boiled like other green vegetables, the water being strained off with much of the salt.

GENERAL DIRECTIONS

Men supplied with condensed rations, such as the 24 hour ration, to serve for only a short period, are advised to eke them out from the start as far as possible by supplementing any of the wild foods described in the list. This will offer the double advantage of accustoming them gradually to the "wild" diet and extending the period covered by the condensed rations. A look-out should at all

/times

times be kept for any of the edible weeds which can be stowed in the pack for later cooking and eating.

To skin rats, mice and birds, cut off the heads, make an incision down the centre of the breast and abdomen, just skin deep. Then peel off the skin from centre to sides, then pull the skin off the back from above downwards. Afterwards cut open the belly and draw out the guts leaving the liver behind.

PRECAUTIONS

Water should be boiled for two minutes always if taken from ponds or ditches.

Poisonous plants

(a) Unless a man has special knowledge of the fungi, it will be advisable to stick to mushrooms (which are easy to identify by their brown or pink under gills).

(b) Some of the weeds, which may have tempting leaves, are poisonous because they contain oxalic acid. These include all the docks, sorrel (too commonly eaten in salads) and the leaves of rhuba

(c) Buttercups are poisonous.


(d) Cow parsley is an edible plant but several others of the same order which closely resemble it are very poisonous, e.g. hemlock

On the whole it will be advisable to stick to the edible weeds described above. Some or all of them are plentiful in the countrysides of Europe during the summer and autumn.

Animal food. Great care should be taken to see that the meat has not putrified, and it is advisable to eat any animals that may have been killed fairly soon to make sure of this. Dead animals, such as dogs found run over or horses killed in action, should only be eaten if they are still warm when found.

TO MAKE A SMOKELESS FIRE FOR COOKING

This can be made in a tin having two rows of holes bored through the sides, close to the bottom, with the spike of a clasp knife. The holes should be nearly big enough to admit the end of the little finger and it is important to bore them close together and right at the bottom of the tin as shown in the illustration.



Mess tin.

A = sticks thrust into the ground to form a tripod to support the mess tin.

This forms a little blast furnace, the upper part of the tin acting as a chimney to create a draught which enters through the holes when the fire is lighted. The fuel consists of small dry twigs which can be collected from beneath hedges in wet weather. The ideal twigs are those from the little dead branches of spruces or other conifers.

/The

The fire is started with a small piece of paper, over which are sprinkled a few thin dry twigs. As soon as these have lighted, more twigs are added and stoking with these continued as long as the fire is needed.

If the twigs are quite dry there will be no smoke.

The great advantage of this fire is that the tin can be placed on wet ground in wet weather and the fire will burn as well as in dry weather. A bundle of these twigs can be dried and kept dry if carried inside the breast of the battle dress. This tin weighs scarcely anything and can normally be used for storing other articles in the pack or ready filled with dry twigs collected as opportunity offers.

17th May, 1944.

III E

EXERCISE	DATE.	LOCATION	OBJECT OF EXERCISE.
DEBENHAM	24.2.44	Alconbury Airfield	To practice Jedburgh trainees in Reception Committee work.
SPUR	25.4.44.	PETERBOROUGH	To practice Jedburgh teams in co-operation with resistance groups and to study planning, mounting and carrying out of guerilla operations.
CURB	8.5.44.	UPPINGHAM	To provide opportunities for carrying out Reception Committee procedure. To study reconnaissance and occupation of an alternative 'safe' area also to study the employment of a small force in a large target area where the enemy may be in some strength.
LASH	31.5.44.	N.W.LEICESTER	Practice in the forming of a plan and the issue of orders. To study the technique of organising and operating several resistance groups and the problems of communications and administration of these groups.
KICK	28.7.44.	ALCONBURY AIR-FIELD	To practice Jedburgh trainees in Reception committee work.
AURORE	13.4.44.	LONDON.	Briefing Exercise.
HELIOGABALUS	5.5.44.	"	" "
ARK	9.5.44.	"	" "
RABBIT	11.5.44.	"	" "
BROTHER	18.5.44.	"	" "
FALCON	24.5.44.	"	" "

III F.

BRITISH JEDBURGH OFFICERS

No.	Rank	Name & Initials	Regiment
256076	Lieut.	ALLSOPP, S.J.O.	K.R.R.C. American.
145351	Capt.	BENNETT, K.D.	R.A.C.
78393	Capt.	BLATHWAYT, C.G.W.	D.R.R.C.
190815	Lieut.	BRITTON, D.J.	R.A.
255011	Lieut.	BROWN, B.	R.A. A/Tk.
132260	Major	BROWN, O.H.	The Buffs
165919	Lieut.	CANNICOTT, S.	R.A. 99th A/Tk.
95064	Capt.	CAREW, T.A.	R.A. 82nd H.A.A.
UDF/240316	Major	CLUTTON, A.H., M.C.	Special Service Force
189012	Capt.	COOMBER, A.	R.A.C. 23rd Hussars
65371	Major	COOMBE-TENNANT, A.H.S., M.C.	Welsh Guards
155146	Capt.	COX, J.	188 Fd. Regt. R.A.
71959	Capt.	CRASTER, O.	Oxf. & Bucks. L.I.
86548	Capt.	CRAWSHAY, W.R.	R. Welch Fus.
157326	Major	CROSBY, M.G.M.	Gordon Highlanders
278544	Major	DENNING, A. du P.	Hampshire Regt.
240388	Lieut.	EVANS, W.L.O.	King's Regt. (L'pool)
240428	Capt.	FENTON, R.S.	Sherwood Foresters
162755	Major	FORREST, A.J. (O'Brian Tew)	R.A.
53872	Major	GRENFELL, O.P.	R.A.C. R.T.R.
148884	Capt.	GOUGH, V.A.	Somerset L.I.
239306	Capt.	GUTHRIE, D.D.	D.C.L.I.
204390	Capt.	HALL, H.	R.A.C. 27th Lancers
132514	Capt.	HALLOWES, G.	Gordon Highlanders
40301	Lt.Col.	HASTINGS, J.R.H. (Hutchison)	General List
264516	Capt.	HARCOURT, R.	R.A.C. G.H.Q. Liaison Regt.
70575	Major	HOOD, E.	Somerset L.I.
261656	Lieut.	ISAAC, I.	R. Welch Fus.
71222	Major	JOHNSTONE, F.	R.A.C. R.T.R.
312556	2/Lt.	MACDOUGALL, L.R. (MacDonell)	Black Watch
90855	Major	MACPHERSON, R., M.C.	Q.O. Cameron Highlanders

BRITISH JEDBURGH OFFICERS (Cont.)

No.	Rank	Name & Initials	Regiment
156829	Capt.	MARCHANT, G.	Int. Corps
129260	Capt.	MARCHANT, J.J.	Wiltshire Regt.
169943	Major	MARTEN, H.N.	R.A.C. 2nd Northants
76264	Capt.	MAUDE, J.C.C., M.C.	Army Air Corps
166686	Lieut.	MELLOWS, T.A.	R.A.C. 27th Lancers
262289	Lieut.	MONAHAN, J.H.F.	R. Fusiliers
251332	Capt.	MONTAGUE, J.C.C.	R.A.C. 2nd Bn. R.T.R.
129302	Lt.Col.	MUSGRAVE, G.R. (O.C. M.E. 65 - also volunteer for operations)	R.A.
104205	Major	NIELSON, D.J.	R. Fusiliers
91977	Major	OGDEN-SMITH, C.M.	R.A.
132194	Major	PARKINSON, R.	R.A.C.
140509	Capt.	RADICE, J.	R.A.C. Queen's Bays
193114	Capt.	RUBINSTEIN, R.	69 S.L. Regt. R.A.
281582	Capt.	SELL, C.	36 S.L. Regt. R.A.
131433	Major	SHARPE, L.C.M.H.	General List Int.
126569	Capt.	SMALLWOOD, J.	R.A.C. 24th Lancers
148909	Capt.	STERN, D.L.	Lancashire Fusiliers
256087	Lieut.	THOMSON, G.	K.R.R.C. American.
292510	Capt.	TROFIMOV, A.A.E.	R.A.
258159	Capt.	VICKERY, P.C.H.	R.A.C. G.H.Q. Liaison Regt.
164930	Capt.	WALLER, J. de W.	Rifle Brigade
89630	Capt.	WATSON, W.	R.A. Heavy A.A.
144595	Major	WHITTY, V.E.	R.A.C. R.T.R.
40055	Major	WILSON, R.K.	12 Medium Regt. R.A.
85604	Major	WISE, A.	R. Warwicks

a) Two of the above-named Officers trained under false names, as they had previously worked at S.O.E. H.Q.:

Lt. Col. Hastings was in reality Lt. Col. J.R.H. HUTCHISON, late Head of R.F. Section.
Major Forrest was in reality Major H. O'BRYAN TEAR, who also had been on the Staff of that Section.

b) Lieut. ALLSOPP)
Lieut. THOMSON) These Officers, although holding a British Commission at the time of training, were of American nationality, and transferred to the U.S. Army before proceeding on operations.

BRITISH JEDBURGH OFFICERS (Cont.)

No.	Rank	Name & Initials	Regiment
156829	Capt.	MARCHANT, G.	Int. Corps
129260	Capt.	MARCHANT, J.J.	Wiltshire Regt.
169943	Major	MARTEN, H.N.	R.A.C. 2nd Northants
76264	Capt.	MAUDE, J.C.C., M.C.	Army Air Corps
166686	Lieut.	MELLOWS, T.A.	R.A.C. 27th Lancers
262289	Lieut.	MONAHAN, J.H.F.	R. Fusiliers
251332	Capt.	MONTAGUE, J.C.C.	R.A.C. 2nd Bn. R.T.R.
129302	Lt.Col.	MUSGRAVE, G.R. (O.C. M.E. 65 - also volunteer for operations)	R.A.
104205	Major	NIELSON, D.J.	R. Fusiliers
91977	Major	OGDEN-SMITH, C.M.	R.A.
132194	Major	PARKINSON, R.	R.A.C.
140509	Capt.	RADICE, J.	R.A.C. Queen's Bays
193114	Capt.	RUBINSTEIN, R.	69 S.L. Regt. R.A.
281582	Capt.	SELL, C.	36 S.L. Regt. R.A.
131433	Major	SHARPE, L.C.M.H.	General List Int.
126569	Capt.	SMALLWOOD, J.	R.A.C. 24th Lancers
148909	Capt.	STERN, D.L.	Lancashire Fusiliers
256087	Lieut.	THOMSON, G.	K.R.R.C. American.
292510	Capt.	TROFIMOV, A.A.E.	R.A.
258159	Capt.	VICKERY, P.C.H.	R.A.C. G.H.Q. Liaison Regt.
164930	Capt.	WALLER, J. de W.	Rifle Brigade
89630	Capt.	WATSON, W.	R.A. Heavy A.A.
144595	Major	WHITTY, V.E.	R.A.C. R.T.R.
40055	Major	WILSON, R.K.	12 Medium Regt. R.A.
85604	Major	WISE, A.	R. Warwicks

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b) Lieut. ALLSOPP)
Lieut. THOMSON) These Officers, although holding a British Commission at the time of training, were of American nationality, and transferred to the U.S. Army before proceeding on operations.

BRITISH JEDBURGH W/T OPERATORS

No.	Rank	Name & Initials	Regt.
5255446	Sgt.	ADAMS, W.	R. Sigs.
5348971	Sgt.	AUSTIN, J.	R. Berks.
7949725	Sgt.	BAILEY, F.	R.A.C.
1436889	Sgt.	BASSETT, C.M.	R.A.C.
3603976	Sgt.	BRIERLEY, R.	R.A.C.
7955910	Sgt.	BROWN, K.J.W.	R.A.C.
14561888	Sgt.	BROWN, O.A.	R.A.C.
14400059	Sgt.	CAIN, T.F.	R.A.C.
7938850	Sgt.	CAREY, N.E.S.	R.A.C.
14231870	Sgt.	CHAMBERS, J.	R.A.C.
14410309	Sgt.	CHATTEN, R.E.	R.A.C.
7945551	Sgt.	COLVIN, P.M.	R.A.C.
7961434	Sgt.	CORNICK, E.A.	R.A.C.
451406	Sgt.	COTTINGHAM, D.	R.A.C.
14403727	Sgt.	DALLOW, A.J.	R.A.C.
7963328	Sgt.	DE VILLE, A.	R.A.C.
14525261	Sgt.	ELLIS, F.J.	R.A.C.
14290042	Sgt.	GARDNER, D.	R.A.C.
7672285	Sgt.	GIBBS, D.	R.A.C.
1427066	Sgt.	GRINHAM, E.J.	R.A.C.
14290052	Sgt.	HARRISON, F.	R.A.C.
14290054	Sgt.	HENNEY, T.	R.A.C.
6354187	Sgt.	HOLDHAM, A.	R.A.C.
7952737	Sgt.	HOOKER, I.	R.A.C.
14371287	Sgt.	KEY, A.W.	R.A.C.
794775	Sgt.	LENEY, R.	R.A.C.
7889459	Sgt.	LINDSAY, J.B.	R.A.C.
7961382	Sgt.	LOOSMORE, R.	R.A.C.
79611204	Sgt.	MASON, G.	R.A.C.
2363352	C.Q.M.S.	MENZIES, J.S.	R. Sigs.
6856580	Sgt.	RAVEN, J.	R.A.C.

BRITISH JEDBURGH W/T OPERATORS (Cont.)

No.	Rank	Name & Initials	Regt.
7948701	Sgt.	RAWSON, B.	R.A.C.
7946074	Sgt.	SEYMOUR, K.	R.A.C.
7952657	Sgt.	SHARP, J.	R.A.C.
235647	Sgt.	SMITH, G.N.	R. Sigs.
14401047	Sgt.	SMITH, N.A.	R.A.C.
1651938	Sgt.	SOMERS, C.C.	R.A.F.
14423408	Sgt.	TACK, G.H.	R.A.C.
2184661	Sgt.	TAYLOR, J.C.	R.A.C.
6856995	Sgt.	VERLANDER, H.	R.A.C.
2368795	Sgt.	WHITTLE, M.	R. Sigss.
322254	Sgt.	WILDE, R.	R.A.C.
7952734	Sgt.	WOOD, N.	R.A.C.

AMERICAN JEDBURGH OFFICERS

No.	Rank	Name and Initials	Branch of Service
O-1057948	1/Lt.	ANSTETT, R.E.	Coast Artillery Corps
O-417365	Capt.	AUSTIN, B.M.D.	Infantry
O-440395	Capt.	ALLEN, E.T.	Field Artillery
O-105759	Lieut.	BROWN, C.E.	Cavalry
O-1314241	Capt.	BANK, A.	Infantry
O-1295491	1/Lt.	BAZATA, D.D.	Infantry
O-514834	1/Lt.	BOGGS, W.C.	Infantry
O-413060	Major	BONSALL, J.H.	Field Artillery
O-23959	Capt.	CARMAN, C.M.	Infantry
O-1575843	1/Lt.	CHADBOURNE, P.H.	Infantry
O-403761	Major	COLBY, W.	Field Artillery
O-132276	1/Lt.	CONEIN, L.	Infantry
O-1286091	Capt.	CYR, P.	Infantry
O-1292148	1/Lt.	DILLOW, K.C.	Infantry
O-1313987	1/Lt.	DONOVAN, P.W.	Infantry
O-1303688	Capt.	DREUX, W.B.	Infantry
O-1170369	1/Lt.	FORBES, J.R.	Field Artillery
O-1288037	1/Lt.	FOSTER, R.	Infantry
USMCR 08062	Major	FULLER, H.W.	United States Marine Corps Reserve
O-1321029	1/Lt.	GENNERICH, C.	Infantry
O-451286	Major	GILDEE, J.	Field Artillery
O-1167452	Capt.	GUILLOT, N.	Field Artillery
O-1178174	1/Lt.	HANNA, W.C.	Field Artillery
O-1574059	2/Lt.	HEYNS, R.E.	Infantry
O-117491	Capt.	KNERLY, J.	Field Artillery
O-856308	Capt.	KNOX, B.M.W.	Air Corps
O-1285452	1/Lt.	LUCAS, R.A.	Infantry
O-517469	1/Lt.	McINTOSH, H.D.	Infantry
O-24774	Major	MANIERRE, C.E.	Infantry
O-442720	Major	MONTGOMERY, R.	Infantry

AMERICAN JEDBURGH OFFICERS (Cont.)

No.	Rank	Name and Initials	Branch of Service
O-1301589	1/Lt.	MOORE, R.E.	Infantry
O-514465	1/Lt.	MUNDINGER, R.G.	Field Artillery
O-1166791	Capt.	MYNATT, C.	Field Artillery
O-412128	Major	OLMSTED, J.M.	Infantry
O-25773	Capt.	PIETSCH, W.H.	Infantry
O-508682	1/Lt.	SINGLAUB, J.K.	Infantry
O-1031210	Capt.	SOLLENBERGER, McC.	Cavalry
O-1031841	1/Lt.	STARRING, M.B.	Infantry
O-359875	Major	SUMMERS, J.W.	Cavalry
O-25856	1/Lt.	SWANK, L.	Corps of Engineers
O-1291911	1/Lt.	TODD, H.A.	Infantry
O-1293152	1/Lt.	TRUMPS, S.R.	Infantry
O-1322496	1/Lt.	VERHAEGHE, G.M.	Infantry

AMERICAN JEDBURGH W/T OPERATORS

No.	Rank	Name and Initials
35270238	T/Sgt.	ADAMS, W.
17155757	T/Sgt.	ANDERSON, R.J.
15134230	T/Sgt.	BACIK, A.
12163863	T/Sgt.	BAIRD, R.R.
32967117	T/Sgt.	BAUMGOLD, T.
12141181	T/Sgt.	BERLIN, W.B.
13151112	T/Sgt.	BEYNON, W.W.
6916249	T/Sgt.	BILLINGSLEY, J.
11087181	T/Sgt.	BOURGOIN, L.J.
13032124	T/Sgt.	BRADNER, J.
16089276	T/Sgt.	CALDWELL, J.J.
15121222	T/Sgt.	CARPENTER, J.J.
11103990	T/Sgt.	COLE, F.J.
11084219	T/Sgt.	COTE, R.E.
36287373	T/Sgt.	DENNEAU, A.J.
36401323	T/Sgt.	ESCH, E.B.
32888898	T/Sgt.	FLOYD, R.C.
12152566	T/Sgt.	FRANKLIN, N.R.
12145641	T/Sgt.	FRIELE, B.E.
15373700	T/Sgt.	GODDARD, L.E.
12141816	T/Sgt.	GRUEN, A.
13150815	T/Sgt.	HANSON, F.A.
37658721	T/Sgt.	HENELY, M.F.
12013049	T/Sgt.	KEHOE, R.R.
11019152	T/Sgt.	LAJEUNESSE, L.E.
12150930	T/Sgt.	LOHSE, R.
32779206	Sgt.	McGOWAN, J.E.
19102433	T/Sgt.	MERSEREAU, C.P.
12158469	T/Sgt.	PALMER, H.V.
12147067	M/Sgt.	PIERRE, R.L.

AMERICAN JEDBURGH W/T OPERATORS (Cont.)

No.	Rank	Name and Initials
18138196	T/Sgt.	POCHE, F.M.
12120395	T/Sgt.	ROCCA, V.M.
15121174	T/Sgt.	SCOTT, C.A.
32867390	T/Sgt.	SPEARS, D.A.
16169645	T/Sgt.	STOYKA, J.L.
17106991	T/Sgt.	THOMPSON, W.T.
12202816	T/3	TRACY, T.J.
35455498	T/Sgt.	VAN HART, J.T.
15134442	T/3	WATTERS, L.J.
11080713	T/3	WHITE, J.A.
35540859	T/3	ZIELSKE, W.F.

FRENCH JEDBURGH OFFICERS

Rank	Name & Initials
Lt. (A/Capt)	AGUIREC, P.
Capt.	ALCEE, R.
Lieut.	ALLET, B.
Capt.	AMBEL, L.
Lieut.	AMIEL, J.
Capt.	AMY, R.
Lieut.	BARAUD, R.
S/Lieut.	BATAILLE, F.
S/Lieut.	BEAUMONT, J.
Lieut.	BLACHERE, L.
Lieut.	BOINEAU, C.
Lieut.	BOURDON, M.
Lieut.	BOURRIOT, H.
S/Lieut.	BROUILLARD, J.
2/Lieut.	CARLIERE, R.
Lieut.	CHAPEL, F.
Lieut.	CHARRON, P.
Asp.	CHAULAIS, H.
Lieut.	CONTE, A.
A/2/Lt.	CORMIER, F.
Capt.	COUDRAY, M.
Lieut.	DANTEC, Y.M.
2/Lieut.	DARTIGUES, G.
Capt.	DECRVILLE, J.
Capt.	DE MERVILLE, R.
Lieut.	DEPREZ, C.
Capt.	DEROUEN, J.G.
Lieut.	DE SCHONEN, P.
Lieut.	DELORME, Y.
Lieut.	DEVAILLY, M.
Lieut.	DE WAVRANT, G.
Lieut.	DHOMAS, A.

FRENCH JEDBURGH OFFICERS (Cont.)

Lieut.	DUMESNIL, H.
S/Lt. A/Lt.	DUPONT, P.
Capt.	ERARD, P.
Lieut.	FAVEL, J.
Capt.	FAY, M.
Lieut.	FERANDON, F.
Capt.	FONTAINE, M.
Lieut.	FONTCROISE, H.
Asp.	FOURCADE, P.
Capt.	FRANCOMTE, R.
Lieut.	FRAYAN, A.
Lieut.	GAIRAUD, A.
Lieut.	GERVILLE, M.
Capt.	GOUVET, P.
Lieut.	GRAMONT, J.
Capt.	GRANTER, P.J.
A/S/Lt.	HACHE, L.
Cdt.	JEANCLAUDE, D.
Capt.	KERNEVEL, J.
Lieut.	LASSERE, J.
Lieut.	LAVIGE, J.
S/Lieut.	LAVISME, J.
Lieut.	LEB, D.
Lieut.	LEBEL, P.
Chef de Bn.	LEGRAND, L.
S/Lieut.	LE LANN, J.
Asp.	LE ROCHER, J.
Lieut.	LEVALOIS, G.
Lieut.	LE ZACHMEUR, G.
Lieut.	MAITRE, R.
Lieut.	MARCHAND, P.
Capt.	MARCHANT, E.

FRENCH JEDBURGH OFFICERS (CONT.)

Rank	Name and Initials
Capt.	MARTINO, J.
Lieut.	MASSONI, A.
Lieut.	MONTCLER, S.
Lieut.	MONTLAC, A.
Lieut.	MORGAN, P.
Asp.	MORHANGE, J.
Capt.	MUTIN, P.
Capt.	NOIR, C.L.
Capt.	PAOLI, A.
Capt.	RRATO, E.
Asp.	PUGET, H.
Lieut.	RABEAU, L.
Capt.	RAINCOURT, R.
Lieut.	REMOND, G.
Lieut.	REQUIET, P.
S/Lieut.	REVARD, G.
Asp.	RIMBAUD, P.
Capt.	ROCHER, G.
Lieut.	RONGLOU, J.
Lieut.	SOUAL, J.
Lieut.	TELMON, J.
Asp.	TEVENAC, F.
S/Lt.	THEVENET, F.G.
Lieut.	THOUVILLE, R.
Capt.	TOSEL, J.
Cdt.	VERMEULEN, J.
S/Lt.	VIDALEY, J.
Lieut.	VIGUIER, M.
Lieut.	WAGUET, R.

N.B. Almost without exception these Officers trained under false names in order not to compromise their families, who were still in France.

FRENCH JEDBURGH W/T OPERATORS

Rank	Name and Initials
S/Lieut.	BOURGOIN, J.
S/Lieut.	CAMOUIN, J.
S/Lieut.	CHEVALIER, A.
S/Lieut.	DE REYSEN, F.
S/Lieut.	DESCHAMPS, J.
S/Lieut.	GIRY, L.
S/Lieut.	GUILLEMOT, J.
S/Lieut.	LEGRAND, R.
S/Lieut.	LEJEUNE, C.
S/Lieut.	MASSON, G.
S/Lieut.	MAURIN, P.
S/Lieut.	MERSIOL, R.
S/Lieut.	NICOLE, J.
S/Lieut.	RARISELLE, R.

N.B. Almost without exception these Officers trained under false names, in order not to compromise their families, who were still in France.

BELGIAN JEDBURGH OFFICERS

Rank	Name & Initials
Capt.	BACHELART, C.
2/Lt.	D'OULTREMONT, E.
2/Lt.	SELYS LONGCHAMPS, E.
Lieut.	SHREURS, W.
Lieut.	WINIWARTER, A.A.E.

DUTCH JEDBURGH OFFICERS

Rank	Name & Initials
Lieut.	BESTEBREURTJE, A.
Lieut.	BRINKGREVE, H.
2/Lieut.	GROENEWOUD, J.
Lieut.	STAAL, J.

Appendix III(G)

Notified in A.C.I.s 3rd November 1943
Effective date 19th October 1943.

WAR ESTABLISHMENT - M.E. 65.

79/W.E./7775S.D.3.)

Commandant (lieutenant-Colonel)	1
General staff officer, 2nd Grade	1
Major	1
Chief instructor (Major)	1
Company commanders (Majors)	3
Adjutant (Captain)	1
Instructors (Captains or Subalterns)	21
Instructor, R. Signals (Captain)	1
Quartermaster	1
Total Officers	31
Regimental sergeant-major	1
Regimental quarter-master sergeant	1
Clerk, R.A.S.C. (warrant officer, Class II)	1
Company quarter-master-sergeants	3
Assistant instructors -	
Infantry sergeants	21
R. Signals (sergeants)	3
A.P.T.C.	1
Armourer sergeant, R.E.M.E.	1
Duty sergeants	4
Instrument mechanic,R.Signals (sergeant)	1
Clerk, R.A.S.C. (sergeant)	1
Officers' mess steward	1
Sergeants' mess caterer	1
Total, warrant officers, staff-sergeants and sergeants	41
Lance-sergeants	3
Corporals	9
Lance-Corporals	14
Privates	123
Total, rank and file	149
Total, other ranks	190
Total, M.E. 65	221
Attached -	
A.C.C. - cooks for -	2
Officers' mess	2
Sergeants' mess	4
Rank & file mess (includes 1 corporal)	7
Students' messes	15
Total,M.E.65 (including attached)	236

WAR ESTABLISHMENT - M.E. 65 (contd)

ii) Distribution of rank and file by trades and duties.

Tradesmen -	
Carpenter and joiner, R.E.M.E.	1
Clerks, R.A.S.C.	13
Driver-mechanics, R.A.S.C.	4
Storeman, technical (trained in wireless duties)	1
Total, tradesmen	19
Non-tradesmen -	
Batmen	48
Drivers, I.C.	21
General dutymen	14
Medical officers' orderly (lance-corporal)	1
Motor-cyclist orderlies	2
Orderlies for -	
Officers' mess	2
Sergeants mess	1
Rank and file mess	4
Students messes	22
Regimental police	4
Sanitary dutymen	4
storemen, non-technical	7
Total, non-tradesmen	130
Total, rank and file	149

iii) Transport

Motor-cycles, solo	2
Cars, 2-seater, 4 x 2	14
Trucks, 15-cwt 4 x 2, G.S.	4
Lorries, 3-ton, 4 x 2, G.S.	4
Lorries, 3-ton, 4 x 2, troop carrying	3

NOTE: All personnel of this establishment except the instructional staff may be of low medical category.

SET-UP OF JEDBURGH SECTION

AS AT D-DAY, 6th JUNE 1944.

DR/JED	Lt. Col.	D.L.G.	Carleton-Smith	(British)
DR/JED.1	Major	H.B.	Cox	(U.S.)
DR/JED.3	Major	V.J.A.	Horton	(British)
DR/JED.4	Captain	J.W.	Jaycox	(U.S.)
DR/JED.5	Major	F.L.	Young	(British)
DR/JED.6	Captain	F.J.	Coolidge	(U.S.)
DR/JED.7	Captain	J.	Verneuil	(French)
DR/JED.8	Lieut.	A.V.	Wastin	(French)
DR/JED.AQ	Captain	H.E.P.	Buck (F.A.N.Y.)	(British)

PROFORMA FOR JEDBURGH WARNING

ORDER

(a) Country Section responsible for operation.

(b) General mission of the team.

(c) Numerical composition of the team.

(d) Place and time at which the Jedburgh team will report for final briefing.

(e) Probable date of departure from the United Kingdom.

(f) Nature of Reception Committee, if already known.

(g) Stores and containers being taken, by types.

(h) Money being taken.

APPENDIX IV B.

NOTE ON THE PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE JEDBURGH PLAN

Method of work

+KLEBER must take on regional chiefs having the following mission:

i) To go on the spot and choose, in agreement with the local chiefs, the groups which are to be reserved for the application of the Jedburgh plan.

ii) To look for parachute grounds in the immediate vicinity of the rallying point of these groups. Points moreover chosen in such a way as to coincide as often as possible with the ground themselves.

ii) To give necessary instructions to certain members of the group so that they will be able to carry out reception.

I gave KLEBER a very detailed note on the layout of a landing ground and precise details on the role of reception committees.

We have agreed on the terms which should be used in telegrams dealing with landing grounds.

He will see that the necessary material is looked for, i.e. lamps for receptions, W/T sets for listening to messages. The same precisions have been given to MONTESQUIEU for that part of the plan which affects him.

It will be necessary to send them eventually the necessary equipment for receptions.

+ One of Pontcarral's staff officers entrusted with this side of the work.

London 13th April, 1944.

MITCHELL PLAN. (DRP/2061 of 7 JAN: 1944)

O.R. 5685

LOW COUNTRIES & FRANCE

SCALE 1:2·834,000 OR 46·5 MILES TO 1 INCH

MILES 50 40 30 20 10 0 50 100 MILES

PROBABLE AREA OF JEDBURGH OPERATIONS.

E. FRISIAN ISLANDS: LANGEOOG, NORDERNEY, JUIST

W. FRISIAN ISLANDS: TERSCHELLING, VLIELAND, TEXEL, SCHIERMONNIKOOG, AMELAND

Wesermunde, Emden, Leeuwarden, Groningen, Bremen, DenHelder, Ijmuiden, Haarlem, AMSTERDAM, THE HAGUE, HOOK OF HOLLAND, Rotterdam, Utrecht, Deventer, Munster, Essen, Duisburg, Flushing, Zeebrugge, Blankenberghe, Ostend, Bruges, Ghent, Antwerp, Maastricht, BRUSSELS, Aachen, Cologne, Eupen, Malmedy, Wiesbaden, Mainz, Trier, Luxembourg, Saarbrucken, Metz, Verdun, Strasbourg, Nancy, Toul, Dover, Calais, Dunkerque, Boulogne, Southampton, Portsmouth, Plymouth, St. Omer, Lille, Douai, Arras, Cambrai, Abbeville, Amiens, St. Quentin, Dieppe, Cherbourg, le Havre, Rouen, Beauvais, Laon, Soissons, Reims, Mézieres, Arlon, Caen, Lisieux, St. Lo, Châlons-s-Marne, St. Dizier, Troyes, Epinal, Colmar, Lannion, St. Malo, St. Brieux, Brest, Dinan, Mayenne, Chartres, Rennes, Le Mans, Orléans, Auxerre, Langres, Mulhouse, Belfort, Vesoul, Dijon, Seurre, Dôle, Mouchard, Poligny, Châlons-s-Saône, le Creusot, Nevers, Bourges, Vierzon, Blois, Tours, Angers, Nantes, Redon, Vannes, Lorient, Quimper, Douarnenez, Brest, Sabres, Roquefort, Mont de Marsan, St. Sever, Orthez, Sauveterre, Pau, Bordeaux, Langon, Périgueux, Monpont, Jardres, Poitiers, Fleuré, Chateauroux, Moulins, Montluçon, Paray-le-Monial, Gex, Geneva, Roanne, VICHY, Clermont-Ferrand, Limoges, Angoulême, Nontron, la Rochelle, LES SABLES D'OLONNE, Toulouse, Carcassonne, Narbonne, Montpellier, Sete, Nîmes, Avignon, Apt, Marseilles, Toulon, Nice, Lyons, St. Etienne, Grenoble, Perpignan

Rivers: Maas, Scheldt, Lys, Meuse, Rhine, Somme, Seine, Aisne, Marne, Moselle, Loire, Yonne, Cher, Creuse, Saône, Doubs, Rhône, Ain, Isère, Dordogne, Garonne, Adour

SEINE INFÉRIEURE, OISE, SOMME, EURE, CALVADOS, MANCHE, ORNE, SEINE PARIS ET OISE, SEINE ET MARNE, MARNE, AUBE, ARDENNES, MEUSE, MOSELLE, BAS-RHIN, MEURTHE ET MOSELLE, HAUTE MARNE, VOSGES, HAUT-RHIN, PAS DE CALAIS, FINISTÈRE, CÔTES DU NORD, ILLE ET VILAINE, MAYENNE, SARTHE, EURE ET LOIRE, LOIRET, MORBIHAN, MAINE ET LOIRE, LOIRE INFERIEURE, INDRE ET LOIRE, LOIR ET CHER, CÔTE D'OR, HAUTE SAÔNE, DOUBS, JURA, NIÈVRE, SAÔNE ET LOIRE, DEUX SEVRES, VENDÉE, VIENNE, ALLIER, CHARENTE, CHARENTE-INFÉRIEURE, HAUTE CREUSE, PUY DE DÔME, RHÔNE, LOIRE, SAVOIE, HAUTE SAVOIE, ISÈRE, CORREZE, CANTAL, HAUTE LOIRE, ARDÉCHE, DRÔME, HAUTES ALPES, ALPES MARITIMES, BASSES ALPES, VAUCLUSE, BOUCHES DU RHÔNE, VAR, LOZÈRE, AVEYRON, LOT, LOT ET GARONNE, TARN ET GARONNE, GERS, HAUTES PYRENÉES, BASSES PYRENÉES, ARIÈGE, AUDE, HERAULT, GARD, PYRENÉES ORIENTALES, DORDOGNE, GIRONDE, LANDES

ENGLISH CHANNEL, MEDITERRANEAN SEA

BELGIUM, GERMANY, SWITZERLAND, ITALY, SPAIN

Geographical Section, General Staff. W.O. 1944