S.O.E. History 12 Vol. III

ARCHIVES

HS 7/19

5
251

FILE NUMBER	SUBJECT
HISTORY 12 volume 3	HISTORY OF JEDBURGHS IN EUROPE
VOLUME	
FROM 1944	
TO	

IX A.

R.2032.

ADE/372

Copy No: .....

S P E C I A L F O R C E H E A D Q A R T E R S .

O P E R A T I O N A L P R O C E D U R E

—O—O—O—O—O—O—O—O—

12 May 44.

Appendix VIC.

LCS/810

From:- Lt.Col. D.L.G.
Carleton-Smith.
S.F. H.Q.

12th December, 1944.

I have much pleasure in forwarding a copy of extracts of a letter from General de Larminat commanding the French Forces in the West to our General.

To:- Sgt. D. Rawson.

COPY

16. 11. 44.

En prenant le Commandement des Forces Francaises de l'Ouest, j'ai pu apprécier le magnifique travail qu'avaient accompli dans cette region les equipes "Jedburgh" et "Shinoille" placées sous vos ordres, et les sentiments de sympathie qu'elles avaient suscités partout.

Au moment ou ces equipes quittent le sol francais pour la liberation duquel elles ont si efficacement agi, je vous demande d'exprimer aux officiers et operateurs radios qui les constituent la reconnaissance et la cordiale affection de leurs camarades francais.

Vos hommes ont bien travaillé pour la victoire commune, mais ils ont de plus bien travaille pour la comprehension et l'affection mutuelles de nos deux pays.

Bien cordialement à vous.

(SGD) LARMINAT.

R.2040.

INDEX.

INTRODUCTION

PAPER 1 — Organisation and Operational Procedure at SOE/SO H.Q.

PAPER 2 — Procedure for Despatch of JEDBURGHS.

PAPER 3 — Standing Orders for War Room

PAPER 4. — Preparation and Writing of Messages

PAPER 5 — Procedure between SF.H.Q. and SF/SO Staffs.

PAPER 6 — OPERATIONAL standards in relation to tasks requested by SF and SO Staffs.

PAPER 7 — SOE/SO H.Q. Signal Instruction No. 13.

LIST OF APPENDICES

To Paper 1

A — Information Report (on Military Situation)

B — Information Report (on SOE/SO Situation).

C — Kardex Amendment Form.

D — Conventional map markings.

To Paper 3

E — War Room Duty Rota

F,G. — Log pro-formas

H — Pro-forma for daily brief.

To Paper 4.

I — A.F.C.2136

J — List of prefixes

K — Degrees of priority

L — Phonetic alphabet

M — Abbreviations and phrase code words.

To Paper 2

N — Proforma for Jedburgh Warning Order

R.2033

OPERATIONAL PROCEDURE.

INTRODUCTION

1. This document consists of seven separate papers which have been prepared in order that a standardised procedure may be established and understood by all those directly concerned in operations in support of forthcoming military operations.

2. This procedure will come into force on 18 May 44 and will not thereafter be varied except by the instruction of ADE or ADE/US.

3. This document is not exhaustive but provides as far as possible for such needs as can be foreseen. It is of the utmost importance that every officer concerned in the conduct of operations should have a thorough knowledge of this procedure. Section Heads will ensure that such officers study thoroughly those parts of this document which particularly concern them and have a general knowledge of the rest.

4. A further paper will be issued shortly on the procedure for co-ordinating the Joint Operations Room, A.F.H.Q. with SOE/SO H.Q., London.

R. 2049.

PAPER I

ORGANISATION AND OPERATIONAL PROCEDURE AT SOE/SO H.Q.

INTRODUCTION

1. SOE/SO H.Q. is under the operational control of S.C.A.E.F. and accordingly has so to direct its activities as to give the maximum support to the operational plans of S.H.A.E.F. This support falls into two categories:-

(a) General support designed to weaken the German war effort and create the most favourable conditions possible for the military assault on Western Europe.

(b) Special support against strategic targets which will affect the actual battle.

2. The first of these categories describes the type of work now being carried out in Western Europe by SOE/SO. The second requires the maximum co-ordination with military operations, which will be effected through SOE/SO liaison with S.H.A.E.F. and through S.F. and S.O. Staffs attached to the headquarters of Army Groups and Armies.

3. It is with the object of further facilitating the co-ordination of Country Sections' activities with military operations that the operational procedure outlined below is being introduced.

OPERATIONAL PROCEDURE

4. The present procedure has been varied as little as possible for the following reasons:-

(a) It is the result of considerable experience and consequent improvement.

(b) It is most probable that there will be periods during the process of ejecting the Germans from France and the Low Countries, when SOE/SO activities may revert approximately to their present form.

5. The procedure set out below relates particularly to the activities of the following Sections:-

D/R, DR/LC, F, RF, EU/P, N and T.

D/R.JED. D/R.OG. D/R.SAS.

EU/P will forthwith come under the command of D/R for D-Day operational activities in France and the Low Countries and all joint exercises connected therewith.

6. All Sections concerned will be prepared to operate this procedure from 18 May 44.

DUTIES OF D/R REGION

7. D/R will be responsible under AD/E and ADE/US for the conduct of all operations by SOE/SO in France and the Low Countries.

8. D/R will command F, RF, EU/P and, through DR/LC, N and T Sections.

D/R.JED D/R.OG. D/R.SAS.

The operational procedure for D/R Region and for DR/LC sub-region will be in accordance with the instructions issued by D/R and D/R.LC respectively.

9. An Operations Room for D/R has been established in Room 364, next to the War Room.

10. D/R will deal, in the first instance, with all requests from SF/SO Staffs for tasks to be carried out in support of military operations. If a

decision by AD/E or ADE/US is required, D/R will inform AD/E or ADE/US of the request and of the resources available, and will make a recommendation as to the method of carrying out the task.

11. Requests from S.H.A.E.F. will come through the SOE/SO Liaison Section who will be responsible for informing AD/M Section. AD/M Section will inform AD/E, ADE/US, DR and the War Room. As in the case of requests from SO and SF Staffs, AD/E or ADE/US will make any major decisions and DR will be responsible for carrying them out.

12. DR will carry out such tasks as are ordered either by issuing instructions to one or more of the Country Sections under his command or by the use of a JEDBURGH team.

13. D/R will be responsible for informing the SF ~~or SO~~ Staffs concerned what action is being taken and when any tasks are likely to be executed and also for informing them of the results when they are known. This applies to all tasks given to the Field irrespective of whether the tasks have been requested by SF or SO Staffs or not.

14. D/R will also be responsible for dealing with all messages from the I (b) Section of SF~~/SO~~ Staffs. BSS/A has been attached to D/R to undertake this work. He will collect the necessary material for replies, first from Country Sections, and secondly if necessary, from outside sources such as M.I.5 or Section V of M.I.6 through BSS/AA, and will be responsible under the direction of DR for replying to the Staffs.

15. D/R will also be responsible for the co-ordination of activity by Country Sections arising out of suggestions made by their organisations in the Field, to ensure that there is no contradiction or duplication and that these activities are co-ordinated with military plans and any action being undertaken by other Services.

DUTIES OF COUNTRY SECTIONS.

~~16~~. Country Sections will be responsible for issuing all orders to their respective Resistance Groups in the Field.

~~17~~ 22. F, RF and EU/P will maintain with each other a constant liaison on all matters, particularly tasks in which they may be jointly interested. Liaison will also be maintained as necessary by these Sections with DR/LC, N and T Sections.

~~18~~ 23. All information received by Country Sections relating to the MILITARY SITUATION, particularly the movement of enemy troops, will be passed to the War Room with particulars of the time and date of the information and an assessment of the value of the source graded in accordance with the system set out in para 36 below. For this purpose a white copy of the Information Report form will be used. (Specimen attached at Appendix A). ~~Two copies~~ One will be passed to the War Room. and one to AD6/INT. This information will NOT be distributed by the War Room without the approval of AD6/INT.

~~19~~ 24. All information other than amendments to the KARDEX received by Country Sections relating to the SOE/SO SITUATION will be passed to the War Room with the grading shown in accordance with the system set out in paragraph 36 below. For this purpose a blue copy of the Information Report form will be used (specimen attached at Appendix B). Two copies will be passed to the War Room.

~~20~~ 25. When any information is received by a country Section which involves an amendment to the KARDEX, the amendment will be sent to the War Room on a KARDEX Amendment Form. (Specimen attached at Appendix C).

~~21~~ 26. At the end of each moon period Country Sections will send to the War Room a statement showing the cumulative total of each of the items on the reverse of the KARDEX card for each card, which has been affected by deliveries during that moon period. Country Sections will also send with this statement a statement of roughly what percentage of stores delivered are still available for each card concerned.

16. Letters etc. will be addressed simply to D/R and not to any particular Section or officer of D/R Staff unless it is definitely desired that only a certain officer should deal with the question when the paper should be marked Personal and in the case of BIGOT and Red Label papers.

17. Letters etc. originating from D/R or the Staff will come as from D/R and be signed either by D/R, DR/US or a member of the staff "for" them.

18. D/R Registry will serve D/R and the Regional Staff. Each Country and other Sections mentioned above will maintain its own registry.

19. Papers received by D/R will not normally be circulated outside the Regional Staff. Where a paper should be seen by one or more of the Country Sections, copies will be made for them to retain.

20. Except on routine and non-operational questions, Sections etc. outside the Region should not correspond direct with Country Sections but should do so through D/R. There is no objection to a copy of correspondence addressed to D/R being sent direct to the Section or Sections obviously concerned in order to speed up action. Where this procedure is employed, however, replies from Country Sections will be sent through D/R.

16. Letters etc. will be addressed simply to D/R and not to any particular Section or officer of D/R Staff unless it is definitely desired that only a certain officer should deal with the question when the paper should be marked Personal and in the case of BIGOT and Red Label papers.

17. Letters etc. originating from D/R or the Staff will come as from D/R and be signed either by D/R, DR/US or a member of the staff "for" them.

18. D/R Registry will serve D/R and the Regional Staff. Each Country and other Sections mentioned above will maintain its own registry.

19. Papers received by D/R will not normally be circulated outside the Regional Staff. Where a paper should be seen by one or more of the Country Sections, copies will be made for them to retain.

20. Except on routine and non-operational questions, Sections etc. outside the Region should not correspond direct with Country Sections but should do so through D/R. There is no objection to a copy of correspondence addressed to D/R being sent direct to the Section or Sections obviously concerned in order to speed up action. Where this procedure is employed, however, replies from Country Sections will be sent through D/R.

22. Normal channels will continue to be used by Country Sections to obtain intelligence. If any intelligence is required from S.H.A.E.F., the request will be passed to ADE/INT.

BARDSEAS

23. It will be the responsibility of EU/P to watch closely the development of the battle and to recommend to D/R when he considers that any of the BARDSEAS should be despatched.

24. D/R will be responsible for deciding when the BARDSEAS will be used. After this decision has been taken EU/P will be responsible for their despatch.

JEDBURGHS

25. This reserve of trained personnel will NOT be used without the permission of ADE or ADE/US.

26. Orders for the employment of a JEDBURGH team will be issued by D/R and their briefing and despatch will be in accordance with the procedure described in Paper 2 of this document.

DUTIES OF THE WAR ROOM

27. The War Room will be responsible for presenting at all times a full picture of the situation in both its military and SOE/SO aspects. This information will be available in the War Room for AD/E, ADE/US, D/R and his Staff, and all Country Section Officers concerned with the conduct of operations.

35. The War Room under the direction of ADE/INT will pass on to SF/SO Staffs at 21 Army Group and FUSAG, to D/R and to other Country Sections concerned, all relevant Military Information received from SOE/SO sources together with the Country Section's evaluation of the source.

and will include this in their twice-daily Sitreps to SF/SO Staffs and S.H.A.E.F. Liaison Section. Any items of urgent importance will be sent by message. The War Room will NOT send out any information derived from copies of telegrams without checking with the appropriate Country Sections.

36. The War Room will pass on to SF/SO Staffs at 21 Army Group and FUSAG and to ADE/INT, D/R and other Country Sections concerned all relevant military information received from SOE/SO sources, together with the Country Section's evaluation of the source.

37. The War Room will also receive from Country Sections amendments to the KARDEX, and will issue these amendments to all holders of the KARDEX.

SITREPS

38. From SF and SO Staffs.

Situation Reports will be made daily from information received up to the following times:

SF Det.,	21 Army Gp.	0600 hrs and 1800 hrs
"	1 Cdn Army	1200 2400
"	2 Brit. "	1200 2400
SO Det.,	FUSAG	0600 1800
"	1 U.S. Army	1200 2400
"	3 "	1200 2400

When detachable sections are away from their SF or SO detachments, they will make reports to SOE/SO H.Q. from information received by them up to 1200 and 2400 hrs.

24. Normal channels will continue to be used by Country Sections to obtain intelligence. If any intelligence is required from S.H.A.E.F., the request will be passed to ADE/INT.

BARDSEAS

28. It will be the responsibility of EU/P to watch closely the development of the battle and to recommend to D/R when he considers that any of the BARDSEAS should be despatched.

24. D/R will be responsible for deciding when the BARDSEAS will be used. After this decision has been taken EU/P will be responsible for their despatch.

JEDBURGHS

25. This reserve of trained personnel will NOT be used without the permission of ADE or ADE/US.

26. Orders for the employment of a JEDBURGH team will be issued by D/R and their briefing and despatch will be in accordance with the procedure described in Paper 2 of this document.

DUTIES OF THE WAR ROOM

27. The War Room will be responsible for presenting at all times a full picture of the situation in both its military and SOE/SO aspects. This information will be available in the War Room for AD/E, ADE/US, D/R and his Staff, and all Country Section Officers concerned with the conduct of operations.

28. The War Room will be responsible for keeping D/R, F, RF, and EU/P informed of any changes in the situation. All information passed by the War Room will refer to the map G.S.G.S. 1/250,000, unless otherwise stated.

29. All operational information from sources outside S.O.E. which has a bearing on activities in support of military operations will be brought to the attention of D/R and his staff by the War Room.

30. The War Room will receive from Country Sections SOE/SO information and will include this in their twice-daily Sitreps to SF/SO Staffs and S.H.A.E.F. Liaison Section. Any items of urgent importance will be sent by message. The War Room will NOT send out any information derived from copies of telegrams without checking with the appropriate Country Sections.

31 The War Room will pass on to SF/SO Staffs at 21 Army Group and FUSAG and to ADE/INT, D/R and other Country Sections concerned all relevant military information received from SOE/SO sources, together with the Country Section's evaluation of the source.

32. The War Room will also receive from Country Sections amendments to the KARDEX, and will issue these amendments to all holders of the KARDEX.

SITREPS

33. From SF and SO Staffs.

Situation Reports will be made daily from information received up to the following times:

SF Det.,	21 Army Gp.	0600 hrs and 1800 hrs
"	1 Cdn Army	1200 2400
"	2 Brit. "	1200 2400
SO Det.,	FUSAG	0600 1800
"	1 U.S. Army	1200 2400
"	3 "	1200 2400

When detachable sections are away from their SF or SO detachments, they will make reports to SOE/SO H.Q. from information received by them up to 1200 and 2400 hrs.

39. From War Room

SOE/SO information received from Country Sections and military information from SOE/SO sources, together with the Country Sections' evaluation of the source will be transmitted in a twice-daily Sitrep at 1200 and 2400 hrs to SF~~/HQ~~ Staffs and SHAEF Liaison Section. Military information will NOT be included in copies sent to SF or SO Dets. with Army HQ. The War Room Sitrep will be distributed as follows:

SF Staff 21 Army Group
SF Staff Second Army
SF Staff First Cdn. Army.
SO Staff FUSAG
SO Staff First U.S. Army
SO Staff Third U.S. Army
AD/M for SOE/SO Liaison SHAEF

and to detachable sections when away from their SF/SO detachments.

40. To and From MASSINGHAM

A daily Sitrep will be sent to Massingham as at ~~1700~~ 2200 hrs. MASSINGHAM will also send a daily Sitrep to SOE/SO HQ.

GRADING OF INFORMATION

41
36. Information both Military and SOE/SO will be graded as follows by Country Sections before passing it to the War Room:-

A. Information from men considered entirely reliable
B. Information from well established circuits.
C. Information from sources of unknown reliability.

This grading will be quoted in messages and Sitreps wherever appropriate.

WAR DIARY

42
37. All Sections will continue to supply L/WAD with all relevant material for the War Diary. The War Room will send copies of all SITREPS and Summaries produced. DR will take particular care that copies of all operation orders and briefs of JEDBURGHS and BARDSEAS are sent to L/WAD. All documents referring to operational activities will be sent to L/WAD in duplicate and one copy will be passed by him to the Section responsible for writing the War Diary for OSS/SO London. Of all documents referring to operational activities one copy will be sent to L/WAD and a second copy will be passed to L/WAD. US.

DAILY CONFERENCE

43
38. From 18 May 44 a conference will be held in the War Room daily at 10.30 hrs. This conference will be presided over by either ADE or ADE/US and the following officers will attend. or their representatives

ADE/SAC > MG, ADM, ADE/SIGS, CD/S OR CD/L
DR/HO > DR, D/R.LC.
DR.JED, F, DR/OG, DR/SAS, DR/AIR, RF, EUP, AL, ADE/INT

44
39. At this conference ADE/INT will report the latest information from D-day onwards available from S.H.A.E.F. on the military situation. ADE/INT will therefore visit S.H.A.E.F. each morning before the Conference.

46
40. DR will be responsible for supplying the latest information about the SOE/SO situation.

47 Orders will be issued by MG at the conclusion of the Conference and will consist of hand-written confirmation of orders given verbally by ADE or ADE/US with two appendices attached, containing the latest available information. Appendix A will describe the Military Situation and Appendix B the SOE/SO Situation. These appendices will be prepared by the War Room Staff and handed to MG before the conference. Appendix A will be revised by ADE/INT where necessary as a result of his information from S.H.A.E.F.

R.

LIAISON WITH S.H.A.E.F.

47 In addition to the SOE/SO Liaison Section with S.H.A.E.F., which will principally be concerned with operational matters and particularly with forward planning, a constant intelligence liaison will be maintained by ADE/INT.

48 Any information obtained through this liaison or through any other liaison will be passed first to the War Room, who will then distribute it to those concerned.

49 Any messages or information for the SOE/SO Liaison Section with S.H.A.E.F. will be passed to AD/M Section, who will be responsible for keeping ADE/SAC informed.

LIAISON WITH P.W.D.

50
45 Existing contacts with P.W.E. and O.W.I/M.O branches of O.S.S. will continue. All matters concerning propaganda or political warfare in connection with operations controlled by S.H.A.E.F. will be referred to P.W.D. through ADM/H, who will be responsible for keeping SOE/SO liaison at SHAEF informed.

POLITICAL PROBLEMS

51
46 Normal contacts between Regional and Country Section heads and the Foreign Office will continue. Any political problems, however, which arise in connection with operations controlled by S.H.A.E.F. will be referred to the British or American political advisers to the Supreme Commander through the SOE/SO Liaison Section at S.H.A.E.F.

TARGET PLANNING

52
47 Whenever any task is to be undertaken which involves the provision of technical intelligence on the selection of targets to achieve the desired result, MG/TGT will be consulted.

53
48 MG/TGT will keep himself informed of the progress of military operations and if he considers that an attack on any particular industrial or economic target would assist the progress of the Allied forces, he will suggest any such targets to D/R.

TECHNICAL PROBLEMS

54
49 When any problems arise involving the provision of special stores or technical planning, D/B will continue to be consulted as the liaison with the technical services of S.O.E.

MAP MARKING

55 All operational maps will be marked in accordance with the conventional signs set out in Appendix D. These signs are not exhaustive and sections may use their own symbols for information peculiar to their own maps, provided that they adhere to the signs laid down for the information set out in Appendix D.

DISTRIBUTION OF MESSAGES

56 To and From SOE/SO Operators in the Field in D/R Region

Distribution will be as at present, but ~~2 copies will be sent to DR, i.e. D/R.JED, two to the War Room and none to AD/E~~. but 3 copies will be sent to D/R and delivered to the DR/G duty officer in room 364 and one to the War Room. Translations of telegrams received by EU/P will be sent to the Signals Office and there duplicated and distributed in the same way as other agents' telegrams in D/R Region.

57. To and From SOE Missions Abroad

Of all telegrams distributed to DR region of Class C or lower, ~~two copies will be sent to D/R, one copy to D.J.D~~ 3 copies will be sent to D/R and delivered to the DR/G duty officer and one copy to War Room.

58 To and From SF~~/SO~~ Staffs.

(a) Distribution will be as follows:-

War Room	2 copies
SOE/SO Liaison SHAEF	1 copy (through AD/M)
AD/M	1 copy
ADE/INT	1 copy
D/R	3 copies
~~D/R.JED~~	~~1 copy~~
D/R.LC	1 copy
F	3 copies
RF	7 copies
EU/P	1 copy
BSS/AA	1 copy
L/WAD	2 copies

(b) D/R.LC will be responsible for informing N and F when messages affect their Sections. One of D/R's copies will be for the use of BSS/A, who will watch all messages from the I (b) point of view.

(c) Messages which for security reasons are to have a restricted distribution will begin with the prefix ". PEAK ". These messages will be distributed as follows:-

War Room	2 copies

If a wider distribution is subsequently required, instructions will be given to the Signal Master by MG. or MG/US

DUTIES OF AL SECTION

59
~~54~~ The present procedure for mounting air operations will continue.

60
~~55~~ The procedure for despatching JEDBURGHS ~~and BARDSEAS~~ will be in accordance with Paper 2 of this document.

SIGNALS

61
~~56~~ All questions of signal planning and communication problems, will be referred in the first place to ADE/SIGS, as Chief Signals Officer of SOE/SO Headquarters. Normal contacts and co-operation with D/SIGS will, however, be continued by Country Sections.

62
~~57~~ All queries on message traffic or D.R.L.S. will be taken up with the Signal master at HQ Signal office in the first instance. No direct contact between Staffs and main W/T station will be permitted.

TIME

63
~~58.~~ Zone B time will be used unless otherwise ordered. Instructions on the use of this time are contained in "The Preparation and Writing of Messages".

(a) (b) (c)

LINE COMMUNICATION WITH SF Staffs.

64. S.F. H.Q. exchange is now connected by telephone with the following military headquarters to which SF Staffs are attached:-

SHAEF
21 Army Group Main
Second British Army Main
First Canadian Army
1st U.S. Army Group
1st U.S. Army

So long as these H.Q. remain in the U.K., the SF detachments can be obtained by asking S.F. H.Q. switchboard for the appropriate headquarters and then asking the headquarters switchboard for the SF Staff. Officers calling S.F. H.Q. through these military exchanges will ask for S.F. H.Q.

65. A direct line between S.F. H.Q. and S.A.S. H.Q. is being installed. The teleprinter link is already operating.

ORDERLIES.

66. Orderlies are available as follows:-

Duty	Hours of Duty	Location
War Room Orderly	24 hours	Room 360
F Section Orderly	0900-1800	" "
RF Section Orderly	0900-1800	RF Section
T Section Orderly	0900-1800	Room 360

DR/G will make use of the War Room orderly.

PAPER 2

R. 2051.

PROCEDURE FOR THE DESPATCH OF JEDBURGH TEAMS

ACTION (a)	DEPARTMENT OR OFFICER RESPONSIBLE FOR TAKING ACTION (b)	OTHER OFFICERS CONCERNED (c)	REMARKS (d)
1. REQUEST FOR A ~~JEDBURGH TEAM~~ TASK	D/R	DR/JED Country Sections under D/R	It should be understood that JEDBURGHS are being trained to operate only in France, Belgium or Holland. The request for a task will usually come from SO~~/SF~~ Staffs in the field. Sometimes the original request might come from SOE/SO Liaison Officers with SHAEF. In view of the situation in the field, London Group (as far as possible in conjunction with BRAL's wishes) may decide to send one or more JEDBURGH teams. Usually these JEDBURGH teams will be sent to existing Resistance Groups through Reception Committees for liaison, organisation or leadership. It is possible, under certain conditions, that they may be sent to an existing Reception Committee to arrange for the subsequent reception of a S.A.S. Detachment to stiffen up local Resistance Groups for a coup-de-main role. Sometimes even a JEDBURGH team of three will be augmented by one or more students from ME.65 who have shewn themselves more suitable for coup-de-main roles, to carry out a special coup-de-main task with the assistance of local Resistance Groups.
2. DECISION TO SEND A JEDBURGH TEAM	AD/E or ADE/US	D/R	Information and request for action involving despatch of a JEDBURGH team to a certain area will be received by D/R. Before recommending the despatch of a JEDBURGH team, D/R will consult the Country Section or Sections concerned and DR/JED (including, as far as possible, BRAL representatives). Final decision will be that of AD/E or ADE/US. As soon as it becomes probable that a JEDBURGH team will be needed, DR/JED may issue a preliminary warning order on the scrambler to ME.65.
3. ISSUE OF WARNING ORDER	DR/JED	AL Country Sections concerned War Room	As soon as it has been decided to send a JEDBURGH team, D/R will assemble DR/JED and the team's briefing officer and a representative from the Country Section(s) concerned, giving them the task, area and composition (numerical and qualifications) of the team. DR/JED will make out the Warning Order on the pro-forma attached at Appendix 'N'.

(a) (b) (c) (d)

3.
(contd.)

Distribution :
1 copy (by Scrambler) to M.E.65.
1 " to Briefing Officer
1 " " War Room.
3 copies to C.S.O. (1 for DYC/M.
1 " MS/4.
1 " CSO
London Group)
1 copy to the Country Section of each Section concerned.
1 " " AL
1 " " D/R
1 " " D/FIN
1 " " DR/INT

When the War Room receives copy of the Warning Order they will include the gist of it in thei. next Sitrep. In urgent cases the field will be informed direct by signal by D/R.

Arrangements will be made for the selected team to see the Warning Order at M.E.65 as soon as available.

4. PREPARATION FOR BRIEFING.

a). Selection of Brieing Officer	DR/JED	Country Section responsible for despatch of JEDBURGHS	As soon as it has been decided to send a JEDBURGH team, DR/JED will detail a Briefing Officer to become attached to the Country Section concerned until the team has been finally despatched.
b). Selection of team and conveyance to place for final briefing.	O.C. M.E.65	D/R, DR/JED. DR/JED Briefing Officer. Country Section concerned.	DR/JED, after consultation with the Country Section concerned and with the BRAL representative of DR/JED, and if necessary, with D/R himself, will speak to the O.C. M.E.65 on the Scrambler to decide upon the actual personnel selected for the operation. Apart from the fact that AD/E, ADE/US or D/R may, from time to time, earmark for special tasks or retain as reserves certain JEDBURGH teams or individual personnel, O.C. M.E.65 will recommend whom is to go. O.C. M.E.65 will arrange transport of JEDBURGH teams and personal equipment to rendezvous for final briefing. The JEDBURGH team will stay at this rendezvous until final briefing is complete, after which, if it is due for despatch, it will go direct to the aerodrome. In other cases it may go to Holme.

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
4. (contd)			
a). Compilation of Operation Instruction	Country Section	DR/JED Briefing Officer. ~~I/ADE~~ ADE/INT London Group Sigs. DR/JED D/R ADE or ADE/US DR/INT	a). <u>General Mission of Team</u> i) Task in general - made out by D/R, AD/E or ADE/US ii) Task in detail - made out by D/R or officer of Country Section
			b). <u>Estimated time of departure from London and from U.K.</u>
			c). <u>Factors affecting achievement of mission.</u> (i) Information as to terrain (ii) Information about own agents, resistance groups, etc., and other JEDBURGH teams in the area. (iii) Information about local conditions in the area, curfew, safe houses, reception arrangements, etc. (iv) Information about enemy formations and activities in the area. (v) Future action, cover story, etc.
			d). <u>Inter-communication</u> (i) Code name for the station and the signal plan to be allotted by D/Sigs under present arrangement. (ii) Signal plan will be made out by O.C. London Group Sigs., under D/Sigs, under present arrangement.

	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
4. (contd.)				When the Operation Instruction is completed by Country Sections, it will be inspected by DR/JED, who will satisfy himself that it is complete in all necessary details. The Operation Instruction will then be handed by DR/JED to DR for signature. In certain cases he will take it to ADE or ADE/US for final signature.
d).	Money	DR.JED Briefing Officer.	D/FIN.	A form of requisition order is under consideration.
e)	Maps, aerial photographs.	DR/JED Briefing Officer.		A library of maps and aerial photos will be maintained at the Briefing Room.
5.	PREPARATION FOR DESPATCH			
a)	Arrangements for Aircraft.	Country Section.	AL	Standard Form A.T.F.1 will be used.
b)	Parachutes and Packages.	Country Section.	AL	Standard Forms A.T.F.2 and 3 will be used.
c)	Ordering of Containers.	Country Section.	AL	Standard Form A.T.F.4 will be used.
6.	RECEPTION ARRANGEMENTS.			
a)	Mitchell Plan.	DR/JED	Country Sections MS/C.	Country Sections will ask DR/JED to warn MS/C by telephone and confirm on Form MSC/BBC.
b)	All other areas.	Country Sections.	MSC	Country Sections will warn MS/C by telephone and confirm on Form MSC/BBC. In all cases it will be the responsibility of Country Sections to keep the Briefing Officer and AL informed immediately reception arrangements are completed.
7.	BRIEFING OF TEAM	Country Sections.	DR/JED Briefing Officer. London Group Sigs.	Having obtained any additional maps, photographs, etc., the DR/JED Briefing Officer will be responsible to the Country Section for the complete briefing of the whole team collectively (including briefing of W/T Operator, issue of crystals, etc. by O.C. London Group Sigs.). Country Sections will make available the various experts, particularly on intelligence, to come to the briefing room if required. In no circumstances should the JEDBURGH team feel that any information is being withheld from them.

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
8. DESPATCH OF TEAM	DR/JED Briefing Officer acting under orders of Country Section.	AL Country Sections.	DR/JED Briefing Officer will be responsible for arranging the necessary transport to the aerodrome where the team will be handed over by the Briefing Officer. The Briefing Officer will remain with the team until it departs and, except in exception circumstances (when there are other JEDBURGH operations in hand and he has orders to return to London immediately), he will remain at the aerodrome until the aeroplane reports it has dropped the team. Should the team return to the aerodrome or be otherwise delayed (through bad weather, no signals etc.) if it involves a delay of 24 hours or more, he will take the team to Holme and telephone the Country Section for further instructions. As soon as his duties are completed, the DR/JED Briefing Officer will return to London and report to DR/JED for further instructions.
9. OPERATION IN THE FIELD	Country Section	DR/JED	In every case, as soon as the composition of a JEDBURGH team has been finally decided upon, this team comes operationally under the orders of and the direct concern of the Country Section involved. In the case of exceptional developments arising it may become necessary to transfer the operation control of a JEDBURGH team from one Country Section to another after it is in the field. DR/JED will see Sitreps from JEDBURGHS in the field and watch over, on DR's and BRAL's behalf, their personal interests and affairs.

This paragraph is under consideration for revision.

.....

PAPER 3

R. 2048.

WAR ROOM

STANDING ORDERS

MANNING OF THE WAR ROOM

1. There will be on duty two officers, one A.T.S. officer and one Secretary by day and not more than one officer, one A.T.S. officer and one Secretary by night.

HOURS OF DUTY

2. The duty rotas will be in accordance with the tables at Appendix E.

ALLOCATION OF DUTIES.

3. MG/O is in control of the War Room.

4. Officers.

(a) Examination of all messages and deciding on War Room action to be taken.

(b) Ensuring that the Kardex and maps are kept up-to-date.

(c) Liaison with F, RF and EU/P daily to keep list of agents,

(d) Preparation of twice daily Sitrep (~~1000~~ 1200 hours and 2400 ~~2200~~ hours) to all S.F. and S.O. Detachments and SOE/SO liaison at SHAEF.

(e) Preparation of a daily Sitrep as at ~~1700~~ 2200 hrs to MASSINGHAM

(f) Preparation of daily Summary (1500 hrs.) and 1830 hours.

(g) Preparation of daily Brief at 0900 hrs for ADE and MG.

(h) Keeping DR and the sections concerned informed of important changes in the military situation.

(i) Passing urgent information (both Military and SOE/SO) by message to SF/SO Staffs and SOE/SO Liaison at SHAEF.

(j) The issue of Kardex Amendments (see paragraph 20).

5. A.T.S. Officers.

(a) Keeping all maps and charts up-to-date.

(b) Amending the Kardex

(c) Keeping up the "Kardex" Amendment Book" (See para 20 (c)).

6. Secretaries

(a) Registration of messages.

(b) Control of the Battle Board.

(c) Filing.

(d) Typing.

7. Handing Over by Duty Officer, Map Officers, and Secretaries.

There will be an overlap of ½ hour (vide duty rota at Appendix E) to allow of the officer coming on duty being put fully in the picture. Similarly, an operlap of ½ hour will be observed by Map Officers and Secretaries.

INFORMATION TO BE MADE AVAILABLE

8. In Map Form

(a) Own and enemy forward troop locations, including Army boundaries.

(b) Own and enemy H.Q. down to Divisions.

(c) Main enemy reserve formations and movements.

~~(d) Locations of main enemy dumps.~~

(d) Location of Organisers, Resistance Groups, Maquis, Jedburghs and Bardseas.

(e) Railway, road and tele. communication demolitions.

(i) Planned.
(ii) Planned and ready.
(iii) Ordered to be blown.
(iv) Blown and still effective.

~~(g) Location of German railway personnel.~~

NOTE The SOE/SO situation shown on the battle map will be checked with Country Sections daily at 0930 hours.

9. In Kardex Form.

Latest information regarding all Organisers, Resistance Groups, Jedburghs and Bardseas.

10. In Tabular Form.

(a) Locations and other details of S.F. ~~and S.O.~~ Detachments.

(b) Summary of Jedburghs and Bardseas in the Field and with whom communications have been established.

(c) Summary of Jedburghs and Bardseas available to go to the Field, and of Jedburgh teams earmarked for special tasks.

(d) Summary of tasks being undertaken at request of military formations, and progress in carrying them out.

(e) Air Operations Summary showing -

(i) Operations completed previous night.
(ii) Operations accepted for following night.
(iii) Aircraft available.

(f) Agents WT skeds.

A

DRILL FOR DEALING WITH 'IN' MESSAGES.

11. Arrival.

All 'IN' messages will go first to the War Room Registry, when a Secretary will -

(a) Log them on proforma as in Appendix F attached, and insert on each copy:

(i) Log number
(ii) Time of receipt.
(iii) The letter 'A', 'B' or 'C' (Each message received in duplicate will have the letter 'A' placed on one copy and 'B' on the other. Each message received in original only will have the letter 'C' put on it.
(iv) The stamp "To be returned to the War Room".
(v) The "To see" stamp.

(b) Hand the 'A' or 'C' copy to the appropriate duty officer.
Hand the 'B' copy, if any, to the Map officer.

(c) Any correspondence other than in message form will be logged on the proforma as attached at Appendix G.

12. Treatment of 'A' or 'C' Messages.

(a) On receiving an 'A' or 'C' message the duty officer will take such action as he considers necessary and note on the message the action taken. He will strike out on the "To See" List the officers who are not concerned.

(b) The message will then be circulated as necessary, returned to the War Room Registry for the "Action Taken" column of the log to be completed.

13. Treatment of 'B' Messages.

(a) On receiving a 'B' message, the Map Officer will amend the map and add the information to the Kardex Amendment Book as necessary and then file the messages on the Battle Board. No alteration will be made to target maps without consulting the Country Section concerned.

(b) When the 'A' message is placed on the Battle Board, the 'B' message will be removed and destroyed.

14. "PEAK" Messages.

(a) Messages which for security reasons are restricted in circulation at SOE/SO HQ will begin with the prefix "PEAK".

(b) These messages will be delivered in an envelope marked "PEAK" and handed immediately by the Secretary to the Duty Officer. The Duty Officer will take the envelope to MG,

or in his absence MG/US, to open. In the absence of MG and MG/US the Duty Officer will open the envelope and if the information is urgent will show the message to ADE or ADE/US.

(c) These messages will not be circulated in the War Room until permission is given by MG or MG/US.

15. Telephone Messages.

(a) Any officer or secretary receiving a telephone message will note it down in duplicate and then hand the two copies to the War Room Registry, when it will be treatedas a normal 'IN' message.

(b) All 'IN' telephone messages will be received on extension 488. For 'OUT' telephone messages extension 561 will be used. Extension 488 will on NO account be used for outgoing calls.

16. Messages.

Attention of War Room Duty Officers is drawn to the paper "Procedure for Preparation and Writing of Messages". The War Room Duty Officer is authorised to frank messages of "Priority" degree of priority. The only officers authorised to frank messages "EMERGENCY PRIORITY" are ADE, ADE/US, MG, MG/US, DR and DR/US. In an emergency and in the absence of all the above officers, the War Room Duty Officer may frank a message "EMERGENCY PRIORITY" but will be held responsible for his action.

AD/M, ADM/US, ADE/SAC, ADE/SAC.US, DR/MO, DR/MO.1

BATTLE BOARD.

17. A Battle Board will be kept for all 'IN' and 'OUT' messages. All messages more than 24 hours old will be removed from the Battle Board and filed by the Secretary on duty.

MILITARY INFORMATION

18. Two copies of the white Information Report will be received by the War Room from Country Sections. One copy will be passed immediately to ADE/INT. Information derived from telegrams will be sent to SF/~~SO~~ staffs at 21 Army Gp. and FUSAG only after the Country Section and ADE/INT have assessed the information. Military information will NOT be passed to SF/~~SO~~ staffs below Army Gp.

19. A summary of the military situation will be prepared daily by ADE/INT and included in the Daily Summary (See para 26)

20. AMENDMENTS TO KARDEX

(a) Amendments to the Kardex will originate from the Sections, who will send them to the War Room. The War Room will despatch these amendments to all holders of the Kardex, as they are received, without waiting to make a consolidated list. ~~As soon as the A.D.L.S.~~ whenever DRIs of ADLS available ~~is established~~, amendments which are not urgent can be sent out by this means as an Appendix to the Daily Summary. Details of cross deliveries

(b) At all times, as copies of signals from the Field are received by the War Room notes will be made of these messages involving a

to the Field by type will be attached to the Daily Summary issued 2 days after the night on which their operations take place

possible amendment to the Kardex, in the Kardex Amendment Book. When amendments are received from the Section, the A.T.S. officer will check the amendments with the Kardex Amendment Book, and, if any information of importance appears to have been omitted, will consult the Section concerned.

SITREPS

21. From SF and SO Staffs.

Situation Reports will be made daily from information received up to the following times:-

SF Det.,	21 Army Gp.	0600 hrs and	1800 hrs.
"	1 Cdn. Army	1200	2400
"	2 Brit "	1200	2400
~~SO~~ SF Det.,	FUSAG	0600	1800
"	1 U.S. Army	1200	2400
"	3 " "	1200	2400

When detachable sections are away from their SF or ~~SO~~ detachments, they will make reports to SOE/SO H.Q. from information received by them up to 1200 and 2400 hrs.

22. From War Room

SOE/SO information received from Country Sections and military information from SOE/SO sources, together with the Country Sections' evaluation of the source will be transmitted in a twice-daily Sitrep at 1000 and 2200 hrs to SF/~~SO~~ Staffs and SHAEF Liaison Section. Military information will NOT be included in copies sent to SF or ~~SO~~ Dets. with Army H.Q. The greatest care will be taken to restrict the length of the Sitrep messages to the minimum consistent with intelligibility. A sitrep as at ~~1700~~ 2200 hrs also will be sent daily to MASSINGHAM.

23. The War Room Sitrep will be distributed as follows:-

SF Staff 21 Army Group	~~SO~~ SF Staff FUSAG
SF Staff Second Army	~~SO~~ SF Staff First U.S. Army.
SF Staff First Cdn. Army	~~SO~~ SF Staff Third U.S. Army.
	AD/M for SOE/SO Liaison SHAEF.

and to detachable sections when away from their SF/~~SO~~ detachments. Copies will be distributed internally as for messages to SF/~~SO~~ Staffs.

24. In addition to the SITREP, the War Room will prepare for MG daily at 0900 and 1830 hours a brief, summarising what has occurred during the night. A proforma for this brief is attached at Appendix H.

25. ~~The drafts for the Sitrep due at 1000 hours~~ The draft for and the daily Brief will be prepared by the Officer on duty during the night. To ensure that the Brief is ready and typed by 0900 hours information received after 0800 hours will not be included. Any important information received after 0800 hours will, if time permits, be inserted as a "Stop Press", otherwise it will be notified verbally to MG. MG/O will visit the War Room daily at 0900 hours and check the ~~SITREP and~~ Brief before it goes to MG. Eight copies of the "Military" and "SOE/SO" situation sections of the Brief will be typed and headed respectively Appendix "A" and "B" for inclusion in the Orders issued after ADE's Conference.

SF.HQ DAILY SUMMARY

26. From 18 May 44 a Daily Summary will be issued by the War Room at 1500 hrs with the same distribution as the Sitrep. This will contain all non-urgent information ~~previously included in the SITREP~~, a summary of progress in tasks being undertaken for the military formations, and, as appendices, all non-urgent Kardex amendments and copies of any relevant papers produced at SF.HQ. This summary will be sent whenever DRLS or ADLS facilities are available.

SFHQ WEEKLY REVIEW

27. A Weekly Review will be prepared by MG/O from the Weekly Sitreps of Country Sections and from information supplied by the War Room, DR, AL and ADE/INT. This bulletin will be issued on the Wednesday of each week and distributed to the same addressees as the Sitrep and Daily Summary. It will also be attached to the Weekly Sitrep sent by SOE H.Q. to the Chiefs of Staff.

LIAISON WITH SHAEF

28. If information is required from SHAEF the channels of approach will be:-

(a) For Intelligence: through ADE/INT

(b) For Operational Information: through AD/M Section.

29. If it is desired to pass information to the SOE/SO Liaison detachment with SHAEF, it will be passed through AD/M Section.

VISITORS

30. Admittance to the War Room is restricted to the following officers:-

CD
Director of OSS
Director of OSS London
V/CD
A/CD
AD/A
AD/N
ADE
ADE/US
CD/S ADE/SAC
MG
MG/US
MG/O
MG/TGT
ADE/INT
AD/M ADE/INT.1.
ADM/S
D/SIGS. ADM/SAC.
ADE/SIGS
DR
DR/US DR/MO, DR/MO.1.
DR/PLANS
DR/JED
DR/JED.U.S.
Jedburgh Briefing Officers
DR/LC DIR.OG, DIR.SAS
F
RF
EUP
Officers of F, RF, EUP DIR concerned with conduct of operations.
N, T
AL, L/WO

Any officer named above may depute one of the officers of his section to visit the War Room after warning the War Room by telephone. Officers will be added to the above list only on the instruction of MG or MG/US.

ADDRESSES OF WAR ROOM STAFF

31. Addresses and telephone numbers of War Room Staff will be posted in the Secretary's office. A file will also be kept up-to-date of addresses of ADE, ADE/US, MG, MG/US, DR, DR/US, DR/PLANS, F, RF, EUP, N and T and the officers of Country Sections responsible for operations and W/T.

32. Before going off duty, officers will leave particulars of their movements and the telephone number where they can be contacted if urgently required.

SECURITY

33. When the War Room is manned, windows will be kept shut. At suitable times, as directed by the Duty Officer, the door leading to the balcony will be opened to air the room. While the door is open the telephone will NOT be used.

34. There will at all times be at least one officer present in the War Room.

35. The Secretary on duty will check that none other than the officers authorised in para. 30 above or those deputed by them are admitted to the War Room. Applications for permission for any other officers to visit the War Room will be made to ADE, ADE/US, MG or MG/US.

R. 2043.

5 May 44.

PAPER 4.

THE PREPARATION AND WRITING OF MESSAGES

1. Army Message Form C.2136 will be used for all traffic between this Headquarters and SF/SO Staffs.

2. This form is available in two sizes and will be used for all messages originated by Sections and handed to Sigs. Incoming messages from Sigs will be on pink paper.

NUMBER OF COPIES

3. One copy of the message will be made for each addressee, one for originators' file and one for the Signals Office.

ADDRESSES OF STAFFS

S.F. H.Q.	WATERMARK
SF Det. No. 3, 21 Army Group	UPPERMOST
SO Det. FUSAG.	YALELOCK
SF Det. No. 1, Second British Army	VARICOSE
SO Det. First U.S. Army	YANKYDOODLE
SF Det. No. 2, First Canadian Army	VALIDATE
SO Det. 3rd U.S. Army	UNDERFOOT
SOE/SO LIAISON, SHAEF.	TOPFLIGHT.

2.(b) H.Q. Signals Office and the Signal Sections attached to SF and SO Staffs will be instructed to use these code words exclusively in transmitting messages.

3.(c) Officers originating messages may use either the full form of address or the code word. If the full form is used, it will be converted by Signals before encoding.

4.(d) Whenever the detachable portions of SF and SO Staffs at Army Headquarters are so detached, they will be represented by the following code words:-

Detachable portion,	SF Det. No. 1	TIGERCUB
" "	SF Det. No. 2	THUMBMARK
" "	SO Det. 1st U.S. Army	TEATRAY
" "	SO Det. 3rd U.S. Army	TAPDANCE.

(b) Here insert the date and time. The date time system will be used, employing a group of six figures and a letter. The first two figures will indicate the day of the month, inserting where the date is before the 10th, the figure 'o': the remaining figures will indicate the time, on the 24 hour clock; and the letter will indicate the time system used as follows:-

GMT	.....	letter Z
BST	.....	" A
BDST	.....	" B

but unless otherwise ordered Zone B time will always be used.

Neither the month nor the year will be inserted.

For example - 1045 hrs. BDST on 9th August, 1944, will appear as "091045B".

/5 (c).....

R. 2043.

5 May 44

PAPER 4

THE PREPARATION AND WRITING OF MESSAGES

1. Army Message Form C.2136 will be used for all traffic between this Headquarters and SF/SO Staffs.

2. This form is available in two sizes and will be used for all messages originated by Sections and handed to Sigs. Incoming messages from Sigs will be on pink paper.

NUMBER OF COPIES

3. One copy of the message will be made for each addressee, one for originators' file and one for the Signals Office.

ADDRESSES OF STAFFS

4. (a). In messages the following Code names for addresses addresses will be used:-

SF Detachment	21 Army Group	
" "	First Canadian Army	
" "	" " "	(detachable part)
" "	Second British Army	
" "	" " "	(detachable part)
SO Detachment	FUSAG	
" "	First U.S. Army	
" "	" " "	(detachable part)
" "	Third U.S. Army	
" "	" " "	(detachable part)
SOE/SO Detachment	SHAEF	
SOE/SO H.Q.		

In due course code words will be received from SHAEF and these will then be notified to all concerned for use in place of the above addresses.

USE OF THE FORM

5. The following notes are issued for guidance in use of the form (see form at Appendix "I")

(a) Here insert ~~H.Q. SOE/SO~~ SF. H.Q.

(b) Here insert the date and time. The date time system will be used, employing a group of six figures and a letter. The first two figures will indicate the day of the month, inserting where the date is before the 10th, the figure 'o': the remaining figures will indicate the time, on the 24 hour clock; and the letter will indicate the time system used as follows:-

GMT	.....	letter Z
BST	.....	" A
BDST	.....	" B

but unless otherwise ordered Zone B time will always be used.

Neither the month nor the year will be inserted.

For example - 1045 hrs. BDST on 9th August, 1944, will appear as "091045B".

/5 (c).....

5. (c) Here insert the name of the addressee for action. Where a message is to be repeated to another addressee for information only, the name of such addressee will be inserted at (d).

(e) The text of the message will start with the originator's number. This will be preceded by a prefix indicating the Section or sub-Section originating the message. The list of such prefixes is attached at Appendix "J". Each Section having a prefix will keep a list of numbers, which will be deleted as they are used.

(f) Messages originated for transmission by Sigs will all be signed in this space with the name and rank only.

(g) Degrees of priority. The degrees of priority and officers entitled to use them are set out in Appendix "K" hereto, which supersedes ADE/1051 of 25 Jan 44. Where a priority is intended to apply to all addressees, the word "ALL" should be inserted before the degree of priority otherwise it will apply only to the action addressees. If priorities for action and information addressees are different, no further distinction in priorities can be made, The three-letter abbreviations shown in Appendix "K" will be used on the message form.

(h) Nothing must be written on the message form outside the thick black lines.

6. Before issuing the message, all map references will be checked by an officer other than the writer of the message. When a letter of the alphabet is used in a map reference, the phonetic alphabet will be used. This is attached at Appendix "L".

7. All spelling of proper names will be checked as in 6 above.

THE TEXT

8. (a) Care must be taken that all copies of messages are legible. Particular care is required where a number of carbons are taken.

(b) Messages must be short and to the point, without being cryptic.

At Appendix "M" are set out tables of:-

I Abbreviations
II Initial letters of groups and organisations.
III Phrase code words

which have been agreed for use between the SF/SO Staffs and ~~SOE/SO H.Q.~~ S.F. H.Q. No other abbreviations than these should be used.

(c) Proper names and the word NOT will be written in capital letters.

(d) Punctuation signs will not be used except for full stops in the body, NOT at the end of the message. Either the sign ® or the word "STOP" will be used.

/8 (e).....

8. (e) "All informed". Insert "all infm" at end of text if it is not necessary that an addressee should know to what other addressees the message has been sent. It is a courtesy to Signals which saves much operating time and therefore increases EFFICIENCY.

(f) "Ack". Insert at end of text ~~(before "all infm")~~ if you wish all "action" addressees to acknowledge.

(g) "All Ack". Insert at end of text ~~(before "all infm")~~ if you wish ALL addressees to acknowledge.

(h) When referring to any previous message whether from SF/SO Staffs or from ~~SOE/SO HQ~~ SF/SO HQ; the date of that message as well as its prefix and originators number, must always be included: e.g. ref. AE21 of 19 Sep.

ZERO HOUR

9. "H" hour will be used exclusively to express zero hour and all figures shown in conjunction therewith will be followed either by "minutes" (mins) or "hours" (hrs), unless the context clearly indicates which is meant e.g. "H + 3 mins" or "H - 4 hrs"

LIST OF APPENDICES

I AF 2136 (Message Form)

J List of Prefixes

K Priorities

L Phonetic Alphabet

M Abbreviations and phrase code words

PAPER 5.

R. 2042.

PROCEDURE BETWEEN SF.H.Q. AND SF/SO STAFFS.

INTRODUCTION

1. The work of the staffs falls into three main categories and will in general be dealt with at SOE/SO H.Q. as follows:-

(a) Ops. (both G and Q) ..... D/R and staff (incl. D/R.JED)

(b) Information ..... War Room

(c) I (b) ..... Officer attached D/R's staff.

2. Copies of all messages both to and from SF and SO staffs will be distributed to all those responsible for action, as in para 1 above, and also for information to:-

SOE/SO Liaison S.H.A.E.F. (when at H.Q.)
AD/M
ADE/INT
F
RF
EU/P
DR/LC
Jnr. Comd. Skoyles (see para 8)

3. Any messages which require a minimum distribution such as those concerning Army Group or Army intentions and future plans will begin with the prefix "PEAK". The distribution of these telegrams will be restricted in the first instance to ADE, ADE/US, MG and MG/US. This prefix will in no circumstances be applied to Sitreps.

OPERATIONS.

4. All messages referring to tasks requested in support of military operations will be dealt with in the first instance by D/R's staff. Reference will be made to ADE or ADE/US on all occasions where policy is involved or if it is recommended that a JEDBURGH should be despatched.

5. D/R will also be responsible for informing SF and SO staffs of what action is being taken, when any tasks are likely to be carried out and results when they are known.

INFORMATION

6. From SO and SF Staffs

(a) Sitreps will be made daily from information received up to the following times:-

SF Detachment,	21 Army Group	0600 hrs and 1800 hrs
"	1 Cdn. Army	1200 " " 2400 "
"	2 Brit. "	1200 " " 2400 "
SF Detachment,	FUSAG	0600 " " 1800 "
"	1 U.S. Army	1200 " " 2400 "
"	2 " "	1200 " " 2400 "

(b) The following military information is required in the Sitreps:-

(a) The approximate front line.
(b) Own army boundaries.
(c) Enemy divisional identifications.
(d) Locations of enemy divisions and higher H.Qs excluding divisions which are in contact with our troops.
(e) Locations and movements of enemy armour.
(f) Changes in location of SF or SO detachments.
(g) Any other information which it is considered would be of interest to SOE/SO H.Q.

(g) Enemy intentions
(h) Own intentions

Items (a) (b) and (d) are required in sufficient detail to be marked on the 1/250,000 map. Item (e) in the maximum available detail.

Items (a) and (b) will only be included on Sitreps from staffs attached to Army H.Qs and NOT from staffs with Army Groups. Map references should be given for all place names except the largest towns etc.

(c) Staffs attached to Army H.Qs will confine their Sitreps to information about their own Army front.

(d) The headings given in sub-para (b) will be used in the order given but will be referred to only by their letter, e.g:-

A. BORDEAUX ANGOULEME POITIERS stop B right
ANGOULEME COGNAC SAINTES .....etc. stop C.763
Infantry Division TOURS stop D nil ..... etc.

(e) As soon as the A.D.L.S. is established each staff will send in a daily summary which will be used to relieve the W/T links as far as possible of all non-urgent information. The time of despatch of this summary will depend on the A.D.L.S. facilities available.

(f) All information derived from the military staffs will include the evaluation as assessed by these staffs, whether this is in general terms such as "reliable" or in the form of a grading such as "C.4.". When any military information is derived from the interrogation of an SOE/SO agent by an SF or SO staff, that information will be graded as to its source by the SF or SO staff concerned as follows:-

A = Entirely reliable
B = Probably reliable
C = Not reliable

This grading will be used in passing the information to Army or Army Operations Intelligence Staffs and will also be included in the report of such information to SOE/SO H.Q. At the same time the name of the source will invariably be included in all such reports sent to SOE/SO H.Q.

This grading will also be used if, as may possibly happen, an interrogation is carried out by SF or SO staffs of a man who is not an SOE/SO agent.

7. To SF and SO Staffs

(a) A Sitrep will be issued by the War Room as at 12.00 hrs and 24.00 hrs daily.

(b) This Sitrep will contain the latest information received about the SOE/SO situation, and for detachments at 21 Army Group and FUSAG only any military information received from SOE/SO sources. It will also contain at 10.00 hrs a summary of the previous night's air operations and at 22.00 hrs a summary of operations laid on for that night. Any items of operational urgency will be sent as separate messages and not held up for the Sitrep.

(c) All items of military information and results of sabotage sent out will be graded as follows:-

"A" = information from men considered entirely reliable.

"B" = information from well established circuit.

"C" = information from source of unknown reliability.

(d) All Ia matters will be dealt with under the direction of ADE/INT

(e) From 18 May 44 a Daily Summary will be issued by the War Room with the same distribution as the War Room Sitrep. This will be used to relieve the W/T pressure by having in it non-urgent Sitrep items as well as copies of any papers produced in London which are the concern of SF and SO staffs, and issued whenever DR or ADLS is available.

(f) Amendments to the Kardex will be issued as they occur by W/T until the establishment of the A.D.L.S. Thereafter only urgent amendments will be sent by W/T the remainder will be included as an appendix in the Daily Summary.

(g) Details of stores deliveries to the Field will be sent out as amendments to the KARDEX as follows:-

(i) Daily by W/T, number of containers of each standard type delivered. When DRLS or ADLS is available stores deliveries by types of stores will be sent out with the Daily Summary 2 days after the night on which the air operations take place.

(ii) At the end of each moon by A.D.L.S. the revised cumulative total of all stores shown on the cards.

(iii) At the end of each moon a rough assessment of the stores available for each organisation expressed as a percentage will be sent out by A.D.L.S.

(h) D-day target maps for Railways, Telecommunications and Road targets are being kept by SF/SO staffs in the same form as those kept by the War Room. Amendments will be issued by the War Room with Kardex amendments.

(h) A Weekly Review will be sent to all staffs giving in general terms a resume of SOE/SO and military activities.

I (B) TRAFFIC

8. The following arrangements have been made to handle I (b) problems of SF ~~and SO~~ staffs.

(a) Capt. Wells has been attached to D/R's staff with the following principal duties:-

(i) To see that no I(b) messages are overlooked and to watch all messages from and to SF/~~SO~~ staffs for I(b) implications.

(ii) To obtain the material for answering any problems raised in the first instance from the Country Section concerned and secondly from any other appropriate source.

(iii) To reply to the staffs under the direction of D/R.

(b) Jnr. Comd. Skoyles has been appointed as the link between SOE/SO H.Q. and all outside contacts on I(b) matters. Capt. Wells will therefore only have to deal with one person for outside contacts.

(c) Copies of all messages from and to SF/~~SO~~ staffs will be distributed to both Capt. Wells and Jnr. Comd. Skoyles.

LINE COMMUNICATION WITH SF/SO STAFFS.

9. S.F. H.Q. exchange is now connected by telephone with the following military headquarters to which SF and SO Staffs are attached:-

SHAEF
21 Army Group Main
Second British Army Main
First Canadian Army
1st U.S. Army Group
1st U.S. Army

So long as these H.Q. remain in the U.K., the SF and SO detachments can be obtained by asking S.F. H.Q. switchboard for the appropriate headquarters and then asking the headquarters switchboard for SF Staff or SO Staff.

10. As from 1 Jun 44, the titles of SF/SO Detachments will be as follows:-

(a) No. 1 SF Detachment, Main H.Q, Second British Army.
(b) No. 2 SF Detachment, H.Q., First Canadian Army.
(c) No. 3 SF Detachment, Main H.Q., 21 Army Group.
(d) No. 10, SF Detachment, G-3 Section, H.Q., First U.S. Army.
(e) No. 11 SF Detachment, G-3 Section, H.Q., Third U.S. Army.
(f) No. 12, SF Detachment, G-3 Section, H.Q., First U.S. Army Group.

R.2034

Paper 6

DETERMINATION OF OPERATIONAL STANDARDS IN RELATION TO TASKS REQUESTED FROM THE FIELD

ORIGINATORS REQUESTS FOR TASKS

1. Requests for tasks in the Field may be received in London from either:-

(a) SO/SF Detachments with Armies.

(b) SO/SF Detachments with Army Groups.

(c) SOE/SO Liaison Staff with SHAEF.

As soon as Army Gp. HQ has moved overseas all requests from SF ~~and SO~~ Staffs will be made to the SF ~~or SO~~ Staff at Army Gp. HQ with copies to SOE/SO HQ for information. During the period when Army Staffs are overseas and Army Gp. HQ is still in the U.K. Armies will send requests direct to SOE/SO HQ who will inform the Army Gp. staff concerned.

"Action" messages requesting tasks will therefore normally come from Army Group and the calculations in this paper are based on requests originating from Army Group.

If a task is requested by Army Gp. which falls outside the area for which Army Gp. are responsible, it will be referred to SHAEF before a decision is taken.

CATEGORIES OF TASKS

2. Tasks can be considered under three distinct categories:-

(a) Where personnel properly equipped and with the necessary stores already exist in the Field in W/T communication with London.

(b) Where additional personnel or equipment or stores have to be sent to the Field, and where reception arrangements exist.

(c) Where additional personnel, equipment or stores have to be sent to the Field and no reception arrangements exist.

ALL NECESSARY PERSONNEL, EQUIPMENT AND STORES ALREADY IN THE FIELD

3. Where all personnel, equipment and the necessary stores are already in the Field near enough to the target area or areas, it will only be necessary to send out, by wireless, a signal to order the task. Most agents in France have a W/T schedule at least once every 24 hours. Some of the smaller circuits have schedules only once every 48 hours. The majority of circuits in the Low Countries have schedules at least every 48 hours and a certain number once every 24 hours.

At the worst, therefore, it should not take more than 48 hours to order a high priority task, sometimes less than 24 hours, but it must be pointed out that for a multitude of reasons operators in the Field may miss a schedule which may cause sometimes a 24 hour or even longer delay. Also an accumulation of outward "Broadcast" messages may cause a similar delay.

/4.....

TASKS INVOLVING DESPATCH OF SORTIES FROM ENGLAND BEFORE THE TASKS CAN BE UNDERTAKEN

4. (a) Where Reception arrangements exist

Where it involves the despatch of a sortie to a dropping ground already approved for the present or following moon period, there will not be more than a 24 hours delay in the laying on of a Reception Committee, except in the case of a "Mitchell" dropping ground where at least 48 hours will be required.

(b) Where Reception arrangements do not exist

Where it involves the use of a hitherto unapproved ground or one that has not been used for some time, AL will only require two or three hours to "O.K." the ground. In special cases SHAEF may, in view of the importance of the task, over-rule the Air Ministry's objections of a geographical or flak nature. As regards the completion of arrangements in the Field, if it is a ground which has not recently been suggested from the Field as suitable, a delay of three to eight days may be necessary in order that reconnaissance may be made and report as to its suitability received in London. Again an incomplete report or conditions in the Field unsuitable for W/T contact may cause further delay.

(c) Blind Drops

In the case of a blind drop based upon existing information from the Field, two or three hours should be sufficient to allow AL to check up possibility of finding the D.Z.

5. Time taken to despatch a sortie containing personnel, equipment and stores

(a) Personnel and personal equipment

Provided personnel can be located for final briefing within a few minutes of Baker Street, their briefing can be completed in urgent cases within six hours from the time of commencement. AL are prepared to accept personal equipment for packing up to 24 hours before the time of departure. If it is desired to despatch packages containing personal equipment at less than 24 hours notice, AL will have to ear-mar special personnel for this hasty packing.

Personnel can be briefed and despatched within 24 hours. It is not, however, considered feasible for them to be despatched on the night of the same day on which they were warned, except in great emergency, because they would be too tired. They could, however, go the following night. It is, therefore, recommended that no personnel should be despatched until the night following the day of their briefing, that is to say 36 to 48 hours after the decision has been taken to despatch them.

In the case of Bardseas, all tasks are allotted to them already and very little final briefing and other preparations will be necessary. In the case of Jedburghs, provided they have received, during the final stages of their training, basic information of their likely areas of operation, it is considered their briefing never need exceed six hours. They could be in London from M.E.65 within three or four hours of the decision having been taken to send a Jedburgh team. In the case of other agents who are immediately available, only in very complicated cases should briefing take more than six hours. It is considered that in all cases, the necessary briefing could be assimilated within a period of 36 hours.

/5.(b).....

5. (b) Despatch of packed stores and containers

At present AL requires four days notice for the preparation of stores for despatch. Provided Country Sections ensure that a proportion of container sets of all types, W/T stores, packages, etc. are always held immediately available by AL, AL should be able to get them to the aerodrome within 36 hours.

ALLOTMENT OF AIRCRAFT

6. As regards provision of aircraft and the briefing of the crews, provided sufficient priority has been given for the allotment of the aircraft, 36 hours will be sufficient.

CONCLUSION

7. From the above it will be seen that where all requirements, both of personnel, equipment and stores, exist in the Field, orders to carry out a task can be received in the Field 24 hours, or at the most 48 hours, after the decision has been taken in London. Where it involves the despatch of a sortie, the minimum time can be 36 hours if all goes right and there is no congestion. Provided no hitch occurs in any of the four concurrent preparations (laying on reception arrangements, arranging aircraft, loading of stores, briefing), then, in this 36 hours it should be possible between now and D-day to lay on the necessary organisation for the despatch of the sortie whatever it may contain. It should be noted that this timing covers only the period up to the time when the message is received by the W/T operator in the Field. The time taken for the message to be delivered to the man who will actually carry out the task will vary considerably and is not capable of calculation. In most cases it will take longer for messages to the Allied French organisations than to the independent groups.

R.1972.

PAPER 7

SECRET

3 May 44

SOE/SO LONDON GROUP SIGNAL INSTRUCTION No.13

INFORMATION

1. Various orders have been issued from time to time on points of procedure used in communications between SOE/SO HQ and SO and SF detachments.

INTENTION

2. To re-state these orders and to add to them, so that all current orders exist in one instruction.

METHOD

3. All previous SOE/SO LONDON GROUP Signal Instructions are hereby cancelled.

4. Message Form

(a) AFC 2136 will be used at SOE/SO HQ for originating all messages. A copy of this form is attached at appendix I

(b) All messages teleprinted from MAIN WT STATIONS to HQ SIGNAL OFFICE must be in the same form as AFC 2136 except that the date time of origin will be at the end of the text.

(c) Where a message is received from SO Detachments, who will be using the US Army message forms, it will be the responsibility of the MAIN WT STATION (STATION 53C) to change the form of the message before it is teleprinted to HQ SIGNAL OFFICE, to conform to Para (b) above.

(d) The MAIN WT STATION will also be responsible for changing an OUT message to SO Detachments into the US Army form.

5. "All informed" procedure.

This procedure will NOT be used for messages between S.F. H.Q. and SF and SO Staff detachments.

This procedure will only be used in conjunction with Link A that is for messages between SF Hq & Staff SO

and handed in for transmission.

(ii) MAIN WT STATION, in preparing copy for SF 21 ARMY GROUP, will delete from that particular message the second and third addressees.

and (iii) MAIN WT STATION, in preparing copy for SF 2 BRITISH ARMY, will delete the first and third addressees, etc.

6. Transmission of figures.

Figures which are spelt out in enciphering will be returned to figures in deciphering.

R.1972.

PAPER 7

SECRET

3 May 44

SOE/SO LONDON GROUP SIGNAL INSTRUCTION No.13

INFORMATION

1. Various orders have been issued from time to time on points of procedure used in communications between SOE/SO HQ and SO and SF detachments.

INTENTION

2. To re-state these orders and to add to them, so that all current orders exist in one instruction.

METHOD

3. All previous SOE/SO LONDON GROUP Signal Instructions are hereby cancelled.

4. Message Form

(a) AFC 2136 will be used at SOE/SO HQ for originating all messages. A copy of this form is attached at appendix I

(b) All messages teleprinted from MAIN WT STATIONS to HQ SIGNAL OFFICE must be in the same form as AFC 2136 except that the date time of origin will be at the end of the text.

(c) Where a message is received from SO Detachments, who will be using the US Army message forms, it will be the responsibility of the MAIN WT STATION (STATION 53C) to change the form of the message before it is teleprinted to HQ SIGNAL OFFICE, to conform to Para (b) above.

(d) The MAIN WT STATION will also be responsible for changing an OUT message to SO Detachments into the US Army form.

5. "All informed' procedure.

Where a message is addressed to two or more addressees, the originator may add at the end of the text the words "all informed" or in its abbreviated form "all infm".

When these words appear at the end of the text, Signals will be permitted to delete from a message going over any particular channel all those addressees who are NOT served by that channel,

e.g. (i) A message is addressed from SOE/SO HQ to SF 21 ARMY GROUP, SF 2 BRITISH ARMY, SF 1 CANADIAN ARMY, with "all informed" at the end of the text, and handed in for transmission.

(ii) MAIN WT STATION, in preparing copy for SF 21 ARMY GROUP, will delete from that particular message the second and third addressees.

and (iii) MAIN WT STATION, in preparing copy for SF 2 BRITISH ARMY, will delete the first and third addressees, etc.

6. Transmission of figures.

Figures which are spelt out in enciphering will be returned to figures in deciphering.

7. Lateral Communications

Lateral comn between any two outstations working on the same frequency will NOT be permitted.

8. Opening additional channel

(a) If an outstation wishes to open an additional channel in order to clear traffic, it will do so by asking Home Station by Service Message to open on an indicated channel, giving plan name and frequency.

(b) MAIN WT STATION may similarly ask a hy det outstation to open its second channel, but may NOT make such a request in respect of lt dets associated with Sections.

9. Priorities.

(a) New priorities are being introduced by SOE/SO and will be taken into use as follows:-

Q Signal	New SOE/SO Priority	Old SOE/SO Priority	Current US Army Priority	Current British Priority	US & British Army Prefix
QSQ	Emergency Priority	Most Immediate	Urgent	Emergency	O
QSP	Priority	Immediate	Priority	Important	P
QTC	Routine	---	Routine	---	R
QDF	Deferred	Deferred	Deferred	Deferred	D

(b) When SOE/SO messages are passed to normal Army channels for transmission, the appropiate equivalent Army priority must be substituted for the SOE/SO priority.

(c) When either EMERGENCY PRIORITY or PRIORITY "IN" messages are received at HQ Signal Office, the addressee will be notified immediately by telephone, or by advance copy which will be marked as such by rubber stamp.

(d) All messages will be dealt with within their degrees of priority according to the time handed in to Signals.

10. Time

In order to conform to Army procedure:-

(a) Time Signals from BBC Broadcasts will be taken as official time.

(b) Local times will be indicated by adding the following suffixes to times:-

Greenwich Mean Time	Z
British Summer Time	A
British Double Summer Time	B

11. Call Signs

Owing to the narrow separation between channels all initial transmissions will be prefaced by the Call Sign of the station calling. This call sign will be sent once only.

12. Q Code Signals

The following Q Code Signals may be used on SF and SO wireless channels:-

QSR	Cease transmitting but listen out on the present frequency.
QMW	Close down and return to base
QKO	Carry on with communication (i.e. cancel QSR)
QWM	I am forced to close down and am returning to base.

13. The provisions of this Signal Instruction will be brought into use forthwith.

14. Paras 4, 5, 6 and 10 will apply also to comms between SOE/SO HQ and JEDBURGH and BARDSEA parties.

15. ACKNOWLEDGE.

A.G. Leonard

Lieut. Col. Royal Signals
CSO London Group.

Distribution

OC No.1 SF Sig Sec
OC No.2 SF Sig Sec
OC No.3 SF Sig Sec
Lt. Col. Rowlandson (for CSO's 1) 3 copies
OC SO Sig Secs
OC No.10 SO Sig Sec
OC No.11 SO Sig Sec
OC No.12 SO Sig Sec
Col. Nicholls
Capt. Heffer (3 copies)
Signalmaster HQ Signal Office
OC Sta 55A
OC Sta 53B
OC Sta 53C
OC ME 65 (for Lieut. Keeney)
OC STS 63 (for Lieut. Bridgman)
Lt. Col. Carleton-Smith
Lt. Col. Hazell
Brig. Mockler-Ferryman
CSO London Group
File
Spare (5 copies)

R.2035.

DISTRIBUTION

(a) PAPERS 1-7

	Copy No:
ADE	1
ADE/US	2
ADE/SAC	3
ADE/SAC/US	4
MG	5
MG/US	6
MG/O	7
ADM	8
ADM/US	9
ADE/INT	10
ADE/SIGS	11
DR	12,13, 14, 15
F	16, 17, 18
RF	19, 20, 21
EUP	22, 23
DR/LC	24
N	25
T	26
AL	27, 28, 29
War Room	30, 31
Lt.-Col. Rowlandson	32
Lt.-Col. Jackson	33
LSl	34
L/WAD	35, 36
File	37, 38
Spare	39, 46

(b) PAPER 3

War Room 47, 48

(c) PAPERS 4 and 6

1 SF det.	
2 SF det	47
3 SF det	48
SO det. FUSAG	49
SO det First U.S. Army	50
SO det. Third U.S. Army	51
	52

(d) PAPER 5

1 S.F. det.	47, 48, 49
2 " "	50, 51, 52
3 " "	53, 54, 55
SO dot FUSAG	56, 57, 58
" " First U.S. Army	59, 60, 61
" " Third U.S. Army	62, 63, 64.

(e) PAPERS 1-7 (for information)

CD	65
V/CD	66
A/CD	67
AD/H	68
D/SIGS	69
AMX	70

IX B.

OPERATIONAL CLOTHING - EQUIPMENT - STORES.

1. ITEMS TO BE CARRIED ON THE MAN.

(a) Items which must be carried
Jacket Parachute
Battle Dress with cap or beret
Face Veil
Smock Parachutist
Skeleton Webbing Equipment
(Belt, Braces, Pistol Holster, Pouch for Pistol Magazine, Pouch for Carbine Magazine, Pouch for Compass, Haversack, Water Bottle.)
Colt .45 Pistol and Carbine .30
Fighting Knife
Mess Tin, containing:-
Dehydrated carton 1
Kreyberg Ration 1
Margarine 2¾ oz tin 1
Llyons Tinned Ration 1
Spoon,
Spare Socks
Binoculars
Watch
Clasp Knife
Pencil
Field Message Pad
Compass
Protractor
Matches
Torch
Whistle
Flask
Shell Dressing
Housewife
Water Purifying Tablets
Morphia
Gas Cape
Parachute Shovel

2. ITEMS TO BE CARRIED IN THE RUCKSACK.

(a) Items which must be carried
Dehydrated Cartons 3
Kreyberg Rations 2
Biscuit & chocolate 1
Boots Ankle & Laces
Lavatory Paper
Candles (2)
Sleeping Bag
Hexamine Cooker
Oil & Flanellette
First Aid Kit
Cartridges .45 Pistol (50)
Cartridges .30 Carbine (150)

3. OPTIONAL ITEMS WHICH MAY BE CARRIED ON THE PERSON.

American Parachute Boots
String Vest
Steel Helmet
Washing and Shaving Kit.

P.T.O.

4. OPTIONAL ITEMS WHICH MAY BE CARRIED IN THE RUCKSACK.

Set of Underclothing.

5. ITEM WHICH MUST BE CARRIED, BUT MAY BE WORN ON PERSON OR CARRIED IN THE RUCKSACK.

Sweater, High Neck.

WEIGHT OF RUCKSACK.

The weight of the filled Rucksack - including all items under para 2 (a) and the underclothing under Para 4, is (thirty-four) 34 pounds. Any additional items of personal kit may be put into the Rucksack, but the total weight of the packed Rucksack MUST NOT EXCEED 40 (forty) lbs.

APPENDIX IX C.

S.F. H.Q.

JEDBURGH OPERATION INSTRUCTION.

Ref. Map:-

OUTLINE OF MISSION.

1. Very short e.g. You will be dropped in area ..... in company with two SAS officers whose object is to organise in that area a base for future SAS ops. Your task will be to assist SAS by arranging such support from resistance groups as they may require and also to report to S.F.H.Q. on the possibilities of development in the area.

INFORMATION.

2. ENEMY.

Short general statement only. Details in Appendix A (Prepared by Country Sec. Int. and DR/Int.)

3. SAS (or other tps cooperating).

(a) General outline of SAS operation.

(b) Other Jedburgh teams or OG's operating in the area.

4. TOPOGRAPHY.

In Appendix B (prepared by Country Sec. Int).

INTENTION.

5. One short paragraph giving concisely the object for which the Jedburgh is being sent to the field. (This will normally be taken from DR Operation Order ordering the despatch of the Jedburgh.)

METHOD.

6. Details of air operation.

(a) Section or organisation responsible.

(b) DZ and whether to reception or not.

(c) Whether containers will be included or not.

(d) Night from which operation will stand by.

7. Immediate action on arrival.

8. General outline of resistance organisations in the area.

(a) F Section - Details of personalities, contact addresses, etc. in Appendix C.

(b) R.F. Section - Details of personalities, contact addresses, etc. in Appendix D.

9. Task in connection with resistance groups.

(a) Reports required - strength, organisation, potentialities, etc.

(b) Objectives for which resistance should be organised.

(c) Maximum number of men at which the group should aim.

(d) Possibility of reinforcement by future Jedburghs or Allied Mission.

(e) Relationship and attitude to local commanders.

10. Relationship to SAS and other tps.

(a) Relationship to SAS Comd.

(b) Relationship to any future Jedburghs despatched.

(c) Relationship to Allied mission (if in prospect

11. Possibilities of maintenance.

(a) Limitations on air range.

(b) Scale of air effort likely to be available.

(c) Possibility of landing operations - selection and construction of grounds.

12. Action if captured.

13. Action if withdrawal becomes necessary.

14. Action when overrun by Allied tps.

ADM.

15. Details of adm. arrangements and movements prior to departure.

16. Finance.

INTERCOMN.

17. Code names of:

Jedburgh
Each member
W/T operator.

Any other code names applicable.

18. Signals brief - attached as Appendix E.

19. Instructions for gaining W/T contact.

20. BBC messages and phrases.

21. Section responsible for handling traffic.

Col.G.S.
S.F. H.Q.

IX D.

SECRET.

CONTAINERS CONTENTS OF JEDBURGH LOAD.

A. "H.1".

"808", lbs.	145
Cordtex, ft.	600
Adhesive Tape, rolls	16
Primers, C.E.	190
Detonators, No. 8 or 27	225
Bickford Safety Fuze, ft.	240
Fog Signals or Pressure Switches	32
Pull Switches	4
Release Switches	1
Pencil Time Fuzes: Black	5
Red	30
White	30
Green	20
Yellow	15
Copper Tube Igniters	100
Matches, Fuze, boxes	6
Striker Boards	24
Balloons	6
Rubberised Fabric, yds.	3
Vaseline, tubes	1
Bostik Solution, tubes	3
Rubber " "	1
Wire, Trip, .014", reels	1
Crimpers	1
Tubes, Fuze, Sealing	50

Weight 310 lbs.
Marking: H.1.
J.

B. "H.4"

Firepots	58
Paraffin Incendiaries	24
Instantaneous Fuze, ft.	700
Bickford Safety Fuze, ft.	168
Pocket Time Incendiaries:	
Red	24
White	24
Green	24
Yellow	24
Pencil Time Fuzes: Red	25
White	25
Striker Boards	30
Adhesive Tape, rolls	5
M.L. Flares	27

Weight: 306 lbs.
Marking: H.4.
J.

C. Grenade M36. ("C" type using 3 inner cells).

Grenade M36	96
Detonators	96
Cigarettes, French	1,000

Weight: 310 lbs.
Marking: GRENADE.
J.

To sheet two .....

D. Grenade Gammon No. 82. ("C" type using 3 inner cells).

Grenades Gammon No. 82 (not made up	80	
Primers, C.E.	80	
Detonators No. 10.	80	
Plastic, lbs.	120	
Matches, Fuze, boxes	13	
Bickford Safety Fuze, ft.	168	
Adhesive Tape, rolls	4	Weight 300 lbs. Marking: GRENADE GAMMON. J.

E. Rifle, .303", Mk. IV. ("C" type using 2 inner cells).

Rifles, .303", Mk. IV.	9	
Rifle, .303", Sniper's	1	
Slings	10.	
Cleaning Material, sets	10	
Blankets	1	
Ammo. cal., .303", in bandoliers, rds.	1,500	Weight: 300 lbs. Marking: FUSIL J.

F. L.M.G. Bren ("C" type using 2 inner cells).

LMGs. Bren, complete with spare barrels	2	
Magazines	16	
Carriers, Barrel, Bren	2	
Cleaning Sets	2	
Blankets	1	
Ammo. cal., .303" in cartons, rds.	2,000	Weight 303 lbs. Marking: MITRAILLEUSE. J.

G. Food ("C" type using 1 inner cell).

Corned Beef, tins	72	
Biscuits/Chocolate, tins	5	
Margarine, tins	6	
Ammo. .303" lbs. (approx. 600 rds.)	30	Weight 292 lbs. Marking: VIVRES. J.

H. .303" Ammo. and Food ("C" type using 3 inner cells).

.303" ammo. ball, rounds	1,872	
Soles, leather, repair, prs.	22	
Heels	10	
Nails, lbs.	6	
Outfits, stitching	1	
Chocolate, lbs.	8	
Biscuits, lbs.	12	
Blankets	1	Weight 300 lbs. Marking: 303/F. J.

To sheet three .....

I. Standard Charge ("H" type).

Standard Charges, 3 lb.	20	
Rail Charges	20	
Bickford Safety Fuze, ft.	250	
Pressure Switches	54	
Fog Signals	50	
Pull Switches	12	
Detonators No. 8.	100	
Copper Tube Igniters	100	
Striker Boards	12	
Adhesive Tape, rolls	16	
Wire, Trip, .014", reels	1	
" " .032", "	2	
Crimpers, pr.	4	
String, balls	2	Weight 315 lbs.
		Marking: STDC.
		J.

J. W/T. Container, "F" Type (packed by Base).

JED. set	1
Batteries, dry, spare	6
M.C.R. complete	1
Generator, hand	1
Charger, Trickle, MW/35	1
Voltmeter	1
Hydrometer	1
MK. 2 tool kit	1
Paper and Stationery.	

SECRET.

PACKAGE CONTENTS OF JEDBURGH LOAD.

(a) 2 Panniers, Airborne Division.

Carbines, American, Special, .300	3	
Wireless Sets	1	
Haversacks containing 300 rds. of ammo. .300" & personal kit	3	
Rucksacks, packed	3	
Ammo. cal. .300", rds.	450	Total weight - 230 lbs. Marking J.

(b) Accumulator Package.

6 volt, 30 A.H. 4

(Packed by BASE).

(c) .303" Amm., Ball and Incendiary. (Both packed with "C" type cell).

Ammo. cal. .303", ball or incendiary 1,500 rds.

Weight 115 lbs.
Marking: 303.
J. OF
303 INC. J.

(d) Food and Comforts (500 lb. B.F. Carton).

Cable, Duratwinflex, ft.	600
Detonators, No. 33	100
Sugar, lbs.	25
Margarine, lbs.	7
Coffee, lbs.	16
Soap, lbs.	2
Chocolate, bars.	30
Cigarettes, British	350
Matches, safety, boxes	16
Boots, ankle, with laces, prs.	3
Socks, prs.	3

Weight 102 lbs.
Marking: F/C.
J.

NOTE: In addition to the markings shown above, all packages are marked with a red circle.

APPENDIX X.A. Sheet 1

DATE OF DESPATCH: 12/13 August 1944

CODE NAME OF TEAM: ALAN.

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 77.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Capt. S.McC. Canicott (Br) (PEMBROKE)
Lieut. A. Gairaud (Fr) (ARIEGE)
Cpl. F. De Heysen (Br) (KRONER)

SKED TIMES: Odd Days -0800-0830hrs
1400-1500hrs
Even Days -1030-1100hrs
1900-2000hrs
Night Transmissions -2200hrs.
0200hrs.

BRIEF PREPARED BY: Zone Sud-Est (F Sub-Section).

AREA: Saone et Loire.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To accompany half a troop of 3/French Parachute Bn; to contact F.F.I. Mission CANELLE, and 1) provide liaison SAS/Resistance Groups and SAS/London; 2) take part in action designed to harrass enemy movements on road and railway in particular Lyons/Nevers, Lyons/Dijon.

SAS BASE: Harrods

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: Approx. 7 November 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Landed with group of 10 S.A.S. and quickly contacted all the local Resistance leaders, notably Cmd. de la Ferte, Chief of Dept., by whom the Officers of the Team were given command of the Btn. de Charollais. The radio operator remained at disposal of Cdt. Conan of the S.A.S. The Btn. was in the South of the Dept. to west of MACON, and the Team worked well with its leader and founder "CLAUDE".

The objective allotted to them was to harass enemy communications along road and rail between MACON and BELLEVILLE.

Almost entirely controlled area, and kept railway LYON/DIJON cut regularly between CHALON and MACON.

Destroyed: 1 small bridge blown up.
5 cars and 2 lorries certainly destroyed.
32 vehicles badly damaged or destroyed.

Assisted First French Armoured Division in liberation of town of VILLEFRANCHE on 3 September 1944.

From 6 September 1944 Battalion became attached to First French Armoured Division and went through hard fighting to East of LURE.

/Early

Part 3

DATE OF DESPATCH: 9/10 August 1944

CODE NAME OF TEAM: ALEC.

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 27.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Lieut. G.G. Thomson (Am) (CROMARTY)
Lieut. B. Allet (Fr) (OXFORD)
T/3 J.A. White (Am) (COLORADO)

SKED TIMES: Odd Days: -0830-0900hrs
1900-2000hrs
Even Days: 1130-1200hrs
1700-1800hrs
Night Transmissions: -2200hrs
0200hrs

OPERATION ORDER NO: E.M.F.F.I. 30.

BRIEF PREPARED BY: Zone Nord (F Sub-Section in consultation with DR/SAS).

AREA: Loire et Cher

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To accompany a recce. party of S.A.S. to Loire et Cher; to provide the link between S.A.S. and Resistance groups, contacting VENTRILOQUIST.

SAS BASE: Not concerned.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: 22 September 1944

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS: Destroyed 10 vehicles
" Armoured train
" Bridge at Soucerres on request from General Patton.

Though dropped 60 miles east of intended point, contacted "Antoine" on 12 August 1944. Commenced guerilla operations forthwith and blocked all roads to Loire, as far south as Nevers.

Ambushed every road, especially those leading north from Bourges. Eventually cleared area as far south as Bourges (centre of German escape corridor to Loire crossings).

Immobilized German armoured train on line Bourges/Nevers.

Gave 35th American Division useful information concerning formations on southern flank of Third Army. Maquis also captured and passed to Third Army all the plans for the withdrawal of German 16th Division from Cher to Germany.

Continual and successful harassing of German troops on all roads.

Cleared town of Les Aix Augillon on 4 September 1944 and occupied Bourges on 6 September.

/Organized

Organized repair of aerodrome at Bourges, and captured 10,000 gallons of aeroplane spirit at Avord.

By liaison with Americans, Germans and Maquis, warned the F.F.I. of the surrender march of 2,000 Germans from Indre to Orleans, Beaugenay and Mer sur Loire, preventing serious incidents.

Organized medical supplies for hospital at Bourges.

Conclusion: Though the Team considered their arrival in the field was too late to make full use of patentialities of Resistance in the area, the Mission was successful in its liaison work with the F.F.I.; organized and took part in much guerilla activity against the retreating Germans on road and rail, and passed valuable information to advancing Allied forces.

Sheet 4

DATE OF DESPATCH: 12/13 August 1944 CODE NAME OF TEAM: ALEXANDER

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 57.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Lt. S.J.O. Alsopp (Am) (RONA)
Lt. R. Thouville (Fr) (LEIX)
Sgt. N.R. Franklin (Am) (CORK)

SKED TIMES: Odd Days: -1230-1300hrs
1500-1600hrs
Even Days: 1200-1300hrs
1830-1900hrs
Night Transmissions: -2300hrs
0300hrs

OPERATION ORDER NO: E.M.F.F.I. 31

BRIEF PREPARED BY: Zone Sud-Ouest (F Sub-Section)

AREA: Creuse

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To accompany half a troop of S.A.S; to be under the command of F.F.I. Mission BERGAMOTTE; to stiffen resistance and to assist in the organisation and equipment of resistance forces; in particular to harass enemy movements on roads and railways Perigeux/Limoges/Chateauroux and Toulouse/Limoges/ Chateauroux.

SAS BASE: Not concerned.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: 26 November 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Actually dropped some 60 kms from proper dropping zone in the Haute Vienne, but contacted a maquis group and Team Lee, who made liaison with Mission Bergamotte and despatched Alexander and the 15 S.A.S. with them to the Creuse. It was possible at this time to move fairly freely in the department except on main roads or through large towns. Mission Bergamotte was in full control of military operations in Creuse, the maquis chiefs acting under their orders - which gave the F.T.P., A.S. and F.F.I. a unified command.

Alexander also contacted the Resistance leaders and were given a new mission to contact the maquis leaders of Nord Dordogne. They arrived at a maquis near Perigueux just as that town was liberated. In No. Dordogne the Team joined up with the maquis leader 'Rac' who had 2,000 men under arms and 4,000 waiting to be armed all well organised and disciplined, a most impressive performance. The F.T.P. leader in N. Dordogne was 'Louis' controlling a similar number of men and it was part of the teams mission to make the two groups work together. Many guerilla actions were fought and an attack mounted against Angouleme on 31 August with conspicuous success. The Maquis Rac and Alexander with them chased the

enemy from Angouleme through Cognac and Saintes to Royan in Charente Inferieure and took its place among other units containing the Germans in the Royan, La Rochelle sector.x The main work of the Team now was to attempt to obtain arms and ammunition for Rac and much travelling was done in this connection - also to obtain gasoline. In October the Regiment Rac was joined by the Regiment Armagnac with Jedburgh team Mark and the teams managed to bring the leaders of these two departments into accord. In late October Alsop returned to London to explain the situation in the Royan sector and arranged for parachutage of supplies. When the mission ended in November on General de Larminat taking command of the whole area, Alexander left a detailed map of all German dispositions and defences in the Royan secotr with D.S.S. in Paris.

As well as fulfilling the usual Jedburgh mission of stimulating, and helping to organise the activities of Resistance, this Team also passed to London important information on a new German secret weapon, the V.4. For details of how this information was obtained, and description of the weapon - see Team file Alexander.

x See pages 9 - 11 Alexander's report.

Sheet 5

DATE OF DESPATCH: 24/25 August 1944 CODE NAME OF TEAM: ALFRED

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM
IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 93.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Lieut. G. de Wavrant (Fr) (AUDE
Capt. L.D. Macdougall (Br) (ARGYLL)
Sgt. A.W. Key (Br) (WAMPUM)

SKED TIMES: Odd Days: -1100-1200hrs
1730-1800hrs
Even Days: 1300-1400hrs
1800-1830hrs
Night Transmissions: -2100hrs
0100hrs

OPERATION ORDER NO: E.M.F.F.I. 34.

BRIEF PREPARED BY: Zone Nord

AREA: Oise.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To be despatched to PASTEUR 1) to assist in the organisation of F.F.I., 2) to provide additional means of delivering stores to the F.F.I., 3) to provide an additional link between London and numerous F.F.I. Groups.

S.A.S. BASE: Not Concerned.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: Approx. 1 September 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Dropped to Reception Committee and made contact with Resistance leaders immediately. Gave assistance to small S.A.S. party who dropped blind.

Despatched runners with information to Allied lines.

Organized F.F.I. to safeguard bridges over OISE, on orders received from London, but Maquis lacked arms to do very much.

Successful ambush at FRANCIERES 30 August 1944, and at LA NEUVILLE ROY ambushed small party of Germans, and liberated 30 American prisoners who were escorted to Allied lines.

After American advance, organized patrols for mopping up operations, and continued friendly liaison with F.F.I.

Conclusion: Team was first 'alerted' on 9 August 1944. If despatch had not been delayed two weeks, much more would have been accomplished.

Sheet 7

DATE OF DESPATCH: 15/16 August 1944

CODE NAME OF TEAM: ANDREW.

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 37

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Major A. Coombe-Tennant (B) (RUPEL)
Lt. E. D'Oultremont (Bel) (DEMER)
Sgt. F. Harrison (Br) (NETHE)

SKED TIMES: Odd Days: -1300-1330hrs
1800-1900hrs
Even Days: 1000-1030hrs
1500-1600hrs
Night Transmissions: -2100hrs
0100hrs

OPERATION ORDER NO: E.M.F.F.I. 34

BRIEF PREPARED BY: Zone Nord.

AREA: Ardennes

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To assist in the organisation of F.F.I.; to provide additional means of delivering stores to F.F.I., and to provide additional links between London and F.F.I. contacting CITRONELLE.

S.A.S. BASE: Not concerned.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: Approx. 16 September 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Missed Reception Committee on drop, and W/T set was broken - no direct communication with H.Q. throughout Mission. After two or three days, the Team was found by Colonel Prism (Mission CITRONELLE), who was expecting arms, but not a Jedburgh Team. x

As requests for arms sent via CITRONELLE were not acted on by E.M.F.F.I., the Team could only place themselves at Colonel Prism's disposal and remain with his Maquis group, with whom they took part in one or two small scale engagements with the enemy.

On approach of Allied forces, messengers with notes on enemy dispositions were sent through to the Allied lines.

Conclusion: Excellent and friendly relations were maintained with the F.F.I., and two highly trained Allied Officers must have been of assistance to Colonel Prism; but the Mission failed, through no fault of the Team, to provide extra communication links with London, or to produce arms or equipment.

x Refer to report on Mission CITRONELLE - para. "Missions NOAH and ANDREW" - filed with Jedburgh Team "ANDREW's" file - with ARCHIVES.

Sheet 8

DATE OF DESPATCH: 11/12 July 1944. CODE NAME OF TEAM: ANDY.

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 49

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Major R. Parkinson, (Br) (FIFE)
Cdt. J. Vermeulen (Fr) (CARLOW)
Sgt. Loosmore, R. (Br) (LUNDY)

SKED TIMES: Odd Days: -1930-1000hrs
1600-1700hrs
Even Days: 0800-0900hrs
1130-1200hrs
Night Transmissions: -2400hrs
0400hrs

OPERATION ORDER NO: E.M.F.F.I. 13.

BRIEF PREPARED BY: RF

AREA: Haute-Vienne

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To assist ELLIPSE in the organisation of Haute Vienne and to maintain 'coup de main' parties for the disruption of the four railways converging on LIMOGES.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: Approx. 20 September 44

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Both Officers sustained injuries on landing (see Appendix XI.B. "Casualties").

Contact was made with ELLIPSE and other Resistance leaders through the Reception Committee, but the Officers were exfiltrated on 28 July 1944, and the only member of the Mission who remained was the W/T operator, who continued to work for ELLIPSE, and later for Team IVOR. His work was of great value, and communications were steadily maintained.

Sheet 9

DATE OF DESPATCH: 14/15 August 1944.

CODE NAME OF TEAM: ANTHONY.

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 83.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Lieut. C. Deprez (Fr) (PERTH)
Lieut. M.B. Starring (Am) (NEBRASKA)
(Sgt. J. Bradner (Am) (PFENNING)

SKED TIMES: Odd Days: -1000-1100hrs
1430-1500hrs
Even Days: -1400-1500hrs
1700-1730hrs
Night Transmissions:-2300hrs
0300hrs

OPERATION ORDER NO: E.M.F.F.I 34.

BRIEF PREPARED BY: Zone Sud-Est.

AREA: Saone et Loire.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To accompany half a troop of 3rd French Parachute Bn; will contact French Section organizer DITCHER, and 1) provide liaison SAS/Resistance g groups; 2) SAS/London, and 3) take part in action designed to harrass enemy movements on roads and railways, in particular Lyons/Nevers; Lyons/ Dijon.

SAS BASE: Not concerned.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: 12 September 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Contacted Resistance chief (Cdt. de la Ferte) (see Team ALAN's report also). Team was split up to serve different Maquis groups. Took part in continuous harassing actions on road LYONS/CHALONS/DIJON and on railways until overrun by General de Lattre's French Armoured Division. x

Distributed arms and ammunition as requested by Resistance chiefs.

Blew up canal 3 kms. north of PARAY LE NONIAL, and flooded road to MONCEAU LES MINES.

Took part in the attack on AUTUN.

Conclusions: At time of arrival, the Team found the Department well organized, and the time for action had arrived. They assisted in guerilla activities against the targets indicated in the brief, and maintained good relations with the F.F.I., and communication with H.Q.

x For details of targets attacked - see Supplementary Report on Team ANTHONY, by Capt. Deprez. (Filed in ANTHONY's file with ARCHIVES.)

Sheet 19
Done &B

DATE OF DESPATCH: 25/26 August 1944

CODE NAME OF TEAM: ARCHIBALD

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM
IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 74

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Major A. du P. Denning (Br)(CUMBERLAND)
Lieut. A. Montlac (Fr)(MONTGOMERY)
Sgt. R.L. Pierre (Am) (SEN)

SKED TIMES: Odd Days: -0830-0900hrs
1800-1900hrs
Even Days: 1200-1300hrs
1530-1600hrs
Night Transmissions: -2100hrs
0100hrs

OPERATION ORDER NO: E.M.F.F.I. 34.

BRIEF PREPARED BY: Zone Nord.

AREA: Meurthe et Moselle.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To assist in the organisation of F.F.I; to assist in providing stores for F.F.I; and to provide additional link with London and F.F.I, contacting PLANETE.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: Approx 20 October 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Joined Maquis group of 180 men under a Captain Noel in ~~FORD~~ Forêt de CHARMES. Contacted by PLANETE, for whom the Jedburgh Team carried 35,000,000 francs. Liaison, however, with Departement Chiefs was not easy to establish and Team concentrated on arming the Maquis NOEL, the only active group in the South of the Department.

S.A.S. in the area were more successful in obtaining arms. Jedburgh requests went unanswered.

On 2 September 1944, contacted and gave useful information to American forces (42nd Cavalry).

Maquis attacked town of CHARMES and held it for four days ahead of U.S. forces, but were unable to save the Bridge over the Moselle, and had to retire when American advance was held up. Finally assisted in the crossings made at LOREY, ST. MARD and VELLE, and drove off S.S. and parachute attempts to retake these villages by night. Also guarded U.S. lines of communication before LUNEVILLE, and assisted in "cleaning up" of the town.

Conclusion: In spite of lateness of arrival in area, the Team armed 1600 - 1800 men; accounted for 450 Germans, and probably 200 - 300 more; and were of use to American and French forces in crossing of MOSELLE and liberation of LUNEVILLE.

DATE OF DESPATCH: 24/25 August 1944

CODE NAME OF TEAM: ARNOLD

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM
IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 21

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Capt. M. Coudray (Fr) (SUSSEX)
Lt. J.H.F. Monahan (Br) (LONDONDERRY)
Sgt. A. de Ville (Br) (ESCUDO)

SKED TIMES: Odd Days: -1100-1200
1700-1730
Even Days: 1000-1030
1800-1900
Night Transmissions: -2300
0300

OPERATION ORDER NO: E.M.F.F.I. 34.

BRIEF PREPARED BY: F Sub-Section.

AREA: Marne

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To assist in the organisation of F.F.I. to provide additional means of providing stores for the F.F.I., and to provide additional links between London and F.F.I. contacting PEDLAR or DIPLOMAT.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: 18 September 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Dropped near IGNY-LE-JARD, S.W. of EPERNAY to NICK (Major Boddington) by whom Reception Committee was arranged.

Lost all personal arms, maps, uniforms and crystals and had no direct communication with London throughout the Mission.

200 men, armed as result of dropping operation on arrival of Team, assisted American forces in action at village of TRY - near one of the Marne bridges - 27 August 1944.

At ST. DIZIER (HAUTE MARNE) had successful liaison with F.F.I. leaders obtaining useful information for U.S. Third Army, and organizing patrols for mopping up German prisoners after the liberation of the area.

Reconnoitred road BOLOGNE-CHAUMONT before advance of Second French Armoured Division.

Conclusion: Owing to speed of American advance, Team arrived too late to organize guerilla operations, but performed a useful work of liaison between Resistance forces and advancing Allied troops.

DATE OF DESPATCH: 18/19 August 1944

CODE NAME OF TEAM: ARTHUR

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 53

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Capt. C.F. Mynatt (Am) (CONNECTICUT)
S/Lt. L. Hache (Fr) (SMABRERE)
Sgt. A.V. Bacik (Am) (MILIEME)

SKED TIMES: Odd Days: -0800-0830hrs
1200-1300hrs
Even Days: 1300-1400hrs
1730-1800hrs
Night Transmissions: -2200hrs
0200hrs

OPERATION ORDER NO: E.M.F.F.I. 34.

BRIEF PREPARED BY: Zone Nord

AREA: Cote d'Or.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To assist in the organisation of FFI: to provide additional means of delivering stores to F.F.I. to provide an additional link between London and F.F.I., contacting OVALE.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: 18 September 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Captain Mynatt was injured on landing, and unable to proceed with the others when sent by OVALE to SOANE et LOIRE (in area of CHATEAU DE FRANAY and AUTUN). Took part in guerilla operations and gave assistance to S.A.S. who joined their Maquis groups. Took part in attack on AUTUN with advancing French forces. After liberation, took over the arms of 3,400 prisoners.

Conclusion: Arrived too late to be of much assistance in organizing; and requests of stores were not answered. Communications worked adequately throughout without 'jamming', and the Team were of assistance in actions designed to harass the retreating Germans. Their failure to obtain stores on request did not improve relations with F.F.I.

DATE OF DESPATCH: 11/12 August 1944.

CODE NAME OF TEAM: AUBRY.

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM
IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 25.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Capt. G. Marchant (Br) (RUTLAND)
Lt. J. Telmon (Fr) (KILDARE)
Sgt. I. Hooker (Br) (THALER)

SKED TIMES: Odd Days: 1300-1400hrs
1730-1800hrs
Even Days 1100-1130hrs
1600-1700hrs
Night Transmissions: -2400hrs
0400hrs.

OPERATION ORDER NO. E.M.F.F.I.34

BRIEF PREPARED BY: F Sub-Section.

AREA: Seine et Marne.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: You will be dropped to our organiser ARMAND (SPIRITUALIST) who has a powerful circuit in the Seine et Marne, principally concentrated in the Meaux area. Your mission will be to assist ARMAND in carrying out the tasks necessary in this area and to provide an additional link between London and his groups.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: 6 September 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

This Team had to leave in civilian clothes owing to built up nature of the district in which ARMAND (Spiritualist) had his Resistance group. ARMAND met the Team on landing. The W/T operator was successfully established in a farm house at FORFRY. The Officers moved into Eastern suburbs of Paris. Sabotage lectures were given and railway lines cut and trains derailed nightly on the vital eastern approaches to PARIS. On 21 August 1944, the Team moved back to FORFRY and the MEAUX area. Germans were retreating fast through the area, but little action could be taken as arms were not supplied in response to requests. On 26 August 1944, the Team put on uniform and awaited arrival of men from PARIS who were taking to the Maquis on ARMAND's orders. On 27 August 1944, the Maquis, in process of forming, was attacked and dispersed by the Germans.

Conclusion: A dangerous Mission, carried out with courage. Captain Telmon was killed on 27 August 1944.

Relations with the French community were excellent. Had it not been for training given by the Jedburgh Officers, and their skill in handling weapons, the action at FORFRY would have been complete disaster.

DATE OF DESPATCH: 15/16 August 1944

CODE NAME OF TEAM: AUGUSTUS.

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM IN ME.65 RECORDS: 39.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Major J.H. Bonsall (A) (ARIZONA)
Capt. J. Dechville (Fr) (HERAULT)
Sgt. R.E. Cote[illegible] (Am) (INDIANA)

SKED TIMES: Odd Days: -0900-0930hrs
1500-1600hrs
Even Days: 1030-1100hrs
1900-2000hrs
Night Transmissions: -2100hrs
0100hrs

OPERATION ORDER NO: E.M.F.F.I. 34.

BRIEF PREPARED BY: Zone Nord

AREA: Aisne

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To assist in the organisation of F.F.I., to provide additional means of delivering stores to F.F.I. and to provide additional links between London and F.F.I. Groups, contacting CARDIOIDI.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: All three members of team killed.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Team was successfully received by Resistance leaders of the Department and it was agreed that they could be of most use in the south of the Department (area of SOISSONS). This was a dangerous journey as all roads were controlled, and had to be made in civilian clothes and with false papers.

On arrival at safe-house at RUGNY, existence had to be clandestine, but excellent liaison was maintained with the F.F.I. under Lieutenant SEIGNEUR. On advance of American forces, the Team attempted to move through the lines to the north to continue to harass the enemy retreat.

In the course of this move, in torrential rain, at about 2245 hours on 30 August 1944, their car was stopped by German tanks at BARENTON-SUR-SERRE, and the Team was shot forthwith.

Reports by Emile Fortier, L'Adjoint au Chef de Zone A.5 are filed in Team file AUGUSTUS with ARCHIVES.

DATE OF DESPATCH: 25/26 August 1944 CODE NAME OF TEAM: BASIL.

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM IN M.E. 65-RECORDS: 94.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Capt. R. Raincourt (Fr) (AMBLEVE)
Capt. T.A. Carew (Br) (SUTHERLAND)
Sgt. J. Stoyka (Am) (ORE)

SKED TIMES: Odd Days: 1000-1100hrs
1600-1630hrs
Even Days: 0800-0830hrs
1600-1700hrs
Night Transmissions: -2400hrs
0400hrs

OPERATION ORDER NO: E.M.F.F.I. 34.

BRIEF PREPARED BY: Zone Nord.

AREA: Doubs

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To assist in the organisation of F.F.I; to provide additional means of delivering stores to F.F.I.; to provide an additional link between London and F.F.I., contacting LIGNE.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: 24 September 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Radio and personal equipment was lost on drop, but Team managed to make contact with London on an Agent's B.Mark II Set, which they obtained through the F.F.I. Reception Committee.

Toured the Maquis groups and found only 300 out of 2,000 men armed. Requests to London for supplies went unanswered.

This Team arranged reception of Team NORMAN. Work of the area was divided between NORMAN, BASIL and an agent THEODULE, and Team BASIL took over "operations", - co-ordination of ambushes, preservation of bridges, etc.

By 1 September 1944, roads were cleared, and contact made with an O.S.S. Officer from General Patch's Headquarters, to whom information was given, and BASIL and the F.F.I. in the area undertook preservation of bridges - this work was successfully carried out.

4 September 1944, organized attack and capture of MONTHE, taking 120 prisoners, and killing many of the enemy garrison.

5 September 1944, took part in attack and capture of PONTALIER. Captain Raincourt set up his Headquarters there, and Captain Carew joined Sous Groupement "R" deployed round SALINE.

/8 September

8 September 1944, arranged reception and distribution of arms on re-organization of F.F.I. in the area into the First Regiment Franche-Comte, and carried out course of instruction for Officers.

Set up organization to receive and pass on escaped prisoners of war from Switzerland, and passed Captain Ambel (of Team TIMOTHY) and Lieut. Masson, both attached Mission ORGEAT, into SWITZERLAND to get round behind the German lines.

Conclusion: Team contacted F.F.I. successfully and made contact with London. Carried out terms of their brief in liaison and organization of F.F.I. in DOUBS area and control of the Swiss border. Requests for arms were not answered by London until too late - this was not the fault of the Team.

DATE OF DESPATCH: 20/21 August 1944. CODE NAME OF TEAM: BENJAMIN.
Bernard

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM
IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 81

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Major A.J. Forrest (Br) (STIRLING)
Lieut. P. Marchant (Fr) (ULSTER)
2/Lt. J. Camouin (Fr) (SERRE)

SKED TIMES: Odd Days: -1330-1400hrs
1800-1900hrs
Even Days: 1030-1100hrs
1900-2000hrs
Night Transmissions: -2300hrs
0300hrs

OPERATION ORDER NO: E.M.F.F.I. 34.

BRIEF PREPARED BY: Zone Nord.

AREA: Meuse

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To assist in the organisation of F.F.I: to provide additional means of delivering stores to F.F.I., and to provide additional links between London and F.F.I. groups, contacting PLANETE.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: 27 September 1944

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Teams Benjamin and Bernard were briefed and despatched together to a poor Reception, and spent two days and three nights collecting up stores and parachutes. As Benjamin's W/T set was broken the Teams decided to stay together. Contacted Resistance leaders after some days. For the 'set-up' they found in the department of Meuse, see Benjamin's report page 3.[x]

On 24 August the Gestapo and Milice carried out a heavy raid in nearby town of Les Islettes. Many Resistance leaders were arrested, the maquis group was dispersed and the teams were forced to move camp and reform the maquis.

On 29 August contact was made with an S.A.S. group. News was received that the Americans were approaching the sector, and guides were sent out to contact the advance troops with information on the enemy. Offensive patrols were also led to harass the enemy retreat. In one of these Cdt. Prato was wounded.[xx]

x In Team file, with Archives.
xx See "Casualties" Appendix XC.

P.T.O.

After liberation of Clermont the maquis moved in and organised mopping up operations. The enemy returned however in some strength and in an ambush the remaining members of the Teams were wounded with the exception of Capt. Marchand and Capt. Waller. The teams then reported to 11 S.F. Detachment. and were sent to assist 'Pedlar' in a daylight parachute operation.

The teams considered that they arrived in the area two months too late. Resistance was week, and dispirited by lack of support prior to their arrival. On the arrival of the Teams all caution went to the winds - resulting in the Germans being well aware of what was happening and carrying out heavy arrests. There was then no time for the Teams to re-organise to any degree before they were overrun.

DATE OF DESPATCH: 20/21 August 1944.

CODE NAME OF TEAM: BERNARD.
Benjamin

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM
IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 43

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Capt. F. Prato (Fr) (ARGENS)
Capt. J. de Waller (Br) (TIPPERARY)
Sgt. C.M. Bassett (Br) (LANCASHIRE)

SKED TIMES:

Odd Days: -1300-1330hrs
1900-2000hrs
Even Days: 1100-1200hrs
1700-1730hrs
Night Transmissions: -2300hrs
0300hrs

OPERATION ORDER NO: E.M.F.F.I. 34.

BRIEF PREPARED BY: Zone Nord.

AREA: Meuse.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To assist in the organisation of F.F.I; to provide additional means for delivering stores to F.F.I., and to provide additional links between London and F.F.I., contacting PLANETE.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: 27 September 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

See Team BENJAMIN.

DATE OF DESPATCH: 27/28 September 1944. CODE NAME OF TEAM: BRIAN.

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 2

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Major F. Johnston (Br) (ILLINOIS)
Capt. R. Francomte (Fr) (ORKNEY)
Sgt. N.A. Smith (Br) (LIRA)

SKED TIMES: Odd Days: -0900-1000hrs
1430-1500hrs
Even Days: 1330-1400hrs
1800-1900hrs
Night Transmissions: -2400hrs
0400hrs

OPERATION ORDER NO: E.M.F.F.I. 34.

BRIEF PREPARED BY: Zone South East - F.Sub-Section

AREA: Doubs.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To assist in the organisation of F.F.I. to provide additional means of delivering stores to F.F.I; to provide an additional link between London and F.F.I, contacting PASCAL.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: 22 November 1944

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Contacted PASCAL and remained with him to organize attacks on enemy troop concentrations and lines of communication, notably transport on the road PONT DE ROIDE - MONTBELIARD - BELFORT. Took part in guerilla operations, including an unsuccessful attempt to hold bridge at LISLE-SUR-LE-DOUBS, and attacks on garrison at PONT DE ROIDE and AUDINCOURT.

8 September 1944, Gerald Percy Sandys HEWITT was captured, and later handed over to American Seventh Army.

Gave assistance and established H.Q. for SAS/SF Mission "ETOILE", whose Jedburgh Team had become casualties.

Established an information service on intelligence received from behind the German lines and close liaison with 2ième Bureau French First Army and First Army Corps. Arranged with them to organize the Maquis at MONTBELIARD to:

a) prevent destruction of bridges at MONTBELIARD

b) organize teams of guides to lead their tanks and infantry through the minefields

c) continue to provide information on enemy dispositions.

/When

When the attack on BELFORT commenced, this group succeeded in these tasks, and liaison maintained with First Corps enabled their action to coordinate into the main plan of attack.

Conclusion: A successful Jedburgh Mission, which established excellent relations with and provided liaison between F.F.I. and Allied ground troops. Organization was thorough and successful, and guerilla action well maintained.- though handicapped by lack of arms.

DATE OF DESPATCH: 14/15 August 1944

CODE NAME OF TEAM: BRUCE.

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 79

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Lieut. J. Favel (Fr)(GALWAY)
Major W. Colby (Am) (PERKSHIRE)
2/Lt. L. Giry (Fr) (PLASTRE)

SKED TIMES:

Odd Days: -1200-1300hrs
1630-1700hrs
Even Days: 0830-0900hrs
1400-1500hrs
Night Transmissions: -2100hrs
0100hrs

OPERATION ORDER NO: E.M.F.F.I. 34.

BRIEF PREPARED BY: Zone Nord (F. Sub Section)

AREA: Yonne.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To assist in the organisation of F.F.I; to provide additional means of providing stores for F.F.I; and to provide an additional link between London and F.F.I., contacting DONKEYMAN.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: 22 September 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Dropped in the town of Montargis and missed Reception Committee, but managed to contact Resistance and reach safe house. Resistance in Yonne was under divided control, and Team formed a useful liaison link between the various local commanders.

On 22 August contacted G.2 and G.3 of American 4th Armoured Division at Courtenay, and at their request organised information service and local security patrols round American out-post positions. Harassing actions were increased to protect the American right flank.

After contacting S.F. Detachment 3rd U.S. Army a co-ordinated plan for F.F.I. action in Department was put into effect and Resistance occupied the town of Auxerre on 26 August. Bridges were also blown as directed by 3rd U.S. Army. Continual guerilla action was also maintained against enemy columns retreating from the South and S.W. Towns were occupied immediately on withdrawal of the Germans and road blocks and barriers set up by the F.F.I then denied the use of these towns to further retreating columns. They also prevented many demolitions being carried out by the enemy.

Information passed by this Team assisted the link up made in this region between 3rd U.S. Army and 7th French Army after the capture of Dijon.

The Team advised on the work of forming the F.F.I. Groups into mobile battalions to join General Delattre as infantry to follow his Armoured units to the North and North East.

Conclusions: A successful liaison mission - many arms were received and distributed - and the presence of this team co-ordinated the action and command of the F.F.I. of the department with the wishes of the Allied High Command. The strength of Resistance in the Department prevented the enemy retreating from South and South West from interfering with the right flank of the advancing American 3rd Army.

DATE OF DESPATCH: 17/18 August 1944

CODE NAME OF TEAM: BUNNY.

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM
IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 69.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Capt. J. Radice (Br) (PESO)
Lt. M. Gerville (Fr) (YEN)
Sgt. J. Chambers (Br) (DRACHMA)

SKED TIMES: Odd Days: -0800-0900hrs
1400-1430hrs
Even Days: 0900-1000hrs
1300-1330hrs
Night Transmissions: -2200hrs
0200hrs

OPERATION ORDER NO: E.M.F.F.I. 34.

BRIEF PREPARED BY: Zone Nord.

AREA: Haute Marne.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To assist in the organisation of F.F.I. to provide additional means of delivering stores to FFI; to provide an additional link between London and FFI, contacting OVALE.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: 15 September 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS: Contact was made with Resistance on the 'drop' and team was assigned to maquis group between Auberive and Langres. Contact was also made with S.A.S. in the Department.

Lt. Gerville blew the railway line between Langres-Dijon and the enemy never repaired it again. The road Auberive-Langres was also controlled. On withdrawal of the Germans this group occupied Auberive and organised its future defence and set up a hospital.

Petrol dump at Foulain was destroyed in conjunction with S.A.S.

Agents were sent out to contact advancing Allied troops, and Leclerc's Division was contacted near Chatillon, and ambushed retreating Germans on road Chatillon-Chaumont. On 13/14 September attacked and occupied Langres in conjunction with S.A.S.

Conclusions: Operating with a small F.F.I. group this Team, despite their casualties[x], maintained constant and successful guerilla action against the enemy.

[x] See Appendix XC "Casualties." Capt. Radice - killed.
Lt.Gerville - wounded.

201

DATE OF DESPATCH 25/26 August 1944.

CODE NAME OF TEAM: CECIL.

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 17.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Major D.J. Nielson (Br) (DELAWARE)
Lieut. A. Frayan (Fr) (LYS)
Sgt. R. Wilde (Br) (CENTAVO)

SKED TIMES: Odd Days: -1130-1200hrs
1700-1800hrs
Even Days: 1000-1030hrs
1500-1600hrs
Night Transmissions: -2200hrs
0200hrs.

OPERATION ORDER NO: E.M.F.F.I. 34.

BRIEF PREPARED BY: Zone Nord (F Sub Section)

AREA: Aube.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To assist ABELARD in organising and training groups and carrying out tasks allotted to F.F.I. and to provide additional means of communication between groups and London.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: 25 September 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Originally 'alerted' on 9 August but departure was delayed. Contacted Resistance leaders on the drop - a battle for Troyes was in process at this time, and American 3rd Army was contacted.

At request of Abelard Team undertook the task of arming and organising about 2000 men. Arms for these were never received from London though fighting on the U.S. right flank was continuous. Provided U.S. Army with information as to situation on rivers Aube and Marne, prevented the enemy blowing 5 bridges between Arcis and Brienne on the Aube, provided information as to where the Marne was fordable by tanks, and provided guides. Blew Seine bridges south of Troyes to prevent counter attack from that direction. Organised small groups of F.F.I. for guerilla action in south of the Department. Contacted S.F. Detachment 3rd U.S. Army at Chalons-sur-Marne and re-inforced Resistance in the Yonne which was fighting on the line Auxerre Tonnerre-Chatillon[x]. Played a useful part in preventing trouble between local F.F.I. Commanders and bringing Resistance in the Department under coordinated command of Colonel Diagramme - General Koenig's representative.

[x]Refer to report of team Bruce.

P.T.O.

Conclusion. The Mission arrived too late to carry out their task of training the F.F.I. Guerilla actions were hindered by lack of arms. This was not the fault of the Team - much useful work was done in liaison between the various groups of the F.F.I, and with Allied ground forces.
The team emphased the point that had they been sent in earlier, and in time to train and organise the F.F.I, more damage could have been inflicted on the enemy, and many F.F.I. casualties probably avoided.

DATE OF DESPATCH: 27/28 August 1944

CODE NAME OF TEAM: CEDRIC.

Notified done 23/24

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 35.

SKED TIMES:

Odd Days: -1100-1130hrs
1500-1600hrs

Even Days: 1200-1300hrs
1730-1800hrs

Night Transmissions: -2100hrs
0100hrs

OPERATION ORDER NO: E.M.F.F.I. 34.

BRIEF PREPARED BY: Zone South East. F Sub Section.

AREA: Haute Saone.

OUTLINE OF MISSION; To be dropped in Haute Saone, to come under the command of EMILE. To assist him in training and organising Resistance Elements in his area and to provide additional W/T link between London and these groups.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: 29 September 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Originally 'alerted' 11th August but departure delayed.
Contacted Emile and found no organised Resistance in the department.
Emile had been working along the Besancon-Belfort road (N. of the Doubs).
As Germans were moving N.Eastwards this was most important artery in the area. Assisted team Roderick on arrival and despatched them to S.W. of Besancon.

Owing to numbers of Germans in area all journeys made by the team to contact scattered groups in Haute Saone had to be made in civilian clothes.
Cut Besancon-Belfort railway and ambushed road Vesoul - Gray, also cut Besancon-Belfort road in several places and organised ambushes on all small roads.

After a dangerous journey through the lines made contact on 7 Sept. with American 3rd Division and organised maquis agents to work through the lines.

Conclusions: The team was successful in organising and carrying out constant guerilla action in a vital area to the enemy - but could have organised the department more fully and done more damage to the enemy had they arrived in the field earlier.

DATE OF DESPATCH: 5/6 August 1944

CODE NAME OF TEAM: DANIEL I.

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM
IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 10.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Capt. K.D. Bennett (Br)
Lt. P. de Schonen (Fr)
Sgt. R. Brierley (Br)

OPERATION ORDER NO: E.M.F.F.I. 22

BRIEF PREPARED BY: Zone Nord.

AREA: Cotes du Nord.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To provide the liaison link between Mission Aloes and the Commander of the Department concerned.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: 10 August 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Dropped away from correct D.Z. but managed to contact Team Frederick and Mission Aloes H.Q. at Kerien. Daniel stayed at Frederick's H.Q. The work of liaison with Aloes mission was difficult to perform, and as Frederick's organisation was well set up there was little for this Team to do, and they were recalled with a view to a further mission.

DATE OF DESPATCH: 4/5 September 1944.

CODE NAME OF TEAM: DESMOND.

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 24.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Capt. W.H. Pietsch (Am) (SKERRY)
Lieut. H. Bourriot (Fr) (SHETLAND)
Sgt. R.R. Baird (Am) (HAMPSHIRE)

SKED TIMES: Odd Days: - -
Even Days: - -
Night Transmissions: -

OPERATION ORDER NO: E.M.F.F.I. 45

BRIEF PREPARED BY: Zone Nord.

AREA: Dijon.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To assist the F.F.I. in harassing and destroying enemy troops passing from West to East through the area. (In conjunction with O.G. CHRISTOPHER)

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: 15 September 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Dropped to a good reception in company with O.G. Christopher and made immediate contact with Resistance leaders. Germans at this time were withdrawing through Dijon to reach the Belfort gap, and towns on the route were held by permanent enemy garrisons.

Passed through the lines to American 3rd Army H.Q. with valuable information on situation in Chatillon/Dijon area and to ask for tank support and co-ordinate plans for an attack on Chatillon by the F.F.I. and O.G.s with 106th Cavalry Squadron. Gave complete information on road blocks, mines and anti-tank weapons guarding the city. However, the Germans left before attack was mounted and the F.F.I. occupied Chatillon and maintained order.

Arranged for O.G. Christopher to be under command of S.F.Det.3rd U.S. Army. Took part with General Le Clerc's tanks in action against a group of surrounded enemy at Maisey.

Conclusions: A short mission which carried out some useful liaison work between O.G. Group, F.F.I. and American 3rd Army. Constant guerilla action was already going on in the area, and the team took part whenever opportunity occured.

DATE OF DESPATCH: 7 April 1945

CODE NAME OF TEAM: DICING.

Dutch

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Major Harcourt (Br)
Capt. Bestebreurtje (Dutch)
Capt. Ruysch Van Dugteren (Dutch)
Sgt. Somers (Br)

BRIEF PREPARED BY: Dutch Section.

Op Ops.

AREA: ASSEN.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To be dropped in the ASSEN area to represent Special Forces and to act as the liaison between Resistance and the paratroops.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: 18th April 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

The team dropped with a stick of 15 paratroops of the 3rd and 4th French Regiments. Major Harcourt was captured on landing,[X] and Capt. Bestebreutje hurt. The remaining members of the team however were found and hidden by a local Resistance leader. Through this man contacts were made with local people. Resistance in the area was weak and badly organised. Some military information was collected and passed to London. S.A.S. made movement uncomfortable for the Germans.

On 10 April a reception committee was staged and arms successfully received and distributed by the Team, who then gave weapon instruction to the Resistance, some of whom were in action by the 11th April.

On 12 April recce units of the advancing Canadians were contacted. On 14th and 15th April Resistance in Groningen was contacted.

Conclusion: The time given to this team was too short for them to do much in the way of organising Resistance, but work of liaison was carried out, and a good job done in arranging for an arms drop so soon after arrival.

~~24~~ 29

DATE OF DESPATCH: 5/6 August 1944.

CODE NAME OF TEAM: DOUGLAS I.

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM
IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 8

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Capt. R.A. Rubinstein (Br) (AUGURE)
Lieut. J. Ronglou (Fr) (ANACHORERE)
Sgt. J.D. Raven (Br) (HALF CROWN)

SKED TIMES: Odd Days: -0830-0900hrs
1500-1600hrs
Even Days: 1000-1030hrs
1700-1800hrs
Night Transmissions: -2200hrs
0200hrs

OPERATION ORDER NO: E.M.F.F.I. 22.

BRIEF PREPARED BY: Zone Nord.

AREA: Morbihan

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To provide the liaison link between Mission ALOES and the Commander of the Department concerned.

S.A.S. BASE: Dingson.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: 18 August 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Jumped in company with 15 S.A.S. troops - reinforcements for Dingson base in Morbihan. Guerilla activity in the area had largely ceased and Germans had withdrawn to Lorient. Arranged contact between Brigadier McLeod (S.A.S.) and Colonel Eono (Aloes).

Otherwise communications with Aloes were not good and the team found the local Resistance Commanders relied more on S.A.S. than on Aloes and the Jedburgh link.

The team considered that they arrived too late to help to organise the F.F.I. - whose battle here was more or less over. At Vannes local information was collected and passed on beach defences and the enemy situation between Lorient and the mouth of River Vilaine, but this work was largely duplication and 3rd Army were fully informed.

DATE OF DESPATCH: 15 September 1944 CODE NAME OF TEAM: DOUGLAS II.

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM
IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 8

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Capt. R.A. Rubinstein (Br)(AUGURE)
Lieut. J. Ronglou (Fr) (ANACHORERE)
Pte. Van Hart (Am) (HALF CROWN)

SKED TIMES:

OPERATION ORDER NO: E.M.F.F.I. 46.

BRIEF PREPARED BY: Zone Nord.

AREA: Aisne/Doubs/Jura

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To assist local Commanders of the F.F.I., particularly by the provision of communications both between Groups in the field and between Groups and London, contacting Ligne (with Group SERPOLET)

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: Approx 4 October 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Owing to delay in despatch the area was already liberated when the mission arrived. (Nr. Besancon).

As Allied troops were short of information regarding enemy positions ahead, Mission moved forward to Lisle sur le Doubs and organised patrols to collect information in thickly occupied area S.W. of Montbeliard. Contacted Div. H.Q. in the area and passed information to London of approximate routes of advance and action required of F.F.I.

Dutch 26

DATE OF DESPATCH: 11/12 September 1944.

CODE NAME OF TEAM: DUDLEY

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 12.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Major J.M. Olmsted (Am)
Major H. Brinkgreve (Dutch)
Sgt. J.D. Austin (Br)

P

BRIEF PREPARED BY: Dutch Section.

AREA: Overyssel - Almelo.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To contact and organise local resistance forces. Assist in harassing Germans, preventing demolitions. and finally to link up with Airborne forces.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: 24 November 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

This team had to operate throughout in civilian clothes, these and false papers had to be obtained through the "underground" after their arrivals which caused some days delay in starting work. The Resistance leaders were contacted on arrival, and the reception was good. Contact was made with London.

During the course of their mission the team had to move their H.Q. welve to fifteen times, owing to enemy interference, arrests of Resistance contacts etc.

By 1st October it was found that approximately 3,500 men in the Overijssel area could be relied on for immediate action, another possible 12 to 15000 more available upon arrival of allied troops. Much good work of cutting lines of communication and canals was carried on by small groups throughout September. On 1st October a conference was held of Resistance leaders of the K.P., P.U.U. and O.D. with a view to setting up a combined H.Q.

From then on much intelligence was received from all groups, detailed plans of the defences of Zwolle, Deventer and the Ijssel line and a card index of 200 towns and communities was set up. Major Brinkgreve was the main force that united all the Resistance groups.

Payment of rail road strikes was organised and labour organised to close gaps in the dike of N.E. Polden mined by the Germans. On 17 Nov. after contacting Pete of Arnhem and others, Major Olmsted joined an escape party of British Airborne Div. R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. personnel

OVER.

to attempt a pass through the lines with information gathered to report to Prince Bernhardt's H.Q. For details of how this officer reached the Rhine and contacted U.S. 101st Airborne Div., see Report on Team Dudley pages 7, 8 and 9.

Conclusion: By the 24 Nov. the Team had organised 1,200 armed men, had arms in store for 3,800 more, and with an allied advance could have called on 12-15,000 more in the Overijssel area. After Major Olmsted's return Capt. Brinkgreve and Sgt. Austin both became casualties.[x] Had the Allies been able to advance from Arnhem as planned the team could have given great assistance. As it was they worked with great success under conditions of great difficulty and danger.

HS 32

DATE OF DESPATCH: 8/9 July 1944.

CODE NAME OF TEAM: FELIX.

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM
IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 89

RN SOUQUET Jean Paul

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Capt. J. Kernevel V (CARNAVON) (Fr)
Capt. J.J. Marchant. (SOMERSET) (Br)
Sgt. P. Colvin. (MIDDLESEX) (Br)

SKED TIMES: Odd Days -1200-1300hrs
1530-1600hrs
Even Days 1030-1100hrs
1400-1500hrs
Night Transmissions: -2200hrs
0200hrs

OPERATION ORDER NO: 14 (E.M.F.F.I.)

BRIEF PREPARED BY: RF

AREA: Cotes du Nord.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To organise and arm Resistance in the Eastern half of the Cotes du Nord, to find landing grounds, and if possible a suitable place on the coast for the landing of stores for the Resistance.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: 20th August 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Jumped to R.C. organised by Jedburgh team Frederick. Contacted Resistance elements in the area, but were not so successful in contacts with S.A.S. Organised the area into five Bns., gave landing grounds to London and received 46 aircraft in fifteen days, distributed and gave instruction in handling of weapons. (More could have been done had more trained instructors been sent as requested by the Team). When the action phrase "Le chapeau de Napoleon est-il encore a Perros-Guirec" was received the Team had prepared plans to block the heavily fortified coast area and prevent movement inland, and to attack all small German posts inland. Permanent ambushes were placed along all roads and all communications cut. They controlled 30 Coys of 3,100 armed men. Numerous and successful guerilla actions were fought. x

Established complete coordination with advanced American forces (U.S. 3rd Army).

Conclusion: An extremely successful mission resulting in coordination of the efforts of the various Resistance groups in the area and successful guerilla action when called for in support of Allied forces.

x See Report Team Felix (P.6).

DATE OF DESPATCH: 9/10 July 1944

CODE NAME OF TEAM: FRANCIS.

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM
IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 45.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Major Ogden-Smith, C.M. (Br) (DORSET)
Capt. G. Le Zachmeur (Fr) (DURANCE)
Sgt. A.J. Dallow (Br) (GROAT)

SKED TIMES: Odd Days: -0900-1000hrs
1500-1530hrs
Even Days: 1000-1030hrs
1900-2000hrs
Night Transmissions: -2400hrs
0400hrs

OPERATION ORDER NO: E.M.F.F.I. 14.

BRIEF PREPARED BY: RF.

AREA: Finisterre

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To organise Resistance in Finisterre.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: Approx 1st September 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

The Team divided the area into a zone north of the road Rosporden - Lorient in which Maquis groups could be established and a zone south of the road which was strongly garrisoned by the Germans, the majority of the Resistants had to live at home. This necessitated much movement and constant brushes with the enemy and resultant casualties.x
Contacted Resistance groups and also Teams Giles and Gilbert - for the latter team Francis sent several W/T messages, as Gilbert's set was broken. A service later repaid by Gilbert in similar manner. Also contacted S.A.S. group in the area. By the time the action message was received the Team had groups of about 3000 men armed. All roads were cut - notably the road Quimper-Quimperle-Lorient, and many guerilla actions organised. Took part in seige of Quimper, which was entered on 8 August.x Passed information through Jedburgh Ronald to Aloes H.Q. Armed and organised naval patrols at Douarnenez to prevent Germans leaving Crozon.

Conclusions: A dangerous area for Resistance and heavily garrisoned by the enemy. The Team did much to organise the guerilla action required ahead of the Allied forces and to contain the Germans in Lorient and the Crozon peninsular. For details of air operations and actions fought see Report of Team Francis, page 10.

x See Appendix XC "Casualties". Major Ogden-Smith killed.

x Refer reports of Teams Gilbert and Ronald.

DATE OF DESPATCH: 27 September 1944.

CODE NAME OF TEAM: FRANK.

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM
IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 20.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Lieut. A. Massoni (Fr)
Capt. I. Isaac (Br)
Sgt. T. Henney (Br)

OPERATION ORDER NO: 48.

BRIEF PREPARED BY: Zone Sud Ouest.

AREA: La Rochelle.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To assist in harassing and destroying enemy troops in the area of La Rochelle, contacting Mission SHINOILE.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: Approx 15 November 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

The team was at the disposal of Mission "Shinoile." On their behalf they visited Saintes, H.Q. of the secteur facing La Rochelle, and obtained accurate maps and information on the sector. Assisted in reception and distribution of arms sent from London for the F.F.I.

As the Germans in St. Nazaire were quiet, and owing to lack of arms wherewith to harass or destroy them, the policy of Mission Shinoile was "to let sleeping dogs lie" - so Team Frank saw little action.

DATE OF DESPATCH: 9/10 June 1944.

CODE NAME OF TEAM: FREDERICK.

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM IN M.E. 65 RECORDS:

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Major A.W. Wise. (Br) (KINROSS)
Capt. P. Aguirec (Fr) (VIRE)
Sgt. Kehoe R.R. (Am) (PESETA)

SKED TIMES: Odd Days: -1000-1030hrs
1900-2000hrs
Even Days: 0900-0930hrs
1600-1700hrs
Night Transmissions -2300hrs
0300hrs.

OPERATION ORDER NO: D/R.No.6.

BRIEF PREPARED BY: RF.

AREA: South West Guingamp.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To assist S.A.S. to establish a base into which other S.A.S. parties (approximately 60 all ranks previously dropped for tactical tasks) may withdraw and be resupplied, and to make use of resistance in accomplishing this task.

S.A.S. BASE: Samwest.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: 17 August 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Dropped to S.A.S. Base Samwest in Britanny and remained there four days, when the camp had to be evacuated owing to enemy pressure. Contacted Chief of F.F.I. for the Cotes du Nord and established purely Jedburgh base, carrying out arming of patriots. Organised a number of raids and demolitions on enemy petrol and electrical installations and attacked road convoys. Arranged intelligence net, connecting various maquis groups by "convoyeuses" and bogus motor cycle gendarmes. Arranged reception of further teams and supply drops from U.K. Were surrounded by 800 enemy and had a narrow escape in breaking through the cordon at night; after losing all equipment except crystals for W/T and cipher. Moved to another maquis group, this was also attacked but inflicted 500 casualties on the enemy to 27 of their own. In accordance with orders from London protected the road Lamballe-Guimgamp-Morlaix. This was effected with 2000 armed men and enabled the American Task force to run through without hindrance. Received a French mission from U.K. Stood by for a week whilst the F.F.I. cleared the Paimpol Peninsula of enemy before returning to U.K.

P.T.O.

Conclusion:

Most useful work was performed by the team during the four weeks it was in action. Calm judgment and bravery were frequently displayed and the detailed report is worth reading.x

x See Team File Frederick with Archives.

DATE OF DESPATCH: 3/4 April 1945. CODE NAME OF TEAM: GAMBLING.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Major A.H. Clutton. (Br)
Capt. M.J. Knottenbelt. (Dutch)
C.Q.M.S. J.S.S. Menzies (Br)

BRIEF PREPARED BY: Dutch Section.

AREA: Veluwe.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: Team GAMBLING, with an S.A.S. recce party, was to proceed to the area north of APELDOORN some days before the crossing of the Ijssel by troops of First Army, in order to implement the S.A.S./S.F. plan, i.e: Preservation of canal and river bridges, harassing of German troops, passing of intelligence to advanced Allied troops, preservation of motor and internal water transport.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: 16 April 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

The team and SAS recce party of 3 were safely dropped and contacted Paul Van Apeldoorn (Piet van Arnhem), and he gave them information on the state of Resistance in the area. Much communication was carried on with London concerning the reception of the remainder of the SAS party.

When Canadian troops crossed the Ijssel, Gambling made telephonic communication with Battalion H.Q. and suggested the bridge north of the town in the Epe-Oene direction which could be held by Resistance. The Canadians refused to go so far north, but asked for assistance in attempts to cross the bridges in the town of Apledoorn. These attempts failed.

On 16/17 April the Germans evacuated the town and Gambling informed the Canadians of this fact. Meanwhile much useful information had been passed to the Canadians by Gambling II at Paul van Apeldoorn's H.Q.

Conclusion: Had the Canadians used the bridges north of Apeldoorn Resistance could undoubtedly of held them, and in that respect the team fulfilled their mission as briefed by S.F. H.Q. The bridges in and south of the town were too strongly held for Resistance to take much action.

For the teams views on the unsuitability of S.A.S. for work of this clandestine nature - the team were never at any time able to work in uniform - see Report of Team[x]. They formed a high opinion of Paul van Arnhem and his organisation. Information of immense value was obtained and sifted by his organisation, and passed to the Canadians by Team Gambling.

[x] In file Gambling with Archives.

DATE OF DESPATCH: 11/12 July 1944.

CODE NAME OF TEAM: GAVIN.

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM
IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 82

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Cdt. E. Jeanclaude (Fr) (SHILLING)
Capt. W.B. Dreux (Am) (SIXPENCE)
Sgt. G. Masson (Fr) (HALFPENNY)

SKED TIMES: Odd Days. -1130-1200hrs
1800-1900hrs
Even Days. 0800-0900hrs
1630-1700hrs
Night Transmissions: -2400hrs
0400hrs

OPERATION ORDER NO: E.M.F.F.I. 14.

BRIEF PREPARED BY: RF.

AREA: Ile et Vilaine.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To organise resistance in the area.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: 18 August 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Team Gavin worked with Team Guy and both were dropped to reception committee in Mayenne (nr. Courcite) 75 miles from their intended area of activity. Had difficulty in establishing contact with any reliable Resistance leaders and Cmdt. Jeanclaude travéled many miles on a bicycle in civilian clothes. Eventually a slow and dangerous journey to Le Ferre in Ille et Vilaine was arranged and undertaken. The day after arrival the Teams made contact with American forces already at Combourg, and were given task of organising Resistance forces for patrol duties and covering forces for lines of communication of U.S. 6th Armoured Div. advancing south and later to the 83rd Division in the St. Malo area.

Conclusion:

Having been dropped so far from their allotted area, and without any reliable 'contacts' the Team was unable to carry out their mission in time - However, valuable assistance was given to the U.S. 6th Armoured Division and 83rd Infantry Division in cleaning up the area. The comparative failure of this mission is a proof of the point that Jedburgh Teams in uniform are not of much use unless sent to reinforce known Resistance elements. In the area allotted to these teams more could have been accomplished by agents in civilian clothes and without heavy equipment.

DATE OF DESPATCH: 9/10 June 1944.

CODE NAME OF TEAM: GEORGE.

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 47.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Capt. P. Erard (Fr) (SAVE)
Capt. P. Cyr (Am) (WIGTON)
Cpl. C. Lejeune (Fr) (RUPEE)

SKED TIMES: Odd Days: 0930-1000hrs
1500-1600hrs
Even Days: 0830-0900hrs
1800-1900hrs
Night Transmissions -2400hrs
0400hrs.

OPERATION ORDER NO: 5 (D/R)

BRIEF PREPARED BY: F.

AREA: West of Redon.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To assist S.A.S. to establish a base into which other S.A.S. parties (approximately 60 all ranks previously dropped for tactical tasks) may withdraw and be resupplied, and to make use of resistance in accomplishing this task.

S.A.S. BASE: Dingson.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: 21 August 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Dropped with S.A.S. base (Dingson) west of Redon. Assisted S.A.S. in equipping and arming patriots in the Morbihan and by liaison between the S.A.S. Commander, Cdt. Bourgoin and Resistance leaders, established good relations between them.

Took part with S.A.S. and patriots in large scale action against German feldgendarmerie and paratroops who attacked the S.A.S. base. After this action Team George left with Resistance leaders "Fonction" and "Hauteur" for the Loire Inferieure. After a dangerous journey south travelling only by night, the Team reached the maquis group of Saffre on 27 June. A gestapo agent was in this group and it was heavily attacked next day. Again Team George took part in the action, and then succeeded in making their escape and reached Ancenis. Here Capt. Erard was asked to take charge of Resistance in Loire Inferieure and the team did so until the arrival early in August of the D.M.R. Colonel Vaudel (Delegue Militaire) and Hauteur and Fonction left for the north again. Such Resistance as there was in the Department was honeycombed with enemy agents, and the leaders all mistrusted each other. Jedburgh George brought leadership and confidence to these divided groups, and by 23 August, when they left the Department, had 2,500 men armed and in uniform, and organised, who alone for three weeks held the line of the Loire from St. Etienne (West of Nantes) to Montrelais (East of Varades) protecting the U.S. 3rd Army's right flank from St. Etienne to Redon.

P.T.O.

2,000 more men were being instructed and trained, fighting contact was kept with the Germans in St. Nazaire, and a large amount of information was being transmitted to Allied H.Q. For details of how the Team made their contacts, their difficulties in communication with London where there was reason to suspect that the Team was being 'controlled', and the vicissitudes of their clandestine existence - refer to Report of Team George[X] p.17 to end.

When the Americans advanced to Ancenis, Capt. Cyr managed to get through the lines with plans of the U-boat base at St.Nazaire and defences of the coast of Loire Inferieure, and information on the military situation in the department, and was given the task of organising Resistance to protect the U.S. 3rd Army'sright flank as it swung towards Paris. At 3rd Army's request, arms for 5,000 men were provided. Local guides were provided to indicate minefields and defensive positions. Bridges across the Brenne river were protected and also lines of communication of 20 Corps along the line Segre-La Fleche-Vendome.

For details of organisation set up to accomplish this see page 39 of Team Report.

Conclusion. A magnificent work of organisation was carried out under extremely difficult conditions, and extremely valuable information and support given to U.S. 3rd Army. Though unable to remain with S.A.S. in Morbihan the Team, through the excellent relations established with Resistance leaders, carried out another and possibly more vital task, in a department less highly organised, and more in need of unity of command.

~~37~~ 38

DATE OF DESPATCH: 7 September 1944 CODE NAME OF TEAM: GEORGE II

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM
IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 47

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Capt. P. Erard (Fr) (SAVE)
Capt. P. Cyr (Am) (WIGTON)
S/Lt. C. Lejeune (F) (RUPEE)

OPERATION ORDER NO: -

BRIEF PREPARED BY: Zone Sud Ouest.

AREA: Bordeaux Region.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To organise flying columns to harass the Boche in the Bordeaux Region - with Temporal, attached to Mission Shinoile.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: 20 November 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

As a result of contacts made on their first Mission this team returned to the field with "Hauteur" and "Fonction" and 7 Aspirants French officers for the Maquis (Cdts. Martel and Villecourt) - Mission Shinoile. They were dropped to the department of Vienne (Capt.Erard broke his leg on landing)[x] but the Mission entailed much movement, and much of the time was spent in their old area of Loire Inferieure.

All senior Resistance leaders were contacted and the "mobile columns" organised. All companies lacked equipment - boots, money, transport. Bordeaux surrendered before any action could be mounted, so the mission transferred their attention to the pockets of St.Nazaire. and La Rochelle, and finally decided that assistance was most needed in the St. Nazaire sector. Capt. Cyr arranged with 83rd Div.H.Q. at Rennes for petrol to be supplied for transport of the F.F.I. companies north from Vienne. For details of dispositions carried out, see Report "George II" pp.7.[xx]

Captains Cyr and Erard made contact with the Germans at Pornic and established communication with a German Lieutenant who agreed to work for them - for example on their orders he sent a patrol out of Pornic into an ambush at a pre-arranged place.

x Refer Appendix XC "Casualties".

xx Team file "George".

The operation mounted to Les Sables d'Olonne[x] re-inforced the mission with equipment, material and personnel.

By 7 October about 3,000 men were armed and equipped and in position South of the Estuary of the Loire, and the pockets of St. Nazaire and La Rochelle completely hemmed in. The mission took over command under Colonel Felix, Chief of operations - St. Nazaire, and set up its Headquarters at Nantes (P.12 Report George II) - See xx.

Conclusions Again this Team proved its ability as liaison officers and organisers. Much was done to unify the Resistance forces under the command of the F.F.I., to organise, equip and care for the welfare of these groups - and the isolation of the German held pockets.was successfully accomplished - cutting off any hope of escape for the garrisons or chances of raiding the surrounding countryside for food.

[x]Refer reports of Harold, Tony, Frank, Quentin and Raymond.

xx See also Report of Mission Shinoile in George file.

DATE OF DESPATCH: 18/19 July 1944

CODE NAME OF TEAM: GERALD.

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM
IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 73

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Lieut. J. Beaumont (Fr) (NORFOLK)
Capt. J. Knerly (Am) (SUFFOLK)
Sgt. B.E. Friele, (Am) (SELKIRK)

SKED TIMES: Odd Days -1630-1700hrs
1900-2000hrs
Even Days 1330-1400hrs
1800-1900hrs
Night Transmissions -2300hrs
0300hrs

OPERATION ORDER NO: E.M.F.F.I. 14.

BRIEF PREPARED BY: RF

AREA: Morbihan.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To organise Resistance, contacting Cmdt. Bourgoin.

S.A.S. BASE: Grog.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: 18 August 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

After preliminary landing troubles, collecting stores etc, contact was made with three F.F.I. battalions and several F.F.I. chiefs. The second week Lt. Beaumont changed into mufti, travelled 60 kms through enemy territory to contact Bourgoin of the S.A.S. but failed to meet him. The team then decided on independent action.

Some of the maquis were in a poor state for clothing and supplies, the team arranged a scale of payment as long as their funds lasted. The morale of the men must have been much enhanced and they were given a 100% response for any task required.

Upon receipt of the BBC alerting phrase the F.F.I. went into action according to orders and harassed enemy columns.

The team contacted the first American armoured units and guided them to Brest. They further assisted this unit during it's action in Brittany.
Conclusion: The detailed report interprets far more adequately the enthusiasm with which the team was imbued and carried it's members through several adventures.

36480

DATE OF DESPATCH. 9/10 July 1944 CODE NAME OF TEAM: GILBERT

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM
IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 78

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Capt. C. Blathwayt (Br) (SURREY)
Lt. P. Charron (Fr) (ARDECHE)
Sgt. N. Wood (Br) (DOUBLOON)

SKED TIMES: Odd Days: -1000-1030hrs
1400-1500hrs
Even Days: 0900-1000hrs
1300-1300hrs
Night Transmissions: -2100hrs
0100hrs

OPERATION ORDER NO: E.M.F.F.I. 14.

BRIEF PREPARED BY: RF.

AREA: Finisterre.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To organise Resistance forces in S.W.Finisterre.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: 22 September 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Bad drop. The personnel were safe but all equipment lost. Despite close vicinity of enemy patrols, contact was made with a number of maquis and after several nights sleeping in ditches the team established H.Q. in a friendly chateau near Quimper.

Contact with London was established via team Giles until the end of July and several landing grounds notified. Contact was also made with many F.F.I. chiefs at the chateau. The temm joined a maquis 200 strong and left the chateau - this maquis was well trained and was used forguarding landing grounds and as a "home" unit by the team. They received new radio equipment at the end of July and performed valuable work as an independent team in maintaining communication, training, arming and organising the Breton Maquis, particularly when the enemy was unable to leave the coast or towns and the Resistance ruled the country side.

They took a very active part in several pitched battle in and around Quimper, inflicting severe casualties on the enemy which must have effected his morale considerably. Useful liaison work was done when the allied advance forces appeared and some careful negociating had to be done when quiet sectors were enlivened by passing U.S. columns who left the F.F.I. to hold positions after they had shot everything up and gone on.

P.T.O.

Whilst waiting at a rendez-vous to receive the surrender of the garrison of Concarneau - the team narrowly escaped being shot up by the Gestapo, who had taken over from the original German commander.

The team remained in Finisterre until the end of September, assisting the F.F.I. in mopping up operations. Practically the entire zone was cleared of enemy without Allied intervention.

Conclusion Much useful work was accomplished. The maquis of Bretons showed wonderful courage and determination. The detailed report is interesting reading.x

x See File Gilbert with archives.

37 44

DATE OF DESPATCH.: 8/9 July 1944

CODE NAME OF TEAM: GILES.

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 3

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Lieut. P. Lebel (Fr) (LOIRE)
Capt. B.M. Knox (Am) (KENTUCKY)
Sgt. G.H. Tack (Br) (TICKIE)

SKED TIMES: Odd Days: 1200 - 1300hrs
1800 -1830hrs
Even Days: 1000 -1100hrs
1400 -1430hrs
Night Transmissions: -2100hrs
0100hrs.

OPERATION ORDER NO: D/R.10.

BRIEF PREPARED BY: F.

AREA: Finisterre.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To organise Resistance.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: Approx. 4 September 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS.

Dropped to an organised reception committee and joined a small, fairly well organised maquis group headed by the military leader of the F.T.P. Resistance movement in the area. Organised many reception committees and dropping grounds - see (Appendix A to Report of Team Giles). Also contacted the F.F.I. Chief of Finistere, Lt.Col. Berthaud who had his H.Q. at Quimper. Arranged reception of Jedburgh Teams Horace and Hilary for work in Brest and Morlaix regions. Set up medical service, which saved many lives after signal for active operations was received. Contacted Team Francis and decided on zones of activity. Organised information service to gather news of German dispositions.

Owing to frequent droppings of arms etc., the Germans were aware of the presence of this team and armed maquis groups in the centre of Finistere, and constant moves had to be made. Giles organised small ambushes on roads but managed to restrain the F.T.P. from open action until the signal was received.

Reported German garrison and observation post in Chateau de Trevarez, near Chateauneuf. This was dive bombed by the R.A.F. on 30 July, with great success.

P.T.O.

On hearing the message "Le chapeau de Napoleon est-il encore a Perros-Guirec" the signal for Resistance to rise in Brittany, the team organised an attack on German 2nd Paratroop Division on route from Chateaulin to Carhaix, and ambushed and blew bridge at Laneblau forcing the bulk of the division to turn back. Provided guides for advanced Allied units and made contact with Aloes on 7 August who charged them with the task of centralizing all information on the enemy in Finistere. Harassed enemy in withdrawal on Brest, and then concentrated armed F.F.I. at neck of Crozon peninsular.[x] Much information was to enemy positions in the Crozon peninsular was supplied to the commanding General VIIIth Corps.

Conclusion. This team carried out its mission of organising and arming Resistance in Finistere, and was able to do valuable work ahead of the Allied ground troops and supply much valuable information.

DATE OF DESPATCH: 11/12 September 1944. CODE NAME OF TEAM: GODFREY.

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM
IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 55.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Lieut. J. Forbes (Am) (RHODE ISLAND)
Asp. J. Morhange (Fr) (ROSCOMMON)
Sgt. F. Hanson (Am) (ROXBURGH)

SKED TIMES: Odd Days: -1100-1130hrs.
1700-1800hrs.
Even Days: 1200-1300hrs.
1600-1630hrs.
Night Transmissions -2200hrs.
0200hrs.

OPERATION ORDER NO: E.M.F.F.I. 43

BRIEF PREPARED BY: Zone Nord.

AREA: Haut Rhin.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: 1) To assist in the organisation of the F.F.I.
2) To report on the state of resistance.
3) To submit grounds for re-supply.
4) To recruit volunteers to take information to the Allied lines.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: 19 September 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Alerted 28 August. Owing to weather and other causes did not drop until 11 September. Contacted small maquis at once but several packages were lost. They attempted several expeditions in mufti and were in town whilst the enemy was evacuating, endeavouring to find intelligence amongst the prevailing chaos. After contact had been made with own troops, Morhanges joined a battalion of F.F.I. and the American officers acted as liaison officer with own forces.

Conclusion:

The rapid Allied advance did not allow full scope for the teams activity.

DATE OF DESPATCH: 4 September 1944.

CODE NAME OF TEAM: GREGORY

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM
IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 10.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Capt.K.D.Bennett (Br)
Capt. P. de Schonen (Fr)
Sgt. R. Brierley (Br)

OPERATION ORDER NO: E.M.F.F.I. 46.

BRIEF PREPARED BY: Zone Nord.

AREA: Jura/Doubs.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To coordinate the actions of F.F.I. personnel in the VOSGES Region with the action of 2nd Battalion S.A.S., and also to be of general assistance to PLANETE.

S.A.S. BASE: 2 Bn. S.A.S.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: Approx. 20 October 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Left too late. The team landed amongst own troops and moved up to the front by car with members of the Etoile mission. They were unfortunate in being attacked from the rear whilst passing through a village, the members of the team were all wounded by L.M.G. fire but managed to seek safety in a ditch until American armoured vehicles arrived on the scene.

36 Combined with Gavin

DATE OF DESPATCH: 11/12 July 1944.

CODE NAME OF TEAM: GUY.

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM
IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 75.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Lieut. A. Dhomas.(Fr)(DRONNE)
Capt. A.A.E. Trofimov (Br)(GIRONDE)
C/C J. Deschamps (Fr)(DORDOGNE)

OPERATION ORDER NO: E.M.F.F.I. 14.

SKED TIMES: Odd Days: -0800-0900hrs
1600-1630hrs
Even Days: 1100-1130hrs
1700-1800hrs
Night Transmissions: -2100hrs
0100hrs

BRIEF PREPARED BY: RF.

AREA: Ile et Vilaine.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To organise Resistance in the area.

S.A.S. BASE: Hamac.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: 7 August 1944

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

See Team GAVIN.

Sect 45

DATE OF DESPATCH: 12/13 June 1944. CODE NAME OF TEAM: HAMISH

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM
IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 1

TEAM MEMBERS: Lieut. R.M. Anstett (Am)(ALABAMA)
Lieut. L. Blachere (Fr) (LOUISIANA)
Sgt. L.J. Watters (Am) (KANSAS)

SKED TIMES: Odd Days: -1200-1230hrs
1600-1700hrs
Even Days: 0800-0900hrs
1430-1500hrs
Night Transmissions; -2400hrs
0400hrs

OPERATION ORDER NO: D/R.7.

BRIEF PREPARED BY: F.

AREA: Chatelleraut - Chateauroux.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To assist Team HUGH in the organisation of resistance in the INDRE Department.

S.A.S. BASE: Bullbasket.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: Approx 18 September 1944

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Operations are closely tied up with those of Hugh, to whom they dropped the week after D. day. The radio operator sustained injuries through dropping from too low. They were able to move about freely for the best part of June and found many maquis groups well organised. Several grounds were notified to London for supplies. They instilled discipline and fire arm precuations into the groups - their authority was acknowledged and several court martials resulting in the death penalty took place. A system of pay was evolved and proper registers of recruits instituted. The supplies from U.K. were working well and much work was done in issuing arms and stores. Training was continued during July and several H.Q. moves were undertaken, owing to the enemy being aware of the presence of Allied officers.

They were reinforced in August by another Jedburgh team (Ivor) and started ambushing and harassing operations on enemy columns, besides effecting demolitions on the Limoges-Paris line. Their subsequent operations closely concerned Chateauroux, F.F.I. negotiations and political conferences with Hugh. They returned to U.K. at the end of September after one member had paid a visit to London and returned to the field in an endeavour to obtained Allied intervention in staying the enemy general exodus through their area.

Sheet 46

DATE OF DESPATCH: 15/16 July 1944.

CODE NAME OF TEAM: HAROLD.

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM
IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 76.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Major V.E. Whitty (Br)(ROSS)
Lieut. P. Rimbaut (Fr)(TYRONE)
Sgt. H. Verlander (Br)(SLIGO)

SKED TIMES: Odd Days: 0800-0900hrs
1600 - 1630hrs
Even Days: 1300 - 1400hrs
1530 - 1600hrs.

OPERATION ORDER NO: E.M.F.F.I. 17

BRIEF PREPARED BY: RF.

AREA: Vendee.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To act as link for the S.A.S. with their organisation in England and transmit their messages for them. To aid them as much as possible. To organise and arm the units of local resistance in the region. To cut all the railway lines and communications North and South e.g. NANTES - POITIERS.

S.A.S. BASE: Dickens.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: Approx. 12 November 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

This team in company with two S.A.S. officers did a 'blind' drop, and landed in a vaillage - missing the D.Z. by 20 miles, but managed to contact members of Resistance and obtain civilian clothes, false papers and bicycles. Resistance in the departments of Vendee and Deux Sevres had so far been inactive owing to lack of supplies and organisation. The team staged several reception committees for arms, and arranged reception of Jedburgh Team Tony. Numerous rail cuts and minor sabotage on lines Niort-Poitiers, La Rochelle-Poitiers, blew up power station at St. Maixent, took part in several guerilla actions. Organised a flying squad to harass enemy movement. Organised liberation of town of Niort. After Germans had left the area in and/liaison with military sub-division at Nantes did much to encourage enrolment of F.T.P. and F.F.I. in regular French Army. Assisted in training of new battalions thus formed, and in organising training school for officers at St. Maixent. (See Part VI para G).

Conclusion: A useful liaison mission in an area where leadership was lacking. Not much work was done in connection with S.A.S. but the team provided a focus for Resistance and carried out their task of arming and leading them.

Sheet 47

DATE OF DESPATCH: 6/7 June 1944.

CODE NAME OF TEAM: HARRY.

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM
IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 46.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Capt. D.D. Guthrie (Br) (DENBY)
Lieut. P.E. Dupont (Fr) (GAPEAU)
2/Cl. Legrand R. (Fr) (CENTIME)

SKED TIMES: Odd Days: -1200-1230hrs.
1800-1900hrs.
Even Days: 1200-1300hrs
1730-1800hrs
Night Transmissions -2400hrs.
0400hrs.

OPERATION ORDER NO: D/R. 3.

BRIEF PREPARED BY: F.

AREA: Mt. Morvan. North-west of Autun.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: Accompanying recce party of two S.A.S. Officers (1st S.A.S. Regiment) to establish a base to receive S.A.S. reinforcements from which raids can be carried out on enemy lines of communication.

S.A.S. BASE: Houndsworth.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: Approx. 26 September 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

The a/c pilot was unable to pin point the D/Z but the team risked it and dropped blind with two S.A.S. officers. Their original contact miscarried. After two days they found a well organisedmaquis and the agent they required, the latter had his H.Q. including cipher and liaison personnel nearby.

A good deal of liaison work was undertaken during this stage with the F.F.I. and supplies arranged by barter for the S.A.S. parties which were coming in slowly.

Losses were inflicted on the enemy during a long action, when the hospital the maquis had set up in an isolated house was attacked.

Several maquis groups were visited by the team and well spoken of except for one instance, where discipline was bad. It was on one of the team's 'grounds' that two Allied supply planes collided in mid-air. The major only declared one plane to the enemy, in order to save the 'ground', which was of great value.

Much organising took place about this time and a regular week's course of training was instituted for maquis leaders. Life became rather unpleasant for the team members after this owing to intrigue by "high" officials.

P.T.O.

They assisted several maquis with ambushes and harassing operations when the German retreat began and continued to do so until the end of operations.

Conclusion:

The task proved long, tedious at times, difficult and disheartening. Much merit is due for the part played by the members of the team.

Shut 48

DATE OF DESPATCH: 9 September 1944.

CODE NAME OF TEAM: HENRY.

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM
IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 51.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Lt. R.E. Moore. (Am) (NEW MEXICO)
Lt. S. Montcler (Fr) (ANGLESEY)
Sgt. V.M. Rocca (Am) (WEST VIRGINIA)

SKED TIMES: Odd Days: -1900-0930hrs.
1400-1500
Even Days: 1100-1200
1430-1500
Night Transmissions: -2200
0200

OPERATION CODE NO: E.M.F.F.I. 43.

BRIEF PREPARED BY: Zone Nord.

AREA: Belfort.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To contact PASCAL and assist in the organisation of the F.F.I. To report on the state of resistance. To submit grounds for re-supply and to recruit volunteers to take information to the Allied lines.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: 24 September 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Dropped in N. Doubs to Reception Committee and contacted Jedburgh Team Brian and Resistance leaders, but found they were cut off from the Belfort zone and unable to pass through the lines. Contacted Colonel Stevens of "Sainfoin" at Besancon in hope of travelling with him via Switzerland, but were too late also for this route. Information from area North of Belfort was scanty, and the Team was ordered to return to U.K. As Pascal had Team Brian at his disposal and did not require another Team.

Conclusion

By the time this Team arrived the military situation was such it was impossible for them to penetrate to the area for which they were intended.

Sheet 51

DATE OF DESPATCH: 5/6 June 1944.

CODE NAME OF TEAM: HUGH.

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM IN ME. 65 RECORDS: 4.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Chef de Btn. Legrand (Fr) (FRANC)
Major W.R. Crawshay (Br) (CROWN)
C.C. Mersiol, R. (Fr) (YONNE)

SKED TIMES: Odd Days: -1000-1100hrs
1630-1700hrs
Even Days: 0900-1000hrs
1400-1430hrs
Night Transmissions: -2300hrs
0300hrs.

OPERATION ORDER NO: D/R. 4.

BRIEF PREPARED BY: F.

AREA: Chatellerault - Chateauroux.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: Accompanying S.A.S. recce party (two officers of 1st S.A.S. Regiment) to establish a base to receive S.A.S. reinforcements from which raids can be carried out on enemy lines of communication.

S.A.S. BASE: Bullbasket.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: Approx 10 September 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Conference soon after landing with Surcouf and Samuel to agree action plan for S.A.S. main body, resulting in allocating Poitiers to resistance groups and Aigurande to the S.A.S. Next day contacted several maquis leaders who had group forming. Owing to lack of arms they arranged to disperse pro-tem. The department of Indre was to be organised by the team, leaving the other regions to Samuel and the S.A.S.

Hugh was joined by team Hamish after a week and both teams continued to arm and organise maquis groups. Some subtle negociating was required to settle command questions arising among the French leaders. Their H.Q. was overrun by a maquis group from Vienne who had been in action with a German repression column, they assisted in steadying this withdrawal. During July numerous drop zones were listed and the framework of resistance broadened. The number now estimated to be 6,000.

Harassed enemy road transport, particularly from Brittany and Nantes - obliging them to move in convoys which were subject to air attack.

Were instrumental during August in saving the important dam at Eguzon and in converting the 1er Regt. de France to the Allied ranks. During the enemy evacuation of Chateauroux the maquis attacked the convoys and occupied the town. Hugh were able to instill discipline

and avoid disorder. From the 22 August onwards extensive operations over the department Indre, employing the whole of our 9000 F.F.I., were planned and carried out. Heavy losses were inflicted on the enemy during his retreat through four main axis. This effected the German morale and can be attributable to the surrender of 20,000 troops described by team Julian.
The team remained in action until 10 September when fighting ceased and politics began.

Conclusion Team Hugh has been considered as an example of what a Jedburgh team should be and this is endorsed by the events chronicled in their report. They showed wise repression in avoiding useless "noise" until the end when the organised fighting of their great resistance movement must have hampered the enemy movements considerably. The detailed report of the team is worth reading.x

x See Team file "Hugh" with archives.

Sheet 52 W3

DATE OF DESPATCH: 20/21 June 1944 CODE NAME OF TEAM: IAN.

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 68

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Major J. Gildee (Am) (OKLAHOMA)
Lt. Y. Delorme (Fr) (MAINE)
Sgt. L. Bourgoin (Am) (MAYO)

SKED TIMES: Odd Days -1930-1000hrs.
1900-2000hrs
Even Days 1000-1030hrs
1600-1700hrs
Night Transmissions: -2100hrs
0100hrs

OPERATION ORDER NO: D/R.8.

BRIEF PREPARED BY: F.

AREA: Vienne.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To assist SAMUEL, working through the Chef de Resistance elements in Vienne. To contact F.F.I. resistants and SHIPWRIGHT circuits, to impress upon all concerned that a general uprising must not take place in the department of Vienne, and to mount continuous attacks against rail lines: Bordeaux-Poitiers-Tours, Bordeaux-Niort-Saumur.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: 17 September 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Contacted Resistance chief on arrival and decided to concentrate on arming and training groups in the S. West Vienne and N.Charente and commenced sabotage immediately, notably on Paris/Bordeaux railway lin line where on cuts were maintained daily. Ambushes were mounted on roads and railways. For details of Maquis groups organised see Report by Major Gildee.X

This organisation entailed much movement by the team and frequent brushes with the enemy. Cleared a zone limited by towns of Charoux/ Confolens/Chasseneuil/Champagne Mouton and made a fortified bastion of the area in which volunteers were armed and trained. By 20 July the Team controlled 6,000 men organised in 4 battalions (Page 4 Team Report). Team Ian exercised complete control as regards military operations, but left supply and administration to the Battalion commanders, but by liaison with officers from F.F.I. H.Q. in Paris arranged a loan of 12 million francs for their support.

Hospitals were formed and surgeons and nurses recruited. Telephone

P.T.O.

communication was arranged throughout the area and liaision kept up by motorcycle and carrier pigeon. Frequent small scale guerilla operations were fought, sabotage teams operated on rail lines and bridges between Angouleme/Civray and Angouleme/Saintes. This provoked German retaliation and a fairly large scale engagement was fought,[x] (P.6) but Resistance activity was maintained, and organisation stood up to German attacks.

Organised and took part in liberation of Angouleme by Resistance, and whole of Charente was cleared of the enemy (approx 3rd Sept.).

Conclusion By organising and arming 4 - 6000 men in S.W. Vienne and Charente, Team Ian constituted a barrier in the patch of the Germans attempting to reach the battle area in the north from Bordeaux and the S.West. Constant and successful guerilla actions and sabotage were carried out and large enemy forces contained and larges areas were liberated without support from regular allied troops.

[x] Casualties - Appendix XC - Sgt. Bourgoin.

Sheet 53

DATE OF DESPATCH: 10 June 1944.

CODE NAME OF TEAM: ISAAC.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Lt.Col.J.R.H.Hutchison (Br)(HASTINGS).
Sgt. J. Sharp (Br)

COUNTRY SECTION CONCERNED: DR.

AREA: Morvan Massif.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To report on the suitability of the Morvan Massif for guerilla warfare by French resistance and on the conditions pertaining in the maquis and to assist in their training.

S.A.S. BASE: Houndsworth.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: Approx 25 September 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Dropped with S.A.S. party from too high, causing wide dispersal and loss of equipment. Spent first three days travelling across country to pre-arranged rendez-vous, when discovered by local inhabitant who contacted a maquis for them. They were able to liaise with several group leaders and organised the supply of arms to nine main maquis who would arrange internal distribution; this information was passed to London in detail and caused much disappointment through lack of reply. A few difficulties arose about command positions in the resistance movement, these Col.Hutchison was able to advise on and assist in settling.

A Russian Battalion committed many atrocities in the region - details are included in the report, also the names of the leaders responsible.

The maquis was attacked by 400 enemy on June26, the action lasted 24 hrs and the 150 maquisards were forced to retire five miles, losing all their transport and hospital. Colonel Hutchison with a small SAS patrol attempted unsuccessfully to retrieve the medical stores. Having advised the leaders to join a maquis near Monsauche where the G.H.Q. was situated and in view of their decision to remain as they were, the team moved over itself and reached the new maquis two days later. Considerable wireless traffic was originated from their new location, on behalf of themselves and others, the W/T operator of the mission must have had a very busy time. The first half of July passed quietly. Discussions continued about internal command, cables were frequently sent to London, were often misunderstood and the few replies were unsatisfactory to the field, but inspired by high ~~pix~~ level planning.

With the arrival of Diagramme, the team's position in the maquis groups improved and Col. Hutchison was considered as advisor and un-officially as co-equal. The intelligence network he had originated was increased and made full use of. Finally they agreed that the team would continue to work in the Nievre and Cote d'Or whilst Diagramme would take over other departments.

During the latter part of July the team moved to another maquis and instructions were passed on for more aggressive operations. They were instrumental in getting the Russian elements of the garrison at Chateau Chinon to surrender, these would only negociate with British officers.

Contact was made with 3rd U.S. Army on August 30th and U.S. Forces asked for the Resistance to protect their right flank, this was done.

Discussion became acute regarding the general policy to be adopted and the plan of operations in the Morvan. Colonel Hutchison urged Diagramme to visit Paris and wrote himself to General Koenig, requesting Diagramme should be nominated chief. This was acceded to and the suicidal plan of an F.F.I. attack on Dijon alone abandoned.

Harassing operations on a large scale now took place and effectively aided Allied troops. Something like 50 small actions a days taking place.

On September19th the Morvan was reported clear of enemy and the mission was completed. The number of F.F.I. now amounted to 30,000 which had proved their ability to hamper, harrass and slow down the enemy to a great extent.

Conclusion: See Colonel Hutchison's own report. They illustrate the difficulties encountered by the team in carrying out their task and the qualities of tact and tolerance which were often needed and displayed.

Chute 49

DATE OF DESPATCH: 17/18 July 1944

CODE NAME OF TEAM: HILARY.

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM
IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 6

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Lt. E. Marchant.(Fr) (CHARENTE)
Lt. P.H. Chadbourne (Am) (NEVADA)
C/C Pariselle R. (Fr) (KOPEK)

SKED TIMES: Odd Days: -1300-1400hrs
1830-1900hrs
Even Days: 1200-1300hrs
1500-1530hrs
Night Transmissions -2300hrs
0300hrs

OPERATION ORDER NO: E.M.F.F.I. 14.

BRIEF PREPARED BY: RF.

AREA: Finisterre

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To organise resistance in the area.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: Approx. 30 August 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Dropped to Reception organised by Team Giles, and was assigned to the area of Morlaix in Cotes du Nord. Contacted Resistance both F.F.I. and F.T.P. and both accepted leadership of the Team. Submitted landing grounds to London and took part in several guerilla engagements. Organised medical service.
On receiving action phrase organised ambushes against German retreat on road to Brest and held a battalion of A.A. guns and M.M.Gs for two days until they surrendered to U.S. forces. Protected viaduct at Le Pouttron. When overrun by Americans the team worked with the U.S. 17th and 15th Cavalry Squadrons, to keep order in the town of Morlaix and organised the Maquis groups into companies and battalions to work as tank infantry with the Americans.
Conclusions: A successful mission - both in liaison work to bring unity between different Resis tance elements, and in organisation and action after this was achieved. Their authority being accepted, the Team was able to be of assistance in keeping order among the civil population after advanced U.S. forces had arrived and in the work of cleaning up the area.

Sheet 50

DATE OF DESPATCH: 17/18 July 1944.

CODE NAME OF TEAM: HORACE.

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 5

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Major J. Summers (Am) (WYOMING)
Lt. Levalois G. (Fr) (SOMME)
T/3 Zielske, W. (Am) (DIME)

SKED TIMES: Odd Days: -1100-1200hrs
1630-1700hrs
Even Days: 0800-0830hrs
1700-1800hrs
Night Transmissions:-2400hrs
0400hrs

OPERATION ORDER NO: E.M.F.F.I. 14.

BRIEF PREPARED BY: RF

AREA: Finisterre.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To arm and organise the French Resistance in the Arrondissement of Brest.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: 11 September 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Dropped to reception committee organised by Jedburgh Giles and were passed on to the north and reached the Brest area in wine barrels among a load of wine being delivered to the Germans!

The leader of the Brest circuit contacted the Team about five miles N.W. of Brest and a second journey had to be made in wine barrels (this time the truck had a flat tire and a German patrol helped the driver to change the wheel).

Team keep contact with some 5000 Resistants in the town, and 2000 outside. Small dumps of arms were made in the surrounding countryside - each to supply about 10 - 12 men who alone knew exact location of their dump. Grounds were submitted to London and reception committees organised. Those working for the Germans in the docks and arsenal carried arms into the city and larger weapons were infiltrated in civilian trucks carrying supplies for the Germans. Owing to the flak in the area, London refused many of the grounds submitted and only some 1500 men were armed when the U.S. forces arrived. From then on Resistance was armed with captured German weapons. The team was able to turn over to G.2 of 6th Armoured Division detailed reports and maps of the enemy positions and installations, and guides were sent out to meet the advancing U.S. forces.

After arrival of U.S. forces, Resistance was used to set up a line of security patrols on both flanks and later formed a 'screen' between the 30,000 enemy in Brest and the comparatively weak containing force. No enemy recce patrols got through this Resistance screen. Lines of communication were kept open and the supply routes for the 6th Armoured Division in its first arrival before Brest.

Conclusion: Owing to difficulties of supplying arms to the area comparatively little action could be taken before the arrival of regular troops. However the Team had achieved its mission of organisation, and small guerilla actions were carried out[x], bigger things were undertaken and achieved when arms and support arrived.

[x] For details of actions see Appendix to Report of Team Horace. File Horace with Archives.

Not Issued Sheet 54

DATE OF DESPATCH: 6/7 August 1944.

CODE NAME OF TEAM: IVOR.

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 9

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Lt. Y.M. Dantec (Fr) (SELUNE)
Capt. J.H. Cox (Br) (MONMOUTH)
Sgt. L.F. Goddard (Am) (OREGON)

SKED TIMES: -

OPERATION ORDER NO: E.M.F.F.I. 28.

BRIEF PREPARED BY: Zone Ouest (F Sub-Section).

AREA: S. Cher.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To co-ordinate with HAMISH the limits of Southern Cher in which the new team is to work, to assist in organising and arming the F.F.I. of the south Cher, as far North as ST. AMAND.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: 15 September 1944.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Dropped to reception organised by Team Hamish and through them contacted local Resistance leaders. Radio operator was killed on landing.x For exposition of situation in the area on their arrival see report of Team Ivor.xx On 14 August ~~Team~~ Sgt. Loosemore (ex Team Andy) was passed on to join Ivor by Hamish.

Team managed to persuade all groups in the area to acknowledge overall command of Col. Benoit (1er Regiment D'Infanterie) and kept in touch with Teams Hugh and Hamish and Mission Bergamotte in the Creuse to co-ordinate the efforts of Resistance.

All roads constantly ambushed, Bourges airport was occupied, and several engagements fought and prisoners taken. Entered Bourges, Vienzon and Mehun-s-Yevre on withdrawal of Germans. 9 September contacted General Koenig in Paris for 4 Bn S.A.S. in N.Cher to assist in clearing up S.Cher. Team played its part in preventing trouble when Germans in the area surrendered and marched North to the Loire to surrender to U.S. 9th Army.

P.T.O.

xAppendix XC Casualties - Sgt. Goddard.

xxTeam File 'Ivor' with Archives.

Conclusion. A useful mission in an area heavily occupied by the enemy and vital to him for his withdrawal to the N.E. The team did much to bring unity to Resistance elements already fairly thoroughly organised and carried out a good work of liaison. More would have been accomplished had London complied with their frequent requests for arms.
For details of losses inflicted on the enemy see Report of Team Ivor page 15.

Not yet done Sheet 55

DATE OF DESPATCH: 12/13 August 1944.

CODE NAME OF TEAM: JACOB.

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM
IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 40

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Capt. V.A. Gough (Br)(ARRAN)
Lieut. G. Baraud (Fr)(CONNAUGHT)
Sgt. K. Semour (Br) (SKYE)

SKED TIMES: Odd Days: -0830-0900hrs
1300-1400hrs
Even Days: -1100-1200hrs
1700-1730hrs
Night Transmissions: -2300hrs
0300hrs.

OPERATION ORDER NO: E.M.F.F.I. 21.

BRIEF PREPARED BY: Zone Nord.

AREA: Vosges.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To work in conjunction with S.A.S. to assist in the organisation, training and arming of the Maquis.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED:

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Little is known of achievements of this team as both officers and majority of S.A.S. group with whom they dropped are dead[x]. The W/T operator was also taken prisoner but on his return to the U.K. reported that the Team contacted Resistance leader immediately on arrival, and joined a Maquis group and did some work of instruction, but were ambushed and broken up on 17 August - five days after arrival. The only survivor of the Team, Capt. Gough remained with the maquis and with S.A.S. and continued in communication with London until 19 Sept. - is thoughtto have been captured about end of October.

x See Appendix XC - "Casualties"

Jmre Sect-56 avs

DATE OF DESPATCH: 10/11 August 1944. CODE NAME OF TEAM: JAMES.

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 26

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Lt. J.K. Singlaub (Am)(MISSISSIPI)
Asp. D. Leb. (Fr) (MICHIGAN)
T/3 A.J. Denneau (Am)(MASSACHUSETTS)

SKED TIMES: Odd Days: -0900-1000hrs
1730-1800hrs
Even Days: -0800-0900hrs
1500-1530hrs
Night Transmissions: -2300hrs
0300hrs

OPERATION ORDER NO: E.M.F.F.I. 31.

BRIEF PREPARED BY: Zone Sud-Ouest (F Sub Section)

AREA: Correze.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To contact Mission TILLEUL and accompanying a recce party of S.A.S., half a troop/s of 3/French para. bn; to provide the liaison with the Resistance groups and communication with London.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED:

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Contacted Mission Tilleul with Reception Committee. Found Resistance well organised and active though politically divided. Main objective for Resistance was to keep the Route Nationale 89 (Bordeaux-Clermont-Ferrand-Lyons) cut to prevent the Germans withdrawing from the S.West.

In agreement with Tilleul the team gave assistance and leadership to the F.T.P. groups. On 14 August Koenig's order "to attack between the Loire and the Garonne all German garrisons, however important they may be" was received, and James took part in attacks on Egleton, Brive and Tulle, and ambushes on the route.

Much instruction was given in the use of bazooka, p.i.a.t and the types of German small arms captured at Tulle and Brive. By 28 August Correze was clear of Germans though ambushes were still maintained on Route 89 against possible future attempts to pass through the area. James, therefore, went north to Creuse and contacted "Bergamotte". With them James contacted the teams in Indre and Cher where the enemy were still retreating north east through Poitiers, Chateauroux and Bourges, and with their group from Correze were instructed to form a mobile column to harass the enemy on this route. James returned to London by Hudson to get equipment for this "column legere" but another mission was proposed, and the team only returned to Correze to contact certain men required for the new project.

Conclusion: The team gave skilled support and leadership in action in an area where Resistance was already organised and active - However they emphasize throughout their report that more could have been achieved a) had they been sent into the field earlier, b) had they had more support from London and some replies to their requests for arms, and c) had French internal politics not been such as to divide the Resistance forces among themselves.[x]

x See Political Report on the Correze by Team James.

57 Blank Sheet 58 Done CRS Done

DATE OF DESPATCH: 15/16 September 1944.

CODE NAME OF TEAM: JIM.

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM
IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 55

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Lt. J. Lavige (Fr) (LEITRIM)
Capt. P. Donovan (Am) (PENNSYLVANIA)
Sgt. M. Henely (Am) (WEXFORD)

SKED TIMES: Odd Days: -1230-1300hrs
1700-1800hrs
Even Days 1030-1100hrs
1500-1600hrs
Night Transmissions: -2100hrs
0100hrs.

OPERATION ORDER NO: EMFFI. 46.

BRIEF PREPARED BY: Zone Nord.

AREA: Ain/Jura/Doubs.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To assist the local Commanders of the F.F.I., particularly by the provision of communications both between groups in the Field and between these groups and London, contacting Ligne (with Group THYM of Mission Orgeat).

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: Approx 27 September 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Despatched too late. Acted as liaison officers to allied troops.

Skell's 9 drs cvs drs

DATE OF DESPATCH: 16/17 August 1944.

CODE NAME OF TEAM: JOHN.

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM
IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 22.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Capt. D.L. Stern (Br) (BEAU)
Lieut. J. le Rocher (Fr) (LUCIDE)
Sgt. D. Gibbs (Br) (SILENCE)

SKED TIMES: Odd Days: -1000-1100hrs.
1700-1730hrs
Even Days: 1330-1400hrs
1700-1800hrs
Night Transmissions : -2300hrs
0300hrs.

OPERATION ORDER NO: E.M.F.F.I.

BRIEF PREPARED BY: Zone Ouest (F Sub-Section)

AREA: Tarn et Garonne.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To work with PEMENTO in Tarn et Garonne; to assist in the organisation of F.F.I. and Resistance elements under his control and to report on the potentialities of his groups.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: Approx 1st October 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

The team was dropped 150 km South of destination and did not locate Pemento for several weeks when the scale of activities was reduced to a minimum anddid not warrant their employment as orginally assigned. In the interim they joined up with some F.F.I. columns, whom they assisted and advised. The last period, before returning to U.K., was used to assist in evacuating allied sick,&wounded, they also organised the collection of a Heinkel 177 for despatch to the R.A.F. experimental centre.

Conclusion The mission could not be carried out, the information about their original contact was out of date, they were dropped far off their ~~exi~~ course and were sent out too late.

61 Amc 015

DATE OF DESPATACH: 10/11 August 1944. CODE NAME OF TEAM: JULIAN I.

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 7.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Major A.H. Clutton (Br)(STAFFORD)
Asp. J. Brouillard (Fr)(VERMONT)
CQMS T.S. Menzies (Br) (ESSEX)

SKED TIMES: Odd Days: -1100-1200hrs
1600-1630hrs
Even Days: 1800-0900hrs
1430-1500hrs
Night Transmissions: -2200hrs
0200hrs.

OPERATION ORDER NO: E.M.F.F.I. 33.

BRIEF PREPARED BY: Zone Sud-Ouest (F Sub Section)

AREA: Indre et Loire.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To assist Team HUGH to organise and take charge of Maquis Indre et Loire and to work under the direction of HUGH.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: Approx 25 September 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Contacted immediately by Hugh and Resistance leaders. Commenced training courses for the already organised resistance groups and gave practical demonstrations of cratering roads on roads Levroux-Isoudun and Levroux-Loches.
21 August Maquis of N. Indre moved to position on Route Nationale 76 to deny its use to 16th German division. 4 September F.F.I. occupied Selles, Chabris, St. Aignan and Valencay. For record of frequent ambushes and guerilla actions see Report of Team Julian Section B.[x] Considerable number of casualties were inflicted on the enemy. A number of reception committees for arms and supplies were carried out.
[x] In Section C. of report see detailed account of part played by this team under General Elster on the Loire. Julian contacted a U.S. patrol under Lt. MacGill and arranged liaison with the F.F.I. and meeting between General Elster and General Macon G.O.C. 83 Div. The point is well made in this report of the small recognition given to the F.F.I. who were entirely responsible for this surrender, the troops under General Elster did not come in contact with U.S. forces until they marched north to

[x] In Team file with Archives.

surrender. Julian ensured that the F.F.I. were kept informed of the lines of march and halting places of the enemy columns, and did much to obtain their co-operation. Had the F.F.I. not been in the picture it is likely this surrender would not have been negotiated without some trouble.

Conclusion. This was a useful, full scale Jedburgh mission. The team carried out an important liaison role between the F.F.I. and American forces, organised training and instruction of the maquis, and took part in many guerilla actions in a department where the work of the Resistance gave as much or more assistance to the A.E.F. as any other in France.

Sheet 62 HS5 Done 3/18

DATE OF DESPATCH: 16 November 1944.

CODE NAME OF TEAM: JULIAN II.

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM IN M.E. 65 RECORDS:

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Capt. J. Kerneval (Fr) See base file Vol 2
S/Lt. Sauvage (Fr)
S/Lt. Mersiol (Fr).

OPERATION ORDER NO: E.M.F.F.I. 49.

BRIEF PREPARED BY: Zone Nord.

AREA: Mulhouse (Haut-Rhin).

OUTLINE OF MISSION: Organise resistance in co-operation with OSCAR, destroy enemy troops in this area, protect vulnerable points, report enemy troop movements and military intelligence, organise reception committees for arms dropping, if further arms required.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: Approx 9 February 1945.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Originally alerted to go by air - but weather conditions interfered and the team eventually went to Nancy to attempt to infiltrate on foot. Before this could be done Alsace was liberated and Strasbourg and Mulhouse liberated on 23 November and 25 November. The team was put at the disposal of the F.F.I. in Alsace and sent to Strasbourg on 13 Dec. They were in the city at the time of the German counter attack on 1 Jan. and organised an information service with a view to remaining there should the Germans recapture it. Attempted to arm the F.F.I. to reinforce 1st French Army defending Strasbourg, but Paris (the command of the F.F.I. was now in France) did not reply to the requests. After the situation was restored and Colmar captured on 2 February the Team withdrew.

Conclusion By the time the Team reached France conditions made it impossible for them to fulfil their mission. As it turned out the weather that prevented their despatch was no "ill wind" for the Reception would have been by the Gestapo![x]

[x]See Team Report. Julian II - with Archives.

DATE OF DESPATCH: 9/10 August 1944.

CODE NAME OF TEAM: LEE.

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 16.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Capt. C.H. Brown (Am) (PICE)
Lt. N. Vigier (Fr) (SOUS)
C/C A. Chevalier (Fr) (REIS)

SKED TIMES: Odd Days: -1230-1300hrs
1800-1900hrs
Even Days: 1100-1130hrs
1600-1700hrs
Night Transmissions: -2200hrs
0200hrs.

OPERATION ORDER NO: E.M.F.F.I. 31

BRIEF PREPARED BY: Zone Sud-Ouest (F Sub Section)

AREA: Haute Vienne

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To accompany a half troop of 3rd French Para. Bn; To be at the disposal of HAMLET (SALESMAN) to reinforce Maquis groups which he controls; to assist this S.A.S. party and to provide them with W/T communication to London.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: Approx 9 September 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Contacted 'Hamlet' on reception in company with 23 French S.A.S. troops. Found Resistance strong in the department and controlling all railways and most of the department with exception of Limoges and St. Leonard which were garrisoned by the Germans. Team worked very closely with 'Hamlet' (Major Staunton) and on 13 August hearing that Germans from the south were moving to join up with Limoges garrison, who in their turn were preparing to break out, it was decided to push military operations to the limit. Bridge at St. Leonard was blown up, recce being carried out by Lee - all other roads from Limoges were ambushed, and an anti-tank ditch dug on the route nationale.
Negotiated with the Garde mobile (3000men) to come over to the Resistance.
[x]On 21 August Lee with Major Staunton entered Limoges to negotiate its surrender. The maquis took over the city and Team Lee moved west to Angouleme - the pivot of German withdrawal from Bordeaux and S.West. An ambush was mounted on one of the last columns to leave the city, which was liberated on 1 September.

P.T.O.

[x]See Lee Report. Appendix for Record of conditions offered and accepted.

Lee, Staunton, S.A.S. and O.G moved north to Indre and took part in more guerilla activity. Mission ended about 9 September, Viguier and Chevalier remaining at the disposition of the D.M.R.

Conclusion The team arrived at the critical time for Resistance in Haute Vienne, worked in excellent terms with Resistance, O.Gs and S.A.S. and was able to give valuable help and leadership in action.

DATE OF DESPATCH: 7 September 1944.

OPERATION CODE NAME: MARKET.

CODE NAME OF TEAMS: EDWARD.
CLAUDE
DANIEL II
CLARENCE)
STANLEYII)

SERIAL NO. OF TEAMS IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: EDWARD 13
CLAUDE 14
DANIEL 38
CLARENCE 11

MEMBERS OF TEAMS: EDWARD: Capt. J. Staal (Dutch)
Capt.M.Sollenberger (Am)
Sgt. J.R. Billingsly (Am)

CLAUDE: Lieut. J.Groenewoud (Dutch)
Lieut. H.A. Todd (Am)
Sgt. C.A. Scott (Am)

+CLARENCE: Capt. A.J.Bestebreurtje (Dutch)
Lieut. G. Verhaeghe (Am)
Sgt. W. Beynon (Am)

DANIEL: Major R.K. Wilson (Br)
Lt. Dubois (Dutch)
Sgt. G.W. Mason (Br)
Sgt. Fokker (Dutch)

+ Team CLARENCE returned to England on 1st October 1944 and was despatched again as Team STANLEY II, Capt. Vickery replacing Lieut. G. Verhaeghe.

BRIEF PREPARED BY: Dutch Section.

AREA:

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To establish contact with the Dutch underground movement and to provide liaison between air-borne forces and local population; and additional W/T contact with England. Team EDWARD was to be attached to the Airborne Corps H.Q.; Team CLARENCE with the 82nd Airborne Div. U.S.A.; Team CLAUDE with the 1st Airborne Div. and Team DANIEL with 101st Airborne Div. U.S.A.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: Approx. 28 September 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

EDWARD. H.Q. MISSSION.

Contacted local resistance in Groesbeck on night of 17 September and soon after with leaders of the O.D. in Malden, Heumen, Overasselt and Mook. Telephone communication with centre of enemy held Nijmegen was established and valuable information obtained and passed on to Corps H.Q. A meeting of the O.D. leaders was held and some internal strife settled

OVER.

In liaison with Team Clarence a meeting of resistance leaders in Nijmegen district was held, and their activities in the assault on the bridge across the Waal organised. Contact by telephone was made with Resistance in enemy held Arnhem enabled Corps H.Q. to contact the 1st British Airborne Division.

Edward made contact with the chief engineer of water works and ferries in Nijmegen - obtaining most detailed information on possibilities of river crossings and bridges. 100 workmen for construction of an air strip near Malden were also provided. Contact was also established with sub missions Clarence and Daniel, but Claude with 1st British Airborne Div. could not be contacted.

Conclusion:

The mission produced much information through contacts made with Dutch resistance, and were also able to provide labour and release the fighting men. W/T communication was well maintained.

SUB MISSION - DANIEL II.

Attached to 101st Airborne Div. U.S. Army and remained with their C.P. throughout the actions at Son and St. Oedenrode. Lt. du Bois was attached to General Taylor G.O.C. 101st Airborne Div. as interpreter and liaison officer. Contact was made with the K.P. at St. Oedenrode - well organised but few in number, and also with Orde Dienst.

Team Daniel and the K.P. were given the duty of guarding about [illegible] prisoners of war taken by the Division.

In Uden the K.P. and the O.D. were at loggerheads, but the team succeeded in putting matters right between them, and leaving things on a fairly sound basis. Liaison was maintained with Team Edward at Airborne Corps H.Q.

SUB MISSION - CLAUDE.

This team was attached to the British 1st Airborne Div. in the Arnhem area. Arrangements for civilian labour were made immediately and transport obtained and the team moved into Arnhem with the advance party. The team went to the hospital with the battalion M.O. at Arnhem and made satisfactory arrangements. Took part in stiff fighting at Arnhem bridge. In the course of this Capt. Groenewoud was killed. Lt. Todd, after evading capture for several days, was made a prisoner of war. Sgt. Scott is missing.x

For an interesting account of the fighting at Arnhem, and experiences after being made P. of W., see Lt. Todd's Report on Claude Mission.xx

SUB MISSION - CLARENCE - STANLEY II.

Team Clarence was assigned to the American 82nd Airborne Div. The radio equipment was lost on the drop. Guides and interpreters were recruited from Dutch civilians.

Lt. Verhaeghe was wounded[x] and put out of action. Capt. Bestebreutje slightly wounded but able to carry on. Liaison was made with team Edward, and messages passed to London through Edward's W/T set.

Jedburgh H.Q. was with the advanced elements of the 82nd Div.

x See Casualties Appendix XC.

xx In team file Claude with Archives.

OVER.

On October 3rd Capt. Vickery was sent out to replace Lt. Verhaeghe and the team was re-named STANLEY II and fresh W/T outfit supplied. Arms for the O.D. Resistance group in Nijmegen area were supplied from Prince Bernhardt's H.Q. and distributed by the team - Resistance was organised for defence of the area Leewen, Wamel, Dreumel and Alphen. Agents were infiltrated and exfiltrated over the Waal and telephone communication established with enemy held Tiel[x]. Much information was provided and Stanley II was able to act as a forward O.P. for the guns.

The Commander of the Eigth Armoured Brigade inspected the Dutch Resistants in the line and their defensive positions and strong points were organised and equipped by the team. They came under the individual command of the 60th K.R.R.C. and could call on them for fire support, and medical assistance.

Much training in handling of weapons, patrolling etc. was given by the Team. At the end of November the Canadian 7th Armoured Brigade took over from the 8th Armoured Brigade. By the courtesy of the commander 49 Div. the Team arranged for the Resistants to go on his courses in mines, sniping, tactical training and battle school.

Conclusion: This team carried out a long and useful work of liaison with Dutch Resistance both O.D. and Stoottraphen, and had actual control of these forces in the line in support of Allied forces. In addition much useful information was obtained through Resistance contacts in enemy held territory and instruction and training was also organised.

[x]See Appendix A to Capt. Vickery's report on Team Stanley II.

DATE OF DESPATCHED: 31/1 September 1944. CODE NAME OF TEAM: MAURICE.

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM
IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 41.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Capt. O.M. Carman (Am) (UTAH)
Lieut. H. Dumesnil (Fr) (VIRGINIA)
Sgt. F.J. Cole (Am) (GEORGIA)

SKED TIMES: Odd Days: -1300-1330hrs
1900-2000hrs
Even Days: 0830-0900hrs
1300-1400hrs
Night Transmissions: -2300hrs
0300hrs

OPERATION ORDER NO: E.M.F.F.I. 34.

BRIEF PREPARED BY: Zone Nord.

AREA: Jura.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To assist in the organisation of F.F.I. to provide additional means of delivering stores to F.F.I; to provide additional link between London and F.F.I., contacting LIGNE.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: Approx 20th September 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Contacted Resistance on reception. Found Resistance numenous and able to move fairly freely - more or less in control of the area. Also contacted Teams Basil and Norman. The Maquis were even running a "Frontier Journal de Marche du Groupement Frontiere." Were sent by Ligne to the area of Besancon, ahead of the American advance.
Contacted American 7th and 3rd Infantry Division and acted as liaison between them and the F.F.I. Co-ordinated action of F.F.I. with American attack on Besancon, sending out information patrols and guides. Gave assistance in collecting, cleaning, and repairing arms - all arms were locked up.
Contacted S.F. Staff - 3rd Army.

The team arrived too late to take much part in operations - the Americans were advancing fast, and the Germans pulling out.

DATE OF DESPATCH: 27/28 August 1944.

CODE NAME OF TEAM: NORMAN.

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 38

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Lt. F. Bataille (Fr)(WASHINGTON)
Lt. K.C. Dillow (Am)(MINESOTA)
Sgt. L.E. Lajeunesse (Fr)(TENNESSEE)

SKED TIMES: Odd Days:- -1900-0930hrs
1200-1300hrs
-1000-1100hrs
Even Days: -1430-1500hrs
-
Night Transmissions: -2200hrs
0200hrs.

OPERATION ORDER NO: E.M.F.F.I. 34.

BRIEF PREPARED BY: Zone Nord.

AREA: Jura.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To assist in the organisation of F.F.I; to provide additional means of delivering stores to F.F.I; to provide additional links between London and FFI contacting LIGNE.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: 22 September 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Dropped to reception organised by Team Basil. Contacted team Maurice.[x] Were assigned by D.M.R. of the Jura to eastern half of the department. Visited all maquis groups, and advised the leaders on all military operations. They found maquis well organised and in control of all secondary routes and rural areas. No trains were running. For summary of ambushes planned and resulting casualties inflicted on enemy see Report of Team Norman.

Contacted H.Q. of 3rd French Spahi Regiment. Assisted newly formed Premier Regiment de Franche Comte in liaison, training and intelligence.

Conclusion. This is another Team who consider they could have done more had they arrived earlier. Resistance had already done a great work, and the team gave them all assistance they could for a short period before being overrun.

[x] See Report of Team Maurice. File 'Maurice' with Archives.

DATE OF DESPATCH: 18/19 August 1944.

CODE NAME OF TEAM: PAUL.

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 44.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Major E.H.M. Hood (Br)(SHROPSHIRE)
Capt. F. Cormier (Fr) (OURTHE)
Sgt. K.J.W. Brown (Br)(LIMERICK)

OPERATION ORDER NO: E.M.F.F.I. 34.

BRIEF PREPARED BY: Zone Nord, F Sub-Section.

AREA: Cote d'Or.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To assist in the organisation of F.F.I. to provide additional means of delivering stores to F.F.I., to provide an additional link between London and F.F.I. contacting OVALE.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: Approx 18 September 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Contacted Resistance on reception near Avot and found an efficient maquis group of about 200 men. Visited all groups in the area, instructing in use of P.I.A.T., gammon grenades etc. Despatched runners through the German lines with intelligence on the area. Arranged reception for Jedburgh Desmond and O.Gs. Assisted Capt. Mynatt of Team Arthur who was injured.[x]
Took part in mopping up and restoring order in Dijon.

For details of conditions the Team found among the maquis of Cote d'Or, see Team Paul's Report. Organisation work was not necessary, but the Team did some useful instruction work, and were well received.

[x]See 'Casualties' - Appendix XC.

Sheet 76

DATE OF DESPATCH: 31/1 September 1944.

CODE NAME OF TEAM: PHILIP.
(Rupert)

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM
IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 95.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Capt. J. Derouen (Fr). (KINTYRE)
Lt. R.A. Lucas (Am) (CAITHNESS)
Sp.3/Cl.J.M. Orgat (Am) (LEINSTER)

OPERATION ORDER NO: E.M.F.F.I. 43.

BRIEF PREPARED BY: Zone Nord.

AREA: Meurthe et Moselle

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To assisf in the organisation of the F.F.I. To report on the state of resistance and to submit grounds for re-supply. To recruit volunteers to take information to the Allied lines.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: 17 September 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Dropped to Reception organised by elements of two Vosges Maquis groups near Mirecourt, and never succeeded in reaching area of Nancy for which they were briefed. Moved North and contacted Team Archibald in Meurthe et Moselle, and took command of maquis at Lemeuil-Mitry (about 300 armed men, and 400 unarmed). Still attempting to reach Nancy, contact was made with American advance units at Toul. On 9 September contacted S.F. Detachment 3rd U.S. Army and also teams Archibald and Arnold, and were given the task of arming Maquis at Verdun and Conflane to protect U.S. left flank. Were unable to obtain these arms and were ordered back to U.K.

DATE OF DESPATCH: 27 September 1944.

CODE NAME OF TEAM: QUENTIN.

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 80. Quinine 78

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Capt. R.S. Fenton (Br) (CORNWALL)
Lt. J. Lassere (Fr). (WICKLOW)
Sgt. D. Rawson (Br) (MERIONETH)

OPERATION ORDER NO: E.M.F.F.I. 48.

BRIEF PREPARED BY: Zone Sud Ouest.

AREA: La Rochelle.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To assist in harassing and destroying enemy troops in the area of LA ROCHELLE, contacting Jedburgh TONY.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: Approx 20 January, 1945.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

This team was placed at the disposal of George with Mission Shinoile. Lieut. J. Lassere took over command of an F.F.I. battalion and was mainly busy with administrative matters. Capt. Fenton and Sgt. Rawson were very active in instructing the F.F.I. in the use of weapons, mines and W/T, thus aiding considerably in containing the enemy within La Rochelle. They took part in several sabotage expeditions near the enemy lines.

As will be seen this operation, although late in starting, was of considerable duration.

DATE OF DESPATCH: 27 September 1944. CODE NAME OF TEAM: RAYMOND.

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM
IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 92.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Lt. Chaulais (Fr) (GLOUCESTER)
Capt. R. Waguet (Fr) (WATERFORD)
Sgt. W. Adams (Br) (KINCARDIN)

OPERATION ORDER NO: E.M.F.F.I. 48.

BRIEF PREPARED BY: Zone Sud-Ouest.

AREA: La Rochelle.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To assist in harassing and destroying enemy troops in the area of La Rochelle, contacting Mission Shinoile.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: Approx. end of December 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

This team was placed at disposal of Team Harold. Gave instruction of in use/P.I.A.T. and Bazooka to newly formed F.F.I. Battalions. From 2 October Lt. Chaulais of this Team was in the front line before La Rochelle as technical advisor in charge of heavy arms.
Also took charge of problem of mines. Formed an information service working into La Rochelle and got precise information on German troop movements, installations, patrols, observation posts etc.
Conclusion This team formed part of a sea-borne operation to Les Sables d'Olonne taking arms and equipment, and providing Jedburgh teams as instructors and leaders for the F.F.I. containing the Germans in the La Rochelle area.

DATE OF DESPATCH: 31/1 September 1944.

CODE NAME OF TEAM: RODERICK.

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM
IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 84.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Capt. A. Paoli (Fr) (NAIRN)
Lt. W.C. Boggs (Am) (NEW HAMPSHIRE)
T/Sgt. Mersereau (Am) (STRONSAY)

OPERATION ORDER NO: E.M.F.F.I. 43.

BRIEF PREPARED BY: Zone Nord.

AREA: Doubs.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To assist in the organisation of the F.F.I. To report on the state of resistance and to submit grounds for re-supply. To recruit volunteers to take information to the Allied lines.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: 10 September 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Contacted Resistance leaders on reception and later Team Cedric. Main activity in the area was on Belfort - Besancon road. Team joined a group 15 miles from Besancon. Ambushed units of the 11th German Armoured Division approaching Besancon.
Sent out guides to contact American advance units.
Contacted 3rd Armoured Division of U.S. 7th Army giving information on enemy units identified and the roads they were following.
Took part in battle for Besancon.

Conclusion: The team contributed to the fine work done by Resistance in this area, but arrived too late to help organise or train the groups.

DATE OF DESPATCH: 5/6 August 1944.

CODE NAME OF TEAM: RONALD.

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 19.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Lt. J. Dartigues (Fr) (BOUTTON)
Lt. S.R. Trumps (Am) (BOURSIER)
(Sgt. E.B. Esch (Am) (POUND)

SKED TIMES: Odd Days: -1300-1400hrs
1900-1930hrs
Even Days: 0800-0900hrs
1600-1630hrs
Night Transmissions: -2100hrs
0100hrs.

OPERATION ORDER NO: E.M.F.F.I. 22.

BRIEF PREPARED BY: Zone Nord.

AREA: Finisterre.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To provide the liaison link between Mission ALOES and the Commander of the Department concerned.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: 6 September 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Team despatched late to perform a Jedburgh role. They were present in the final clearing up of the Breton Peninsula, particularly at Concarneau. They assisted team Gilbert during the latter part of it's activities.

They were able to organise a system of information and reconnaissance into the towns by French patriots which worked very well.

Scepire 82
Scion 83
(84)

DATE OF DESPATCH: 27th September 1944. CODE NAME OF TEAM: SIMON.

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM
IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 52.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Capt. M. Fontaine (Fr) (FERNAND)
Capt. A.W. Coomber (Br) (COUSTARD)
L.A.C. C. Somers (Br) (STEPHANE)

OPERATION ORDER NO: E.M.F.F.I. 48.

BRIEF PREPARED BY: Zone Sud-Ouest.

AREA: La Rochelle.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To assist in harassing and destroying enemy troops in the area of LA ROCHELLE, contacting Jedburgh Tony.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: 14 November 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Allocated to Team Tony and met Commander of the troops of the department with whom Team Tony was working on excellent terms. The chief work was to obtain arms for some 4,000 F.F.I. of whom only 1500 were so far armed, and the Team contacted 94 Division (U.S.) and 9th Army H.Q. in efforts to obtain them. Also drove to No.1 Battlefield Clearance Group near Trun - but with no avail. Finally on 8 October they took the request to G.3. SHAEF (requirements are given in Team Simon's report, page 5) and the decisions given). Team Simon carried out training programmes, sabotage classes, led patrols and organised information service - and generally assisted the F.F.I. containing the Germans in La Rochelle.

85

DATE OF DESPATCH: 31/1 September 1944.

CODE NAME OF TEAM: STANLEY I.

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM
IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 70.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Capt. O. Craster (Br) (YORKSHIRE)
Lt. R. Carliere (Fr) (MEATH)
Sgt. E.J. Grinham (Br) (WORCESTERSHIRE)

OPERATION ORDER NO: E.M.F.F.I. 43.

BRIEF PREPARED BY: Zone Nord.

AREA: Haute Marne.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To assist in the organisation of the F.F.I. To report on the state of resistance andtto submit grounds for re-supply. To recruit volunteers to take information to the Allied lines.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. BASE.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: 15 September 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Despatched too late and poor co-operation from London. Joined a maquis of 400, plus the ler Regt. de France. Instructed the F.F.I. in the use of arms and equipment which they endeavoured to get supplied to them from U.K. This group was lacking in offensive spirit and did not really go into action until the French 7th Army appeared and they assisted in mopping up operations.

Conclusion: The F.F.I. group had a high potential value which could have been exploited if the team had been sent earlier and allowed time to train and equip.

DATE OF DESPATCH: 10/11 September 1944.

CODE NAME OF TEAM: TIMOTHY.

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 87.

MEMBERS OF TEAM:
Capt. L. Ambel (Fr) (NESQUE)
Lt. R.G. Mundinger (Am) (MARCELIN)
Sgt. D. Spears (Am) (ESCAUT)
Lt. R.E. Heyns (Am) (DYLE)

OPERATION ORDER NO: E.M.F.F.I. 46.

BRIEF PREPARED BY: Zone Nord.

AREA: Amiens

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To work with Mission Sainfoin, a part of Mission Orgeat, and provide intercommunication for the F.F.I. in the Jura and Doubs area and to organise an information service for the Third Army as it advanced. Contacting LIGNE.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: Approx. end of September 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Found on arrival that the area was cleared of Germans and the mission moved north to Besancon to contact Resistance leaders, and Orgeat H.Q.

Capt. Ambel attempted to pass through Switzerland into S.Alsace to send back information by courier and radio.

Otherwise there was little work for the mission to do and return to London was ordered on 23 September 1944.

87

DATE OF DESPATCH: 17/18 August 1944.

CODE NAME OF TEAM: TONY.

SERIAL NO. OF TEAM IN M.E. 65 RECORDS: 50.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Major R. Montgomery (Am) (DOLLAR)
Lt. M. Devailly (Fr) (ECU)
Sgt. E.McGowan (Am) (QUARTER)

SKED TIMES: Odd Days: -1400-1430hrs
1900-2000hrs
Even Days: 0900-1000hrs
1500-1530hrs
Night Transmissions: -2200hrs
0200hrs

OPERATION ORDER NO: E.M.F.F.I. 29.

BRIEF PREPARED BY: Zone Nord.

AREA: Vendee.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To contact DICKENS S.A.S. Base; to assist in the Maquis in arming and organising itself, and to report on the organisation, strength and arms state of the various groups.

S.A.S. BASE: Dickens.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: Approx 10 November 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Dropped to reception organised by Team Harold, and put in touch with maquis group near Parthenay. On arrival found Resistance divided and scattered. By the time Team Tony left the department all groups except the F.T.P, were coordinated under command of the F.F.I. Owing to lack of arms the Team also found the maquis groups small, disorganised and relatively inactive - the team worked very closely with the F.F.I. Commander Colonel "DAvid".

The Team's liaison work co-ordinated their efforts with Mission Shinoile and Team George II, Team Harold, then in Deux Sevres, S.A.S. in S. Vendee, D.M.R. agent "Antelope" operating in La Rochelle, D.M.R. 9th/ in Morbihan, U.S. 94th Division, U.S./Army and U.S. 83rd Division.

U.S. 94th Div. was furnished with detailed reports on enemy situation in La Rochelle, and the Pornic-Painboeuf region south of St. Nazaire. O.S.S. H.Q. was also provided with complete information of all French workers and prisoners of war taken to Germany from the Vendee. Arms for 400 men were obtained from London and for 2,750 men from U.S. Army. Clothing was obtained from German warehouses, the U.S. Army and E.M.F.F.I. in Paris. Petrol and rations were obtained from the 94 Div. at Rennes.

P.T.O.

The team left 3,225 men armed. For details of dispositions of the F.F.I. in the Teams departure, and chronological record of their work see Report of Team Tony, pages 7 - 16.

This mission was almost entirely one of liaison, organisation and intelligence, and considering the difficulties encountered, remarkable results were achieved.

DATE OF DESPATCH FROM NORTH AFRICA: 9/10 June 1944.

CODE NAME OF TEAM: AMMONIA.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Lt. B.E. Austin (Am) (GASPARD)
Lt. A. Conte (Fr) (LUDOVIC)
Sgt, J. Berlin (Am) (MARTIAL)

COUNTRY SECTION CONCERNED: Massingham.

AREA: Cahors, WHEELWRIGHT circuit.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To stimulate and sustain guerilla action in Dordogne Dept. and on main lines of communication MONTAUBAN/BRIVE.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: Approx. 17 September 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

The team found there were difficulties between the various Resistance leaders. Contacted Quinine who had the primary objective - troops movements between Brive and Montauban fairly well covered, so team moved south to Lot et Garonne to organise harassing of troops movements between Montauban and Bordeaux. They found Resistance inactive, and the people frightened to take action. Gave instruction in demolitions and co-ordinated the work of three large maquis groups to derail trains, blow bridges, cut wires etc. On the withdrawal of the Germans from Garonne, Ammonia's men harried them to the outskirts of Bordeaux, and finally took over a sector on the S.West.

Conclusions:

This team was handicapped by internal political strife in the area, and encountered a certain amount of resentment. Also the failure of H.Q. to supply arms on request hindered their activities and lowered their prestige. However a useful work was done on the destruction of communications and harassing of troop movements.

Sheet 19

DATE OF DESPATCH FROM NORTH AFRICA: 28/29 June 1944. CODE NAME OF TEAM: BUGATTI.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Major H.W. Fuller (Am)(KANSUL)
Asp. G. Rocher (Fr) (HOPEI)
C/C. M. Guillement (Fr)(CHEKIANG)

COUNTRY SECTION CONCERNED: Massingham.

AREA: Pyrenees.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To assist in development of area and engage in harassing tactics on every line of communication. Also to lay on reception for mass daylight troops.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: Approx 18 September 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Contacted Resistance immediately on arrival, and set to work on sabotage operations and ambushes. Fought several actions with the enemy.

Cut off all water supply to the petrol refinery at Peyrouzet. On 14 August B.B.C. message for maquis to commence full scale guerilla action. Controlled the valley of Luchon and Pont de Labroquere over the Garonne. Carried out many ambushes on Germans leaving Tarbes and other towns. Captured the Luchon-Toulouse courier with all Gestapo mail and documents. Captured German General Mayr commanding occupational troops in the region Toulouse-Pau. Organised small patrols to close Spanish frontier to enemy trying to escape. The maquis group organised by this Team were incorporated in the French regular army under orders received from General Cochet. A total of about 1000 prisoners were captured in operations controlled by this team.

Conclusion: Much useful sabotage and guerilla action carried out. The team was handicapped throughout by failure of Algiers to supply arms and explosives they requested.

Sheet 22

DATE OF DESPATCH FROM NORTH AFRICA: 29/30 June 1944.

CODE NAME OF TEAM: CHOLOROFORM

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Capt. J. Martino (Fr) (JOSHUA)
Lt. H.D. McIntosh (Am)(LIONEL)
C/Ch. J. Nicole (Fr) (LATIMER)

COUNTRY SECTION CONCERNED: Massingham.

AREA: Drome Hautes Alpes.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To re-establish resistance in area disorganised by "heroic but ill-timed action" of Lt. ALAIN against non-military targets.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: 8 September 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

The team had a disappointing beginning. Their threefold mission had already been accomplished. The misunderstanding between Lt. Alain and the men had been cleared up, the maquis groups were well organised and the railways were out of use to the enemy.

Having met the chief of the Hautes Alpes sector, they agreed to his request for assistance in his area and moved off after notifying Algiers. Much useful work was performed by the team during the month they were there in training, organising, arming and supplying the maquis groups. These eventually numbered 300 - 400 and took part in harassing operations, bridges demolitions and surrender of the enemy in the Gap region. The team acted as liaison officer to the American Division which took over and they were present during the Vercors and Briancon fighting.

Conclusion: Thanks to their initiative in finding new tasks their sphere of usefulness was if anything increased.

Sent 23

DATE OF DESPATCH
FROM NORTH AFRICA: 16 August 1944. CODE NAME OF TEAM: CHRYSLER.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Capt. C. Sell (Br) (ELIE)
Lt. J. Soual (Fr) (BAZIN)
Sgt. R.E. Chatten (Br) (ARTUS)

COUNTRY SECTION CONCERNED: Massingham.

AREA: Ariege.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To stimulate and sustain guerilla warfare in the area.

S.A.S. BASE: Nil.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: 8 September 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

This team was particularly briefed to deal with communications in the Carcassonne gap and prevent escape of enemy across the frontier. Neighbouring maquis chiefs were contacted and targets on l. of c. and electricity supplies etc. were allocated. Preparations made to block the Spanish frontier and ambushes mounted against enemy forces withdrawing from the area. Trains brought to a standstill were reported for air attack - with good results. Mounted attack on the tunnel at Trebes. Organised the liberation and defence of Carcassonne - helped by rumours spread among the enemy of large numbers of Canadian and American paratroopers with the Maquis! Many small engagements fought and permanent ambuscades mounted.

When work in Carcassonne gap was completed the Team moved to Perpignan to attend to the frontier question, which they found well in hand. Assisted in collection of arms for distribution to a more active region. Passed on General Cochet's orders re holding of Courts Martial etc.

Conclusion:

The team found the F.F.I. leadership in the area weak and defensively minded, and felt that more could have been done had they been sent in earlier. However a good job was done in closing the Carcassonne gap, and it was not thought that many Germans escaped across the Spanish frontier. Good work was also done in maintaining discipline after liberation of the area and according to General Cochet's orders.

Sheet 51.
Sheet 24

DATE OF DESPATCH
FROM NORTH AFRICA: 13/14 August 1944.

CODE NAME OF TEAM: CINNAMON

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Lt. F.L. Ferandon (Fr) (ORTHON)
Capt. R. Harcourt (Br) (LOUIS)
Cp/Ch. J. Maurin (Fr) (LUC)

COUNTRY SECTION CONCERNED: Massingham.

AREA: Var (PERPENDICULAIRE CIRCUIT)

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To stimulate and sustain guerilla warfare in the area.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED:

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Capt. Harcourt made a hard tree landing and broke both legs, he was moved to a farm and cared for by French patriots.
For ten days the other members worked with the few resistance groups in the region who were mopping up enemy pockets in the woods.
They attempted bridge demolitions and were able tp pass on first hand information to own troops.

Conclusion: Despatching was too late and the actual drop badly arranged. The detailed report gives a lot of information on the political conditions reigning in large French towns immediately following the liberation.

26

DATE OF DESPATCH
FROM NORTH AFRICA: 6/7 August 1944.

CODE NAME OF TEAM: COLLODION.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Capt. H. Hall (Br) V (AUGUSTINE)
Lt. P. Morgan (Fr) (BENOIT)
Sgt. T. Baumgold (Am) (JULES)

COUNTRY SECTION CONCERNED: Massingham.

AREA: Aveyron.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To join QUININE; to support ARETE Mission following the death of ARETE.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: Approx End of August.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

The first week was spent making contacts and familiarising with maquis life. They were present when the Germans attacked and occupied the town nearby, taking away 18000 litres of Benzol fuel - the latter was destroyed. This first week demonstrated clearly the tension existing between the two rival French factions and which was to cause trouble later. The team endeavoured to unite the parties but were not always successful.

A move to another maquis was made where they were able to procure supplies for them. With their advice and assistance counter measures were taken which prevented the enemy from taking reprisals on a town as they had threatened to do. A column was attacked and severe losses inflicted. On August 17 a German A.A. unit was encircled and persuaded to give in with resistance although they were well armed and 140 strong. The maquis harassed the retreating German columns from Toulouse and caused considerable damage. The team was present at the liberation of several towns and were given a great welcome after the fighting.

Not to be done

DATE OF DESPATCH
FROM NORTH AFRICA: 25/26 June 1944.

CODE NAME OF TEAM: DODGE.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Capt. C.E. Maniere (Am)(RUPERT)
Sgt. Durocher (Fr.Can.)(OSWALD)

COUNTRY SECTION CONCERNED: Massingham.

AREA: JOCKEY circuit Nr. Valence, Drome and Isere.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To reinforce Team VEGANIN.

S.A.S. BASE: Nil.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: Approx. end of August.1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

See Team VEGANIN with whom they worked.

DATE OF DESPATCH FROM NORTH AFRICA: 12/13 August 1944

CODE NAME OF TEAM: EPHEDRINE.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Lt. L. Rabeau (Fr) (JULIEN)
Lt. L.E. Swank (Am) (GANTOR)
Cpl. J. Bourgoin (Fr) (LEON)

COUNTRY SECTION CONCERNED: Massingham.

AREA: Savoie (Jockey circuit)

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To stimulate and sustain guerilla action in the area-to Jockey circuit.

S.A.S. BASE: Nil.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: 8 September 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS: Lt. Swank was killed on 14 August[x]. The rest of the Team proceeded to the Maurienne, having contacted team Novocaine and joined a maquis group in gaerilla activity against convoys going up the Maurienne to Italy. For details of action see[xx] Ephedrine Report. Heavy German reprisals resulted.

Conclusion: The team arrived too late and were dropped too far from their objective to be able to fulfil their mission properly. However they did succeed in Beaching the Maurienne - one of their primary objectives. Assisted in harassing the enemy in many minor engagements.

x See "Casualties" Appendix XC.

xx In Team Ephedrine file, with Archives.

DATE OF DESPATCH FROM NORTH AFRICA: 12/13 August 1944. CODE NAME OF TEAM: GRAHAM.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Major M.G.M. Crosby(Br) (HUGE)
Capt. P. Gouvet (Fr) (CRISPIN)
Sgt. W.H. Adams (Am) (DESIRE)

COUNTRY SECTION CONCERNED: Massingham.

AREA: Basses Alpes (Perpendiculaire circuit)

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To stimulate and sustain guerilla warfare in the area - to Perpendiculaire circuit.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: Approx. End of August 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Landing operation succeeded after several abortive attempts. Several days passed whilst the various French officers discussed plans and ways and means, finally the two Jedburgh officers were attached to a mission (Noel) and joined a maquis. Here they carried out some instruction, the men were well organised but badly in need of training. Owing to the general mobilisation order in the district the maquis strength had risen to 250.

The Jedburgh team, having called upon all available F.F.I. were able, with the assistance of an American Recce Column, to clear Apt and Cereste of the enemy. These places had been re-taken but were evacuated by 250 Germans when they realised the stiff resistance they were up against. The last three days appear to consist of mountaineering and dodging enemy columns.

Sent 17 LVS

DATE OF DESPATCH FROM NORTH AFRICA: 16/17 August 1944. CODE NAME OF TEAM: JEREMY.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Capt. G.M. Hallowes (Br)(AIMABLE)
Lt. H. Fonteroise (Fr)
Sgt. R.A. Leney (Br) (FERME)

COUNTRY SECTION CONCERNED: Massingham.

AREA: Haute Loire.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To work with HECKLER in Haute Loire; to assist in the organisation of F.F.I. and resistance elements under her control and report on the potentialities of her groups.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: 15 September 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Received by Heckler. The department was more or less clear of Germans but the possibility of enemy columns withdrawing from the South and S.West was to be guarded against. Watch was kept on roads south of Le Puy and demolitions prepared. Groups of 150 men were formed, armed and motorized. By 7 September the team had three battalions of two companies each. Two battalions moved north to area of Vichy to harass enemy columns where they contacted Capt. Grell (O.S.S.) and then moved the battalions east of Dijon to form part of an F.F.I. Division to clear up German pockets in Vosges.

Conclusions:

This mission arrived after the Allied invasion in the south had begun. Though despatched from North Africa, communications were with London, and the object of preventing German withdrawal from south and south west to the battle area in the north was in support of operation Overlord. They made a good report of the work done by Heckler in Haute Loire.

DATE OF DESPATCH
FROM NORTH AFRICA: 16/17 August 1944.

CODE NAME OF TEAM: MARK.

Sheet 64

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Lt.F.G. de Thevenet (Fr)(SYMPATHIQUE)
Lt.L.E. Conein (Am) (INTREPIDE)
Sgt.J.J. Carpenter (Am) (LESTER)

COUNTRY SECTION CONCERNED: Massingham.

AREA: Tarn et Garonne.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To work with WHEELWRIGHT in Tarn et Garonne; to assist in the organisation of F.F.I. and Resistance elements under his control and to report on the potentialities of his groups.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: 12 November 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Were dropped south of their objective in Gers, contacted Resistance leader and found it was not possible to move to Tarn et Garonne. On 17 August all maquis groups moved to intercept German garrison at Auch on the way to Toulouse, and came in contact with the enemy at Isle Jourdain. 23 August Team went to Toulouse to negotiate entry of Brigade of Armagnac.

Then the team became involved in local politics and finally went to General Cochet's H.Q. in Marseilles, and carried his orders concerning the F.F.I. situation on the Spanish frontier back to Resistance leaders in Toulouse. The U.S. officer and W/T operator then joined up with team Martin and went north to the Royan sector, to organise an intelligence service. Information was passed to Rennes and to SHAEF and 94th Div.H.Q. at Chateaubriant. On General de Larminat taking over command in the west, the team returned to the U.K.

Conclusion:

This team arrived in the field too late to carry out the mission for which they were briefed. Once the fighting was over in the south it was difficult to avoid being drawn into local politics, and the decision to move north to an area where fighting was still going on was a wise one.

Martin comes - before this

DATE OF DESPATCH FROM NORTH AFRICA: 27 August 1944.

CODE NAME OF TEAM: MASQUE.

Sheet 66.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Capt. N. Guillot (Am)
Lt. J. Gramont (Fr)
Sgt. F.M. Poche (Am)

COUNTRY SECTION CONCERNED: Massingham.

AREA: Isere.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To join Commandant Noir in Isere and to place themselves at his disposal.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: Approx. 4 September 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Dropped in the Ardeche - 8½ km. N. of St. Agreve. Contacted Resistance leaders, but were unable to cross the Rhone to join Cdt. Noir. They therefore put themselves at the disposal of the Allied Mission in the department whose leader was "Pectoral". The main operation in which he was engaged was the capture of Lyon. Team Masque was made responsible for the movements of the F.F.I. of the Ardeche to deploy for the attack. Liaison with the E.M. F.F.I. of the Loire at St. Etienne was established and the necessary requisitions made. Lyon was liberated on 3 Sept.

The team considered that they arrived too late to take up a responsible position in an organisation which had been going for some time, but repeated that the F.F.I. in Ardeche gave an "excellent impression of cohesion, discipline and morale."

Jed Sect No 65

DATE OF DESPATCH FROM NORTH AFRICA: 16/17 August 1944.

CODE NAME OF TEAM: MARTIN.

See also Miscellaneous / Personnel file and Team MILES

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Capt. T.A. Mellows (Br)(BLASE)
Lt. G. Remond (Fr)(SUBSTANTIE)
Sgt. N.E.S. Carey (Br) (PLACIDE)

COUNTRY SECTION CONCERNED: Massingham.

AREA: Gers.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To work with WHEELWRIGHT in Gers; to assist in the organisation of F.F.I. and Resistance elements under his control and to report on the potentialities of his groups.

S.A.S. BASE: Nil.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: 20 September 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

No detailed report made by this team as Capt. Mellows was killed x and the French officer remained in France. From telegrams it can be told that the team contacted Resistance leaders on arrival, took part in a number of actions to harass the enemy, such as the liberation of Auch and Mont de Marsan by resistance groups, and in maintaining order in Toulouse. Passed many messages to London for Resistance leader "Hilaire."

x See Appendix XC Casualties.

DATE OF DESPATCH FROM NORTH AFRICA: 16/17 August 1944. CODE NAME OF TEAM: MILES.

Sheet 68

see also cypher file

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Capt. E.T. Allen (Am) (LIBRE)
Asp. P. Fourcade (Fr) (LUMINEUX)
Sgt. A. Gruen (Am) (FIDELE)

COUNTRY SECTION CONCERNED: Massingham.

AREA: Gers.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To work with WHEELWRIGHT in Gers; to assist in the organisation of F.F.I. and resistance elements under his control and to report on the potentialities of his group.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: 23rd September 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Contacted Resistance leaders on landing and were sent to maquis group south of Auch. Auch was liberated next day and after pursuing the Germans to Isle-de-Jourdain (compare Team Mark) left with Team Martin for Mont de Marsan, and took part in action against German column approaching the town (see team Martin). On 23 August Miles joined "Hilaire" in Toulouse. The team then proceeded to Narbonne, Port Vendree and Perpignan, and reported to London on Spanish frontier question.

On return to Toulouse the team report situation there at the time was very confused and politics causing strife between F.F.I. and F.T.P. The U.S. members of the Team wisely refrained from taking part.

Sheet 69

DATE OF DESPATCH FROM NORTH AFRICA: 13/14 August 1944.

CODE NAME OF TEAM: MINARET.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Major L.C.M.H.Sharpe (Br)(EDMOND)
Sgt. J.W. Ellis (Br) (ARSENE)

COUNTRY SECTION CONCERNED: Massingham.

AREA: Gard.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To stimulate gerilla action in Gard and to arrange the subversion of satellite troops from the Wehrmacht.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: Approx. 13 September 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

As well as to stimulate guerilla action by the F.F.I. this team was also fully briefed by P.W.B. to arrange the subversion of satellite troops from the Wehrmacht. Contacted Resistance leaders through Mission "Isotrope" of 5/600 men and joined a maquis in the regional mounts - fairly well armed and supplied. R.99 was the most important route - it was cut in two places by demolitions and ambushes mounted. For some three weeks the maquis was continuously in action. Considerable casualties were inflicted on the enemy and prisoners taken when contact for negotiations could be established. This negotiation, in view of his rank and his uniform, was carried out by Major Sharpe. Estimated that the maquis accounted for 300 German dead, 2900prisoners and large quantities of transport, arms ammunition, etc.

In general, time was too short for the subversive operations, but with the help of a Russian girl in the maquis, 200 Armenians were seduced from their H.Q. at Le Vigan and transported to a prison camp by night - leaving 45 German officers and N.C.O's to be mopped up in a later operation. Nimes was occupied on German withdrawal two days ahead of the French troops.

Conclusions

Excellent relations existed between this team and its maquis group, and a good work was done towards the liberation of the department in which previously the maquis had not been very active. The arrival of the team evidently provided the incentive that was needed.

Sheet 70.

DATE OF DESPATCH
FROM NORTH AFRICA: 13/14 August 1944.

CODE NAME OF TEAM: MONOCLE.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Capt. J. Tosel (Fr) (IMMENSE)
Lt. R.H. Foster (Am) (SOLIDE)
Sgt. R.J. Andersen (Am) (RAIEUX)

COUNTRY SECTION CONCERNED: Massingham.

AREA: Drome.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To stimulate guerilla action in the area, contacting Major LEGRANDE, the Chief of the F.F.I. Drome.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: Approx. end of August.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Contacted Resistance leaders also teams Graham and Citroen on reception, N.E. of Apt. Remained two days in the area, and were then provided with a truck and proceeded north. Armed maquis groups and F.F.I. Regt. and highly carried out coup de main actions. Observation of R.N. 7. along the Rhone - For details of organisation and activities on receipt of B.B.C. action message see Report of Team Monocle. X
After 20 August the Germans refused to move by day on R.N. 7.

After arrival of Americans on 22 August the work was more of providing information and mopping up. Telephone communication was established with agents in Valence and after German withdrawal when American forces bypassed the town, the F.F.I. went in and cleaned up - taking about 1000 prisoners.

Conclusion: This team was situated in an important position and much harm was done to enemy communications by constant guerilla action and sabotage.

x In team file, with Archives.

Sheet 73

DATE OF DESPATCH FROM NORTH AFRICA: 6/7 August 1944.

CODE NAME OF TEAM: NOVOCAINE.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Lt. C. Gennerich (Am) MATHIEU.
Lt. J. le Lann (Fr) HERVE.
Sgt. W. Thompson (Am) GILLE.

COUNTRY SECTION CONCERNED: Massingham.

AREA: Haute Alpes (JOCKEY circuit)

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To stimulate and sustain guerilla warfare in the area.

S.A.S. BASE: Nil.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: 6 September 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

The first week was spent in making contacts, helping to form maquis groups and instructing them in the use of arms. The first objective of the team was to cut the enemy lines of communication S.W. of Briancon. This was accomplished by demolishing two bridges and a tunnel, after stealing a ton and a half of explosive. The enemy garison at Guillestre being isolated, surrendered to a few F.F.I. officers and the team.

During the second week the Grenoble-Briancon road was cut. The team's posts were attacked and losses inflicted on the enemy amounted to 24 against only 1 of their own. Briancon was entered on August 25 with American troops after the Germans had evacuated; 250 maquis aided the defence of the town but this was recaptured by the enemy after intensive shelling. French units having moved up, the team assisted by maquis, were ordered to help in clearing Briancon.of the enemy. This was effected on September 6 and the team's mission was completed.

Conclusion: The team carried out the task assigned to them in a very worthy manner under difficult conditions and often without even adequate supplies.

Sect 74

DATE OF DESPATCH FROM NORTH AFRICA: 31 July 1944.

CODE NAME OF TEAM: PACKARD.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Capt. A. Bank (Am)
Lt. C. Boineau (Fr)
2/Lt. Montfort (Fr)

COUNTRY SECTION CONCERNED: Massingham.

AREA: Lozere.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To work with the Allied Mission in a strictly military capacity and to carry on guerilla activities whether the mission was in accord or not.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: Approx. 13 September 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

The team carried out their duties of organising, arming and leadership of resistance groups for the first half of August; necessitating considerable tact, patience and perseverance in dealing with different political factions. When the enemy retreat started through their area, harassing operations were organised against their columns after demolition and road blocks had been carried out. The Jedburgh officers acted as Battalion commanders when the Germans were evacuating and the maquis were taking over Ales and Nimes.

The team undertook several personal recce operations, drawing enemy fire. In order to contact own forces they travelled through the German lines near Tarascon and returned after an unsuccessful attempt to get reinforcements. After enemy movement ceased the team joined Novocaine at Briancon and returned after the city's capture was complete.

Conclusion: The preliminary stages of the team's work was handicapped by the mission they dropped with, their perseverance in working to a plan brought results which hindered the enemy and was instrumental in assisting the Allied advanee.

DATE OF DESPATCH FROM NORTH AFRICA: 8/9 June 1944.

CODE NAME OF TEAM: QUININE.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Major E. Macpherson (Br)(ANSELME)
Asp. M. Bourdon (Fr) (ARISTIDE)
Sgt. O. Brown (Br) (FELICIEN)

COUNTRY SECTION CONCERNED: Massingham.

AREA: Droite Circuit, Cahors Area.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To assist resistance group in Lot Department to stimulate and sustain guerilla action on the area of lines of communication MONTAUBAN/BRIVE.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: Approx. Beginning of September 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Their activities can be divided into five phases.
One. They contacted a small maquis south of Correze whom they armed with their brens. With this small force they seriously delayed the advance of Das Reich Panzer Div. who were moving southwards. The maquis suffered 20 killed out of 27 whilst defending a bridge for six hours. The main objective was to cut and keep cut the Route Nationale W.20 and railway from Montauban to Brive. Ready and intelligent co-operation was met with in the department of Lot and by July 1st all rail traffic had been eliminated. The road proved to be a much more difficult target but was effectually dealt with in the end.

Two. Changed from small maquis action to co-ordinated effort. In view of the team's exceptional mobility they gained a very wide-spread influence and proved the excellence of their organisation by having the enemy rail network cut in 660 places without seriously displacing any personnel. They trained and armed first class cadres for each maquis.

Three. The latter part of July brought Regional and Departmental F.F.I. chiefs - these were supported and were put in touch with each other. We continued to act as guide to them and often counselled - particularly if any action was impending.

Four. A strong mobile F.F.I. force was formed to cope with large enemy forces moving eastwards, this was commanded by a French general but the team were asked to assist in it's employment. This force numbered 22,000 and eventually captured more than it's own number of prisoners.

five. The F.F.I. were brought under command of Armee B and our sphere of influence reached to the Vosges. We assisted with many supply problems and organisation questions.

Conclusion: Most excellent work was performed by this team and some of the detailed cables are most illuminating of the spirit which animated this action.

DATE OF DESPATCH FROM NORTH AFRICA: 13/14 August 1944.

CODE NAME OF TEAM: SCEPTRE.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Lt. W.C. Hanna (Am) (VAILANT)
Lt. F. Tevenac (Fr) (INTENSE)
Sgt. T.J. Tracy (Am) (DEVOUE)

COUNTRY SECTION CONCERNED: Massingham.

AREA: Alpes Maritimes.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To conduct guerilla warfare in co-operation with the Maquis in region of Alpes Maritimes along Italian-French frontier.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: Approx. 10 September 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Unfortunate start. One officer with broken foot and radio sprained knee. Bad landing ground. Were obliged to base near Fayance. Assisted 10 British paratroopers and later three Americans. The maquis were contacted and 12 sections of approximately ~~120 prisoners~~ 20 men each were sent on patrol resulting in 190 prisoners, 300 killed plus equipment destroyed. Assisted in the attack on Fayance, this was successful and the 517 Regiment took over afterwards. The team was split up and the two American members returned to U.K.

Conclusion: Despatched too late.

DATE OF DESPATCH FROM NORTH AFRICA: 30 August 1944.

CODE NAME OF TEAM: SCION.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Major O.P. Grenfell. (Br)
Lieut. G. Revard. (Fr)
Sgt. T. Cain. (Br)

COUNTRY SECTION CONCERNED: Massingham.

AREA: Vercors.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To rally the disorganised elements of the F.F.I. in the area and to stimulate them into guerilla activity against the usual targets, and in particular against the Rhone Valley. It was further briefed to make plans for the securing of the road running south from Grenoble and the Die-Crest Road, action to be taken on the executive orders from SPOC.

S.A.S. BASE:

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: Approx. 9 September 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

This team was dropped too late.
They endeavoured to find action and were present when Lyons was taken over from the enemy - they managed to help the F.F.I. in their fight against the Milice but were unable to perform a real Jedburgh task.

18

DATE OF DESPATCH FROM NORTH AFRICA: 8/9 June 1944. CODE NAME OF TEAM: VEGANIN.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Major H. Marten (Br) (CUTHBERT)
Capt. C.L. Noir (Fr) (DEREK)
Sgt. D. Gardner (Br) (ERNEST)

COUNTRY SECTION CONCERNED: Massingham.

AREA: Jockey circuit Nr. Valence, Drome and Isere.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To assist resistance movement and to stimulate sustained guerilla action in the area of main lines of communication on the east bank of the Rhone between Avignon and Vienne.

S.A.S. BASE: Nil.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: Approx. End of August.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

Team Veganin lost W/T operator owing to failure of his parachute.[x] Met by a good reception. Their chief objective was German communications on left bank of the Rhone, and the P.L.M. railway - roads and railways Lyons/Grenoble, and Grenoble/Valence. The team found themselves immediately involved in internal politics between the A.S. and F.T.P. The team carried out some re-organisation, separating the F.T.P. into their own maquis groups. Some difficulty was encountered in carrying out the Mission in N. Drome, as the local leaders wished to withdraw all the maquis groups to the fortress of the Vercors, but managed to compromise and retain two companies of the A.S. and F.T.P. groups in the valley.

On ~~10~~ 24 June Team Dodge joined Veganin and shortly after Major Marten returned to Algiers. Instruction was given by Major Maniere in handling explosives and rudiments of battle drill. The chief difficulties were shortage of leaders and N.C.Os, the maquis were out of hand and pillaging the countryside. Little by little by much travelling on the part of Cdt. Noir, recruits and leaders came in. Noir also organised and partially armed the 'sedentaires' - for details see page 11 of his report.[xx]

x See Casualties Appendix XC. Sgt. Gardner.

xx In Team file Dodge with Archives.

However, despite difficulties of control in the area and strained relations with the F.T.P. the control panels of the Basse Isere plant were destroyed, (see also Major Manniere's report), high tension cables cut, and no power went to factories working for the Germans; and small attacks were carried out on the P.L.M. railway - nearly always with success despite strict German patrols. On 5 August Major Manniere was captured. The mission then passed under the orders of F.F.I. leaders in the Vecors.

Throughout Cdt. Noir occupied himself mainly with work of organisation and liaison, and encountered many difficulties. For details of sabotage carried out, and training see Major Manniere's report. This latter is also an interesting record of his experiences after capture by the milice who handed him over to the Gestapo.

Major Marten's return to Algiers was in order to urge the advisability of a speedy advance up the route Napoleon to Grenoble.

DATE OF DESPATCH FROM NORTH AFRICA: 28/29 June 1944.

CODE NAME OF TEAM: WILLYS.

MEMBERS OF TEAM: Capt. P.J. Granier (Fr) (SIMON)
Capt. J.C. Montague (Br) (HONAN)
Sgt. F.A. Cornick (Br.) (CHANSI)

COUNTRY SECTION CONCERNED: Massingham.

AREA: Ardeche.

OUTLINE OF MISSION: To follow up Pectoral Mission and to assist them in every possible way, and in particular to raise and arm guerilla bands for subsequent action on enemy lines of communication.

S.A.S. BASE: No S.A.S. Base.

DATE MISSION COMPLETED: 5 September 1944.

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS:

This team had some difficulty in establishing a satisfactory relationship with the Allied mission at whose disposal they were placed. Capt. Granier remained exclusively on Intelligence work with the Mission. Capt. Montagu managed to contact a good many of the maquis chiefs, advised and reported on the success of their ambuscades, and did all he could to stimulate activity against the Route nationale 86. On the West bank of the Rhone. He also visited sabotage groups, and got their undertaking to keep the railway permanently cut, and to cut the German telephone communi-cations on both sides of the Rhone. He took part with the American O.Gs in the department in an action against a column of 5,000 Germans and Russians moving north in the area Villefort, Les Vans, Barjac and Vallon.

For details of the tactics employed, and suggestions made see report of Capt. Montagu, Section II, pages 5,6,7.[x]

[x] In team file "Willys" with archives.

JEDBURGH TEAMS IN FRANCE.

Appendix I B.

JUNE — DECEMBER. 1944.

O.R. 5685

LOW COUNTRIES & FRANCE

SCALE 1:2·834,000 OR 46·5 MILES TO 1 INCH

MILES 50 40 30 20 10 0 50 100 MILES

ENGLISH CHANNEL

NORTH SEA

E. FRISIAN ISLANDS: LANGEOOG, NORDERNEY, JUIST

W. FRISIAN ISLANDS: SCHIERMONNIKOOG, AMELAND, TERSCHELLING, VLIELAND, TEXEL

Harwich, Southampton, Portsmouth, Plymouth, Dover, Dunkerque, Calais, Boulogne, Dieppe, Cherbourg, le Havre, Rouen, Caen, Lisieux, St.Lo, Lannion, St.Malo, Brest, St.Brieuc, Dinan, Quimper, Douarnenez, Lorient, Vannes, Redon, Nantes, Angers, Tours, Le Mans, Orléans, Blois, Vierzon, Bourges, Châteauroux, Poitiers, Jardres, Fleuré, Mayenne, Rennes, Chartres, Beauvais, Amiens, Abbeville, St.Omer, Arras, Douai, Lille, Cambrai, St.Quentin, Soissons, Laon, Reims, Caen, Lisieux, Seine, Somme, Oise, Aisne, Marne, Loire, Cher, Creuse, Vienne, Dordogne, Garonne, Lot, Lys, Escaut, Meuse, Moselle, Rhine, Maas, Ems, Weser, Elbe, Scheldt, Ourthe, Sambre, Rhône, Saône, Doubs, Isère, Ain

Flushing, Zeebrugge, Blankenberghe, Ostend, Bruges, Ghent, Antwerp, Maastricht, BRUSSELS, Aachen, Eupen, Malmedy, Namur, Mons, Liège, Verviers, Spa, Stavelot, Huy, Dinant, Charleroi, Mézieres, Arlon, Luxembourg, Trier, Saarbrucken, Metz, Verdun, Châlons-s-Marne, Toul, Nancy, Epinal, Colmar, Mulhouse, Belfort, Vesoul, Dijon, Seurre, Dôle, Mouchard, Poligny, Châlons-s-Saône, Le Creusot, Nevers, Moulins, Montluçon, Paray-le-Monial, Gex, Geneva, Roanne, Lyons, Clermont-Ferrand, Vichy, Limoges, Angoulême, Nontron, Périgueux, Monpont, Bordeaux, Langon, Sabres, Roquefort, Mont de Marsan, St.Sever, Orthez, Sauveterre, Pau, Toulouse, Carcassonne, Narbonne, Montpellier, Sete, Marseilles, Toulon, Nîmes, Avignon, Apt, Nice, Grenoble, Lyons, St.Etienne, Troyes, Auxerre, Langres, Cologne, Wesermunde, Emden, Bremen, Leeuwarden, Groningen, Deventer, Utrecht, Haarlem, IJmuiden, AMSTERDAM, THE HAGUE, Rotterdam, HOOK OF HOLLAND, Munster, Essen, Duisburg, Wiesbaden, Mainz, Saarbrucken, Strasbourg, Julich, Aachen, Maastricht, Liège, Verviers, Spa, Stavelot, Huy, Dinant, Charleroi, Mons, Namur, Meuse, Rhine, Maas, Ems, Weser, Elbe, Scheldt, Ourthe, Sambre, Rhône, Saône, Doubs, Isère, Ain, Lys, Escaut

HOLLAND, BELGIUM, GERMANY, SWITZERLAND, ITALY, SPAIN

PAS DE CALAIS, SOMME, SEINE INFÉRIEURE, SEINE ET OISE, SEINE ET MARNE, EURE, CALVADOS, ORNE, MANCHE, ILLE ET VILAINE, CÔTES DU NORD, FINISTÈRE, MORBIHAN, MAYENNE, SARTHE, MAINE ET LOIRE, LOIRE INFERIEURE, INDRE ET LOIRE, LOIR ET CHER, LOIRET, NIÈVRE, CHER, INDRE, VENDÉE, DEUX SEVRES, VIENNE, HAUTE VIENNE, CHARENTE, CHARENTE-INFÉRIEURE, CORREZE, CREUSE, PUY DE DÔME, ALLIER, CANTAL, DORDOGNE, GIRONDE, LOT ET GARONNE, TARN ET GARONNE, LOT, AVEYRON, LOZÈRE, HAUTE LOIRE, ARDÈCHE, DRÔME, HAUTES ALPES, BASSES ALPES, VAUCLUSE, BOUCHES DU RHÔNE, VAR, ALPES MARITIMES, GARD, HÉRAULT, AUDE, ARIÈGE, HAUTES PYRENÉES, BASSES PYRENÉES, LANDES, GERS, TARN, HAUTE GARONNE, PYRENÉES ORIENTALES, SAÔNE ET LOIRE, AIN, HAUTE SAVOIE, SAVOIE, ISÈRE, DOUBS, HAUTE SAÔNE, HAUT-RHIN, BAS-RHIN, MEURTHE ET MOSELLE, MEUSE, MOSELLE, ARDENNES, AISNE, MARNE, AUBE, HAUTE MARNE, VOSGES, CÔTE D'OR, YONNE, JURA

HORACE 9 July; HILARY 18 July; FREDERICK 10 June; RONALD 6 Aug; FELIX 9 July; GILES 9 July; DANIEL 6 Aug; GAVIN 12 July; GILBERT 10 July; FRANCIS 10 July; GERALD 19 July; GUY 12 July; DOUGLAS 6 Aug; GEORGE 10 June; QUENTIN 27 Sept; FRANK 27 Sept; HAROLD 16 July; TONY 18 Aug; RAYMOND 27 Sept; SIMON 27 Sept; IAN 21 June; HUGH 6 June; JULIAN 11 Aug; ALEC 10 Aug; HAMISH 13 June; IVOR 7 Aug; ISAAC; HARRY 7 June; ANDY 12 July; ALEXANDER 13 Aug; GEORGE II 7 Sept; LEE 10 Aug; JAMES 11 Aug; GEORGE III; AMMONIA 10 June; QUININE 9 June; MARIS 17 Aug; COLLODION 7 Aug; JOHN 17 Aug; MILES 17 Aug; MARTIN 17 Aug; BUGATTI 29 June; CHRYSLER 16 Aug; ALFRED 25 Aug; AUGUSTUS 16 Aug; ANDREW 16 Aug; BENJAMIN 21 Aug; ARNOLD 25 Aug; AUBRY 12 Aug; BRUCE 15 Aug; PAUL 19 Aug; ARTHUR 19 Aug; HARRY 7 June; DESMOND 5 Sept; JIM 16 Sept; ANTHONY 15 Aug; ALAN 13 Aug; CECIL 26 Aug; BUNNY 18 Aug; ALASTAIR 28 Aug; NICHOLAS 9 Sept; HENRY 12 Sept; GODFREY 12 Sept; CEDRIC 28 Aug; RODERICK 1 Sept; BRIAN 28 Aug; BASIL 26 Aug; NORMAN 28 Aug; MAURICE 26 Aug; GREGORY 1 Sept; DOUGLAS II 16 Sept; TIMOTHY 16 Sept; JULIAN II 16 Nov; PHILIP 1 Sept; ARCHIBALD 26 Aug; BERNARD 21 Aug; STANLEY 1 Sept; JACOB 13 Aug; JEREMY 28 Aug; WILLYS 29 June; VEGANIN DODGE 29 June; MASQUE 27 Aug; JUDE 15 Aug; PACKARD 1 Aug; MINARET 14 Aug; CITROEN 14 Aug; GRAHAM 13 Aug; SCEPTRE 14 Aug; CINNAMON 14 Aug; EPHEDRINE 13 Aug; SCION 30 Aug; MONOCLE 14 Aug; CHLOROFORM 30 June; NOVOCAINE 7 Aug

Geographical Section, General Staff. W.O. 1944.

CASUALTIES

Killed in Action, Died of Wounds, or Died in Enemy Hands

Rank	Name	Nat.	Team	Nature, Date and Place of Casualty
Major	OGDEN-SMITH, C.M.	British	FRANCIS	Wounded and killed in action at QUERRIEN (QUIMPERLE), FINISTERE on 29 July 1944. Buried at QUERRIEN.
Capt.	GOUGH, V.A.	British	JACOB	Captured in VOSGES area end of October 1944. Known to be prisoner in Gestapo Camp at SCHIRMEEK-LA-BROQUE, ALSACE, 8 November 1944. Killed on or shortly after 25 November 1944. Body identified and place of burial established at GAGGENAU, Germany, July 1945.
Capt.	RADICE, J.F.D.	British	BUNNY	Died at LANGRES Hospital on 25 August 1944, as result of wounds sustained in action at LONGEAU, on 22 August 1944.
L/Capt.	MELLOWS, T.A.	British	MARTIN	Died of wounds in enemy hands, as result of action at MONT DE MARSAN, 21 August 1944. Buried at MONT DE MARSAN.
Major	BONSALL, J.H.	U.S.A.	AUGUSTUS	Killed by German forces encountered at BARENTON-SUR-SERRE at about 2245 hours on 30 August 1944. Buried at BARENTON-SUR-SERRE.
Lieut.	SWANK, L.E.	U.S.A.	EPHEDRINE	Killed in an accident on 14 August 1944 near ST. PAUL (SAVOIE). Buried at ST. PAUL.
Capt.	DECHVILLE, J.	French	AUGUSTUS	Killed by German forces encountered at BARENTON-SUR-SERRE at about 2245 hours on 30 August 1944. Buried at BARENTON-SUR-SERRE.

Rank	Name	Nat.	Team	Nature, Date and Place of Casualty
Capt.	TELMON, J.F.	French	AUBRY	Killed in action between FORFRY and OISSERY, near PARIS on 27 August 1944. Buried at OISSERY.
Lieut.	BARAUD, G.M.E.	French	JACOB	Killed in action on 4 September 1944, near RAON L'ETAPE, VOSGES.
Capt.	BRINKGREVE, Henk	Dutch	DUDLEY	Killed in action on 5 March 1945, between LOSTER and GRONAU, in Province of OVERYSSEL, HOLLAND.
Capt.	GROENEWOUD, J.	Dutch	CLAUDE	Killed in action at ARNHEM on 19 September 1944.
Sgt.	AUSTIN, J.P.	British	DUDLEY	Arrested about 4 December 1944 in Province of OVERYSSEL, HOLLAND. Shot by Germans whilst in captivity ~~between 15 — 20 March 1945.~~ on 4 Apr. '45 near ZWOLLE. Buried at HATTEM, near ZWOLLE
Sgt.	GARDNER, D.	British	VEGANIN	Killed on Operations near BEAUREPAIRE by failure of parachute, 8/9 June 1944. Buried at BEAUREPAIRE, South of France.
T/Sgt.	BOURGOIN, L.J.	U.S.A.	IAN	Killed in action at PLEUVILLE on 2 August 1944. Buried at PLEUVILLE.
T/Sgt.	COTE, R.E.	U.S.A.	AUGUSTUS	Killed by German forces encountered at BARENTON-SUR-SERRE at about 2245 hours on 30 August 1944. Buried at BARENTON-SUR-SERRE.
T/Sgt.	GODDARD, L.E.	U.S.A.	IVOR	Killed on operations by failure of parachute on 6 August 1944 at BEDDES, (Cher Sud). Buried at BEDDES.

WOUNDED

Rank	Name	Nat.	Team	Nature, Date and Place of Casualty
Major	DENNING, A. du P.	British	ARCHIBALD	Slightly wounded in action near CHARNES, MEURTHE et MOSELLE on 3 September 1944, but able to carry on.
Major	FORREST, A.J.	British	BENJAMIN	Slightly wounded in ambush near CLERMONT-EN-ARGONNE on 1 September 1944. Able to carry on.
T/Major	PARKINSON, R.A.	British	ANDY	Sustained compound fracture of leg as result of bad drop on 11 July 1944 in area DOMPS/EYMOUTIERS. Exfiltrated by Lysander, 28 July 1944.
Capt.	BENNETT, K.D.	British	GREGORY	Wounded in ambush on 6 September 1944 near BAUME-LES-DAMES (DOUBS). Operated on at U.S. 95th Evac. Hospital and later evacuated to British Hospital at NAPLES. Returned U.K. 16 October 1944.
Capt.	HARCOURT, R.	British	CINNAMON	Sustained fracture of both legs as result of bad drop on 13/14 August 1944, near BRU-AURIAC (VAR).
L/Capt.	CANNICOTT, S.McC.	British	ALAN	Seriously wounded in action on 25 September 1944 at MAGNEY - D'ANIGOU, east of LURE.
Capt.	BAZATA, J.D.	U.S.A.	CEDRIC	Slightly wounded in action on approximately 9 September 1944 near LOULANS. Able to carry on.
Capt.	MYNATT, C.	U.S.A.	ARTHUR	Sustained fractured spine as result of drop on 18/19 August 1944 near AVOT, DIJON, COTE D'OR. Admitted to 12th Evac. Hospital on 11 September 1944.

Rank	Name	Nat.	Team	Nature, Date and Place of Casualty
Lieut.	HEYNS, R.E.	U.S.A.	TIMOTHY	Sustained fractured right ankle and badly sprained left ankle as result of drop on 10/11 September 1944 in AMIENS area.
Lieut.	VERHAEGHE, G.	U.S.A.	CLARENCE	Wounded in action on 18 September 1944 near MALDEN, NIJMEGEN area, HOLLAND.
Cdt.	FRANCOMTE, R.	French	BRIAN	Slightly wounded in action on 5 September 1944 at LISLE-SUR-LE-DOUBS.
Cdt.	VERMEULEN, J.	French	ANDY	Sustained broken ankle as result of bad drop on 11 July 1944 in area DOMPS/EYMOUTIERS.
Capt.	DE SCHONEN, P.E.A.	French	GREGORY	Wounded in ambush on 6 September 1944 near BAUME-LES-DAMES (DOUBS). Operated on at U.S. 95th Evac. Hospital and later evacuated to French Hospital at NAPLES.
Capt.	ERARD, P.P.M.	French	GEORGE II.	Sustained broken leg on landing on 7 September 1944 near LOUDUN. Able to continue with Mission.
Capt.	PRATO, E.	French	BERNARD	Seriously wounded in action on 31 August 1944 at FUTEAU in BIESME VALLEY. Evacuated by U.S. forces to 39th Evac. Hospital on 1 September 1944.
Lieut.	ALLET, B.	French	ALEC	Seriously wounded in action on 4 September 1944 at LES AIX AUGILLON near BOURGES. Admitted to hospital at BOURGES.

Rank	Name	Nat.	Team	Nature, Date and Place of Casualty
Lieut.	GERVILLE, M.	French	BUNNY	Seriously wounded in action near LATRECY Route Nationale between CHATILLON and CHAUMONT on 8 September 1944. Admitted to LANGRES Hospital on 14 September 1944.
Lieut.	MONTLAC, A.	French	ARCHIBALD	Wounded in action on 3 September 1944 near CHARNES, MEURTHE et MOSELLE.
S/Lieut.	CAMOUIN, J.	French	BENJAMIN	Slightly wounded in ambush on 1 September 1944 near CLERMONT-EN-ARGONNE. Able to carry on.
Capt.	BESTEBREURTJE, A.J.	Dutch	CLARENCE	Wounded in action on 18 September 1944 near MALDEN, NIJMEGEN area, HOLLAND. Able to carry on.
Sgt.	BASSETT, C.M.	British	BERNARD	Wounded in ambush on 1 September 1944 near CLERMONT-EN-ARGONNE. Evacuated to 39th Evac. Hospital (U.S.) on 1 September 1944.

PRISONERS OF WAR

Rank	Name	Nat.	Team	Nature, Date and Place of Casualty
Major	HARCOURT, R.	British	DICING	Captured 9 - 14 April 1945 in ASSEN area, HOLLAND. Liberated end of April 1945.
Major	MANIERRE, C.E.	U.S.A.	DODGE	Captured on 5 August 1944 near VALENCE, DROME. Liberated by Russians from Stalag Luft I. at BARTHE on the Baltic on 2 May 1945. Returned U.K. 26 May 1945
Capt.	TODD, H.A.	U.S.A.	CLAUDE	Captured near ARNHEM on 27 September 1944. Escaped 1 May 1945. Overrun by U.S. forces 4 May 1945.
Sgt.	SEYMOUR, K.R.	British	JACOB	Captured 17 August 1944 near ST. DIE, VOSGES. Liberated from Stalag IX.C. and returned U.K. 4 April 1945.

MISSING

Sgt.	SCOTT, C.A.	U.S.A.	CLAUDE	Last seen by Capt. H.A. Todd - Team CLAUDE - on 17 September 1944 near OOSTERBEEK, West of ARNHEM, HOLLAND.

APPENDIX XD.

HONOURS AND AWARDS.

NOMINAL ROLL OF JEDBURGH BRITISH OFFICERS.

145351	Major	BENNETT, K.D.	Mention in Despatches	R.A.C.
78393	Capt.	BLATHWAYT, C.G.W.	M.C.	D.R.R.C.
190815	Capt.	BRITTON, D.J.	(Never went to Field).	R.A.
255011	Capt.	BROWN, B.	(Never went to Field).	R.A.Anti-Tank.
132260	Major	BROWN, O.H.	Mention in Despatches	The Buffs.
165919	Capt.	CANNICOTT, S.	M.C.	R.A. 99th A.T.
95064	Capt.	CAREW, T.A.	Mention in Despatches	R.A. 82nd H.A.A.
UDF/240316	Major	CLUTTON,A.H. M.C.	Bar to M.C.	Spec.Serv.Fce.
169012	Capt.	COOMBER, A.	Mention in Despatches	R.A.C. 23rd Hussars.
65371	Major	COOMBE-TENNANT A.H.S. M.C.	Mention in Despatches	Welsh Guards.
1[illegible]146	Capt.	COX, J.	" " "	188Fd.Regt.R.A.
71959	Capt.	CRASTER, O.	" " "	Ox & Bucks L.I.
86548	Major	CRAWSHAY, W.R.	D.S.O.	R.Welch Fus.
157326	Major	CROSBY.M.G.M.	Mention in Despatches	Gordon Hrs.
278544	Major	DENNING A. du P.	M.C.	Hampshire Regt.
240388	Capt.	EVANS, W.L.O.	Mention in Despatches	King's Regt. (L'pool).
240428	Capt.	FENTON, R.S.	Mention in Despatches	Sherwood Frstrs.
[illegible]055	Major	FORREST, A.J. (O'BRYAN-TEAR)	" " "	R.A.
53872	Major	GRENFELL, O.P.	" " "	R.A.C. R.T.R.
148884	Capt.	GOUGH, A.V.	" " "	Somerset L.I.
239306	Capt.	GUTHRIE, D.D.	M.C.	D.C.L.I.
204390	Capt.	HALL.H.	Mention in Despatches	R.A.C. 27 Lancer
132514	Capt.	HALLOWES, G.	" " "	Gordon Hrs.
264516	Capt.	HARCOURT,R.	" " "	R.A.C. G.H.Q. Liaison Regt.
40301	Lt.Col.	HUTCHISON,J.R.H.	D.S.O.	Gen.List.
70575	Major	HOOD, E.	Mention in Despatches	Somerset L.I.
261656	Capt.	ISAAC, I.	(No Award)	R.Welch Fus.
71222	Major	JOHNSTON, F.	Mention in Despatches	R.A.C. R.T.R.
312556	Capt.	MACDOUGALL,L.R.	" " "	Black Watch
90855	Major	MACPHERSON,R.M.C.	Bar to M.C.	Q.O.Cam.Hrs.
156829	Capt.	MARCHANT, G.	M.C.	Int.Corps.
129260	Capt.	MARCHANT, J.J.	Mention in Despatches	Wiltshire Regt.
169943	Major	MARTEN, H.N.	" " "	R.A.C.2nd Northants
76264	Capt.	MAUDE,J.C.C. M.C.	" " "	Army Air Corps.
[illegible]86	Capt.	MELLOWS,T.A.	" (Posthumous)	RAC 27th Lancers
262289	Capt.	MONAHAN,J.H.F.	" " "	R.Fusiliers.
251332	Capt.	MONTAGUE,J.C.C.	" " "	RAC 2nd Bn RTR.
104205	Major	NIELSON,D.J.	" " "	R.Fusiliers.
19977	Major	OGDEN-SMITH C.M.	" (Posthumous)	R.A.
132194	Major	PARKINSON,R.	Mention in Despatches	R.A.C.
140509	Capt.	RADICE, J.	" (Posthumous)	RAC Queen's Bays
1[illegible]14	Capt.	RUBINSTEIN,R.	Mention in Despatches	69 SL Regt. R.A.
2[illegible]82	Capt.	SELL, C.	" " "	36 SL Regt. R.A.
131433	Major	SHARPE.L.C.M.H.	" " "	Gen.List Int.C
126569	Capt.	SMALLWOOD,J.	" " "	24 Lancers RAC.
143809	Capt.	STERN,D.L.	" " "	Lancs. Fus.
292510	Capt.	TROFIMOV,A.A.E.	" " "	R.A.
258159	Capt.	VICKERY,P.C.H.	" " "	G.H.Q. Liaison Regt. R.A.C.
164930	Capt.	WALLER, J.de W.	" " "	Rifle Bde.
89630	Capt.	WATSON.W.	(Never went to Field)	R.A. H.A.A.
144595	Major	WHITTY, V.E.	Mention in Despatches	R.T.R. R.A.C.
40055	Major	WILSON,R.K.	" " "	12 Med.Regt. R.A.
[illegible]5604	Major	WISE, A.	D.S.O.	R. Warwicks.

HONOURS AND AWARDS.

JEDBURGH BRITISH OFFICERS CITED FOR FRENCH DECORATIONS.

Major	BENNETT, K.D.	Croix de Guerre a l'ordre de Corps D'Armee.
Capt.	BLATHWAYT, C.G.W.	" " " " " " L'Armee
Major	BROWN, O.H.	" " " " " " "
Capt.	CANNICOTT, S.	" " " " " " "
Major	CAREW, T.A.	" " " " " " Division
Major	CLUTTON, A.H. M.C.	" " " " " " L'Armee.
Capt.	COOMBER, A.	" " " " " " Division.
Capt.	COX, J.	" " " " " " "
Capt.	CRASTER, O.	" " " " " " "
Major	CRAWSHAY, W.R.	Legion D'Honneur
Major	CROSBY, M.G.M.	Croix de Guerre a l'ordre de Corps D'Armee.
Major	DENNING, A. DU P.	" " " " " " Division
Capt.	EVANS, W.L.O.	" " " " " " "
Capt.	FENTON, R.S.	" " " " " du Regiment
Major	GRENFELL, O.P.	" " " " " de Division
Capt.	GOUGH, V.A.	" " " " " "
Capt.	GUTHRIE, D.D.	" " " " " " L'Armee
Capt.	HALL, H.	" " " " " " Division
Capt.	HALLOWES, G.	" " " " " " "
Capt.	HARCOURT, R.	" " " " " " "
Lt.Col.	HUTCHISON, J.R.H.	Legion d'Honneur
Major	HOOD, H.	Croix de Guerre a l'ordre de la Brigade
Capt.	ISAAC, I.	(To be considered)
Major	JOHNSTON, F.	Croix de Guerre a l'ordre de l'Armee.
Capt.	MACDOUGALL, L.R.	" " " " " " la Brigade
Major	MACPHERSON, R.	" " " " " " l'Armee
Capt.	MARCHANT, G.	" " " " " " l'Armee
Capt.	MARCHANT, J.J.	" " " " " " Corps D'Armee
Major	MARTEN, H.N.	" " " " " " Corps d'Armee
Capt.	MAUDE, J.C.C. M.C.	" " " " " " la Division
Capt.	MELLOWS, T.A.	" " " " " " l'Armee(Posth)
Capt.	MONAHAN, J.H.F.	" " " " " " la Brigade
Capt.	MONTAGUE, J.D.C.	" " " " " " l'Armee
Major	NIELSON, D.J.	" " " " " " la Division
Major	O'BRYAN-TEAR, H.L.	" " " " " " l'Armee
Major	OGDEN-SMITH, C.M.	Legion d'Honneur a titre Posthume
Major	PARKINSON, R.	Croix de Guerre a l'ordre de la Division
Capt.	RADICE, J.	" " " " " " la Div.(Posth.)
Capt.	RUBINSTEIN, R.	" " " " " " la Brigade
Capt.	SELL, C.	" " " " " " Corps d'Armee
Major	SHARPE, L.C.M.H.	" " " " " " Corps d'Armee
Capt.	SMALLWOOD, J.C.	" " " " " " la Division
Capt.	STERN, D.L.	" " " " " " la Brigade
Capt.	WALLER, J. de W.	" " " " " " Corps d'Armee
Major	WHITTY, V.E.	" " " " " " Corps d'Armee
Major	WISE, A.	Legion d'Honneur

Capt

TROFIMOV A.A.E CROIX de GUERRE a l'ordre du Corps d'ARMEE

HONOURS AND REWARDS.

NOMINAL ROLL OF JEDBURGH BRITISH N.C.O'S.

No.	Rank.			
5255446	Sgt.	ADAMS, W.	Mention in Despatches	R. Sigs.
5348971	"	AUSTIN, J.P.	(Posthumous)	R. Berks.
7949725	"	BAILEY, F.	Mention in Despatches	R.A.C.
1436889	"	BASSETT, C.M.	" " "	"
3603976	"	BRIERLEY, R.	" " "	"
7955910	"	BROWN, K.J.W.	" " "	"
14561888	"	BROWN, O.A.	M.M.	"
14400059	"	CAIN, T.F.	Mention in Despatches.	"
7938850	"	CAREY, N.E.S.	" " "	"
14 1870	"	CHAMBERS, J.	" " "	"
14 0309	"	CHATTEN, R.E.	" " "	"
7945551	"	COLVIN, P.M.	" " "	"
7961434	"	CORNICK, E.A.	" " "	"
451406	"	COTTINGHAM, D.	(Never went to Field)	"
14403727	"	DALLOW, A.J.	M.M.	"
7963328	"	DE VILLE, A.	Mention in Despatches.	"
14525261	"	ELLIS, F.J.	" " "	"
14280042	"	GARDNER, D.	" (Posthumous)	"
85	"	GIBBS.	Mention in Despatches	"
1427066	"	GRINHAM.EJ.	" " "	"
14290052	"	HARRISON, F.	" " "	"
14290054	"	HENNEY, T.	(No Award)	"
6354187	"	HOLDHAM, A.	M.M.	"
7952737	"	HOOKER, I.	Mention in Despatches	"
14371287	"	KEY, A.W.	" " "	"
2324021	Cpl.	LANGMAID, R.R.	(Never went to Field)	R. Sigs.
794775	Sgt.	LENEY, R.	Mention in Despatches	R.A.C.
7889459	"	LINDSAY, J.B.	(Never went to Field)	"
7961382	"	LOOSMORE, R.	M.M.	"
79611204	"	MASON, G.	Mention in Despatches	"
2363352	C.Q.M.S.	MENZIES, J.S.	M.M.	R. Sigs.
6856580	Sgt.	RAVEN, J.	Mention in Despatches	R.A.C.
7948701	"	RAWSON, D.	" " "	"
7946074	"	SEYMOUR, K	" " "	"
7952657	"	SHARP. J.	" " "	"
235647	"	SMITH, G.N.	" " "	"
14401047	"	SMITH, N.A.	" " "	"
38	"	SOMERS, C.C.	" " "	"
14423408	"	TACK, G.H.	M.M.	R.A.F.
2184661	"	TAYLOR, J.C.	(Never went to field)	R.A.C.
3856995	"	VERLANDER, H.	Mention in Despatches	"
2368795	"	WHITTLE, M.	" " "	"
322254	"	WILDE, R.	" " "	R. Sigs.
7952734	"	WOOD, N.	" " "	R.A.C.
		DU ROCHER, L.T.	" " "	"
				R.C.C.S.

HONOURS AND REWARDS

JEDBURGH BRITISH N.C.O'S CITED FOR FRENCH DECORATIONS

Sgt.	ADAMS, W.	---
"	BAILEY, F.	Croix de Guerre a l'ordre du Regiment
"	BASSETT, C.M.	" " " " " de la Division
"	BRIERLEY, R.	" " " " " du Regiment.
"	BROWN, K.J.W.	" " " " " du Regiment.
"	BROWN, O.A.	" " " " " de la Division
"	CAIN, T.F.	" " " " " du Regiment
"	CAREY, N.E.S.	(Under consideration)
"	CHAMBERS. J.	Croix de Guerre a l'ordre du Regiment
"	CHATTEN, R.E.	" " " " " du Regiment
"	COLVIN, P.M.	" " " " " de la Division
"	CORNICK, E.A.	" " " " " du Regiment
"	DALLOW, A.J.	" " " " " de la Division
"	DE VILLE, A.	" " " " " du Regiment
"	ELLIS, F.J.	" " " " " du Regiment
"	GARDNER, D.	" " " " " du Regiment (Posth).
"	GIBBS, D.	(Under consideration)
"	GRINHAM, E.J.	Croix de Guerre a l'ordre du Regiment
"	HARRISON, F.	" " " " " du Regiment
"	HENEY. T.	(No award)
"	HOLDHAM, A.	Croix de Guerre a l'ordre de la Division.
"	HOOKER, I.	" " " " " de la Division
"	KEY, A.W.	" " " " " du Regiment
"	LENEY, R.	" " " " " du Regiment
"	LOOSMORE, R.	" " " " " de l'Armee
C.Q.M.S.	MENZIES. J.S.	" " " " " de la Division.
Sgt.	RAVEN, J.	" " " " " du Regiment
"	RAWSON, D.	" " " " " du Regiment
"	SEYMOUR, K.	---
"	SHARP, J.	Lt.Col. Hutchison to make citation
"	SMITH, G.N.	(Under consideration)
"	SMITH, N.A.	Croix de Guerre a l'ordre du Regiment.
"	SOMERS, C.C.	" " " " " du Regiment.
"	TACK, G.H.	" " " " " de la Division.
"	VERLANDER, H.	(Under consideration)
"	WILDE, R.	Croix de Guerre a l'ordre du Regiment.
"	WOOD, N.	" " " " " du Regiment.
2	WHITTLE	(Under consideration)

HONOURS AND AWARDS:

NOMINAL ROLL OF AMERICAN JEDBURGH OFFICERS.

Rank.	Name.	Recommendation.
Lieut.	Alsopp.	
Lieut.	Anstett, R.E.	Silver Star.
Capt.	Austin, B.M.D.	
Capt.	Allen, E.J.	
Capt.	Brown, C.E.	Bronze Star.
Capt.	Bank, A.	Bronze Star.
Capt.	Bazata, J. de W.	Distinguished Service Cross.
Major	Bonsall, J.H.	Distinguished Service Cross.
Lieut.	Boggs, W.C.	
Lieut.	Conein, H.	
Major	Colby, W.	Bronze Star.
Lieut.	Chadbourne, P.H.	Bronze Star.
Capt.	Cyr, P.	Distinguished Service Cross.
Capt.	Carman, C.M.	
Capt.	Dreux, W.B.	
Lieut.	Dillow, K.C.	
Lieut.	Dussaq, R.A.	Distinguished Service Cross.
Capt.	Donovan, P.W.	
Lieut.	Foster, R.	
Lieut.	Forbes, J.R.	
Major	Fuller, H.W.	Silver Star.
Major	Gildee, J.	Legion of Merit.
Lieut.	Gennerich, C.	Bronze Star.
Capt.	Guillot, H.	
Lieut.	Heyns, R.E.	
Lieut.	Hanna, W.C.	Bronze Star.
Capt.	Knerly, J.	Silver Star.
Lieut.	Lucas, R.A.	
Capt.	Knox, B.M.W.	Bronze Star.
Capt.	McIntosh, A.	Silver Star.
Capt.	Mynatt, C.	
Lieut.	Mundinger, R.G.	
Lieut.	Moore, R.E.	
Major	Montgomery, R.	Legion of Merit.
Major	Manniere, C.E.	Distinguished Service Cross.
Major	Olmsted, J.	Distinguished Service Cross.
Capt.	Pietsch, W.H.	
Capt.	Sollenberger, C.	Bronze Star.
Lieut.	Singlaub, J.E.	Bronze Star.
Major	Summers, J.	Distinguished Service Cross.
Lieut.	Starring, M.B.	
Lieut.	Swank, L.E.	
Lieut.	Thompson, G.G.	Bronze Star.
Lieut.	Trumps, S.R.	
Lieut.	Todd, H.	Distinguished Service Cross.
Lieut.	Verhaighe, G.M.	Silver Star.

All the a/n have been recommended for Mention in Despatches.