






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WAR DIARY

SO Branch, OSS London

Vol. 4

JEDBURGHS

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JEDBURGHS

CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY

PREAMBLE . . . TO 1 JANUARY 1944

7 July 1942

Term "JEDBURGHS" first applied to uniformed personnel to be dropped behind enemy lines. (p.i)

3 to 11 March 1943

JEDBURGHS used in General Headquarters exercise "Spartan". (p.x)

6 April 1943

Use of JEDBURGHS set forth in SOE paper: "Coordination of Activities Behind Enemy Lines with the Actions of Allied Military Forces Invading N.W. Europe." (p.xii)

23 April 1943

Parallel American document issued under same title, recommending general approval for JEDBURGH plan and requesting necessary personnel to implement it. (p.xiii)

21 July 1943

SOE proposals approved. War Office requested to provide personnel. (p.xiv)

24 August 1943

OSS/SO proposals approved by U.S. Theater Commander. (p.xiv)

20 September 1943

Concurrence of OSS/SO, SOE, G-3 ETOUSA, and COSSAC to the organization of 50 American JEDBURGH teams and 50 British JEDBURGH teams. (p.xvi)

16 October 1943

Approval by U.S. Theater Commander of TO for JEDBURGHS and Army Staffs. (p.xvi)

October and November 1943

American JEDBURGH personnel and Army Staffs recruited by OSS Washington. Lieutenant-Colonel Canfield's recruiting trip. (pp.xvii-xxi)

23 December 1943

55 American JEDBURGH officer candidates arrive in U.K. (p.xxii)

31 December 1943

62 American JEDBURGH radio operator recruits arrive in U.K. (p.xxii)

3 January 1944

Training of JEDBURGH personnel begun in U.K. (p.xxiii)

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JEDBURGH

Chronological Summary (Cont'd)

JANUARY - JULY 1944

Late December 1943

Lieutenant-Colonel Frank V. Spooner (Br) was appointed first Commandant of Jedburgh training school. (p.1)

January 1944

Three meetings of officers were held in London to study phase concerning preparations for reception of teams in France. (p.11)

5 January 1944

Memorandum from Colonel Bruce to C. G. ETOUSA requesting the OSS officers be allowed to visit US Divisions in England to recruit personnel for implementation of Jedburgh plan. (p.4)

10 January 1944

OSS authorized by Assistant Adjutant General to procure Jedburgh officers. (p.5)

25 January 1944

Pre-D-day Jedburgh preparations issued. (p.11)
Mitchell Plan was to be basis for reception of Jedburgh teams. (p.12)

January to 1 February 1944

Major part of basic training for Jedburghs furnished at STS-45, STS-40, STS-6. (p.9)

February 1944

Staff of officers for Jedburgh program was created at Baker Street. (p.4) Major H. Cox, Jr. and Major F. O'Brien (Br) were assigned as heads of this group. (p.4)

1 February 1944

Milton Hall became available as Jedburgh training center. (pp.9,10,11)

21 February 1944

Operational training began and continued until D-day. (p.10)

24 February 1944


Director of London Group spoke to Jedburghs on "Role of the Jedburghs." (p.10)

Mid-March 1944

First Jedburgh team established. (p.13)

Late March 1944

Difficulties in securing personnel from French forces training in England solved by recruitment of 70 French officers from Middle East. (p.8)



VOL. 4

JEDBURGHS

Chronological Summary (Cont'd)

JANUARY - JULY 1944 (Cont'd)

1 April 1944

By this time majority of teams had been created. (p.13)
Essential part of Jedburgh training completed. (p.14)

8 April 1944

(Lieutenant-Colonel Musgrave)(Br) became Commandant of Jedburgh training school. (p.3) Command was vested in staff at Milton Hall headed by Lieutenant-Colonel Spooner until termination of this phase, when it became operational, and the command was assigned to (Lieutenant-Colonel Smith)(Br) and Major Cox. (p.4)

24 April 1944

Change in organization of 3 companies effected. (p.3)

27 April 1944

Major H. W. Fuller was to be dispatched with 15 Jedburgh teams to North Africa. (p.3) Approval received by OSS from AC of S, G-3 for dispatch of 15 Jedburgh teams to North Africa to support resistance groups in southern France. (p.14)

2 May 1944

Major Fuller and Jedburgh teams left Milton Hall for Mediterranean. (p.14)

3 May 1944

Major McLallen was appointed Deputy Commandant. (p.3)

12 May 1944

"Operational Procedure of SFHQ" issued. (p.14)

5/6 June 1944

Team Hugh, first Jedburgh team, was dispatched to Chateauroux area in Department of Indre, France. (p.17)

6/7 June 1944

Team Harry dispatched to Morvan Mountains area north-west of Autun, France. (p.26)

9/10 June 1944

Team Frederick dispatched to Guincamp area in Brittany, France. (p.33)
Team George dispatched to Redon area in Brittany, France. (p.39)

12/13 June 1944

Team Hamish dispatched to Chateauroux area in Department of Indre, France. (p.46)

20/21 June 1944

Team Ian dispatched to area south of Poitiers in the Department of Vienne, France. (p.54)

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VOL. 4

JEDBURGHS

Chronological Summary (Cont'd)JULY - DECEMBER 19448/9 July 1944

Team Giles dispatched to the Finistere area of France (p.323); Team Felix dispatched to the Cotes du Nord area of France (p.361).

9/10 July 1944

Team Francis dispatched to the Finistere area of France (p.382); Team Gilbert dispatched to the Finistere area of France (p.408).

11/12 July 1944

Team Gavin dispatched to the Ile et Vilaine area of France (p.444); Team Andy dispatched to the Haute Vienne area of France (p.451); Team Guy dispatched to the Ile et Vilaine area of France (p.469).

15/16 July 1944

Team Harold dispatched to the Vendee area of France (p.491).

17/18 July 1944

Team Horace dispatched to the Finistere area of France (p.512); Team Hilary dispatched to the Finistere area of France (p.541).

18/19 July 1944

Team Gerald dispatched to the Morbihan area of France (p.558).

28 July 1944

Team Andy returned from the field (p.462).

5/6 August 1944

Team Daniel dispatched to the Cotes du Nord area of France (p.581); Team Ronald dispatched to the Finistere area of France (p.606); Team Douglas dispatched to the Dijon area of France (p.615).

6/7 August 1944

Team Ivor dispatched to the South Cher area of France (p.629).

9/10 August 1944


Team Alec dispatched to the Loire et Cher area of France (p.665); Team Lee dispatched to the Haute Vienne area of France (p.683).

10/11 August 1944

Team Julian dispatched to the Indre et Loire area of France (p.710); Team James dispatched to the Correze area of France (p.742).

11 August 1944

Team Aubrey dispatched to the Seine et Marne area of France (p.768); Team Daniel returned from the field (p.582).



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JEDBURGHS

Chronological Summary (Cont'd)

JULY - DECEMBER 1944 (Cont'd)

12 August 1944

Team Jacob dispatched to the Vosges area of France (p.764); Team Alan dispatched to the Saone et Loire area of France (p.783); Team Alexander dispatched to the Creuse area of France (p.795).

14 August 1944

Team Anthony dispatched to the Saone et Loire area of France (p.825); Team Bruce dispatched to the Yonne area of France (p.840).

19 August 1944

Team Gavin returned from the field (p.450).

22 August 1944

Jedburgh organization put under EMFFI (p.61).

23 August 1944

Teams Felix, Guy and Gerald returned from the field (pp 369, 473, 564).

24 August 1944

Team Douglas returned from the field (p.618).

2 September 1944

Team Hilary returned from the field (p.547).

4 September 1944

Team Gregory dispatched to the Cotes du Nord area of France (p.589).

6 September 1944

Team Aubrey returned from the field (p.782).

7 September 1944

Team George II dispatched to the Bordeaux area of France (p.241).

9 September 1944

Teams Giles and Francis returned from the field (pp 338, 389).

12 September 1944

First Dutch Jedburgh team dispatched to the field (p.62).

15 September 1944

Teams Horace and Ronald returned from the field (pp. 518, 609).

15/16 September 1944

Team Douglas II dispatched to the Aisne/Jura/Doubs area of France (p.624).

22 September 1944

Team Ivor returned from the field (p.635).

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VOL. 4

JEDBURGHs

Chronological Summary (Cont'd)

JULY - DECEMBER 1944 (Cont'd)

23 September 1944

All American Jedburghs dispatched to field. SO Jedburgh section moved to 24 Grosvenor (p.61).

25 September 1944

Teams Alec, Lee and Julian returned from the field (pp. 682, 689, 721).

26 September 1944

Team Bruce returned from the field (p.846).

27 September 1944

Team Gilbert returned from the field (p.421).

28 September 1944

Teams Douglas II, Anthony and James returned from the field (pp. 625, 830, 746).

13 October 1944

All American and British Jedburghs ordered to return to U.K. (p.62).

16 October 1944

Team Gregory returned from the field (p.605).

18 October 1944

Team Alexander returned from the field (p.802).

23 October 1944

Team Alan returned from the field (p.788).

25 October 1944

Team George II returned from the field (p.242).

7 November 1944


Team Harold returned from the field (p.502).

End of November

All American personnel withdrawn from France (p.63).

1 December 1944

EMFFI closed down; SOE Jedburgh section returned to Baker Street (p.61).



PREAMBLE . . . TO 1 JANUARY 1944

JEDBURGHS

JEDBURGHS

PRELIMINARY EXPLANATION

The SO-ETO War Diary begins arbitrarily on the first day of January 1944. This preamble to the JEDBURGH Section is an attempt to summarize the main events of the JEDBURGH story prior to that date.

ORIGIN OF JEDBURGH IDEA

The JEDBURGH plan dates back to the spring of 1942 when it was contemplated that there would be a re-invasion of the Continent during that year. On 6 July 1942 Major-General C. McV. Gubbins, then head of SOE London Group, in a note (Pr.1) to the Chief of the SOE Security Section wrote:

"A project is under consideration for the dropping behind of the enemy lines, in cooperation with an Allied invasion of the Continent, of small parties of officers and men to raise and arm the civilian population to carry out guerrilla activities against the enemy's lines of communication. These men are to be recruited and trained by SOE. It is requested that 'JUMPERS' or some other appropriate code name be allotted to this personnel."

On 7 July 1942 the Chief Security Officer allotted the code name "JEDBURGHS" to this personnel (Pr.2).


No detailed planning for the use of JEDBURGHS, however, took place until early in 1943. Planning continued through 1943 in conjunction with the SO Branch Planning Section and culminated in the Basic JEDBURGH Directive issued 20 December 1943 (Pr.3).

(Pr.1) M/KV/206/MG 6 Jul 42 Mf R-1 F- 370

(Pr.2) DCE 1/KV/3819 7 Jul 42 Mf R-1 F-371

(Pr.3) War Diary Vol 12 p. 36

Actual training of the first JEDBURGHS was begun on 3 Jan 44.



PREAMBLE . . . TO 1 JANUARY 1944

JEDBURGHS


WHAT ARE JEDBURGHS?

JEDBURGHS are specially trained three-man teams. They will be dropped by parachute at prearranged spots behind enemy lines in France, Belgium and Holland on and after D-day. Each JEDBURGH team consists of two officers and a radio operator with his W/T set. One officer is a native of the country to which the team is going, and the other British or American. The members of the team are soldiers and will normally arrive in the field in uniform. There they will make contact with the resistance groups, bringing them instructions from the Supreme Allied Commander, W/T communication, supplies and, if necessary, leadership.

FUNCTIONS OF JEDBURGH TEAMS1. General Purposes.

The purpose of JEDBURGH teams, as defined in the Basic JEDBURGH Directive of 20 December 1943 is "to provide a strategic reserve for creating and controlling offensive action behind the enemy lines on and after D-day where existing communications, leadership, organization, or supplies are inadequate, and for carrying out additional specific tasks demanded by the military situation."

Liaison. The principal function of JEDBURGH teams is liaison with resistance groups. They will be sent only to areas where there are actual or potential resistance elements, well behind the German front lines (at least 40



PREAMBLE . . . TO 1 JANUARY 1944

JEDBURGHS

miles). They will be sent particularly to groups which need special outside assistance or to which specific D-day tasks cannot be assigned until the last moment. Each team will be dropped from the air near to its operational area, together with arms, explosives, and stores. The members of the team will make contact with, and operate with, the local resistance group. They will represent the Supreme Allied Commander and bring the group its latest orders from Allied Headquarters and from SOE/SO HQ London. From that point on, the JEDBURGH team will act as the focus for resistance in the area.

JEDBURGH duties may include any or all of the following:

- a. Organizing a group for guerrilla activity.
- b. Equipping a group with arms and stores.
- c. Giving instruction to the men in the use of arms and stores.
- d. Providing W/T communication, and passing along orders received from London.
- e. Leading, giving technical advice, or assisting a group in operations against the enemy.

Reinforcement and Morale. Some of the resistance groups will be self-contained and ready for action on D-day. It will not be necessary to despatch JEDBURGH teams to them. But others, to be effective, will require a last-minute stiffening, reinforcement, and support. JEDBURGH teams are well equipped to provide this. The French are convinced that the arrival by air of JEDBURGHS, in uniform, with supplies of the proper arms, explosives, etc., and

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PREAMBLE . . . TO 1 JANUARY 1944

JEDBURGHS

with knowledge of the Allied Commander's wishes and how to carry them out, will have a vast effect on the patriotic morale and efficiency of the local groups (Pr.4).

Coordinating Resistance Groups with Allied Invasion.

This reserve of JEDBURGH teams constitutes an important weapon in the Allied Commander's hand which can be directed to meet any particular military situation. Through the use of JEDBURGHS the activities of resistance groups over a large area of North-West Europe can be coordinated and synchronized to coincide with military operations launched against the Continent. The JEDBURGHS will, therefore, be employed with reference to the requirements of the Allied military forces operating on the Continent. These requirements will be communicated to SOE/SO HQ London by the SF (Pr.5) staffs and SO detachments working with the military formations in the field. (Pr.6) It is estimated that, if allotted suitable tasks, JEDBURGHS working with resistance groups can achieve a really considerable effect, out of all proportion to the small expenditure of men and equipment involved (Pr.7).

Intelligence. JEDBURGHS in the field will not act as intelligence agents. In the course of their operations they will, however, keep their eyes open and pass back to

-
- (Pr.4) Draft Plans 312/997 18 Mar 43 Mf R-1 F-372-381
 (Pr.5) SF stands for "Special Forces" of SOE
 (Pr.6) The SO dets, also, were later called "SF staffs" and SOE/SO HQ was changed to "SF HQ".
 (Pr.7) Draft Plans 312/997 18 Mar 43 Mf R-1 F-372-381

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SOE/SO HQ London any information of military value, particularly as regards enemy troop movements, locations of HQs, military dumps and installations. JEDBURGHS are trained to report what they see, but they will not draw deductions (Pr.8).

2. Specific Tasks. "The function of JEDBURGHS will be strategic in that they will operate some distance behind the lines, and their role in the field is likely to be one of some duration. But the actual tasks carried out will be of a tactical nature." (Pr.9) They will harass and hinder the enemy's movement in the rear. Actually, it will not be possible for the high command to allocate definite tasks until the last moment. Then, working in conjunction with their resistance groups, the JEDBURGHS will undertake such specific assignments as the following:

- a. Rail cutting.
- b. Attacks on enemy road vehicles, including transport parks.
 - Removal or changing road signs.
 - Destruction of petrol pumps
 - Planting of camouflaged tire bursters.
 - Erection of obstacles across roads.
 - Opening and jamming of swing bridges.
 - Removal of all small tools from garages and workshops.
 - Mining of roads.
- c. Misdirecting, delaying and dislocating Panzer Division movements.
- d. Destruction of telecommunications.
 - Secret cutting of lines, or removal of large sections.
 - Cutting and incorrect joining of cables.
 - Tight wires neck high for despatch riders.
 - Sniping despatch riders.
- e. Liquidation of enemy Commands and Staff, through

(Pr.8) SIS later agreed to an intelligence form covering types of general information JEDBURGHS might report.
(Pr.9) War Diary Vol 12 p.113

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attacks on staff cars, small administrative detachments, and rear installations.

f. Interference with enemy supplies (military depots only - food, ammunition, petrol and oil.)

g. Sabotage of enemy aircraft. Attacks on planes, supplies and pilots off duty.

h. Destruction of electric power points used for military purposes.

i. Demolition of minor bridges, or premature demolition of major bridges already prepared by the enemy.

j. Preservation of vital points for later use by Allied armies . . . by preventing final enemy demolition of bridges, ports, etc.

k. Attacks on railway installations: round houses, turntables, and R.R. signals.

l. Attacks on locomotives and rolling stock, without causing lasting damage.

The following targets will not be attacked by JEDBURGHS:

a. Industrial targets.


b. Public utility installations, other than electric power used for military purposes.

c. Shipping.

d. Demolition of major bridges not already prepared for demolition by the enemy.

Whatever the primary tasks assigned to them, JEDBURGHS will also be given secondary tasks of guerrilla warfare against small enemy detachments, staff officers, and despatch riders.

These specific tasks, such as tampering with rear ammunition dumps, cutting telecommunications, ambush of staff cars, guerrilla attacks on HQs and lines of communication, rely for their maximum effect on repetition night



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after night. They could not be carried out by auxiliary operational groups or paratroops, as such large groups of uniformed men could not exist for any length of time behind enemy lines unsupported. They are ideally suited tasks for JEDBURGH teams, however, where only three men have to be received by the indigenous groups, whose members are already skilled at concealing themselves whenever necessary.

3. Other Possible Uses.

A JEDBURGH team may be despatched to an area where no actual or potential resistance group exists . . . but only if the task is of high priority and if at least one member of the team knows the district intimately.

Another possibility is that JEDBURGH teams will be sent in to act as reception for bodies of airborne troops. In this case the JEDBURGHS would be the liaison between the airborne troops and the resistance elements in the area.

It has also been proposed that several JEDBURGH teams might be despatched to work together in a given area, under a senior officer (Pr.10)

DESCRIPTION OF POSSIBLE JEDBURGH OPERATION

Prevention of Enemy Demolition of a Bridge (Pr.11)

1. The Military Commander tells his SF Staff or SO Detachment officer late on D.1 day that he attaches considerable importance to the prevention of demolition of a bridge now located some 50 miles behind the enemy front line. This information is communicated to SOE/SO HQ London.

(Pr.10) DRJ/249 to MG 2 Feb 44 Mf R-7 F-415/7
(Pr.11) Appendix B to Plans/301/156 30 Mar 43.

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2. SOE/SO HQ London decides that this task can not be carried out by either resistance groups alone or by any SOE/SO agent. It is therefore decided to despatch a JEDBURGH team.

3. Approximately 8 local stalwarts will be required to assist the JEDBURGHS in this operation and it will be necessary for the party to survive behind the enemy lines for some time before they are likely to be overrun by the advance of our troops. Accordingly, SOE/SO HQ London arranges for suitable explosives, arms, food, etc. to be packed into containers, selects the JEDBURGH team, and arranges for their briefing and air transport.

4. The JEDBURGH team is dropped into the selected area during the night of D.2/D.3.

On arrival, containers are collected and secreted, the W/T is set up and communication established, while the JEDBURGH leader or second-in-command makes contact with the local resistance group.

5. During the night D.3/D.4, the local group assembles, is issued with arms and equipment, is instructed in its use, and is organized to carry out the task. While the second-in-command undertakes these duties, the leader, with a local guide, reconnoitres the bridge.

6. At this stage the enemy are themselves anxious to preserve the bridge for the eventual withdrawal of their forward troops. Beyond reconnaissance, therefore, the JEDBURGH team takes no action.

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
7. After two or three days it is apparent that the Allied advance is approaching. The Nazis are withdrawing across the bridge and an Axis sapper party is stationed at the bridge and tests charges, etc. The JEDBURGH leader still takes no action beyond keeping the bridge under observation.

8. During this period the local group, having been issued their arms and equipment and having received their instructions, can either disperse to the village and their normal pursuits, or, if German repressive measures become acute, hide in the woods or hills.

9. Eventually the main body of the enemy, including his artillery, has moved back across the river line and all roads are congested with rearward-moving enemy traffic. The enemy sapper party is waiting by the bridge to blow it after his rearguards have crossed.

At this stage the JEDBURGH leader assembles his group within striking distance of the bridge. At the moment when elements of the rearguard are beginning to cross, the local group moves stealthily down the river to the bridge site, cuts the firing cables, kills the small sapper detachment, and removes the explosives.

10. The Allies will now reach this bridge within a very few hours and the enemy has no chance of collecting another sapper party, moving it up against the stream of rearward traffic and blowing the bridge. It is therefore ready for Allied use intact.



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
11. The above operation is pictured as entirely successful. Even if success is not achieved, and if the enemy blows the bridge at any stage in the battle, this information can be passed back to the Allied Command by the JEDBURGH W/T and plans adjusted accordingly. The JEDBURGHS will also have carried out their secondary guerrilla warfare tasks.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND FINAL APPROVAL OF JEDBURGH PLAN

Exercise "SPARTAN"

Members of SOE participated in a General Headquarters exercise, "SPARTAN," which was held from midnight 3 March until midday 11 March 1943. (Pr.12) The exercise was a simulated invasion of the Continent at the stage when Allied troops would fan out from a bridgehead already gained. The "British" forces advanced from the direction of Salisbury Plain towards Huntingdon. The "Germans" attempted to hold this advance. In "SPARTAN" 11 SOE JEDBURGH teams were used on behalf of the "British" Second Army. Other ranks from the 8th Battalion of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers acted as the local resistance groups. SOE also infiltrated 6 agents and W/Ts into "German" territory. Counter-espionage personnel were placed in the field to give practice to the agents and the Field Security Police. The agents and JEDBURGHS were from the Country Section desks of SOE; many were foreigners, but this was no obstacle as all could speak good English.

A special W/T base was established in Scotland to



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which all agents and JEDBURGH parties worked and which was linked up to the SOE representatives at "British" Army Headquarters. Staff officers from SOE were attached to "British" Army Corps and Divisional Headquarters. Lieutenant-Colonel (then Captain) F. O. Canfield (Pr.13) represented SO Branch during the exercise.

In the exercise the JEDBURGHS were allotted tactical tasks which may be summarized as follows:

Demolitions5 Prevention of demolitions3
Dislocations of lines of communication2
Attack on HQ1

Secondary tasks were given of general guerrilla activities against small enemy and administrative detachments, against staff officers in cars, and against despatch riders.

From this exercise the following conclusions were reached regarding JEDBURGH operations:

a. JEDBURGHS should normally be dropped well back (over 40 miles) behind the German front line. Having been dropped well back, and having carried out their primary tasks in the enemy's rear, JEDBURGHS, if still alive and in W/T communication, will, if the tide of battle flows in our favor, become located nearer and nearer to the front line, and available for tactical tasks.

b. JEDBURGHS are particularly suitable to operate against the enemy's lines of communication and to carry out, with the help of "local groups", small-scale guerrilla warfare.

(Pr.13) War Diary Vol 11 p. 5

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c. Agents may, in certain circumstances be instructed to arrange reception and prepare local groups for JEDBURGH operations in their vicinity.

d. JEDBURGHS must, like agents, be picked up directly they are overrun by our advance.

e. At least 72 hours will usually elapse between the time when the Military Commander states his requirements and approves a project and when the JEDBURGH team can start to undertake the task. Thus, tasks of immediate tactical importance can not normally be given to JEDBURGHS.


f. SOE Staffs and Signal Sections in the field are required to be attached to Army Headquarters and to Army Group Headquarters. A small SOE detachment should also work permanently at Supreme Headquarters.

BASIC JEDBURGH PAPERS

The lessons learned in exercise "SPARTAN" were incorporated in a paper prepared by the Planning Section of SOE issued under the date of 6 April 1943. This paper, entitled "COORDINATION OF ACTIVITIES BEHIND THE ENEMY LINES WITH THE ACTIONS OF ALLIED MILITARY FORCES INVADING N.W. EUROPE", (Pr.14) was submitted to the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander for his approval. The paper recommended that "the methods of employment and control of resistance groups formulated herein be accepted and that general approval be given to the provision of the necessary personnel and stores so that planning may commence immediately."

(Pr.14) War Diary Vol 12 p. 52

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
On 23 April 1943, an American document (15) paralleling the above British paper and bearing the same title, was prepared by Lieutenant-Colonel Franklin O. Canfield, Chief of the Planning Section of SO Branch, and submitted by OSS to the Commanding General, ETOUSA, for approval. The paper recommended general approval for the JEDBURGH plan and for the provision of SO detachments at each U. S. Army HQ, Army Group HQ, at Supreme Allied HQ and at SOE/SO HQ London. . . to coordinate the activity of resistance groups with Allied military operations.

SOE, on 27 May 1943, forwarded to the War Office a second paper (Pr.16) under the same title, in which its personnel requirements "for controlling resistance activities" were more specifically stated. It proposed that a reserve of 35 JEDBURGH teams be made available in England. Of these 105 men, 70 were to be transferred from British Home Forces at the proper time and the other 35 made available by the appropriate Allied government or the Free French Committee. Approximately 90 SOE-trained officers and other ranks would be required for the staffs to be attached to military formations in the field (SOE to supply the majority of this personnel). Another 90 were needed for special signal sections also to be attached to the two British-Canadian armies in the field. (SOE to supply only a small proportion of these.) Lieutenant-General F. E. Morgan, Chief of Staff to the

(Pr.15) War Diary Vol 12 p.65

(Pr.16) CMcVG/1224 27 May 43 Mf R-1 F-382/388

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Supreme Allied Commander, approved the SOE proposals in this 14th Report, dated 19 July 1943. In this report, (Pr.17) sent to the British Chiefs of Staff Committee, General Morgan stated:

"I have discussed with SOE their proposals for establishing shortly before D-day:

a. Small SOE Staffs and Signal Sections at Headquarters of Armies, and SOE representatives at Headquarters of Army Groups and of the Supreme Commander, for controlling resistance groups.

b. Reserve teams of personnel (JEDBURGHS) to be kept in this country for use after D-day, to provide, if necessary, suitable leadership and equipment for those resistance groups found to be in need of them.

I have agreed in principle to these proposals, and request that the Chiefs of Staff instruct the War Office to prepare the detailed establishments and arrange, at the appropriate time, for the transfer to SOE of any personnel necessary."

Acting on the above report, the British Chiefs of Staff Committee, in its 167th meeting, (Pr.18) held on 21 July 1943, "approved the proposals regarding SOE staffs and invited the War Office to prepare the detailed establishments and arrange at the appropriate time for the transfer to SOE of any necessary personnel."


The OSS proposals were indorsed by Major-General R. W. Barker, Deputy Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander, in a memorandum to the Chief of Staff ETOUSA dated 17 July 1943 (Pr.19). The memorandum - "DIRECTION AND SUPPORT OF RESISTANCE GROUPS IN ENEMY-OCCUPIED COUNTRIES

(Pr.17) War Diary Vol 12 p.117

(Pr.18) Minutes 167th Meeting British C of S
21 Jul 43. Mf R-1 F-403/3A

(Pr.19) War Diary Vol 12 p.69

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SUBSEQUENT TO THE INITIATION OF OPERATIONS ON THE CONTINENT"
 - was prepared for General Barker's signature by Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph F. Haskell (Pr.20) of G-5 (Planning Division of ETOUSA and COSSAC). It made the following conclusions and recommendations:

a. That on staffs of U. S. armies there should be American officers to coordinate and control, through SOE/SO HQ, the activities of resistance groups in accordance with desires of the army commanders.

b. That it is desirable to have JEDBURGH teams led by American officers in contact with resistance groups in areas in which U. S. armies will operate.

c. That approval in principle to the OSS proposals be granted.

d. That the organization for U. S. army staffs be worked out between OSS, G-2 and G-3 ETOUSA.

e. That the number of American JEDBURGH teams to be organized and trained be determined by OSS, SOE and G-5 ETOUSA in conjunction with representatives of COSSAC.

f. That the organization and training of staff officers and JEDBURGH teams, British and American, proceed simultaneously.


g. That as soon as the number and organization are determined, the OSS be directed to secure the required personnel and proceed with the training of the individuals.

The above memorandum was approved by Lieutenant-General J. L. Devers, U. S. Theater Commander, on 24 August 1943; and on 29 August the Theater Commander issued a directive (Pr.21) to the Commanding Officer, OSS ETOUSA, ordering that the plans for coordinating resistance group activities be implemented and advising that the War Department had been requested (Pr.22) to give full support to OSS for the recruiting of specially qualified personnel in time

(Pr.20) War Diary Vol 11 p.1

(Pr.21) War Diary Vol 12 p.118

(Pr.22) AGWAR Cable #W.3727 28 Aug 43 Mf R-1 F-192



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to begin training with the British.

Concurrence of SOE, OSS, G-3 ETOUSA, and COSSAC was given on 20 September 1943 to the organization and training by OSS of 35 American JEDBURGH teams, plus 15 reserve teams, for operations in support of Allied forces invading the Continent (Fr.23) the same number that had previously been authorized to SOE. On 9 October 1943, the Commanding Officer, OSS ETOUSA, requested authority of the Commanding General, ETOUSA, to increase the OSS Detachment Table of Allotment to provide for personnel required to activate the approved operational plans; (Fr.24) summarized as follows:

- 50 JEDBURGH officers
- 50 JEDBURGH enlisted men (Free French to supply third man in each team.)
- 10 officers for instructing JEDBURGH teams
- 1 officer for JEDBURGH administrative work
- 33 officers and 27 enlisted men for special staffs at Army Group and Army Headquarters in the field
- 2 officers for assignment to Supreme Allied Headquarters
- 39 officers for SOE/SO HQ London, for joint control of JEDBURGH teams and resistance groups.


The above table of allotment for OSS was indorsed approved by the Commanding General, ETOUSA, on 16 October 1943.

RECRUITING OF AMERICAN JEDBURGH PERSONNEL

The Acting Chief of SO Branch, OSS London, on 15 April 1943, had appointed the Chief of the SO Planning Section, Lieutenant-Colonel (then Captain) F. O. Canfield, as the U. S. officer responsible in all matters concerning JEDBURGHS (Fr.25). In fulfilling this responsibility,

(Fr.23) War Diary Vol 12 p.119
(Fr.24) War Diary Vol 12 p.122
(Fr.25) Memo Brewer to Chief SOE Planning Sec
15 Apr 43 Mf R-1 F-328

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Lieutenant-Colonel Canfield worked closely with the head of the SOE Planning Section, (Lieutenant-Colonel M. W. Rowlandson.) Lieutenant-Colonel Canfield had previously been appointed the SO representative in SOE's newly formed Planning Section, 3 March 1943. It was due to this cooperation, and to the cooperation of the officers who assisted them at COSSAC, that the SOE and OSS proposals were in complete agreement, and were submitted and ultimately approved almost simultaneously. This made it possible for the British and American JEDBURGH teams to begin their training jointly early in January 1944.


Major (then Captain) John Tyson, (Pr.26) Chief of the SO Training Section was made responsible for American JEDBURGH training on 1 September 1943 . . . but at that time no American JEDBURGHS had yet been recruited.

Lieutenant-Colonel Canfield, in an air-pouch letter dated 25 August 1943 to Major George Sharp, Area Operations Officer for Western Europe, made the following statement on the importance of recruiting suitable personnel for SO operations in the European Theater:

"The Plan for SO representation at SOE HQ, for SO Staffs with U. S. armies, and for agents and JEDBURGHS in the area where U. S. armies will operate, depends exclusively on one thing: qualified personnel to carry it out."

Accordingly, soon after the final approval of the OSS proposals by the Theater Commander on 24 August 1943, Lieutenant-Colonel Canfield left London (4 September 1943) for Washington, on a recruiting mission. He carried with

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him basic documents on the approved plans for JEDBURGHS and Army Staffs, as well as a letter to the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, War Department, signed by Brigadier-General James C. Crockett, Assistant Chief of Staff G-2 ETOUSA, requesting "that arrangements be made for Lieutenant-Colonel Canfield or any other officers appointed by him to visit the necessary camps or stations to enable him to select personnel with the special qualifications required" (Pr.27). OSS Washington authorized 100 officer personnel slots for the European Theater, in order to carry out the so-called JEDBURGH Plan, which actually included Army Staffs and SOE/SO HQ personnel as well. It was planned to use 50 of the slots for JEDBURGH officers, 34 for SO Army Staffs, and 16 for SOE/SO HQ, these officers to be assigned to the Western European and Planning Sections.


The qualifications for JEDBURGH officers were as follows:

"Officers recruited as leaders and seconds-in-command should be picked for qualities of leadership and daring, ability to speak and understand French, and all-round physical condition. They should be experienced in handling men, preferably in an active theater of operations, and be prepared to be parachuted in uniform behind enemy lines and operate on their own for some time. They must have had at least basic military training and preferably have aptitude for use of small arms weapons." (Pr.28)

For JEDBURGH radio operators the qualifications were as follows:

(Pr.27) Ltr G-2 ETOUSA to G-2 War Dept 2 Sep 43 Mf R-1 F-338
 (Pr.28) Personnel Rqmts SOE/SO D-day Plan
 29 Sep 43 Mf R-1 F-389/391

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"Qualifications for radio operators are not so high as for leaders and seconds-in-command, and a fair working knowledge of French is sufficient. In addition to normal requirements for good radio operators, they must be of exceptionally good physique to stand up to training and be prepared to be parachuted behind enemy lines to operate their sets in open under war conditions. They should attain a speed of 15 words per minute before being shipped to the U.K." (Pr.29)

A special meeting to discuss JEDBURGH Plan recruitment was held in Washington on 1 October 1943, with the following OSS officers in attendance: Colonel E. L. Connely, Chief of the Personnel Procurement Branch; Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Gamble, Assistant Chief of Strategic Services Operations; Lieutenant-Colonel R. T. Salzmann, Major George Sharp, Major J. F. Lincoln, and Mr. C. Sumner Williams, of the SO Western European Desk; Lieutenant-Colonel L. Lowman, Chief of the OSS Communications Branch; Major J. E. Alderdice, Executive Officer of the OG Branch; Mr. G. W. Howland, OSS Security Officer; Mr. J. M. Scribner, Chief of Strategic Services Operations; and Lieutenant-Colonel Canfield (Pr.30). It was agreed that the recruiting would fall into three parts:

- a. Procurement of 50 JEDBURGH officers.
- b. Procurement of 50 enlisted JEDBURGH W/T operators.
- c. Procurement of 50 SO Army Staff officers.

The Executive Officer, Operational Groups, was made responsible for recruiting the 50 JEDBURGH officer leaders, working in conjunction with Colonel Connely's office. The Communications Branch and the Personnel Procurement Branch

(Pr.29) Personnel Rqmts SOE/SO D-day Plan

29 Sep 43 Mr R-1 F-389/391

(Pr.30) Minutes Meeting on Spec JEDBURGH Plan Rcrmt OSS
Wash 1 Oct 43 Mr R-1 F-392/383

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
undertook to secure the 50 JEDBURGH W/T operators from Army Signal Corps schools. Candidates for the SO Army Staffs were to be supplied through the cooperation of G-2 Division, War Department, and the Army Ground Forces. A screening committee for interviewing the officers was appointed, consisting of Mr. C. S. Williams, Lieutenant-Colonel R. T. Salzmman, and Lieutenant-Colonel Canfield. With respect to security, SA-1 forms were to be made out promptly and Mr. G. W. Howland would attempt to clear all of the selected individuals prior to their departure from the U. S.

Most of this intensive recruiting had been completed by the end of November 1943. The following men had been secured to implement SO's plans for the European Theater: 55 JEDBURGH officers, 62 JEDBURGH radio operators, 54 Army Staff officers, and 27 enlisted men for the Army Staffs. Ten French Army officers, from the French Military Mission, were also secured as possible JEDBURGH officer candidates, but these men were not counted in the American quota. The principal sources of the above personnel were:

a. 55 JEDBURGH officers. Upon request of OSS to the Adjutant General, through the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, HQ, Army Ground Forces, and with the concurrence of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2----- roughly 100 officers with the necessary qualifications were ordered to Washington on 21-day temporary duty for interview by OSS (Pr.31). Many of those chosen were from parachute regiments of the Airborne Command.

(Pr.31) Ltr Director OSS to Adj Gen via AC of S,
G-1 HQ AGF 9 Oct 43

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b. 62 JEDBURGH radio operators. Upon request by OSS to the Assistant Chief of Staff G-1 through the Military Personnel Division, Army Service Forces, permission was secured to recruit W/T operators from Army Signal Corps schools (Pr.32). OSS recruiting missions were then sent to the Signal School at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, where 6 qualified men were obtained, and to the Signal School at Camp Crowder, Missouri, where 50 qualified men were obtained. Six French-speaking U. S. navy ratings, who were in training at the OSS Communications School, were also added to the group.


c. 54 Army Staff officers. At the instigation of OSS, the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, with concurrence of the Assistant Chief of Staff G-1, requested the Adjutant General, to order officers with the necessary qualifications to Washington on 14-day temporary duty for interview by OSS (Pr.33). The officers were made available through HQ, Army Ground Forces, and the majority selected had had considerable army staff experience. Intimate knowledge of France and the French language also influenced selection.

His mission completed, Lieutenant-Colonel Canfield returned to London on 28 November 1943.

(Pr.32) Ltr Director OSS to AC of S G-1 via Mil Pers Div
ASF 9 Oct 43 Mf R-1 F-213/5

(Pr.33) Ltr AC of S G-2 to Adj Gen 22 Sep 43 Mf R-1 F-394/396

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ARRIVAL OF AMERICAN JEDBURGHS IN U.K.

The 55 JEDBURGH officers arrived in the UK on 23 December 1943 and were put through the Student Assessment Board in three groups between 28 December 1943 and 5 January 1944. Thirty-seven of the JEDBURGH officer candidates were selected for training and sent in three groups to the following schools in Scotland, STS-6, STS-45, and STS-41, where they underwent preliminary training until Milton Hall was opened on 5 February 1944. The group of JEDBURGH radio operator recruits arrived in the UK on 31 December 1943 and were sent to the Communications School, STS-54. They were not put through the Student Assessment Board but each man was interviewed by three psychiatrists. After a month of W/T training 46 of the original 62 joined the JEDBURGH officer group at Milton Hall on 5 February, the others either having been transferred out of OSS or assigned to the Western European Section.

JEDBURGH TRAINING PLANS

(Note. JEDBURGH training is dealt with in greater detail in the Training Section, Volume 10, of this Diary. The following is a summary of training plans as contemplated in December 1943.)

Plans called for the training of 300 JEDBURGHS, consisting approximately of equal numbers of British, American and French officers, including 100 W/T operators (enlisted men) from British and American sources (Fr.34).

(Fr.34) Memo SO Training Off to SO Planning Off
4 Sep 43 Mf R-1 F-397/398

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PREAMBLE . . . TO 1 JANUARY 1944

JEDBURGH

Training for JEDBURGH officers was to be given, beginning 3 January 1944, at Milton Hall, Peterborough. Training for W/T operators was scheduled at STS-54 until 1 February 1944, and thereafter at Milton Hall, at which time the individual three-man JEDBURGH teams would be formed.

The general training program would be divided into two parts - 6 weeks basic paramilitary training and 6 weeks operational training, including parachute jumping at STS-51. The operational training was planned to consist of constant rehearsal of actual operations: teams to be dropped by parachute, stores collected, suitable hide-outs found, W/T communications established, and raids made on "enemy targets."

In addition to the above, it was planned to give JEDBURGH officers general instruction in:

- a. Background of resistance movements in North-West Europe since 1940.
- b. Ways in which resistance groups can assist in an invasion.
- c. Geography of France and the Low Countries.
- d. Observation and memory training.

1 April 1944 was the target date set for the completion of JEDBURGH training. (Pr.35) By D-day it was hoped that all the British and American JEDBURGH officers would have a sound working knowledge of the French language and a good general idea of present-day life in France.

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PREAMBLE . . . TO 1 JANUARY 1944

JEDBURGHS

Specific details of the training program were to be worked out by the SOE Training Section Chief, (Colonel James Young,) and by the SO Branch Training Head, Major John Tyson, in consultation with the JEDBURGH Section, which had been set up under the Western European Section. Major Henry B. Coxe, Jr., (Pr.36) was assigned to the JEDBURGH Section as the SO Branch representative, on 1 December 1943. At that time the British head of the JEDBURGH Section was (Major Combe-Tennant,) Major John Tyson had requisitioned 10 American officers from Washington to serve as instructors at the JEDBURGH school.

JEDBURGH EQUIPMENT AND STORES

A joint SOE/SO committee headed by (Majors Combe-Tennant) and Coxe was set up to consider and deal with all questions of JEDBURGH equipment. [Colonel Young] and Major Tyson were directed to obtain the necessary quantities of stores, to be held at Milton Hall. A standard short wave radio set for the use of JEDBURGHS in the field was designed, and (Colonel F. W. Nicholls) Chief Signals Officer of SOE, was asked to confirm that enough of these sets would be available to meet training and operational requirements.

JEDBURGH SECURITY

The British and American heads of the JEDBURGH Section (Majors Combe-Tennant) and Coxe) were given the task of providing suitable cover stories for


- a. the training of JEDBURGHS in England

0036


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Layout of Jed Equipment FIGURE 1



Supply Department - Milton Hall FIGURE 2

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FIGURE 3



FIGURE 4

Jedburgh Fully Equipped

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Jedburgh in Full Equipment FIGURE 5



Jedburgh with Full Equipment FIGURE 6

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PREAMBLE . . . TO 1 JANUARY 1944

JEDBURGHS

b. use by JEDBURGHS in case of capture in the field.
In this they were to consult with the Chief Security Officer
of SOE.

It was decided that "Allied Commandos" would be the
official cover for Milton Hall, and that the school would
be designated "ME/65."

Consideration was given to the possibility of issuing
false "ordres de missions" to JEDBURGHS upon going into
the field. A possible cover of Airborne Division uniforms
was also discussed.

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JEDBURGH

JEDBURGHMILTON HALLAdministration

The first Commandant of the Jedburgh training school was Lieutenant-Colonel Frank V. Spooner of the British Army, who had been assigned to this post during the latter part of December.

Lieutenant-Colonel Spooner was largely responsible for the development of the training program and for the physical establishment of Milton Hall. Major H. W. Fuller, USMC (1), was assigned as deputy commandant, and [Major O. H. Brown,] British Army, as chief instructor. Major R. V. McLallen, AUS (2), was appointed deputy chief instructor. (Major H. L. Trebilcock,] British Army, was assigned as adjutant, with additional duty of transport officer. Captain S. Thornton, Inf(3), U.S. Army, was appointed area administrative officer. Toward the end of February, (Major John Sherwood,] British Army, was designated commander for the headquarters company and he also assumed the duties of accounts officer. (Major R. D. Guthrie,] British Army, represented G-2. (Captain McCoy was the medical officer for the school and was assisted by two medical orderlies.)

In addition to the above administrative officers, there were twenty-five instructors, whose names are as follows:

(Major W. Sykes,] British Army
 (Captain S. Lasarewitz,] British Army
 (Captain A. Thornton,] British Army
 (Captain Ogden-Smith,] British Army
 (Captain R. Fenton,] British Army
 (Captain J. J. Marchant,] British Army

-
- (1) War Diary Vol 11 p. 552
 (2) War Diary Vol 11 p. 31
 (3) War Diary Vol 11 p. 551

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LT COL MUSGRAVE - CO JED
TRAINING CENTER

(Captain D. Nielson,) British Army
(Captain D. Stern,) British Army
(Captain A. W. C. Coomber,) British Army
(Captain V. A. Gough,) British Army
(Captain J. De W. Waller,) British Army
Captain C. Manniere, Inf (4), U.S. Army
Captain W. Dreux, Inf (5), U.S. Army
Captain B. M. W. Knox, AC (6), U.S. Army
(Captain A. Cooper,) British Army
(Lieutenant L. Young,) British Army
(Lieutenant A. du P. Denning,) British Army
(Lieutenant I. Isaacs,) British Army
Lieutenant L. Swank, CE (7), U.S. Army
Lieutenant A. Bank, Inf (8), U.S. Army
Lieutenant L. E. Conien, Inf (9), U.S. Army
(Lieutenant R. Kirkby,) British Army
Lieutenant P. Brightman, FA (10), U.S. Army
Lieutenant G. Di Giovanni, Ord (11), U.S. Army

All of these officers, including the administrative personnel, became operational with the exception of four men: (Lieutenant Kirkby,) British Army; (Captain Cooper,) British Army; 1st Lieutenant Di Giovanni, U.S. Army, and 1st Lieutenant P. Brightman, U.S. Army.

(Major Sykes,) British Army, was a member of the staff and acted as instructor in weapon training and unarmed combat until relieved for reasons of health. On 17 March (Lieutenant L. Young,) British Army, a signal officer, was replaced by (Captain G. S. Kenney,) British Army. For the purpose of administration, Jedburgh officers were formed into three

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companies. A company was commanded by Major H. A. Dorsey, Ord (12), B Company by (Major M. C. M. Crosby,) British, and C Company by (Major B. W. Gilmour,) British. (Captain E. T. Robinson,) British Army, KDG, was quartermaster.

For the most part, the administrative and instructional staff remained the same throughout the training period. However, certain changes in the way of replacements or additions were made. On 8 April (Lieutenant-Colonel Musgrave,) British Army, became the commandant, replacing Lieutenant-Colonel Spooner, and on 3 May Major McLallen was appointed deputy commandant to succeed Major Fuller, who was dispatched with 15 Jedburgh teams to North Africa (13).

In view of the fact that nearly all the permanent staff had become operational, it was deemed necessary to secure two additional officers. On 19 April Lieutenant (R. J. Thompson,) British Army, and (Lieutenant F. P. Bellamy,) British Army, joined the staff. It was also decided to effect a change in the organization of the three companies of Jedburgh officers and on 24 April Major H. A. Dorsey, who had had the command of Company A, became the administrative officer for all three companies.

A second signal officer, in the person of (Captain J. G. Lewis,) British Army, was assigned to the school on 18 May. During May, (Captain J. A. Revell,) British Army, became the transport officer and (Captain A. W. Tew,) British Army, was appointed accounts officer.

LONDON

Administration

To carry out the administrative functions in London in connection with the Jedburgh program a staff of officers

(12) War Diary Vol 11 p.560

(13) Memo Canfield to Ops "A" Sub Sec G-3 SHAEF 27 Apr 44
Mf R-1 F-92

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was created with headquarters at Baker Street. Major H. Coxe, Jr., Cav (14), and (Major F. O'Brien) (British Army) were assigned as joint heads of this group. The latter represented the SOE branch until early in March when he was relieved by (Lieutenant-Colonel Carleton Smith.) Major J. Tyson, AUS (15), was designated head of the training section and in this capacity was responsible for arranging for the training, equipment, encadrement, and transport of personnel to the school. During the training period the command was vested in the staff at Milton Hall headed by (Lieutenant-Colonel Spooner.) On 8 April at the termination of this phase the command, henceforth operational, was assigned to (Lieutenant-Colonel Smith) and Major Coxe. The remaining officers comprising the London staff were as follows:

Major J. W. Jaycox, Inf (16), briefing officer

(Major J. V. A. Horton,) (Br.), briefing officer

(Major F. L. Young,) (Br.), briefing officer

Captain Francis L. Coolidge, AC (17), briefing officer

Captain E. Buck (FANY), administrative officer

(Lieutenant Andre V. Wastin) (Fr.), briefing officer

AMERICAN PERSONNEL OF JEDBURGH TEAMS

The original scheme called for the training of 50 American Jedburgh teams. After selection and screening by an assessment board had taken place, only 35 qualified officers were available by 1 January from the United States. In order to fill the quota, Colonel D. K. E. Bruce requested permission from the Commanding General, ETOUSA, that two OSS officers be allowed to visit U.S. Divisions in England and examine the records of officers who might be fitted for inclusion in the Jedburgh plan. (18) On 10 January Majors

War Diary Vol 11 (14) p18 ; (15) p.19 ; (16) p.60 ; (17) p.63
(18) Memo Bruce to CG ETOUSA 5 Jan 44 Mr R-1 F-399/400

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H. B. Cox and H. W. Fuller were authorized by the Assistant Adjutant General to procure the additional number in this manner. (19) Some of the new recruits were obtained in a comparatively short time, while others did not report to Milton Hall until late in February, thus the problem arose of giving all an equal amount of basic and operational training, and adjustments in the courses had to be made from time to time to meet this need.

The following is a list of American Jedburgh officers and W/T operators who completed their training and were qualified for assignment on D-day:

Major John H. Bonsall, FA (20)
 Major William E. Colby, FA (21)
 Major John M. Olmsted, Inf (22)
 Captain Douglas D. Bazata, Inf (23)
 Captain Charles E. Brown, Cav (24)
 Captain Charles M. Carman, Jr., Inf (25)
 Captain Francis L. Coolidge, AC
 Captain Konrad C. Dillow, Inf (26)
 Captain Phillip W. Donovan, Inf (27)
 Captain Cecil F. Mynatt, FA, (28)
 Captain William H. Pietsch, Jr., Inf (29)
 Captain McCord Sollenberger, Cav (30)
 1st Lieutenant William C. Boggs, Inf (31)
 1st Lieutenant Ian Forbes, FA (32)
 1st Lieutenant Robert E. Heyns, Inf (33)
 1st Lieutenant Robert A. Lucas, Inf (34)
 1st Lieutenant Raymond E. Moore, Inf (35)

(19) Memo Corley to CG 1st U.S. Army and CG SOS, ETOUSA 10 Jan 44/
 War Diary Vol 11 (20) p.563; (21) p.564; (22) p.565; (23) p.566
 (24) p.567; (25) p.568; (26) p.569; (27) p.570; (28) p.571
 (29) p.572; (30) p.573; (31) p.574; (32) p.575; (33) p.576
 (34) p.577; (35) p.578

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JEDBURGHs

1st Lieutenant Robert G. Mundinger, FA (36)
1st Lieutenant John K. Singlaub, Inf (37)
1st Lieutenant Mason B. Starring, Inf (38)
1st Lieutenant Harvey A. Todd, Inf (39)
1st Lieutenant Shirley R. Trumps, Inf (40)
1st Lieutenant George M. Verhaeghe, Inf (41)
1st Lieutenant Lucien H. Wante, Inf (42)

DETACHED

Major John J. Gildee, FA (43)
Major Robert K. Montgomery, Inf (44)
Major John W. Summers, Cav (45)
Captain Paul Cyr, Inf (46)
Captain William B. Dreux, Inf
Captain Stephen J. Knerly, FA (47)
Captain Bernard M. W. Knox, AC
1st Lieutenant Robert M. Anstett, CAC (48)
1st Lieutenant Philip H. Chadbourn, Jr., Inf (49)

NORTH AFRICA

Major Horace W. Fuller, USMCR
Captain Everret T. Allen, FA (50)
Captain B. M. Austin, Inf (51)
Captain Aaron Bank, Inf
Captain Nelson E. Guillot, FA (52)
Captain Cyrus E. Manniere, Inf
1st Lieutenant Lucein E. Conein, Inf
1st Lieutenant Ray H. Foster, Inf (53)

War Diary Vol 11 (36) p.579; (37) p.580; (38) p.581; (39) p.582
(40) p.583; (41) p.584; (42) p.585; (43) p.586; (44) p.587
(45) p.588; (46) p.589; (47) p.590; (48) p.591; (49) p.592
(50) p.593; (51) p.594; (52) p.595; (53) p.596

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1st Lieutenant Charles Gennerich, Inf (54)
 1st Lieutenant Walter C. Hanna, FA (55)
 1st Lieutenant Henry D. McIntosh, Inf (56)
 1st Lieutenant Lawrence E. Swank, CE 95

ENLISTED MEN

M Sgt Roger L. Pierre (57)
 T Sgt Albert V. Bacik (58)
 T Sgt Robert R. Baird (59)
 T Sgt Willard W. Beynon (60)
 T Sgt James R. Billingsley (61)
 T Sgt John L. Bradner (62)
 T Sgt James J. Caldwell (63)
 T Sgt Francis J. Cole (64)
 T Sgt Roger E. Cote (65)
 T Sgt Anthony J. Denneau (66)
 T Sgt Elmer B. Esch, (67)
 T Sgt Richard C. Floyd (68)
 T Sgt Norman R. Franklin (69)
 T Sgt Lewis F. Goddard (70)
 T Sgt Frank A. Hanson, Jr. (71)
 T Sgt Michael F. Henely (72)
 T Sgt Lucien E. Lajeunesse (73)
 T Sgt Charles P. Morsereau (74)
 T Sgt Vincent M. Rocca (75)
 T Sgt Carl A. Scott (76)
 T Sgt Donald A. Spears (77)
 T Sgt John L. Stoyka (78)
 Tec 3 John A. White (79)

War Diary Vol 11 (54) p.597; (55) p.598; (56) p.599; (57) p.600
 (58) p.601; (59) p.602; (60) p.603; (61) p.604; (62) p.605
 (63) p.606; (64) p.607; (65) p.608; (66) p.609; (67) p.610
 (68) p.611; (69) p.612; (70) p.613; (71) p.614; (72) p.615
 (73) p.616; (74) p.617; (75) p.618; (76) p.619; (77) p.620
 (78) p.621; (79) p.622

DETACHED

1st Sgt Lucien J. Bourgoïn (80)
1st Sgt Robert R. Kehoe (81)
1st Sgt Lee J. Watters (82)
T Sgt Berent E. Friele (83)
T Sgt John E. McGowan (84)
Tec 3 William F. Zielski, Jr. (85)

NORTH AFRICA

1st Sgt Jacob B. Berlin (86)
T Sgt Robert J. Anderson (87)
T Sgt William H. Adams (88)
T Sgt Theodore Baumgold (89)
T Sgt James J. Carpenter (90)
T Sgt Arthur Gruen (91)
T Sgt Howard V. Palmer (92)
T Sgt Francis M. Poche, Jr. (93)
T Sgt William T. Thompson (94)
T Sgt John T. Van Hart (95)
T Sgt Thomas J. Tracy (96)

FRENCH PERSONNEL

To facilitate the contact with French resistance leaders, it had been agreed to have a French officer as a component part of each team. Difficulties arose in securing the necessary personnel from the French forces then training in England; consequently a representative of OSS and SOE had to make a recruiting trip to the Middle East, and the 70 French officers to be included did not reach Milton Hall until late in March. They proved to be, on the whole, well-trained, seasoned soldiers, many of whom had been in the service of

War Diary Vol 11 (80) p.623; (81) p.624; (82) p.625; (83) p.626
(84) p.627; (85) p.628; (86) p.629; (87) p.630; (88) p.631
(89) p.632; (90) p.633; (91) p.634; (92) p.635; (93) p.636
(94) p.637; (95) p.638; (96) p.639

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FIGURE 8


Milton Hall



FIGURE 9

Jed Teams Exercising at Milton Hall

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Milton Hall

FIGURE 10



FIGURE

Enlisted Men's Quarters at Milton Hall //

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France since 1940. They did not need the basic training and devoted themselves to specialized operational tasks. In spite of natural linguistic obstacles, personal relations among the various groups were exceptionally good and few "misunderstandings" developed.

TRAINING

It had been designed originally to set up a 6 weeks' period of basic training at Milton Hall to be followed by a more specialized and technical program, but as Milton Hall was not ready for occupancy until 1 February, the Jedburgh officers and enlisted men were split into three equal groups and assigned to the following schools:

STS 45, which is at Fairford, Gloucester

STS 40, which is at Gumley Hall, Lancashire

STS 6, which is at Walsingham, Surrey

The major part of the basic training was furnished at these schools from early January to 1 February. On this latter date, groups of 50 were sent to STS 51, located at Altrincham, Manchester, for a special 3-day course in parachute jumping. All officers and enlisted men were required to make three jumps, two during daylight and one at night. As many of the trainees had had previous acquaintance with parachute jumping, this experience was not entirely a novel one. At the conclusion of each course, the Jedburghs were granted a leave of 3 days, after which they reported to Milton Hall for the remainder of their schooling.

Upon the completion of their basic training, the following activities were emphasized:

- Weapon instruction
- Demolitions
- Physical exercise
- Practice in the French language

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Several groups of officers entered the school during the first two weeks in February, without having had preliminary basic training, and special provision had to be made for them.

Operational training began on 21 February and was continued until D-day. During this phase of instruction, stress was placed on the execution of practical field exercises, in collective rather than individual training.

To provide a background for the trainees, a series of talks by prominent outsiders and experts in their field was arranged on a variety of subjects, such as history of the resistance movement in France, the Maquis, Corsica, current conditions in Belgium. Brigadier E. E. Mockler-Ferryman, director of the London group, gave the first of these talks on 24 February, (97) speaking on the subject of the "Role of the Jedburghs." He declared that "their functions will be strategic from the point of view of Allied High Command in that they will operate some distance behind the lines", but that, on the other hand, "the actual task will be of a tactical nature, in that they will go into the field with the object of operating with the resistance groups, French, Belgian or Dutch, as the case may be."

PHYSICAL FACILITIES OF MILTON HALL

On 1 February Milton Hall became the home of the Jedburghs. Although it had been secured in December from its previous occupants, considerable alterations had to be made and quarters for the over-flow officer personnel and for the enlisted men had to be erected on grounds nearby. The Hall was a splendid example of late 17th Century architecture; it possessed several hundred rooms and had extensive

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grounds. It was located four miles from the town of Peterborough and was reached from the main road by a driveway one-half mile in length. In the process of converting the Hall into a school, a number of rooms on the first and second floors were turned into officers' class rooms or rooms for demonstrations. An effort was made to secure the latest equipment for wireless sending and other techniques that would prove of value to the Jedburghs when they were put in the field. Equipment for athletics was complete. A motion picture projector was secured and set up in a large room on the first floor and films illustrating features of the training courses were frequently shown.

PRE-D-DAY JEDBURGH PREPARATIONS IN FRANCE

It is clear that while the training of the Jedburgh teams was of paramount importance, attention should also be directed to preparations for the reception of the teams in France. Three meetings of officers familiar with the situation in France were held in London during January to discuss this phase of the question. Major de Owelis, Major Debesse, Major Rewez, Major Coxie and Major O'Brien were present at the third meeting on 25 January. It was believed that these preparations should be concerned primarily with the discovery of safe houses, the organization of reception committees, and "creation of small groups to form the nuclei of larger forces to be put at the disposal of the Jedburgh teams on and after D-day." (98) It was further agreed that Captain M. Millett should assume the responsibility for the first two of these tasks. In order to carry them out, he was to travel to France, taking on his person two and one-half million francs, a sum to be

(98) Pre D-day Jed Preparations DRJ/173 25 Jan 44 Mf R-1 F-207/9

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FIGURE 12

Demolition Class at Milton Hall



FIGURE 13

Wireless Instruction at Milton Hall

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Night Perception Training

FIGURE 14



FIGURE 15

Model Used for Night Perception Training
- Various degrees of moonlight and starlight -

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Night Perception Training **FIGURE 16**



FIGURE 17
Armory at Milton Hall
(Complete Types of Small Arms - German, British and American)

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furnished in three equal parts by SOE, OSS and BRAL. His mission, which was to be the basis for the reception of the Jedburgh teams, is referred to hereafter as the Mitchell Plan. (99) The formation of the small groups of resistance elements was to be undertaken by: (a) the BRAL military delegates, and (b) the F-Section organizers, "if that were possible."

FIELD EXERCISES

Field exercises constituted a most important side of the operational training. They were designed in accordance with directives to simulate actual conditions and problems that were likely to be encountered in France. These varied in duration from 36 hours to 10 days. Three of them were known respectively as "Spill Out" (100), "Spur" (101), and "Lash" (102). "Spill Out", one of the first to be undertaken, was a 6-day mock operation carried out in March. "Spur" was intended to be an ambush of a German general staff by partisans, directed by Jedburghs, and was staged on 24 and 25 April for the special benefit of General Koenig, who had arrived to inspect the school. From the standpoint of operational technique, the most outstanding exercise was that of "Lash". Beginning on 31 May and ending on 8 June, this exercise was thus in progress when D-day arrived.

The objectives in its conception were:

First: To give practice in the forming of a plan and the issue of the orders which the plan entailed.

Second: To study the technique of organizing and operating several resistance groups.

Third: To study the problems of communications, local protection and administration in these groups.

-
- (99) Min Jed Mtg on D-day Preparations 25 Jan 44 Mf R-1 F-210/12
 - (100) Ex "Spill Out" staged Mar 44 Mf R-1 F-302/13
 - (101) Ex "Spur" staged 24/25 Apr 44 Mf R-1 F-288/301
 - (102) Ex "Lash" staged 31 May - 8 Jun 44 Mf R-1 F-276/87

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Small Arms Range at Milton Hall **FIGURE 18**




FIGURE 19


Demolition Class at Milton Hall

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
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Milton Hall Training Course

FIGURE 20



Firing Range at Milton Hall

FIGURE 21

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FIGURE 24

Jed Teams on Training Course

Field Course



FIGURE 25

Milton Hall Training Course

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
The area of operation extended over a large part of Leicestershire, not too distant from Milton Hall. There the country side was hilly and there were a number of roads - conditions which made the region suitable for the nature of the exercise. The plan itself provided for a Jedburgh team to contact a resistance group and use it to attack enemy rail communications and other targets to be indicated through W/T at a later time.

The conclusion reached in the critique was that the exercise on the whole had been carried out successfully; but it might have been considered more successful had the movement by daylight to the area of the objective been made in smaller groups rather than in the relatively large parties which could be easily observed by the enemy. Minor criticisms included the drawing up of vague orders which failed to convey to the persons carrying them out the necessary information, and the lack of adequate understanding of the technique of "laying up" to escape the enemy.

SETTING UP OF THE JEDBURGH TEAMS

In the middle of March the first of the Jedburgh teams, consisting of one American or British officer, one French officer and an American or British W/T operator, was established. By the first of April the majority of the teams had been created, though changes in their composition continued to be made throughout the operational period until D-day. Choice of the membership of each team was carried out by Lieutenant-Colonel Spooner and later by his successor (Colonel Musgrave,) with the assistance of the chief instructor Major McLallen. However, much consideration was given to individual preferences expressed in a poll taken

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among the officers and men. In this way it was felt that teams could be secured that would function smoothly and harmoniously without the friction of personalities.

JEDBURGHS TO NORTH AFRICA

The essential part of the Jedburgh training had been completed by 1 April. It was then suggested that teams might be sent to North Africa, from which they could be dispatched to support resistance groups in southern France. Lieutenant-Colonel (then Major) F. O. Canfield, AUS (103), on 27 April secured the necessary approval from Major-General H. R. Bull, AC of S, G-3, by endorsement of OSS request to send fifteen Jedburgh teams, with administrative personnel, to this area (104). On 2 May Major Fuller and the Jedburgh teams, of which seven were American-French, left Milton Hall for the Mediterranean. The North African contingent was augmented in the middle of June when ten additional Jedburgh teams, of which five were dispatched by air to that area.

FINAL OPERATIONAL PROCEDURE

Detailed procedure for the dispatch of Jedburgh teams to France on and after D-day is set forth in "Operational Procedure of Special Force Headquarters, 12 May 1944." (105) An amendment to these instructions was issued on 28 May in order to clarify certain points that might be subject to misinterpretation. (106)


The procedure is outlined under the following headings:

Request for a Jedburgh Team

The request for a Jedburgh team was, in most instances,

-
- (103) War Diary Vol 11 p. 5
 (104) Memo Canfield to Ops "A" Sub Sec G-3 SHAEF 27 Apr 44/ Mf R-1 F-92
 (105) SFHQ Op Procedure 12 May 44 Mf R-1 F-216/75
 (106) Amendment to SFHQ Op Proc of 28 May 44 Mf R-1 F-324

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to be made by SO/SF Staffs in the field. However, SOE/SO liaison officers attached to SHAEF, or the London Group, which should act in accordance with the wishes of BRAL, might originate a request.

Decision to Send a Team

The D/R, after consulting with the country section or sections concerned and the DR/JED, recommended the dispatch of a team. The AD/E or ADE/US should, however, make the final decision.

The Issue of a Warning Order

The D/R was then to explain to the DR/JED, the teams briefing officer, and to a representative from the country section or sections, the nature of the task, and the DR/JED would issue a warning order to the various interested groups.

Preparation for Briefing

The country section would have major responsibility in the assembling of material for the brief. However, the briefing officer, detailed by DR/JED to the country section, would conduct the actual process of briefing. The composition of the Jedburgh team was to be determined by the OC/ME 65, although the AD/E, or ADE/US, or D/R might "ear mark for special tasks, or attain as reserves, certain Jedburgh teams or individual personnel."

Preparation for Dispatch

The country section was to have charge of the arrangements for aircraft, parachutes and packages, and ordering of containers. "The DR/JED will advise the country section of any special containers normally provided for Jedburghs, but the country section is at liberty to alter these, if necessary, in view of the nature of the operations concerned."

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FIGURE 26

Captain Keeny giving radio instructions to a team



FIGURE 27

Harrington dressing room

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Reception Arrangements

The F-Section would have major responsibility for the execution of the Mitchell Plan, which provided for the setting up of safe houses and for contacting the leaders of the partisans groups. Captain Millett, who was formerly attached to DR/JED, was assigned to F-Section.

Briefing of Teams

The country section was to undertake the task of briefing the Jedburgh teams and would have the services of a briefing officer, assigned by DR/JED. It might also call in experts who would have information and knowledge of value to the team.

Dispatch of Team

The transport of the team to the airdrome was to be directed by the DR/JED acting under orders of the country section.

Operation in the Field

Finally, the country section would direct the activities of the team in the field.

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FIGURE 28

Captain J. H. Cox (Br.) ready to board plane.



FIGURE 29

Major J. W. Jaycox briefing a Jedburgh team.

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Lt. Dantec ready to board **FIGURE 30**



Weather office at Harrington

OPERATIONS

Team Hugh (106a)

Jedburgh team Hugh was the first Jedburgh team to be dispatched to France from the U.K.

Members of Team

The members of team Hugh were:

- (Captain L. Legrand, (French), code name: FRANC
- (Captain W. R. Crawshaw (British), code name: CROWN
- (C.C. R. Mersiol) (French), code name: YONNE

Area to Which Dispatched

Team Hugh was dispatched on the night of 5/6 June to the Chateauroux area in the Department of Indre, France.

Background of Resistance in Area

The team was dispatched with an SAS group known as Bullbasket and instructed to make contact with the organization under the direction of our agent Samuel, sent to the field in April 1943. Samuel acted for almost a year as W/T operator and later as personal secretary to Philippe, who had built up an extremely active and powerful organization covering an area from Vierzon to Perigeux with affiliations as far south as Tarbes. Recently this group has been in contact with a group of approximately 2,000 men spread generally over the Indre. Although not a military body, this group was prepared to take action on D-day. Its supply of arms was not good. However, Philippe rated the organization highly.

Philippe and the head of the Indre organization were arrested in early May but contact has been maintained with Samuel, who seemed to have the situation well in hand.

The arrest of their leader has not disrupted the

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Operations, Team Hugh (Cont'd)

organization as is evidenced by the fact that receiving grounds for operations had been received and the circuit organizing Lysander pick-ups in the Indre was functioning normally.

There was no information on organized groups of maquis available. However, the points suggested for dropping stores suggested that there might be some well armed groups up in the wooded region east and northeast of Leblanc.

The region was under the authority of a Delege Militaire Regional.

Purpose of Mission


The primary task of team Hugh was to help SAS in the establishment of their base, which was to be reinforced by other SAS troops and from which raids could be carried out on enemy lines of communication. The team was to arrange whatever assistance from resistance needed by SAS to establish the base.

The team was to report to SFHQ as to the state of resistance elements in the area in terms of personnel, leadership, arms and potentialities. No attempt was to be made to organize large groups in this area unless specifically instructed by SFHQ.

The mission was also to consult with the leader of the group to which it was assigned on the advantages of contacting other groups operating in the area such as the Delege Militaire Regional or the F.F.I. Chief.

Method of Dropping and Reception Committee

The team was to be dropped blind with an SAS group at a designated spot.



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JEDBURGH

Operations, Team Hugh (Cont'd)Equipment

The standard Jedburgh load (107) was dropped with the team.

Scale of Air Support Likely

The military situation would determine the amount of future aircraft deliveries. However, the team was instructed to accept assistance from resistance where needed, but no general recruiting requiring large amounts of supplies was to be undertaken unless otherwise instructed.

Communications

2 W/T sets were dropped with the team. Contact with the Home Station was to be established as soon as possible.

Should it become necessary for the team to identify itself to any group, arrangements were made for an agreed message to be broadcast over BBC.

Finance

Each of the officers took 100,000 French francs and 50 American dollars. The W/T operator took 50,000 French francs and 50 American dollars.

Relations with Other Allied Units

Special Airborne Services. The mission of the team was to act as the link between SAS and resistance groups. They were not to be under the command of SAS, but they would as far as possible see that the operations of any group they contacted conformed to the requirements of the SAS commander.

Other Jedburgh Parties. If contact with resistance proved successful, and if SFHQ instructed the team to organize group resistance, it would be possible to send further Jedburgh teams upon request. In this case, the team would arrange for reception of such additional teams.

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Operations, Team Hugh (Cont'd)

Allied Forces, If Overrun. If overrun by Allied Forces the team was instructed to report to the nearest Allied unit and ask for the intelligence officer. They were not to give him any details of the work but merely ask this officer to pass them to the nearest SF staff. This staff would identify the team and pass them back to SFHQ.

Action

Upon Arrival in the Field. Upon arrival in the field the team was directed to proceed to a designated spot where they would be contacted by a person who would establish his identity by use of a pre-arranged message. Then they would carry out their mission and establish contact with resistance groups who could help them in establishing the SAS base. It was not the intention of the group to establish a base which would be held indefinitely for resistance, but rather one to be used for raiding enemy lines of communication. Consequently, choosing a suitable location was important.

If Withdrawal Should Become Necessary. If the team should have completed its mission, or if its return to the U.K. was desired, instructions for exfiltration would be sent through the team's normal radio channels.

If Captured. The team took no cover story with it to the field, so in event of being taken prisoner they would be taken as soldiers in uniform performing their ordinary military duties. Every established law of warfare would apply to them and they would give their name, rank, and number only.

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Operations, Team Hugh (Cont'd)

Information Provided to Team

The following information was given to the team prior to its being dispatched:

- a. Enemy order of battle in the area.
- b. Location and defense of airdrome and factory.
- c. Police and Gestapo locations.
- d. Information regarding curfew and restrictions in the area.
- e. Topography of the area .
- f. List and description of other Allied agents operating in the area:
 - 1. Ellipse, Delege Militaire of Region 5.
 - 2. Bacon, Chef D'Operations.
 - 3. Groc, sabotage instructor.

First Word from Field

On 6 June Hugh reported his safe arrival in the following W/T message (108): "All arrived safely with all containers and equipment. One rucksack destroyed. Send another immediately."

Summary of W/T Messages Exchanged

7 June From Hugh (109)

"Contact established with head of resistance Indre area.. Already toured 100 kilometres without sight of enemy. Population enthusiastic. Whole area practically controlled by resistance group. Existing Maquis groups have doubled in 48 hours. Reports show enemy may be leaving Chateauroux. Can ensure permanent cut Toulouse railway by Maquis. Will require Jed teams soon. Send immediately by SAS 3 Jed set valves."

7 June SFHQ to Hugh (110)

"Your number one excellent work. Agree most important task permanent cutting Toulouse railway. Have earmarked Jed team but shall not dispatch until need confirmed by you. Sending valves from tonight. Greatest danger is that you may be flooded by Maquis candidates. Insist on rigorous vetting to keep out

(108) C-4064/106 6 Jun 44
 (109) C-4081/12 7 Jun 44
 (110) C-3031 7 Jun 44

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Operations, Team Hugh (Cont'd)

undesirables. You must keep numbers down as otherwise manoeuvrability suffers and supplies may be inadequate."

8 June From Hugh (111)

"Impossible to limit the numbers joining the resistance owing to spontaneous uprising. Urgently require Jedburgh teams, arms and material."

8 June SFHQ to Hugh (112)

"Two eureka in Indre area held by F circuit. These should now be located as best suited for non moon supply all resistance your area. Second Jedburgh ready at call from you as from 11th June. Will be trained reception D.C. three."

8 June SFHQ to Hugh (113)

"Highest priority now Bordeaux railway. This SAS task but give them all help you can. FFI group 400 armed men in area LeBlanc also given this task and receiving stores tonight. Coordinate through FFI chief Indre. Subject to weather and possible priority changes we plan 50 sorties for resistance Indre area up to 11th July. You should not count on more than this which will have not only to equip new men but maintain in ammunition all those armed your area. When calling for ammunition state clearly types and quantities."

9 June SFHQ to Hugh (114)

"Give your proposals division of responsibility between yourself and next Jedburgh team. Also require report local command set up with view to eventual unification. State most urgent arms requirements for delivery with next Jedburgh team or whether they should bring standard Jedburgh containers."

10 June SFHQ to Hugh (115)

"Send soonest new pinpoint for Jedburgh party due leave tomorrow Sunday. Give also alternative point. We suggest this point should be same as yours. In future make your messages more comprehensible. Make use of word stop and avoid abbreviations."

10 June SFHQ to Hugh (116)

"Will send from Sunday Jedburgh party of three men 15 containers 8 packages. BBC message included in cable."

11 June From Hugh (117)

"Morale good but depends on rapidity of invasion. Can one count on eventual arrival of paratroops. Pro-

(111) C-4086/16 8 Jun 44
(112) C-3043 8 Jun 44
(113) C-3042 8 Jun 44
(114) C-3053 9 Jun 44

(115) C-3075 10 Jun 44
(116) C-5280 10 Jun 44
(117) C-4124/23 11 Jun 44

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Operations, Team Hugh (Cont'd)

pose organize area as arranged. Hugh remains with department chief FFI and organize reserve. 3 Jed teams in three sectors. Hugh could thus ensure control over local command and coordination of work in sectors and recce further. Can now guarantee permanent cutting of all railway lines. Will work up to efficient ambushes."

11 June SFHQ to Hugh (118)

"Reference paratroops our answer is no except SAS whose plans you can obtain. Reference proposed organization remember your briefing. Before any question of control by you is raised you must get agreement local FFI chief also that of Samuel to whom you are accredited and London headquarters."

12 June SFHQ to Hugh (119)

"Jedburgh party 3 men 15 containers 8 packages coming tonight 12th Belabre Xray 17. If they miss reception will rendezvous morning 13th Belabre Xray 14 cross roads of grande communication party 4 and nationale seven two seven at 5 o'clock local time."

13 June From Hugh (120)

"Increased enemy activity in this area. Germans dispersed Maquis west of Chateauroux on 11th June. On 9th June enemy repelled F.T.P. groups who attacked a train in Argenton - Q - 37 Station, 48 partisans and 70 civilians being killed."

13 June From Hugh (Confirming the arrival of Hamish) (121)

"All arrived. Operator hurt ankle. Further news later."

13 June SFHQ to Hugh (122)

"If region gets too hot you should endeavor to persuade resistance to retreat towards the Creuse where they may be supplied and finally to the Massif Central where they should be able to hold out indefinitely."

14 June From Hugh (123)

"Got your message 19. Answer is yes. We meet and plan at least once a day. Enemy attacking maquis in Chateauroux forest with shell fire."

15 June From Hugh (124)

"Thank you 35 containers arrived other night including 12 intended for us. Several packages lost. Did not receive plats, tobacco, boots, shorts, or petrol. Urgently require petrol. Eureka arrived safely. Operator twisted ankle. Hamish moving to La Chatre today."

(118) C-5821 11 Jun 44	(122) C-5829 13 Jun 44
(119) C-5828 12 Jun 44	(123) C-4198/30 14 Jun 44
(120) C-4175/28 13 Jun 44	(124) C-4234/31 15 Jun 44
(121) C-4176 13 Jun 44	

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Operations, Team Hugh (Cont'd)15 June From Hugh (125)

"Maquis in Ecueille Buzancais area very active. If enemy activity does not increase may request team for there."

17 June SFHQ to Hugh (126)

"Das Reich Division believed moving northward by rail Coutras-Poitiers. Alert SAS and inform us if any of his teams can attack."

17 June From Hugh (127)

"SAS well established. Maquis in area only recently formed. Morale feeble. Would take three months to train. Please give directive."

17 June From Hugh (128)

"All Maquis warned to look out for 12 missing SAS."

18 June From Hugh (129)

"Two of missing SAS contacted by maquis."

19 June SFHQ to Hugh (130)

"Keep maquis groups small and give each group a specific target. Report progress and targets. Give information and progress SAS in your area."

21 June From Hugh (131)

"Hugh, Chief FFI and Delege Militaire have contacted Colonel ORA who will take military command and provide cadres. Area now under our control and organized as follows: (1) Static personnel consisting of men armed at home as well as small maquis. Will carry out sabotage. Harassing. Maintain resistance whole area. (2) Mobile elements consisting of better fighting elements will be formed in large zone south of Aigurade in contact with Creuse which region we are visiting shortly. Morale all maquis not poor but a hell of a lot to do and every step takes a lifetime to arrange. Reference Sad Athletic Sack - we are informed they are in Vienne though will have information shortly."

22 June SFHQ to Hugh (132)

"Organization Indre approved but caution against extending to Creuse which is in other hands."

22 June SFHQ to Hugh (133)

"Interfere with movement German infantry division moving northwards from Toulouse and report progress."

(125) C-4235/32 15 Jun 44
 (126) C-5838 17 Jun 44
 (127) C-4284/33 17 Jun 44
 (128) C-4285/34 17 Jun 44
 (129) C-4312/35 18 Jun 44

(130) C-5845 19 Jun 44
 (131) C-4395/3 21 Jun 44
 (132) C-5852 22 Jun 44
 (133) C-5855 22 Jun 44

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Operations, Team Hugh (Cont'd)24 June From Hugh (134)

"Request one plane on ground BARSAC, with petrol, plat mortar 2" with ammo. Pistols with ammo. Eureka, S-phone, flashlights, candles, boots, trousers and equipment."

25 June SFHQ to Hugh (135)

"Sending one plane on BARSAC from night 25."

26 June From Hugh (136)

"Two day conference at our H.Q. with DMR representative has been successful. Plan of action decided. Training centre for cadres agreed. Pupils from F.F.I., F.T.P. arriving tomorrow. All keen on Jedburgh teams. F.T.P. rather sticky."

29 June From Hugh (137)

"Disappointed results of drop. Realize you may have supply difficulties, but did not receive half of what we requested. Require for this moon at O.P. maximum 10 planes. Ammunition of all types, petrol in bulk. Carbines, Hawkins grenades, anti-tank rifles, mortars, bazookas, Smith machine carbines not Stens."

29 June From Hugh (138)

"Are maintaining cut railway lines all Indre. No important Boche circulation. Have successfully carried out attacks on small convoys. Reliable in formation that Boche intend to use Toulouse - Orleans railway as soon as Port d'Orleans is repaired, and will guard very strongly."

(134) C-4463/40 24 Jun 44
(135) C-3419 25 Jun 44
(136) C-4526/42 26 Jun 44

(137) C-4573/45 29 Jun 44
(138) C-4581/46 29 Jun 44

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Operations, Team Harry

Team Harry (138a)

Jedburgh team Harry was the second team to be dispatched to France from the U.K.

Members of Team

The members of team Harry were:

- (Captain D. D. Guthrie) (British), code name: DENBY
- (Lieutenant P. E. Dupont) (French), code name: GAPEAU
- (2/C1 R. Legrand) (French), code name: CENTIME

Area to Which Dispatched

Team Harry was dispatched on the night of 6/7 June to the Morvan Mountains area northwest of Autun, France.

Background of Resistance in Area

The team was dispatched to the area in charge of the organizer of the SAS circuit known as Houndsworth.

There was a circuit in the area which had been in the field for a considerable time. In December 1943 an organizer had been sent to the area to strengthen the link between headquarters and this circuit which had been working there since 1942. A W/T operator was dispatched in March 1944 to enable more direct contact with the group to be carried on. Contact with this operator revealed the existence of the following groups in the area:

- a. 2500 maquis, a large percentage with previous military training, organized in groups of 6 to 15 - about 10 camps varying from 150 to 450 in size.
- b. Two camps at Cluny composed of 300 men each, about half of which had some form of weapon.
- c. 150 men in groups of 10 at Macon

Purpose of Mission

The primary task of team Harry was to help SAS establish a base which could be reinforced by further SAS troops for

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Operations, Team Harry (Cont'd)

the purpose of destroying enemy lines of communication. Contact was to be made with the local leader of resistance and his advice sought as to the best place to establish this kind of base.

No attempt was to be made to organize large groups at first. However, investigation was to be carried on to this end. If resistance on a large scale seemed probable, a further mission would be sent.

In addition, the team would consult with the group's leader regarding the advantages of making contact with other groups operating in the same area. If orders are given for the establishment of large resistance groups, the aim would be to set up sections of 100 to 200 men. In this case it would be necessary to establish grounds for the delivery of supplies and additional Jedburgh teams.

Method of Dropping and Reception Committee

Team Harry was dropped at a pre-arranged spot with no reception committee.

Equipment

The standard Jedburgh load was dropped with the team. No containers were taken.


Scale of Air Support Likely

The extent of supplies to be delivered to this area would depend on the development of the mission. Upon arrival of SAS reinforcements, responsibility for supply of the SAS base would pass to SAS.

Communications

The team was dropped with two Jedburgh W/T sets with instructions to establish communication with the Home Station

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Operations, Team Harry (Cont'd)

as soon as possible. In addition they were to be responsible for passing traffic from the SAS receiving party to SAS headquarters via SFHQ until arrival of SAS reinforcements with independent communications.

Should it become necessary to identify themselves to some group which they had contacted, upon request a pre-arranged BBC message would be broadcast at designated times.

Further delivery of stores were to be requested by means of various BBC messages which the team took with them.

Finance

Each officer took 100,000 French francs and 50 American dollars with him. The W/T operator took 50,000 French francs and 50 American dollars.

Relations with Other Allied Units

Special Airborne Services. The primary task of the team was to assist SAS in the setting up of their base. Any assistance required by SAS from the resistance groups was to be arranged. Although acting as liaison between SAS and the resistance groups, the team was not to be under the command of SAS.

Other Jedburgh Parties. After investigation of all possibilities in this area, additional Jedburgh teams could be requested. This would depend largely on the extent of resistance to be undertaken.

Allied Forces, If Overrun. When overrun by Allied forces, the team had instructions to report to the nearest Allied unit and ask for the intelligence officer of the formation to which the unit belonged. They were not to give details of their work to anyone, not even to this officer,

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Operations, Team Harry (Cont'd)

but simply ask to be forwarded through him to the nearest SF Staff. The SF Staff would identify them and pass them back through the lines to SFHQ in the U.K.

Action

Upon Arrival in the Field. On landing the team was advised to proceed to a spot where, at a designated time, a man would approach them. Upon being challenged with a pre-arranged question, if he were the correct contact, he would reply with the prescribed answer. When the contact had been able to establish himself, the team was to proceed to carry out its mission as liaison between the SAS unit, and the resistance groups. If contact was not made within five days, headquarters was to be advised.


If Withdrawal Should Become Necessary. If at some future time the team had completed its mission and it was deemed advisable for it to return to the U.K., instructions for such return would be given through normal radio channels.

If Captured. The team went into the field with no cover story. If captured, they would be taken prisoner as soldiers in uniform performing their ordinary military duties. Every established law of warfare would apply to them, and each should, therefore, give his name, rank, and number only.

Information Provided to Team

The following information was provided to the team prior to its departure for the field: (139)

- a. Order of battle of the enemy in the area.
- b. Location, number, and general information regarding Police and Gestapo.



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Operations, Team Harry (Cont'd)

c. Information about curfew and restrictions in the area.

d. Topography of the area.

First Word from Field

This team was dropped 10 miles from the pre-arranged dropping zone but landed okay and signalled the aircraft to drop their stuff. They contacted resistance and used his W/T set as their own was destroyed. (140)

On 9 June 1944 the first message was received from team Harry via Lemniscate (W/T operator in the field): "Arrived safely 2 sets destroyed also 2 rucksacks and contents no contact made with Louis contacted Lemniscate using his set. Send immediately 1 set to Donda(e)stin terrain de Pair reply on our signal plan." (141)

Summary of W/T Messages Exchanged

Team Harry sent a series of mutilated messages at first which were believed to be sent by an officer of the team. Later the W/T operator came up and the messages came through decipherable. All that could be learned from the first messages was that the team had dropped safely.

The following messages were exchanged during the remainder of the month of June:

14 June From Harry (142)

"Isaac arrived. SAS found him. Several members gendarmerie have joined maquis. Lack arms. Ground St. B ready."

15 June From Harry (143)

"Prepared receive 20 containers St. Bernard. Include Eureka's. Contact made FFI and Isaac's equipment. Cheers Harry."

-
- (140) Daily Summary 7 June 1944 Mf R-7 F-428/30
(141) Harry via Lemniscate to SFHQ C-4104/1 9 Jun 1944
(142) C-4216/9 14 Jun 1944
(143) C-4236/10 15 Jun 1944

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JEDBURGHES

Operations, Team Harry (Cont'd)16 June From Harry (144)

"Enemy increasing activity against maquis. Do not use S9."

16 June SFHQ to Harry (145)

"Sorry St. Bernard out of range for moment and may not be in again until end next moon. If deliveries in immediate future essential you must move west of a line Nolay Fleury keeping ten kms away from Nevers account flak. Louis in same difficulty but has now given ground within range which we expect serve within next few days. If you can move west to area this line we will give you a pinpoint and means to contact Louis group there."

17 June From Harry (146)

"All SAS now here."

20 June From Harry (147)

"Maquis Jean at N2357. About 220 increasing considerably. 150 armed. Training increasing under regular captain. Ready 30 days. Leadership good. Maquis Hernard N2444 about 80 increasing. Leadership unsatisfactory due to resentment newly arrived officers."

22 June From Harry (148)

"Safe drop SAS and 62 containers. Maquis received them with joy. Same ground same quantity again. We will borrow Eureka for reception."

24 June From Harry (149)

"Include earliest Hawkins and pull switches. Enemy appear to be surrounding us. Cheerio."

25 June From Harry (150)

"Both 6625 and 5685 crystals useless. Can you repeat your last B/C S1 traffic. Thank you."

26 June From Harry (151)

"Maquis ambushed convoy 24th. Our casualties 1 dead enemy 30 dead. 3 Russian prisoners taken. Regarding interrogation see report Isaac. Montsauche burnt as reprisal. Training maquis Cheviere improving. Numbers increasing considerably arms and equipment needed urgently Peintre, St. Bernard, Fine, Fantassin. DZ's being arranged by Isaac."

(144) C-4267/12 16 Jun 44
 (145) C-5822 16 Jun 44
 (146) C-4300/13 17 Jun 44
 (147) C-4375/14 20 Jun 44
 (148) C-4422/16 22 Jun 44

(149) C-4460/17 24 Jun 44
 (150) C-4491/18 25 Jun 44
 (151) C-4523/19 26 Jun 44

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JEDBURGHs

Operations, Team Harry (Cont'd)27 June From Harry (152)


"Evening 26th enemy attacked maquis Jean with estimated 150 men. Enemy set fire our hospital. Patients evacuated include 2 English. Also set fire Vermot. SAS great assistance. Our casualties 3 dead 6 wounded approximate enemy estimated conservative 50 dead. Did not get broadcast."

30 June From Harry (153)

"Will try to see contacted SAS. Peinture available now. Thanks. Cheerio."

(152) C-4534 27 Jun 44

(153) C-4618/45 30 Jun 44



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JEDBURGHS

Operations, Team FrederickTeam Frederick (153a)

Jedburgh team Frederick was the third Jedburgh team to be dispatched to France from the U.K.

Members of Team

The members of team Frederick were:

(Major A. W. Wise) (British), code name: KINROS

(2nd Lieutenant P. Aguirec) (French), code name: VIRE

M/Sgt. R. R. Kehoe (154) (U.S.), code name: PESETA

Area to Which Dispatched

Team Frederick was dispatched on the night of 9/10 June to the Guincamp area in Brittany, France.

Background of Resistance in the Area

There is no knowledge of established maquis groups in this area but the spirit of resistance is strong throughout Brittany and the support of the majority of the population could probably be relied upon. It was the task of the team to contact such forces and individuals as would be useful in establishing and protecting the SAS base known as Samwest.


The Gendarmerie throughout Brittany are generally sympathetic and a French source estimated a total of 3,000 men organized in the Brittany area. There is no specific information as to the location of camps.

A French officer, sent from England in 1943, had previously established a circuit in this area, but when he was arrested a few months later his organization scattered.

Purpose of Mission

The prime purpose of team Frederick was to assist SAS in establishing their base, which was to be used as a place where other SAS parties might withdraw and be re-supplied. In particular, the team was to arrange for the assistance of

(153a) Operations after 1 Jul 44 p.137
(154) War Diary Vol 11 p. 624

Operations, Team Frederick (Cont'd)

resistance elements in establishment of the base, and to be prepared to arrange for the reception of such additional arms and stores as would be needed by the resistance gathered together.

Method of Dropping and Reception Committee

Team Frederick was dropped at a pre-arranged point to a reception committee organized by the SAS base party.

Equipment

The team was to take no Jedburgh containers with them. Each member of the team took one rucksack and the team took 2 W/T sets with them.

Scale of Air Support Likely

SFHQ would attempt to supply the resistance groups organized in this area. To accomplish this information regarding additional dropping ground was to be furnished SFHQ.

Communications

The team was dropped with 2 W/T sets, with instructions to establish communication with the Home Station as soon as possible. The SAS W/T operator was to have independent contact with the SAS Home Station.

Finance

Each officer of the team took 100,000 French francs and 50 American dollars. The W/T operator took 50,000 French francs and 50 American dollars.

Relations with Other Allied Units

Special Airborne Services. The team was to assist SAS in establishing their base and was to be under the command of the officer in charge of the SAS party in the field, but was to report independently to SFHQ on the state of resistance in terms of personnel, leadership, arms and potentialities.

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Other Jedburgh Teams. If it was felt that the supply and organization of resistance demanded it, request could be made for up to three additional Jedburgh teams. In this case the team was to arrange for the reception of the additional teams at a suitable dropping point in the locality where the teams would be used.

Allied Forces, If Overrun. If overrun by Allied Forces the team was to report to the headquarters of the nearest Allied unit and ask for the intelligence officer. No details of the work were to be given, but they were simply to ask to be forwarded through this officer to the nearest SF staff. This staff would identify them and pass them back to SFHQ.

Action

Upon Arrival in the Field. On arriving in the field the team was to be met by the SAS group and would immediately set about carrying out their missions of arranging such assistance from resistance groups as would be required in establishing the SAS base.

If Withdrawal Should Become Necessary. If it became necessary for the group to withdraw, SAS would handle all the arrangements.

Information Provided to the Team.

The following information was provided to the team prior to its departure for the field (155):

- a. The enemy order of battle in the area.
- b. Information regarding Gestapo and counter-espionage units.
- c. Orders restricting movement in the area.
- d. Topography of the area.

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First Word from the Field

In a W/T message (156) dated 11 June Frederick reported:
 "Arrived safely with all containers and equipment. Have con-
 tacted local groups. Great possibilities Cotes du Nord area.
 Send Jed team and arms for them. Advise soonest possible
 dropping ground."

Summary of W/T Messages Exchanged

18 June From Frederick (157)

"SAS attacked Monday and dispersed. Guarding 3
 of their wounded here. Jeds okay. Have contacted
 guerilla leaders. Paris Brest underground cable cut by
 us. All railway lines in area cut. No traffic received
 as yet."

18 June From Frederick (158)

"Send arms and ammunition soonest possible for
 500 men."

19 June SFHQ to Frederick (159)

"Confirm grounds you give. Congratulations Peseta
 on promotion to 1st Sgt."

20 June From Frederick (160)

"Want Stens, carbines, grenades. Bonfires will be
 lighted."

21 June SFHQ to Frederick (161)

"Propose to send 4 aircraft 22 June. What clothes
 and money required?"

21 June From Frederick (162)

"Our position 1 km from Plumelin Quinton. Recep-
 tion Committee for dropping will consist of Maquis."

21 June SFHQ to Frederick (163)

"Confirm you are ready to receive night 22 June."

22 June From Frederick (164)

"Cannot receive night 22. Repeat dropping same
 arrangements night 23."

- | | |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------|
| (156) C-4126/27 dated 11 Jun 44 | (161) C-3312 21 Jun 44 |
| (157) C-4312/31 18 Jun 44 | (162) C-4384/91 21 Jun 44 |
| (158) C-4327/20 dated 18 Jun 44 | (163) C-3314 21 Jun 44 |
| (159) C-3276 19 Jun 44 | (164) C-4416/27 22 Jun 44 |
| (160) C-4370/48 20 Jun 44 | |

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Operations, Team Frederick (Cont'd)

23 June From Frederick (165)

"Confirm dropping arrange tonight 23."

23 June SFHQ to Frederick (166)

"Is your ground suitable for Jeds. If so can you obtain necessary contacts for them."

24 June From Frederick (167)

"Region humming with enemy activity. Successfully carried out attack on communications. Boche communications in Brittany in chaos. Will try again after ammunition dump. Our morale terrific."

24 June From Frederick (in reply to query from SFHQ on 23rd) (168)

"My ground not suitable for Jeds. Am arranging ground and contacts. Details later."

24 June SFHQ to Frederick (169)

"Do you require more arms on your ground."

25 June From Frederick (170)

"Send battle-dress and cigarettes, soap, tobacco, pipe and ration for two weeks for Jed team also batteries for receivers. All Resistance Chiefs in Brittany now contacted. Dropping on my ground great success. Thanks."

26 June SFHQ to Frederick (171)

"Will send same load tomorrow your new ground near Plesidy. Bonfires if possible. Will send requirements in package marked 'Pour Frederick'".

27 June From Frederick (172)

"Okay to go ahead with plan as arranged for today 27 on Ground Yves. If impossible for you today okay for tomorrow 28 with BBC message as given. Bonfires will be lit. Big Boche convoy near Carhaix."

28 June From Frederick (173)

"Details for Finisterre team. Ground MMn 58 Pl1 5 at 54mm. East of 0720 and 45mm. North of 5340 between Stangkerloulas and Chelledxs Trois Fontaines. Safe house and reception must be arranged and team met by chiefs Finisterre region. Require minimum 2 days warning of drop. Boche very troublesome in this area. Request team bring one million French francs for use of Frederick team."

(165) C-4438/88 23 Jun 44
(166) C-3370 23 Jun 44
(167) C-4448/22 24 Jun 44
(168) C-4453/65 24 Jun 44
(169) C-3401 24 Jun 44

(170) C-4509/73 25 Jun 44
(171) C-3436 26 Jun 44
(172) C-4535/3 27 Jun 44
(173) C-4562/92 28 Jun 44

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
29 June SFHQ to Frederick (174)

"Four Halifaxes and two Hudsons will visit you tonight. Captain Leblanc on his way to contact you. Please arrange send him home with Hamilton if possible. Thanks for rendezvous Finisterre, will advise you later."

30 June From Frederick (175)

"Last night great success. Thanks again."

(174) C-3528 29 Jun 44
(175) C-4614/43 30 Jun 44



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JEDBURGHS

Operations, Team GeorgeTeam George (175a)

Jedburgh team George was the fourth Jedburgh team to be dispatched to France from the U.K.

Members of Team

The members of team George were:

(Captain P. Erard) (French), code name: SAVE

Captain P. Cyr (176) (U.S.), code name: WIGTON

(2nd Lieutenant C. Lejeune) (French), code name: RUPEE

Area to Which Dispatched

Team George was dispatched on the night of 9/10 June to the Redan area in Brittany, France.

Background of Resistance in Area

The spirit of resistance in Brittany was known to be very good, but there was little in the way of known organized groups.

In 1943 a circuit known as the Oscar circuit had been sent to organize resistance to cut communications between Brittany and the rest of France. His organization was dispersed because of betrayal to the Gestapo by an informer.

Another circuit under the organizer Rodrigue and sponsored by the British was known to be working in the area. Its objectives were the same as Oscar, but it was thought that its personnel was limited to the extent that it would only be able to carry out its own specific tasks.

It was impossible to make any accurate estimation in numbers of organized resistance groups.


Purpose of the Mission

The purpose of the team was to assist the SAS party Dingson in establishing a base in this area. SAS planned to drop a party of 16 to establish a base which would be used by other

(175a) Operations after 1 Jul 44 p.155
(176) War Diary Vol 11 p. 589

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JEDBURGH

Operations, Team George (Cont'd)

SAS parties as a place to withdraw to and be re-supplied. Team George was to arrange for assistance from resistance in establishing this base. It was to work with another agent, Fernand, who was also working with the SAS group.

Arrangements were to be made by the team for reception of additional arms and stores as they might be needed by resistance groups.

The team was directed to report back to SFHQ on the resistance elements in the area.

Method of Dropping and Reception Committee

Team George was dropped to a reception committee organized by the SAS base party.

Equipment

The team was to take no Jedburgh containers with them. Each member of the team took one rucksack.

Scale of Air Support Likely

SFHQ would attempt to supply whatever resistance was organized in the area. To do this the team was to pass to SFHQ pinpoints of any additional dropping ground which might be needed.

Communications

The team was dropped with 2 W/T sets and instructed to establish communication with the home station as soon as possible. The SAS W/T operator was to have independent contact with the SAS Home Station.

Finance

Each of the officers took 100,000 French francs and 50 American dollars. The W/T operator took 50,000 French francs and 50 American dollars.

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JEDBURGHS

Operations, Team George (Cont'd)Relations with Other Allied Units

Special Airborne Services. The team was to act as a link between SAS and the resistance groups they contacted and would come under the command of the officer in charge of the SAS party in the field.

Other Jedburgh Parties. The team could request up to three additional Jedburgh teams if the supply and organization of resistance seemed to merit it. In this case team George would make arrangements for the reception of these teams.

Allied Forces, If Overrun. If overrun by Allied forces, the team was instructed to report to the nearest Allied unit and ask for the intelligence officer. They were not to disclose any details of their work even to this officer but merely ask him to forward them to the nearest SF Staff. Here they would be identified and passed back to SFHQ.


Action

Upon Arrival in the Field. Upon arriving in the field the team was to arrange assistance from resistance groups in establishing the SAS base. This would involve contacting existing groups and organizing new ones. The team would arrange for reception of arms and stores required in the organization and establishment of such groups.

If Withdrawal Should Become Necessary. If the team should complete its mission, or it should become necessary for them to withdraw from the field, the SAS unit would handle all the arrangements.

If Captured. If captured, every attempt would be made to discover what information the team had. Therefore, the team

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Operations, Team George (Cont'd)

was never to speak of their work or training. However, they were instructed as follows in case of capture:

- a. In Company of Resistance Forces. Each member of the team was to state that he was an American (French or British) liaison officer and give his name, rank and number. If questioned further, he could add that he received his orders from an officer whose name he does not know in the operations division of General Headquarters.
- b. In Company of Other Members of the Team. Each member of the team was to give his name, rank and number, as in the above case. If pressed for details, the team was to tell the truth in substance; that is, they were sent to France to work as liaison officers with French forces. They were dropped by parachute at a spot, the exact position of which was not given them, but where they were going to be met on the ground. As there was no one to meet them when they landed, there must have been some error of navigation by the plane and they were lost.

Information Provided to Team

The following information was provided to the team prior to its departure for the field:

- a. Enemy order of battle in the area.
- b. Gestapo and counter-espionage information.
- c. Information regarding restriction of movement in the area.
- d. Topography in the area.
- e. List and description of other allied agents operating in the area:
 1. Meridien, Delege Militaire Regional
 2. Galilee, Chef d'Operations
 3. Beche, sabotage instructor

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JEDBURGHS

Operations, Team George (Cont'd)First Word from Field

The first word from team George was received in a W/T message dated 11 June (177): "4000 partisans must receive hundred brens, 1000 stens, 1000 battledress. Situation hot will explode if arms not received. Contacted Fernand send him previous request, urgent, has lost everything. Nr. 1 of June 10 - reception committee available every night on ground Barcleine map 4 Michelin ref 418235 need 1 million francs. Please we beg you send equipment immediately."

Summary of W/T Messages Exchanged11 June From George (178)

"Radios dropped blind tenth morning. Dispatching mistake, found bad condition radio. Have us located due to position. It is okay. Main frequency jammed. Send another."

11 June From George (179)

"Dingson strong 4000 men on base, good leadership, no arms. Send hundred brens, thousand battledresses. Send plats, carbines and equipment for 2000 men. Send first possible date urgent recognition letter F."

13 June From George (180)

"Received message 6. We await another principal frequency. Contact established with chiefs departments Finistere and Loire Inferieure."

14 June SFHQ to George (181)

"Inform us how many armed men your area. Send ammunition requirements of different types as hope to mount large scale deliveries on your ground."

15 June From George (182)

"Noise intense from nearby German radio station. Can I have another frequency please."

15 June SFHQ to George (183)

"Number your telegrams. Keep us informed."

(177) C-4103/1 11 Jun 44
 (178) C-4130 11 Jun 44
 (179) C-4131/3 11 Jun 44
 (180) C-4200/7 13 Jun 44

(181) C-3153 14 Jun 44
 (182) C-4211/9 15 Jun 44
 (183) C-5830 15 Jun 44

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Operations, Team George (Cont'd)15 June From George (184)

"Send Jedburgh team Finistere 8000 men trained - lack arms. Ground and reception ready."

16 June From George (185)

"Send us brens, plats, grenades, carbines, rifles."

16 June SFHQ to George (186)

"Intend send Jedburghs your area. Desire urgently to know how mass deliveries stores going."

16 June From George (187)

"Send 4 planes 303 ammo, 2 planes plat bombs, 1 plane sten ammo, 2 planes 36 grenades, 1 plane carbine. Send more battledress - many losses due to previous bad droppings."

16 June From George (188)

"Excellent dropping night 14th. Congratulate pilots all containers packages okay. 2000 men armed, 5000 more unarmed."

16 June SFHQ to George (189)

"When using Eureka give serial number of set."

17 June From George (190)

"French parachutist captured taken to jail handcuffed - Germans."

18 June From George (191)

"On order of the DMR and our agent we are leaving for Loire Inferieure. Maquis very important but badly organized and without arms. Zone strategically important to assure cutting lines of communication Brittany and ensure supply operations in Morbihan. We are traveling in civilian clothes in Gestapo auto. We will keep liaison with SAS. SAS able to arm maquis sufficiently."

(During the period 18 June to 25 June the SAS base was attacked by heavy German forces. George escaped the encirclement. Their next message follows.) (192)

25 June From George (193)

"With DMR and agent we escaped encirclement of SAS and are marching on foot towards Loire Inferieure terrain alarme. We are almost at St. Enbert. Will you confirm arrest of French agent. Is security alarme affected by it. Have you instructions for us."

(184) C-4232/12 15 Jun 44
 (185) C-4246/13 16 Jun 44
 (186) C-3203 16 Jun 44
 (187) C-4255/16 16 Jun 44
 (188) C-4254/15 16 Jun 44

(189) C-3210 16 Jun 44
 (190) C-4278/18 17 Jun 44
 (191) C-4309/19 18 Jun 44
 (192) George Sitrep Rep 12/26 Jun 44
 (193) C-4504/20 25 Jun 44

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JEDBURGHS

Operations, Team George (Cont'd)25 June From George (194)

"For urgent messages reply on emergency plan. From one time pad start from Group GDNRJ page 50. Please confirm."

25 June From George (195)

"Morbihan resistance rising completely. 4000 patriots armed and dispersed in small groups, harrassing. Enemy losses at and around Dingson maximum 500. Boche using important reserves against us, including artillery. Attitude of population wonderful."

27 June From George (196)

"Arrived safely 'Alarme' ground, Loire Inferieure. Begin tomorrow 28 dropping for 2,000 in slices of 500. Reception committee standing by every night from 28th."

30 June From George (197)

"'Alarme' attacked at dawn 28th by Boches. Surrounded during daytime, managed to escape at night. Cease all ops on 'Alarme' ground."

30 June SFHQ to George (198)


"Pass to Hauteur and Fonction, 'Go to safe place and lie low for a few days. Keep in contact and await any instructions. Have no news arrest Trouvere, what makes you suppose he has been. We are maintaining contact Dingson and will keep you posted."

30 June From George (199)

"Situation Loire Inferieure 'boiling'. Patriot is enemy agent. All lost except life and set. Hunted by Gestapo. Despite storm attempted unsuccessfully to contact you. Everything has to be done again. Remaining and doing our best."

(194) C-4505/21 25 Jun 44
 (195) C-4529/22 25 Jun 44
 (196) C-4544/23 27 Jun 44
 (197) C-4589/24 30 Jun 44

(198) C-3578 30 Jun 44
 (199) C-4602/24 30 Jun 44



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JEDBURGH

Operations, Team HamishTeam Hamish (199a)

Jedburgh team Hamish was the fifth Jedburgh team to be dispatched to France from the U.K.

Members of Team

The members of team Hamish were:

Lieutenant R. M. Anstett (200), (U.S.), code name: ALABAMA

(Lieutenant L. Blachere (French), code name: LOUISIANA

Sergeant L. J. Watters (201), (U.S.), code name: KANSAS

Area to Which Dispatched

Team Hamish was dispatched on the night of 12/13 June to the Chateauroux - Chatellerault area in the Department of Indre, France.

Background of Resistance in Area

Team Hugh was dropped to this area with an SAS party known as Bullbasket with the intention of establishing an SAS base from which raids could be carried out on enemy lines of communication. Their arrival occasioned a spontaneous rising of the resistance elements, and Hugh requested another Jedburgh team to assist in the organization of these groups.

The organization with which Hugh made initial contact was under the direction of an F section agent known as Samuel, who was in touch with approximately 2000 men spread generally over the Indre. This was not a military body, however, and its supply of arms was uncertain. There was no information about organized groups or maquis in the area.

Resistance activities since D-day were described in messages from Hugh and Samuel as follows:

a. The population was enthusiastic and the whole area was practically under the control of the resistance groups,

(199a) Operations after 1 Jul 44 p.265
(200) War Diary Vol 11 p.591
(201) War Diary Vol 11 p.625

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Operations, Team Hamish (Cont'd)

which had doubled in number in 48 hours.

b. Local maquis could insure the permanent cutting of the Toulouse railway.

c. A Battalion of the Premier Regiment de France at LeBlanc was in contact with Hugh and wished to join the resistance forces.

Purpose of Mission

The mission of team Hamish was to assist Hugh in the organization of the new resistance elements which had sprung up subsequent to Hugh's arrival and to the establishment of SAS base Bullbasket. The team was to concentrate on forming separate groups of approximately 100 to 200 men each. In addition, the team was instructed to select suitable landing grounds for DC3's and notify SFHQ of these locations.

Method of Dropping and Reception Committee

Team Hamish was dropped to a reception organized by Hugh.

Equipment

The standard Jedburgh load (202), plus one extra package of medical equipment, was dropped with the team.

Scale of Air Support Likely

Roughly 50 air sorties were planned for the supply of this area during the July moon. This limitation in air support from the U.K. would restrict the number of new resistance groups to be formed and organized in the area.

Communications

The team was dropped with two Jedburgh W/T sets and instructed to establish communication with the home station as soon as possible.

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JEDBURGH

Operations, Team Hamish (Cont'd)

Arrangements were made for prearranged messages to be broadcast over the BBC after the dispatch of the team - in order to establish their identity with field contacts.

The team was also given a microphotographed list of BBC messages for use in connection with future deliveries of stores and personnel.

Finance

Each of the officers took 100,000 French francs and 50 American dollars. The W/T operator took 50,000 French francs and 50 American dollars.

Relations with Other Allied Units

Special Airborne Services. SAS established their base Bullbasket in the Chateauroux - Chatellerault area on 6 June 1944 with the dispatch of a party of two officers and Jedburgh team Hugh. Jedburgh Hugh had been attached to SAS to act as their link with resistance, but was not under SAS command. Jedburgh Hamish's relationship to SAS was similar, namely one of liaison between SAS and the resistance elements.

Other Jedburgh Parties. Normally each Jedburgh team was directly under the command of SFHQ. Team Hamish was instructed to agree with Hugh on division of responsibility in the field.

An Allied Mission. In the event that an Allied mission were dispatched to the area at a later date, it would be likely that the team would be placed under the command of the mission.

Allied Forces, If Overrun. When overrun by Allied forces, the team had instructions to report to the nearest Allied unit and ask for the intelligence officer of the formation to which the unit belonged. They were not to give

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Operations, Team Hamish (Cont'd)

details of their work to anyone, not even to this intelligence officer, but simply ask to be forwarded through him to the nearest SF Staff. The SF Staff would identify them and pass them back through the lines to SFHQ in the U.K.

Action

Upon Arrival in the Field. Upon arrival in the field they would contact Hugh, who would inform them of the general situation as regards resistance in the area. Their primary task would be to help SAS in the establishment of their base and to arrange such assistance from resistance groups as SAS might require. In addition to the assignments listed under "Purpose of Mission" above, the team would also report back to SFHQ on the state of resistance groups in terms of personnel, leadership, arms and potentialities. They would not attempt to organize large groups unless ordered to do so by SFHQ.

If Withdrawal Should Become Necessary. In the event that the team should have fulfilled its usefulness in the field while still deep behind the active zone of hostilities, instructions on details of exfiltration would be sent through normal radio channels from SFHQ.

If Captured. The team went into the field with no cover story. If captured, they would be taken prisoner as soldiers in uniform performing their ordinary military duties. Every established law of warfare would apply to them, and each should, therefore, give his name, rank, and number only.

Information Provided to Team

The following information was provided to the team prior to its departure for the field:

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JEDBURGH

Operations, Team Hamish (Cont'd)

- a. Enemy order of battle in the area.
- b. Location of airfields, factories, food depot, petrol dump, and motor car park.
- c. Police and Gestapo locations, curfew restrictions.
- d. Topography of land - roads, terrain, railways.
- e. List and descriptions of other Allied agents in the area. The following are the most important of the latter:
 1. Samuel, F section agent in charge of area; circuit "Shipwright".
 2. Ellipse, alias Perrichon, Delege Militaire of Region 5.
 3. Baron, alias Gerard, chef d'Operations of Region 5.
 4. Croc, alias Herand, sabotage instructor, Region 5.

First Word from Field

In a W/T message sent on the 14th of June Hugh confirmed the safe arrival of Hamish. (203)

On the 15th of June Hamish established W/T communication with SFHQ and stated that he was waiting to see the Delege Militaire and that until he could see him the situation was fluid.

Summary of W/T Messages Exchanged

14 June SFHQ to Hamish (204)

"Delighted you can lay on bonfires during non-moon. Watters promoted 1st Sgt from 13 June."

15 June From Hamish (205)

"Moving Aigurande. Will organize groups at Neuville La Chatre Mich 68 Pl 19. Request Alabama Rucksack and W/T set include personal equipment."

16 June From Hamish (206)

"Have contacted local groups east of Indre. Moved to new position south 7 kms Neuville Mich 68 Pl 19. Have 550 men armed. Necessary petrol urgent. Drop point

434/41

(203) War Room Summary 14 Jun 44 Mr R-7/ (205) C-4228/9 15 Jun 44
(204) SFHQ to Hamish C-3171 14 Jun 44 (206) C-4265/10 16 Jun 44

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Operations, Team Hamish, (Cont'd)

from Samuel's W/T follows. First point terrain Vistule
Velles Paul 27 letter Uncle message Vedette alterne
point terrain Moselle Dunle Paletau Victor 16 letter
dumb message QSM Orgueur".

16 June From Hamish (207)

"Order follows 5xC.10. 5xC.9. 3xC.1. 1xMills
Grenades. 1xPhosporus Grenade. Packages shoes size
40 pairs each. Ammunition assorted. Assorted food.
Mark Rucksack W/T set package Hamish. Full report
tomorrow."

17 June From Hamish (208)

"Southeast Indre practically controlled by maquis.
Parts Toulouse - Brives in area every night. As con-
sequence need sugar, salt, coffee - little go long way.
Chef La as eventual retreat SE. Petrol anti-tank
weapons need desperately wants mortar two inch also.
Okay designate reception as in fourth message bonfires
used until further notice. Visiting groups today more
tonight."

18 June From Hamish (209)

"Visited camps in sections, impressive. 200 trained.
Total 550 armed. Trucks, cars, motor cycles too.
Trentaine basic training program under way. Have 29
German prisoners. 50 troop carriers passed through LA
CHATRE Saturday morning, some empty also 4 armored cars.
Went towards Argentan. No landing ground yet. Equip-
ment needed as follows: Bren, Piat, petrol, mortar,
carbine, mines, SMG, AMMO, Opull, switches, 10 Sten,
maps this area."

18 June From Hamish (210)

"Want amanol to blow route 20 in this area. 800
motorized S.S. Troops arrived Chateauroux week ago and
patrol route 20 in force."

18 June SFHQ to Hamish (211)

"Sending two aircraft with 24 containers to ground
vistule with Mosele as alternative. 15 containers with
special stores for you the remainder for Samuel. If
this operation successful we could send repeat operation
48 hours later."


19 June SFHQ to Hamish (212)

"All your containers and packages will be marked H."

19 June From Hamish (213)

"Okay reception Vistule. First Moselle alternative."

(207) C-4266/11 16 Jun 44	(211) C-5840 18 Jun 44
(208) C-4297/16 17 Jun 44	(212) C-3269 19 Jun 44
(209) C-4322/13 18 Jun 44	(213) C-4342/14 19 Jun 44
(210) C-4323/15 18 Jun 44	



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Operations, Team Hamish (Cont'd)21 June From Hamish (214)

"Containers safely received also equipment. Okay to go ahead with plan as arranged tomorrow 22. Received nothing for Samuel. Ellipse and Chef Creuse want Jeds soon."

21 June From Hamish (215)

"Tell Hugh Surcoat moved to 7 kms east Ste Severe."

22 June SFHQ to Hamish (216)

"German Infantry Division moving towards north. Keep us informed of its movements and try slow it down as much as possible by attacks on railways and if possible roads."

23 June From Hamish (217)

"Containers safely received also 4 packages. Thanks. Railway between Vierzon and Orleans north here report heavy traffic north. 1000 Boche infantry arrived in area East Indre."

24 June From Hamish (218)

"In Indre railroad and telephone finished, roads difficult. Impossible stop Boche but can slow down by ambush. For this need mines and booby traps. Need surgical supplies and sulfa drugs. Dropping grounds later. Been playing games with Boche patrols, it's fun."

28 June From Hamish (219)

Designates dropping grounds and says he can handle 200 containers up to July 12th.

28 June From Hamish (220)

"Still at La Chatre. Airfield 5 kilometres east Chateauroux active, 5 places now but more expected." Reports he is looking for new dropping ground.

28 June From Hamish (221)

"Group at Issoudoun attacked by 300 Boche. Withdrawing south towards us. No losses. No more receptions there."

(214) C-4393/26 21 Jun 44
(215) C-4394/7 21 Jun 44
(216) C-5854 22 Jun 44
(217) C-4439/5 23 Jun 44

(218) C-4464/4 24 Jun 44
(219) C-4552/32 28 Jun 44
(220) C-4550/36 28 Jun 44
(221) C-4555/35 28 Jun 44

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
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JEDBURGHES

Operations, Team Hamish (Cont'd)

29 June From Hamish (22)

"More on Chateauroux airfield now. Have 30 Stukas that leave northerly direction every morning between 0700 and 0800 hours, return about 2100 hours. Are placed around airfield under trees. Boche requisitioning 2,000 bicycles in Chateauroux."

Operations, Team IanTeam Ian (222a)

Jedburgh team Ian was the sixth Jedburgh team to be dispatched to France from the U.K.

Members of Team

The members of team Ian were:

Major John Gildee (223) (U.S.), code name: OKLAHOMA

(Lieutenant Y. Deslorme) (French), code name: MAINE

Sergeant Lucien Bourgoin (224) (U.S.), code name: MAYO

Area to Which Dispatched

Team Ian was dispatched on the night of 20/21 June from Harrington airfield to an area south of Poitiers in the Department of Vienne, France.

Background of Resistance in Area

At the time the team was dispatched the resistance groups in the whole of Vienne were acting under the orders of an F section agent known as Samuel (name of the circuit: Shipwright). Samuel was in close touch with the Chef de Resistance for the area, who was asking for arms and ammunition. Ninety containers had been dropped in response to this request. Samuel reported the existence of the following groups:


- a. Three small maquis groups, of which one numbered 150 highly disciplined men.
- b. 1500 armed men in the old unoccupied zone.
- c. 2000 unarmed men in the old occupied zone.

Purpose of Mission

The mission of team Ian was to contact Samuel and assist him, working through the Chef de Resistance, in the organization of resistance in Vienne. Samuel had specifically asked for a Jedburgh team, directives, and material to accomplish this.

(222a) Operations after 1 Jul 44 p.299
(223) War Diary Vol 11 p. 586
(224) War Diary Vol 11 p. 623

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Date 23 January 1979



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JEDBURGH

Operations, Team Ian, (Cont'd)

In addition, the team was instructed to see that small coup-de-main parties were organized to mount continuous attacks against the following railway lines:

- a. Bordeaux - Poitiers - Tours
- b. Bordeaux - Niort - Saumur

As a secondary task the team would investigate and report on the possibility of controlling an area of several square miles, into which large-scale daylight deliveries of stores could be made, with large bonfires in the center as aiming points for the aircraft.

Method of Dropping and Reception Committee

Team Ian was dropped in a non-moon period to a reception organized by Samuel. Signal lights only were used to identify the ground.

Equipment

The standard Jedburgh load (225), modified as follows, was dropped with the team:

- Less 1 C.4 (Brens)
- Less 1 C.14 (Carbines)


Replaced by 2 H. 21 (Special rail charges)

Scale of Air Support Likely

Approximately 15 to 20 additional air sorties were planned for the supply of this area. This would necessarily limit the number of men who could be supplied, and the team was instructed to carry word to the field that a general uprising must not take place in the Department of Vienne, at least for the present.

Communications

The team was dropped with two Jedburgh W/T sets and instructed to establish communication with the Home Station as soon as possible. Should their own sets fail for any



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JEDBURGH

Operations, Team Ian, (Cont'd)

reason, they could establish contact through Samuel's channel.

If they should have to identify themselves to any group, they could apply to headquarters to have a pre-arranged BBC message broadcast on any day they chose. Arrangements would be made to have the messages broadcast after the news in French on one or other of the following transmissions:

1.30 p.m., 2.30 p.m., 7.30 p.m., 9.15 p.m. (local time in France)

The team was also given a list of BBC messages for use in connection with further deliveries of stores or personnel.

Finance


Each of the officers took 100,000 French francs and 50 American dollars. The W/T operator took 50,000 French francs and 50 American dollars. The team also carried with it a package for Samuel containing 1,000,000 francs.

Relations with Other Allied Units

Special Airborne Services. The team was given instructions to assist any S.A.S. parties they might encounter in the field. They would not, however, come under S.A.S. command.

Other Jedburgh Parties. Normally each Jedburgh team was directly under the command of SFHQ. However, it would be possible for team Ian to request that further Jedburgh parties be sent to the Vienne area, if conditions warranted it.

An Allied Mission. In the event that an Allied Mission were dispatched to the area at a later date, it would be likely that the team would be placed under the command of the Mission.



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JEDBURGHs

Operations, Team Ian, (Cont'd)


Allied Forces, If Overrun. When overrun by Allied forces, the team had instructions to report to the nearest Allied unit and ask for the intelligence officer of the formation to which the unit belonged. They were not to give details of their work to anyone, not even to this intelligence officer, but simply ask to be forwarded through him to the nearest SF Staff. The SF Staff would identify them and pass them back through the lines to SFHQ in the UK.

Action

Upon Arrival in the Field. Upon arrival in the field they would contact Samuel, who would inform them of the general situation as regards resistance in the area. In addition to carrying out the assignments listed under "Purpose of Mission" above, they were instructed to impress on all concerned that a general uprising must not take place in Vienne, that supply could not be on a scale to support such an uprising. They should also report back to headquarters on any grounds suitable for paratroop landings, allotting each ground a code name and a BBC message. Should a large-scale paratroop operation be attempted, this message would be broadcast on the night of the operation. Care should be taken, however, not to give anyone in the field the impression that there were necessarily any intentions of employing parachute troops in the area.

If Withdrawal Should Become Necessary. In the event of enemy action making continued existence in the Vienne impossible, the team should endeavor to persuade the resistance groups to move southwest towards the Maquis at Auteuil.

If Captured. The team went into the field with no



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Operations, Team Ian, (Cont'd)

cover story. If captured, they would be taken prisoner as soldiers in uniform performing their ordinary military duties. Every established law of warfare would apply to them, and each should, therefore, give his name, rank, and number only.

Information Provided to Team

The following information was provided to the team prior to its departure for the field (226):

- a. Enemy order of battle in the area.
- b. Location and defense of petrol and ammunition depots.
- c. Airfields and landing grounds.
- d. Police and Gestapo locations.
- e. Topography - terrain, roads, railways.
- f. List and descriptions of other Allied agents in this area. The following are the most important of the latter:
 - 1) Samuel, F section agent in charge of area; circuit "Shipwright".
 - 2) Ellipse, Delege Militaire of Region 5.
 - 3) Lemme, deputy to Ellipse.
 - 4) Diametre, alias Astronome, Chef d'Organization Resistance de l'Armee.
 - 5) Baron, Chef d'Operations of Region 5.
 - 6) Fourche, sabotage instructor, Region 5.
 - 7) Parthe, W/T operator, Region 5.
 - 8) Peruvien, alias Jacky, a W/T operator, Region 5.

First Word from Field

In a W/T message (227) sent on 21 June Shipwright reported the safe arrival of Jedburgh party Ian: "Jedburgh team made good drop; intend send them Chatellerault."

On the next day, 22 June 1944, team Ian's W/T "came up" for the first time (228). They reported arriving safely

(226) See Jedburgh Operation Instruction No. 8 Mf R-7 F-442/54
(227) Shipwright to SFHQ #A931/111 21 June 1944
(228) Ian to SFHQ #C-4415/5 22 June 1944

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JEDBURGHS

Operations, Team Ian, (Cont'd)

in spite of being dropped to the wrong ground, and added that they were awaiting contact with Samuel to agree on the mission.

Summary of W/T Messages Exchanged

SFHQ in a message to Ian on 22 June (229) stated:

"German Infantry Division moving north Toulouse - Normandy. Keep us posted movement. Attack wherever possible."

The following messages were exchanged during the remainder of the month of June:

23 June From Ian (230)

"Broadcast of June 22 not received. If possible send groups twice."

24 June From Ian (231)

"Broadcast last night not received due to weak signal. Impossible to copy. If message important, repeat on day sked. W/T sets now repaired; ground hard, packing not sufficient on transmitter."

25 June From Ian (232)

"Broadcast last night not received due to weak signal. Will give you report on new W/T sets as soon as possible."

28 June From Shipwright (233)

"Shipwright reported that the Chatellerault area was too dangerous for Ian and that he was sending them to the southwest part of the Vienne Department. From there they would also be able to deal with the Confolens and Ruffec regions in Charente."

(229) SFHQ to Ian #C5A53 22 June 1944
(230) #C-4437/10 23 June 1944
(231) #C-4457/15 24 June 1944
(232) #C-4484/25 25 June 1944
(233) Serial NR A 1828/189 28 June 1944

SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES

Number of Jedburgh Teams in the Field - - - 6
Number of Jedburgh Teams with Americans - - 4
Total of American members - - - - - 5
Casualties - - - - - 0

Air Operations

Number of Aircraft Used for Operations - 16
Number of Containers Dropped - - - - - 192

Accomplishments of Individual Teams

Hugh This team, operating in the Indre section, was engaged in maintaining cut railway lines in the section. A Jedburgh team to assist it had been dispatched.

Harry This team was meeting stiff opposition in its attempt to establish contact with resistance and cut enemy lines of communication.

Frederick Despite a great deal of enemy activity in the area, the team was meeting with some success in carrying out attacks on enemy communication lines.

George After being attacked by heavy German forces but escaping encirclement, the team's plans were again upset by discovery of an enemy agent among the patriots.

Hamish This team was concentrating on slowing down enemy troop movements. It had arranged for the reception of much needed supplies for the area.

Ian This team was concentrating on hindering troop movements to the Normandy front. Little was known of its activities due to wireless difficulties.

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Ceremony at Milton Hall FIGURE 32
- Raising French Flag - on Bastille Day



Bastille Day at Milton Hall FIGURE 33
- French in Full Regalia

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FIGURE 34

French Officers at Milton Hall - Bastille Day



FIGURE 35

Jedburghs Preparing to be Dispatched

OPERATIONS

With the Allied campaign in France in full swing, the emphasis of the Jedburgh section was on operations. At the beginning of July, six teams had been dispatched from England to France, of which four included American personnel. Seven teams had been dispatched from North Africa to France, including four teams with American members.


Organization of EMFFI

On 22 August 1944 a tripartite organization known as EMFFI, Etat Major des Forces Francaises de l'Interieur, and under command of General Koenig was established. This order followed the placing of the FFI under his command. This organization, a combination of American, French and British officers was to handle operational functions including training, recruiting, intelligence, air dispatch, operational planning, procurement, signals and special units (Jedburghs, Operational Groups and Allied missions). Matter of finance, personnel and administration were to be dealt with by non-integrated sections of SFHQ. (234) The Holland and Belgium operations, however, remained under the command of SFHQ.

A separate EMFFI headquarters was established with offices at Bryanston Square. The Jedburgh office under (Lieutenant-Colonel Carleton-Smith) (British) and Lieutenant-Colonel (then Major) Henry Cox, Cav (US) (235) took up offices here on 25 August 1944.

By 23 September all American Jedburghs had been dispatched. The only problems remaining were purely administrative, so the SO Jedburgh section moved back to 24 Grosvenor Street. On 1 December EMFFI headquarters were closed down and the SOE Jedburgh section resumed its work at Baker Street.

(234) War Diary Vol 3 p
(235) War Diary Vol 11 p 18

OperationsGuerrilla Activity

Through the middle of August the Jedburgh teams worked with the Maquis concentrating for the most part on training and organizing groups to be ready to assist in the Allied drive. Near the end of August General Koenig's signal for increased guerrilla activity was passed and the role of the Jedburgh's became increasingly important. Organization of resistance groups continued but on an even larger scale; important bombing targets were passed to the Air Force; many Allied airmen were evacuated back to England; and after a team was overrun by Allied armies, the members acted as guides and intelligence officers.

Dutch Jedburghs

On 12 September the first American-Dutch Jedburgh team was dispatched to Holland to contact the underground and organize resistance (236). Four additional teams, known as the Dutch Liaison Mission, were dispatched with Allied Airborne Divisions on 17 September to the Nijmegen and Arnhem area of Holland. Three of these teams included American personnel (237).

Withdrawal of Teams

As each Jedburgh team was overrun by the advancing Allied armies, and their mission was considered completed by London headquarters, the whole team (in some cases the French members remained behind) returned to London by way of Paris to be de-briefed and submit a report on its mission. On 13 October all American and British Jedburghs were ordered to return to the United Kingdom even though their work was not entirely completed (238).

(236) p this Vol
(237) p this Vol
(238) Cable Mockler-Ferryman to Redman 13 Oct 44

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
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JEDBURGHs

Operations

By the end of November all American personnel had been withdrawn from France and were being dispatched to the United States for further assignment.

Operations, Team HughTEAM HUGH (239)Summary of W/T Messages Exchanged3 July From Hugh (240)

"Training coming on well. Begin more serious operations next week. 4 - German bombers concealed under trees edge of Chateauroux airdromes."

4 July From Hugh (241)

"Reliable Senior Railway Engineer reports that all circulation in region passes across on bridge on river Allier between La Guerche and Saincaize. This target is out of our area. Can you arrange blow up this bridge. Have received report that railway line Paris-Dourdan is working at high pressure by Javisky."

"Organization mobile troops almost completed. 5 battalions in dispersed formation. 2 battalions in area La Chatre, 1 Le Blanc, 1 Mezieres, 1 battalion FTP south and north of Chateauroux. Static elements still being organized. Area can then be considered as almost completed in view of number of missions in which can arrange drops. Wet equipment, clothing and boots still lacking."

5 July From Hugh (242)

"Maintained interruption in rail circulation by more than 500 cuts, destruction of points and electric leads. Road circulation impeded by felling trees and destruction of bridges notably on Route Nationale. Guerrilla action-4 engagements with reprisal columns. Reaction and circulation of enemy feeble except in north of Department."

5 July From Hugh (243)

"Maquis control all minor roads. Each mobile Maquis has quantity of captured transport which must be kept on road. Hugh and chief FFI have own cars and control large area which they must visit constantly. At present all transport at standstill lack of fuel. Require at least 2 planes petrol to form stock."

"Armament nearly completed. Only munitions and replacement explosives and arms will then be needed from standard loads. Require boots, uniforms, equipment and cigarettes. Above all we cannot exist without petrol."

6 July From Hugh (244)

"German troops at Chateauroux. 1000 airmen at Lemarin in strength. 20 fighters, 20 bombers parked south side of drome. Installations west of drome. 2000 troops in barracks. 35 in Commandantur and 30 to Supply Service. Troops at Eguzon. Group of artillery with effectives totalling 750 at La Chatre. Gestapo are searching for Maquis in area Montmorillon - St Savin - Latrimouille."

(239) See p 17 1st Qtr this volume
(240) C-4684/48 3 Jul 44
(242) C-4733/54 5 Jul 44
(244) C-4770/59 6 Jul 44

(241) C-4711/31 4 Jul 44
(243) C-4746/55 5 Jul 44

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JEDBURGHS

Operations, Team Hugh (Cont'd)7 July From Hugh (245)

"As result of report of Gestapo in Vienne we reconnoitred whole area yesterday. Learned following bad news, German force of at least 1 battalion with armored cars attacked SAS, 1 July, in Foret Serrerrietes. Approximate losses, SAS 11 killed including one officer. 35 captured including two jeeps. We are trying to contact remaining SAS. Following day Boche attacked Maquis groups operating in the area but they managed to escape. Some Maquis have arrived in Indre. Others, probably with Samuel, have gone towards Charente. Terribly sorry about SAS but not surprised. They were too close to Poitiers and their jeeps were talked about north of Orleans."

7 July From Hugh (246)

"Sergeant Davies, 12th Squadron RAF, has arrived here safe and well. Crashed southwest of Paris night 27/28. Whole crew jumped safely. Results target that night were fairly good."

7 July From Hugh (247)

"Lieutenant Bundgaard, US Army Air Force arrived here safe and well. Crashed at Buzancals 4 July."

8 July From SFHQ to Hugh (248)

"We want remnants of Bullbasket party to retire to you. Reply urgently if you can receive them without endangering your security and if so where."

9 July From Hugh (249)

"Financial crisis acute. Money for whole Indre missing owing disappearance DMR in south. Boche has broken our contacts with south. Send five million francs; against DMRs account in Madere in specially marked package. Chief FFI prompted this telegram in agreement DMR."

10 July From Hugh (250)

"We are withdrawing owing enemy in area obliged cancel Barsac."

11 July From Hugh (251)

"Serious situation arisen due to enemy pressure. Situation is fluid we will report later."

(245) C-4789/60 7 Jul 44
 (247) C-4812/63 7 Jul 44
 (249) C-4875/70 9 Jul 44
 (251) C-4919/74 11 Jul 44

(246) C-4792/61 7 Jul 44
 (248) C-5904 8 Jul 44
 (250) C-4899/73 10 Jul 44

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Operations, Team Hugh (Cont'd)11 July From Hugh (252)

"German force of several hundred from Montmorillon and Chateauroux attacked Maquis groups operating in the area of Le Blanc morning 11 July. Fighting took place 6 kms north of Tilly until afternoon then with the Maquis battalion grouped at 8 kms south of Belabee. Maquis withdrew at night towards Dunet together with elements from Vienne who were attacked in woods east of Belabre. Our casualties light. Several deaths and more wounded. German casualties not known. Withdrawal of Maquis elements was excellent and morale sound."

12 July From Hugh (253)

"Request special bombing of HQ Boche Colonel commanding repression columns Indre, Vienne, Creuse & Loire, situated Boneuil Matours. Defense company and tanks also present."

12 July From Hugh (254)

"Fighting has ceased but Boche still in area. Bordeaux-Tours railway, enemy has ordered that all cover for 100 meters on either side of railway be cut down."

12 July From Hugh (255)

"Enemy believed withdrawn. Having occupied Belabre yesterday, ordered Mayor to line up 150 men on square to be shot but refrained at last moment. They threatened return in eight days and will shoot all if find it again center of maquis activity. Milice and Boche looted town. Maquis from Vienne - 18 killed; maquis Indre about 10. Training of our Maquis superior to Vienne. Known 3 Milice serious wounds."

15 July From Hugh (256)

"Shocked at arrival of Jed Team on Negus in middle of Boche operation. Lucky there was not catastrophe. Can just understand your not advising us of Revez in Creuse and Ian in Vienne for security reasons, but surely we were the people to arrange this last drop within five miles of our HQ. Negus is most unsafe, well known for miles around. There was no doctor on ground and operation should certainly have been postponed in view of situation. Have not yet contacted team but they landed badly. Doctor reports that English Major will be there three months in bed and French Major three weeks. We knew that DMR had been asked about Jed team for Haute Vienne and we agreed it was desirable. Why didn't you consult us who have even better contacts than DMR. This unsatisfactory drop need not have occurred. Team now great liability."

(252) C-4934/75 11 Jul 44
(254) C-4962/78 12 Jul 44
(256) C-85/89 15 Jul 44

(253) C-4946/77 12 Jul 44
(255) C-4966/80 12 Jul 44

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Operations, Team Hugh (Cont'd)

16 July From Hugh (257)

"Misunderstood our reports. Boche only passed through Le Blanc to raid Belabre region. Situation changed as enemy now active whole area with raiding tactics not occupation. Reports indicate Le Blanc airdrome suitable for pick-up operation. One of tasks of recent enemy column Belabre region was to protect withdrawal of Gestapo from Limoges towards the north. This agrees with reports of similar withdrawals by Gestapo of Paris and Bordeaux. Many Boche services have already withdrawn from southwest. All enemy movements are towards the north."

17 July From Hugh (258)

"100 bombers now around Chateauroux airdrome. 1,200 airmen sleep in town. Anti-aircraft defense negligible."

17 July From Hugh (259)

"Visited Parkinson, Vermeulen yesterday. Both in considerable pain but good spirits. Parky's injury is serious but in good hands. They cannot understand why you do not reply their message. Send more morphia as they have exhausted their stocks."

19 July From Hugh (260)

"Boche armored divisions heading in direction of Limoges. Larger portion division at Bourgneuf. 16th attacking maquis Creuse which is withdrawing northward."

20 July From Hugh (261)

"Small engagement at Aigurande on Monday. About 12 dead. Considerable expansion Maquis in north. The Gestapo active. We have also formed static elements in Chateauroux itself."

20 July From SFHQ to Hugh (262)

"If impossible to send airmen out through Spain, suggest you keep those who wish to stay in maquis. Others must use their own escape lines."

21 July From Hugh (263)

"Reports are circulating that Boche HQ at Bonneuil Matours has been bombed. 200 enemy killed. Can you confirm?"

21 July From SFHQ to Hugh (264)

"Very interested your information Boche armored

(257)	C-100/93	C-101/94	16 Jul 44	(258)	C-155/96	17 Jul 44
(259)	C-156/98		17 Jul 44	(260)	C-224/100	19 Jul 44
(261)	C-241/2		20 Jul 44	(262)	C-5959	20 Jul 44
(263)	C-269/3		21 Jul 44	(264)	C-5976	21 Jul 44

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Operations, Team Hugh (Cont'd)

division. Can you tell us where they are coming from and on which routes. Also source of information. Yes, Bonneuil Matours was bombed on 14th."

22 July From Hugh (265)

"2 Divisions now reported at Bellac. Sources Agent de Liaison X from DMR who is in creuse and our own intelligence service. On 16th Boche attacked Maquis Bourgneus. Advance guard of divisions reported at Bousac yesterday. Boche is evidently advancing northwards and will probably disperse from Bellac on roads Poitiers - Argenton - Le Blanc - La Chatre. Has as second objective repression of maquis en route. Have also report that Jed mission in Creuse have been killed or captured. Maquis in Creuse have fought magnificently but probably heavy casualties. We will block at least road to Le Blanc with trees but will not engage. Delighted news Bonneuil Matours."

23 July From Hugh (266)

"Considerable Boche activity. On 20th, repression column of about 200 failed to engage maquis near Recqueres. On 21st, column of about 800 attacked maquis at Angles west of Le Blanc on frontier of Vienne. Result not yet known. Two of our HQ were killed by Boche patrols in vicinity of Parkinson and Vermeulens safe house. They spent the day in pond. Consider would be wise to send plane for Parkinson. Boche police very active in north of department."

24 July From Hugh (267)

"Reliable source states 2 Boche divisions will shortly move eastwards from Poitiers via Le Blanc. Only 1 division was in Creuse. Portion of it has passed through La Chatre. Consider maquis in south Creuse have been largely disorganized if not totally dispersed. They were too ambitious. Whole maquis Creuse would appear to have been killed, Jed mission included."

25 July From Hugh (268)

"Movement of 2 divisions from Poitiers seems most imminent. Premier regiment and enemy elements are already in position on road between Le Blanc and St Gaultier to assure security road."

25 July From Hugh (269)

"Situation enemy confusing. First local elements very active throughout whole area with very little success thanks our system of dispersal maquis in small groups. Second, division from Creuse advancing from Limoges has or is passing through La Chatre. Third, 2 divisions in Poitiers are moving. Unable give details of ops

(265) C-299/8 22 Jul 44
(267) C-385/13 24 Jul 44
(269) C-440/15

(266) C-333/10 23 Jul 44
(268) C-414/14 25 Jul 44

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JEDBURGHs

Operations, Team Hugh (Cont'd)

Chablis and Madere as Frank who supervised them is sick in north with poisoned wisdom tooth. Only know there were enemy on Chablis first night it came. Great increase recruiting of both cadres and men. This is due to two reasons - approaching end of harvest and desire to be in maquis before the end."

26 July From SFHQ to Hugh (270)

"May ask you to take concerted action later on against all communications targets your area. If possible conserve up to half your material for this purpose. Here are BBC messages which will denote order for action. First, railways - 'Une Femme fagotte.' Second, telephones - 'Ne folatrez pas le matin'. Third, roads - 'Quasimodo est une fete'. Fourth, intensive guerilla activity but not open warfare - 'Le Xeres est un vin d'Espagne'. These are known to all resistance groups your area."

28 July From SFHQ to Hugh (271)

"Can you tell us whereabouts 11th German armored division. Believe near your area. We also want to know the number of bogies seen on tanks your region and any distinctive markings or signs indicating to which division they belong."

29 July From Hugh (272)

"Have now received accurate information about Boche troops Creuse. There is still repression column of 20,000 men in area Bourgneuf - Gueret - La Souterraine. Mainly Georgians and Cossacks with German officers. It was another division that moved via La Chatre towards Nort. Experience has shown that Russian troops most susceptible to our propaganda. Can you arrange drop Russian pamphlets telling them to join maquis in area. Let us know if yes and when."

29 July From Hugh (273)


"Much Boche activity in area disorganizes and retards our work. Main roads are full of Boche transport. Can you arrange for RAF attack repression in Indre generally and also specifically according to our instructions. All operation demands of this sort would be sent on emergency grid."

29 July From Hugh (274)

"Loches was surrounded on 27th and there is great police activity in sector. Germans have requisitioned all chateaus in area. Consider they have intention to install important HQ here."

(270) C-4237 26 Jul 44
(272) C-607/24 29 Jul 44
(274) C-602/22 29 Jul 44

(271) C-6030 28 Jul 44
(273) C-609/16 29 Jul 44



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JEDBURGHs

Operations, Team Hugh (Cont'd)29 July From Hugh (275)

"Maquis Haute Vienne have just occupied Bellac Le Dorat. Expect big Boche Reaction."

29 July From Hugh (276)

"Important information received first hand from refugee from Rouen. Boche telephone exchange at Gruchet Le Valasse in concrete blockhouse on Propriete de Toulvents et Genets. Flying bomb starting points."

29 July From Hugh (277)

"Important anti-aircraft installation between Magny and Nucourt. Until now RAF bombs have fallen to the right of Nucourt. Arms depots in the wood to the left of Bolbec 400 yards to the west of Briante - Lille - Bonne railway. Another at Mirville in the park adjoining viaduct. Petrol depot near Etampes 1 kilometer away from airforce camp on road Paris - Orleans."

29 July From Hugh (278)

"Reliable source states that SS column will occupy Le Blanc shortly, probably 31st. This may be followed by employment of Drome for anti-maquis squardron."

30 July From SFHQ to Hugh (279)

"On all future operations will drop Russian propaganda leaflets your region and hope send you soon Russian liaison officers."

31 July From Hugh (280)

"Have retrieved following personnel who will join maquis. Lance Corporal Lebar, 1st Royal Winnipeg Rifles Canadian Army, captured 9 June near Caen. Private Jaffre, 502 Parachute Regiment, US Army, captured 6 June near St Lo. Private Huff, 508 Parachute Regiment, US Army, captured near St Lo 2 June. All three escaped from POW train near Tours on 21 July."

31 July From Hugh (281)

"Creuse Chief FFI has escaped. There is also hope for American and Briton of Jed mission."

1 August From Hugh (282)

"Two Boche columns of over a 100 vehicles each have left Chatellerault and Poitiers for direction Angles sur Anglin this morning. Advance guard of 17 vehicles was signalled at Merigny yesterday. This is probably operation against Le Blanc. We may ask for RAF attacks during next 2 days on emergency sched."

(275) C-608/25 29 Jul 44
(277) C-640/28 29 Jul 44
(279) C-6057 30 Jul 44
(281) C-704/36 31 Jul 44

(276) C-639/27 29 Jul 44
(278) C-638/29 29 Jul 44
(280) C-703/35 31 Jul 44
(282) C-788/40 1 Aug 44

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JEDBURGH

Operations, Team Hugh (Cont'd)3 August From Hugh (283)

"Owing departure of DMR to reorganize Creuse DMR has delegated functions to Mission Hugh. This puts us on higher plane and gives us measure of control over all resistance elements in Indre including Chiefs FFI, FTP, ORA and ASSNOP in particular financial control. We ask you therefore to pass through us all matter concerning department and areas to north, northeast and northwest where we have considerable influence."

3 August From Hugh (284)

"Have just contacted very interesting resistance group who will form rapidly into maquis of over 1000 in all operating northwest Indre, Loire and Cher, and Indre and Loire. Not yet armed but great possibilities and well directed. This organization demands to be controlled solely by Koenig and command. For this reason they have asked to be controlled directly by Mission Hugh. Prepare therefore large quantities basic armament and considerable sum of money."

3 August From Hugh (285)

"Will be delighted receive Russian officers. Why don't you send us a mission from Tito. Suggest this to Fitzroy Maclean."

3 August From SFHQ to Hugh (286)

"Very interested your maquis Fronsac. Give us exact location strength and state of armament and tell us by return whether you could receive Jedburgh team to take over this group."

4 August From Hugh (287)

"Refusal Fraonsac is unfortunate as head Maquis Maine et Loire has already returned. We will arrange new ground as soon as we can remake contact. Don't rush your fences. Maquis don't form themselves overnight in exact locations and strengths. As soon as we have precise information we will inform you. Liaison is not easy across Loire. Our 18 was a warning order. As for Jed team, yes. We already have more work than we can handle comfortably."

4 August From Hugh (288)

"Send a Jed team on Mascara or Graves. We will nurse them here for a week putting them in picture and arranging contacts with Indre et Loire and Maine et Loire. We will arrange their passage but send them this moon or it will be too late. Their work will be difficult"

(283) C-903/43 3 Aug 44
(285) C-907/46 3 Aug 44
(287) C-992/52/3 4 Aug 44

(284) C-906/45 3 Aug 44
(286) C-74 3 Aug 44
(288) C-993/54 4 Aug 44

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Operations, Team Hugh (Cont'd)

and delicate though great possibilities. An ordinary Jed team will not do. Suggest Marchant and Chadbourn as former comes from this part of world and latter speaks excellent French. Otherwise Clutton and Brouillard. If you can't send an outstanding team we would prefer to carry on alone."

5 August From Hugh (289)

"Colonel Bertrand has force of 1300 men in Cher in woods south of Bourges. They have been half armed by BOA. Are now asking us for arms and pay. Are you prepared to send another Jed team. Reply immediately."

5 August From Hugh (290)

"Everything going very nicely in Indre but all impatiently waiting for your ops especially for bazookas. Receiving sets also essential in view our large dispersal. Healthy organizations in Indre et Loire, Maine et Loire and springing up everywhere. On 3 August maquis attacked enemy repairing bridge near Celon. Killed 25 Boche."

6 August From SFHQ to Hugh (291)

"Cannot promise second Jedburgh team but doing our best. Sending Jedburgh team on Mascara from tomorrow night. Ground Vouvray accepted for 15 containers."

7 August From Hugh (292)

"Thanks for million and personal supplies. 3 planes dropped their loads perfectly. But apart from petrol, boots and a handful of rifles and stens there was nothing but ammunition. Maquis which are served by new ground are new maquis without arms and we cannot allow them to increase without personal arms so ammunition alone is an awful flop. Realize you have other priorities but don't send any more ammunition to Mascara and only quantity commensurate to quantity arms to other grounds. Must have bazookas and brens. Don't send ammunition alone. Would prefer to wait."

7 August From SFHQ to Hugh (293)

"Reference Colonel Bertrand group near Bourges. Last night we dispatched a new Jedburgh team which has already made contact with Colonel Bertrand. We suggest you let them handle this group. We are working on your supply requirements but you must realize present great demands from circuits near Brittany and Normandy. But you are going to be taken care of soon."

7 August From Hugh (294)

"Have learned from authorized source that General

(289) C-1041/51	5 Aug 44	(290) C-1074/54	5 Aug 44
(291) C-6155	6 Aug 44	(292) C-1181/60	7 Aug 44
(293) C-6162	7 Aug 44	(294) C-1204/64	7 Aug 44

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Berlon fears that Germans will soon disarm Premier Regiment. In consequence has ordered all detachments to resist such an attempt and has arranged for elements at Le Blanc to sleep outside their barracks each night in order to avoid being taken by surprise."

9 August From Hugh (295)

"Chief Gestapo Chateauroux killed by Maquis yesterday. Strength of organized maquis our area is about 5000. Can use all grounds during non-moon period but lamps only."

9 August From SFHQ to Hugh (296)

"Sending Jed team on Mascara from Thursday. Loosmore attached team Ivor with whom Hamish is in contact. He is to go to rendezvous at Ground Paris four kms north Chateaufort 16 kms east La Chartres. Password 'I come for Captain Monmouth'".

11 August From Hugh (297)

"Egalite has established himself in Indre et Loire. His 2 ops are first class. Yesterday they encircled important Boche convoy. Destroyed several lorries, killed 8 and captured 8 prisoners with no losses themselves. All this with minimum arms."

11 August From Hugh (298)

"All static ack ack positions in Indre have moved. Airfield at Chateauroux 'La Marinerie' was mined yesterday. All available transport at Chateauroux has been requisitioned by Boche from tomorrow. Boche evacuation is in progress. Certain detached numbers left in direction of Bourges."

11 August From Hugh (299)

"Team Julian arrived safely thank you. Congratulations on your quick work in sending team to Bertrand. Julian will take over military and supply questions north of line Loches - Chateauroux - Issoudun. Exact details later."

12 August From Hugh (300)

"Very urgent Frankal FFI Headquarters and SFHQ Houlette Mission send protection for Eguzon. Informed Germans in SW preparing to evacuate Eguzon. Fear sabotage of barrage and above all of transformers. Can have Eguzon attacked and occupied immediately by over 1,000 men. But strong German reaction might result in hunt for us and heavy losses if our action premature. Limited Maquis troops. When shall we act. Is collaboration possible with Allied troops. Request reply extremely urgent to be communicated to Hamish."

(295) C-1344/68 9 Aug 44
(297) C-1452/72 11 Aug 44
(299) C-1455/74 11 Aug 44

(296) C-714 9 Aug 44
(298) C-1454/73 11 Aug 44
(300) C-1519/79 12 Aug 44

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JEDBURGHs

Operations, Team Hugh (Cont'd)12 August From Hugh (301)

"Maquis attacked Boche outpost at Chambon near Ville Dieu. Captured all 15 Germans there plus 1 cannon and heavy MG. No maquis losses. 4 or 5 similar successful incidents take place every day but we have not the time to report them."

12 August From Hugh (302)

"Very urgent FFI Headquarters. First regiment of France ready to rejoin resistance either in companies or sections just received order to report Vichy to defend Marshall against Germans. Has requested FFI chief by roundabout source which order to obey. Shall we take Premier Regiment troops by groups and singly and oppose its departure, or shall we let them go to Vichy. Troops in the Eguzon can also oppose German sabotage. Request urgent reply."

12 August From SFHQ to Hugh (303)

"Time now come for increased guerrilla effort as enemy shows signs pulling out your region. In your operations pay great attention to preserve to the utmost all permanent works such as bridges, viaducts, etc."

12 August From Hugh (304)

"Boche troops constantly passing through Chateauroux towards Bourges. 3000 passed through last night."

13 August From SFHQ to Hugh (305)

"Sending from Monday night on ground Beaujolais about 30 shock troops with mission to protect hydro-electric plant at Eguzon."

14 August From Hugh (306)

"Following information from Boche NCO prisoner. Railway Bordeaux - Tours been repaired. 5 trains of which 3 carried tanks arrived Tours morning of 11th. Ammo depot at Roche - Corbon been blown up. Ack ack posts at St Cyr, Roche - Corbon and Avertin. German area commander Tours Colonel Boehmer. On 4 August Wehrfel Korps was in Carcassonne region. Headquarters at Mille Petit 8 kms from Carcassonne. GOC is General Petersen. Korps consists of 159 Inf Div of reserve, 198 Inf Div, 716 Inf Div. Can you confirm Carcassonne dispositions as we suspect information belonging to Gestapo."

14 August From Hugh (307)

"Vouvray great success last night but all midget

(301) C-1531/80 12 Aug 44
 (303) C-6208 12 Aug 44
 (305) C-1173 13 Aug 44
 (307) C-1661/88 14 Aug 44

(302) C-1345/01 12 Aug 44
 (304) C-1552/83 12 Aug 44
 (306) C-1660/87 14 Aug 44

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JEDBURGHES

Operations, Team Hugh (Cont'd)

receivers smashed as well as receiving set Mark II. Lay on 2 deliveries for list you gave. We will put fires on all grounds so Paullac and Marguerite are good. Mascara now controlled by Jed team Julian but know that they require several deliveries. Isn't ground Pommard overrun by Allies."

14 August From Hugh (308)

"Numerous engagements yesterday. Two Boche officers and over 30 men killed or captured. Maquis have encircled 50 enemy in wood after capturing their vehicles. Our losses 1 killed."

14 August From Hugh (309)

"From sure source - 4 trains loaded with tanks and other material were at Port de Piles on Creuse this morning at seven thirty from Chatterault."

15 August From SFHQ to Hugh (310)

"Sending 2 aircraft with remaining shock troops on ground Beaujolais again tonight. Pilots report good reception there last night but 2 aircraft failed to recognize signal letter. Make sure you have distinct signal letter placing signalling light 50 meters away from your bonfires so as not to be obscured."

15 August From Hugh (311)

"Have retrieved American pilot - 2nd Lt Causer."

15 August From SFHQ to Hugh (312)

"Supreme Allied Headquarters want following information urgently. First, movements troops going north. Second, troops engaging maquis. Third, German elements left behind after withdrawal main troops. Four, enemy strength your region. We are informed that the 159th division is moving northwards to battle area. Do all you can to stop or delay their advance. Congratulations excellent work. Ground Pommard not yet overrun according our information but certainly near Allied lines."

15 August From Hugh (313)

"Since opening of guerrilla operations we have killed or captured over 124 Boches including 12 deserters. At least 30 have been wounded or escaped. Our losses have been 16. We have engaged enemy 25 times and have burned or captured 37 vehicles. This does not include following operations. Yesterday 20 to 300 cyclists attacked the company of Lt Cesario in Commandant Dipetnons Battalion in the north. After 1 hour of fighting the enemy withdrew with very heavy losses. We only report confirmed figures. You can add 25 percent not reported."

(308) C-1683/89 14 Aug 44
(310) C-1337 15 Aug 44
(312) C-1379 15 Aug 44

(309) C-1690/90 14 Aug 44
(311) C-1731/90 15 Aug 44
(313) C-1765/82 15 Aug 44

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Operations, Team Hugh (Cont'd)

16 August From Hugh (314)

"From Butch; Arrived safely but nearly all containers were streamers. Replace all material: From Hugh; Thanks for your letter. Consider Marguerite and Graves more important than Vouvray. Regarding Obolensky's message, send his material on Beaujolais but not alone as cannot continue to ask semi-armed maquis to handle stuff for others."

16 August From Hugh (315)

"An armored train travels between Chateauroux and Limoges repairing cuts in line. There are 11 wagons on train of which 4 are ack ack platforms. Present location of train is Limoges area. Fairly good source."

16 August From Hugh (316)

"More and more Boche troops are quartered in barracks and chateaux around La Martinerie airfield. They are probably troops in passage but quarters are always full. Send fighters to cannon and machine gun barracks and all big buildings around. Sure source."

17 August From Hugh (317)

"40 Boche tanks are concealed in Les Bols Dumaron east of Chateauroux."

17 August From Hugh (318)

"Frank to FFI Hq. First Regiment of France is almost entirely in resistance. To hold the enemy we are obliged to hold a small sector at Saubanc. German Central Commission should shortly pass. You can rest assured that all units of First Regiment will intervene at opportune moment."

17 August From Hugh (319)

"Retrieved following Americans - 2nd Lt M F Missimer, 119 Inf; Lt W R Fredenberg, 379 Fighter Squadron, 362nd Fighter Group. Staff Sergeant J Edmonson, Company E, 507 Parachute Inf."

17 August From Hugh (320)

"Tours is a dead city. No troops visible. Bridges guarded by skeleton pickets with Brens. Small caliber gun well concealed at cross roads of St Avertin. No defensive works in town. Boche started to evacuate Loches yesterday morning. Cross roads of St Aignan and Celle are congestion points of Boche evacuation."

(314) C-1808/98	16 Aug 44	(315) C-1842/82	16 Aug 44
(316) C-1844/85	16 Aug 44	(317) C-1897/55	17 Aug 44
(318) C-1905/56	17 Aug 44	(319) C-1904/57	17 Aug 44
(320) C-1957/60	17 Aug 44		

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Operations, Team Hugh (Cont'd)

17 August From SFHQ to Hugh (321)

"Can expect air force bombing target this afternoon 17th. Time will depend on weather. Hoping to send two aircraft to ground Pomard from tomorrow Friday. For Butch - Sending new containers soonest. Contact us on your own W/T plan. Good Luck Tyson."

17 August From SFHQ to Hugh (322)

"You can send American aviators to Mr Barriaud la Croisille Haute Vienne. Password 'Je Vines de la part de Charles.' They will be exfiltrated by next air operation. Please confirm if safe for them to travel. If not keep them with one of your groups."

17 August From Hugh (323)

"Indications that Boche first Army moving from southwest towards Champagne. First Army left Poitiers on 10 August towards Reims via Orleans. Third company of assault battalions left Bordeaux same date by Charente Inferieure towards Orleans. 11th Inf Div still region of Bordeaux on 6 August."

18 August From Hugh (324)

"Yesterday American fighter machine gunned one of our headquarters wounding five people seriously and destroying our only ambulances. You realize these accidents will happen but suggest most strongly that all of us and perhaps all maquis in France use identification ground strips. We have parachutist of all colors. You could change strips twice a week which would prevent Boche copying us. In general single vehicles on road are maquis."

18 August From Hugh (325)

"Have dispatched carrier pigeon number 11043 with plan of La Martinerie at 0530 this morning. Am mounting coup de main operation against Boche there. Will ask for air support before our attack as disorganization and panic yesterday was terrific."

18 August From Hugh (326)

"With capture of Orleans St Aignan and Selle are dead. Loches, Bourges, Valencay and Verzon are main itinerary. Convoys passed today from Tours through Cormery, Brery and Chenononaux."

18 August From Hugh (327)

"Last night there were 500 lorries in 'Le Parc D'artillerie' at Poitiers. They are probably there today. Bomb them at once."

(321) C-1577 17 Aug 44	(322) C-6246 17 Aug 44
(323) C-1956/59 7 Aug 44	(324) C-1995/64 18 Aug 44
(325) C-1992/63 18 Aug 44	(326) C-1996/65 18 Aug 44
(327) C-2038/100 18 Aug 44	

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Operations, Team Hugh (Cont'd)

18 August From SFHQ to Hugh (328)

"Tell Egalite that new code will be sent by next operation on Le Blanc. Sending more medical packages next operation. Regret terrible unfortunate error of fighter. Have notified Air Force."

19 August From Hugh (329)

"At 7 o'clock on Wednesday Captain Jean who commands maquis to which Egalite is accredited attacked and took town of Loches during absence of Egalite. This was very rash and against our orders. However Egalite has established outposts 7 kms from town to give warning of Boche counter attack. Maquis forces about 1500 badly armed. Can you give air support."

19 August From Hugh (330)

"Following identifications obtained from interrogation Boche POW. 208/7 Aviation unit commanded by Colonel Rentsch moved from Tours towards Paris the night 13/14; 113 technical aviation was transferred from Cognat to Orly before 10 August; 1st Motorized technical battalion was en route from Bordeaux towards Fontainebleau on 12 August; HQ of 1st Army AOK left Bordeaux area for Fontainebleau as 1st destination on 10 August. Army commander General Vouder Chevallerie. 11th Panzer or motorized division was still in Bordeaux on 6 August. This division is known as Gerspengste Division. Commander Lt General Von Witkersheis."

19 August From SFHQ to Hugh (331)

"Please send back by Hudson operation as many rescued pilots as possible. Keep contact with Romain or Croc. Standby times for September moon period from 29 August to 10 September from 2200 to 0200 hours. Do not send in new grounds as they will not be served. Regret our maximum is about three grounds due to priorities elsewhere. Give pinpoints for RAF to attack. We must have precise coordinates."

20 August From Hugh (332)

"Have retrieved following personnel: Major J D Learment, Nova Scotia Highlanders; 2nd Lt W H Robbins, 505 Parachute Inf; the following from 405 Fighter Group, 9th US Army Air Force: 2nd Lt W S Davis, 2nd Lt I T Hersey; 1st Lt A J Blood."

20 August From Hugh (333)

"Main road Tours - Chatellerault is full of Boche. Traffic going in both directions according to most reliable observer. Too strong for us to attack request fighter support."

(328) C-6260 18 Aug 44

(330) C-2094/3 19 Aug 44

(332) C-2234/17 20 Aug 44

(329) C-2089/2 19 Aug 44

(331) C-6268 19 Aug 44

(333) C-2227/15 20 Aug 44

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Operations, Team Hugh (Cont'd)20 August From SFHQ to Hugh (334)

"Hamish wishes rendezvous with Franc re military operations his area. Please give safe house with password also convenient meeting date."

21 August From Hugh (335)

"Boche has evacuated Eguzon dam. We have strong cordon all round to prevent sabotage. Enemy is now grouped in 2 centers Poitiers and Chatellerault. 10,000 Boche in Poitiers with nests of well sited anti-tank guns. Important troop concentrations reported in Foret de Vouille west northwest of Poitiers."

21 August From Hugh (336)

"With departure of Germans from Chateauroux department of Indre is free of enemy troops. Yesterday morning about 1,000 enemy leaving Chateauroux towards east were attacked by FFI at exit of town. Known results are over 200 Boche killed and over 100 lorries captured with other important material. Our losses slight. Unfortunately elements of FFI occupied the town and replaced the Prefet. They have now evacuated town, however, and we have placed a cordon of over 700 men about 10 kms away from town to prevent reprisals. Premier regiment de France has taken up positions with us."

21 August From Hugh (337)

"Have dispatched all American and Canadians across Loire to their own lines by our channel. Could not persuade pilots to wait for Hudson. Yes, Eclipse has granted us full responsibility for all funds in Indre."

21 August From Hugh (338)

"Information from Prisoners - Schnelle Abteilung 608 commanded by General Lieutenant Hechel from Lucon in Vendee to Angers filtrated east through St Maure in small parties from 10 to 12 August. Four squadrons 500 men. enemy battery from QYT Regiment 1198 in position 1 1/2 kms west of Doue along road from Angers. 12 cannon 152 caliber with tractors. Also at Doue 500 men from 7th Army. All enemy units in region of St Maure Chinon are trying to force way towards east through Loches. FFI have evacuated Loches but block road. Violent combat all day yesterday with 200 Boche armed with cannon and mortars. We have moved up reinforcements."

22 August From Hugh (339)

"Consider Chateauroux action brilliant success. We are not occupying town for moment to avoid possible reprisals on civilians. Loches action also holding up enemy columns. But although no enemy in Indre we are not

(334) C-6282 20 Aug 44

(336) C-2295/20 21 Aug 44

(338) C-2339/25 21 Aug 44

(335) C-2288/18 21 Aug 44

(337) C-2331/22 21 Aug 44

(339) C-2376/27 22 Aug 44

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calling ourselves liberated while there is still enemy garrison in Poitiers. RAF bombing of Chateauroux in particular of Chateaudozons was great success."

22 August From Hugh (340)

"Strong indications that enemy preparing serious resistance south bank Loire from Tours to Amboise. Small division of 3 regiments of which 1 of SS in and around Tours. In particular Parc de Grammont. Details Tours defenses. New explosive charges on aerial bombs been placed under bridges. Pont de Saint Louis 1 cannon and MGs. 25 men at St Martin Le Beau. Nothing between Lussault and Amboise. Battery at Crossroads route N 10 and GC 29. 3 places on 105 enfilading routes in 10 D 2 and near 58. 1 cannon at crossroads Rue Colbert and Rue Nationale. Several anti-tank guns 25 and 47. About 150 men with 2 cannon and MGs defend Amboise."

22 August From Hugh (341)

"Without possible doubt Boche is fleeing through Loches, Montresor, Valencey, Bourges. Our forces have delayed enemy about 12 hours by occupying environs of Loches. Enemy has now retaken town. Casualties even on both sides. No civilian casualties. We have plenty of men there but no arms. Please obtain necessary priority to drop us 6 Planes on Bourgeil. 4 of loads A and D, 2 of B and C. Other 2 grounds Brechlore and Beaujolais. If you can lay more Hermitage and Graves. We can still do most valuable work in this northern area."

25 August From Hugh (342)

"Starting general offensive from today against Boche column withdrawing from south and west through region between Tours and Loches and Cher valley. 6 mobile battalions compose attacking force. Please warn RAF that immediate fighter bomber support be asked for by Hugh, Julian, or Hamish. We are all covering the operation in different sectors. Hugh will coordinate as far as possible."

25 August From Hugh (343)

"Most urgent, armored train advancing on Chateauroux from Reuille has been immobilized 1 km north of Reuille by cuts in line. Will be immobilized whole way to Chateauroux by similar cuts. But don't let it reach its objective. Demand instant bombardment. Considerable light ack ack."

25 August From Hugh (344)

"Saw Hamish yesterday. Unless you state definitely to contrary Crown will return England by Dakota to discuss several pressing subjects and will return here 48 hours later by next Dakota."

(340) C-2339/25 21 Aug 44
(342) C-2742 25 Aug 44
(344) C-2779/38 25 Aug 44

(341) C-2432/29 22 Aug 44
(343) C-2740/36 25 Aug 44

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25 August From SFHQ to Hugh (345)

"Personal for Crawshay. Regret delay. Authority only received today. War Office order 36/44 promoted acting major. Congratulations."

27 August From SFHQ to Hugh (346)

"Had long conference with Crown. You may expect aerial bombardments of escaping German columns so watch out for our planes. All your targets have been passed to Air Force."

28 August From SFHQ to Hugh (347)

"Understand Group Patrick no longer needed for protection Eguzon. Ivor making request for such a group to help him. Please discuss matter with Colonel Obolensky and Ivor. We are agreeable to such action unless you have better use for this Patrick Group."

28 August From SFHQ to Hugh (348)

"Hamish here in London. We have decided bring Hamish team home. Double Dakota operation planned on La Martinerie Chateauroux from tomorrow Tuesday 29th. Expect you arrange reception. Blachere will give you teams money."

31 August From SFHQ to Hugh (349)

"In view Boche activity Le Blanc advise us by return regarding security airfield."

1 September From SFHQ to Andy (350)

"Captain Crown returning probably tomorrow by Dakota via Limoges."

3 September From Hugh (351)

"Request that two other American groups under Colonel Butch actually working south of Indre be sent to Indre to be put under direct command of Butch"

3 September From SFHQ to Hugh (352)

"Very sorry about your casualties but all Allied Air Forces have been told to look out for white star."

4 September From Hugh (353)

"Crown returned. Enemy movements greatly diminished. No columns between Tours and Mezieres. Enemy evacuated Chateauroux in the morning. About 1,000 Boche at Rocheposay. Several Hundreds at Mezieres. Ecueille and

(345) C-6323	25 Aug 44	(346) C-6351	27 Aug 44
(347) C-6364	28 Aug 44	(348) C-6365	28 Aug 44
(349) C-4083	31 Aug 44	(350) C-6421	1 Sept 44
(351) C-3706/71	3 Sept 44	(352) C-6458	3 Sept 44
(353) C-3820/74	4 Sept 44		

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region of Valencay still occupied. We took 30 to 50 prisoners. Hamlet and OG Groups special forces have joined us. Please give us any information on enemy units still to our west. 16th Inf Div has passed through Chateauroux Valencay. General Reinhardt was in Chatellerault 31 August."

4 September From Hugh (354)

"Enemy formation of 500 vehicles dispersed in earth tracks around Vicq. They are at following points Track to Lagilardeere up to 2 kms northeast of Vicq. Tracks near road from Vicq to Pleumartin, Vicq to Roche, Posay-Vicq to Angles. This excellent and important target if immediately laid on but they may move tonight."

5 September From Hugh (355)

"Enemy lorries from Vicq are mounting this evening towards Preuilly, Buzancais, Chateauroux or Levroux. Another column along axis Levroux, Brion, Issoudin, Bourges. Another column towards Luat Lignieres. Send reconnaissance tomorrow as they stop for day at 6 o'clock in morning."

5 September From Hugh (356)

"French and American special forces are actively harrying enemy with great enjoyment and some success. Their field craft is nearly as good as the maquis. Interrogation of prisoners confirms that is constantly moving among axis Pleumartin, Laroche, Posay, Prluilly, Buzancais. An armored column and a Marine detachment are expected to pass along this axis tomorrow. Please arrange Air Force patrols along this early every morning as Boche columns lay up for day after midday."

5 September From Hugh (357)

"Number of prisoners Indre difficult to compute owing mild Gallic tendency to exaggerate. Number certainly over 600. Am compiling careful record of bridges destroyed and saved."

6 September From SFHQ to Hugh (358)

"Information passed to RAF. Grunseth group must be attached to Colonel Obolensky immediately. Both parties have been ordered to cooperate with you."

7 September From Hugh (359)

"Very important. Enemy columns largely disorganized, very densely packed consisting of vehicles motorcycles and pedestrians left Chateauroux this morning along road to Issoudun. Pass to RAF. Chateauroux is being definitely

(354) C-3821/73 4 Sept 44
(356) C-3961/81 5 Sept 44
(358) C-6487 6 Sept 44

(355) C-3860/85 5 Sept 44
(357) C-3962/82 5 Sept 44
(359) C-4132/2 7 Sept 44

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evacuated. We are moving our mobile columns eastwards to continue harrying enemy."

8 September From SFHQ to Hugh (360)

"Can you explain circumstances of Monarque's return to London. Monarque claims return was ordered by Troubadour. Troubadour has sent signal to us saying Monarque wanted to return and asking authorization. Who is telling the truth. We await instructions for Obolensky. Return Norwegian groups via Dakota from Limoges as soon as possible."

8 September From Hugh (361)

"From Vega. Have examined Le Blanc. Excellent in all respects for day or night ops. Security excellent. Boches at Bonbin and Chateauroux."

9 September From Hugh (362)

"RAF bombing has been most profitable. Enemy has abandoned vehicles and equipment along all roads. Enemy now withdrawing from direction Chateauroux - Issoudon through Chateauneuf, Lignieres and La Chatres. Preuilly and Mezjeres are clear of enemy. Chateauroux and Issoudon are practically evacuated."

9 September From Hugh (363)

"Last enemy columns are moving from Lignieres to Chateauneuf mainly on Grand Chemin 69. Lignieres will be main bottleneck for another 24 hours. Pass to RAF. Mission of American commandos now finished. We agree with Obolensky that they return by Dakota from Le Blanc. Do you agree. Will ask you to direct all Dakota operations on to La Martinerie as soon as it is absolutely safe. Probably from 10 September. We are desperately short of petrol and La Martinerie is nearer theater of operations than Le Blanc."

10 September From Hugh (364)

"Department of Indre and attached areas of Indre and Loire are now entirely liberated. Franc is ill and tired. Propose establish liaison with Allied Forces and then return. Do you consent."

10 September From Hugh (365)

"Cannot understand why you continue parachute ops. We are fully armed to compete with any Boche remnants. Environs of Chateauneuf sur Cher continue to be interesting bombing target."

(360) C-579 8 Sept 44

(362) C-4278/6 9 Sept 44

(364) C-4353/10 10 Sept 44

(361) C-4207/4 8 Sept 44

(363) C-4308/7 9 Sept 44

(365) C-4392/11 10 Sept 44

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11 September From Hugh (366)

"Germans have just surrendered at Issoudun to American General commanding 80th Division repeat at Issoudun. Warn aviation not to bombard this group which will be sent to Loire Valley."

11 September From Hugh (367)

"The official taking over by new authorities will take place after march past of FFI troops today at Chateauroux, and tomorrow at Le Blanc."

11 September From SFHQ to Hugh (368)

"Obolensky's party is to return by Dakota soonest. To Franc - Congratulations on liberation Indre and Indre et Loire. We regret to hear you are ill. We agree to your returning to London after having established contact with Allied Forces."

13 September From Hugh (369)

"Enemy has not blown up bridges or installations in Indre. All destructions have been caused by FFI. In Indre et Loire FFI have prevented Boche from blowing Pont de Blere. Prisoners are being concentrated in 2 camps south west and south east Indre."

14 September From SFHQ to Hugh (370)

"Frank received your No 61. He does not understand the nature of the difficulties which you report concerning Adibatique. If you have any information shall be glad of it. On the face of it have the same opinion as you of Adibatique."

22 September From SFHQ to Hugh (371)

"Hope send two planes to Le Blanc morning 23rd. Can you give us immediately names all personnel now at Le Blanc awaiting return this operation. Also when the Operation completed, advise us if you have anyone left behind."


Report of Team Upon Return from the Field - 5 Jun to 22 Sept 44

Initial Mission

Team Hugh was to contact resistance groups and assist SAS advance elements to arrange reception committee to receive main body of SAS; commence immediate action against rail communications Limoges-Chateauroux and Bordeaux-Tours;

(366) C-4420/13 11 Sept 44
(368) C-1096 11 Sept 44
(370) C-6535 14 Sept 44

(367) C- No number
(369) C-4715/23 13 Sept 44
(371) C-2854 22 Sept 44



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reconnoiter safe areas for SAS to operate from; put their radio link at disposal of advance SAS party who had no means of communication.

Team Hugh was not under command of SAS. Once this mission was completed, Hugh was to contact base for further orders with a view to working with resistance groups.

Briefing in London on 3 June 1944

Departure 2300 hours 5 June. Very cramped in aircraft. Encountered slight flak on crossing French coast. Jumped at 0140 hours 6 June in following order: 1 and 2, two SAS officers with leg bags; 3, Crown; 4, Yonne; 5, Franc.

Ground very mediocre for purpose - narrowly missed landing in a wood. Only five men in reception committee commanded by agent "Olive". At least two kilometers between first container and last package. First contacts with London at 1030 hours 6 June.

Preparation of Initial Mission

In the afternoon of 6 June, Hugh contacted the chief of the "Armee Secrete" of Indre - Surcouf, as well as Samuel (372) of F Section. A conference was held as a result of which it was decided that it was inadvisable to divide the effort of the SAS group on the two main rail communications as the line Limoges - Chateauroux would certainly be kept permanently cut by the FFI in the Haute - Vienne Creuse and Indre; the distance between the two lines was too great to permit the SAS to operate effectively on both in view of the undesirability of splitting up the force; the line Bordeaux - Tours was incomparably the more important from the strategic point of view, and also the more difficult target as it could be easily surveyed by the enemy and the environs were unsuitable for

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permanent tenure by a maquis.

Consequently, the following plan was pressed upon the OC, SAS detachment, who accepted it, that the group should operate in the region of Poitiers, and that the SAS main body should be dropped near to Aigurande.

History of the Initial Phase.

In the evening of 6 June, the team and SAS moved near to Chateauroux and assisted at a parachute operation pre-arranged for Samuel.

On 7 June we inspected several resistance groups who were in the act of forming in the sector of La Chatre and met Robert, Achille, Duplix (Maquis leaders).

There were great possibilities in the region but without sufficient cadres of arms the men would do better to disperse for the moment. During the night 7 June, Olive was killed by the enemy at Eguzon.

Continued inspection of Maquis on 8 and 9 June, arranged and supervised reception committees during both nights for SAS party on ground near Aigurande.

On 9 June moved with the SAS groups Surcouf and Samuel to the region of Le Blanc.

The situation at that date was the most interesting region and that over which Surcouf had the most control was Le Blanc; Samuel decided to leave Indre in our hands and return to his groups in Vienne; the SAS group in the evening of 9 June was placed under the protection of an efficient group in Vienne near Lussac-les-Chateaux, where they would be in contact with Samuel. Thus they were in the nearest possible safe area for operations against the line Bordeaux-Poitiers.

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Termination of Initial Mission

Our initial mission could thus be considered as terminated and OC, SAS detachment agreed that a far more important task lay ahead of us, that of organizing and arming the resistance in Indre in constant relation with the chief of the AS.

This proposition was accordingly put to London and at the same time we asked for three more Jedburgh teams for Indre, which were never received. This was a great disappointment as the enormous task of organizing the resistance of the whole department lay before us, and contemporaneous with the excitement caused by D-day, it was the psychological moment to take the existing framework well in hand.

Observations

We had six hours sleep in the first five days and were completely "out" on 11 June.

As regards the SAS, we never considered that uniformed troops, foreign to the country and its language, could carry out sabotage in better conditions than the resistance. On the contrary, they attract far more remark, and consequently draw danger not only on themselves, but on all the Maquis in the region.

The future was to show that these very factors were to bring catastrophe upon them while their positive achievements were considerably less than were effected by the Maquis in the same period with less facilities at their disposal.

The employment of "Jeeps" by the SAS at that early stage, showed how little they appreciated the true position.

On 13 June, Jedburgh team Hamish (373) arrived on ground "Barsac" near Belabre. Team consisted of Lieutenant

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Robert Anstett (374) (Bobby), (Lieutenant Blachere) (Lucien) and radio operator Lee. They were dropped too low, all three of them were very shaken, and Lee twisted his ankle.

As Surcouf was almost constantly in the sector of Le Blanc, and as it was necessary for us to get things going in the northwest we decided to put Hamish in the sector La Chatre - Aigurande, where we knew there were already reliable elements to be armed.

Hamish moved to area La Chatre on 15 June, without incident.

Situation in Mid-June

Immediately following the enthusiasm occasioned by the opening of the second front, the strength of the resistance in the department of Indre had increased to about 3,000 men of whom roughly half were armed. The Armee Secrete (AS) were already separated from the "Franc-Tireurs et Partisans" (FTP). This duality was encouraged by the fact that certain agents from F Section only armed the FTP. For example, Edward (375) and Richard (376) in the area of St Benoit, only contacted the departmental chief of the FTP "Rolland." Another example: "Pauline" (377) alias Genevieve Alias Marie in the region of Valencay only worked with the FTP chief Alex (previously departmental FTP chief). Later on "Pauline" had cause to regret this policy.

In the region of Le Blanc, the service COPA supplied arms under the direction of Croc the Delege Militaire Departmental (DMD), Ellipse's representative. At the moment of our arrival, this organization had not spread further

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afield than Le Blanc area.

The AS groups were divided as follows:

About 600 each in the sectors of Le Blanc and La Chatre.

About 100 each around Chateauroux, Buzancais and Vatan.

Under a hundred around Issoudun.

The FTP had about 400 men in the northern sector

(Alex) and about 600 in the southern sector Prissac-

Saint Benoit du Sault-Eguzon, with 100 men at Le Blanc.

The ORA in the Brenne and at Chateauroux was commanded by Colonel Martel (Chomel) alias le Commandant Charles, who at that time did not consider that the moment was yet ripe to place his men in the Maquis.

Policy adopted in Mid-June

In view of these circumstances Hugh decided on the following policy: As soon as Hamish was well established in LaChatre, Hugh would endeavor to pick up contacts in the north of the department, and with the ORA in particular, in order to organize a coordinated framework of resistance throughout the department, and settle some very delicate questions of command. At the same time Hugh would remain in constant liaison with Surcouf. The question of arming the Maquis in Le Blanc already well equipped, could safely be left to Croc and the service COPA, although we did in fact use one ground in this region immediately - "Barsac". In addition we must supervise the maintenance of sabotage on the railways, and control strictly all guerrilla activity as the topography of the Indre is not suitable for concealment of Maquis. The men were untrained, lacked leaders, and were not sure of themselves, and a foolish move might bring about irreparable harm to morale as well as destroying the existing

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framework.

Experience has shown of those enthusiasts who joined the Maquis on D-day, that a German attack on an untrained Maquis compromises irreparably their future progress. Enemy repression columns were very active at that moment, and the German attacks on the Chateauroux Maquis in the Foret de Luant, as well as those on the groups of Alex (FTP) and Comte (AS) near Valencay, suppressed all progress for a very long time.

Questions of cooperation, strategy and command resolved

On 20 June, a conference was held at Mexieres-en-Brenne, between Colonel ORA, Surcouf, Croc and Hugh; a previous conference between Martel, Surcouf, and Croc a few days previously had had negative results. At this second conference, the situation was cleared up and the following decisions taken:

Colonel Martel would relinquish the idea of commanding the resistance in Indre, but would take up the military command under the authority of Surcouf. In particular, he would exercise direct command over the mobile troops of the Maquis who would be formed into Companies and battalions. The "Chefs de Secteur" would continue to command the static elements and small Maquis in their section. A third category of resistance was also envisaged - Individuals who would carry out their normal work, but would have personal arms hidden near their homes. These men could be called upon when necessary.

The general strategy decided upon was that the Creuse represented the safest and most suitable region for Maquis and that in the event of the resistance in Indre being strongly attacked, the mobile elements could withdraw intact, and in

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good order to the Creuse. Experience was to show that this idea was false. The resistance in Indre, through the prudent measures taken, was to remain relatively secure, whereas the Creuse and surrounding departments were targets for repression columns.

The reasons for this were that, our security was good, the enemy was very badly informed on the strength of the Maquis in the department and considered that any Maquis in the Indre were far too far from their, the enemy's, life line of communication, the line and road Bordeaux - Poitiers - Chatellerault, to do any serious harm.

On 25/26 June, a two day conference was held at Hugh's headquarters attended by Ellipse (delegue militaire regional, (DMR)), Croc (DMD), Martel, Surcouf (AS) and Rolland (FTP). The decisions already taken were ratified by Ellipse, with the difference that he pressed for the adoption of more immediate action, in order to imbue the troops with an offensive spirit; we did not consider that the time was quite ripe for this, a view that was confirmed by London.

Ellipse who was most clear headed and who completely dominated the situation, fixed the precise relation between the zone of action and tasks of the AS, FTP and ORA, and Military inspection of all the resistance.

(It will be seen that it took us three weeks to a month to obtain a really firm grip on the situation, and we think that the same period must have been necessary for all other Jedburgh teams to effect the same.)

History of Intermediate Phase

As a result of this conference, it became possible during the days that followed, for Hugh to tour various Maquis,

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instructing and advising. However, we were soon to find that we had not time to do this task thoroughly, as the more we travelled, the more we found that the team had incessantly to change quarters over an enormous field of action in order to contact distant groups, and constitute a larger coordinated zone of action, provide the necessary new terrains for parachute operations and coordinate the zones of those already existing.

The phase from 25 June to 10 July was a period of intensive organization where thanks to the parachute operations of service COPA, Hamish, Edward, Pauline and where necessary, Hugh the resistance in Indre produced as first class troops, five mobile battalions in addition to well organized Maquis in every sector. During this period we regrouped a number of resistance movements in particular in the region Vatan. At the same time sabotage operations were maintained over the whole area. There were five hundred rail cuts from 6 June to 6 July in Indre alone. We found on arrival that rail cuts were frequently senseless and usually badly placed, and our advice on this point increased their efficacy while economizing explosive.

Enemy Repression Column

Although the enemy had been active throughout this period on a small scale, attacking and surrounding small Maquis, all over the department and making road movement extremely perilous, right up to 10 July, we had had no large scale engagement.

Towards 8 July, the Maquis in the Vienne were attacked at the same time as the SAS group Bullbasket, (378) and withdrew into the Indre in the region of Belabre. This German

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attack was mainly due to the lack of security shown by the SAS who even at that early stage paraded about the country in Jeeps.

On 10 July, repression columns of about 2000 SS and several hundred Miliciens coming from Poitiers, Chatellerault and Chateauroux attacked the Maquis in the Belabre region. The attack, which was made from all quarters, was carried out by several columns which arrived along the roads from Le Blanc Montmorillon, St Gaultier, and Prissac. The company Marc from Captain Marceau's battalion, was attacked around 0900 hours in the farm "des Herolles." This company resisted the enemy for several hours, killing at least 20 Germans and Miliciens, including the chief of the militia in Poitiers. They carried out an orderly withdrawal during the afternoon. The Company Chaumont from the same battalion, was attacked in the afternoon, 10 kilometers to the north. The two companies withdrew during the night southeast to the region of Dunet.

The most serious attack took place in the woods of Luzeraize and Souvigny, between Belabre and Prissac. The two companies who had withdrawn from the Vienne had more than 20 killed. They withdrew about 11 o'clock in a southeasterly direction, and overran Hugh's headquarters. Hugh controlled the withdrawal of all elements, having under immediate command Captain Marceau's battalion and the elements from the Vienne. The sum total of the operation was 30 killed in the Maquis, and 44 enemy killed.

(The repression column was brought upon us by the carelessness of the Maquis from the Vienne, who had withdrawn on to us without due attention to security, and concealment.)

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Period from 11 July to 31 July

The main achievements in this period were:

1. A great increase in the number of parachute grounds.
2. The broadening of the general framework of resistance.
3. Consolidation of the elements slightly scattered in the attack of 10 July.

Parachute operations were effected on Mascara (Near Vioux), Beaujolais (Near Tilly) (on the boundary of the Haute Vienne), Riesling (Buzancais-Ecueille), Madere (Le Blanc) Chablis (Foret de Lancosme).

Hugh moved his tactical headquarters north into the Brenne, accompanied by Martel and Surcouf. We slowed down guerrilla activity after the attack on Belabre as a result of the presence of at least one German Division in the Creuse who were moving north to Indre with the intention of seeking out and destroying all pockets of resistance, a mission they had just accomplished successfully in the Creuse.

In addition to this force, SS repression elements failed to locate and engage our Maquis near Angles and Mezieres at this time.

Hugh and his liaison officers were obliged to travel as extensively as ever during this period, and both Branc and Crown had numerous hairbreadth escapes on the roads. On 20 July, Lieutenant Prince Joachim Murat was killed on leaving a cafe south of Mezieres, by fire from a German armored car. Hugh who was still in the cafe escaped out of the back.

Murat's death was a great loss, as he was a most able and intrepid Liaison Officer.

However, our prudent measures bore fruit, and the Maquis grew very considerably during this period. We inculcated a

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spirit of discipline and instituted training programmes, while arming over 6,000 during this period.

We turned certain Maquis in the safer areas into infantry training depots who served as reinforcements for the mobile battalions.

This orderly program of expansion must appear incredible in comparison with the experiences of other Jedburghs, but was effected by a unified command and by the innate decency of the three chiefs, Surcouf, Martel and Rolland. Mission Hugh was known to everyone, and was not just a British mission somewhere in the background. Wherever there was political trouble Hugh made a point of taking the bull by the horns. Rolland, Chef FTP, resented our introduction of armistice army officers. Martel, the Army colonel, expressed the gravest misgivings about Hugh's policy of arming FTP elements as well as the others. Surcouf was very bitter about the previous activities of F Section agents. We placed ourselves on a pedestal as direct representatives of General Eisenhower and General Koenig. We were soldiers of integrity who would carry out our orders received from London. (In this connection orders were usually thrust into London's mouth). In the final issue of any argument, these three good Frenchmen, Surcouf, Martel, and Rolland could always be won on our plea of a united French effort.

Martel was the best type of French senior officer; Surcouf, a refrigerator salesman from Lorraine, had but one ideal; a united strong France, and was completely selfless in pursuing this desire; Rolland, a canny French bourgeois turned communist, could always be handled by flattery or belittling.

Thus, when certain communist Maquis employed their energies

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in parading about towns as liberators, rather than fighting the Germans, we commiserated with Rolland for his inability to control them, though lauding him for his own good faith.

During this period, we noted the first concentrations of enemy troops to the south and west of the department, which gave us an indication of a probable general withdrawal.

During the last days of July, German circulation became intense in the north and northeast of the department and we gave the order for restrained guerrilla activity. Every day our Maquis stopped German vehicles moving towards the east and we had numerous small local actions.

Usually we dealt with the tourist cars from Brittany and Nantes, containing specialist personnel who had bad route itineraries, and had not made provision against Maquis attack.

In the first stages of the retreat the Germans feared air attack more than the Maquis, and consequently withdrew in dribblets. They were soon forced to change their policy however, and withdrew in great convoys. This permitted Hugh and other Jedburgh teams to call down shattering bombardments upon them. This was probably the greatest service rendered by the Maquis to the Allied Command. The pity is that the Air Force would not always take prompt action on information supplied. Nevertheless, results achieved in Indre and Indre et Loire were impressive.

Period from 1 August to 22 August

During the first days of August, team Hugh was appointed delege militaire of the department of Indre and Indre et Loire.

This increased our work enormously. We even contacted

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a Maquis in Maine et Loire north of Tours, but brought other missions under our control which enabled us to effect operations on a wider strategic scale and coordinate all resistance efforts.

We obtained Jed teams Julian (379) and Ivor (380) to help us out in the north east of Indre and in the Cher.

At that particular moment the resistance in Indre et Loire were in the key position. The Germans showed a most healthy respect for resistance in Indre, as a result of our work at the end of July, and the great columns for Bordeaux, La Rochelle and Nantes, nearly all skirted our immediate area.


The main axis for the withdrawal was Poitiers-Chateaullerault-Tours-Bourges. Other columns followed the itinerary Ligeuil-le-Grand Pressigny-La Haye Descartes-Loches. However, they all converged on the Cher valley, through Saint Aignan and Bourges.

We had a great number of local actions in Indre et Loire at this period. During the same time the four BBC phrases indicating the moment for an intensification of guerrilla activity, were passed down to commanders of battalions, sectors and subsectors, together with specific orders as to individual action to be taken. Sabotage operations were increased as regards the roads, for the railways in Indre had long been cut. All Maquis adjoining railways had been allotted the permanent duty of keeping the lines cut since D-day.

We could not at that moment plan for a coordinated policy of guerrilla action as we were not sure as to what would be the enemy's future movements.

On 10 August the strength of armed and organized resistance groups in Indre and Indre-et-Loire under our direct control had

(379) p710 this Vol
(380) p629 this Vol

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increased to between eight and ten thousand, which was nearly the maximum that could operate as Maquis in such unsuitable guerrilla country, without coming out into the open. Unfortunately we received very few parachute operations in August, owing to the higher priority of resistance in Brittany.

Two very important side issues must be mentioned here. At the beginning of August, our intelligence brought us information that an SS party of 200 men was coming from Poitiers with the intention of blowing up the barrage at Eguzon. This is the most important source of water power in France, and the enormous transformers there, once destroyed, would take a long time to replace and refill.

We immediately surrounded the barrage with a thousand FTP and asked London for parachute troops. We could not actually occupy the barrage as it was garrisoned by 300 Wehrmacht. We learned from a Polish deserter however, that they had no explosive.

In response to our signal, London sent an OG group of thirty American parachutists under a very conscientious and sensible officer, Captain John E Cook, Inf (381) Lieutenant Colonel Serge Obolensky, AUS (382) also came, and was able to represent our American Allies most creditably at subsequent parades to celebrate the liberation of Indre.

We decided that the best thing to do with this negligible force was to parade them about the country, so as to give the impression that there was at least a brigade of Allied parachutists. This had the required effect.

The Wehrmacht garrison, who were very strongly armed, withdrew without molestation, as we wished to do nothing

(381) War Diary Vol 11 p 672
(382) War Diary Vol 11 p 16

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that would place Eguzon too much in the limelight, and we occupied the whole installation.

The second issue concerned the Premier Regiment de France. We had been keeping the closest watch on the attitude of this regiment, through Colonel Martel who had numerous contacts. We had received the strictest orders, however, from General Koenig, that Hugh as Delegeue Militaire, was, on no account, to flirt with this regiment, or offer them attractive terms to come over on our side.

At a certain moment, about mid-August, it was apparent that three-quarters of the regiment was prepared to join the resistance with their arms. General Berlon commanding the regiment, was, however, still sitting on the fence.

We arranged for the Maquis under team Hamish to put him under arrest, as in our position of delegue militaire, we would have compromised General Koenig, if we had taken that measure.

With Berlon's arrest, the regiment came over, and we placed them around Eguzon, and as companies to reinforce our mobile battalions. It may here be stated that they distinguished themselves by their courage and military ability in all subsequent actions.

Period from 20 August to 10 September

On 21 August, the German garrison evacuated Chateauroux towards the east and were attacked by our Maquis lying in ambush for the occasion. We certainly killed over 200 enemy and captured 100 vehicles. Our losses were slight.

The FFI occupied the town, against our orders and deposed the Prefet. We persuaded them to evacuate the town and placed

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a strong cordon of men all round the town to prevent reprisals. We reported this to London, and advised them not to announce the liberation of Chateauroux, as we considered it premature. They thought otherwise.

The calm experienced in Indre during the previous period was to be of short duration. The withdrawal route through Tours became more and more hazardous for the enemy, in view of the presence of the Americans on the Loire. In addition, it was to the enemy's advantage to shorten his lines of withdrawal by passing through Indre, instead of skirting it; while he was also anxious to find alternate routes, and generally to enlarge his zone of retreat in order to minimize the effects of constant air attack.

Furthermore, the mass retreat of troops from the southwest and west which had only just started, obliged him to use every line of retreat he could force.

Our plan of counter-action was a two-fold one. First, we endeavored to restrict the number of escape itineraries used by the Germans, by attacking them all thus forcing the enemy to concentrate in larger convoys along fewer routes, both ambushed by our mobile troops and rendering them far more vulnerable to air attack. Secondly we decided to move mobile units, not employed in Indre, into positions to attack enemy columns along their main axes of withdrawal to the north of department.

To effect this dual plan, we had at our immediate disposal, 9000 men divided as follows:

1. Colonel Martel's Brigade Group (AS and ORA) to the west, northwest, and southwest of Chateauroux, divided into

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six battalions and two cycle squadrons as cavalry.

- a. Battalion Marceau (South of Le Blanc).
- b. Battalion Le Noir (Forest SW of St Gaultier).
- c. Battalion Carol (Mezieres region).
- d. Battalion Medard (Buzancais region).
- e. Battalion Raoul (Groupement D'Epernon).
- f. Battalion Victor (Groupement D'Epernon).
- g. Cavalry group (Motor-cycle combinations and bicycles with hotchkiss 50 mm guns).

(e,f, and g formed Recce Group and Shock Troops)

This Brigade was first-class, fully armed, having a large cadre of regular soldiers and most of the premier regiment.

2. Francis' AS group (two battalions) from Levreux to Reuilly with Jedburgh team Julian.

3. Robert's AS group (3 battalions) northeast of Chateauroux, with Jedburgh team Hamish.

4. Northern FTP group (800 men) north of Valencay.

5. Southern FTP group (1,000 men) Eguzon-St Benoit.

6. All static formations (Troupes de Secteurs and milices patriotiques) of which the better elements consisted of (FTP) Bataillon Guy Lebon at Le Blanc - 800 men. (AS) Groupement of Le Blanc commanded by Captain Nimetz and subsequently Captain Jacques de Bondy (1,000 men).

Having put the first part of our plan into effect with most successful results, we executed the second part by 24 August, moving the mobile troops from the hitherto quiescent Indre up to the main enemy lines of withdrawal on the axis of the Cher. We coordinated this offensive plan with that

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of Colonel Bertrand and Jedburgh team Ivor in the Cher.

As a result of these moves from south to north, we exposed our rear in the south of Indre. We therefore considered it indispensable to form a solid flank guard to the southwest and west, where there were still over 80,000 Germans waiting their turn to withdraw. We effected this with the groups of Nimetz and Guy Lebon reinforced by placing charges on all bridges and other "oeuvres d'art" essential to German progress along these axes. Special sabotage teams were ready to blow these charges at any time round the clock.

Our cover from the south was assured by the southern FTP. Not that there was much to fear from this direction.

Our cover against an attack on Chateauroux was assured by Robert's battalion.

No sooner were our troops in position to carry out this offensive action, when there were unmistakable signs of the Germans making large-scale attempts to break through on our southern flank. We therefore had to modify the strength of our northern force.

At this stage, Crown flew home to London, in order to convince headquarters that there were between 60,000 to 100,000 Germans still to our west; to inform headquarters of our offensive plan in order to obtain direct air support and try to obtain an American column from north of the Loire. (This came too late materially to effect operations, but in time to accept the surrender of 20,000 Germans, vide team Julian's report on 83rd American Division); to persuade Air Headquarters to take more energetic action on the accurately given and important targets constantly given by us.

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Crown having gained a 75 per cent success, returned, and the operations developed as follows:

Loches, foolishly captured against our orders by an undisciplined Maquis, was recaptured by the enemy, on 20 August after bitter fighting. Enemy columns then followed the axis Loches-Nouans, en route to the Cher valley or to direction Valencay. Both columns were caught in ambush and dreadfully punished, right up to the end of August. It is impossible to compute the losses and delay caused to the enemy, save that the writer was present at one action where we captured six 88 mm guns and over a hundred prisoners, wounding and killing many more.

Dismayed by their losses on the axis Loches-Nouans, the enemy changed their main axis to Saint Flovier-Chatillon, then on 27 August to Pleumartin-Preuilly and fourthly on to Tournon-Mezieres. At the end of August they were using all four, and we waged battle royal upon all four, also calling down successful air bombardments (but not enough).

Certain specific actions should be cited. On 27 and 28 August, half of the "bataillon Lenoir" commanded by Captain Kerlinou, plus the "Groupe Le Coz" (the undisciplined Maquis of the Loches incident) had surrounded a detachment of about a hundred Germans at Saint Hippolyte, a village between Loches and Chatillon, who had been placed there as an outpost to assure the protection of a column proceeding from Saint Clovier to Saint Cyran. The Maquisards were surrounded in their turn by large enemy reinforcements and thus found themselves between two fires. They fought their way out losing twenty one killed. Fifty one enemy bodies were found buried on 1

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September, the Boche being in too great a hurry to take away his dead.

Crown had returned to Indre via Limoges and had brought up with him from that liberated city, Hamlet (383) (F Section), Croc (BCRA), Jedburgh team Lee (384) and two OG groups. On the night 29/30 August, this force, together with a maquis of 60 men, held up until 0100 hours a column of 10,000 enemy, inflicting severe losses and losing only two ourselves.

During the last days of August, attempts made by large German formations to break away from the west through southern Indre at Le Blanc, were all defeated by the "bataillon Lebon" and the Groupement Nimetz". They inflicted severe casualties on the enemy and took over a hundred prisoners from the "Kriegsmarine", the 360 Grenadiers and the 950 Indian Regiment.

During the first days of September, the 16 German Infantry Division was engaged on the axis Chatillon-Lemoux and Loches-Valencay, being badly cut up.

Otherwise in early September, the enemy abandoned their northern itineraries for the single axis Preuilly-Mezieres-Vendoeuvres-Chateauroux. Tours was finally evacuated on 1 September at 0400 hours. Loches was evacuated on the same night.

We brought down all our strength on this axis and obtained most successful air attack on these columns.

On 4 September, the capture of Poitiers by the FFI hastened the end of the retreat and on 9 September, a final lame German column of 20,000 men passed by Chateauroux, was courageously contacted by Major Clutton of team Julian and handed over to Lieutenant Magill and the tardy American column

(383) War Diary Vol 3 p
(384) p683 this Vol

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of the 83rd Division from the north of the Loire, who claimed and obtained much credit.

For political reasons, the FTP continued recruiting and on 10 September the resistance had risen to a strength of over 19,000 men.

Fighting was over, politics began, Hugh left.

Conclusions

It is difficult to estimate the losses inflicted upon the enemy. The best indication is that apart from the bloc of 20,000 captured by 83rd Division we captured 1,200 prisoners in the period 25 August to 25 September, at a time when it was extremely inconvenient to take prisoners, and where we avoided it as far as possible without inhumanity.

Indirectly, by forcing the enemy to form suitable targets for the Air Force and by giving accurate pinpoints of enemy targets we probably caused more harm than by direct guerrilla action.

The resistance in Indre, and south Indre et Loire (Jedburgh teams Hugh, Hamish and Julian) and that in Nievre and the Cote d'or (Jedburgh teams Harry (385) and Mission ISAAC) constituted a solid hedgehog through which all the enemy from the west and southwest of France had to pass. To the north lay the Americans, to the south, the Seventh Army and General De Lattre's forces.

Although we were unable to contain the mass formation (there must have been 200,000 in all) we undoubtedly inflicted very heavy casualties on them both in men and material, and by delaying their progress considerably, we indirectly contributed to the enormous totals of prisoners taken by the AEF.

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We are proud of the detailed information we were able to supply, which embraced in its scope, the exact locations of V-1 sites and a telephone exchange near Rouen down to the order of battle of A German Corps at Carcassonne.

We were pleased to be able to succour and evacuate over 30 American, British and Canadian soldiers and airmen.

We have not touched on the brutalities of the Gestapo, nor on the details of the political differences with which we had to contend, as neither is relevant to the main theme of a military report. Both were very tedious factors however.

The excellent state, in which, it will be observed, our telegrams were received (we sent over 250) contributes the greatest possible tribute to our radio operator and the Jedburgh set.

Financial Statement

Lieutenant Mersioll --- received ----- 50,000 Frs

Expenses	
Food -----	15,000
Lodging and employees -----	10,000
Miscellaneous -----	5,000
Total -----	30,000
Returned -----	20,000

Captain Legrand --- received ----- 100,000 Frs

Expenses	
Food, lodging -----	24,000
Paid to FFI for various services -----	59,000
Total -----	83,000
Returned -----	17,000

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JEDBURGHES

Operations, Team Harry

TEAM HARRY (386)

Summary of W/T Messages Exchanged

9 July From Harry (387)

"Three nights unadvised planes have circled Peinture, reception committee will stand by until end moon recog letter A. Organized new hospital area Plaineifat. Maquis medical officer carried out operation successfully on SAS corporal broken pelvis, punctured bladder with almost no instruments. Thanks your reassuring messages. Am anxious arm local villages but am soft pedalling as have little confidence. Rather encourage sedentaires enter Maquis for training."

10 July From Harry (388)

"SAS have requested exfiltrate wounded soldier. Can do this Switzerland lot easier if seaplane can land Lac Sevions or other near lake. Is this possible."

13 July From SFHQ to Harry (389)

"Do all you can to cut main line Chalons sur Saone Nevers where it passes through your area. Tell us as soon as you have done this."

14 July From Harry (390)

"Had already suggested bridge Etang sur Arroux as target to SAS who later reported bridge blown. Also line reported cut 12th. Recce now being carried out. Am organizing equivalent company commanders course for region."

16 July From Harry (391)

"Line has been cut 6 times since D-day. Bridge Etang sur Arroux blown 4th July partly repaired but will be blown within 3 days. Assure you line will be kept cut."

21 July From Harry (392)

"Serious accident Peinture 0010 hours 19th. American crew Arnold Marinoff and Ducan, and William Hovaner and another unidentified, appears rear gunner. RAF crews J. M. Miles and S. J. Talor on harness. Numbers 6672 on boots and 4 other unidentified. Both planes burned out and bodies badly mutilated, unrecognizable. All had Christian burial SAS chaplain. Will send more information if obtained. Death instantaneous all cases. Sincerest sympathy all concerned SAS and self."

(386) See p 26 1st Qtr this Vol
(388) C-4892/44 10 Jul 44
(390) C-26/40 14 Jul 44
(392) C-282/47 21 Jul 44

(387) C-4861/31 9 Jul 44
(389) C-3909 13 Jul 44
(391) C-111/42 16 Jul 44

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23 July From Harry (393)

"Convoy of 40 lorries carrying large aircraft bombs left Avallon going to Paris via Auxerre. Left Avallon 1630 traveling 25 kms per hour."

23 July From Harry (394)

"Near St. Florentien, large petrol stores situated south of route west 4 and north of canal 3 kms approximately east of St. Florentin. Storage tanks sunk in ground and very strong ground defense. Intelligence that petrol from here being sent to front. Appears excellent air target. Quantities arms found on Sgt Charles Taylor and Sgt Grayhan Bancroft Byrne."

26 July From Harry (395)

"Reliable intelligence Paris Germans requisition all water transport. Working night and day transport to Normandy on river Seine. Attack by 3000 or 5000 Germans imminent on Maquis Montsauche and Lormes. Include tanks, aircraft, cavalry."

27 July From Harry (396)

"Daylight parachutage - this operation appears highly dangerous at present with large scale attack on Maquis imminent. Can stores not be dropped instead by 4 or 5 sorties each by night on Peinture and Conducteur."

28 July From Harry (397)

"No petrol or other special stores received last parachutage Cocker as advised by you. Report that male population being rounded up Autun and Chateau Chinon. Attack Maquis Anost reported by 57 still in progress but little result so far. What chances exfiltrate RAF pilots? Eight hostages shot Autun after attack by SAS petrol factory."

31 July From Harry (398)

"Have with me following RAF personnel from aircraft Z166 bomber squadron shot down 25/26 near Auxerre. Flying officer R.J.B. Cann, Top Sgt H. G. Hill, Top Sgt R. S. Drongeson, Top Sgt R. E. Storey, Top Sgt Rafeleye. Other two men left plane okay but no contact made yet."

31 July From Harry (399)

"Arrested Lemniscate. Would like to emphasize the opportunity of unifying command region Morvan. Suggest you consult Isaac. Pair feared with Lemniscate. Suggest Boa be taken over permanently or temporarily by Ratissoir and Harry. Ratissoir has been official representative Pair when Pair absent and working also well with Harry. In any case Harry available and can include any job in mission."

(393) C-348/51	23 Jul 44	(394) C-356/52	23 Jul 44
(395) C-463/54	26 Jul 44	(396) C-516/56	27 Jul 44
(397) C-585/58	28 Jul 44	(398) C-714/60	31 Jul 44
(399) C-737/63	31 Jul 44		

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Operations, Team Harry (Cont'd)2 August From Harry (400)

"Grave of Frederic William Fisher or Fichven. Flight Lieutenant reported at Taingy buried by peasants. Will check and give more."

3 August From Harry (401)

"Am being attacked by over 1000 enemy."

3 August From Harry (402)

"Enemy encircling us from Chalaux and Plaine-fat and St. Marte. Warn Telemetre. Ask him ask Bernard help us by attacking enemy's rear at Damcushes. SAS shook them. Received planes Cocker last night include cash. 3rd plane reported dropped containers on SAS. Investigating soonest possible."

4 August From Harry (403)

"Enemy withdrawn. One Maquis killed. Enemy casualties considerable but can't give figures. All well here. Please try lay on sorties grounds Monday Bernard."

6 August From Harry (404)

"Can accept day parachutage any date on Brintaug, Sucteur from 9 August. Why have you refused Rocket and Darol."

7 August From Harry (405)

"Contact Diagramme. Ask him come Montsauche soonest possible. Send anti-typhoid injections for 5000 patients, also anti-tetanus serum and anti-gangrene serum for 300 patients on Conducteur, Fantassin, or Kepi and consider urgent. Have here Sgt R. J. Taylor in Plane Z, 166 B Squadron. Quite fit. Passed him to SAS."

9 August From Harry (406)

"If you have anyone Forest Yerv and North Orleans, warn them that man calling himself Jacques is Gestapo agent."

9 August From Harry (407)

"Still no sign of Diagramme. Becoming anxious. Anxiously awaiting parachutages Nievre. Please expedite Maquis Montsauche bombed twice 8th. No damage. Send Battledress or at least armllets. Centime received crystals and paybook."

(400) C-83 2 Aug 44

(402) C-934/66 3 Aug 44

(404) C-1138/69 6 Aug 44

(406) C-520 9 Aug 44

(401) C-886/64 3 Aug 44

(403) C-289 4 Aug 44

(405) C-1224/70 7 Aug 44

(407) C-1347/73 9 Aug 44

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Operations, Team Harry (Cont'd)11 August From Harry (408)

"Ask for permission to come to London by Dakota SAS which should leave during the night of 11/12. Will bring important papers. Should go back to London being unfit for any kind of work in the Maquis. Please answer immediately."

12 August From Harry (409)

"Diagramme badly wounded. Gaiety to be his representative Yonne. Diagramme also put Ratissoire sole representative Boa. Result Centime and Denly have nothing to do. Don't feel this is quite the moment for spot of leave. Can you please give us a job soonest possible."

14 August From Harry (410)

"Diagramme asks me organize mobile column in conjunction SAS. Am presuming you approve this and carrying on."

17 August From Harry (411)

"Maquis Iremerd been attacked four days. Reported 1500 Boche artillery and three attacks aircraft. Maquis Julien have killed over 100 enemy. His losses three. Maquis Mario base armies not quite so favorable. Attacks continue. Above reason unable receive operation cadre now. Attack on Julien preceded by 17-year old boy, hands tied behind back. Denby witnessed."

17 August From Harry (412)

"Gapeau leaves today for Yonne with radio operator Zelandais. He will use poem method. He will use signal plan Zelandais."

19 August From Harry (413)

"All Gendarmes Autun have joined Maquis. This appears to be bad principle but suggest ruling on it London. Reports all Germans leaving region. Only Russians remaining. Am on my way Chateau Chinon investigate and contact if possible."

21 August From Harry (414)

"Petain reported last night Saulieu. Ambushes out but fear too late. Enormous traffic through Autun towards Dijon from direction Moulins. Also traffic passing Chateau Chinon towards Autun. So far not succeeded contact Russians. Have passed message but no Russians came rendezvous."

(408) C-1434/75 11 Aug 44
 (410) C-1678/82 14 Aug 44
 (412) C-1915/86 17 Aug 44
 (414) C-2301/25 21 Aug 44

(409) C-1541/77 12 Aug 44
 (411) C-838 17 Aug 44
 (413) No number 19 Aug 44

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22 August From Harry (415)

"Ouroux occupied FFI. Corbigny and Clamecy evacuated Germans but convoys still passing through latter."

23 August From Harry (416)

"Understand that German or Prussian troops willing surrender but not to resistance. Trying to arrange that they should surrender to Gendarmerie."

24 August From Harry (417)

"Have received over 20 requests for arms today. Are parachutages still coming or not. Prisoner taken states that large infantry ammo dump at Montrichard department Ile is not blown up by Boche as ordered to the last German to leave town."

25 August From Harry (418)

"Convoy 200 vehicles now on road Avallon - Chatillon."

28 August From Harry (419)

"15 to 20 thousand Germans reported area Montbard to Semur. Headquarters Chateau Menaille arriving by truck at night."

29 August From Harry (420)

"Airdrome Auxerre repaired available landing. Americans approved."

2 September From Underfoot to Harry (421)

"Francis to Denby. Arrived but not of course by land enroute. Thanks today's developments found all dumps emptied by FFI. Jockey grounds still secure. Will you check to make sure all FFI info gets back to Army channels from your area. I acted as courier for their dope which was hot."

5 September From Harry (422)

"German recce parties pushing along roads Lormes to St. Brisson and Corbigny to Montsauche. Also on road Brinon to Clamecy and Clamecy to Vezelay. Bumping our ambushes but anti-tank material very low."

7 September From Harry (423)

"Bridge blown Dun Les Places. If important convoys signaled how about me bringing in RAF on Eureka."

(415) C-2367/92	22 Aug 44	(416) C-2451/93	23 Aug 44
(417) C-2626/94	24 Aug 44	(418) C-2757/6	25 Aug 44
(419) C-3076/57	26 Aug 44	(420) C-3201/58	29 Aug 44
(421) C-3669/193	2 Sep 44	(422) C-3875/3	5 Sep 44
(423) C-683	7 Sep 44		

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Operations, Team Harry (Cont'd)7 September From Harry (424)

"General Hans commanding garrison Nevers spent last night Corbigny on way east. Roads Lormes to Saulieu and Corbigny to Montsauche to Saulieu continuous convoys."

10 September From Harry (425)

"Contacted 7th Army north Autun. Took son of General deLattre slight foot wound to Maquis hospital."

11 September From SFHQ to Harry (426)

"We have been informed of a column of 5,000 Germans moving east over Loire at Decize. Could you send us confirmation of this move and actual location of this column."

13 September From Harry (427)

"Column reported at St Pierre Le Moutier. Reported split into 3 columns, one marching to Nevers, one to Decize, one Bourbon-Lancy. Consider figures grossly exaggerated. Believe German troops that area wholly or at least largely surrendered to Americans. Will verify this surrender later today. Have signalled above to 7th Army. Have permanent contact Verteine. Also contact Wilson and Colby. Have visited Col of Eumead 7th Army."

14 September From Harry (428)

"Some 20,000 Boche have surrendered to Americans and SAS and FFI. Leaves approximately 5,000 unaccounted for. Probably surrendered by now."

16 September From Harry (429)

"All quiet in my area. Propose giving Centime week's leave to look for parents not seen for 3 years. Subject your confirmation. Please reply."

19 September From Underfoot to Watermark (430)

"Please ask Denby of Jed team Harry to report here with his W/T operator when he ceases to be operational. What is his present location?"

20 September From SFHQ to Harry (431)

"When your mission finished proceed Paris and contact Colonel Jackson, 79 Champs Elysees, who will make all arrangements for your return UK."

(424) C-4140/6 7 Sep 44
 (426) C-1146 11 Sep 44
 (428) C-4786/10 14 Sep 44
 (430) C-283/10 19 Sep 44

(425) C-4374/8 10 Sep 44
 (427) C-4672/9 13 Sep 44
 (429) C-4991/11 16 Sep 44
 (431) C-2511 20 Sep 44

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Operations, Team Harry (Cont'd)21 September From Underfoot to Yalelock (432)

"Jackson from Powell. We do not need complete Jed teams. Specifically we would like to have Maj Forrest of Jed Benjamin, Capt Waller of Jed Bernard, Maj Nielson of Jed Cecil, Capt Denby of Jed Harry and Team Maurice intact. Delay their departure to England if you can until after conference with you."

Report of Team Upon Return from the Field - 6 June to 21 September

We left England on the evening of D-day. Before leaving, at the airdrome, as I was actually stepping into the plane I was handed a copy of briefing for Mission Isaac (433). As the pilot was anxious to leave I had only time to give a very quick glance at this briefing. The trip was uneventful. When we arrived over the DZ area we stooged around for about three quarters of an hour, when the dispatcher informed me that as the pilot could not find the pin-point, he intended to return to base. I asked the dispatcher if the pilot knew where he was, and he replied that he knew where he was, but could not find the actual pin-point. As we were dropping blind anyhow, this did not seem of great importance to me, and I told the pilot that provided he could drop us within 10 miles of the pin-point and could also tell us where we would land, we were willing to go. He agreed to do this, and he told me we would drop between the villages of Rouvray and Saint-Leger-Vaubau. He said that he thought it would be a slow stick and asked me to give the letter G when I reached the ground so that he could come in again and drop our three packages. Actually the stick was extremely slow, chiefly due to the fact that the two SAS officers had rucksacks on their legs which jammed on the Hudson slide, but we all got away all right, and I gave the letter G, and the plane dropped the three packages on its second run in. The stick was over a mile

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in length on the ground, but we closed on myself all except Centime whom we did not contact until about mid-day next day.

When daylight came we proceeded to look for our packages, and found that the two containing the wireless sets had roman-candled. The only one intact was the one containing my rucksack and about 150 field dressings. We decided to lay up for the day, and move off at sundown. We located ourselves and found we were near the village of Bussieres. At about 6 o'clock, having buried our chutes, packages, etc., we moved off south towards the RV. We moved very slowly owing to the weight of our equipment, the SAS officers had rucksacks which were nearly double the weight allowed to us. The 1 to 1,000,000 American map issued to us proved now, and often later, extremely inaccurate and unsatisfactory, and we had great difficulty in reaching our objective. Our rendezvous was in the early morning on a bridge over the Cure where we had to contact "Louis". We reached a point about 7 kilometres short of the RV and being exceedingly tired, and very much overloaded, we did not see how we could make the RV in time, so Captain Wellstead (SAS) and myself decided to dump our kit with the others and go on to make the contact without any equipment. Moving on as fast as possible we just managed to get to the RV in time but found no one there. We made our way back to the others and slept through the afternoon. That night we all proceeded down to a hut we had seen near the RV and again went to the RV at the specified time. There was still no one there. We camped in this hut and the following night again tried the RV. There was still no one there. The following morning we decided to send Gapeau into the village of Vieux-Dun to see if he could make a contact with the resistance. We fitted him out in as near civilian clothes as we could,

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
Operations, Team Harry (Cont'd)

and he proceeded to Vieux-Dun. There Gapeau contacted a peasant woman who knew a boy who was taking a Belgian into the Maquis, so he brought them back to our hut, and we all proceeded under the direction of the peasant boy into the Maquis which was situated in the Bois-de-la-Chevriers.

We found the Maquis, and were fortunate to find Lemniscate actually in the Maquis at the moment. We identified ourselves, and asked permission to pass a message on his signal plan. (The Belgian, incidentally, turned out to be a Gestapo agent and was shot in the night!) The Maquis we found ourselves in was known as the Maquis Camille, or the Maquis Grandjean, and was definitely one of the better Maquis in the neighborhood. We were very well received.

This Maquis, at the time, consisted of some 120-150 men, including a rather short "company" of Spaniards. It had been founded and was commanded by a man named Camille, an ex-NCO of the French army. He had a great personality and was very popular throughout the neighborhood. He always made a point of paying cash for all "requisitioning" of food, tobacco, etc., that he was forced to carry out and the peasants and local townspeople knew that they would always get a square deal from him. Of course, he was fortunate in the fact that the Etat Major of the DMR (Lemniscate) was only a few kilometers away from his camp and he consequently drew his budget as regularly and as promptly as was possible. Shortly after I arrived Lemniscate, for security reasons, decided to move his Etat Major from the farm he occupied and come inside the perimeter of the Maquis Camille. This Etat Major consisted of himself and his wife, Pair and Ratissoire (BOA), Du Fouet, "Inspector of Maquis", an appointment I never understood,

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and treated with a certain amount of suspicion (I heard later before leaving France, that he was under arrest for appropriating FFI funds - no confirmation); several girls who worked on cipher etc., and, of course, various liaisons etc., who arrived from time to time.

Grandjean, who was regional commander, was also in this Maquis most of the time. He, too, had been in the resistance from the very beginning, doing excellent work. He suffered at this time from the fault which I found prevalent among most resistance leaders, i.e., a lack of appreciation of the bigger picture. He would interest himself only in the Maquis where his headquarters was and was not in touch with the other Maquis under his command. Later he improved greatly and was astonished to find several Maquis "under his command", of whose existence he had never heard. Grandjean latterly did very good work in his job and was almost constantly on the road.

The SAS officers who naturally were a bit worried at having lost contact with England proceeded to select a suitable site for the recce group that they were expecting. This they chose in the Bois-de-la-Peirouse, a few kilometres east of the Maquis. A few days later Major Frazer (Houndsworth) (434), and one OR arrived in the Maquis. Having been out of touch with his two SAS officers he had decided to come in without waiting to get contact. He and his party had come in with two planes, but had been dropped from a very great height, and he had temporarily lost contact with the rest of his party. They eventually all dribbled in and he proceeded to set up camp where we had recced in the Bois-de-la-Peirouse. A day or two later Colonel Hastings and his operator also arrived.

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My time was chiefly taken up at this time with laying on reception committees for the remainder of Major Frazer's squadron. This operation, however, owing to bad weather was cancelled night after night. This meant, among other things, that Major Frazer's recce group was out of food and I organized an arrangement whereby the Maquis Camille provided them with rations. In actual fact this continued for a considerable period and we eventually arranged a system by which Major Frazer "bought" rations from the Maquis, paying either in ammunition and weapons or cash. In this way the SAS managed to get fresh meat and vegetables, and the Maquis ammunition and arms. This system worked so well that a cash payment was never asked for, both sides being entirely satisfied with the arms or rations that they received from the other. Eventually the rest of the squadron came in, half on my field St. Bernard, and half on another field we had chosen near the Maquis Montsauche. There were one or two broken ankles and sprains, but on the whole the operation was successful.

Shortly after this Major Frazer moved his camp to another site nearer to the Maquis but in a valley which he considered considerably more secure if less easily defendable. The Maquis Camille had at this time just organized a hospital which they established in the Chateau-de-Vermot. This was not a perfect site as I pointed out to them, it being on the edge of the wood and on the side of a road, but it was the only building possible and we pushed out advance LMG posts to give us warning of any attack in the neighborhood. There were in the hospital two SAS, one with a sprained back from jumping, and one with dysentery. A few days later the hospital was attacked by 654 Battalion "Russian Army of

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Liberation" which was half Germans and half Russians. The attack began at about 3:30 in the afternoon. The advanced LMG post gave us warning of the attack and we managed to evacuate all personnel and patients from the hospital. The enemy penetrated to the hospital, and proceeded to destroy all medical equipment and set fire to the hospital.

The enemy troops were very low grade and untrained. I myself sat for a considerable time in the wood picking off troops who wandered up and down the wood without any idea of fieldcraft. But having mortars and good supplies of ammunition etc., they were definitely too strong for us. I sent a message to Major Frazer asking him if he could help us with counter-attack on the enemy's flank, which he did, arriving himself some time later close to the village of Vermot together with some half dozen Bren guns. There he found troops collecting on the road and holding his fire he managed to open up with all his Brens on a column of about 50 who were apparently waiting to ambush. There is no doubt that he did considerable damage here. The Maquis themselves must have accounted for between 10 and 20 Germans at least, our casualties were 3 dead and 5 or 6 wounded. The enemy here, as always, did not dare to venture into more than the very fringes of the wood. The castle was completely gutted and the enemy withdrew next morning, having kept up sporadic and unaimed fire all night. On leaving they burned half the village of Vermot and shot seven hostages. Also several houses in Dun-Les-Places were burned and they shot 21 hostages including the cure, doctor, schoolmaster etc. During the night it was decided to evacuate the camp, the transport in the MT part was destroyed as much as possible and the whole

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camp proceeded on foot and by ox-cart, north to Les-Iles-Menefriers. The SAS moved also to a new site more or less parallel with the Maquis camp.

By this time I had contacted several other Maquis including the Maquis Montsauche near which part of Major Frazer's squadron was installed. This was a slightly bigger Maquis than the Maquis Camille. It had been founded and was commanded by a man named Bernard, but suffered at this time and later from an influx of regular army officers or reserve officers who arrived in the Maquis for one reason or another and expected to take command. This naturally was resented by men who had been in the resistance already for several years and although not as militarily expert as real officers, felt that the new-comers had merely been waiting to see which way the cat jumped before taking sides. At this time Colonel Hastings decided to change his base from the Maquis Camille to the Maquis Montsauche and the affair of Colonel Dupain and Colonel Moreau occurred. Colonel Moreau who stayed in the Maquis was an elderly retired army officer who was obviously playing a political game and intended to stand as deputy for the region after the war. He was consequently very unpopular with the Maquis leaders and the Maquis in general in the neighborhood. Colonel du Bois, his second in command, although a much more sympathetic character, had the reputation, which may or may not have been founded on fact, of having been exceedingly pro-Vichy up to the period of D-day and was also consequently not approved of locally either.

There was, during the whole period I was in the area, a constant antipathy between this Etat Major and the various

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Maquis. I myself personally sympathize very much with the Maquis, who, although they were not particularly expert soldiers, were on the whole doing a good job with no ulterior motive other than the liberation of France.

Shortly after this the Maquis Montsauche ambushed a convoy successfully with the result that the village of Montsauche of about 1,500 inhabitants was completely burned as a reprisal.

Of the other Maquis that I contacted during this period, the best was undoubtedly the Maquis Socrate under the command of Socrate, who had become almost a by-word for courage and action in the neighborhood. Unfortunately this Maquis leader was killed later in action, but his excellent work and his own personal bravery was absolutely invaluable. The Maquis Serge was a smaller, but also good Maquis. Serge himself by profession an orchestra leader, and like practically all Maquis leaders militarily inexperienced but courageous, did a lot of damage to enemy convoys etc. The only bad Maquis I found was Maquis Verneuil. Verneuil himself was about 22 years old, but had managed to collect a large band around him who began to terrorize the neighborhood. His Maquis arrested Frenchmen and held them prisoners without any form of trial on the slackest pretext. In fact later a radio operator who had been parachuted from England was kept several weeks under arrest without any attempt being made to confirm his story. Several of our liaison agents were arrested and were never asked if they were who they said they were. Finally one of his lieutenants shot a Russian escaped prisoner of war who had joined the SAS and with whom Major Frazer was very satisfied. This man was shot on no pretext at all except that he could not speak much French.

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Verneuil himself was obviously a type of paranoiac with no experience either of the army or the handling of men, or for that matter any idea of right or wrong.

The Maquis Camille had by now set up a new camp on the edge of the ground Peinture. The SAS base camp was installed some 3 or 4 miles away in the valley of Chalaux. The relation between the SAS and the Maquis, especially the Maquis Camille, was of the greatest friendliness. The system of exchange of rations for arms, which I have already explained, still obtained. Whenever one party asked a favor of the other they were only too pleased to do all they could to help. I feel I must say that this was due very largely to the great charm and personality of Major Frazer, who, although he spoke scarcely a word of French, really made himself a great favorite of the resistance that he met. The detachment at Montsauche did not get on as well with the Maquis, but fortunately there were no serious differences of opinion.

Captain Tristan, a regular army officer, had joined the Maquis Camille in the capacity of military advisor to the Maquis. This officer had been only quite recently working in the Survey Service of the French Army and "deserted" to us with all his equipment. He about this time decided to find a better and more permanent camp. This he found near the village of Plaine-fat and proceeded to organize wooden huts, sanitation, etc. We installed our hospital in a little farm a mile or so from the Maquis.

On one of our parachute operations on Peinture two planes unfortunately collided in mid-air, an American and an RAF plane. It appears that the American plane was looking for another ground and came to Peinture which was the depot, and where the Eureka was installed as he could not find his own ground. This unfortunately happened at the same time as

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we had an operation on this ground. All the crews of both planes were killed. I was exceedingly anxious that the Germans should not realize that Peinture was a DZ as it was probably our best field, and I hoped to keep the accident a secret. But the mayor came to me and said that if the Germans found out, as they probably would, that there had been an airplane accident there which he had not reported he would be in great danger. So we eventually compromised. He gave me 24 hours in which to bury the crew of the one plane which had crashed in the wood, and was visible only to aircraft, and he would then report to the authorities the fact that one plane had crashed and show them the wreckage of the other plane which was in the open. This, I felt, did not necessarily give away the fact that the scene of the accident was a DZ. This we did, and the Germans never realized that it was anything more than one plane crashed.

About this time London asked me to organize a reception committee for a massive daylight operation which I hoped to do on Peinture. Unfortunately, a few days before the scheduled operation, the Germans started attacking various Maquis and, as the Maquis Camille itself was very short of transport as a result of having blown up all their trucks at Vermot, large quantities of transport would have had to come from other Maquis. This I considered far too dangerous and felt that a large proportion of the operation would almost inevitably be lost to the enemy so I asked London to postpone the operation. Later when I signalled that the operation could be received safely, nobody bothered to answer me (or Colonel Hastings, or Colonel Diagramme or BOA). Two deserters from the organization Todt were brought into the

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Maquis at this time. The FFI were at first very suspicious of Gestapo agents, etc., but it transpired that these two boys were each half Jewish and were enforced labor. They were eventually put to work on construction, cook houses, etc., where they worked very well. When I last saw them, shortly before leaving the area, they assured me that they were perfectly happy.

Major Frazer had by now received several jeeps (most of them unfortunately had roman-candled), and also two six-pounders, one of which he was keeping in reserve at his Chalaux base. He asked me if the Maquis Camille would like this six-pounder put into position by their Maquis as in his valley there was no field of fire. As I knew, the Maquis were delighted at the idea and Captain Tristan found a site for it covering several roads. Two days after it was put into position the Germans attacked the Maquis and were, I am sure, more than surprised when the six-pounder opened up on them and their transport. The Maquis themselves did a lot of good work that day, and the fire discipline was a great improvement on the attack on Vermot, Bren gunners firing in short bursts etc., and not haphazard. Major Frazer himself sent over a message congratulating the Maquis.

I picked up a wounded German, 18 years old and 3 months in the Army. He was an educated boy and assured me that few people in Germany liked Hitler any more. But, as usual when I interrogated prisoners, I treated this with considerable reserve, feeling that that was what he thought I wanted him to say. I put him in the Maquis hospital, and when better gave him to Major Frazer to work in the cook-house.

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That night, unfortunately, things did not go too well. Everybody was tired and nervous. An hour or two before dawn Grandjean woke me to say that one of his outposts had reported that a "party" of Germans had infiltrated past them and he had been forced to withdraw. I doubted this, knowing the enemy'd dislike of entering the Maquis woods and pointed it out to Grandjean. I also explained what a bad position the enemy would be in if he found himself in the middle of our defenses, as he certainly would not be there in very great strength. But the old habit of fight-and-withdraw, which at the time of much poor armament etc., was essential, still persisted and Grandjean had given orders to destroy all arms and ammunition in our stores and withdraw to a hill a mile or two away. So we packed up all possible kit and reached the ridge at daybreak. Here we found a small group of Verneuil's men come to ask if they could have some arms. I was even more convinced by now that it was all a false alarm and hated to think of our previous arms and provisions being blown up. So I raced back to the stores and disconnected the time pencil. It was a 2-hour delay, and still had an hour to go. We distributed the arms and I took two men back to the PC with me to do a careful recce to find out if the Germans were really there. They were not, of course, and in fact we later learned that they had withdrawn at sundown the day before. The Maquis returned during the day but observation posts were maintained.

Remembering the enemy's anger and consequent reprisals after they took an unexpected beating at Vermot, I was afraid that he would resent the 6-pounder. Also in view of the fact that the Maquis Montsauche had recently been bombed by

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aircraft, I thought it on the cards that they would send planes after the Maquis Camille. The Maquis itself was well concealed in the woods, and the only obvious air target was the little farm where the PC was - and the hospital. I, therefore, recommended to the medical services that the hospital be evacuated at once and set up in the Maquis Montsauche, where they would be very much more secure, although the conveniences were considerably less. This I felt was only fair to the wounded. This advice was taken but in actual fact no bombing took place. Not many days later Colonel Diagramme gave a ruling that there were to be no hospitals or sickbays at all. Medical services were to be entirely mobile, operations to be done on the spot and wounded billeted locally in farm houses etc. This, of course, entailed a great deal of difficulties and complications, but I feel sure the colonel's reasoning was the same as mine.

I had discussed the possibility of organizing some sort of course for Maquis leaders with Lemniscate. Although all of them were as keen as mustard, they knew practically nothing about organizing any moderate-sized military operation. He was in favor of this, so I proceeded to organize the course. This was held at the Maquis Montsauche, Colonel du Bois being commandant and myself acting as chief instructor. It was a week's course and was based on the school of infantry course at Barnard Castle. The syllabus included:

Weapon training - rifle, LMG, piat and bazooka, all grenades and explosives, sten, marking carbine, etc.

Company in attack - theory, sand table, and practical

Company in defense - theory, sand table, and practical

Organization of Maquis

Hygiene in the Maquis

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Orders

Map reading, etc.

The students numbered about a dozen, being the leaders or 2 1/c's of the Maquis in the neighborhood. The students were obviously more of the standard of NCO's than company commanders, but I am sure several lessons were learned and, in my opinion, it helped to instill a military outlook into most of the Maquis leaders present.

About this time Lemniscate went to Paris, and was unfortunate enough to be arrested by the Gestapo together with Pair (BOA). Colonel Diagramme had been expected out for the Mission Verveine, and Colonel Hastings and I felt sure that he would take care of the work of Lemniscate, but there seemed no one to replace Pair so I suggested to London that Ratissoire and I, who had been working under Pair, could carry on for him in the meantime. London agreed to this. It appears that the budget was probably in one of the planes that crashed a week or two before. At any rate it was two months overdue and the Maquis were very short of money. I was afraid that they would have to start "requisitioning" food etc., a thing which we had managed to avoid up to date. A message was received advising arrival of money in an operation on Cocker, and a cell was duly received containing money. A day or two later the details of this money was received. This, of course should have been sent in advance and not after the operation. It was then discovered that 30,000,000 out of 60,000,000 francs were missing. Fortunately we eventually found these in another operation which had by mistake been dropped on the SAS reception committee. This money was in an unmarked cell with a couple of Sten guns and some 4 by 2. One of the SAS had helped himself to a quantity

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of 4 by 2 but had not noticed the money. Both Ratissoire and I were not very keen on distributing any of this money without the permission of Diagramme who had by now arrived and had been officially designated as DMR. Owing to the urgent need of money in the Maquis I made every possible effort to contact Diagramme who had disappeared into the blue without leaving any contact. Eventually he returned and the money was handed over to him.

Colonel Diagramme now proceeded to reorganize much of the resistance in the neighborhood. He said that two officers (Ratissoire and myself), were unnecessary to organize the BOA operations which I agreed with, and he put Ratissoire in sole charge of BOA. He then asked me if the part of my mission which dealt with liaison between SAS and resistance was important, and I replied that by now the SAS were on such good terms with the resistance that I felt that they could easily stand on their own feet as far as liaison was concerned. He then suggested that Gapeau should go and be his representative in the Yonne. According to my briefing I was to receive no alteration of my mission except from London, but as Diagramme had come very recently from London and was obviously a very senior officer of General Koenig's headquarters, and also as Gapeau had not cooperated at all with me and had not made himself very popular with the French, I was quite willing that he should go. I asked Colonel Diagramme what he wanted me to do and there appeared to be nothing at the moment, which was a little disconcerting, but he assured me he would find something for me very shortly. A few days later he told me that he had arranged with Colonel Moreau that I should organize mobile shock columns in the various Maquis. I pointed out that we would need extensive

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transport and that I myself would need a car to move from Maquis to Maquis. This Colonel Moreau assured me was quite feasible, and all the necessary transport would be provided so I readily agreed to take control of this. Unfortunately, as was typical of Colonel Moreau, no transport whatsoever appeared and I found myself in the Maquis of Montsauche unable to move away any distance from this Maquis.

One afternoon Colonel Moreau with what appeared to be a complete change of heart invited me to accompany him on an inspection of two companies of the "mobile shock column". I readily agreed and we proceeded in his car to the two companies in question. We found them drawn up in a hollow square and the colonel made a little speech introducing me as the British officer who was responsible for their arms and equipment. He then asked everyone who wanted new boots to stick up their hands. About 75 percent put their hands up and he turned to me and said, "You must tell the English we need boots." He then continued through every weapon and garment, all of which we were very short of, a thing I knew perfectly well. Every time a large proportion of hands was raised. The gist of the whole little ceremony was really to introduce "The English officer who is responsible for your not having enough weapons." The whole affair was repeated at the next company. Colonel Hastings and I about this time had asked Colonel du Bois to prepare an estimate of clothing and equipment and weapons needed. This he did on a fantastically lavish scale, asking us to request from London even 5,000 handkerchiefs! I myself when asked for BD equipment etc. always made a point of saying I would do this when and if there were enough arms and ammunition in the area. These I maintained were definitely priority, and

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although I agreed it was unpleasant having everybody dressed in different clothes, in civilian shirts, in breeches, in slacks, etc., a man so dressed could fire a rifle and kill a German. Boots I considered an exception to this rule, and did my best to obtain supplies of them.

I was constantly being asked for ~~arms~~^{arms} and clothes. All other Maquis leaders agreed on this priority and were more than grateful when I managed to procure arms and ammunition for them, even if in much smaller quantities than they had asked for.

Major Frazer told me that he was expecting a Dakota to evacuate his wounded. Colonel Hastings and an SAS officer were organizing the landing field and he asked me if I could help the transport of the wounded to the field. This was some distance away, across the town of Saulieu, which was in the habit of being occupied by the Germans. But with the help of the Maquis Robert, which was not far from the town, I managed to organize a convoy, laid on 2 ambulances etc., I arranged an area a few miles from the actual field and the convoy arrived without any mishap. The journey of course was very unpleasant for the wounded. Two or three hours before the plane was expected we received a message that the RAF had called the operation off owing to insufficient moon. I arranged for the passing of the wounded back again to the base, which also fortunately went off without any mishap.

I made an attempt now to contact the Russian elements in the neighborhood. According to rumor they were willing to surrender, realizing of course that that would be their only chance (these units were prisoners of war who had volunteered to fight on the German side). Prisoners I interrogated at different times stated that they were so

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badly treated and ill-fed that they would have volunteered to do anything. As one Russian put it, "I would have volunteered to kill my father and mother I was so hungry." With the help of Ratissoire, who is Russian-born, I wrote a message suggesting that the Russians in Chateau Chinon should meet me at the RV with the object of parleying. I passed this message into the town by means of a Russian prisoner who said that he would do anything to help the Allies as he wanted to prove to the Soviet Republic that he was a real communist. I waited several hours at the RV but no Russians came and I afterwards heard that the prisoner was arrested. I also passed a message written in French, German and English to Russians in Corbigny saying that as an officer of the Allied armies I would accept their surrender, pointing out that if they did not surrender now it was unlikely that they would get any sympathy from their own government later. This message too failed to produce any reply.

The three Maquis near Premery were attacked at this juncture - the Maquis Julien, which was an off-shoot of the Maquis Camille and consisted mainly of Parisians; the Maquis Daniel, commanded by a Belgian called Maurice; and the Maquis Mario.

The Germans had attacked for 2 days and suffered very heavy casualties, especially at the hands of the Maquis Julien, who were very well armed and had even procured an auto-mitrailleuse from Paris.

I went down to see Maurice and find out if I could help him with advice or anything else. He appeared to be holding his own, but the Maquis Mario which was apparently less well run was in difficulties and had let itself be surrounded. They were reported to be out of food and water, although

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they still had ammunition. The same night with some 30 men, carrying water and bread, we made an attempt to get through the enemy lines. This we succeeded in doing but unfortunately the timing was bad and we realized that we would be unable to contact and withdraw before dawn, so we had to give it up and return. We later learned that the Maquis Mario had already withdrawn. They withdrew unfortunately without advising the other 2 Maquis, who now found their flanks open. They too had therefore to disengage. Fortunately, the enemy seemed to have enough himself and withdrew himself. The Maquis were therefore soon able to reorganize themselves and get going again. It was at the first attack on these Maquis that the Germans tied a local peasant boy's hands behind his back and made him walk in front of them as protection.

One afternoon I heard that Marshal Petain was on his way through my area. I immediately alerted all Maquis in the area but was too late. In actual fact, Petain slept the night at Saulieu where the Maquis Robert found the protection too strong for them. We did, however, manage to capture one car which was a straggler and contained four of Petain's own personal bodyguard. They were able to provide me with the route that Petain was taking and which in spite of bad reception I managed to signal to London.

At this time, the Germans were obviously beginning to pull out. They evacuated a large number of their garrisons, concentrating only on the protection of the two roads running east to Saulieu. Most of the Maquis left the woods, setting up their PC's in the villages. Colonel Moreau's Etat Major moved to Ouroux, but he embittered the local Maquis leaders by forbidding them to ambush convoys on the Montsauche road.

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Other Maquis moved into Anost, Corbigny, Quarre les Tombes, etc. The Maquis Camille had pushed its Spanish company (now much larger) up towards Avallon and I decided to go up there and visit them and see how things were going in that area.

When I reached Avallon, I found that Verneuil had "liberated" the town that morning. In other words, when the Germans had left, he had driven through the town standing up in an open car with two motorcycles in front. Unfortunately it was premature. The Germans returned that evening. Verneuil quickly withdrew. The Germans, finding the town decked out with flags, shot the complete gendarmerie before passing on east.

I did not stay in Avallon but pushed through to Auxerre, which also had been liberated an hour or so before I arrived. There, however, a proper defense of the town was immediately organized and the Germans never managed to get back. I slept at Auxerre and eventually made my way to 3rd Army where Lieutenant Colonel Robert Powell, Cav (435) received me very kindly and sent one of his staff with me back towards Auxerre to try and find reputed dumps of German arms. As practically always these dumps were grossly exaggerated and there was nothing left for the Morvan. At Auxerre we split, the United States officer proceeding towards Gien where he also hoped he would be able to find arms for the Morvan, and I back to Avallon where I heard of a scrap going on with the Maquis "Le Loup" near Premery. I got to Clamecy where I called on the FFI major commanding the town. His "garrison" consisted of about a dozen men, the rest being all out on ambushes etc. During lunch a message came that a big column of Germans was at the moment entering Clamecy, so we promptly left in the other direction! I circled the town and made my way down

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to where I heard "Le Loup" was. There I found him and an SAS jeep. It appeared that their officer had been wounded or killed, but might still be in the ditch alive where he had last been seen. So I organized a party to go and look for him. Unfortunately he was no longer there and must have, I think, been killed. I took a prisoner, an 18-year-old Pole, who when he realized he was not going to be shot was utterly delighted at the thought of being a prisoner of war. I gave him to the SAS to work in their cook house.

I proceeded back to my area and instigated a system of ambushes all over the area, especially on the two main roads going east. Instead of having large ambushes we now had very small and very numerous ambushes which shot up the convoys and then withdrew to shoot them up again later on. The Germans pushed defensive groups along the roads holding the towns and cross-roads etc., thereby allowing their convoys the maximum protection.

All the time I was in the Morvan I had very little evidence of the so-called "communist peril". The FTP and FFI worked together very well with about as much jealousy or rivalry as one would imagine would obtain under similar circumstances in England. There is little doubt that the FTP did really good work against the Germans and were notorious for their courage and "guts". Several times I discussed this matter with the French, and the only times I heard the famous rumors of the secret arms dumps at Clermont-Fenard to be used for the civil war after the war was from died-in-the-wool reactionaries, some of whom seemed to be in absolute terror of the communists. A good example of a more normal approach to the problem was afforded to me by the Maquis de Champean. This officer,

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retired commandant of the Air Force, was a member of one of the oldest families in France, a typical aristocrat to look at. He was approached by the FTP to be their representative, a kind of minister-without-portfolio, who already had of course valuable contacts. He agreed at once, put the FTP badge up and worked hard for his group of Maquis. He would laughingly explain that he was not the slightest bit communist, but felt that any job which helped to get rid of the Germans was a job worth doing for France.

Colonel Hastings asked me to go down towards Saulieu and investigate a rumor we had heard of 200 Tigers advancing in our direction. We both, I think, felt this to be highly improbable, but I said I would go down and see if there was any truth in it. I found no evidence of these tanks but at Anost I heard that the advanced elements of the Seventh Army were already at Autun. I had already contacted the Third Army and asked them for any instructions for my area. I now felt that it was probably even more important to contact the Seventh Army, since we appeared to be directly in front of its advance. At Autun I found a squadron of the 2me Dragons. I hoped they would liberate Autun that night but the officer commanding told me that there were so many FFI troops between him and Autun that he was afraid to attack with his armor for fear of shooting Frenchmen, and decided to wait until first light. I took a private soldier who had been wounded in the foot, the son of General deLattre, to the Maquis hospital at Anost for treatment. Next morning Autun was liberated and I passed through to Macon where I was redirected to Lons-le-Saunier where the SF unit was. There I saw Colonel Head and reported all details of enemy troops in my area. He sent me to G-2 to give them any information that they needed. I

Operations, Team Harry (Cont'd)

then returned to Autun where I found fighting going on around the town, 90 Germans having parleyed with the cure of a little village, surrendered to me on the condition that I hand them over to the real army. This I managed to do - to the captain commanding the squadron of 2me Dragon.

I then proceeded back to my area where the tail end of the convoys appeared to be passing through. I received a signal from London warning me that 40,000 German troops were advancing from Nevers. I had already heard this rumor and considered it grossly exaggerated, which fact I signalled to London and investigated. As I had suspected there were about 20,000 who had by now surrendered to American troops, FFI, and SAS. Apart from possibly a few isolated groups hidden in woods, the area was now obviously clear - the Seventh Army had made contact with the Third Army. I, therefore, proceeded to Paris to report to Lieutenant-Colonel William Jackson, FA (436).

Centime (W/T operator) reports that the Jedburgh set worked very efficiently and he was surprised what good reception he made with the set. Latterly he got hold of a suitcase set which he preferred working with, if only because it was not necessary to have someone generating for him.

On arrival we lost considerable kit. W/T sets were replaced practically immediately, but personal kit, including essentials such as flashlights, were never replaced the whole time we were in the field. This made night reception for W/T operator exceedingly difficult. Clothes were never replaced. The only personal package received the whole time we were in the field contained nothing else but one paybook for the W/T operator.

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After 1 August London sent exactly one message, despite the fact that I continued sending a normal amount of traffic. Many of these messages included direct questions. One signal explaining that for some reason or other messages would have to be very limited in future would have been very welcome.

Financial Statement

Received by Captain Guthrie - - - - - 100,000 francs

Expenditure

Expenses 6 June to September - - - - 20,000

Handed to resistance leaders - - - - 18,000

Exfiltrating RAF personnel - - - - 10,000

Car expenses - - - - - 10,000

58,000 francs

Returned - - - - - 42,000

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Operations, Team Frederick

TEAM FREDERICK (437)

Summary of W/T Messages Exchanged

1 July From SFHQ to Frederick (438)

"Can we send Jedburgh to Kergoulas. Do you want repeat on Alain."

2 July From SFHQ to Frederick (439)

"Development your area now matter of utmost urgency. Arms deliveries can be made as rapidly as you can absorb. Wish you to concentrate on west of Cotes du Nord. Are preparing further Jed for east of this Department whom we wish you to receive as soon as possible. Submit maximum number grounds stating in each case maximum container capacity per op and whether fit for bodies. Wish you to be on ground when next Jed arrives. They will bring you full orders and new directives."

2 July From Frederick (440)

"Can you drop these arms on Wednesday June 5. Ground MMN 58 at 05MM east 0620 and 45 north 5400 south west Runan. Arms desired 150 Sten guns, 100 rifles, 10 Bren, grenades, explosives and ten 2-inch mortars."

3 July From SFHQ to Frederick (441)

"Will send three aircraft Wednesday weather permitting on ground Runan. Air Force very pleased your reception."

3 July From Frederick (442)

"For HQ SAS can now arm 3 battalions as follows dropping grounds at Plevin, St Trephine, St. Martin. Request planes night 4/5. Training cadres are now with each battalion."

3 July From Frederick (443)

"Must postpone drop Wednesday near Runan due to enemy activity against that maquis."

4 July From SFHQ to Frederick (444)

"Sorry bad weather Alain last night. Will try tomorrow Wednesday. Postponing Pierre near Runan. Will do Yves tomorrow 5th with 4 aircraft."

4 July From Frederick (445)

"Can we have drop on ground at Runan Friday July 7. Please drop Frederick package Wednesday on Yves."

(437) See p.33 1st Qtr this Vol
 (439) C-5879 2 Jul 44
 (441) C-3641 3 Jul 44
 (443) C-4687/33 3 Jul 44
 (445) C-4703/84 4 Jul 44

(438) C-3610 1 Jul 44
 (440) C-4656/25 2 Jul 44
 (442) C-4570/66 3 Jul 44
 (444) C-3662 4 Jul 44

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4 July From SFHQ to Frederick (446)

"Please advise if LeBlanc has arrived."

5 July From Frederick (447)

"Do not drop Finisterre team tonight. Drop them Friday July 7 same message and letter. Boche were in area Monday. Okay for Yves tonight. LeBlanc contacted. Should return England next sea operation."

6 July From Frederick (448)

"Desire drop arms 300 grenades and some explosive on Ground MMn 59 Pl1 5 22 MM east 0520 and 12 MPI north 5380 northeast Jugon. Also boots for 100 men. Maquis area Guingamp attacked by Boche Sunday. 70 Boche killed, 10 maquis."

7 July From SFHQ to Frederick (449)

"Must know very urgent if you can arrange for reception of a Jedburgh team for Cotes du Nord. Inform us what ground we could use from night Saturday 8th, Sunday 9th."

7 July From SFHQ to Frederick (450)

"Jedburgh Giles to Alain tonight with money. Will repeat Alain on advice from you four aircraft. Acknowledge and confirm."

7 July From Frederick (451)

"Okay for Saturday on ground Caramel near Jugen. Can you increase arms from 200 to 400 ground near Henon on Sunday."

8 July From Frederick (452)

"For information of RAF 2300 Boche in villages of Plounevez Moedec. General Hq and command post 1 km southeast of village MMN 58 Pl1 48 MM east 06607 MM north of 6380 infantry and artillery. High tension line between Brest and Gouyec blown yesterday. Convoy 20 Boche lorries destroyed near Rostrenen by maquis working with us."

8 July From SFHQ to Frederick (453)

"Regret Alain postponed bad weather but will try again tonight. Will also do Caracec tonight with Jedburgh team Felix. Will also do Yves and Pierre."

- | | |
|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| (446) C-3678 4 Jul 44 | (447) C-4750/2 5 Jul 44 |
| (448) C-4761/97 6 Jul 44 | (449) C-3737 7 Jul 44 |
| (450) C-3739 7 Jul 44 | (451) C-4813/15 7 Jul 44 |
| (452) C-4833/46 8 Jul 44 | (453) C-3756 8 Jul 44 |

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Operations, Team Frederick (Cont'd)9 July From Frederick (454)

"We have changed Hubase to Canihuel near St Nicholas for security. Recommend promotion Aguirec to rank of captain. In contact and working in complete agreement with chief of all resistance in Cotes du Nord. Have joint Hq with resistance and all military operations handled by us. Droppings being arranged as fast as possible. Desire Smith does not overlap our work."

9 July From Frederick (455)

"Twin drops known to have been success last night. Boche attack 5 hours before drop at Pierre. Boche captain and adjutant killed. No maquis casualties. Many cases of great bravery here. Is it possible to demand decorations for outstanding cases. Suggest good for morale of maquis. Thanks to RAF for a grand job. Drops arranged by Smith failed. Believed too hasty preparation."

10 July From Frederick (456)

"Contact made July 9 with Demagny, Delegeue Etat Major Region. Complete agreement reached on points concerning command of any FFI of Cotes du Nord. Battle last night on Cadoudal. Maquis chief killed. Denounced by traitor. Moncontour region out of action for moment."

10 July From SFHQ to Frederick (457)

"Regret death Chief Cadoudal. All our sympathy. Ground Kerfot refused by Air Ministry too near balloon barrage. Can you give fresh point."

10 July From Frederick (458)

"One Jed team and material dropped on Caramel all okay. Report not in yet on Alain."

11 July From SFHQ to Frederick (459)

"Please inform Aguirec he is already promoted acting Captain and temporary Lieutenant and convey our congratulations."

20 July From Frederick (460)

"Desire drop arms for 500 men night of Thursday 20 July on ground 5847. Require most urgently 10 million francs."

(454) C-4857/4 9 Jul 44	(455) C-4879/38 9 Jul 44
(456) C-4886/52 10 Jul 44	(457) C-3821 10 Jul 44
(458) C-4905/15 10 Jul 44	(459) C-3843 11 Jul 44
(460) (Via Wash 181035) 20 Jul 44	

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Operations, Team Frederick (Cont'd)20 July From Wash 18115 (461)

"Frederick encircled by 600 Boche last Tuesday. Managed to break out but lost everything except arms and cipher. Do not use any terrain or message already used once by Frederick as Boche may know position. Will commence parachuting soon as radio received. Morale tops as Boche patrol searching for us 3 yards away, Mille Fois Cambronne, came in handy."

20 July From SFHQ to Frederick (462)

"Our congratulations for having succeeded in escaping from the Germans and successful attack against them. We are sending a radio this evening on Mossy. We are glad about the good relations with the AVECCHRE FFI. Give us names under which we can contact them."

21 July From SFHQ to Felix (For Frederick) (463)

"Regarding decorations, send us the name, decoration proposed, text of the citation very short. We will award them as soon as possible. Try to send us such information as the real name, rank, and date of birth."

31 July From Frederick (464)

"Request 2 drops arms for 250 each for Wednesday."

31 July From Frederick (465)

"Results Plesidy battle much better than first report. 500 Boche out of action, killed or wounded. Germans report best armed and disciplined maquis yet contacted. Maquis reformed with loss of only one Bren and casualties as in previous message. Their morale excellent."

31 July From Frederick (466)

"Our base is now about 6 kms southwest of Bourbriac. Maquis near Pleven was attacked by large number of Boche Saturday during a 15 hour fight. They held their position. Germans withdrew with large casualties. Two maquis killed."

2 August From SFHQ to Frederick (467)

"Allied advance will probably be rapid in your direction. Task is now preservation not destruction. Greatest importance attached to preservation of road Morlaix, Saint Brieuc, Lamballe. You will prevent enemy carrying out demolition of road bridges, culverts, etc on this road and on secondary roads in this area. Report if you require assistance and your prospects of success in this task."

(461) 18115 20 Jul 44
(463) C-5969 21 Jul 44
(465) C-710/79 31 Jul 44
(467) C-4486 2 Aug 44

(462) C-5967 20 Jul 44
(464) C-709/82 31 Jul 44
(466) C-741/8 31 Jul 44

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2 August From Frederick (468)

"Have 2000 men now being concentrated on and near route Morlaix, St Brieuc, Lamballe. Tasks being allotted. Can use aid parachute troops later. Have further 2000 available in department for secondary tasks. Prospects of success good. All drops ordered now of utmost importance."

3 August From Frederick (469)

"Boche reported to have evacuated Lamballe. Believe 200 remain at St Brieuc, 300 at Guingamp. Reliably reported to be evacuating Cotes du Nord."

3 August From Frederick (470)

"Can receive Jed team Friday night okay. Chief of FFI Cotes du Nord with us now as always. Send our money and rations with team."

3 August From SFHQ to Frederick (471)

"Here are two orders from General Koenig to all commanders in Brittany. First, in order to avoid possibility of battles between resistance and advancing troops in confusion of battle you must prepare to send forward a small unarmed party including one officer, or NCO to make contact with Allied troops. They should be briefed to supply exact information on disposition your troops. Warn them above all in no circumstances to start running as this will inevitably draw fire."

3 August From SFHQ to Frederick (472)

"Second, until Colonel Eono's mission has had time to take charge of general situation you must order your men as soon as they are overrun by Allied troops to assemble in predetermined spots under their own officers. They should have their arms with them but must deposit them under guard in order that there may be no risk of their being taken for snipers. Urgent this instruction be strictly observed. Providing these instructions are observed the Allied armies have been requested not to take possession of these depots of weapons. Copies these instructions have been given to armies concerned."

4 August From SFHQ to Frederick (473)

"They will be enlisted on arrival and will act as guides to forward units. They should ask the first soldier they see for the nearest division G-2. On arrival at divisional headquarters they must ask for G-2 branch. Until Divisional Headquarters specifically ask for it they must not mention the password. When asked for they will give password Angouleme."

(468) C-856/81 2 Aug 44
 (470) C-938/97 3 Aug 44
 (472) C-140 3 Aug 44

(469) C-905/30 3 Aug 44
 (471) C-139 3 Aug 44
 (473) C-186 4 Aug 44

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JEDBURGHS

Operations, Team Frederick (Cont'd)4 August From Frederick (474)

"Okay for drop tonight of men on ground Bonaparte. Orders from General Koenig understood and dispatched to maquis groups."

5 August From Frederick (475)

"Drop of mission last night complete success. Contacts made with FFI. Americans reported at Callac this morning."

7 August From Frederick (476)

"Odd parties of Boche still at large but maquis on all important points and can deal with same. Information on maquis passed on to Mikison and Americans consider our role almost completed."

7 August From SFHQ to Frederick (477)

"Army Command requests protection of St Brieux, Guingamp, Morlaix road after passage of motorized division and cavalry who are greatly in advance of the other elements. This protection should be given only by organized units."

9 August From Frederick (478)

"Desire confirmation of promotion of Vire."

10 August From Frederick (479)

"Boche activity in Paimpol Pluebian serious. Essential American help is given quickly. Boche committing atrocities in Pleubian. Maquis strong enough to contain enemy but not to attack at moment. We are now near Briec."

11 August From Frederick (480)

"Situation at Pleubian grave. Whole villlage will be burned by tonight by Boche if materials for them are not provided by populace. Boche in strength - 100 area Lezadricux with artillery and strong defense position including Paimpol. Impossible task for maquis attack. German atrocities in region appalling."

11 August From SFHQ to Frederick (481)

"Vire promoted Lieutenant first June this year."

11 August From SFHQ to Frederick (482)

"Have requested urgently air support for FFI area Paimpol."

(474) C-996/71 4 Aug 44

(476) C-1211/21 7 Aug 44

(478) C-1306/11 9 Aug 44

(480) C-1451/33 11 Aug 44

(482) C-6203 11 Aug 44

(475) C-1038/99 5 Aug 44

(477) C-475 7 Aug 44

(479) C-1373/29 10 Aug 44

(481) C-6200 11 Aug 44

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20 August From Yalelock to Watermark (483)

"The following agents - Max alias Esguihoux, Differentiale, Ale, First escort refer Uppermost. Leave air strip T 2 to Northolt scheduled departure 1600 today. For Carleton Smith - Jed team Frederick unescorted same flight."

Report on Team Upon Return from Field - 9 June to 20 August 1944

The Mission. The Mission given to the team was to drop with a party of SAS into the Cotes du Nord and to assist them in establishing a base by providing liaison and arms and materials for the local patriots.

Briefing. It was stated that little resistance movement was known in Brittany and gave the names of the agents who might be useful to us. In actuality we found an extremely strong underground movement and the three agents were either dead or unheard of. In our opinion it would have been better to have contacted the resistance in the Cotes du Nord, say two weeks before D-day, as this area was to turn out to be one of the most important in France.


Dropping. We jumped in the middle of a stick of SAS in bright moonlight. In the air we heard a number of explosions on the ground and thought we were dropping into a battle. It turned out to be an unfortunate SAS paratrooper who had packed his detonators in with his plastic HE with fatal results.

The Reception Committee was assisted by an enormous crowd of onlookers of both sexes, most of whom were smoking, which we did not consider very wise as the Boche were in a town only seven kms away.

Action on arrival. Before leaving I had been placed under the orders of Captain Le Blond who formed the Samwest base on arrival. The base was well hidden in the Foret de

(483) C-2216/98 20 Aug 44

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Doualt and section posts for the defence of the HQ were organized soon after arrival.

Events in Samwest base. The day after the arrival of the SAS, numbers of representatives of the various partisan groups arrived but we did not contact the real head of the Cotes De Nord and Brittany areas until much later. Two women and a man were also held as spies and after questioning one woman and the man were shot and daggered respectively.

Unfortunately, however, the SAS held these prisoners in full view of the various people who came to have a look at the base. In view of the fact that the man was beaten up every ten minutes or so the results to his face were not pretty, and in my opinion subsequent brutal treatment of SAS prisoners may have had something to do with this.

Without our knowledge some of the young patriots were armed with weapons which had been dropped the previous night to the SAS and they congregated that evening in a farm about 200 yards from the base - none of them being trained to handle a weapon like a sten gun. As chance would have it, a car containing two Boche Officers stopped at the farm to ask the way to Carhaix. One officer entered the room where these young patriots were having supper and asked quite politely for directions.

The answer he received was about five slugs in his belly. Holding his stomach in place with one hand he regained the car and a grenade was thrown at the patriots. The whole base stood to but nothing happened that night.

The following morning, however, a lorry containing about 40 Boche of the 2nd Paratroop Division armed and proceeded to burn the farm and shoot the occupants.

As the farm was within range of one or two SAS section

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posts a first class battle started. Later in the morning, however, the Boche, who had a radio, called up re-inforcements and by the middle of the afternoon there must have been about 400 Boche at least attacking the position.

Withdrawal. Captain Le Blond gave the order to withdraw in small groups to the base named Dingson in the south and our team with Squadron Leader Smith of the SAS broke out of the forest and moved in an easterly direction, losing nearly all our kit in the process.

During the withdrawal, we had a piece of providential good luck when a motor cycle patrol which was in hot pursuit was machine gunned from the air by a Beaufighter and decided that there was no future in continuing.

After a very cold and miserable night hidden in some gorse we arrived near Tremargat and lay up in the woods. We contacted the local schoolmistress Simone Legoeffic who undoubtedly saved our lives, as we were very hungry and chilled to the bone.

She arranged guides for us to assist us to the southern base and we marched that night to Kergrist where we failed to contact the guide for the next stage. We lay up in a wood and waited for daylight.

The next day Simone came with news that there were two SAS officers and a corporal very gravely wounded in a deserted farm not far from the Foret of Doualt.

Return to Peumerit de Quintin. I decided to return with the team to this farm and see what we could do.

On arrival we found Sergeant Robert of the SAS looking after these officers who were nearly dying. We arranged for a doctor to come from Guingamp, who arrived and performed a

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wonderful operation on Lieutenant La Serre and Lieutenant Bottella undoubtedly saving both men's lives.

These men were looked after and nursed back to health by the courage and fortitude of Madame Le Moigne and Madame Quiennec of Peumerit de Quintin and they are now back to duty. In view of the fact that the Boche frequently passed 500 yards away during the two months they were there, this is a remarkable achievement.

Work at Peumerit De Quintin. When the wounded were properly established we made contact with Marceau, chief of the FFI of the Cotes Du Nord and Francois of the FN. He stated that funds were needed badly and we supplied them with about 50,000 francs on the spot, also leaving money with the wounded.

I decided to establish a base in the region about 10 kms from the Forest of Doualt and carry on alone with the team with the original intention of arming the patriots.

We arranged two parachutings for Maquis not far away. Both succeeded without incident and we arranged for a "cadre" of FFI leaders to watch them in order to learn the procedure of a Reception Committee.

Move to Canihuel. After about 2 weeks at Peumerit de Quintin I decided that a move to another region was necessary for security reasons; the area was thick with Boche and we had had three ambushes on the road just behind our base in one week. We had organized a number of expeditions against Boche petrol installations, transformers and cables and an attack on a convoy of 20 lorries near Rostrenen, which had succeeded perfectly.

We moved to a deserted farm house in the woods above Canihuel near St Nicolas du Pelem and established radio

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communications and contacts with all Maquis in our area by means of two bogus gendarmes on a motor cycle and five girl convoyeuses on bicycles - these being the only people who could get through Boche and Gestapo inspections without much trouble.

A lot of work was done at Canihuel as our radio worked perfectly and Marceau assisted us greatly by bringing in several contacts and by introducing us to Thiery and Domigny chief of region M.

A number of parachutings were arranged and worked successfully, including reception committee's for teams Giles (484) and Felix (485).

Attack at Canihuel. After about five days at the farm we were working a schedule with London in the morning when we had a report that Boche and Russian cavalry were looking for Maquis in the woods. We did not pay much attention except to post a sentry: this sort of story was very common. A few minutes later machine gun fire opened up very close to us and Boche approached the farm on horse back together with infantry. As we were five in number and there were eight hundred encircling the region we quit the farm just having time to collect crystals and cypher.

The German Coy commander noticed our aerial between two trees and dispatched a section to see what was in the farm. We hid up in the wood about 150 yards from the farm hoping to return later and collect some of our kit.

After a time, all seemed quiet and Captain Aguirec thought he heard French voices and went to see what was happening. He almost fell on to a German sentry who luckily did not see him and in the meanwhile a villager came to me and said the

(484) See pp 323 this Vol

(485) See pp 361 this Vol

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farm was stiff with Boche. I decided to try and break out of the the cordon which was closing in around us and get away during the night.

When Captain Aguirec returned we moved as a patrol over about three fields which did not provide much cover and as the Boche were close I decided to take cover with the team in a small patch of gorse about 30 yards square. We lay tight and about half an hour later a patrol talking in German passed three yards from our heads. It was impossible to throw a grenade at them as there was a Coy of 150 just down the path. At long last, darkness came and we moved out down to the village which the Boche had just left, had a meal and got a guide for the next move.

Cime of Kercheren. We moved to this area after the Canihuel party and lay up for two days as the Gestapo now had our details and were after us in no small way.

We ordered another radio through Captain de Moduit of the SAS and a set was dropped to Felix but unfortunately the only chute to fail was the one with our set and this put us back for a while.

We arranged several drops for our Maquis through De Moduit, however, which was good cooperation on his part considering his set was already over-worked.

We moved about 10 kms further north after five days, and later moved again to a region about 7 kms from Etang Neuf, not far from Plesidy.

Action against Maquis at Plesidy. We carried out an official inspection of the Maquis at Etang Neuf, which consisted of 3 Coys - all armed and clothed in uniform and with extremely good discipline, the best being under the command of Sous Lieutenant Robert SAS.

Operations, Team Frederick (Cont'd)

The day after our inspection the Boche attacked this Maquis in strength. All ranks were on PT except the sentry on the gate with a Bren gun who opened fire and killed 30 Boche in their lorries before he was killed at his post like a good soldier.

The Maquis stood to and the results of a series of attacks on all three Coys were 27 Maquis killed or missing, Germans 500 killed and wounded.

The Germans stated after this action that it was the best disciplined and armed Maquis they had yet contacted. The Maquis moved their position after this action and lost only one bren gun, that of the sentry on the gate.

Attack against our HQ. The afternoon of the Plesidy battle. Boche patrols approached our HQ and opened up with Machine Guns in the next field to our tent. We moved out to a region about 7 kms SW of Bourbriac. We found here our best PC well concealed in gorse on the top of a hill; we had learned enough lessons by this time to chose a good one.

Orders from London. After some parachutings had been carried out from this region we received orders to protect the road Lamballe - Guingamp - Morlaix and to stop the Boche blowing bridges and installations. This was done the same afternoon and over 2000 armed men were concentrated on the sector with the result that the American task force had a completely clear run through to Morlaix without a bridge being destroyed. The American commander and his officers paid great tribute to the Maquis for a fine job of work.

Mission Aloes. (486) I received orders about this time to prepare to receive the above mission. Arrangements were made for a farm to accommodate the personnel - two cars for the use of Colonel Eono and a HQ in the school at Kerrien.

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The drop succeeded without accident except that for some reason the Jed team dropped about 15 miles away. The next day the mission moved down to Kerrien and the resistance collected the arms dropped.

The mission HQ at Kerrien was of no small interest to the villagers as it bore a strong resemblance to a mad house. I was also a little disconcerted when on entering the school Colonel Eono asked me who I was and what I wanted. In view of the fact that our team had made the entire arrangements for his welfare and I had introduced myself to him the night before, this was a little staggering. The next day the village was attacked by German parachutists who were driven off by troops of the Maquis aided by some of the mission.

Contact with the US Army. About this time, advance units of the US Army were beginning to overrun our position and Colonel Passy gave Captain Aguirec and myself liaison duties with General Ernest of the US task force, myself with the Americans and Captain Aguirec with the French. Our normal Jed role ceased at this point as there were no more parachutings.

The Paimpol Peninsula Battles. The only effective resistance remaining in the Cotes du Nord was force of about 3000 Germans and Russians who occupied the towns of Treguier, Lezadrieux, Plunez and Paimpol. These towns were attacked and held by Americans and patriots in three days in the above order. The Maquis casualties were very slight indeed and they had previously done an excellent job in bottling up the Germans in this peninsula and preventing them from breaking out and attacking the US Supply lines.

The only point of note here is that in the attack on Paimpol the French patriot attack went in at 0630 and the

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American on the same axis of advance at 0730 due to bad co-ordination on the part of the staff responsible for the French attack - the plans of the French attack for the next day only reaching General Ernest at 0230 in the morning when it was too late for him to alter his fire plan. He instructed me to report on this and it was only through pure chance and the grace of God that the patriots were not shot by American guns. It is a lesson for future combined attacks.

Liaison Work. It is felt that a Jedburgh officer can be of invaluable assistance to an Allied commander coming into the area for the first time as he has the dispositions, strengths and capabilities of the Maquis at his finger tips. Captain Aguirec did extremely good work at this juncture by organizing the Maquis Coys to bottle up the Boche.

Return. We had received orders seven days before by SF representative Lieutenant-Colonel Walsh to return to England but we waited until the Paimpol peninsula was clear before returning; it was our area and we controlled the Maquis in it.

Points arising from the Work.

1. The Jed set is first class and never let us down.
2. Home operators must never give QSA3 when they are hearing the out-station reasonably well as was sometimes done. The Out operator may have the Boche in the next field as we frequently did during a sched.
3. Home operators must send messages blind when the Out Station does not come up on the sched.
4. The aerial should consist of one fixed end and the other end on a pole which can be raised and lowered. Avoid a fixed aerial for the reasons quoted under a previous heading.

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5. Teams going into the field should make sure they have a No 1 coil. We started without one and we found it invaluable when one was dropped to us by parachute.

SAS Co-operation. We found at first that it was very difficult to work with the SAS as they had ideas about arming the partisans and rather intruded on our job. We do not mind the maximum number of men being armed naturally, but when hasty preparations are made and the parachutings fail the effect is bad on the Maquis. SAS and Jed parachutings must not overlap.

Morale of Maquis. We found that for the most part the men we had to deal with were very brave - inclined to be far too rash - very fond of petty shootings which brought the whole weight of the Boche down on them - and very good comrades in a scrap. They show little pity for the Boche with ample reason and none at all for the Milice whom they consider 100 per cent worse than the Boche. I personally witnessed the ill treatment and execution of five Milice and none of us felt the least pity for them.

The fighting morale of the Maquis is really good. Volunteers were never lacking for the most dangerous missions and their one idea is to kill Boche.

There is excellent material for the future army of France in their ranks provided they are instructed in the right way for the greater part the younger men had never done military service. The SAS did good work as instructors and occasionally as leaders of sabotage groups.

Work done by the Team. It was estimated before leaving France, working in conjunction with Marceau, that we have armed in the region of 4200 men in our area of the Cotes du Nord, either directly by parachute or by the organized distribution

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of captured German arms. Details of arms parachuted to various Maquis are given in the detailed list.

Operations carried out under our orders.

1. The guarding of the Morlaix - Guingamp - St Brieuc - Lamballe which allowed the US forces free passage.
2. Blowing all rail, cable, telephone communications in the Cotes du Nord during June and July.
3. Attacking petrol either in dumps or stores - the most important being the blowing of 60,000 gallons of petrol, at St Brieuc when the Germans had urgent need of it.
4. Attacks on enemy convoys which occurred every week - the most important being that near Rostrenen of 20 lorries which was completely wiped out.
5. Maquis resistance to the Boche. Every time one of our Maquis coup was attacked, the Boche lost far more men than they could afford. The best case occurred to the Maquis at Plevin which had been armed by us two days before. The Boche surrounded the Maquis for three days, suffered very high losses and then withdrew, which was a great moral and physical blow to the Boche as it was one of the first occasions the Maquis had stood their ground when attacked by the Boche in strength.
6. Several towns were occupied before the US advance the chief being - Guingamp - St Brieuc - Lannion and Morlaix.
7. The battle in the north in the Paimpol peninsula showed that the patriots can be used in certain cases as normal infantry. They followed the American tanks in and held the towns of Lezadrieux, Treguier, and Plunez during the nights of the battle on their own.
8. The above are general points - the detailed actions

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of each Maquis are given in elsewhere.

The FFI. We have received in all our work very fine co-operation from Thiery and Marceau and all minor officials of this organization. The Aloes mission should have full details of all heads of departments of the area.

Conclusion. We have found real pleasure in assisting the French patriots in the liberation of their country, and their splendid spirit of defiance to the Boche has repaid our work a hundredfold.

We feel that our mission has been in some way a success and the sight, when driving up to the Cherbourg peninsula along the main road which our men had guarded, of all bridges intact and all roads clear gave us no little satisfaction. We do not forget either the little team of five very courageous women and the two gendarmes who did our liaison work in the face of the Gestapo and who never failed us when we most needed them.

Financial Statement

Money issued to team ----- 250,000 Frs

Expenses	
Major Wise -----	8,000
Captain Aguirrec -----	76,000
Sergeant Kehoe -----	17,465
	<u>101,465 Frs</u>

Money returned	
Major Wise -----	100,120
(including franc equivalent of 40 pound sterling)	
Captain Aguirrec -----	24,000
Sergeant Kehoe -----	32,535
	<u>156,655 Frs</u>

8,120 Francs in excess was handed in by this team. 120 Francs was excess by Major Wise and it is believed that Sergeant Kehoe handed in only 24,535 - the other 8,000 having been handed in by other teams and been placed by mistake with Kehoe's money - thus accounting for the extra 8,000.

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BOOK IV

GLOSSARY

INDEX OF PROPER NAMES

(A glossary of code names, code words, etc., and an index of proper names for Volume 4, Books I to IV inclusive are contained in Volume 4, Book IV.)

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Operations, Team George

TEAM GEORGE (487)

Summary of W/T Messages Exchanged

16 July From George (488)

"Send explosive and arms for 500 men."

17 July From George (489)

"We are living in civilian clothes near Ancenis. Since 8 July we have had command of Loire Inferieure in accord with chiefs. All contact reestablished. We have 4,000 men organized but not armed."

17 July From SFHQ to George (490)

"After a long silence we received your cables without number or date requesting various materiel. Tell us when you have received 'coup de pied de mulet'. We are happy to make contact again with you. Give us a full report of your activity since the Loire Inferieure incident."

18 July From George (491)

"Your message indecipherable. Could not hear you at all because of storm. Are ready to cut railway lines between Nantes and La Rochelle."

(An exchange of messages about dropping grounds)

29 July From George (492)

"Have blown up two openings of canal Nantes to Brest. Transport of enemy munitions interrupted. Have in our possession detailed plan of all defenses of enemy coast Loire Inferieure south and north. Wigton will be able to bring the plans to London by Lysander and make a report."

(More messages confirming dropping grounds)

1 August From George (493)

"New mass arrests in Loire Inferieure but great possibilities always if arms and money are sent. Financial situation desperate."

2 August From George (494)

"We have blown two locks of canal between Blain and the north. 20 barges with explosive destroyed."

(487) See p 39 1st Qtr this volume	(488) C-118/5 16 Jul 44
(489) C-141/24 17 Jul 44	(490) C-5940 17 Jul 44
(491) C-167/28 18 Jul 44	(492) C-603/34 29 Jul 44
(493) C-782/41 1 Aug 44	(494) C-816/42 2 Aug 44

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3 August From George (495)

"Realize situation. Note Maquis conditions - no good grounds, no protection, no BOA, no torches, no midgets, no electricity, no transport, no eureka, no money, no help. Roads and tracks watched night and day. Spies and Gestapo on grounds often before us."

3 August From George (496)

"More information from our headquarters concerning strategic importance FFI Loire Inferieure would be greatly appreciated. Information concerning Lysander operations forwarded tomorrow."

3 August From George (497)

"Contact ready. If not able send men tonight, answer by sked or emergency at 8 tonight."

4 August From George (498)

"If warned by message we can await your three men every evening on ground south St Sigismond but useless to send Jedburgh team."

4 August From George (499)

"SOS. Please we ask you send arms the minute you receive this message. Extremely urgent. Reception committee day and night on ground south St. Sigismond."

5 August From George (500)

"Give immediately your instructions for policy to follow south of Loire. If arms are sent immediately we are in position to cut all ways of enemy retreat and to take thousands of prisoners. Have given order to attack everywhere and cut roads."

6 August From SFHQ to George (501)

"Your cable without date or number on possibilities of South Loire received. We are very interested. Send urgently all grounds to south of the Loire."

6 August From Underfoot to Watermark (502)


"Picked up Cyr alias Wigton of Jed team George. We are holding pending recommendations."

7 August From Underfoot to Watermark (503)

"Captain Cyr retained this staff. Will be sent as liaison and guide with 2nd French Armored Division

(495) C-890/45 3 Aug 44
(497) C-918/49 3 Aug 44
(499) C-988/54 4 Aug 44
(501) C-374 6 Aug 44
(503) C-1163/11 7 Aug 44

(496) C-891/47 3 Aug 44
(498) C-967/51 4 Aug 44
(500) C-1046/55 5 Aug 44
(502) Nr. 71 6 Aug 44



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of XX Corps to operate in territory well known. When released by Division will be infiltrated to Colonel Felix."

9 August From Watermark to Underfoot (504)

"To Powell from Haskell. It is desired in general that Jedburgh teams be returned to UK as quickly as possible after their operational role is completed. In the case of Captain Cyr - if you consider it important to attach him to XX Corps approval is granted herewith."

10 August From Underfoot to Watermark (505)

"Jed team George safe. Erard and Cyr both here, returning Chateaubriant today. Through with written statement and intelligence lower units. Would not object to operations. Their contact London difficult because set in bad state. All info not sent to Watermark has been relayed to Army units with whom they are in perfect liaison."

Report of Team Upon Return from the Field - 9 June to 23 AugustMISSION

Our mission was to drop with a party of SAS and to assist them in establishing a base west of Redon by calling to action all resistance elements who could be put to use and by providing liaison, arms and materials for the local patriots.

Team George was under the command of the OC, SAS party in the field but were to report independently to SFHQ on the state of resistance in terms of personnel, leadership, arms and potentialities.


FROM LONDON TO BALEINEAt the SAS Camp, Fairford

Jedburgh team George left London on 7 June with Major Horton, as conducting officer, and Jedburgh team Frederick (506) for the SAS camp. There we contacted Commandant Bourgoin who was to be our CO.

Our first impression was not good. There seemed to be a strained feeling between Jedburghs and SAS, the latter did not seem to recognize our value to them and rather implied that

(504) C-726/727 9 Aug 44
(506) p 33 this volume

(505) C-1419/151 10 Aug 44

Operations, Team George (Cont'd)

we were a nuisance and a burden. SAS feared interference by outsiders into a role which they wished to carry out themselves.

We did not leave the first night. We occupied ourselves studying maps and going over our plans. The day before leaving we were given a general briefing by Commandant Bourgoin. After talking with Commandant Bourgoin and his officers, and owing to the fact that Captain Erard had already worked with him before, relations between us became somewhat easier. After having drinks with them all and a final talk with Commandant Bourgoin we left for the field.

Dropping

Having fitted our own chutes and checked our packages, we emplaned at 11:30. The trip was uneventful except for a little flak. Our position in the plane was worse than sardines. We were all crammed together and were greatly relieved when we reached the field and were able to get out. We had some trouble with the static line. It got caught in the front of the plane. Consequently, about 10 feet of static line was flying around in the plane. Everyone got tangled up in it.

The method of jumping was different from that which we had experienced before. We all stood up and ran down towards the tail of the plane, jumping out in a very unorthodox manner. We had no legbags with us so we carried our equipment in our hands. This would have been a hindrance on landing had the enemy been present.

Reception

When we were approximately 100 feet from the ground, 15 to 20 persons could be seen running to the spot where we were to land. We had no more than touched the ground when

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we were pounced upon. People started pulling us about trying to disentangle us from our parachutes. They were all laughing and talking loudly. When we asked them to keep quiet, they replied that there was nothing to worry about as the Germans were far away - actually two kilometers.

We went to a designated rendezvous where approximately 75 men had gathered in the middle of a field. When most of the SAS had been brought to this field, we started towards a farm called Farm de la Nouee, which was the Dingson base. Team George by now had found one another.

IN MORBIHAN (MALLESTROIT AND DINGSON)

Upon arrival at the farm we were given the most unexpressible welcome. Women, children and men were laughing and crying with joy. At 3:00 in the morning girls came running out kissing us and giving us flowers and wine. The men between the ages of 12 to 75 were ready that night to march on the German garrison which was about two kilometers away.

The natives and patriots spent most of the night picking up containers and bringing them to a RV. Team George got about two hours sleep.

First thing in the morning we made contact with Captain Puesh Samson, who was in charge of a party at the farm of La Nouee (between Mallestroit and St. Marcel).

We then set out to look for our packages which could not be found. Immediately searching parties were sent out in all directions but still the packages containing radio and equipment could not be located. At approximately 1400 hours a farmer arrived with the packages in a cart. He told us they had been dropped at about 0900 hours not far from

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his house which was about 2½ kilometers away from the dropping ground. This must have been a mistake by the dispatcher.

Action by SAS

The very first night of our first day in France, SAS were sent out to carry out demolition operations, cutting railroads, telephone lines, and all other lines of communication. Every day they carried out similar work. They would return to our base with their dead and wounded.

SAS, having all their equipment, arms, etc. ready in England at special airfields, had only a few messages to send. Whatever they asked for they received. We used to receive from 5 to 10, sometimes 30, planes on ground Baleine. This happened every night for eight days. Partisans were busy day and night picking up containers. SAS and ourselves were taking charge of the distribution of these arms and equipment. We made requests for equipment at the same time as the SAS but as most of the materiel dropped was SAS equipment, no one knew from which source it was coming; but this was only a small detail except that SAS were taking all the credit for all that was received.

Action by Jed Team George

The following work was carried out:

- a. Helping to equip and arm the partisans in Morbihan.
- b. Making contacts between Commandant Bourgoin and resistance groups and re-establishing broken contacts between all the organizations dealing with resistance.
- c. Keeping London informed of what was going on in the area.

Contacts

The first contact we had was with Fernand (507), which

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was about two hours after our arrival. Fernand was a British agent who had been sent to Dingson to act as a guide.

Fernand gave us a picture of the general situation and we gave him all the information which he needed; that is, what was going to happen and what London expected from him, from the partisans and from SAS.


Our next contact was with Captain Puesh-Samson of the SAS. We told him that we were to work with him, etc. Relations between us were good.

We then contacted Emile Guilmart who was second in command to Major Maurice, departmental chief of Morbihan. Our relations with Emile and Maurice were always excellent. We contacted Maurice himself later and he introduced us to his Chefs de Battalion, giving us their exact location and keeping us always informed of his intentions and his requests.

On 11 June we met a man called Xavier (508) from Paris, who, incidentally, was killed three weeks later in an ambush. Xavier told us that he was the only survivor of all the region's organization. He also told us that Hauteur had been arrested in Paris. However on Wednesday, 14 June, Hauteur re-appeared at the farm. Hauteur had apparently chosen our farm as general headquarters for his region and he was extremely surprised to find that this headquarters had been formed into a military base, already known to the Germans.

At this point there was a lot of confusion - nobody knowing who was who. Jedburgh George had a lot of difficulty in getting things straightened out.

There was another organization about which we had not been informed at Milton Hall and this was the BOA. We contacted the man in charge of the BOA at Baleine on 11 June. He was called Tainchebraye and known by London as



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Trouvere (509). We kept in close contact with him and our relations were extremely good. It is well to point out here the excellent work he did in Brittany.

Commandant Bourgoin dropped on our ground on the night of 15 June. We did not expect him as his previous plans were to drop to the northern base of Samwest (510), but as this base had been attacked, Commandant Bourgoin decided to drop at Dingson. On Sunday, 11 June, we made contact with him.

Meanwhile our relations with SAS were getting better. We soon found out that the SAS was an original unit with no rules or regulations. Officially they were taking orders from somebody, actually they were apparently taking orders from no one. They had their own planes and their own supplies and their own ideas. They worked in the field as SAS and as Jedburghs. However, by no means did they ruin the show. In fact, they worked wonderfully. As already stated, owing to a great deal of diplomacy, our relations became more and more friendly. We came to a point where perfect coordination was established between Jedburghs, SAS, partisans, BOA and French organizations from London. We never forgot that we were under Commandant Bourgoin's command and this command was never a nuisance or a burden for us.

About 14 June we received a message announcing Fonction's (511) arrival. He arrived safely on the ground Baleine and met us in the farm. Together we planned different things and tried immediately to get as many contacts as we could in the Brittany and Limitrof departments. We cannot remember all the names of the people we contacted at that moment. We can mention, however, "Anic", who was responsible for an

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important group of Saffre; Pierre, who worked later with Hauteur; Colonel Poussin, chief of Finistere, who gave us complete dope on his department and asked us for Jedburghs (the request that we transmitted to London). We also contacted Lieutenant LeBrec, chief of the group of "L'Ecole des Cadres" of Uriage, whom we were going to meet later in Rennes.

Wireless Communications

The day after we located our set we tried unsuccessfully to contact London on our sked. We then attempted to contact them on the emergency. We had been on the air approximately 10 minutes when radio location cars started to locate us. Since SAS had already been on the air constantly at this location, radio location cars in this area were numerous. These radio location cars had been sighted one mile from our headquarters and several unsuccessful attempts were made to capture them.

Apart from radio location cars, a jamming station was also put on our frequency. This certainly did not help matters. One of our sets was broken on landing and the other was slightly damaged. With both sets we managed to build one set which worked very unefficiently. It took from 10 to 15 minutes to regulate our set by sound.

It was impossible for us ever to receive a broadcast on the frequency which London was sending us. It was not until approximately two months later that we were able to receive broadcasts on the frequency given us by London.

The main frequency was also bad due to the fact that there was another station on it. Many attempts were made to regulate the set to a finer degree, but still we did not receive London clearly. This main frequency was always

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jammed. In fact, the jamming station was either jamming us or London. There was another station very close to the frequency we were using.

We informed London that we could not receive messages on the broadcast frequency, neither could we receive on the main frequency and asked them to send messages on the emergency frequency. This was never done. We also asked for a change in the main frequency; this too was never complied with. As it was always necessary to use our emergency frequency it was a simple job for the radio location cars to listen in on our emergency frequency and immediately give us trouble.

Our radio communications were very, very poor and we sweat blood on them.

Carrying Out the Plan

As soon as the arms were distributed, the unforgiveable mistake was made by patriots who shot Germans in nearby towns and returned with their truck and booty to our headquarters. This action aroused the suspicion of the Germans as to our strength which later led to our being attacked in large forces. Constantly from the first to the last day patrols kept a daily contact with the Boche. In order to be armed, organized companies were walking up to 100 kilos to our headquarters and then returning to their farms. No action whatsoever was to be taken against the Germans until the orders were given. Companies or organizations who were too far away from our headquarters were having arms delivered to them in captured German lorries. We kept at our headquarters only a large enough force to what we deemed necessary for protection. An attack on our position seemed sure sooner or later as the Germans knew we were here.

After arming 5,000 men and receiving arms for a further

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5,000, we decided that the organization in armament in the department of Morbihan was at a maximum.

We had a conference with Commandant Bourgoin, Hauteur, and Fonction and it was agreed that Jedburgh team George plus Hauteur and Fonction should go to Loire Inferieure.

We decided to tackle the Loire Inferieure as we knew it was the worst department in Brittany and also because it was of highly strategic value that this department should be armed and organized. We drew these conclusions after giving careful consideration to the plans that we thought the Allies would use in cutting Brittany from the rest of France.

Hauteur and Fonction were both very willing that we should go to the department of Loire Inferieure, the only thing that remained then was Commandant Bourgoin's and Maurice's agreement. This was given to us. We had informed London of our proposed move but did not receive their broadcast reply as we could not receive any message on broadcast. Meanwhile Hauteur went to Loire Inferieure to establish new contacts. The first was with the Chef Sub-divisionnaire Kinley. During his inspection tour, Hauteur established a Maquis in Saffre, under command of Yaco to whom he gave very precise and wise instructions. (If these instructions had been followed, we would never have been attacked in Saffre.) Yaco himself came to our farm La Nouee in order to obtain arms for this Maquis.

We made preparations to leave Maletrois in civilian clothes, traveling in company with two Gestapo agents who were working for us, or at least pretended that they were.

On the Saturday previous to our departure we had a drop of about 30 planes containing four jeeps, guns and

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explosives.

At this point everyone was worried as an attack by Jerry seemed imminent, due to the fact that our presence in the area was obvious and due to patriot and SAS action. Also, the number of planes which we had received no doubt attracted their attention.

The Germans at this point did not realize exactly our strength. They rather expected to find a Maquis of patriots, unorganized and with few arms.

We kept at our headquarters from about 600 to 1,000 men for protection. The problem of feeding and cooking for all these men in a small farm was a difficult one. Under these trying conditions French women who were working for us did excellent work. Enough praise could never be given to the many young girls who contributed to the cause of liberating France. Young girls were used to carry messages and act as couriers between the various units. This was highly dangerous work as they were continually being caught and paid the penalty. Girls were used as it was far easier for them to get through than men.

Attack on Base Dingson

On Sunday morning, 18 June, we were awakened at 8:30 by a loud report which we thought could only be hand grenades. This was immediately followed by machine gun and rifle fire. Thinking that the real attack had come at dawn, we immediately destroyed all papers of importance, hid our codes and radios in safe places and made the necessary plans for a rendezvous should we get separated in the confusion.

From here we went to see Commandant Bourgoin to find out the situation and to receive orders from him. On our arrival at the headquarters, we found that he had left for

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the area where the attack had started. While we were at the headquarters the outposts who had contacted the Jerries returned with four wounded and one prisoner. They reported that two cars containing four feldgendarmes each had come down the road towards the camp stopping every now and then to look over the country. When the two cars reached our outposts, they halted and started looking along the road. At this point SAS stepped out of a ditch with pistol in hand to take them prisoner. One made an attempt to reach for a grenade and the SAS pulled the trigger which failed to fire because it was not loaded. By the time he had loaded it, one of the Germans threw a hand grenade three feet from the SAS, but it did not harm him. At the same time a patriot ran from his hiding place and let go point blank at the Jerry with a sten, also wounding a patriot on the other side of the road. All this happened in a split second.

It was at this point that another outpost, a fair distance away, opened up on the two cars with light machine guns. This was a big mistake, the outposts' fire was going wild and wounding our own men. In the confusion of fire from the other outpost one German managed to escape. On questioning the prisoners which we had taken they told us they had been sent to investigate what was going on in this area as they had heard our planes.

After this first attack everything quieted down for about an hour, so that Captain Erard and Captain Cyr went up to the BOA who had been in charge of the reception committee. Meanwhile our four jeeps were ready mounted with machine guns.

Jerry returned again, this time with a force of about 150 feldgendarmes who advanced towards our lines forcing in front of them about 25 civilians who had been taken as

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hostages from the town of St. Marcell. They were very close to our lines before our outposts discovered them and when they did open up, they overran one of our machine gun positions and captured one of our light machine guns.

By this time all hell was let loose. Machine gun fire from our strongly defended lines cut the advancing German force to pieces. They immediately retreated to the outskirts of the town of St. Marcel where they took up a defensive position and started firing tracers in the woods on our right and left. The woods were set on fire, resulting in a forest fire that produced a thick smoke making precise firing impossible and helping enemy movement. By now Captain Cyr and Captain Erard had come up to the front lines, minus radio operator. The Germans in the town had a perfect observation of our positions from a high steeple in the town. They had expected to find a small force of patriots unarmed. They certainly did not expect to meet the withering fire with which we greeted them. By this time our jeeps had come into action with the result that the Germans started yelling "rouse" and pulled out lock, stock and barrel. Later, we learned that seeing the jeeps they thought that an airborne division was in the area and notified Rommel, which resulted in our being attacked by parachute battalions.

It would take too long to give an account of the next few hours in detail. A furious battle took place. Two hours after the feldgendarmes had left, the paratroops arrived. They were fearless, bold and aggressive fighters. Every inch of ground they advanced on was taken at a great cost in their lives. All day the patriots held on under the leadership of SAS. Their work was wonderful. For four years they had been under the domination of the Germans and now they were

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fighting for avenge until death. This battle was really a mistake because we were using untrained men in a stationary battle with only small arms. The only reason that the CO had given the order to hold was that we had arms for 5,000 men in our headquarters which had not yet been distributed. The Germans by now had brought up machine guns and mortars and were using these as covering fire and were advancing rather quickly.

On returning to our headquarters to send an SOS to London for support, we found the first aid station doing an impossible job for our wounded. The SOS had already been sent by the SAS, for air support, which arrived at about four in the afternoon. It was a little late because the German infantry had entered the woods and it was impossible from the air to tell who was who in the battle. However, it certainly strengthened the morale of the patriots. The planes bombed trucks and troop concentrations, but could not give us the necessary support which we needed because the woods gave excellent camouflage to the Germans.

Seeing the situation as it was, the commanding officer gave orders for a break through the encirclement as soon as it got dark. At this point, I may say that Commandant Bourgoin's efficient leadership was absolutely superior. By 8 o'clock in the evening Jerries had advanced to within 500 yards of our headquarters and since we were encircled it was impossible to do anything but hold or counterattack. At about 9:00 a counterattack was launched. Captain Erard led one company of patriots and Captain Cyr another. By this time many of our SAS officers in this immediate vicinity were either wounded or dead. Lieutenant Marienne who had been severely wounded in the head did a magnificent

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job. Incidentally, later he was captured and tortured before being killed.

Of the 200 men in Captain Cyr's company 115 were left at the end of the counterattack. Some of the hardest fighting of the day took place in this counterattack which threw back the Germans to 1500 yards from our headquarters.

The commanding officer had by this time given orders to prepare all explosives in order to blow up all our arms and ammunition. Our wounded were loaded on trucks and all those who were able to fire a weapon were given a machine gun. We were to leave as soon as it started to get dark.

Captain Cyr's company was being outflanked. This was due to the fact that he advanced too fast in relation to the other units that had been in the counterattack. It was therefore necessary for him to fight his way back to the SAS radio station which the Germans were about to capture.

The commanding officer gave the leaders, and only the leaders, a pre-arranged rendezvous for the next day. This order was given only to the leaders so as to prevent a large gathering of men at one point. This rendezvous was at Chateau de Callac, only 15 miles from our former headquarters between Tredion and Serent.

Before dark the commanding officer had given orders that all were to split up into groups and break through fighting guerilla action until they received further orders. There was a considerable amount of confusion just before dark because the strongest attack was in progress. It was at this point that Jedburgh team George located one another and decided to attempt a break through on their own. Amidst this confusion six British airmen, who had been shot down and had come to our Maquis, having lost contact with their

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British officer, were quite at a loss as to what to do. Jedburgh team George decided to take these airmen with them.

Escape

We left just as it was getting dark. When we reached the German lines, we found a commanding officer making a break-through with his company at a weak spot. We joined his outfit and got through without too much difficulty, most of our trouble coming from snipers. However, we continued alone as Jerries were attempting to follow this unit that had broken through and we did not want to become victims of an ambush which we expected might be laid for them. We later learned that they were ambushed and had to break up into small groups in order to break through.

Our biggest worry was the British airmen who were completely bewildered, and not being trained in infantry tactics, made a good deal of noise. It was necessary at times to take them by the hand and literally lead them.

Incidentally, we must add here with emphasis that the training which we received at Milton Hall was superior and saved our lives on several occasions.

We had traveled about two miles without making contacts with Jerries except for a few patrols. Patrols were numerous and fire could be heard in all directions due to the fact that small groups were breaking through everywhere. Quite often we came into contact with groups who had broken through their encirclement.

After walking some distance we decided to sit down and rest. We had no more than sat down when a column of Jerries started marching up the road, which was 20 yards away from us. This column took about 20 minutes to march past us. Captain Cyr and Captain Erard decided to crawl closer to the

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road in order to identify this German unit; we crawled to within 5 yards of the road but it was impossible to identify the unit. They wore parachute smocks and carried small arms. The grass was about 10 feet high where we were, so we lay there. We came to the conclusion that this unit was an infantry parachute regiment going up to the lines. We lay still for about ten minutes after they had passed before reconnoitering the road. Being a very dark night we were not able to see very far. We decided to continue. The hob-nailed shoes of the pilots did not help matters as far as being silent. We traveled about 10 miles without running into trouble. Then all of a sudden night turned into day and we were nearly thrown to the ground by a most violent explosion. It was our arms depot that was being blown up.

A Jerry patrol must have ambushed a party of patriots because a small battle took place 500 yards in front of us. We lay still and after 10 minutes a Jerry patrol passed in front of us at a distance of about 5 yards. We decided not to attack them because it would only give our position away.

Our progress was very slow because we were carrying full packs plus radios. About two hours before dawn we decided to catch some sleep. Finding no suitable cover in which to hide, we entered a wheat field. We all entered in different directions so as not to leave one definite trail. We slept in a circle approximately 10 yards from one another. About two hours before dawn we were awakened by white Russian cossacks who were patrolling the area on horses. At dawn we discovered we were 600 yards from a small German radio station. Needless to say, we immediately left the area finding cover in some thick bushes.

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
Captain Cyr and Captain Erard left the rest of the party to reconnoiter the route northwest. After a while we met some patriots who knew the area. We used these men as advance scouts. We continued to a pre-arranged RV. From this point on we decided to avoid all contact with patrols as we were nearing the RV and we did not want to give our position away. At 10:00 in the morning we arrived at our assembly point and found everyone there (that is to say all the leaders). It was raining hard and we had no food or cover for the wounded. The girls who had been working at the first aid post were still with the wounded, trying to give them what help they could. After holding a council of war, the commanding officer decided to move his SAS outfit to another place. It was agreed that Jedburgh team George, in company with Hauteur and Fonction, should go to ground Alarm in the Loire Inferieure. At this point Jedburgh George, Fonction and Hauteur were working as one team.

On Our Way to Loire Inferieure

During this time we were staying at a castle. After the departure of Commandant Bourgoin and SAS, we decided to get something to eat. Soon after dark two parachutists arrived at the castle reporting that the Germans knew of our presence and were closing in on us.

It seems almost unbelievable but an old lady of about 45 to 50, who was the "dame de compagnie" of the comtesse of the chateau, led us out of the grounds through the woods to a river. There she told us to swim the river and travel north where she said she would later meet us. At 4:00 in the morning we heard her whistle which was a pre-arranged signal. It was here that we learned that the Germans had

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captured Tainchebraye, alias Trouvere, the BOA chief, and his staff; and "Mary", one of our liaison agents from Paris. That night we slept in an old mill where two wounded patriots had taken refuge. In order to reach this mill, it was necessary to recross the river. The old lady did this without hesitating. The courage of this woman was really splendid. Incidentally, this woman's husband was shot in front of her only a few days later.

In the morning we found a guide who volunteered to take us southeast towards our destination at Loire Inferieure. At this point we were about 25 miles from our former headquarters. The area was full of white Russians and Gestapo who were shooting the civilian population at random, using the excuse that they had been part of our Maquis. We had a good many close shaves that day. Again we were avoiding the enemy instead of giving them battle. At 7:00 in the afternoon, having changed guides in the Bois de Bily, we reached our destination which was an isolated farm house in the Bois de Kerfily two miles northwest of Elven. Here all the roads were being patrolled day and night. We decided to call a halt and let the steam cool off.

We learned that there were wounded parachutists in the area, so we brought them to the farm house where they were cared for. As soon as we could arrange it, we sent for a doctor whom we knew to be safe. After nearly being caught at this farm house, we decided to move out into the woods and get food from the farmer who agreed to bring it to us after dark. We literally lived in a hole that some charcoal maker had used as his oven. All this time we were keeping contact with liaison girls. It was through these

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
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liaison agents that we received confirmation of the capture of Tainchebraye who was chief of the BOA. When captured he had in his possession a Eureka, an S-phone and the exact coordinates of all RAF grounds known to London in the whole of Brittany. He was captured by the Gestapo; as far as we know he is still alive but being tortured for the information which he possessed. The work which he did in France was beyond all praise.

We also received confirmation of Mary's capture. She was a liaison agent who had been working with Hauteur in Paris. She had accepted some of the toughest missions and had until now always accomplished them.

On the afternoon of 24 June two messengers arrived from the doctor who had been taking care of the wounded reporting that the Gestapo knew our position and were waiting for a larger number to accumulate before they attacked. The name of this farm was Kerlauvaux and the name of the farmer Kerherve. For obvious reasons we left that night using the farmer as guide. Incidentally, the farmer was tortured to death by having his head pulled off, his wife and children were then bayoneted. Mercifully the doctor was spared this death but was shot five days after our departure.

From here we continued our journey, sleeping during the day and traveling at night. Leaving the farm at Kerlauvaux we proceeded to St. Christophe east of Elven. At this time we were not contacting London because we could send messages only on the emergency frequency and radio location cars were always listening in for this frequency to come up, with the result that we always had undesirable company in the area. We had close shaves as we passed German sentry posts, but it would take too long to give details about all this.

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For instance one night when we were not sure of our position, our guide awoke the occupants of a house in the town to ask for directions. An embarrassing situation presented itself when a German officer answered the door, because curfew was at 10:00 and it was now 3:00 in the morning. Small incidents such as these always kept our humor and morale at a high point. The Germans, being afraid of the dark, gave us a big advantage.

At this point our progress was slow as we were only able to travel about 5 hours at night due to the short evenings. We reached Questembert on the morning of the 26th. Hauteur changed into civilian clothes and went into the town. It was a lucky day for us because by some miracle he met one of our liaison agents, Jean Pierre Dautel, who had lost contact with us after the battle of Dingson. We decided that we would lay on an operation by truck as we had approximately another 75 miles before reaching our destination. This was not easy because bicycles, cars and trucks were forbidden to be on the road without having a special German permit. Incidentally, every time we met patriots we gave them instructions to pull out the spikes of German lorries, cut railway lines and carry out as much sabotage as they could. These operations were to be repeated immediately after the Germans had repaired the lines.

IN LOIRE INFÉRIEURE TILL OVERRUNVoyage to Saffre

It took us 36 hours to get a truck and make the necessary arrangements for our trip through Redon to the Maquis of Saffre. The truck was a covered pickup. Five of us rode in the back sitting in various positions so as to cover every direction of fire with machine guns. The smell was

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not exactly sweet as we had for company two pigs which were used as decoys. A small portion of a flap was lifted displaying the pigs to any curious Germans who might want to investigate the contents of the truck. In case of serious trouble we were going to shoot our way through. As it was we were stopped twice and our papers checked. It may be said that the pigs did a good job. The result was excellent and we arrived at Saffre at 1400 hours on the 27th.


The route we took was from Rochefort-en-Terre to La Gacilly. From Gacilly we proceeded through Redon by way of Bains and Avessac. From Avessac we went to Guememe. From Guemene we proceeded to Nozay, and from there to the Maquis of Saffre.

In Maquis of Saffre

At the first outpost we were halted by guards with .22 rifles and shot guns. Our arrival in the Maquis camp was received with hysterical enthusiasm. For four long years they had been waiting for someone to bring them arms and at last the day had come. They were completely overcome with joy. The members of this camp numbered about 200 - 25 were armed with shot guns, etc. Earlier on we had sent them FMs and several sten guns. This was all they had in the way of weapons for defense.

But we discovered that Hauteur's orders had not been followed and that there were many more men than there should have been. As sanction, Hauteur dismissed Yaco from his command and put Commandant Philippe in charge of the camp. After this we inspected the defensive positions, fields of fire, approaches to the headquarters, and so forth. Finding the defenses unsuitable we made a complete change. This

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happened to be an excellent move because, though at the time we did not know it, the Germans knew the exact position and location of each weapon in the defensive plan. Only the leader whom we had appointed knew of this change in the defense. Eventually we returned to the rest of the party, among whom we later discovered was a Gestapo agent.


It was at this point that we met Tracteur, who had been sent by London approximately 10 months before as an instructor to the Maquis resistance.

That night at supper one of our hosts was this Gestapo agent and when orders were given for all men without arms to disperse in the morning, he must have taken this into consideration. Two men left the camp that night, one being the Gestapo agent and the other a patriot who was bringing us supplies. After thinking over the situation, we decided that a quick parachuting was necessary, so we immediately sent a message to London asking same. Late in the evening, a messenger from Kinley, named Robert, came and announced to us that Kinley should be in the camp next morning. We gave him instructions and, after discussing and making plans for the next day, we went to sleep in the middle of a field of haystacks so that we could not be taken by surprise.

Attack on Saffre

At 6:00 in the morning on the 28th we were awakened by Yaco who was in a high state of excitement. He told us that our outposts had reported German trucks coming in from all directions and that we were completely surrounded with all escape routes cut off. At this time our radio operator, Lejeune, was at his radio 300 yards away receiving messages from London. Immediately we sent him orders to pack up, but to save the radio at all costs and to do his best to receive

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
the broadcast. Lejeune remained at his post until the end of the broadcast, while the Jerries could be heard only 100 to 200 yards away. We helped him to pack up.

It is difficult to give in detail just what happened during the next few moments, but Jerries started attacking from all points of the compass. It all happened so suddenly that we only had time to save the radio and a few arms. There was considerable confusion as the untrained men did not know what to do. Jedburgh team George, Fonction and Hauteur took charge of the situation, attempting to control and organize the men. On this occasion Hauteur and Fonction's attitude were beyond all praise. They improvised an emergency plan of defense, giving precise orders while the bullets were whistling around them. As Jerry machine-gun fire started to register on our headquarters and men were being hit, the confusion was terrific.

Above all the noise we managed to get the men organized into three separate groups and divided the small arms among these three groups. We sent them out under leaders to make a break-through where they could.

At this Maquis we had found three American and two British pilots who were at this time with us. The group we led numbered from about 40 to 50 people. As we left the farm an FM gunner was killed. Captain Cyr took the gun and carried it to another position, where soon German trucks pulled up to within 15 yards. Before the Germans could get out, we emptied three remaining magazines into their Jerry trucks, this being the last of our ammunition. We continued our advance and ran into one of our men from our outpost, who informed us that we were heading directly into the advancing Jerries. At this time we had with us a farmer, his

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wife and child, and about 40 to 50 patriots. We told the man whom we had encountered to fire what ammunition he had at the Jerries who were coming in.

Escape

Meanwhile the farmer's wife could not keep up with us, so we found a thick clump of bushes and we stuck her in there. Then not knowing what was ahead of us we kept going west. At this time George was carrying radio, plus sleeping bag and what equipment they had been able to grab. Everything was going fine until our group ran point blank into a machine gun, which opened fire hitting three to four persons after changing direction. We stopped for approximately two minutes to hold a council of war. We (pilots and Jeds) gave each other our addresses so that those who survived could tell the story. After this we decided it would be best for the British and American pilots not to follow us but to go by themselves in groups of two or three because we were going to attempt to find a way through. We had such a large group that we were bound to get into trouble, while small groups of two or three might get through.

We started from there heading east. We had gone about 25 yards when machine gun opened fire on the British and American pilots. We believe that one of them was wounded. From all sides we heard Germans yelling to one another. We stopped to throw a grenade in the direction of the machine gun. Meanwhile the group which we were with was well ahead of us. Captain Erard, seeing that we were surrounded and having brought back from Tunisia some experience about the question, decided that we should hide in some bushes. At this time Jedburgh team George was with Hauteur. Nobody

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knew what had happened to Fonction. Our agent Jean Pierre was also missing. As stated, team George with Hauteur took cover in some thick bushes approximately 4½ to 5 feet high. The Germans, knowing that we were there, threw grenades wildly in the bushes. They brought with them dogs which we could hear on our trail, but they never found us chiefly because so many people had been running right and left. The main reason they had attacked the Maquis at Saffre was to capture Jed team George, Hauteur and Fonction whom they knew were arming the Maquis.

Up to this time the Germans had not attacked the Maquis at Saffre because they had carried out no action against the Germans. We stayed in the bushes for 17 hours without moving or changing position. All this time fire and grenades were being thrown into the surrounding hedges. The Germans found a lot of sport in throwing these grenades into bushes where 200 unarmed men were hiding. We decided what action we would take if a grenade got our bush and we came to the conclusion that it would be useless to get out into the open and expose ourselves although we were in uniform. Until it was necessary we did not want to give away our position. We decided to stay in the bushes until we were found and then we would fight it out. The situation got very tense. Most of us said a small prayer - we then all started laughing. The time we spent in these bushes seemed like years. Germans sent their men climbing up trees to locate the men who were hiding in the bushes.

We decided that an attempt must be made to get out that night. We waited until 11:30. Then we located two pilots who were about 25 yards away from us and told them that we

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were going to attempt to get out and go in an easterly direction. We also told them that if they heard no firing, they were to follow us in an hour's time. But if they heard firing, they were to stay in the bushes for another 24 hours and get out the next night. We gave them 8,000 francs and said adieu. With our arms, radio, and equipment on our backs we struck off at a slow pace. Eventually we came to a sentry who was patrolling a road which led into some fields and woods. We got past him all right and reached a farm house. Although we were very quiet, dogs started barking. We could see no Germans about, but someone took a couple of shots in our direction. These shots were followed by some more from someone else. This was about half an hour after dark. We crossed some fields and got into some woods. We came to a main road where we found a sentry pacing up and down. On his return beat one by one we managed to slip by him. Training we had received at Milton Hall came in useful here.

We had not gone another 500 yards when we heard about 10 men jump through a hedge - Germans we thought charging towards us. We held a council of war for about two seconds and decided to do no more running. We would make a last stand. We had a few grenades left, so we pulled the pins of the grenades and waited on the other side of the hedge. The Germans did not know our exact position. We were just about to throw a grenade when we heard French voices. They were Frenchmen and not Germans. Nevertheless we were afraid that they in their turn might mistake us for Germans and shoot at us so we started whispering to them in French. To our amazement we discovered that it was Fonction, Jean-Pierre and

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Yaco with a few patriots.

We proceeded for about a mile and then sat in the middle of a wheat field and held another council of war. We decided that Yaco and his men should go to a safe place. We were to stay together not telling Yaco where we were going but giving him instructions that we would contact him later. George, Hauteur and Fonction, with liaison agent, Jean Pierre, then traveled north for two miles, proceeded northwest and then due west. These directions took us away from the net around the camp. Until morning overtook us we hid in some woods one mile north of Puceul.

On Our Way to Ancenis on River Loire

At this time we had only our radio, one battery, a few weapons and our clothes. We stayed in the area for two days in order to let the heat cool off. We then proceeded to Ancenis (on the river Loire), having sent before us Jean-Pierre on a bicycle he had "found".

We started along the road from Puceul to a farm two kilometers northwest of Nort. We had to go very carefully as the area was boiling with Milice. Next day we started at night outskirting Nort by the north. On the way we had another alert. We do not know whether we had been followed or whether we had run into a trap. From three different directions, at a few yards from us, three German flares went off. In German tactics this means that an attack is about to take place. We took off through fields and reached Les Touches, 5 kilos east of Nort, where we stayed all day. That same day a raid was made by the Milice in the town of Les Touches in order to arrest all the refugees who had escaped from Saffre. They did not find us.

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On the next day we went from Les Touches to a small wood and close to La Pichaudiere, located between Couffe and Ancenis. As we were in a hurry we had to cross the villages of Ligne and Couffe, instead of outskirting them. During all that journey the only thing we had to eat was bread and butter and green apples. We had terrific stomach aches and felt very tired.

In Ancenis

At this stage Hauteur and Fonction changed into civvies and went to Ancenis to contact Jean Pierre at Le Petit Moulin. They came back a few hours later with food which we all needed badly. The situation was not too good. Jean Pierre had a safe place for us, but only for a few days. Hauteur and Fonction had brought back civilian clothes for Captain Erard, who went to Ancenis to meet some people. Then on a bicycle he went with Jean-Pierre to our safe place which was a castle. This castle belonged to Comte and Comtesse de Landemont who were wonderful patriots and very helpful. The castle was packed up with evacuated children from Nantes, together with a lot of servants, nuns and priests. Jerries would often come to the castle to try and convince the Comte that he would have to give up his castle.

The following night team George, Hauteur, Fonction and Jean Pierre proceeded to the castle where they met at the entrance the Comte who was waiting for them. We were still in uniforms and had to crawl inside without being seen or heard. The Comte led us into a library where he had prepared beds and every convenience. It was the first time since our arrival in France that we were sleeping in beds. Of course, there was no question of opening a window or sneezing. We

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stayed three days in this castle.

GENERAL SITUATION

On 4 July, at night, a meeting took place in "The Petit Moulin", the house of Jean Pierre Dautel's parents. This meeting included Hauteur, Fonction, Herve (or Radeau), Pierre, Jean Pierre and Captain Erard.

Once again Hauteur and Fonction asked Erard to accept the position of Delege Militaire for the Loire Inferieure. Captain Erard objected pointing out that by doing so he was enlarging the task of the Jedburghs to a dangerous extent, perhaps also creating a precedent, and in any case causing confusion. Hauteur and Fonction replied that in the present circumstances the only thing to take into consideration were the brutal facts. There was no one else in the Loire Inferieure who could undertake this job. Erard then agreed to become Delege Militaire.

Next morning before leaving, Hauteur gave Erard an address in Ancenis where he could get in touch with the resistance in Loire Inferieure. Hauteur had spent time and sweat to find this address for a new and deadly wave of arrestations had destroyed the whole system of liaison sending everybody underground into safe hiding places. We, being new to this area, had great difficulties in getting in touch with anybody. We were regarded by all as rather suspicious.

At this time, we were hiding in a scrubby little hole near the castle belonging to the Comte de Landemont. We had been forced to leave the castle owing to the fact that the Germans had informed the castle by telephone that they were coming to inspect the house with a view to occupying it.

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Hauteur, Fonction and Herve left us on the 5th and proceeded to the north in order to reorganize themselves in their department, while we started reorganizing the Loire Inferieure. The first thing for us to do was to get in contact with the resistance chain. The situation in the Loire Inferieure was now worse than ever. It is as well here to say a few words about it.

The Loire Inferieure had long been without a departmental chief or DMR. Due to a terrific amount of carelessness and to a strong infiltration of Gestapo agents among the resistance groups, Loire Inferieure had for some months been submitted to a regime of terror.

Every time a new central organization was set up a hammering blow smashed it sending more leaders to join their comrades in the prisons and torture rooms of Nantes. Loire Inferieure was marked by the resistance with a black cross. A general fear was dominating the department. Enemy agents inside the organization had such strong positions and credit that it was impossible to find them in spite of very active work done on their account. The result was that everyone suspected his neighbor. Every new leader we contacted later told us that leaders which we had seen only a few moments before were traitors, these "traitors" having told us the same thing about the leader we were actually speaking to. It was difficult to trust or distrust one fellow more than another.

To add to all this everybody seemed to ignore even the most elementary rules of prudence. The leaders would meet in cafes or on the market square. From miles away one would smell the conspiracy that was going on. The liaison agents

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carried long lists of patriots, plans of every kind, in fact enough written matter for the whole town to be arrested.

The political situation was a nightmare. However, with some difficulty we succeeded to distinguish four categories:

- a. The political groups interested in resistance.
- b. The resistance groups interested in politics (which was quite a different thing.)
- c. The political groups pretending to be interested in the resistance but only really interested in politics.
- d. The resistance groups not interested in politics, (these being the angels.)

Each category included a good many independent groups, each one naturally suspecting the other. The leaders issued daily orders "to kill the traitors", in other words the other leaders. (This can be confirmed by the Delege Militaire Regionaux, Hauteur and Fonction and by the new Departmental Chief, Colonel Felix (Vaudel)).

The various leaders, knowing that there was no departmental chief, had each hoped to be chosen by London or Paris. Among all this jealousy it was difficult to get to the truth. At a later stage we will go through the different categories or groups. It may be mentioned now, however, that the first category (political groups interested in resistance) included the FN (Front National). The FN was mainly communistic but its organization included socialists and also those with no particular opinion. The leader was unknown to us. In fact, it was difficult to get any clear information about them. They had no wish to join the FFI or to admit being under any control. However, we have good reasons for thinking that their leader was Sandra, at that moment chief of the police in Nantes, under German control. Later it will be seen how

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Sandra arrested Michaud (or Daries) representative of Liberation and acting as departmental chief, a position that Sandra had hoped for himself.

In the second category (resistance groups interested in politics) we included "ceux de Liberation et Vengeance" and probably "Resistance" though they would not admit it. But their aversion for the FTP (Francs-tireurs et Partisans) was so big that their anti-communist attitude brought them on the political stage.

The third category included many small groups, continually changing names and very much under the influence of the main political groups. These groups were for instance the VDR, "Ceux du Maquis", and so on.

The fourth category included the ORA (Organization de la Resistance dans l'Armee) with Beigne as Chief. There were also the real Maquis such as Saffre, Teille, Riaille, Savenay, etc. In this category we have to include an organization very different to the Maquis, that is to say the military organization of the department started by the Chief Subdivisionnaire, Kinley, according to FFI rules. This organization numbered officially five battalions. These battalions were located on the map around certain towns, but in actual fact their membership covered a much wider area, so much so that a man sometimes did not know to which battalion he was attached. Each battalion chief pretending to control the area in which he stayed. Besides the men were tired of being called "patriots" having nothing to do but wait for arms which never arrived. Orders were also absent. When we controlled these units, we found that in areas where one battalion was announced we could gather enough men to form a platoon.

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The chiefs of these battalions were very good men, honest, sincere, though at times a bit young and not very conversant with military affairs. Most of them were wearing pips more numerous than their capabilities. This was a result of the massive arrests which had terribly reduced the men's possibilities.

Unfortunately, these battalions were constantly interfering with the "Maquis", the political groups and the resistance organizations which had not joined the FFI, all of them trying to pull the same man under their "enseigne."

Amid all this nobody knew whose orders to obey. The only people who knew what to do were the Gestapo, who were really running the show.

However, there were large possibilities because apart from the leaders and local Napoleons, there were the men - brave, even foolish - still hoping, willing to obey and to fight in spite of all the dangers.

The real things the Loire Inferieure needed to become a large resistance area were: leadership, unity, confidence, deeds, and by deeds we mean arms and money. Because of these men, and because of the role that we felt the Loire Inferieure could play in accordance with headquarter's plans, we decided to stay and take command of the department.

Now, we feel proud of the fact that when we were ordered to leave Loire Inferieure on 23 August 2,500 men, fully armed, dressed in uniform, equipped and organized, had been holding alone for three weeks the river Loire from St. Etienne (west of Nantes) to Montrelais (east of Varades) forbidding passage to the Jerries by constant fighting and watching. Thus they were protecting the right flank of the Third Army

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from St. Etienne to Redon by keeping constant contact and fighting with two German divisions massed and armed at St. Nazaire; 2,000 others were being instructed and trained. Our G-2 was transmitting every day to the Allied headquarters an enormous amount of true information, everywhere order was being re-established, hundreds of prisoners were constantly surrendering to our patrols and there was true unity under authority.

OUR PLAN

On 6 July, the following was our plan:

1. Contact the main organizations and groups.
2. Induce leaders to meet each other and get them to agree on a few vital points:
 - a. Necessity to throw out the Boche.
 - b. Necessity to do this together.
 - c. Necessity of some control in order to give everyone the arms they needed.
 - d. Necessity to obey one order and to execute one command.
3. Set up a new staff on a strictly military basis, incorporating none of our political views.
4. Create headquarters with G-1, G-2, G-3 and G-4.
5. Organize the department into real battalions located in precise areas and under precise leadership.
6. Find in the area of each battalion one or two suitable dropping grounds so that each battalion would receive its own arms; the chief of the battalion being the only one informed of the operation and be informed one day before the dropping in order to prepare a quick evacuation of the ground.
7. Create a mobile reception committee of 6 very reliable men who would move from the dropping ground of the first battalion to the dropping ground of the 2nd

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battalion and so on. These men would be in charge of all the reception committees. The battalion chief being only responsible for the evacuation of the ground, distribution of arms and equipment among his men.

8. Create a mobile group of instructors who would also go from one battalion to another giving the men instructions on the arms they received.

9. Designate to each battalion the targets in their area which would have to be ready for general sabotage.

10. Establish with the chiefs of battalions a series of plans numbered 1, 2, 3, etc., each plan foreseeing the movements and mutual help of every battalion, and corresponding to instructions from London numbered by United States General Instructions 1, 2, 3, etc.

11. Establish an emergency plan of immediate action to carry out sabotage and harassing attacks on targets and areas chosen by us and proposed to London. This work was not to interfere with the smooth running of the organization nor was it to call upon such battalions or men as we wanted to keep intact.

This plan brought out new points:

First, we did not want to hear any more about "The Maquis Mobilisateur" formula which had proved deadly in strongly enemy-held areas and where imprudences were so numerous. Besides, Loire Inferieure was a populated area with little cover and very unfavorable for defensive purposes.

Second, in forming a new unit the members would be chosen with the greatest of care. The chief of that unit being responsible for any incautiousness which might occur. Any man who was not introduced by two well-known and reliable patriots would be rejected.

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Third, we would assist each chief of battalion when the moment arrived for him to organize his men, receive and distribute his arms.

Fourth, we would systematically refuse to give any arms or money to any isolated group refusing to come under our control. We would only arm and pay regular battalions acting under controlled leadership with discipline and order.

In order to restore order, safety and confidence, we decided we would get rid of "Napoleons" and "elements douteux", even executing them if necessary. We were willing to work with any group of any political opinion provided they understood that this was a time for military action under military leadership. Military orders issued by the Allied High Command were the only ones to obey.

This was our general plan. We also had numerous other details to see to, such as finding two or three safe places. In order that we might move about quickly, bicycles were to be obtained, also civilian clothes as our work required our constant presence everywhere. False identity papers were essential. We intended also to create a radio chain by placing the three sets in three different places, thus giving us a chance to transmit without being located too quickly and enabling us to move about without carrying our sets, codes and plans.

LA ROCHE BLANCHE

Jean Pierre Dautel found us a sort of safe house in a little village 12 kilometers north of Ancenis, La Roche Blanche. It was a small, two-roomed house, unoccupied but furnished and located at cross roads called St. Michel du Bois. The house belonged to a lady who would make only

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occasional visits with some friends. She did not know who we were. We lived there for about 8 days.

There were only a few farm houses at that crossroads and the folks did not pay much attention to us. Fortunately they asked very few questions. We had our meals in the village at the Hotel Martin. The village was very friendly but, owing to the presence at the Hotel Martin of one active collaborator, a great friend of Jean Paquis of radio Paris, we had to be rather careful.

Jean Pierre and his friends had provided us with a little clothing, but we had only our jumping boots and also khaki shirts. The appearance of our team was rather queer and we all looked similar. We had no civilian papers yet, but luckily the police never asked for them. From Nantes we got somebody later to take our photos and have false papers made.

We were unable to use our radio set while at Roche Blanche as our last battery had run out. We sent out agents in all directions to try and find us a midget battery from some BOA agent but all in vain. At last we managed to get from Nantes quite a few torch batteries and by putting them together in series we obtained enough current to transmit on the emergency for about one hour but without any result.

Our next job was to get in contact with what remained of the organization in Loire Inferieure. As we had no means of communication, except our own feet and our one liaison agent, Jean Pierre, our task was not easy. We may add here that the last three weeks of fighting had been extremely exhausting. It was constantly raining and the little food we did obtain was very poor. These few days in Roche Blanche

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helped us to recover and to get a clear picture of the political and geographical characteristics of the department.

We had during this time a series of alerts. The most important one being when a train of political prisoners was machine gunned by American planes near Ancenis. Most of the prisoners escaped taking cover in our area. This caused the village to be overrun by a wave of feldgendarmes, miliciens, Gestapo and German troops. While the police and milice were searching through the public places and houses, Captain Cyr and Lejeune hid in a small room of the Hotel Martin. On another occasion some excitement was caused by some countrymen discovering, entirely by accident, our radio and equipment which we had hidden in a ruined chapel. As we were packing up to move to another area, a Gestapo car drove up to the crossroads stopping outside the door of our house. We could do nothing but stand one on each side of the only door, our fingers on the trigger, invoking Saint Michel-du-Bois and all his friends in heaven. But that day too we were lucky, though we had to depart that night.

Not knowing of another safe house, we moved to about one mile from Roche Blanche and hid in the corner of a wheat field which was surrounded by a hedge. We were discovered next morning by a farmer. This was somewhat natural as all the landscape in this part of the Loire Inferieure consisted of small fields divided by low hedges. It was for this reason that we always preferred to live like ordinary citizens instead of crawling about through wheat fields. To add to our troubles, it started raining so, thoroughly fed up, we returned to the village taking cover in the ruined chapel of St. Michel, locking the doors from inside. Meanwhile Jean

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Pierre had been alerted and he introduced us to one of his friends, Jacques Peltier, who found for us the next day an abandoned house on the River Loire near La Meilleraye of Varades.

Peltier came to get us with two bicycles, a tandem and two trailers. We put on our civilian clothes, packed up all our requirements in the trailers and proceeded by road. On the way one bicycle and trailer broke down owing to being too heavily loaded. It was decided that Cyr, Lejeune and Peltier would carry on while Erard rejoined them in the morning. Erard was forced to spend the night in the open having been refused shelter in a barn by two farmers who had been very suspicious and had asked him for his papers, which, naturally, he could not produce.

The following day we all met at that ruined house which we rented until December 1944 for 500 francs.

ON THE RIVER LOIRE, EAST OF VARADES

We stayed here for about two weeks and carried out our plan of reorganization with growing success.

At last, on 12 July, we got in touch with an important person, Michaud (or Daries). With the help of an agent called Chaussade we managed to arrange a meeting between Captain Erard and Michaud (or Daries) who was Delegee for Liberation. He had also, from time to time, acted as departmental chief, as well as being chief of the Guard of Communications Corps in Ancenis. With the help of friends he had recently escaped from prison and was hiding south of the Loire from the Gestapo, who had organized an active search for him. The meeting took place in a cafe of La Croix Baron, 8 kilos south of Varados on the other side of the Loire.

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Erard explained the situation and decided that Daries would work as second in command to Kinley, that is to say when Kinley was found. Meanwhile, he was to have a general inspection of the department, reporting on the precise numbers and names of leaders whom we could trust, locate the exact area of all organized units or groups and report on the state of armament and morale of the men. His first lieutenant, Chassaing, was given the task of locating the first organized unit, totalling about 200 men, and a suitable dropping ground for parachuting in the immediate area of that unit.

We felt that we must give the men of the Loire Inferieure positive proof of our authoritative quality to take charge of them. We knew that a quick parachuting would stir them up, give them confidence and courage, and help us a lot in our own work.

We arranged with Daries and his lieutenants "points de contact" and a system of liaison, which included what we used to call mail boxes in Ancenis and Montrevault. Jean Pierre and Peltier were to act as liaison agents between those mail boxes and our house. We arranged this in order that no one should know exactly where we were staying. But it was difficult for anything to remain secret in the Loire Inferieure. We realized this even better next morning when we discovered that many people in La Meilleraie already knew that we had rented the Pavilion, which was the name of our house.

On 13 August, as a result of previous contacts and various meetings with our agents, an official liaison agent attached to Kinley came to our house. He was guided to our house by Grillette, whom we had met a few days before in

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Varades. Grillette was introduced to us by Peltier as an active patriot, and as a traitor and dangerous collaborator by three other agents. However, in order to get something done we had to take risks.

The name of this liaison agent was Robert. We had actually met him before at the Maquis of Saffre, the evening before the attack when he had delivered us a message from Kinley. Robert told us that although he was in contact with Kinley, he did not actually know where he was living. He had been badly wounded just before the attack on Saffre and had large marks on his face. He was being chased from one place to another by the Gestapo with the result that only a man called Xavier Dic knew where he was hiding.

We made arrangements through Robert and another agent, Joubert, to contact Dic. Erard, on Jean Pierre's bicycle proceeded to the RV, which was located between Mauves and La Varenne about 25 miles from Varades. Dic had meanwhile been contacted by an agent called Collet and had managed to arrive at the RV in time. Dic impressed Erard very much. He seemed a most capable and energetic man. (Unfortunately he was arrested a few days later in Nantes and savagely tortured).

Dic led Erard to a castle situated between Mauves and Nantes where Kinley was hiding. Kinley, Dic and Erard held a conference which lasted three hours. Kinley had previously been chief subdivisionnaire in charge of the Loire Inferieure, Maine et Loire and Vendee. Hauteur and Fonction had asked him at Saffre to take mainly into consideration the Loire Inferieure, but since then the situation had changed. Kinley had become far too well known in the department, and was, there-

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fore, unable to deal with all the questions concerning the department. Erard asked him to do what he could to maintain contacts with the FFI battalions, to get as clear a picture as possible of the general situation, and to renew the contacts with the departments of Maine et Loire and Vendee. Meanwhile Daries was to work in the Loire Inferieure as his representative. He had an excellent knowledge of the department and had already proved himself trustworthy and courageous.

Erard and Kinley had a long argument over these arrangements. This was due to the fact that Kinley hated Daries like poison. They had quarrelled over some money, questions in which Daries had probably not been very scrupulous and on previous occasions he had also failed to obey Kinley's orders. During these arrangements Xavier Dic was a great help, pouring water on the fire as it were.

Hauteur had given Kinley 400,000 francs at Saffre, but this money had been quickly spent helping the units and the Maquis. He had asked us for more money but we had been unable to supply him with any as we had not yet received further francs. Erard and Kinley parted as the best friends in the world.

The next day, 14 August, we met Etienne, previously a school master at Belligne. He was now working as an information agent for the IS. We made arrangements with him and asked him particularly to find us soon a new safe house and to keep us informed of any information which would be useful to London.

During the same day, Erard again met Daries and straightened out his relations with Kinley. Daries had already done some very good work. Through his liaison agents he was ready

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to give us the exact number of patriots who would be quickly available. His first report gave 4,000 men, all unarmed, but organized in small groups. They included men of the main political and resistant organizations. They were badly in need of good leadership. Unfortunately they all ignored one another, had no contacts, and were scattered in unlocated areas. He also gave us a dropping ground for an organized unit south of Loire. He claimed this ground to be perfect, situated between Le Leroux, Bottereau and Barbechat. He described it as being in perfect accordance with the conditions required for a parachuting ground "arma". (Conditions given him in detail by Erard.)

On the following day, 15 August, one of the agents we had sent to get us a battery returned bringing us one from Morbihan. We immediately contacted London giving them the coordinates of the dropping ground and announcing that the reception committee would take place on 18, 19 and 20 August. We sent only a short message as the weather was bad and we were not sure that we would be correctly heard. Radio location posts did not allow us to send long messages and we thought that a correct identity check number would be better than a long explanation. Hauteur and Fonction were also going to contact London for us on their own radio link. At the time we did not know that this had been unsuccessful.

Conditions in the Loire Inferieure forced us to give three precise dates for parachuting. We did not have enough time between 9:30 p.m. (time for receiving definite BBC messages) and 11:30 p.m. to gather the men and get them in position on the field. Consequently, they were in the immediate surroundings of the ground which attracted unnecessary

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attention in such a populated area. In addition, the men would talk to everybody and, for a few hours, security just went to the wind. After our reception the ground we had used had to be considered as burned. This reception was for the first company belonging to Commandant Cottin (real name Cochet) in charge of a battalion in Ancenis.

On the 17th we had arranged a meeting with Cottin and Erard. Erard was unable to go owing to an urgent call from Kinley. Other meetings had also been arranged with Etienne, Grillette and Peltier. Lejeune went to see Cottin while Erard was in Mauves. Cottin had lost contact with Kinley and as a result did not know of our arrival. He refused to select a group of men for our reception committee which was to take place the next day. He was altogether very suspicious and wanted more details about the operation. Lejeune had strict instructions not to disclose this information. He arranged another meeting with Cottin at a later date.

On the afternoon of 18 August, Erard, accompanied by Chassaing and Chaussado, went to the dropping ground. On Erard's orders, Daries had selected six of the best men available to arrange the reception. They were already at Descarvert's house, a mile from the ground, when we arrived. Erard was very pleased with these men. They were students, intelligent and active, obeying all orders and keeping their mouths shut. Unfortunately, they were not able to act as mobile reception committees for very long as they were chased and arrested by the Gestapo, one of them being a double agent.

An hour and a half after Erard had left the house,

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three Gestapo agents and a few miliciens sent by Dr. Kalvert, Gestapo chief for Nantes, encircled the house but everybody had already left and Descarvert, who was in the village, was warned.

Erard, having been out all the afternoon, did not know whether the BBC message had been received by London. There was no wireless of any kind in the vicinity and in any case for some time there had been no electricity. However, the reception committee was laid on just in case and also to train the boys in their future job.

It is well here to mention something about the ground. It was really frightful, cut by hedges, with a great declivity and as small as a pocket handkerchief. (Later George decided to choose his own reception grounds.) We stayed on the ground until 0300 hours. The following day a liaison agent was supposed to have let us know whether our message had been heard during the day. Nobody came. We made another attempt the following night which was just as unsuccessful. By this time Erard decided that we had attracted enough attention and gave orders for a general dispersion. Before leaving Descarvert, arrangements were made with Zero, chief of our mobile RC, whereby we could contact him quickly at any time.

During the following days we were very busy. As when a stone is thrown into water, circles were enlarging all over the department. Our first contacts bringing new ones. During this week Captain Cyr and Captain Erard met practically all the leaders of the various groups and organizations. The presence of Captain Cyr had an important psychological effect on the people we saw.

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In Peltier's house in Varades we contacted Yves Lemoan, regional delegate for the CDL (Comite de Liberation), with whom we were always on excellent terms. He introduced us to Jean Marcel, Louis and the other members of the CDL. Together we worked out the unification of all the political groups. With Yves we held a general meeting of the representatives and leaders of all the outstanding political groups. It took place between Couffe and Mesanger. At a pre-arranged hour, each leader was to be at a RV, e.g. behind a hedge. This enabled us to move every half hour from one leader to another. We foresaw that as soon as we could arrange a general meeting place for all the groups there would be mutual contact between the organizations. At this time Erard met Henri Fontenet, who was leader of "Ceux de Liberation et Vengeance". For the moment he was working in cooperation with Anic, leader of Les Hussards de la Garde in Guemene Penfau, an organization which had been created with the help of Captain Alexandre. Fontenet had been condemned to death by Maurice, departmental chief of Morbihan. Fonction had forbidden him to appear among the FFI. However, we ignored Fonction's order and nobody had any proofs of what he was accused of. He asked to join the FFI and we agreed under the following conditions: he was to give us a complete report on his organization, (numbers of men, names of leaders, localities, etc.), and as he had no military capacities, he was to accept the battalion leaders which we would give him. He agreed on all points. Later we never had any reason to complain of his men or himself and he worked in a very satisfactory way.

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We saw the representatives of the socialist resistance groups and of the FTP and also other leaders of less importance. We re-established contact with former battalion leaders, such as Cottin in Ancenis, Alain in Nantes, Jean-Bari in Pont Chateau, Trouve in Clisson, also with other co-operative people, such as Guy Bourse in Nantes, who was later arrested. With Kinley, Daries and Xavier Dic we reorganized these units into regular companies and sections.

We carried out our plan, point by point, giving each battalion leader precise instructions and asking them to give dropping grounds in their areas. During this time, we covered daily 30 to 40 miles on bicycles including sometimes as many as nine meetings in one day.

The material side of our life on the Loire was sometimes a source of trouble. Food was brought to us every day by Paulette Peltier, Jacque's sister, who came by boat so as not to attract too much attention. We had to cook our own meals. This was not a great worry thanks to Lejeune, but we had constantly in and around the house a cow-watcher, who was a refugee from Nantes and terribly inquisitive. Captain Cyr, in order to disguise his accent a little, pretended to stammer, but as the cow-watcher also stammered the result was sometimes most amusing. It meant, however, that there had to be somebody continually in the house as this fellow was very suspicious and tried several times to find out what we were up to.

Our radio work was also not easy as people were constantly walking along the edge of the river. Jerries would also bathe in the river right in front of our house. Several times we

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had to interrupt our transmissions in order to hide the set under our coats and shirts.

Sometimes Paulette could not get any food for us and we had to cross the Loire and have a meal at St. Florent le Vieil. This restaurant was always full of Germans but they never bothered about us. However, one day Captain Cyr had a rather troublesome conversation with a lieutenant of the Luftwaffe. After this we decided that it would be best for Captain Cyr to pretend that he had been wounded in the mouth and from this time onwards he always wore a bandage over his mouth. Eating became very difficult for him. The local Gestapo agent of St. Florent would always have his meals at the table next to ours. It was easy to recognize him as he was more or less Chinese. He always addressed us with a beaming smile and we were never quite sure whether he meant "just wait a moment and I'll get you and all your gang", or whether he was stupid enough not to see that Captain Cyr was 150 percent American.

By now we were well established as ordinary and innocent citizens. We had, however, a series of alerts. For instance, Captain Cyr was going out to buy some food, he checked his pistol inserting a bullet into the barrel and then realized that a German sitting in a hedge some 10 yards away had supervised the operation with intense interest.

On another day we were very surprised to see Yaco, (Chief of Maquis at Saffre), coming down the road to our house. Having found our hiding place, he came to warn us that a collaborator of Ancenis named Angebault was hot on our tracks. In fact, Etienne, who was present at the time, told us that

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he had just met Angebault at La Meilleraye, half a mile away from our house.

We decided to move and establish ourselves at a camp 500 yards away. The site we chose was a ditch hidden among trees. There was no better place to choose. Hiding in such a populated area was not easy and we were determined to keep in touch with our various contacts in the vicinity. During our time here we did not send many messages. Somebody else had been using our battery and we did not know how much longer it would last. It was also extremely difficult to transmit without being seen, and to add to our difficulties there were two very powerful radio location stations working against us - one in Beaucouze (west of Angers) about 18 miles from us, and one in Beausse (south of Ingrandes) about 5 miles away. Furthermore, there were 20 radio location cars parked in the castle of Landemont. The Luftwaffe had established itself there only a few days after we had left the castle. Until now we had been unable to use our main frequency. We had continually worked on the emergency with the result that it was easy for the location cars to follow us from Malestroit in Morbihan to Varades. Each time we started transmitting after sending for one minute the Germans, who were waiting for us, started to interfere. This made Lejeune's work very hard. We also knew that we should not continually use the emergency channel as there were others in the field besides us.

One of the main items of our plan was immediate sabotage. We carried this out from the very first day, but with the small means we had at our disposal this was not easy. For

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instance, we had to make use of the French "petards de Cavalerie" and other very old demolition weapons stolen from the French barracks or from the Germans. We had received instructions to cut the lines from west to east and never from north to south. We quickly organized small mobile units of saboteurs, among which Yaco's were the most active and efficient.

Among the demolition work which was carried out either by ourselves or by our "Equipes de Sabotage" the following may be mentioned: destruction by fire of the bridge at Ancenis; the railway line from Nantes to Angers was cut in numerous places; the canal from Nantes to Brest was cut at two locks between which twenty boats loaded with German explosives were immobilized, (two of our men were killed when approaching the locks); German convoys were attacked between Ancenis and Ouden; twice the railway line from Nantes to La Rochelle was cut, twice stopping all traffic for 48 hours (we carried this out on instructions which we received through one of Fonction's messengers); attacked and destroyed a German petrol dump near Nantes; numerous roads from west to east were blocked with trees and other obstructions, etc.

At the same time, we had plenty of opportunity to admire the excellent work of the American dive-bombers on the Varades' airfield and on targets all along the Loire. They came nearly every day and were greeted by ack-ack fire but never once did a single German plane go out and attack them.

The time arrived when we could no longer stay at La Meilleraie - Le Varades. Etienne found us a safe farm near St. Sigismond, north of Ingrandes. We packed up our belongings into trailers and departed on bicycles. This was

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done with the help of Jacques Peltier.

ST. SIGISMOND

We stayed at St. Sigismond until we were overrun.

We had one constant preoccupation which was becoming a real nightmare; arms, arms, arms and money. The reorganization of the department was going very well owing to constant contacts, inspections and meetings with leaders and men, but they were all begging for weapons, ammunition and money. We foresaw the moment coming when the famous message would ring out "Le chapeau de Napoleon est toujours a Perros-Guirec." We could never understand why the planes never arrived nor why we did not even get clear replies to our messages.

We sent in succession the coordinates of five new grounds; one south of Nantes, near the forest de Prince (for the armament of our 5th and 6th battalions), Donna and Bella, (two grounds, one for our 1st battalion and the other for Yaco's Corps Francs), St. Sigismond's ground, and another one which was in the area of Riaille.

Our second attempt was made on Donna's ground situated south of St. Mars-la-Jaille. Sometime ago we had already sent London some very energetic messages and we thought that we had given them enough time to prepare for the operation. There was a full moon and the weather (much to our surprise) was perfect. We arranged to have everything ready for the two nights which we had given as our best dropping nights. We had chosen 20 safe men to be on the ground in order to make a quick picking-up (so few seems ridiculous but safety forbade us to use more). Ten men were in charge of a French machine gun to hold up any attack which might take place.

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We had also four three-ton lorries which had been driven with great difficulty from Ancenis, Varades, and Ingrandes. These were hidden around the dropping ground. Captain Cyr and Captain Erard were both present. As the torches we had were not powerful enough, we had had to dismantle car reflectors. Nothing came that night.

Early next morning we dismissed everybody. We were desolated and felt that our credit and authority could not stand much longer on mere good words and promises.

The following evening we were proceeding to the dropping ground for another attempt when a liaison agent from our security service joined us on the road and informed us that the German feldgendarmes and milice were hiding in a two mile circle around our dropping ground Donna. They were watching every road and track. Fortunately at this time our liaison and security was extremely good. All were warned of the danger and no one was caught.

Needless to say, that night patriots distinctly heard planes over the dropping ground. Once again we confirmed the belief that the Allies would never let them down.

Each leader of a newly organized battalion was asked to look for suitable dropping grounds, also to obtain any kind of radio set (receiver). We gave them BBC phrases, recognition letters and all the information they required. We had not been using our mobile RCs very long and as we did not want to put all our eggs in one basket again, we decided that each battalion leader of an organized unit should choose one of his men to act as RC.

We instructed these men and had a practice demonstra-

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tion. The first battalions ready were the 5th and 6th but their ground was accidentally occupied by German forces so they had to find another one. Yaco's Corps Francs had also prepared their dropping ground. Each night they held the RC ready but all in vain.

As things were now getting rather serious we made three simultaneous attempts on grounds Bells, St. Sigismond and Donna. The Jerries having now departed from Donna, there were so few suitable dropping grounds in the area that we had to take the risk of using Donna again. The fields were very small separated by high hedges, roads, tracks, farms and villages. We spent days and weeks looking for suitable dropping grounds. We could not go too far from the areas where the battalions were situated as transport was a big problem.

When we received the message giving us the order to attack, as we were about to be overrun without having received the armament for the 4,000 men we had at that time organized and for the 5,000 who would very soon be ready, we cried like kids considering our useless set, our useless work and all the dangers the patriots of Loire Inferieure had gone through to get to that point, remembering how many guys in prison or under the earth had paid for the trouble they had looking for useless grounds and organizing useless reception committees for planes which never came.

Here we will go back for a moment to the money situation. Many patriots in the Loire Inferieure had to leave their towns, houses and families in order to join the Maquis or to go into hiding. We were also using a good many people in

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our various services. As soon as the men were organized in definite units, they had to continually report at definite places. All these people and their families had to eat sometimes. We had no money to give them except 300,000 francs given to us by Hauteur and Fonction and also what we had received the morning before leaving. This small amount of money went very quickly. At one time starving people attacked the farms in order to get food. We tried like hell to stop this but mere words did not lessen their hunger.

We often had to close our eyes when they chose to attack collaborators and get, through these means, enough money to stop the pillage of their troops. Requisitioning with the farmers did not work as they were not at all sure that we were the strongest. We had many mail boxes which enabled us to keep daily contacts with everybody and we could receive any important information within a few minutes and also give out general orders quickly.

Agents from these mail boxes were constantly coming to our own two private mail boxes. Here the messages were collected by Bernard Juton in Belligne and Jean Pierre in Ancenis, and finally brought to us. This arrangement worked perfectly.

We had special contacts with the DMRs Hauteur and Fonction. When Hauteur and Fonction left, they constantly kept us informed of any orders received from headquarters, their own orders and the general situation. Not once did they let us down. They helped us in every way possible and followed our plan step by step. Hauteur and Fonction seemed to be everywhere in Brittany at once, agents coming in from every direction told us that they had visited them and given

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instructions. This helped us a great deal, as we always had a clear picture of what was going on and we were able to coordinate our plans with those of our neighbors. It was during our stay at St. Sigismond that we met Felix. No one had announced his arrival and at first from what we heard we thought he was rather suspicious but we decided to come to no conclusion until we had seen him. At the beginning of August, Jean Pierre Dautel found his contact and arranged a meeting between him and Captain Erard, near St. Sigismond.

Felix (known as Vaudel) introduced himself as the departmental chief that everyone was waiting for. He told us that Fonction had sent him. He gave us the pass phrases. He held the rank of lieutenant colonel and had come to see us in order to establish with us a final and complete headquarters including departmental chief (which was he), delegue militaire departmental (Captain Erard), and Jedburgh team George acting as BOA.

Captain Erard, still rather suspicious, sent on the following day a messenger to Fonction with certain questions. Fonction replied the same day giving complete and satisfactory answers about the authenticity of Vaudel (Felix).

Captain Erard was delighted to see a real leader taking command in the Loire Inferieure, knowing exactly what he wanted, very intelligent, broad-minded and eager that the department should reach the highest standard. DMR Fonction certainly seemed to know what the Loire Inferieure needed. He had recommended and sent us the best man one could find for the post of departmental chief.

Never once did we have a dispute with Vaudel as our plan,

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our ideas and our points of view had been and were his own. Never was cooperation more perfect. Diplomatic and clever in the highest degree, strong minded and determined, Vaudel carried out his work perfectly and brought the Loire Inferieure up to the standard of the big resistant departments.

As soon as we received the satisfactory replies from Fonction, we gave Colonel Vaudel a complete and verbal report on what had taken place since we had been in the area. The following days were perhaps more active than ever. Captain Erard introduced Vaudel to all the leaders, political chiefs, unit commanders, etc. George and Vaudel held a series of important meetings during which various points were cleared up, reports were received and orders issued. All the time we had to straighten things out between agents who wanted to kill one another. For instance, Cottin would have nothing to do with Daries, while Noizet wanted to kill him; Joseph wanted to hang Yaco; Etienne suspected Jacques Peltier. Descarvert and Daries were looking for a certain Nicolas whom they wanted to send to his grave, meanwhile Alain was using this man Nicolas as chief of his security corps. Fontenot wished death to Commandant Joseph and Lescat wanted the life of Bertrand. We had to pacify them by good words or bad, according to the temper of the fellows concerned. We spent some time in trying to get them to work together and in the end they did this very well.

In order to clear the air, as it were, Colonel Vaudel and team George had to make some big changes. The first concerned Kinley. After Die had been arrested, Kinley's position became worse and worse. The Germans were hot on his

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trail. We arranged a meeting between Vaudel, Erard and Kinley. Even on this occasion the latter was followed. At this meeting it was decided that Kinley should take cover in the department of Mayenne. There he was to receive instructions from London or Paris which we had asked for. Kinley agreed on this plan and left Loire Inferieure where it was no longer possible for him to work.

We then turned our attention to Daries (or Michaud). His position had altered as, up until the arrival of Vaudel, he had been acting as departmental chief. Also there was no point in his remaining second in command to Kinley. What is more, he was becoming rather unpopular in the department. The battalion leaders did not like his lieutenants, or the fellows he was living with. Daries was always on the Gestapo's black list. We decided to ask Daries to follow Kinley's example and take a holiday in order that the wolves might lose his track and forget about him. Eventually he agreed.

It was at this time that the plans of all the German defenses in the Loire Inferieure were completed by the French engineers working for Todt and belonging to our organization. Later it will be explained how these plans were exfiltrated to London.

The plans of the U-boat base at St. Nazaire and the complete defense of the coast of the Loire Inferieure were becoming one of our primary worries. Even though we had them in our possession, they would be of no value if the proper unit concerned did not receive them. London, having been notified that these plans were in our possession, had laid

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on a Lysander operation. We had found and arranged a dropping ground with a suitable RC, but this could not be met at this particular moment because the plans were hidden in a castle near Nantes which was being watched day and night by the Gestapo and had been the last hiding place of Kinley. Our agent, Jean Pierre Dautel, who had made an attempt to get them from the castle, had narrowly escaped being killed and had been chased for several miles. The next day, however, Captain Erard recovered the plans getting through the Gestapo network; the Germans had established barrages on the roads and tracks leading to the castle. It was at this point that the Americans were driving into south Brittany.

A council of war was held and we decided to infiltrate the plans by contacting the first Americans and turning the plans over to the Third Army G-2. Before we had time to initiate the infiltration, we received news that the Americans were advancing very fast and would in the next few hours be in our territory. On Saturday, 5 August, at 1300 hours, we received news that the Americans had sent a column to Ancenis. It was quickly decided that Captain Cyr and Colonel Felix would go to Ancenis by way of Varades so as to contact the Americans who were coming up the river. Captain Erard was to take the plans and proceed with his radio operator, Lejeune, and liaison agent, Jean Pierre, to a pre-arranged RV at Le Petit Moulin.

From Captain Cyr's Report

On the way back to troop headquarters we had a little trouble from German tanks but we soon took care of these. A few Germans were trying to cross the River Loire but this too

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proved unhealthy for them. In their first attempt, they lost over two-thirds of their party due to our superior position and powerful fire.

After telling the group commander of the plans in our possession, he immediately agreed to help us to get them back to Third Army. At this point I did not know of Captain Erard's capture by the Germans but later when I tried to contact him at our RV I found out what had happened. Jean Pierre, our liaison agent, was the only one present at the RV. He was so excited and upset that I could not get a clear picture of the situation. He told me, however, that Captain Erard, who was carrying the plans and was fully dressed in uniform in order to be able to contact the Americans quickly and easily, was coming down to our RV when he heard tanks coming up the street and thinking that there were Americans arriving hurried to meet them. Actually they had met the first Americans in the town of Ancenis and were 200 yards from them. It was most embarrassing to discover that the tanks were Germans. In a matter of seconds the Germans had taken all arms from Erard. Fighting in these conditions with such great odds would have been useless. Captain Erard at once began arguing with the Germans, pointing out that they were making a big mistake by taking away their arms as they were milice working with the Germans.

So convincing was Captain Erard's argument that the tank commander returned to his tanks and held a council of war with his subordinates and then drove off. Captain Erard was amazed, but he considered that the Germans had very bad manners as they kept all his arms.

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Two minutes after the Germans had left Captain Erard, heavy fire broke out as the Germans made contact with the first Americans in Ancenis. At this time Jean Pierre was the only one at the RV and he had the plans with him. Being in uniform and without any more arms to fight with, Captain Erard was forced to hide behind a door while the German tanks passed by and then under a railway line on which a fierce battle took place between German and American armored cars before he could crawl back to Ancenis.

Since these plans appeared to be of the utmost importance, Captain Cyr felt he could not wait for information on the rest of the team. At 1800 hours on 5 August, Captain Cyr left the vicinity of Ancenis with Colonel Felix to see Colonel Reeds, who was squadron commander. On the way we encountered only occasional sniper action and arrived at 1430 hours. After explaining our mission to him, he agreed to help us back through 150 miles of no man's land to the Third Army.

At 3:00 o'clock in the morning we left for VIII Corps headquarters, G-2 in an armed car, a half truck and a tank. Several times enroute small parties of Germans fired at us but this never worried us as our armament was far superior to theirs. We arrived at 8:00 o'clock in the morning. Colonel Reeds showed great interest in our plans and immediately had them photostated. We then gave him a detailed report on the military situation in our area. This was a great help as they were about to make a drive in that direction.

We then left VIII Corps headquarters for Third Army. Entirely by chance we met Lieutenant Colonel Robert Powell, Cav, SFHQ representative. As we were wearing civilian

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clothes with OSS jackets, he immediately recognized us as Jedburghs. He conveyed all the military information of our area to General Patton, G-2 and G-3.

The plans of the U-boat pens at St. Nazaire and coastal defenses were turned over to the Naval Department, G-2. It was decided that we should be given the mission of protecting the right flank of the Third Army as it swung towards Paris. That night Colonel Felix (Vaudel) was infiltrated back to our area. Captain Cyr was held at SFHQ to make arrangements for a parachuting of arms to our 5,000 organized men. It was through the efforts of Lieutenant Colonel Powell and at the request of the Third Army that we eventually received these arms.

G-3 section, SF Detachment 11 (512), Third Army, wanted to attach Captain Cyr to the XX Corps to act as guide and liaison for its advance. Captain Cyr, however, convinced them that he could provide them with a number of men better qualified to make contacts as they advanced. This was done. Guides were always ready to give information and to lead the first elements of American troops into German-held territory. This proved a great help as the local natives knew all the minefields and defensive positions.

After making the necessary arrangements, London agreed to send us 24 planes within the next few days. A field was chosen from aerial photographs in liaison with RAF representatives of Third Army who agreed that Captain Cyr would return in order to organize the reception.

In addition to holding the Third Army's right flank, we were given the following missions:

1. Assist the XX Corps in crossing the Brenne

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River along the line Blois to Vendome. In particular, we were to save bridges and locate alternate crossing sites in case the bridges were blown up. In addition we were to mop up enemy pockets that were left behind the rapidly advancing units. This mission was accomplished by our troops.

2. We were to make the necessary contacts in order that resistance personnel could report daily changes in the fronts Nantes, Angers and Paris. Captain Cyr wrote out notes to the effect that the bearer should immediately be sent to G-2 of the division. Thus these notes were infiltrated through to the leaders of the FFI in the vicinity of Paris, Anger and Nantes giving them instructions to send out from three to five men a day towards the American lines. These men were to use different routes, keeping a good look-out for German troop movements, concentrations, defenses, etc. Upon contacting the first advanced units they were immediately to report to G-2. There they were to give all the military information which they had acquired and then return as guides over the routes by which they had come in. In some cases the password "Angouleme" was used instead of Captain Cyr's note. This had been pre-arranged with G-2 and worked successfully.

3. We were to protect the lines of communications for the XX Corps along the line Segre - La Fleche - Vendome.

Although these tasks were not easy they were all accomplished. To start with, however, we had been using arms which we had stolen from the Germans during small combats.

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Accompanied by Colonel Drumont, Captain Cyr now returned to the Loire Inferieure to arrange the reception committee which was to take place and to carry out missions given by the Third Army. Colonel Drumont stayed in Rennes while Captain Cyr went on to Chateaubriant, where he found the rest of Jedburgh team George safe. This was indeed a glorious reunion. From this point we kept constant contact with all American units in the area giving them all the help we could.

At this time the only unit near Chateaubriant was the E Troop Second Cavalry Unit. Our troops, with what arms they had, were in a defensive position 50 miles ahead of the Americans on the north side of the River Loire. It was 11 August and our troops had been in contact with the Germans on the south side of the Loire since 5 August. At this point our positions were uncertain as we had not the necessary arms to hold off a large attack, should one be launched. We decided the best thing was to use offensive tactics. Every night our men would swim the river and attack strong points which had been giving us trouble during the day. All our prisoners were being turned over to the American units, much to their annoyance as they had no where to keep them. In a few days the parachuting took place, with the result that our defensive positions became far more solid.

Due to lack of communications, each time London sent us a message it was necessary for a messenger from the Third Army to deliver it to us. Our radio at this stage was not working at all. On their side, the Third Army begged us for information but they gave us no radio on which to send our information back to them. We used messengers who sometimes

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traveled as much as 200 miles to the Third Army with the information they required.

If there was an American unit in the vicinity, we always sent our information back through them. If there happened to be more than one unit there was generally a little jealousy between them as to who should get the information and send it back.

Our prayers were answered when we made contact with the Army Intelligence Service. This was a unit sent down by General Patton and they had direct contact with the Third Army. We had but to send them our messages and they would pass them directly to the Third Army. In fact, so satisfied were the Army with this outfit that they moved them to another area. Incidentally, the Third Army thought that the information which they had been receiving had been obtained by the Intelligence Service through their own initiative and did not realize that it was our information being passed through them.

On about 12 August all the American troops in our area were called back, we being left with only a few armed FFI to hold our positions on the Loire River. The situation was not pleasant as we were continually receiving mortar and artillery fire on our lightly armed troops. The German troops south of the river were our secondary worries as there were 18,000 Jerries in and around St. Nazaire trying to get out north of Nantes.

German officers, ammunition, petrol and equipment were continually being parachuted to the Germans in this St. Nazaire pocket. At first the morale of these German troops was poor and they lacked organization. Later, however, officers were

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sent in to organize them and their offensive action began to gain momentum.

About this time Colonel Reed, commanding officer of CCA outfit had moved into the vicinity north of Nantes. As we had intelligence officers continually going in and out of Nantes we were able to supply them with a complete and precise plan of the German defense, minefields, etc. We also provided them with guides who would lead them along routes where patriots had been instructed to remove mines. It was also planned that when the attack started on the outside of Nantes, one of our battalions within the city, was to rise and attack all German defenses from the rear. This operation was a huge success and Nantes was taken practically without a struggle.

During this time we were keeping close contact with VIII Division headquarters, G-2. They made several trips from Rennes to Chateaubriant to personally consult us on the situation west of Nantes and south of the Loire River. Colonel Beck, G-3, VIII Division, was greatly pleased with all the detailed plans and information which we had been able to obtain for him.

As soon as American outfits moved in our area, we made all the necessary contacts for them to fulfill their mission. When an engineering force outfit from headquarters base, section L, Command Z, arrived Nantes, we made all the necessary contacts for them. We also gave Colonel Reed, who later entered Nantes, all necessary contacts such as prefect, our battalion leaders in the area, etc.

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After having escaped from being captured in Ancenis, Captain Erard came back into the town at night. Fighting was still going on but as the patriots were scattered with the Americans everywhere, he could not find Commandant Cottin, leader of the 1st Battalion.

That night the Americans left Ancenis withdrawing to St. Mars-la-Faille, 20 kilos north. Next morning Erard again tried to find Cottin but in vain. Actually what had happened was that Colonel Felix, as arranged before with Erard, had sent Cottin a messenger with orders that he was to defend the town but that if the fighting became hopeless due to enemy pressure, he should return with his forces north of Ancenis. However, this messenger reported his orders so badly that Cottin understood that he was immediately to withdraw his forces and in the morning reported at Couffe.

Hence, when Captain Erard found the town evacuated by our troops, Jerries were crossing the Loire to occupy Ancenis. Erard immediately sent an agent to Daries, (who was hiding in a safe place south of the Loire), with orders that he was to rush into Ancenis by crossing the Loire with as many troops as he could gather together and take charge of the defenses until Erard discovered what had happened to the 1st Battalion.

Daries entered Ancenis the same day, his men taking up positions along the Loire, throwing into the river the Jerries who had already crossed it. At the same time Erard gave orders to the units east and west of Ancenis to establish themselves into defensive positions on each side of the town and river. Many patriots had been arming themselves with

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arms they captured from Germans during the course of combats.

Captain Erard immediately set about looking for Colonel Felix, Captain Cyr and Lejeune and for some contact with the Americans. Messengers eventually arrived reporting that Captain Cyr and Colonel Felix had safely received the plans and were proceeding to Army headquarters. Erard took the road to St. Mars-le-Faille in order to meet the American outfit. In Le Boulay, he met Jean Pierre's brother, Fred Dautel. While resting in their house Jean Pierre entered, followed by Lejeune.

During the next two days we turned Le Boulay into our general headquarters. Erard then proceeded to St. Mars-la-Jaille. This town had been chosen as the rear headquarters for the 1st Battalion and also for Daries' unit, the advanced headquarters being in Ancenis. Three miles north of St. Mars, Erard contacted the first American officers. The first captain he met told him that Captain Cyr had been wounded and was in a hospital in the far north. Erard gave the positions of the FFI and asked for instructions either from London or from Army headquarters. He also asked to be kept informed of all news that might come from Felix and Cyr.

Captain Erard returned to St. Mars where Cottin had established Captain Noizet as "Chef de Place" with the task of reorganizing the companies of the 1st Battalion which were coming back from the front line.

In two days everything was ready, headquarters, barracks, ambulances, hospital, supply depots, garages, etc. Erard had given instructions that each unit would be issued with transport, the Americans providing the necessary petrol. This American unit was in a dangerous position even north of St. Mars-la-Jaille because German units had been left scat-

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tered all over the area north of Loire and were constantly reported as far as Chateaubriant, 30 kilos north of St. Mars. Americans gave us at once a lorry of arms and ammunition.

Meanwhile Erard had issued orders to the other organized units of Loire Inferieure giving them new positions, various missions and instructing their leaders to contact the nearest Allied outfit in their area in order to coordinate their work with the American plans. The battalion leaders were to report daily at St. Mars to our headquarters on the action and tasks which they had accomplished for the Allied headquarters.

On 8 or 9 August Colonel Felix returned. He was met at the St. Mars headquarters by Captain Erard. He fully approved of the measures which we had taken. He brought back complete orders from Army headquarters and good news about Captain Cyr, whose health was perfect.

Our troops had taken possession of all towns and villages of any importance. A local headquarters had been organized in each one with a recruiting office. Collaborators, as well as Jerries, had immediately been arrested. All over the department, patriots were chasing small German units bringing in each day bags of prisoners, their weapons being at once turned over to organized but unarmed units.

One of the first things we did was to enlarge our information service, or G-2, as the Americans wanted hot information about the enemy at any time of day or night.

Whenever an American outfit was moving or taking up new positions, one or several carefully chosen agents were dispatched to them, with a letter from Captain Erard stating that their information should be considered as very reliable.

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These agents were continually receiving and reporting information, first to the outfit they were attached to and then to our G-2. The information reaching our headquarters was reported on maps, controlled through other sources of information and then passed on for confirmation to a main Allied headquarters.

We stayed at St. Mars for two days. Then as our units north and west of the Loire Inferieure became increasingly busy, we decided to move to a more central position. We moved the departmental headquarters to Chateaubriant. Here we had only one company, consisting of 200 men, commanded by Captain Linart and a Corps Franc under the leadership of Marionneau. These units were being reorganized after their combats in the vicinity. Linart was training and arming with German weapons the new FFI which he had enlisted. His instructor was Lieutenant Olive. On the first day at Chateaubriant Erard met Captain Cyr in Linart's headquarters.

IN CHATEAUBRIANT

It would take too long to give complete details of what took place at Chateaubriant. Under headlines we can give an idea of what happened.

Civil Affairs

Colonel Vaudel (Felix) as departmental chief and also Captain Erard as DMR had to deal with civil affairs and the whole thing went fairly smoothly.

Colonel Vaudel and Captain Erard wanted things perfectly regular, in accordance with our rights and duties, but in accordance also with the rights and duties of everybody else and in accordance with the French laws.

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From the moment when we emerged from our underground life and appeared on the stage in an official capacity we called upon all civil powers to cooperate with us.

Our main help came from the Sous-Prefect of Chateaubriant, a young and intelligent man whom we asked to deal with all purely civilian questions. We worked together in perfect cooperation and settled together all difficulties.

The prefect in Nantes who had proved himself useless (beyond all the circumstances) had been quickly changed. The new one, Vienot, was 100 percent with us.

In the towns and villages the mayors had been called upon to collaborate with our local FFI leaders and all decisions were taken in common.

To deal with the food problem, requisitioning, etc. we had appointed as L'Intendant of Chateaubriant, Mr. Rolland. Mr. Rolland had his office at our headquarters.

We immediately had posters issued. These were signed by Vaudel and the Sous Prefect and were sent to all the districts giving warnings and instructions to the population. For instance, it had been decided that no collaborator or suspect could be arrested by the local leader of the FFI without the presence of a gendarme who was to make a proces verbal and to report to his superiors. This was in order to put an end to some abuses which had been reported to us in some villages.

Another decision stated that no FFI leader would be entitled to make any requisitions in his area without referring to the local mayor, to the Sous Prefecture and to ourselves and getting a regular permit.

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In these conditions, FFI worked as the element of order, officially entitled to deal with military questions in cooperation with the Allies, and with civil affairs in cooperation with civil authorities when the civil affairs had consequences on our military tasks. Owing to the strong measures that were taken and to a few strong penalties, unity and order were firmly established.

In order to do this we had to make constant visits to Nantes, Rennes, Laval etc., so as to contact the various people who were interested such as the prefect, sous-prefects, intendant de police, commissaires, presidents des tribunaux, gendarmeries, maires, and others.

Organization

Our headquarters was organized in the following way.

1. Intendance. Mr. Rolland
2. Bureau de la Place. Captain de la Bourdonnais
3. 1er Bureau. Engagements, inscriptions, mutations, etc. Commandant Chaumette
4. 2me Bureau. Chef: Lieutenant Bertrand; Espionnage and Contre Espionnage: 2nd Lieutenant Dautel; Military Inf: 2nd Lieutenant Guillosoou (static), Captain Etienne (mobile); Affaires civiles: Lieutenant Chaye
5. 3me Bureau. Operations: Commandant de Coudraye and Lieutenant Beigne.
6. 4me Bureau. Chef: Captain Goualin

Service Auto	)	At the head of each service
Service Carburant	)	was a lieutenant or 2nd
Service Materiel	)	lieutenant assisted by 2
Service Habillement	)	NCOs.
Service Armement	)	
7. Service Sanitaire.

Doctor: Augustin Michel
 MLE: Colette Hamaut
 MLE: Paulette Peltier

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Commandant de Coudray (Inspecteur des Unites FFI)
 Lieutenant Norbert de la Bourdonnais
 Lieutenant de Mascureaux
 Lieutenant Lucien

By way of posters, we asked all officers and NCOs on active or reserve service living in the department to enlist themselves immediately at Chateaubriant. We then found the right people to put to the right place.

Each service had an office complete with secretaries, typists, etc.

Eventually we had as many cars as we needed and the American headquarters was so pleased with our services that he allocated us the necessary petrol, oil and furniture without any restriction. He also gave us all the medical supplies we asked for, clothing, etc.

Military Tasks

Captain Cyr in his report gave the tasks which we had been asked to accomplish.

First we had to keep the river Loire and to forbid any Germans to cross it. For this purpose, the Loire was held by the 1st Battalion, part of the 5th Battalion, three recce platoons (mobile) and a small Corps Francs unit.

Our first battalion had its rear headquarters at St. Mars-La-Jaille and its advanced headquarters at Ancenis. The first company of 200 men (Captain Noizet) was keeping the river from Oudon (north of Champtoceaux) to Ancenis; the 2nd company of 200 men (Captain Grillette) from Ancenis to Varades; the third company of 200 men (Captain Etienne) from Varades to Ingrandes. The recce platoons were under the command of Lieutenant Chaussade, Pierre and Pablo. They were

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constantly patrolling road N23 and the river itself, crossing sometimes the Loire to detect or attack the German outposts established on the south bank of the river.

The Corps Francs, under the command of Lieutenant Gelis was moving to areas where fighting was taking place and where they had asked for help.

The three companies of the 1st Battalion and the Reserve Cie were linked by telephone communication between them and to the headquarters in St. Mars.

A very small unit (10 men) under the command of Rousseau was keeping at Le Cellier a passage for our agents going south of Loire. This unit helped agents to cross the river and was on constant watch.

At St. Mars-la-Jaille the units were being reorganized re-equipped and instructed. Captain Noizet had been replaced by Captain Merlet.

Daries' men had been sent again south of Loire to keep the 1st Battalion informed of what the Jerries were cooking.

On the west side of the Loire, the 5th Battalion under Captain Alain, had dispatched one company (200 men) to the Isle Gloriette, near Nantes and had three sections extending from Nantes to Le Cellier where they were in contact with Rousseau's outfit.

Our second mission was to protect the right flank of the Third Army during their swinging movement to Paris, and later, the Allied units occupying the area. Actually in the Guerande, 2 German divisions, (about 18,000 men) were trapped in a pocket and it was feared that they would make an attempt to escape, either north of Loire, or south breaking through the weak "dispositif" that we had. Captain Erard himself

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placed the units on this front as well as on the Loire front so as to make the maximum use of their power and so as to coordinate their tasks by close contact and the best utilization of the ground.

The 5th Battalion had dispatched one company between Nantes and St. Etienne-de-Montluc. In St. Etienne itself another company held the front up to Le Temple. Between Le Temple and Fay-de-Bretagne platoons of the 5th and 6th Battalions were cooperating with an American recce unit and (for about a week) with a unit sent to us from Morbihan by Commandant Maurice to help us during the time while we were equipping our own troops. This front was moving from an approximate line Le Temple, Malville, and Boubron to a line Le Temple - Fay-de-Bretagne.

Later, due to local counter-attacks we reported the front line west of Cordemais, on the Loire and as far as Campbon.

On the front held by the 5th and 6th Battalions (whose headquarters was in Nantes - Place Louis XVI) we have to mention that we kept in Nantes itself two companies in reserve, at the request of the American headquarters. The front line was strengthened by strong posts in second line occupying positions which would have to be crossed by the Germans if they tried to escape by outskirting Nantes. These positions were at la Chapelle (200 men), where we also had a training camp. Vigneux, east of Le Temple, Ligne, Les Touches and Nort, the marshes of St. Mars and river Erdre were being made good use of in the defense plan. The units of the 5th and 6th Battalions were to be linked by wireless contact. The sets had already been distributed to the companies.

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North of the area being held by the 5th and 6th Battalions the front was held by companies detached from the former 3rd Battalion and reorganized and reinforced by local patriots so that these units could always act as eventual guides and co-operation units with a perfect knowledge of the ground.

From Heric, Lieutenant Yvon's company and Marionneau's Corps Francs were keeping an area approximately limited by road GC16 (south) road N771 (west) and roads N164 and GC37 (northeast). They were in constant contact with Commandant Simon's unit who, from Blain, was in charge of an area limited by road N771, GC102 and, north the canal from Nantes to Brest.

The forest of Gavre was occupied by a few isolated Jerry units and on 20 August, Commandant Joseph, commanding a unit in Nort had received orders from Captain Erard that the forest should be cleaned up and that a headquarters was to be established in Le Gavre first, and later on road N164, as he would have to keep that area free by forbidding any crossing of the canal N to B between Guenrouet (east of St. Gildas, on road GC2) and Epauld (on road GC102).

North of Joseph's front, Captain de Torquat, whose rear headquarters was in Guemene-Penfau was keeping the canal from Nantes to Brest, from Gueurouet to Redon.

On the 22nd a counter-attack by Commandant Simon had reported our front a few miles west.

Also on the 22nd Captain Linart had left Chateaubriant with a newly equipped and trained company in order to reinforce our positions between Blain and Fay de Bretagne.

Behind the front line and all over the department, in towns and villages, we had organized FFI posts and training camps. (Nozay - Riaille - Chateaubriant - Belligne etc.). From these places new units were sent to the front.

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Our line of defense was not strong enough to prevent a break through by two divisions. But our plan was to keep constant contact so as to know all the time what was the enemy's intention, strength and position, and in case of attack to oblige them to fight from their "base de depart" and hold them long enough to make them reveal their strength and give time to the Americans to rush to our rescue.

We had asked the former patriot leaders who had no special military capacity to put their men under the command of military chiefs chosen by us. They agreed by a very great majority. Yaco, for instance gathered the different Maquis and groups which had been under his command and, after training in Riaille's camp, these men organized in companies were sent as reinforcements to the battalions. (Commandant Cochet had, for instance, received one company on 17 August). From these posts and camps, patrols were taking off day and night to chase the small groups of isolated Germans in areas where they had been reported. From these posts men were also dispatched to watch the communications, railway lines, roads, bridges, etc.

All the units mentioned above had been equipped and armed. As soon as the dropping had taken place, we had stowed away everything in Chateaubriant at an ex-prisoners' camp. The arms had immediately been divided in "standard lots for 10 men" which was: 1 Bren gun, 4 Stens, 4 rifles, 1 pistol and 10 grenades. These arms were sent to the units in lorries. At the same time we requisitioned the uniform warehouses of the French Army of 1939 in Ancenis and with these uniforms and those which had been sent us by London, we

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had been able to dress and equip the units. This contributed highly to discipline and to making the men realize that they were soldiers.

When George left the Loire Inferieure we had 2,500 armed and equipped, some of them using German weapons. Arrangements had been made by Captain Cyr and Captain Erard with the American headquarters to arm 4,000 more men in a matter of days. The Americans were to bring to Chateaubriant German arms borrowed from the general depot in Normandy, including 80mm. mortars and heavy machine guns. When we left on the 23rd we were going to receive the first lot.

In areas occupied by the enemy we had great difficulty in arming the men and keeping contact. We had reestablished contact with Cholet (south of Loire) about the middle of August. Commandant d'Artagnau, responsible for eight battalions (1,800 men) in the Cholet area, had come himself to Chateaubriant. Arrangements were in progress to infiltrate arms to equip his men but this was a hard job as his area was rather boiling at that time.

Commandant Trouve, chief of our 2nd Battalion in Clisson (south of Loire) joined us at Nantes on 15 August, where we had several conferences with him. He was to start equipping his men with stolen arms of dead Jerries the same as the other leaders had started in July and the beginning of August. At the same time, we were to try to infiltrate a complement of weapons to him by the passage at Le Cellier and between Mauves and Nantes.

In Guerande, we had about 3,000 men organized formerly belonging to the following organizations: Les Hussards de la

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Garde, Ceux de Liberation, Vengeance, Resistance, and FTP. We had kept close contact with them mainly through Anic, Fontenot and Louis. The mission of the last liaison we sent (Marie-Therese) was to bring back from them a complete list of safe guides, giving names and location, so that the Allied outfits could know before hand whom they could trust to guide them through minefields and defenses and take them at once to the right people wherever they might be. Marie-Therese who had left on 22 August was not back when we were called back. That list was to be given to the Allied headquarters.

It was also the mission of the units to sabotage the defense works as soon as an attack started on this area and to harass the enemy by all means. We were working out a plan to have arms sent to them by parachute in the marshes of La Grande Briere which was the only place without Germans.

Contacts

Full information concerning the contacts we kept with the Allies is included in the first part of the report. We still can add that in every part of the front where Americans were fighting with us, perfect coordination was always realized.

An Allied Civil Affairs Office had recently been established in Chateaubriant. We had been working in complete harmony and no difficulties had arisen.

Since the last American advance overrunning Rennes, it had been possible to keep in close contact with the chefs de regions. Colonel Vaudel and team George met during the first days of August in Rennes, Nantes and Laval, Colonel Michelin, Colonel Roulier, Colonel de Magny, Laboureux, Colonel Drumont, Colonel de Chevigue, and General Allart.

General Allart had visited us in Chateaubriant. He had

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been very interested and satisfied with the results we had obtained. We met the big shots on several occasions, the last being a general meeting in Rennes under General Allart. This meeting included also the chefs subdivisionnaires and chefs departementaux for all region M. We had the pleasure on this occasion again to see Colonel Maurice of Michelin, Colonel Poussin of Finistere, Commandant Adam of Ile et Vilaine and other people we knew.

Important decisions were made and instructions given by General Allart, Colonel Roulier and Colonel Michelin. We were granted with special instructions as Loire Inferieure was the only departement of region M where fighting was still going bitterly.

It was about 12 August when we saw Chief Subdivisionnaire Kinley again. He came to Chateaubriant and we had a big conference with him. Later on we had the opportunity to meet him in Rennes or Nantes at the chiefs of region M meetings or at the XI Corps. We arranged permanent contact and when we left he was going to establish himself in Nantes.

We had the pleasure to see the day before they left France DMR Hauteur and Fonction. We found them in Rennes through an agent, Eliane Daeron, and spent a whole evening with them, Herve, Le Brec and their main agents. We gave Hauteur and Fonction complete dope of the situation as they were leaving the next morning.

It was on this occasion that we made final arrangements with Lieutenant Le Brec. This officer had been placed in charge, by Uriage, to instruct and train officers for the Maquis all over France. We had had previous contacts with

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him and he had sent two officers to us, Bertrand (or Jean) and Lucien.

As we were suffering because of a lack of young leaders, Captain Erard asked him to send to Loire Inferieure all officers he had left and proposed to him to join the party for the final big show. Le Brec agreed and he and his officers immediately joined the units which especially needed leaders of that caliber.

These dispositions were completed when we appointed Commandant Brochart, who knew perfectly the possibilities in Loire Inferieure, to classify enlisted officers according to their capabilities and to propose the right man for each new service or new unit created. His work was to be coordinated with Commandant Chaumette's work at the 1er Bureau.

Radio Communications

Our last set went off completely about the moment we were overrun. Lejeune tried to repair it himself but he found that the lamp was broken. It was the last one we had and we could not replace it.

In Nantes

Colonel Vaudel and team George decided to move their headquarters to Nantes which was the real capital of the department and where we would be in closer contact with the prefect and the civil authorities. We arranged to have a large building in a safe area of the town as the Germans used to shell the town every evening. Most of our time during the last days were spent in Nantes preparing for our move.

Back to London

On 21 August, a message came through Lieutenant-Colonel

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Powell who sent Lieutenant Neale as messenger. This message originated in General Koenig's office and said that team George had to report immediately to London for an urgent mission with Hauteur and Fonction. Captain Erard was in bed at doctor's order as he needed some sleep and had had a syncope the day before in his office. However the message was imperative and spoke of an "urgent mission." Colonel Vaudel did all he could to keep us. He ran immediately to Rennes where he met Colonel Drumont, general inspector for the FFI to whom he explained the situation. Colonel Drumont issued a message to London in which he asked that George should be left in Loire Inferieure. This message was to be sent through the Third Army.

We left Colonel Vaudel at Chateaubriant on 22 August after settling all urgent matters which needed our special attention. We realized better than ever, that leaving Colonel Vaudel meant we were leaving a very great friend and a leader with whom it had been a constant pleasure to work. We proceeded to Laval and to Army headquarters where arrangements had been made for our return by air. The next morning we went by car to the airfield and we emplaned on a Dakota at 5:00 in the afternoon.

At 6:00 o'clock we were in England. Lieutenant Vatsior came to meet us and we reported the next morning, 24 August, to Lieutenant Colonel Carleton Smith.

Conclusion

Our mission was done and had succeeded by miracle. We had been running all the time along a precipice and these

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results had been heavily paid for by hundreds of arrestations and murders. Besides, we were feeling very depressed, considering what could have been done if we had received the arms and money we were begging for in time. In that case we can guarantee that on 5 August 10,000 men could have been armed. Not a single Jerry would have escaped and damage done to the enemy would have been incredible.

We were told when we came back that London had not played with us because it was feared that we might be under Gestapo control. To this we say, "Why?"

The first reason given to believe that the Gestapo controlled us was this: "You went off the air for 15 days and when you reappeared you didn't give any explanation."

We'll simply say this: If the Gestapo had caught us, the very first thing they would have made us do would have been to make us send a nice long message giving all explanations wished and giving the impression that we were perfectly all right, safe and free.

The second reason given was that: "You did not reply to your recognition phrase."

First, London knew that we did not receive the first two messages about "Le coup de pied de mulet" as Lejeune had not sent acknowledgement and we had not mentioned by message "I received your number so and so" and as, in any case, we had said that we could not receive a broadcast.

Second, the "Coup de pied de mulet" business was not a recognition phrase and had nothing to do with radio traffic. It was just a password and besides it was Lejeune's password when overrun to allow us to get in touch with the SF officer

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of the first Allied unit met. When this question came at the end of July at a time when we could occasionally hear a broadcast we didn't realize what it meant. As we knew that wrong reports on our health had been made by SAS and as London had asked, without explanation, news of our health, we thought for a while that we had been reported as wounded by some sort of animal such as mulet. Besides we were in a very tense and nervous state and making quick preparations for the Lysander operation and hundreds of other things and did not have much time to puzzle over this.

Third, if we had been under Gestapo control, we feel pretty sure they would have asked some questions about the meaning of that mysterious "coup de pied de mulet". And as they knew how to make somebody speak, we would have replied in the most orthodox and required way.

The third reason London gave was that we did not give numbers or dates on our messages.

We did not send numbers or dates in Morbihan where we were known to be safe. Besides, when we were asked to do so, we did it at once. Also, if we were under Gestapo control, be sure that the messages would have been damned perfect. We didn't always send numbers or dates (and it was wrong, we agree) just because in using the emergency channel we knew that perhaps one minute too much of our traffic would steal from friends in the field the opportunity to send an emergency message on the same channel.

Actually, we had only one means to prove that everything was okay - a right identity check number. And that number was always right without any exception.

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We have been told that the Gestapo could have known, by some violent means, this right number. That is wrong because this number being any number, nobody can prove that it's this one or another. If we had given the right one, they would have said "you're lying" and carried on with the torture. So, why give the right one? Any other number had as many chances to be believed to be the right one. It is true that the Gestapo possess special means such as making you sleep and talk in that sleep (sort of hypnotization); but we had, since the beginning, agreed on a wrong number, the same for the three of us, and we used to repeat it to each other nearly every hour in such a way that when encoding this wrong number would appear first in our mind.

The right identity number was really the only way for us to prove our identity and if that proof were not going to be believed, it was not even useful to go over to France.

On the other hand, one good way to check on our health was the intelligence service agents. There were three transmitting to London on the islands and south bank of Loire in front of us, at about 2 or 3 miles from us. Etienne who was working for them as well as for us could have made the liaison between. And if we had found the IS contact in an area poisoned such as Loire Inferieure, it was far easier for SF to find the same contact in London. Besides, we don't realize why London was willing to send a Lysander and 3 other officers (as announced in messages) to the "Gestapo" and reluctant to run the risk of losing a few sten guns which did not mean very much in a war such as this one and did mean an immense lot to us.

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In fact, Mr. Marks, chief of our coding and decoding office, told us when we saw him that he had constantly emphasized that, in his opinion, we were okay and safe boys to play with.

But if this experience resolves a tricky point and helps to build a more perfect checking system of Jedburgh's authenticity for the next war and even this one, we'll think that this was a useful confusion and our only regret will be that team George had to be the one to bring the question out.

Operations, Team George IITEAM GEORGE II

Jedburgh team George's second mission was the 56th Jedburgh mission to France from the United Kingdom.

Members of Team

The members of team George II were:

Captain Paul Cyr, Inf (U.S.) (513), code name "Wigton"
 (Captain P. Erard) (French), code name "Save"
 (2nd Lieutenant C. Lejeune) (French), code name "Rupée"

Area to Which Dispatched

Team George II was dispatched on 7 September to the Bordeaux region of France.

Purpose of Mission

Team George II was to organize flying columns to harass the Boche in the Bordeaux region. They were dispatched with Mission Shinoile (514) and were to work with the organizer Temporal (515).

Summary of W/T Messages Exchanged

30 August From Watermark to Underfoot (516)

"Have urgent mission for Jed George consisting of

(513) War Diary Vol 11 p 589

(514) War Diary Vol 3 p

(515) War Diary Vol 3 p

(516) C-1894/1895 30 Aug 44

Declassified by 68147
 Date 23 January 1979

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Captains Cyr and Erard and 2nd Lt Lejeune, radio operator. Mission to include Fonction and Hauteur. Send three London urgently with all radio equipment. Inform them they have all three been proposed for Croix de Guerre with palm."

8 September From George (517)

"Arrived safely with all containers and equipment. Captain Erard hurt right leg. Contacted Adiabatique."

9 September From George (518)

"Erard broke right leg on landing. Refuses to be evacuated. Arms and personal kit destroyed on landing. Cyr making contact with U.S. Army. In Loudun area 1,000 men armed."

11 September From George (519)

"Captain Cyr went to Nantes, made contact with Felix and Mechalis. 20,000 Germans in St. Nazaire area. Felix needs arms, clothing immediately for 2,000 men. Suggest Dakota operations to Felix on airport at Bourguenais, 8 kilos north Nantes. Also send Jed team."

11 September From George (520)

"Indre department entirely liberated. Should mission toward the east become unnecessary please give approval in advance for us to send our groups to the west. 20,000 Boches in the Loire Inferieure. The FFI of the Loire Inferieure, unarmed, ask our help. Will undertake mission as soon as approval received, also additional information about west."

13 September From George (521)

"Frontal and Emminence arrived safely this morning."

14 September From SFHQ to George (522)

"We do not know origin of BBC announcement of the taking of La Rochelle. All cables received yesterday and this morning indicate town still strongly held by Germans. Send immediately details on actual situation. We are insisting upon immediate aerial or other intervention. If situation remains unchanged all our orders must be executed. First concentrate troops in Fontenay region; second, cut off La Rochelle."

16 September From George (523)

"Warn Air Force urgently that motorized columns FFI will be on road from Poitiers to Nantes on 16th and 17th. Do not machine gun. Have painted white stars on cars where possible."

(517) C-4214/1 8 Sep 44
(519) C-4431/6 11 Sep 44
(521) C-4697/13 13 Sep 44
(523) C-4953/20 16 Sep 44

(518) C-4271/2 9 Sep 44
(520) C-4478/7 11 Sep 44
(522) C-6538 14 Sep 44

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"Fear you have wrongly interpreted our information. The capitulation in question referred to 20,000 Germans commanded by General Elster in the Cher/Chateauroux/Issoudun Valley. Did not refer unfortunately to Boche in your region."

17 September From George (525)

"Two parachutists and containers arrived safely."

18 September From George (526)

"Our first columns have arrived in the region of Poybe, enemy south St. Nazaire."

20 September From George (527)

"Contacted General Dalbne, 94th Division, General Simpson, G-3, G-2, 9th Army. Also Major Shallcross SFHQ. Operations will be carried out in complete coordination with 94th Division and 9th Army."

26 September From George (528)

"Engagement between mobile group and enemy in front of Pornic on 24th. Enemy losses - 3 killed, 3 wounded, 5 prisoners. Erard contacted General Fortier, commander of artillery observation units, to get his permanent support. Cyr and Temporal had long interview with General Malony, 9th Army."

29 September From George (529)

"Are in close contact with enemy. Keeping up strong harassing action, patrols and ambushes. From 24th to 26th took 21 prisoners, one of whom officer. 5 killed. Large enemy elements going from north pocket to south pocket by boat. Pornic has received reinforcements of 1 battalion. Cyr and Eminence left for Les Sables-d'Olonne, for operation."

29 September From George (530)

"Immediately sent liaison to La Rochelle. Will send you information requested in next cables. Present situation south Loire Estuary - 16 line companies, 12 of whom form group under direct command Temporal, Shinoile. Engagements continuing. Many Boche prisoners. Have procured gasoline, oil and American rations but impossible get clothing, heavy arms and reinforcements American troops. Request you take steps to get SHAEF support."

(524) C-1871 16 Sep 44
 (526) C-215/26 18 Sep 44
 (528) C-801/42 26 Sep 44
 (530) C-1021/44 29 Sep 44

(525) C-62/3 17 Sep 44
 (527) C-387/30 20 Sep 44
 (529) C-1019/43 29 Sep 44

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"First information gathered on the spot shows on the contrary that little importance is attached to the Dere Islands by the German Command. These islands occupied by garrison, the majority of whom are Italians. Field artillery non-existent."

29 September From George (532)

"All arms, equipment to Mission Shinoile received from sea operation. Jed teams Frank and Quentin now with Shinoile."

3 October From Captain Galimand to George (533)

"First: we have been informed that tank reinforcements are arriving by sea at La Rochelle. Second: men arriving from Royan and Rochefort. Also, yesterday concentration of boats ready to leave noted at Point de Grave. Through reconnaissance thanks to your avalanche of Jeds, gather urgently details on situation. It is possible that German elements from Royan proceeding to La Rochelle. This movement requires watching."

5 October From Captain Galimand to George (534)

"Harold advises threatened at Surgeres and Rochefort. Germans lacking supplies at La Rochelle, apparently intend to occupy these towns. Civilians must evacuate Rochelle. This supply difficulty explains raid on farms which you pointed out. Have requested air intervention on Ile la Marechale but in view general situation don't think this objective will be used. We have also pointed out at your request Caserne Mangin. Are also exploiting Eminence's two nine and two three. Have also asked for action on La Trenblate and isles, but details on these points are still considered insufficient. Have however a few from Harold. Hope that use of Jed teams will permit of coordination and produce concise information."

18 October From SFHQ to George (535)

"General deLarminat newly designated commander of French forces for operations against Germans on the west coast will make an inspection tour starting 18 October. Report to him and give him complete cooperation. This cable is especially for all Jeds in SW France."

21 October From George (536)

"Have contacted Harold at Niort. 15 planes that were scheduled to arrive have not. Why the delay? Please send them soon as possible. Ground ready. We are impatiently waiting. Frank is in Niort working with Harold."

(531) C-1023/46 29 Sep 44
(533) Sked 1007 3 Oct 44
(535) A-476 18 Oct 44

(532) C-1022/45 29 Sep 44
(534) Sked 1014 5 Oct 44
(536) A-674/70 21 Oct 44

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24 October From Eminence via George (537)

"French staff commander St. Nazaire requests promotion to rank of major of Captain Cyr. Captain Cyr has done a remarkable job on this and his first mission with Allied troops, and as a representative of Allied troops with the French command. He personally took part in several engagements and was an example to all."

25 October From SFHQ to George (538)

"If General is in Nantes give him this message. Sending same Paris. American Captain Cyr of Shinoile Mission with whom you dined at Nantes the other day is now in London. Has possibility of sending arms if you make request and grant authorization through SHAEF channels."

28 October From SFHQ to George (539)

"Impossible to get equipment of any kind without SHAEF authorization. Request must come through General deLarminat. Colonel Vernon leaving for Paris to initiate this action. Cyr returning Monday by plane Paris."

29 October From Eminence via George (540)

"Impossible reach General deLarminat for a few days. Request Captain Cyr not to leave London before receiving General's answer."

31 October From SFHQ to George (541)

"Plane cancelled due to weather. Going Paris tomorrow. Sending supplies and ammunition sea ops to Les Sables d'Olonnes. General deLarminat does not answer. Have waited five days for answer. Going to see him in Paris personally."

4 November From SFHQ to George (542)

"Received cable Tony giving details German troop movements at Point de Grave and La Rochelle towards Tony's circuit. Have requested further details. Can you on your side tell us in what way these movements will affect the German strength of La Rochelle? How does this affect St. Nazaire region? Are changes made by changing garrison or are they definite reinforcements?"

6 November From SFHQ to George (543)

"Following instructions from General deLarminat concerning Jedburgh teams. Your mission is considered ended. However, you are to remain until arrival of (Colonel Carleton Smith.)"

(537) A-776/75 24 Oct 44
(539) A-925 28 Oct 44
(541) Sked 115 31 Oct 44
(543) A-1362 6 Nov 44

(538) Sked 1094 25 Oct 44
(540) A-943/80 29 Oct 44
(542) A-1252 4 Nov 44

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"Situation remains same except American artillery supporting us south St. Nazaire. Has sea ops left London?"

11 November From SFHQ to Eminence via George (545)

"Carleton Smith and Verger arriving Sunday morning at eight Sables d'Olonnes."

17 November From SFHQ to George (546)

"For Carleton Smith from Mockler Ferryman. Both Fenton and Whitty must return to England at the same time as other Jedburghs. If deLarminat requires their services he must send official request to this headquarters via French channels and SHAEF who ordered Jedburghs return here. Destroyer operation to Sables d'Olonnes not possible. Jedburghs to return via Paris when recovered."

21 November From SFHQ to George (547)

"Please acknowledge our last cables. When are you closing down and coming back. Did you get our messages for Colonel Carleton Smith. For Eminence. All your London friends congratulate you and send their best wishes."

Report of Team Upon Return from the Field - 7 Sept to 17 NovFrom London to Loudun

After returning from its first mission in Brittany team George joined with the DMR Hauteur and Fonction, Majors Martel and Villecourt. We were assigned consecutively two missions: one to Paris, which was annulled by the rapid advance of Leclerc; the other, in the Mines du Nord. Then we were offered to the Shinoile Mission and we accepted this assignment immediately.

The assignment proposed was that on being parachuted into Vienne we were supposed to organize the mobile columns destined to pursue the enemy in the regions of the center and the west where they sought either to hold out or to hide themselves.

(544) A-1324/84 10 Nov 44
(546) A-1862 17 Nov 44

(545) A-1651 11 Nov 44
(547) A-2037 21 Nov 44

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This mission was prepared simultaneously by the BCRA and EMFFI. Aside from normal equipment we took with us a Jedburgh set used by the former George plan.

On Thursday, 7 September 1944, at 1615 hours we left with seven candidates. The weather was rainy, windy and generally unfavorable. It had prevented other departures, but the American authorities at Harrington airdrome judged it in a pretty optimistic manner because at 2330 hours team George left the earth in a Liberator. Major Villecourt followed ten minutes later. The trip passed without incident and in spite of a very low ceiling the pilots located the dropping point with extraordinary precision and rapidity.

At 0145 hours we were at last over Pommard, the dropping point, at normal altitude. The jump was very hard by reason of violent wind and rain. Captain Cyr was unconscious several minutes while Captain Erard broke his left leg.

At the Maquis of Scevolles

At the chateau contact was made with Adiabatique, Major Cesar (548). Cesar explained the situation to us. He was at the head of a Maquis containing more than a thousand men scattered in the region. To this Maquis, called the Maquis of Scevolles, belonged among others the units stationed at Loudun (Captain Martineau), at Mirebeau (Captain Bedal), at la Haie-Descartes (Major Dominique), at Richelieu (Captain Alfred). The first message was written out after this first contact.

In the morning we were presented to Lieutenant Colonel Moreau, assigned to Adiabatique as deputy for Lieutenant Colonel Bernard, departmental chief of FFI at Vienne. Com-

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mander Villecourt left immediately for Poitiers, where he saw Lieutenant Colonel Bernard to whom he explained our mission. Bernard declared that before he could entrust us with the troops we were asking for he would have to obtain authorization to do so from his superiors.

Captain Cyr, on his side, went to Nantes. There he met Lieutenant Colonel Felix (known as Vaudel), departmental chief of FFI in the Loire Inferieure and sub-divisional chief for the region M2. He also saw Colonel York, commanding the task forces stationed at Nantes, and in particular his G-2. Cyr drew up an immediate request for materiel based on the situation as it was presented by Cesar.

Furthermore, Captain Erard entered the Loudun hospital, where an Xray showed him that a 24-hour march was not recommended for a fracture. He waited in bed for the necessary plaster, which the hospital did not possess. At last Lejeune established radio connections with London and sent off the first message.

The next day, 9 September, at Angouleme, during a meeting which included Colonel Druilhe, commander of the military region, Colonel Adeline, commanding operations, and the officers of the region, we obtained an agreement in principle so that the troops of the region would be organized into mobile columns under our command. We immediately sent out liaisons to Franck at Le Blanc, and through him to Ellipse (549). In other words, 24 hours after our arrival all the interested parties had been contacted and the foundations of our work had been laid.

On his side, Captain Cyr searched everywhere for the

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indispensable. From Nantes he went to Angers, where he had an interview with the colonel commanding the 83rd American Division with a view to obtaining motor fuel. The colonel sent him to the headquarters of the division at Chateaubriant, but had nevertheless promised to do his utmost to help him and, of his own accord, made an appointment with Cyr for the next day.

As everything was then settled, at least in principle, we turned our attention to reorganizing the units. A minute inspection of the companies showed that whereas discipline was good and the desire to do their best was evident, the units lacked everything. Clothing was non-existent. Many of the men were barefooted, the volunteers were not paid, transportation was nil, equipment (arms) insufficient and officers were lacking. There was much work to be done, but we wanted to get going quickly, very quickly. Also, the next day Commander Villecourt and Captain Cyr went to Le Blanc, to Franck and sent off a detailed report to London. But at the same time, we learned that the last German units in the Centre, against whom we were preparing to march according to the instructions received, had surrendered. It was, therefore, necessary for the Shinoile Mission to consider a change of objective.

For this purpose, Captain Cyr again went to Nantes in order to obtain precise information on the situation in the St. Nazaire pocket - effectives (units) present, order and urgency of requirements, the necessity or non-necessity of bringing up new elements. On his side, Commander Villecourt went to Poitiers in order to obtain the same information on

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La Rochelle.

The same day, Captain Erard left the hospital in plaster and took up his work again.

However, the next day, 13 September, Colonel Adeline, whom we had contacted at Saintes, declared that his effectives at Rochelle were more than sufficient and he even proposed sending reinforcements to St. Nazaire.

It was becoming evident, therefore, that our objective had to be and would be St. Nazaire. The question was settled when Cyr returned from Nantes and reported that the FFI troops there were definitely insufficient and that help had been requested in the Pornic-Palmbœuf sector. Consequently, a meeting was organized for the same evening at Chalet. Colonel Bernard, who in the meantime had been made commander of the sector included between La Rochelle and the south of the Loire Estuary, was to be there as well as Commander Junghans, Colonel Felix's representative.

At noon, Commander Martel arrived from Paris, where he had landed two days before, as well as Captain Roland (known as Eminence (550)). They were accompanied by Troubadour (551).

On 14 September at Chalet we obtained the agreement of the subdivisional and regional chiefs and sector commanders with regard to sending reinforcements to the south of the Loire Estuary. The first mobile detachment was formed. The GMN1 at this time included 5 companies of the ex-Maquis of Scevolles, plus Commander Patriarche's battalion. It was anticipated that other elements would have to be incorporated into the GMN1, in particular three other Cesar companies, and Commander de Razilly's battalion made up in Maine-et-Loire.

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That is to say eleven companies.

We arranged our mission in the following manner:

1. Command of the mobile group.
2. Liaison with American branch of the services and FFI troops in position to the north of the Loire Estuary, for the whole of the troops of the region.
3. Information destined for London.

It was now necessary to get our troops from Vienne to the Loire Inferieure. That is to say, they would have to cover nearly 200 kilometers. We had set going all the garages of the region which were working day and night on our trucks but there remained the problem of finding motor fuel. For this purpose Captain Cyr once again went to Rennes and to Chateaubriant. In this last city he arrived just in time to see the 83rd Headquarters Division. But at Rennes, having pleaded our cause at length with G-2 and G-4, he obtained 12,000 litres of gasoline in cans and the loan of the necessary trucks to transport it to Loudun. In this way the greatest difficulty was overcome.

Finally, on 15 September, Commander Martel went to Nantes and then to Rennes in order to obtain a definite agreement from the regional, subdivisional and departmental chiefs. Moreover, it was a question of coordinating the operation, which had been planned and decided upon at Chalet with the evolutions of the situation in the Loire Inferieure. Commander Villecourt, at Poitiers, was settling the same questions with Colonel Bernard. Commander Martel returned in the evening from Nantes with Colonel Michelin's agreement.

At the same time we took steps with the regional and

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local quartermasters in order to obtain the minimum necessary for our displacement.

It is an opportune moment in which to point out that if this report gives a brief account of the steps taken and the goings and comings which were necessary to obtain the needed agreements, it does not in its dryness show the enormous difficulties encountered in the setup of a cut and dried command. These difficulties reappeared each time a particular question was brought up. The directives were such that interferences occurred continually and it was necessary each time to consult someone other than the person you supposed would be qualified to make a decision. The difficulties encountered in the organization of the units were just as big. All the steps taken to get the indispensable necessities ended up in merely receiving a little soap, some tinned food and hearty encouragement. However, we were determined to leave anyway, and as quickly as possible, even if no help was given us.

We believed that the fact of actually getting started would bring forth the means of support that the static situation did not. Finally, at the departure, it was our staff which requested the unit (the company) for the help which it was supposed to have given it.

The day before the departure, we received a parachute delivery, as well as 2nd Lieutenants Boven and Philip at Pommard. During the night we drew up the order for our first movement.

Displacement of Mobile Groupment No. 1

In the morning, the first echelon of the mobile column

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started out by the following itinerary: Loudun, Thouars, Vrines, a detour at Riche (the Vrines bridge having been destroyed), Argenton-Chateau, the Aubiers, Chatillon Sevre, Clisson, Aigrefeuille, Montbert and St. Philbert.

The 2nd Echelon of the column of volunteer corps from Richelieu and the 1st company of the battalion from Contry-Freslon followed shortly afterwards and normally completed the first stage of their march, Richelieu to Mortague.

At last the 3rd Echelon of the column left Sunday morning, 17 September. It included the 1st and 2nd companies of the battalion from Loudun and the 3rd company from Mirebeau. The staff, minus those who had been detached to leave with the first echelon, were the last to leave.

The whole of the column and the displacement were placed under the orders of Captain Erard. The itinerary of the 3rd Echelon was the same as that of the first two echelons as far as Vieille Vigne. From there the 3rd company and the staff went to St. Jean, the 1st and 2nd companies went to St. Columbin (entrance from St. Philbert). The command post of the groupment was stationed on its arrival at St. Jean.

The same day the 2nd Echelon of the column (volunteer corps and 1st company of the Contry-Freslon battalion) had to carry out the second stage of its march, Mortague to Lege, following the itinerary already laid down. Aside from a few mechanical incidents, all went off to perfection, the road and cantonment passwords always being observed. At the end of the journey the column entered a region which, although free of Germans, had never yet been occupied by, nor even crossed by, FFI or Allied troops. The reception was

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enthusiastic, as can be imagined. We made the liberation concrete for its inhabitants.

To the South of the Loire

At the end of the march, we decided to install the command post at St. Etienne de Corcone, which offered more possibilities than did St. Jean. While Commanders Villecourt and Martel were making a tour of the dropping points, Captains Erard and Cyr were setting up the command post, searching for quarters, temporary offices, hiring the necessary personnel and having the electricity restored.

Sunday evening we drew up the orders for movement No. 2 with regard to the displacement of the Patriarche battalion.

The following day, Villecourt went to Poitiers. During this time Erard, for whom it was painful to even move about in a car, stayed at St. Etienne to get the command post going. Commanders Martel and Cyr, after a brief inspection of the units, started out on the road to Pornic.

They were using a jeep borrowed from the Ninth Army, which Cyr was driving. The two officers crossed no man's land and continued without stopping until they were in sight of the German fortifications. Audaciously following their plan they reached the first German barricade of Pornic, Captain Cyr flourishing a white handkerchief and Commander Martel ready to shoot. The German garrison was so stupefied they did not shoot. The two officers got out of the car and presented themselves to the sergeant in command of the enemy unit. They asked the German to surrender himself and his men according to honorable conditions. After a long palavre, the sergeant decided that he would have to refer to his

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superior, who, having been urgently called, declared that he did not want to do anything without the advice of the lieutenant colonel commanding the fortified place.

It was thus that Cyr and Martel had a long interview with the superior German officer, who refused to surrender and advised them to leave without further delay. In fact, on the German side a discussion had taken place. One sergeant felt that Cyr and Martel should be kept as prisoners while another asserted the contrary with, fortunately, as much energy. It was the latter who triumphed and Cyr and Martel got back into their car and returned to our lines.

The next day, 19 September, was a busy day. Villecourt went to Nantes. In the meantime, Martel made contact with Captain Simon, commanding a group of French SAS, with Captain Fournier, commanding another group of SAS, and with the Yaco and Beigneux groups of the Loire Inferieure units.

Cyr, at Nantes, saw General Scheele, commanding the American 94th Infantry Division, and at Rennes had an interview with General Simpson, commanding the Ninth Army. He was passed on to G-2 and G-3 and saw Lieutenant Colonel (then Major) Laurence Shallcross, Cav, at SFHQ. To all of these he explained the situation and our needs, asking for additional resources and all the help possible. Finally, he paid a long visit to General Malony, commanding the 94th Division, on whom we should have to depend principally.

The next day, at Nantes, Erard again saw General Scheele and, at Colonel Felix's headquarters, met General Fortier, commanding the Artillery Division of the 94th Division.

Following all these interviews, our position was beginning

Operations, Team George II (Cont'd)

to be known and help could be discounted.

The disposition provided for the encampment of the troops was as follows: On the one hand in contact with the advanced German line (Paimboeuf to Pornic), there would be:

1. The parachutists - Captain Simon 3/4 south of the zone with command post at St. Pazanue; Captain Fournier 1/4 north of the zone.

2. The FFI in support, the Charian, Lagardere, Besnier groups at the disposal of Captain Simon; Yaco group at the disposal of Captain Fournier.

On the other hand, in depth:

1. North Zone, St. Pazanne, Retz, Arthon, Machecoul route - the Mobile Groupment No. 1.

2. South Zone, Commander Marcel's battalion.

3. St. Pere-en-Retz and Arthon, Mobile Groupment No. 1.

Until the first of October the Mobile Groupment No. 1 was to occupy the whole of the zone. The forward line was fixed along Rouans, Chemere, Arthon, and Les Moutiers. Operations, for the moment, would be limited to the placing of the units and slight reconnaissances. Our troops were immediately installed. However, on 21 September, we moved our command post forward to St. Hilaire de Chaleons in order to have better control over our units.

Here is a good place to insert a rather remarkable incident. Captain Cyr, during his visit to the German garrison at Pornic, had been notified that an enemy lieutenant wanted to see him privately. By means of intermediary secret FFI agents, a meeting was arranged and he contacted the lieutenant between the approach lines, then on our side. (The

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name of this German officer cannot be revealed at present for, at the time that this report is being drawn up, he is still working for us.)

This officer then offered to give Captain Cyr at all times useful information on enemy displacements in exchange for a ticket for a distant country of which he was a native. Cyr referred this to Commander Villecourt and, after hesitating to arrest him (as in effect he had been able to learn certain details of our disposition), we decided to give him one chance to prove his good faith. He was, therefore, during the night led back to the enemy lines. For the moment the affair went no further.

During this time, we organized our services at St. Hilaire, where the civil authorities and the population had given us a memorable reception, and received the visit of Captain de Rocheconste who, with Commander de Razilly, were soon to put under our orders their battalions from Saumur. Contact was likewise made with Commander Poupet, commanding a battalion from the Loire Inferieure to the south of the river. Finally, Lieutenant Hergat, chief of the resistance of the interior of the south pocket, came to place himself at our disposal.

Our services were growing rapidly. The G-1, G-2, G-3 and G-4 were formed. We needed considerably more space, which led to our installing ourselves at Moulin Heuriet, superb chateau belonging to Count de la Rueille, 2 kilometers from Ste. Pazanne. At the same time we declared all the territory included between the Loire, the sea and the line Bourgneuf, Ste Pazanne, Port St. Pere, Le Pelerin as war

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zone and advised all the civilians to evacuate this zone.

The same day, 23 September, the German lieutenant, previously mentioned, kept his promises. We had asked him to send out that day a patrol made up of ten men, at a determined time and by a fixed route, in order to make certain of destroying it. It was to be the first test. At the hour and place indicated a German patrol, made up of ten men, was coming down the Pornic road. Our ambushade, already in place, was made up of a few armed jeeps, groups of parachutists, and a FFI unit. When the Germans were only a few metres away, we let loose a fire of hell on them. Not one escaped. Three were killed and seven were made prisoners (one of whom was wounded). This lieutenant could have sent to their death in this manner White Russians or Poles or anyone else. But these were real Germans and 100 percent Nazi. We decided then and there to have the lieutenant work for us, however little in esteem we held him.

The next day, Sunday the 24th, there was a serious encounter with the enemy near the village of Chauve. The Germans left six killed on the ground. We had to keep Chauve for fear of the terrible reprisals on the population because of the warm welcome they had given to our troops. It presented an inconvenience by creating a salient on our front. In consequence, we made all useful arrangements, notably specifying that the village would have to be evacuated during the night and occupied during the day.

Furthermore, after an agreement between the civilian authorities and the Germans, the civilian population of Pornic and Palmboeuf were evacuated. It was also necessary to create,

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in liaison with the CIC, a sorting center (Bouaye was decided upon) in order to determine exactly the compulsory route of march, special guards, retreat limits, etc.

This activity was doubled by the continual bringing up of new elements. Following the steps we had taken on our arrival, battalions from the Centre were detailed under our orders. Considerably reinforced, we operated a new advance which placed our positions at the following points - from south to north, La Bernerie, Arthon-en-Retz, Chauve, Chemiere, Pont Berenger, Port-St. Pere, Rouans and Vue; while in depth we occupied Haute-Perche, Les Moutiers, Bourgneuf, St. Hilaire, Ste. Pazanne and Bouaye.

The Germans reacted. They reinforced their advance posts considerably and made large scale troop movements, which used up the small stocks of fuel which they possessed. Their morale also suffered. One felt that they were uneasy and nervous, and their patrols stopped raiding the countryside.

However, contrary to what had happened north of the Loire, we demanded that our troops leave a no man's land of several kilometers between themselves and the advance enemy posts. Our reasons were the following:

1. The enemy had artillery and we had none. It was, therefore, useless to place our men under the fire of their guns.
2. It saved us from weary guard duty and being on perpetual alert.
3. That enabled our agents and the population of the no man's land to warn us of German sorties before they were on top of us.

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But we still needed much more materiel (weapons) clothing, medical supplies and motor fuel. Following our telegrams, London announced a naval operation for the 27th. On the 26th, therefore, Captain Cyr went to Sables d'Olonne, accompanied by Captain Eminence in order to prepare for its delivery. On his side, Captain Erard, who had been made chief of headquarters and of the 2me Bureau (G-2), had completely organized his service and was capable of giving the American authorities and the units the complete plans and disposition of the German defenses down to a machine gun. ✓

The German defenses appeared as follows: on the side, a series of forts turned towards the interior Pornic, St. Brevin, St. Michel-Chef-Chef, Mindin, etc. Then an irregular belt of mobile defenses; light guns, blockhouses, etc. Lastly, after a practically deserted zone, a line of advance posts anchored at Pornic, St. Pere-en-Rety and Fressais. That was the situation.

On Thursday, 28 September, the announced debarkation took place at Sables d'Olonne. There also arrived by boat Jedburgh teams Frank and Quentin. The materiel was divided in the following manner: Shinoile Mission, one half; Jedburgh Tony, one fourth; and Jedburgh Harold, one fourth. The same day, the 94th Division permanently detailed Lieutenant MacFarlan to the Mobile Groupment No. 1. Erard immediately gave him a complete sketch of the enemy and FFI positions with a plan of all types of German fortifications and their respective location in the defense system. ✓

Finally, Lieutenant Monterol, who had come from London, increased the personnel of the Shinoile Mission. The fol-

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lowing days were filled with frequent engagements with the enemy, all of which we won, except during the day of 3 October when one of Captain Martineau's patrols became engaged 2 kilometers northwest of Frossay and could only be disengaged with the support of parachutists and Captain Tarzan was killed. ✓

On 4 October, Colonel Birien asked Colonel Bernard, commanding subdivision B 2, and Lieutenant Colonel Michel, departemental chief in Vienne, to proceed with the formalities of forming battalions placed under our command. Two solutions were proposed: either to perform the formalities in the original departement (Poitiers) or leave it to the departement in which the encampment was situated, (Nantes). Finally, the solution adopted was a combination, but was only carried out some time later.

The question was a delicate one for our supplies and the delivery of the resources we needed depended on it. But, to these administrative difficulties other more serious ones were added. The early autumn found our men without clothing and our services without medical supplies. The physical condition of our men became more and more critical and we had to send out SOS after SOS. ✓

By dint of efforts made, we finally obtained the minimum of our requirements.

On 7 October, that is to say one month after our arrival, ✓ we were able to draw up the following balance sheet: nearly 3,000 armed and equipped men are in position south of the Estuary; the St Nazaire and La Rochelle pockets definitely isolated, with no possible infiltration; the enemy, driven back to his stationary defenses, without supply bases and

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in a state of alert day and night; the staffs formed; liaison set up; a single command established; in fact, our mission practically completed.

At this time, Colonel Felix, subdivisonal chief in M 2 and departemental chief in Loire-Inferieure, had just been made chief of operations for the entire St Nazaire pocket. The work we had done in the south was apparently considered satisfactory enough for him to offer the Shinoile Mission the practical command, under his authority, of all the troops north and south of the Estuary.

Having accepted this new mission, on 9 October we left the south sector command to Lieutenant Colonel Claude, who in this way came under our orders.

At Nantes

The Shinoile Mission installed itself at the Hotel St George, at Nantes, on 9 October. Commander Villecourt was made chief of staff to Lieutenant Colonel Felix. Commander Martel became chief of the 3rd Bureau (G-3). Captain Eminence-Roland became chief of the 4th Bureau. Captain Cyr became Chief of the Inter-Allied Liaison Services.

Political interference did not allow us to organize the sectors to the best advantage. We commenced by dividing the whole of the St Nazaire pocket into three sub-sectors: The south sub-sector (to the south of the Loire Estuary) - Lieutenant Colonel Claude; the Center sub-sector, from the Loire to the left wing of the American Units which were in position - Commander Poupet, and subsequently, Commander Junghans. The North sub-sector, from the right wing of the American units to the Sea.

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Captain Erard organized his service in the same way: A second central-bureau at Nantes, one section of the 2nd Bureau included in each sub-sector command. One central bureau and in each Section. One Service A (2nd Bureau) connected with the units, one Service B (Intelligence Service) connected with the agents, one cartography service, one synthesis service, one liaison service, one materiel service.

The south section of the 2nd Bureau (G-2) was under the direction of Lieutenant Hergat; the center section under Lieutenant Horvene; the north section under Lieutenant Jimmy. All the Bureau (G-1, G-2, G-3 and G-4) went to work straightening things out. In a few weeks the card index files were up to date, the register set up, pay settled, grades verified; clothing was arriving, munitions coming in; trucks repaired and sent off again, henceforth insuring regular service; motor-fuel was no longer wasted; American rations were granted to our men; tobacco rations were doubled; the disposition verified; the inefficient chiefs relieved of their command; information was coming in regularly, more than 70 agents working exclusively for us; we had our air force and our artillery. General de Larminat, on an inspection tour of the sector, was able to declare that we had done good work.

From 9 October to 15 November we insured the command of the St Nazaire Sector and the operation of all the services.

It would be impossible to give a detailed account of our difficulties, successes, and failures. However, the incorporation of the FFI into the regular Army was passing into the practical sphere.

Colonel Chaumel, put in command of the FFLI, St Nazaire sector of operations, took over his post on 9 November. He

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asked the Shinoile Mission to stay with him. But, considering that our part was concluded and that our speciality and our training demanded other tasks, we were given permission to return.

On 20 November, our mission completed, we presented ourselves to our respective staffs.

Financial Statement

Team George

All the team's money was lost in combat.

Team George II

Received - - - - - 450,000 francs

Expenditures

Lejeune expenses - - - - -	50,000
Eleven bicycles - - - - -	110,000
Agents south and north- - - - -	98,000
Agents in Centre - - - - -	7,000
Expenses Cyr - - - - -	45,000
Expenses Erard - - - - -	57,800
Car repair - - - - -	6,500
Body guard - - - - -	15,000
Debts from first mission - - - - -	20,050
Total - - - - -	409,350 francs
Returned - - - - -	41,000
Excess - - - - -	350 francs

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JEDBURGHS 265

Operations, Team HamishTEAM HAMISH (551a)Summary of W/T Messages Exchanged29 June From SFHQ to Hamish (552)

"Our information Le Blanc airfield is that it is at present obstructed but that the Germans propose to bring it back into use. If true this puts it out of court as a ground for our purposes."

30 June From Hamish (553)

"Boche active. Impossible confirm Le Blanc. Ask Hugh. Terrain Paris okay Lysander. Do you want it."

3 July From Hamish (554)

"Chutes did not open on 12 containers. Rifles and Brens smashed. Can you send more petrol, carbines, rifles, bazooka or plat and tommy guns. Do not want Sten if Tommy gun available. Arming sedentaires. How about our mail and reading material."

4 July From Hamish (555)

"Undergoing growing pains. Reorganization under way by end of week will have 7 companies of 160 men each dispersed in sections of 30. Areas are Aigurande, Cluis and south of St Severe. Principal questions training and liaison. Lack leaders. We have schools for NCO and Officers."

4 July From Hamish (556)

"The men are paid 10 francs a day. To keep this up need 500,000 francs a month. Can you help us. Equipment arming each company as follows - 19 pistols, 22 Sten, 30 carbine, 12 submachine gun, 59 rifles, 10 Bren, 6 bazooka plus 2 mortars if available. All equipment now handled by battalion store."

4 July From Hamish (557)

"Sabotage blown 3 bridges between La Chatre and Montlucon and 1 south of St Amand. Have derailed train between Chateaufumeillant and La Chatre. We have our own car now and petrol is scarce."

5 July From Hamish (558)

"Captured 15 tons butter destined for Boche also the truck. Took it from under their noses at La Chatre. One Boche killed. Distributing butter in villages."

7 July From Hamish (559)

"Are now 84 Stukas at Chateauroux airfield. Can handle 300 containers during non-moon period. Estimate

(551a) See p 46 1st Qtr this Vol	
(552) C-5871 29 Jun 44	(553) C-4611/33 30 Jun 44
(554) C-4674/44 3 Jul 44	(555) C-4695/42 4 Jul 44
(556) C-4696/50 4 Jul 44	(557) C-4698/45 4 Jul 44
(558) C-4745/59 5 Jul 44	(559) C-4797/59 7 Jul 44

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date 23 January 1979

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2000 men here by end July. Equipment desired - rifles, Bren, bazooka, mortars, Tommy gun, grenades 303 ammo. For non-moon period use terrain New York, Daphne, Milton in that order."

7 July From Hamish (560)

"Feel question of leaders will be acute by end of July. If requested could you send us French officers and NCO's"

(A series of telegrams follows from Hamish concerning dropping grounds and details for receptions.)

13 July From SFHQ to Hamish (561)

"Could send you junior French officers with very good training but no battle experience. How many would you like and where could you receive them."

15 July From Hamish (562)

"Okay for tonight, will send crack. Want one officer to command 500 men. Also 15 men to act as leaders of sections of 36 men. Send as soon as possible."

17 July From Hamish (563)

"Attacked by 400 Boche. We stopped them but could not prevent their retreat. Our losses were slight. Boche losses later. We could have raised hell with them if we had mortars. Please get mortars to us. Boche using 20 mm. AUC 37 mm cannon plus a heavy machine-gun that sounds like an American 50 caliber. Could you send some chocolate for your wounded."

20 July From Hamish (564)

"Is there going to be a general mobilization order here? If so, feel essential you send us as many young French officers as possible. Action being taken on request for one senior officer and 15 aspirants."

20 July From SFHQ to Hamish (565)

"Hope to be able to send some junior French officers early August moon."

21 July From Hamish (566)

"Report here attack by 2 Boche Divs in Creuse. Have you any information?"

21 July From Hamish (567)

"Need maps badly. 1 to 50,000 covering Southeast

(560) C-4798/60 7 Jul 44
(562) C-80/87 15 Jul 44
(564) C-236/2 20 Jul 44
(566) C-259/65 21 Jul 44

(561) C-3908 13 Jul 44
(563) C-141/92 17 Jul 44
(565) C-4078 20 Jul 44
(567) C-288/7 21 Jul 44

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JEDBURGHs

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Indre and northeast Creuse. We have got to have them. Are we going to get mortars? Please answer."

21 July From SFHQ to Hamish (568)

"Tell us source your information on Boche divisions and if it is reliable. Have had rumors their presence in Creuse."

22 July From Hamish (569)

"Report on Creuse from officer in that group who escaped to north. Our liaison with Creuse broken."

22 July From Hamish (570)

"Reports persist here that Military Mission in Creuse captured. Do you know? Moving north next few days."

25 July From Hamish (571)

"Creuse disorganized according to reports here. Attempting to go there, will report later. Investigating Department Cher also. Undertaking to arm FTP group near here."

26 July From Hamish (572)

"Hitler's mobilization order sending our recruiting way up. Need trained officers and NCOs desperately. As a beginning can you send us 20 junior officers and one senior officer during August moon? This is essential if you want us to undertake any large-scale operation."

27 July From Hamish (573)

"Reference your message number 25. With exception of roads we have been doing exactly what your message calls for. We have blown bridges where we find bridges but can do more. For this need plastic, Bickford and Crodex. Only can step up guerrilla action if possible to find Boche. Have you any further instructions?"

28 July From Hamish (574)

"Department Cher situation follows. 500 men located northeast of Bourges without arms. Evidently could use a Jed team. Could receive Jeds here and send to area. What do you think? Preparing coordinated plan for roads and ambush on receipt of messages."

28 July From SFHQ to Hamish (575)

"Tell us if possible present location German 7th

(568) C-5974 21 Jul 44
(570) C-312/12 22 Jul 44
(572) C-479/21 26 Jul 44
(574) C-555/29 28 Jul 44

(569) C-297/11 22 Jul 44
(571) C-422/20 25 Jul 44
(573) C-517/28 27 Jul 44
(575) C-6034 28 Jul 44

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Armored Division which we believe near your area. In any case report number of bogies on any tanks your region and any signs or distinctive markings indicating to which division they belong. Suggest you stay where you are and do not go to Creuse where we have already important Allied mission. No objection if you organize southern Cher for present. Heavy machine-guns or mortars not available. Impossible send you great number officers but doing utmost. Send you two or three next month."

29 July From Hamish (576)

"Your message number 28 received too late. Here in Creuse now. Have been requesting information from you on Creuse for over a week and your failure to reply promptly plus reports from reliable sources here of capture of all Jed mission by Boche necessitated verification. Will organize southern Cher but tell Jed team need faster reply soonest. No news armored division here as yet."

29 July From Hamish (577)

"More on Cher. Southern part completely disorganized. Chef has been killed. Have very few arms. If Jed team possible."

30 July From Hamish (578)

"More of Cher. So far we know of 2 groups. One of 400 men. Demobilized and without arms in southern Cher. Another of 500 men organized but without arms north of Bauro. Neither have contact with London. If we get shipments immediately can arm parts. Also can cut road between Bourges and Tours and between Issoudun and Orleans. Will work them in to coordinated attack if have time on railroad, telephone, road and ambushade. No news of armored divisions."

30 July From SFHQ to Hamish (579)

"Did you obtain any information Creuse about capture mission. Advise you keep clear of Creuse in future but organize south Cher in addition your present territory. Hope send very soon Jedburgh team to take over this area"

31 July From Hamish (580)

"Blac here should return from Creuse tonight. Only interest in Creuse because when briefed we were to withdraw in that direction if too hot here. Consequently looked to mission in Creuse for coordination if necessary. Are we to understand you do not want us if necessary to withdraw Creuse direction?"

(576) C-617/29 29 Jul 44
(578) C-681/33 30 Jul 44
(580) C-717/34 31 Jul 44

(577) C-634/30 29 Jul 44
(579) C-4384 30 Jul 44

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JEDBURGH

Operations, Team Hamish (Cont'd)31 July From Hamish (581)

"Situation Cher very bad. Many who desire to fight but there is no one yet outstanding enough to take control. Send Jeds soon as possible. Not enough torches hence will use bonfires."

31 July From SFHQ to Hamish (582)

"No objection you organize south Cher to St Amand as another organizer handles department from St Amand to old demarcation line and two other organizers have divided the Cher above demarcation line. Give requirements for groups your sector and we will make deliveries. Please give contacts for groups outside your sector. Hope send you help soon. Hoping to send operation ground Paris soonest. If necessary to withdraw follow instructions your briefing."

31 July From Hamish (583)

"No one knows what has happened to military mission in Creuse. Chef of Creuse is now in Correze. Will have more information. Do know that 1 car used by mission now in hands of Boche."

1 August From Hamish (584)

"Convoy of tanks reported moving from Limoges to Gueret this morning. Not identified. Will keep you informed."

1 August From Hamish (585)

"We have obtained a report dated 15 June 1944 on the manufacture of airplanes in the Bourges area. The type is a twin-engine transport for 10 or 12 persons. Engines are 380 horsepower. From report not much work is being done."

1 August From Hamish (586)

"The Billancourt factory has been decentralized as follows - one factory at St Florent 24 kms south of Bourges where parts are made; another factory underground 3 kms southeast of Bourges where final assembly is done and a third in Bourges itself where the fuselage is assembled."

1 August From Hamish (587)

"There is a fourth factory at Issoudun making part of the fuselage. Making plans to sabotage all 4 factories. At present these factories are short of materials notably oxygen for acetelene torches, light metals, skrey iron and stell. In addition electric supply is stopped quite often. Nothing arrives by train."

(581) C-731/35 31 Jul 44
(583) C-732/36 31 Jul 44
(585) C-783/40 1 Aug 44
(587) C-785/42 1 Aug 44

(582) C-6067 31 Jul 44
(584) C-775/39 1 Aug 44
(586) C-784/41 1 Aug 44

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JEDBURGH

Operations. Team Hamish (Cont'd)1 August From Hamish (588)

"Have you any information on a launching ground for the new JPCOE flying bomb north of Bourges. Will have more information early next week."

2 August From Hamish (589)

"Have made contact with Chef of group south St Amand. 1200 men all soldiers. It's a piece of cake for Jed team. Please send them soon."

2 August From Hamish (590)

"More of Cher. We have found French colonel who will take command of south Cher. He has 12,000 men and all request for arms this sector we refer to him. The Jed team will go to him. It's beginning to look much better. There was a connection between Creuse and Cher but now it's broken. Making receptions with bonfires and Eureka."

2 August From SFHQ to Hamish (591)

"Thanks for valuable information. Have made special request for plastic. Hope send soon. For group south St Amand will send you Jed team soonest. Give us ground where you can receive them."

3 August From Hamish (592)

"Slightly injured American P51 pilot brought to us. Name follows - Albert Debacker, 65 Wing, 355 Fighter Group. Confirmation and instructions."

3 August From Hamish (593)

"Received 2 planes last night ground Paris. Will receive Jed team ground Paris. Need more money American, cigarettes and mail. Toss in a few novels too."

4 August From Hamish (594)

"Ambushed 3 petrol trucks of Milice near Lignieres. All burned. Approximately 10 Milice killed. Our losses none whatsoever. Can you give us exact day Jed team arrival. Necessary to plan activity here."

4 August From SFHQ to Hamish (595)

"Sending Jedburgh team Ivor on ground Paris from tomorrow Saturday 5th. Acknowledge if okay."

5 August From SFHQ to Hamish (596)

"Would like you to make rendezvous Ellipse, who is Delege Militaire your region. Ellipse is the representative

(588) C-786/43 1 Aug 44
 (590) C-851/46 2 Aug 44
 (592) C-885/47 3 Aug 44
 (594) C-954/50 4 Aug 44
 (596) C-6140 5 Aug 44

(589) C-809/45 2 Aug 44
 (591) C-6097 2 Aug 44
 (593) C-913/48 3 Aug 44
 (595) C-223 4 Aug 44

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of General Koenig and as such you are under his jurisdiction in your region. Please confirm whether you can contact Ellipse otherwise we will arrange rendezvous from this end."

6 August From SFHQ to Hamish (597)

"American pilot Albert DeBacker actually reported missing. Following his description - 5 feet 8 inches tall, weight 133 pounds, brown hair, hazel eyes, dark complexion, wide forehead, pointed chin, mother was born in Belgium. In order to establish his bonafide note following questions and answers. First, who is Terry. Answer should be flight leader. Second, who is Duchess. Answer, the dog at airfield. Please advise results. Sending Jed team Ivor and 1 million in containers marked with white cross on ground Paris tonight."

6 August From Hamish (598)

"BBC message received. All set. Tell the boys to bring some American cigarettes for us."

7 August From Hamish (599)

"Goddard killed. Do not know how but he died instantly upon hitting ground. Chute opened but not completely. Legbag still on him. Radio completely broken. Burial tomorrow. More later."

7 August From Hamish (600)

"Received two planes last night. Found container white cross. Cox and Dantec slightly injured in landing. Making rendezvous with Colonel Bertrand this morning. Will pass their messages our radio using their skeds. Buying Goddard this afternoon with full military honors in cemetery at Bedes. Anstett has his personal effects. Identification DeBacher positive. Request instructions."

7 August From SFHQ to Hamish (601)

"Your request for large quantity explosive, we will dispatch 15 containers of total of 30 to ground Aileen. We wish you to attack vital machinery only not to demolish factories completely. Very sorry indeed bad news Goddard. Will try send another operator soon. In meantime you will please handle traffic of Ivor team. Hope Cox and Dantec have recuperated. Reference DeBacker cannot pick him up right now. In meantime can you use him in the maquis or advise him to use his own escape line."

8 August From Hamish (602)

"Pinpoint of launching ground Boche flying bomb follows, 4 kms northwest Dun sur Auron. Boche require 250 kilo watts for their activity these. There is a radar

(597) C-341 6 Aug 44	(598) C-1127/52 6 Aug 44
(599) C-1171/55 7 Aug 44	(600) C-1185/56 7 Aug 44
(601) C-6160 7 Aug 44	(602) C-1277/53 8 Aug 44

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station here. All equipment on the field has been dug in Bernow."

9 August From Hamish (603)

"We have another pilot. American 1st Lt Harrison Meller, 448 Bomb Group, 713 Bomb Squadron. Parachuted north of Paris April 1 1944. Please confirm."

9 August From Hamish (604)

"When you send men into field suggest you do not drop men and containers same run. None of Ivor's team left till it was past the field. Also suggest never drop under 600 feet."

9 August From Hamish (605)

"Commanding General Premier Regiment of France captured tonight near Crevant."

9 August From SFHQ to Hamish (606)

"Loosmore arriving from Hugh. Will be for Ivor. Loosmore will meet you ground Paris. Password, 'I come from Captain Monmouth'. Give us some details about operator with Colonel Bertrand who willing take traffic for Ivor. Make request for money to Ellipse who has sufficient funds available."

10 August From Hamish (607)

"Know nothing about operator with Colonel Bertrand. Will ask Ivor. Will meet Loosmore Ivor. No word from Ellipse."

10 August From Hamish (608)

"Do you have any information on 7 Boche divisions coming north this area. Urgent you reply soonest possible."

11 August From Hamish (609)

"Had contact Antoine yesterday. Will have liaison with him. Sent both pilots north with him. Send on what equipment available. Realized our difficulties. Is Ellipse coming here? Loosmore not here yet. When are you sending French officers here."

11 August From SFHQ to Hamish (610)

"Congratulations on capture of Commandant Berlon. Keep him for eventual exchange for important political prisoner. Ellipse is traveling. Will arrange contact on his return."

(603) C-1319/57 9 Aug 44
(605) C-1348/60 9 Aug 44
(607) C-1364/61 10 Aug 44
(609) C-1465/60 11 Aug 44

(604) C-1324/58 9 Aug 44
(606) C-734 9 Aug 44
(608) C-1427/62 10 Aug 44
(610) C-61197 11 Aug 44

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JEDBURGHs

Operations, Team Hamish (Cont'd)12 August From Hamish (611)

"Boche leaving Chateauroux towards Montlucon. We are ambushing wherever possible."

12 August From SFHQ to Hamish (612)

"Boche shows signs leaving your area. Now is the time for increased guerrilla activities but take all steps possible to preserve permanent works, bridges, etc."

12 August From SFHQ to Hamish (613)

"Inform us soonest arrival Loosmore. Ref French officers will revert. Harrison Meller missing. Here are some checks. Mother is Elizabeth MacFarlane, father's Christian name Norman, wife Virginia, daughter Elizabeth Putnam. Born 14 July. Home address Hargey Street, Philadelphia, Squadron commander is Major Thompson, nicknamed Tommy or Hebe, Group commander is Colonel Thompson."

12 August From Hamish (614)

"Reference our message information incorrect. Boche left Chateauroux direction Bourges last night. Awaiting information Chateauroux airfield. If possible to attack will do so tomorrow."

13 August From Hamish (615)

"Loosmore arrived. Will send on soon as possible. Preparing to move on Chateauroux. Awaiting final orders from DMR."

14 August From Hamish (616)

"Loosmore wants to use W/T plan Andy for Ivor. Suggest you comply. Most of Goddards crystals were broken. Reply this afternoon."

15 August From SFHQ to Hamish (617)

"Information received that 159th German Div approaching battle area in north. Go all out delay or stop them."

15 August From Hamish (618)

"Everything is quiet here. All roads are ambushed and now useless. Recruiting here extremely rapid now. Doing utmost but there is not much here."

16 August From Hamish (619)

"What type of Division is 159th. Will do all possible stop."

(611) C-1523/66 12 Aug 44
 (613) C-1083 12 Aug 44
 (615) C-1626/69 13 Aug 44
 (617) C-6231 15 Aug 44
 (619) C-1794/72 16 Aug 44

(612) C-6210 12 Aug 44
 (614) C-1555/67 12 Aug 44
 (616) C-1657/71 14 Aug 44
 (618) C-1758/71 15 Aug 44

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16 August From SFHQ to Hamish (620)

"159th Division is a training division."

17 August From Hamish (621)

"1000 Boche concentrated around airfield 3 kms east of Chateauroux. Very few remain in city itself. They do not travel in our sector now. Airfield is mined. Could you strafe them."

18 August From Hamish (622)

"Flying bomb ramps at Dun sur Avron are almost ready. The bomb has four separate wings which when opened make one wing on front and one wing on back of body. Test flight recently bomb crashed immediately after take-off because one wing did not open. The bomb is 6 meters long and 2 meters in diameter. The ramp is vertical making 2 loops after which the projectile departs. The wings are supposed to open when it leaves the ramp. The above information supposed to come from a Boche officer. Am trying to confirm."

19 August From Hamish (623)

"There is a chateau on route 76. It is 2 1/2 kms east of center of Bourges where there are 350 Boche officers. 300 meters south of the chateau are 15 buildings which house the Boche. The name of the chateau is Desgadeaux. Could you pay them our compliments."

19 August From Hamish (624)

"We are still holding roads in East Indre south of Chateauroux. No Boche on these roads now. Could we have rendezvous with Hugh. Understand Franc in charge military operations this area."

19 August From Hamish (625)

"Last night Boche started blowing up factories in Bourges. Traffic passing through Bourges with material and red crosses on the trucks. Also using 3 motored planes Junkers 52 for transportation of material and also with red crosses. There are 25 planes on the airfield 1 km west of center of Bourges."

20 August From Hamish (626)

"Ambushed approximately 100 Boche trucks with about 1000 men early this morning. Over 150 Boche killed. Battle still going on between Pruniers and Lignieres 30 kms west Chateauroux."

(620) C-6240	16 Aug 44	(621) C-1947/74	17 Aug 44
(622) C-1984/75	18 Aug 44	(623) C-2112/80	19 Aug 44
(624) C-2108/78	19 Aug 44	(625) C-2109/79	19 Aug 44
(626) C-2210/80	20 Aug 44		

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20 August From Hamish (627)

"Another battle brewing between La Chatre and Chateauroux. 1 of our battalions is ready to enter Chateauroux. We will not enter Chateauroux until we have orders to take the city. Urgent you reply soonest. We have 3rd battalion in reserve."

20 August From SFHQ to Hamish (628)

"Have asked Hugh for rendezvous. You may enter Chateauroux on following condition. Boche departure must be final. Beware of German counter attack and possible reprisals on civilian population."

21 August From Hamish (629)

"Chateauroux entered early this morning. Made total of 6 ambushes over 300 Boche killed. Still chasing remnants of Boche forces from second battle near Ardennes. Total Boche forces attacked yesterday approximately 1500. Must have information regarding American advance towards this sector. Will not attempt to hold Chateauroux unless you want us to."

21 August From Hamish (630)

"Liaison with FFI forces vicinity of Montlucon. There are 600 Boche in barracks surrounded by FFI. They request bombardment. Reference follows - bearing 1 km southwest center of Montlucon 22 4/2. If you want to do it at night can put lights 100 meters from barracks. Reply soonest".

22 August From Hamish (631)

"Chateauroux vicinity in our hands. Ambushed Boche column 3 times yesterday. Still chasing them towards east. Total Boche killed 350. Our total casualties to date 50."

22 August From Hamish (632)

"The airfield 3 kms east of Chateauroux can be used for all types of planes. The runways are all okay. Will report on buildings tonight."

23 August From Hamish (633)

"We have unconfirmed report that Boche division is coming towards Chateauroux from west. Have pulled our troops well out of city and prepared ambushes. Have you any news of Boche moving west from coast."

(627) C-2211/81	20 Aug 44	(628) C-6283	20 Aug 44
(629) C-2303/86	21 Aug 44	(630) C-2316/87	21 Aug 44
(631) C-2369/90	22 Aug 44	(632) C-2429/91	22 Aug 44
(633) C-2513/93	23 Aug 44		

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Operations, Team Hamish (Cont'd)23 August From Hamish (634)

"A Polish major came to see us today. He is forming Polish group in this area. Expects to have 150 men in 10 days and the same amount 10 days later. They want arms. At the same time we now have 700 men in our FFI group without arms. Roughly we need arms for a total of 1000 men. If the Americans are going to arrive here in 10 days it's not necessary. But if not feel this area may become to passage way for Boche troops from west and south. In that case we would need these men. Intend to use ambushes only against all Boche that pass this area."

25 August From Hamish (635)

"A Boche armored train is on the line between Vierzon and Issoudun. Yesterday it stopped at Neuilly, and shot 40 hostages. The road line south of Issoudun is cut. Request air attack urgently."

25 August From Hamish (636)

"Tell the Air Corps to identify vehicles before strafing. We are painting white stars on all our vehicles."

25 August From Hamish (637)

"Reference Chateauroux airfield. No cement runways but landing ground is 1000 meters long. Informed here that all types of planes have used this field. There are no mines on the field."

25 August From SFHQ to Hamish (638)*From Hamish ?*

"All Air Force targets except armored train cancelled. Name of Polish major follows - Stanislaw Malecinski. Was in the Duxieme Bureau Detat Major Polonaise en France at Paris before the Armistice of 1940. Came to France in 39. Has been here ever since. Has idea of forming Polish group which will act on orders from military chief this sector. He will have total of 300 men."

25 August From Hamish (639)

"Armored train has returned to Vierzon repairing the cuts made last night as it went back."

25 August From Hamish (640)

"Saw Hugh in Chateauroux yesterday. Discussed method of stopping Boche moving from west to east along river Cher north of here. We are moving north to take up positions on river Cher. In all cases we are going to

(634) C-2554/95 23 Aug 44
 (636) C-2724/2 25 Aug 44
 (638) C-2751/4 25 Aug 44
 (640) C-2777/6 25 Aug 44

(635) C-2723/1 25 Aug 44
 (637) C-2748/51 25 Aug 44
 (639) C-2752/5 25 Aug 44

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make ambushes in depth. In this area we will be moving all the time. Tell the air corps to look for the white star before strafing."

25 August From Hamish (641)

"Much Boche air activity passing here in night. Believe it to be transport planes evacuating troops west to east."

26 August From Hamish (642)

"Report here Boche trying pass west from Poitiers south of Chateauroux. Consequently we have not moved north as yet. Our reconnaissance of main route used by Boche at present between Ville Franch and Vierzon indicates that it will be very difficult to ambush Boche convoys. Awaiting final decision."

27 August From SFHQ to Hamish (643)

"Polish major Stanislaw Malecinski is well known here. Excellent officer. Give him every possible assistance. You can expect aerial bombardments any day on escaping German columns so watch out for our planes. Advise you coordinate your movements with Hugh and Ivor."

28 August From SFHQ to Hamish (644)

"Am in London. We are coming out. Instructions follow. Give all money to Hugh. Bring out a list of names of people who have helped team Hamish. Include full names, dates and places of birth. Give all equipment. You will mount plane at Chateauroux airfield. We are notifying Hugh to make the reception. Check all reception grounds with Achille and bring back list. Operation set from Tuesday 29 August. Please confirm soonest. Anstett."

29 August From Hamish (645)

"Blac here request to stay here for 1 or 2 weeks longer to fight as company chief. Watters will return on first plane. Please reply soonest."

31 August From Hamish (646)

"Ten German divisions passing through Chateauroux, Issoudun and Bourges. Need Air Force here very badly. We are trying to slow them down with our ambushes."

1 September From Hamish (647)

"Situation here follows - 2 Boche divisions have already passed through Chateauroux. Approximately 8

(641) C-2776/7 25 Aug 44
(643) C-6352 27 Aug 44
(645) C-3200/11 29 Aug 44
(647) C-3556/18 1 Sept 44

(642) C-2869/9 26 Aug 44
(644) C-6367 28 Aug 44
(646) C-3438/20 31 Aug 44

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more divisions coming through. They are using route National 151 going through Chateauroux, Issoudun and Bourges. Bigger convoys passing through the Cher valley. 2 of our battalions are fighting between these 2 convoys. Impossible for them to withdraw to south. Need urgent air support this area. Boche travel during day in small convoys and at night in large convoys. These divisions are infantry but had more cars trucks and bicycles. Terrain here difficult to make successful ambushes."

2 September From Hamish (648)

"Bombing of Boche columns this evening a great effect on morale of our troops. Boche damage very satisfactory. Our two battalions are being caught in a squeeze by Boche Brtueencker Valley and route Nationale near 51. Please give us more air force support tomorrow the 2nd of September. Also tell Air Force to watch for our trucks with white star."

2 September From SFHQ to Hamish (649)

"Have asked Air Force for bombardment retreating enemy columns. Require urgently to know numbers German prisoners your region and possibilities of arrangements to concentrate them in camps. Send also details destructions to permanent works carried out by Boches and details destructions avoided by your action."

4 September From Hamish (650)

"We have 150 Boche prisoners here. They are in a concentration camp of the maquis. Boche have not destroyed any permanent works this area. Boche have mined a few bridges near Chateauroux. We have blown some bridges to slow down Boche columns. Boche still moving through region of Cher valley and National Route 151."

8 September From SFHQ to Hamish (651)

"Weather permitting Anstett returning via Limoges. Meet with car in Aigurande from Saturday 9 September."

10 September From Cretois via Trapper (652)

"Hamish arrived safely. Gone to his territory."

12 September From Hamish (653)

"Anstett back. Saw Julian at Issoudun yesterday. German general surrendered there to General Macolm from the 83rd division. Total of 18,000 Boche. What information have you on Boche west of Hereimi. There are no Boche in this sector now. Setting up headquarters at Croix Blanche not Le Grez Breach this sector."

(648) C-3609/19 2 Sept 44
(650) C-3814/20 4 Sept 44
(652) A-4213/9 10 Sept 44

(649) C-6429 2 Sept 44
(651) C-578 8 Sept 44
(653) C-4524/30 12 Sept 44

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Operations, Team Hamish (Cont'd)12 September From SFHQ to Hamish (654)

"Await your assurance that La Martinerie airfield is okay after recent bombing and passage of Boche. Filled in bomb craters should be marked with red flags. If surface serviceable all over only indication needed is one smoke fire to show wind direction otherwise unserviceable parts must be marked with red flags."

12 September From SFHQ to Hamish (655)

"Following passage through his region of Germans who have surrendered but retain their personal weapons Ventriloque alias Antoine is afraid incidents may arise there. General Patton and Colonel Powell have been notified by him accordingly. We are informing him that under the conditions of surrender the Germans retain their weapons. You should try and put in contact with Antoine who is at Orleans the representative General Macon of the 83rd American Division. Since Allied troops and FFI surround German columns, this should prevent incidents. Are cabling that he should get in touch with you."

12 September From SFHQ to Hamish (656)

"There are still Germans at La Rochelle. You should contact Adiabatique, Chateau de la Gueriniere at Loudin who will direct you to Fontenay area where all FFI forces and Moses are regrouping. Doing utmost arrange daylight operation."

13 September From Hamish (657)

"Am at Limoges waiting for Grell. Hugh told me they are leaving. Jed Hamish mission definitely completed. Desire permission to return via Paris after Sunday 17 September."

13 September From Hamish (658)

"Concerning burned pilot. Desire to evacuate on Saturday 16 September from Chateauroux airfield daylight operation."

14 September From Hamish (659)

"Returned to Chateauroux. Could not wait any longer for Grell. Saw Ellipse. Everything okay. What is the word on Chateauroux airfield operations Saturday morning. There is no need to send equipment here now. American pilot must be evacuated."

14 September From SFHQ to Hamish (660)

"We have no information source BBC announcement that

(654) C-6524 12 Sept 44
 (656) C-6529 12 Sept 44
 (658) C-4688/40 13 Sept 44
 (660) C-1655 14 Sept 44

(655) C-6526 12 Sept 44
 (657) C-4687/39 13 Sept 44
 (659) C-4831/42 14 Sept 44

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La Rochelle is taken. Cables received yesterday and this morning state town still firmly held by Germans. Please give us at once details on situation. We are pressing for bombardment or other form of attack immediately. If situation unchanged your orders are first concentrate your forces around Fontenay, second blockade La Rochelle."

14 September From SFHQ to Hamish (661)

"You should proceed to Fontenay area and place yourself at disposal of Moses for operations to block Germans now in La Rochelle. Hope send you one plane daylight to La Martinerie on Saturday, 16 September."

17 September From Hamish (662)

"Operation complete success. Medical supplies greatly appreciated. Unknown to us American doctor took burned pilot back to Orleans late Friday night. SAS not informed until 11 Saturday morning. Sorry. When will Grell get here."

18 September From Hamish (663)

"Situation here not clear. Many questions regarding future activity of groups this area. Desire to talk with someone who can answer these questions either here or Paris or London. Questions include equipment and training and future employment of troops here. Surcouf wants Anstett to stay as liaison officer. Will stay but unless you intend to equip these groups here for regular combat there is no need for our presence. Would you please answer the following questions promptly. First is Grell coming to Chateauroux and if so when. Second where can we get the above information regarding future here. We can get to Paris if you desire it."

19 September From SFHQ to Hamish (664)

"First Grell is still at Limoges and has been asked contact you immediately at Chateauroux. Second as Etat Major FFI closing down in London on 23rd you should all report to Etat Major at Les Invalides, Paris. American personnel should also report to Colonel Jackson at 79 Champs Elysees, Paris. Your future will be decided by them."

20 September From Hamish (665)

"Grell not here yet. Must we wait for him. Information regarding reporting to Paris received."

21 September From SFHQ to Hamish (666)

"Grell was due at Le Blanc and Chateauroux today so

(661) C-6534 14 Sept 44
(663) C-180/56 18 Sept 44
(665) C-380/60 20 Sept 44

(662) C-73/54 17 Sept 44
(664) C-2316 19 Sept 44
(666) C-2647 21 Sept 44

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MEMO FOR THE RECORD, BUREAU, SEPTEMBER 1944

Operations, Near Boukhal (Cont'd)

You should have seen this by now. If you have missed the memo in "Larger World" you missed Boukhal."

12 September 1944, From Boukhal to Boukhal (Cont'd)

"We will leave from Boukhal plan on September 12th. If conditions are correct, consequently be moved should be moved to the place for collection later. This you have already already done. Separable should be taken with you."

Report of 1st Para Troop, From the Field - 12 June to 15 June 44

We arrived at Boukhal the night of 12/13 June 1944 in a transport company. We were by Jeddah from Boukhal (1000). The transport was excellent but dropping was too low. Sergeant [Name] had to get up and at the end of the [Name] was still unable to walk without limping. We stayed in a [Name] house until Thursday, when we moved over to [Name] house. There we contacted the chief of the groups and on Saturday 17 June visited the various groups. At the time, it was stated, we had 25 trained men in this area with a total of 100 men. This was not true, but actually did not affect us. The important factor was that there were many weapons available and there was the beginning of a cadre of officers. We were extremely well received by the various groups and immediately began to plan for the future. We got four dropping-points from Burouf and sent them in. The area was to some extent controlled by the groups and we were able to move by car most of the time, but the German patrols were always in strength and on some days movement by car was dangerous. The reason the Germans employed this type of patrol was the battle this group had on 13 June prior to our arrival. I was informed two of our men had been killed, and three captured, one of which died later. The Germans lost 50 men killed; number of wounded unknown. By reason of this

(007) A-21 23 Sept 44
 (000) p 17 this Vol

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battle, the Germans were aware of the presence of a small well-armed group. We immediately tried to restrict our operations to cutting the German communications, which was successful with the exception of roads. Here we could not cut often enough to cause the Boche any real trouble and the road situation was such that any cuts could be by-passed using the lesser roads. We, therefore, contented ourselves with blowing various bridges. Above all, our plan was to avoid any all out action that might find our groups exterminated.

On 17 June when we visited the various camps, news of political differences in the north of Creuse reached us. I immediately asked for a rendezvous with the respective FFI and FTP chiefs. On 19 June we met in Aigurande and arrived at an accord which future information showed to be of little value. However, the FFI chief of Northern Creuse asked us to go to the FFI chief of the Creuse. That night we went 60 kilometers south to this chief's headquarters. We were extremely well received and happily thought we had found a real spot for a Jedburgh team, when we were informed it was only a matter of time when Major Revez should arrive there. We left the next morning, 20 June and on the way back north had to duck through two German light armored cars, but no shots were exchanged, and we returned successfully to our safehouse 15 kilometers north of Aigurande. The Boche had been searching for this safehouse using DF equipment, but fortunately had attacked a wood some two kilometers away. Watters had to be carried out to a field where he spent several uncomfortable hours. The Germans did capture one of our cars and killed two men taking the third man prisoner. He later

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was released by the Germans due to his good story of being captured by the Maquis and was working with us again by 1 August. The above action took place on 19 June. Because of this DF activity we laid low for a few days.

On 21 June Ellipse (669) and Croc (670) visited us. Blachere had gone to the reception at Vistula, hence he was not present at this meeting. We had a complete accord on our relations and the overall plan for the future. The idea of keeping our groups small and scattered was discussed, but as the organization continued to grow, we did have to concentrate to some extent. On 23 June we moved to new headquarters near Ste Severe and entered on the critical phase of our mission.

During all this time Anstett had been searching for a Dakota landing ground, but never succeeded in finding one. We opened four new dropping grounds, namely, Paris, Daphne, Milton and New York. Milton was later cancelled and Terrain Young substituted for it.

From 23 June until 9 July we remained at this headquarter. It was at this time our basic organization began to take form. This consisted of companies of 160 men which in turn were composed of 4 sections of 36 men. Each section was self-sufficient and one of these sections was armed as a heavy weapons section. The arms for one company were 19 pistols, 22 Sten, 30 carbines, 12 sub-machine gun, 59 rifles, 10 Bren, 6 Bazooka. This proved to some extent impossible to follow, and we substituted Stens for sub-machine guns, Bren for Bazooka, rifles for carbines. The stuff was coming in regularly and we were quite busy visiting the various camps and training NCOs and officers. We adopted a policy of strong criticism

(669) War Diary Vol 3 p
(670) War Diary Vol 3 p

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and stressed the safety measures incident to the handling of fire arms. There were many accidents and consequently we insisted all guns be unloaded unless on guard or moving into action.

Meanwhile, the Boche moved approximately 700 troops into La Chatre. These were Austrians, and their morale was very low. On 4 July we learned of 15 tons of butter in La Chatre on a truck which had broken down. We ambushed the relief truck sent to take the butter away and then the next day we took the truck itself with the butter back to our headquarters. We had never seen such a large truck or so much butter before. We distributed the butter around the country. This coup was a good joke on Jerry, because the group Ardentes drove the truck right past the seven hundred Germans sitting in La Chatre.

It was during the period from 23 June until 9 July the job got over the hump. Our presence, particularly of two Americans, had become known, and more important, that we were there specifically to work with the FFI gave our organization the necessary military respectability. We insisted on discipline, and on one occasion tried, convicted and killed an Arab soldier in the ranks who had committed rape. It was during this period we also shot two traitors - one a Milicien in our ranks, the other an old man who sold our location to the Boche in Gueret. Our police organization was now functioning and extracting money from various collaborators in the region. We stayed completely out of this and all trials of traitors. We felt it was not for us, but for the French to handle all these questions.

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We also set up a system of pay and allowances for families and saw to it that careful records were kept of all recruits.

The activity against the Boche continued. Bridges were blown, RRs cut and the wire communication system out of action. We began to lay plans for our own telephone system. Boche patrols, land and air, regularly passed close to us, but all large scale activity was avoided. The help of the men in the PTT was exceptionally good. Without them we never would have set up our wire communications system. There were groups in Aigurande and Cluis working all the time. I visited them for three days during this 17 day period while Blachere visited them constantly. Our division of work left Blachere free to work on training while Anstett stayed close to the headquarters and kept the question of supply going. We made many receptions during this period. By this time, I was convinced there was no landing ground available except a small field for a Lysander, but my query was unanswered.

A typical day during this period consisted of the following: If we had a message from Headquarters London, we attempted to answer it or obtain the information to answer it immediately. Blachere would begin instruction at 0800 hours while Anstett would answer what messages we had and see to it that containers received the night before were promptly opened and inventoried. At 11 we would meet with the chef Robert and his second in command and discuss problems. These could be anything from the presence of German agents in our midst to methods of training and operations with a consideration of various targets in our sector. At 1330 hours the BBC messages would pass.

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If we were on for that night, orders were issued for the reception. These went to the company commander and the motor Park. If we had targets for the night those orders were also issued. In the afternoon Blachere would leave for Aigurande while Anstett would inspect the stores. The training went on under the direction of the officers and NCOs of the organization itself. An interrogation of prisoners also would take place in the afternoon at which we would be present to see if we could obtain any information of value to our mission. If we had messages to send, Anstett would get the cipher done. Gradually the cipher was taken over by Watters who did have time on his hands. During this time he began to walk a little, but spent all his time at our personal headquarters 1 kilometer from the regimental headquarters. At 1630 hours there was generally a small manoeuver which was witnessed by either Blachere or Anstett. Supper was at 1930 hours after the BBC messages. If we were still on for that night one of us would leave at about 2100 hours for the ground. Generally we visited various people in the resistance movement on the way and had a glass of wine to pass the time. By 0030 hours all would be ready on the field and as soon as our planes had arrived we would depart for home and bed. If there was no reception that night Blachere and Anstett would discuss problems relating to our mission and how things were going. This was generally done by ourselves at our private cottage, but sometimes we would get one of the original cadre up there and talk with him about the situation generally. From these meetings we obtained much valuable information concerning our relations with the group.

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It was during this time that the need for officers and NCOs became acute. On 7 July we requested French officers and NCOs but never did receive any. The order of General de Gaulle mobilizing all the officers and NCOs in France brought us a number of excellent NCOs and three officers of outstanding ability. As the transition from 3 companies to 3 battalions of 3 companies each took place, these officers rendered invaluable service.

On Sunday, 8 July we moved to a new headquarters near Vijon. It was here our liaison system began to take shape but unfortunately was not finished before we had to move again. During the week of 8 July we continued training as before. Formed our battalions - three of them. Two near Vijon, the third near Aigurande. Each battalion had two complete companies of 160 men trained and armed, and a third company in formation. Plans for the reception of 10 planes 14 July were finished but at the last minute weather cancelled the operation. However, on the 15th the operation was on and we received 7 of the 10 planes. Because of all this activity, the Germans decided to investigate our particular sector which they did the next day, 16 July.

We had sent trucks back to our old headquarters which ran into the leading German light armored car near the village of Marembert. An exchange of shots ensued and the Germans withdrew. We sent a third truck to bring back one of the two trucks that had been damaged, which was attacked by 9 German light armored cars supported by three truckloads of soldiers with a 37 mm cannon and several 20 mm cannon. We immediately sent two sections to hold at all costs, and then set up defenses

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on all roads into the area. Meanwhile the Germans tried to move in on us, but were repulsed. By this time we had over 500 men moving into the line and the Germans were eventually stopped. It was a stalemate, but we could not prevent their withdrawal. One of the Maquisards was able to throw three grenades into a small house where German commander and his adjutant were directing the battle. The battle continued until dusk, when the Germans withdrew in the direction of Chateauroux. Meanwhile, our camp was moving and did so all night to a new position 8 kilometers northwest of Vijon. Our losses were 15 killed and 3 wounded. What the Germans lost we don't know, but it was definitely announced in Chateauroux that we would be exterminated for killing the commandant of that column.

The next day, 17 July, large convoys of Boche troops circulated through the area. There were approximately two battalions that stopped in Aigurande and requested information concerning the American officer working with the Maquis. Fortunately they did not succeed in locating our camp that day or any of the succeeding days.

Now we began to see our men develop into soldiers. The battle was not a success by any means, but it brought about a development in technique and liaison so necessary to any fighting group. We now began training the leaders in general tactics stressing the importance of liaison. The tactics of an ambush were developed and exercises were constantly carried out.

News reached us from the Creuse regarding a large scale attack by German divisions on 21 July. Our request for information

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from London was of no avail, so Blachere went to the Creuse to find out exactly what had happened. There was a complete mystery of the whereabouts of the Francois (the chef there) and the military mission there. As a consequence of this attack we moved north to a position 40 kilometers southeast of Chateauroux and dispersed our groups over an area of 100 kilometers. We were not attacked and continued training.

Our new headquarters were situated near Beddes 4 kilometers northeast of Chateauzeillan. Shortly after our arrival there it became quite evident to us that our armed priority had changed because we did not receive any planes until late in the August moon period. We repeatedly requested mortars and heavy machine guns but unfortunately we did not receive a definite statement that they were unavailable until late in August.

During this time we met Lieutenant Heubert who was chef of a small FTP group numbering approximately 150 men. His group at that time was very poorly armed and consequently we undertook to arm them. He placed himself at our disposal but refused to become a member of our FFI group under the command of Colonel Robert. As a result of this meeting many chefs from the department Cher arrived at our headquarters demanding arms and money. As far as we could determine, the situation in the Cher was completely disorganized and our duties at that time were so pressing that we felt a Jedburgh team would be the solution. We consequently asked London for a Jedburgh team which arrived on the night of 6/7 August. The wireless operator, 1st Sergeant Lewis Goddard, (671) was killed in the drop. He was buried on 7 August in the cemetery at

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Beddes with full military honors. Inside the coffin Anstett nailed one his identification tags.

Shortly before the arrival of Jedburgh team Ivor (672) we located a Colonel Bertrand. This colonel had been the commanding officer of the 1st Infantry Regiment in France before and after the Armistice in 1940. He had succeeded in locating 1200 of his men and was sorely in need of arms. It was quite evident to us that if anyone was going to take command of the southern Cher he was the man. We consequently sent Jed team Ivor to him on 7 August.

We received two American pilots during this period 5-9 August. One, 1st Lieutenant Albert DeBacker and the second, 1st Lieutenant Harrison Mellor. They were dispatched north on 10 August with Antoine's chauffeur. I know now they have returned safely.

During this time there was a serious shortage of plastic which was alleviated by a delivery to ground Aileen.

The Germans were furiously repairing the Limoges-Paris railway and it became increasingly evident to us that they hoped to move some troops by rail through our area. However, the group situated near Cluis succeeded in thwarting any plans the Germans might have had along these lines.

On 1 August we came into possession of a report concerning the manufacture of airplanes in the Bourges area. We passed this information on in our messages.

We also came into possession of information concerning the launching ground for the V1 or V2 flying bombs. We eventually were able to confirm the existence of this launching ground southeast of Bourges, which information was passed on

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to London.

On 3 August we received a report that three Milice petrol trucks would be leaving Chateauroux towards St Armand that afternoon. We instantly set up ambushes on all the possible roads leading to St Armand. We tried to capture the petrol trucks but, unfortunately, the Milice realized they would be killed even if taken prisoners and consequently we had to destroy the trucks with Bazooka fire killing approximately 22 Meliciens. We had no casualties.

On 7 August we ambushed 5 German trucks carrying German female and male military personnel. Approximately 22 Germans were killed in this ambush. Again we had no casualties.

We were asked to make a rendezvous with Ellipse on 5 August but unfortunately we were unable to agree on a place and time.

On 8 August we captured the commanding general of the Premier Regiment of France near the town of Aigurande. This led to a rather complicated situation the facts of which we are not in possession of, but which we were convinced was a question to be settled by the French and the French alone.

Unfortunately there was a difference of opinion regarding the eventual use of the various parts of this Regiment and Colonel Bertrand of the Cher sent Jedburgh team Ivor to us to ascertain why various elements of the Premier Regiment which were located in Colonel Bertrand's sector, were ordered into the sector in which Jedburgh team Hamish was operating. We knew nothing of this order but felt the attitude taken by Jedburgh team Ivor at that time was not in the best interests of their mission. However, we arranged a rendezvous for them

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with Colonel Robert and later on they went to see Jedburgh team Hugh, the French officer of which team had authority deriving from Ellipse to settle any questions concerning this dispute. We did not take part in these conferences and do not know in what manner they were finally settled.

An English wireless operator, Sergeant Loosmore was passed on to Ivor through us to replace 1st Sergeant Goddard.

On 20 August the Boche began to leave the Chateauroux area. The first group left La Martinerie at 2 o'clock in the morning. Our ambushes had been set up on the roads leading from La Martinerie in the general direction of Bourges and we ambushed them repeatedly and succeeded in completely disrupting their convoy, killing approximately 300 Germans.

On the next afternoon we received information that 150 cyclists had started from Chateauroux in the direction of La Chatre. This convoy turned out to be approximately 1,000 men. We immediately threw our 2nd battalion into ambush position along their route. Unfortunately the first ambush position had been discovered by the Germans due to a French traitor whom we later apprehended and shot. However, the ambush positions further along the road were extremely successful and we succeeded over a period of 3 days in killing an additional 300 Germans and chasing them completely off the main roads. Unfortunately, they took a road which led past one of our telephone posts which they destroyed, and a motor park containing one ten-ton truck which was also destroyed.

On Saturday, 27 August, there was a ceremony at Chateauroux celebrating the so-called liberation of that city by the FFI. We would like to point out that the city was not liberated

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by the FFI but was liberated because the Germans decided to leave during the period 1 - 27 August.

From 1 August on our repeated requests for material met with little response. We were sadly in need of this material because Hitler's general mobilization order sent many men into the Maquis and the fact that the war, as far as our area was concerned, seemed to be coming to a quick close gave encouragement to many others to join with us. During this time a Polish Major Stanislaw Malecinski requested arms and ammunition. This information was passed to London. He stated that he desired to form a Polish group to act under the orders of Colonel Robert and that he expected to have at least 300 men within 20 days. Unfortunately the operation supplying them with arms was not mounted until 11 September and at that date the war was definitely over in our area. Consequently the Poles had disappeared in the direction of Paris and no reception was made.

On the night of 27 August Anstett returned to London by air from Le Blanc. The purpose of this visit was threefold: to see if it was possible for an American armored column to come as far south as Chateauroux to cut the escape road being used by the Germans along the valley of the Cher river; and if this was not possible to obtain large supplies of arms and ammunition; to attempt to set up some form of air liaison to cover the Germans that were massing near Poitiers and Chateaurault. Anstett succeeded in the last category only.

During his visit it was decided to withdraw the Jedburgh team Hamish because we had uniformed the command of the entire department under Jedburgh team Hugh and Colonel Surcouf. Consequently, there was no need for our presence in the field.

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While Anstett was in London the Germans began to pass towards Bourges through Chateauroux and Issoudun. Meanwhile two of our battalions had been sent north of Issoudun towards the Cher Valley to ambush German convoys. These two battalions were later trapped and pinned down, but air support requested by Blachere was quick in coming to their rescue and succeeded in disrupting the German movement in that area so that the two battalions could escape.

On 9 September Anstett returned to the field via Limoges. That afternoon he proceeded to Aigurande and by the next day he had joined his team in Issoudun.

On 10 September there was a conference arranged by Jedburgh team Julian (673) between Major General Macon of the 83rd Infantry Division and a German General who was in command of approximately 19,000 troops located east of our area with its headquarters at Chateauneuf. Present at this conference was an American Lieutenant Magill who was the reconnaissance officer for the 83rd Division. At this conference the German general stated that he wanted to surrender to American troops and would not surrender to the FFI because he felt that if he did the entire 19,000 would be killed. He insisted that he be allowed to carry his arms in the general direction of Loire, and at a point to be determined at the Loire, he would lay down his arms and become a prisoner of war. At the time we thought these terms of surrender ridiculous, but in view of the entire situation and the lack of any large concentration of American troops in the area, it was the best type of surrender which could have been made. Unfortunately on that night a group from Cluis was still fighting southeast

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of Issoudun in the outskirts of the small village of Mareuil. In this engagement one of the finest Maquis chiefs that it had been our pleasure to know was killed. It was the last engagement in which our troops took part.

While in Issoudun the presence there of an American pilot was brought to our attention. Upon investigation he turned out to be 1st Lieutenant Robert McHugh, a P47 pilot. He was badly burned but the French doctor looking after him told me that he was in no danger and should not be moved for at least a week. We consequently requested a Dakota operation for Saturday, 16 September. This was accordingly mounted, but unknown to us on 15 September an American ambulance arrived in Issoudun and evacuated the pilot north towards Orleans.

On 11 September we were in Chateauroux for the second liberation ceremony to be held in that city.

While there we saw Crown from Jedburgh team Hugh who requested a rendezvous with us at Le Blanc the following day. We accordingly made this rendezvous and were informed that Hugh had finally received permission to continue towards Paris. He informed us that the entire department from that time on would be our responsibility. In view of these facts we thought it was necessary to discuss the various questions arising with Captain William F Grell, USMCR (674) who we understood to be at Limoges. We left for Limoges on 12 September arriving there that night. Unfortunately Captain Grell had left for Vichy and was expected back the next day. However, he did not return by noon 14 September and we thought it was necessary for us to return to Chateauroux to prepare for the Dakota operation scheduled for 16 September.

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Arrangements were completed for the Dakota operation but it wasn't until 1100 hours Saturday, while on the airfield, that we were informed of McHugh being taken north in an American ambulance. It was reported that his condition at that time was very serious.

The plane arrived at approximately noon with medical stores which were gratefully received by the city of Chateauroux and the French Red Cross in that area. They did much to alleviate the feeling which had arisen towards the Americans as a result of the terms of the surrender at Issoudun.

We entertained the pilots at a luncheon and showed them around Chateauroux. They left at approximately 1800 hours.

On Monday, 18 September we had a grand reunion dinner for all the men of the Maquis at which time Jedburgh team Hamish said goodbye to all their good friends in that group.

On Thursday, 20 September we left Chateauroux for Paris and arrived in Paris on 21 September having spent the night at Orleans. On 24 September arrived in London, our mission completed.

There were a number of telegrams concerning German activity on the west coast which unfortunately we never received and the text of these messages we only saw after we had returned to London.

Conclusion. It is our conclusion that the mission was completed successfully. Upon our arrival we found between 200 or 300 men with about 150 armed. Upon our departure from the field there were 3000 men fighting in our sector and 1000 additional waiting for arms. Our support in the way of supplies was magnificent up to 1 August, but after that time we received

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a total of seven planes up to 20 September. Prior to 1 August we received approximately 40 planes. The amount of sabotage shows that the Germans had something to think about. Most important feature of sabotage in our sector was the continuous cutting of the Paris-Limoges railroad line. We do believe it would have been possible to have placed Hamish in the field prior to D-day. However, after hearing what happened to other Jed teams it became evident to us that we were lucky to have arrived in the field when we did.

We were extremely fortunate to have many excellent French officers that did magnificent work for us. We attribute the success of our mission more to them than to any outstanding work on our part..

The Political Situation at the time we left France.

It became evident to us that as soon as Chateauroux and Indre had been definitely liberated our popularity was on the wane. The affairs of the department following the liberation were conducted by a prefect appointed by General de Gaulle in conjunction with a Comite de Liberation which was composed of the chiefs of 5 political parties that were at all time extremely courteous to us.

The political situation in our sector will remain fairly static until after the peace conference in Europe. What the future will be after that we do not know.

Radio Report

First three days of operation, Home Station did not call but did get emergency station and everything went according to plan next day and ever since.

Most trouble, if it can be called that, was raising the

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night emergency station. Heard them QSA5 but they apparently were not listening to the best of their ability.

Had a few bad skeds due to atmospherics and interference but that was out of our hands. All in all, the Hamish circuit worked very well. Operators were very good on Home Station except for one who usually answered day emergency calls. His sending was very bad. Believe cause to be trying to send too fast and clipping his dashes.

Report on Sets used

Used Jedburgh Set up to 15 July 1944 and worked 100 percent. Then had acquired a B-2 which was used 95 percent of the time till our reporting to Paris. Did use a Mark 15 a few times and it proved also to be a good set but were too many parts to carry so was abandoned. The B-2 seemed to be the most suitable set to use on our mission.

Financial Statement

Received ----- 250,000 Frs

Expenses

Living for 4 people for three months --- 208,000

Returned ----- 42,000
250,000

Money received for operations - 3,300,000
Francs (2,000,000 for Maquis and 1,300,000
dropped by mistake in containers marked
Caen)

To FFI -----	1,500,000 Frs
To Agents in territory -----	575,000
For car -----	40,000
Repairs to car -----	5,000
Tires (wrecked and abandoned) -----	10,000
Village, Aigurande -----	20,000
To families of Maquisards killed in action -----	85,000
Radio -----	10,000
To bodyguards -----	13,000
Incidentals -----	11,000
Total -----	<u>2,269,000</u>
Returned -----	<u>1,031,000</u>
	3,300,000

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Operations, Team IanTEAM IAN (675)Summary of W/T Messages Exchanged1 July From SFHQ to Ian (676)

"Please confirm ground Pomme Ruffec Yorker 13 as 12 kms east north east Ruffec. How many containers can you receive."

1 July From Ian (677)

"Our message number 9 should say 12 kms east northeast of Ruffec. Our maquis groups operating in the area have cut railway lines Bordeaux-Paris daily for past week near Civray."

1 July From Ian (678)

"Have formed efficient resistance group in area Sauze. 100 men assembled and ready to begin. Need 6 Bren guns, 50 Sten guns, carbines with all ammunition and complete ammunition."

2 July From Ian (679)

"Two troops and some armored equipment passed here heading in direction of Paris July 1st, on Paris-Bordeaux railway line. Germans now can temporarily repair railway lines quickly. Suggest bombing."

3 July From Ian (680)

"Can receive 24 containers at Pomme. Urgently require 4 biscuit boxes. Maquis groups operating in the area Cenfolens have been attacked by Boche battalion."

4 July From Ian (681)

"Send money only to Pomme. Need Jed team for area Nontron - Angouleme - Rochefoucauld."

4 July From Ian (682)

"Sabotage group safe urgently require extra supplies explosives. Still unable to hear broadcast."

5 July From SFHQ to Ian (683)

"Will send 30 containers from July 10th. Will send 10 aircraft. Expect operation 10 July onwards and will carry over to non moon if not completed during moon period. Bonfires essential during non moon."

(675) See p 54 1st Qtr this Vol

(676) C-3615 1 Jul 44

(678) C-4635/60 1 Jul 44

(680) C-4686/75 3 Jul 44

(682) C-4704/90 4 Jul 44

(677) C-4634/55 1 Jul 44

(679) C-4654/70 2 Jul 44

(681) C-4702/85 4 Jul 44

(683) C-3700 5 Jul 44

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6 July From Ian (684)

"Transport carrying troops and supplies on road between Paris and Bordeaux direction of Paris, 4 July. Movement continued all day."

8 July From SFHQ to Ian (685)

"Sending operations tonight on grounds Pomme and Poire. One package containing 500,000 francs in container marked with white cross will be dropped on Pomme. Please acknowledge its safe arrival if operation is success."

12 July From Ian (686)

"Money received safely. Will put into immediate use. Now checking equipment."

12 July From SFHQ to Ian (687)

"Regret we could not send 10 aircraft to Orange night 11 July as no cracks heard. Do you want this operation tried again. Please inform why cracks were not passed. Three aircraft were sent."

12 July From Ian (688)

"Maquis 200. Need 12 Bren guns, 100 Sten guns, 100 carbines, 12 bazookas, 4 grenades. Can handle 4 planes."

14 July From Ian (689)

"Reference your message, what do you mean by cracks."

15 July From SFHQ to Ian (690)

"Cracks are the three number groups given our number 9 for special procedure for 10 aircraft operation to Ground Orange. You were to send either of the following Cracks if you were ready for the operation. 349, 402, or 568. As we did not hear one of these cracks we were forced to cancel the extra aircraft."

16 July From Ian (691)

"Can receive at Ground Orange immediately. If you can send more bazookas."

17 July From SFHQ to Ian (692)

"Will send four aircraft ground orange with BBC message Gilet. Sending bazookas also."

(684) C-4764/8	6 Jul 44	(685) C-3762	8 Jul 44
(686) C-4952/36	12 Jul 44	(687) C-3886	12 Jul 44
(688) C-4970/44	12 Jul 44	(689) C-46/52	14 Jul 44
(690) C-3956	15 Jul 44	(691) C-118/52	16 Jul 44
(692) C-3994	17 Jul 44		

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18 July From Ian (693)

"800 Milice and Boche with armored equipment surprise attack. Maquis groups operating in the area now in location south of road ruelle, La Rouchefoucauld. Suggest bombing."

18 July From Ian (694)

"Believe grounds Pomme and Fraise may be used for fields. Bonfire triangle burning 8 to 8 July 21st to 25th inclusive."

22 July From SFHQ to Ian (695)

"Reference your August moon requirements please note present tightness of supplies prevents our arming any additional men your area. Best we can do is resupplying material and ammunition groups already armed. Please restate your needs on this basis with statement position your existing groups."

23 July From Ian (696)

"Have contacted officers of French army to form maquis groups 1500. Need arms urgently. Deliver to grounds Peche and Cerise. Send many bazookas."

27 July From SFHQ to Ian (697)

"Will continue operations during August moon to grounds Pomme, Cerise, Peche and Coucou with same message and signal letters. Inform us soonest other grounds you want served during August. For the present we cannot send operations with more than four aircraft."

27 July From Ian (698)

"800 Germans in Champagne Mouton. Further information to follow."

27 July From Ian (699)

"Maquis groups operating in the area Champagne Mouton have contacted 400 Boche at Ambernac. Boche forced to withdraw. Casualties as yet not known."

30 July From Ian (700)

"Have organized 4 battalions near La Rochfoucauld, Civray, Brossac, Confolens, Charanais, St Mathier, Montbron. Battalions under our control but liaison difficult. Since mobilization impossible to halt increase in maquis."

(693) C-169/64	18 Jul 44	(694) C-187/68	18 Jul 44
(695) C-5978	22 Jul 44	(696) C-314/84	23 Jul 44
(697) C-4269	27 Jul 44	(698) C-510/22	27 Jul 44
(699) C-548/66	27 Jul 44	(700) C-667/16	30 Jul 44

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JEDBURGH

Operations, Team Ian (Cont'd)30 July From Ian (701)

"Now have 2 hospitals with 4 doctors. Send field hospital equipment and basic medical supplies. Send to ground Peche immediately."

30 July From SFHQ to Ian (702)

"Remember hospitals installed in prominent buildings are very tempting targets for enemy. This has happened before and consequences were disastrous. Bear in mind necessity concealment. Will send equipment and medical supplies."

1 August From Ian (703)

"In four days fighting near Champagne routed Germans. Forced to retire to Confolens. 30 Germans killed and 3 prisoners. 2 maquis killed and 10 wounded."

2 August From Ian (704)

"1000 Boche SS and Milice with armor and guns attacked maquis. Bridges destroyed around Chabanais. 200 enemy killed. 100 maquis killed. Enemy retreating towards Champagne Mouton. Need mortars, Brens, rifles and ammunition urgently on our ground. Also shoes and socks."

7 August From SFHQ to Ian (705)

"Sending 750,000 francs in container marked with white cross on next operation ground Orange."

9 August From Ian (706)

"Our automobile attacked by column of 400 Germans at Poeuville. Bourgoin and chauffeur killed. Now have French operator consequently do not need another operator. Our second number 1,300,000 francs and all radio cipher and personal equipment lost in car. Send all material and money plus gasoline to ground Peche with Letter W. For this operation only BBC message Craiate and 5 bonfires as cross. Need arms for 1000 on Grounds Peche, Pomme and Cerise."

10 August From SFHQ to Ian (707)

"Sorry to hear about Bourgoin. Note you have new French operator. Give us his name and some information about him."

15 August From SFHQ to Ian (708)

"Do your utmost hold up or prevent German 159 Division which reported to be moving north towards zone of battle."

(701) C-664/99 30 Jul 44
(703) C-762/23 1 Aug 44
(705) C-6161 7 Aug 44
(707) C-6186 10 Aug 44

(702) C-6058 30 Jul 44
(704) C-861/29 2 Aug 44
(706) C-1356/33 9 Aug 44
(708) C-1388 15 Aug 44

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Operations, Team Ian (Cont'd)16 August From SFHQ to Ian (709)

"Crystals and codes packed and ready for next operation."

18 August From Ian (710)

"Following is text of letter written August 11th which was taken from German vehicle captured by Maquis. Have eaten with Sert and Chambrun and have learned the following. Laval has seen Abetz and has received the commission of organizing political France for the legal constitution. Laval went tonight to the little village near Vittel and Nancy where he met Herriot will be freed. Herriot has accepted. They talked two hours concerning their collaborating in the reunion of the National Assembly. Under this condition Herriot will be freed. Herriot has accepted. They have left Ferrari, accompanied by Herriots wife. They arrived at Paris August 13th. Herriot has been Bussieres and told him they left by the underground. Marshal Petain will know this tonight. As Herriot is president of the Chamber of Deputies and Laval is chief of the government, these two together can reconvene the National Assembly. This they mean to do without losing time. This government is to be formed before the arrival of the English and Americans. Letter signed by Caruchu."

19 August From Ian (711)

"This is 3rd section of our former message. Letter was addressed to Spanish Minister Lequerica. Have many other papers of interest. Shall we destroy them or will you send for them."

19 August From Ian (712)

"Need many bazookas and resupply of bazooka ammunition. Send crystals and code to Ground Peche with same special arrangements. Now have enough ammunition for Bren, Sten and much explosives. Need ammunition for carbine and Colt. Need arms only for 1000 on Ground Peche. Still waiting for personal equipment such as toilet articles, flashlights etc. All lost at Pleuville."

19 August From Ian (713)

"Report of recent activities. One of our battalions detached to Haute Vienne to work in area of Limoges. 2 railroad bridges between Angoleme and Ruffec damaged. 4 trains derailed on Line Paris-Bordeaux. 2 bridges damaged on highway Paris-Bordeaux. In daily ambushes over 30 trucks destroyed and 11 captured. Many minor skirmishes with German patrols. 1 colonel and 1 major and over 100 other Germans killed. Believe about 200 wounded. Garrison at Braconne attacked with 7 Germans killed."

(709) C-6239 16 Aug 44
 (711) C-2071/83 19 Aug 44
 (713) C-2070/93 19 Aug 44

(710) C-1978/43 & C-1982/53 18 Aug 44
 (712) C-2059/23 19 Aug 44

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Operations, Team Ian (Cont'd)19 August From SFHQ to Ian (714)

"Congratulations splendid work. Reference letter addressed Spanish Minister and other papers. You can deliver them to Faust care of Monsieur Barriaud, La Croisille, Haute Vienne. Password Je viens de la part de Charles. They will be sent here by Faust on next air operation."

20 August From Ian (715)

"Several wounded. Area was heavily mined. Maquis lost 31 killed and 33 wounded in all actions. Have reinforced telephone communication with motorcycles and pigeons. Impossible to halt Germans with equipment on hand but they are being hindered and attacked at all opportunities. German morale in area very low. Garrisons at Angoulême, Ruffec, Luxes, Mansle reinforced with about 4000 Hindus. Many road blocks on Paris-Bordeaux highway and we are still cutting railway line daily."

22 August From Ian (716)

"Maquis of area requests someone for President of Committee of Liberation for Department of Charente. As this concerns political affairs we suggest Algiers nominate this person. Maquis now controls area La Rochefoucauld, Nanteuil, Genouille, Pressac, Confolens, Chabonais, Montbron. Unless Germans attack with large forces can guarantee security of area for future operations."

22 August From Ian (717)

"1000 Hindu and 2000 Germans with full complement of artillery and some armored equipment now garrisoned at Camp Braconne. Have arrived recently from direction of Bordeaux. Suggest bombing soonest."

22 August From Ian (718)

"Send personal effects only for Oklahoma and Maine. Radio operator Andre Renault 1171 C 32. Suggest promotion to appropriate grade. Champagne-Mouton attacked by 300 Hindus. 1 armored car, 9 trucks destroyed 138 enemy killed. Enemy has withdrawn to Ruffec."

26 August From Ian (719)

"Have had no connection with Dufour. Until further instructions are received will continue to work only under London orders. Have contacted following aviators. American - Gonet, Koller, Urild, Benson, Garreta, Weber. Canadian - Evans, Joker. Royal Air Force - Blacklar."

(714) C-1863 19 Aug 44
(716) C-2362/52 22 Aug 44
(718) C-2360 22 Aug 44

(715) C-2167/22 20 Aug 44
(717) C-2580/63 22 Aug 44
(719) C-2826/72 26 Aug 44

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Operations, Team Ian (Cont'd)27 August From Ian (720)

"4 trucks ambushed road Angouleme, Ruffec. 50 Germans killed and wounded. 7 maquis killed. German activity has increased in area Angouleme, Ruffec. About 10,000 Germans in this area."

28 August From SFHQ to Ian (721)

"Keep us posted of enemy troop movements. Air Force notified. Advising death of Bourgoin. Please give date and place of death."

29 August From Ian (722)

"Germans departed Camp Braconne. Now occupied by maquis. Several thousand Germans now camped in Sain Amant de Boixe. Suggest bombing."

30 August From Ian (723)

"Please send cipher, crystals and much ammunition for carbines and colts to Ground Peche. Can use as many arms as you can possibly send immediately."

1 September From Ian (724)

"Maquis now occupies Angouleme. In past 3 days maquis has destroyed 15 trucks killed and wounded 50 Germans and have taken 140 prisoners. Is regional military delegate triangle or Ellipse?"

3 September From Ian (725)

"Several thousand Germans with some armor on road Monsac, Baintes and road Monsac, Cognac. Our maquis now occupies three quarters of Charente including Hiersac, Chateauneuf, Jarnac, Cognac, Mante, Luxe, Ruffec. If you want information quickly we must have crystals now soon."

3 September From SFHQ to Ian (726)

"Triangle is Delege Militaire Regional forregion Bernard one and two which includes Charente west of the old demarcation line. Ellipse is Delege Militaire Regional of Robert 5, which includes Charente east of Demarcation line. Please send urgently total German prisoners now in your area and possibilities of their concentration. Also required to know details of enemy destruction to permanent works such as bridges, electric installations etc. together with details any destruction prevented."

5 September From SFHQ to Ian (727)

"Hope send code with Germinal arriving Limoges"

(720) C-3014/82 27 Aug 44
(722) C-3249/92 29 Aug 44
(724) C-3588/37 1 Sept 44
(726) C-4634 3 Sept 44

(721) C-3558 28 Aug 44
(723) C-3346/24 30 Aug 44
(725) C-3682/44 3 Sept 44
(727) C-123 5 Sept 44

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airfield from 6th. You can contact him at Hotel Moderne Limoges. Meanwhile can you communicate via Samuel."

15 September From Ian (728)

"Samuel in London. Nothing here for us. We are leaving Limoges airdrome for London. Nothing left to do. Will wait 24 hours for confirmation."

15 September From SFHQ to Ian (729)

"For Oklahoma. If this reaches you in time you should report to OSS at 79 Champs Elysees Paris. Maine should report to Commandant Lejeune at Les Invalides, Paris."

Report of Team Upon Return from the Field - 20 June to 17 Sept 44Mission

To help Samuel (730) working with the chief of the elements of resistance in the Vienne and contact the resistance element in Shipwright's (731) circuit. Also to prepare continual attacks against the Bordeaux-Tours, Bordeaux-Saumur lines. After contacting Samuel, this mission was replaced by the following:

1. To organize, arm and train the Maquis in the southwest of the Vienne. This mission was completed on the initiative of the team "Ian".

2. To organize, arm, train and direct the military operations of the resistance groups in the Charente.

Dropping

We left Harrington on 18 June to be parachuted into France. The pilot did not find the ground and refused to drop us blind being unable to locate his position owing to bad visibility.

We left England again on 20 June and were parachuted to a "non personnel" ground which was small, surrounded by barbed wire, trees and ditches. The surface was rocky and hard.

(728) C-850/64 15 Sept 44
(730) War Diary Vol 3 p

(729) C-1712 15 Sept 44
(731) War Diary Vol 3 p

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Luckily one of Samuel's lieutenants was with the reception committee, though he had only been expecting material. Major Gildee and Captain Delorme arrived safely and although 1st Sergeant Bourgoin's parachute did not open as quickly as it should, he also made a good landing. The two radio sets were damaged.

Action on Arrival

A car took us to a farm which served as Samuel's headquarters. We contacted Samuel the next morning. We stayed five days with Samuel awaiting the delivery of two other radio sets. One was dropped and was smashed on arrival. Luckily 1st Sergeant Bourgoin managed to repair one of the two sets. During these five days the broadcast receptions were very poor. It was during this time also that Samuel decided it would be better for team "Ian" to organize, arm and train the Maquis in the southwest of the Vienne.

Organization, Events and Actions in southwestern Vienne

We contacted two Maquis (Nonnet. Swear) formed from elements of Civray and Charroux and consisting respectively of 125 and 50 men possessing a few guns, stens and several pounds of explosive. Immediately we asked that they should be completely armed. The morning after our arrival the first sabotage was carried out with the teams of these two Maquis on the up and down line between Paris and Bordeaux. This was continued daily from 26 June. The small factories making charcoal for German gazogene trucks were also sabotaged. Several locomotive supply pumps placed along the Paris-Bordeaux line were blown up the first week in July. Damage caused was quickly repaired by the Germans, but although their transport

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was not stopped it was considerably retarded. At this stage we asked that the Paris-Bordeaux line might be bombed.

This period of action was equally one of reconnaissance. We reconnoitred in the southwest of the Vienne, in the east of the Deux Sevres and in the Charente, in order to find the Maquis chiefs together with their emplacements, resistance groups, landing and parachute grounds, and also to establish a network of agents for the purpose of information and liaison as well as gaining and assuring the confidence and loyalty of the gendarmerie and PTT. We, composed of a hundred men.

In order to accomplish all these missions, we had to travel a great deal. We used a car, transformed into a reconnaissance vehicle armed with two FM, on the road running through German occupied towns and villages because we believed the success of our mission lay in the rapidity of action and that our security would be better safeguarded by force of arms rather than by remaining to contact the different resistance groups clandestinely. In this manner we obtained the following results:

1. A hundred men, the nucleus of a future large Maquis was formed near Ruffec.
2. Two hundred men, the nucleus of a future large Maquis were grouped around Champagnition and commanded by Garnier.
3. A maquis of five hundred men, armed with only a few rifles was contacted near Confolens. It was commanded by Bernard (of Limoges).
4. A resistance group was contacted at Sauze-Vaussais and we asked for arms for a hundred men.
5. The Germans had information on the formation of groups

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which had to be dispersed on the day arms were to be received on the ground "Poire".

6. A sabotage group called "Sape" was contacted and we asked that explosives might be sent for it on ground "Citron".

7. Three hundred men, nucleus of another future large Maquis, were assembled near Chasseneuil and were commanded by Chabanne.

8. The maquis commanded by Bernard of Civray had then two hundred organized men. We asked for arms for it.

9. We tried to reorganize a Maquis camp near L'Usignan which had been attacked by the Germans several days before, but this proved impossible as the group had been dispersed.

10. The lieutenant of the Ruffec gendarmerie was contacted and from him we learned of the good intentions of himself, his subordinates and several of his superiors in regard to ourselves.

11. We requested arms for the formation of all these Maquis. Also clothing and five hundred thousand francs.

Action after this first Organization from 1-20 July

As soon as we had received the arms and explosives asked for, we gave instructions to each Maquis. We commenced sabotage and ambushing on the road and railway Paris-Bordeaux between Angouleme and Chaunay. We were attacked near Confolens by a battalion of Germans. The maquis fought well and the Germans withdrew after several hours of fighting.

The group "Sape" sabotaged the railway line Sainte-Angouleme and derailed several machines.

A Jedburgh team was requested for the south of the Charente. London was informed that armed and equipped troops were

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passing on the line Bordeaux-Paris in the direction of Paris and we requested that they should be bombed.

An aircraft spotting station was reported to London.

On 14 July we visited several towns protected by a group of forty men. Captain Delorme spoke to the assembled populations to encourage them and request their aid for future actions.

Reorganization of the Maquis from 20 July

We did not find anyone in the Charente who went under the title of chief of the resistance for the purpose of coordinating the efforts of the various Maquis. Consequently, we ourselves decided to assume this role and take charge of military operations and the administration of these groups.

With the Maquis which were armed, we chased the Germans from the zone limited by the towns of Charoux, Confolens, Chasseneuil and Champagne Mouton. This zone was transformed into a fortified bastion. We made barricades of trees and masonry on the roads and the bridges were mined. A complete telephonic network was established and by requisitioning a certain number of lorries we were able to form mobile companies which could be moved to any point which was menaced. In this zone we received all the men who, whether from town or country, wished to join the Maquis. These men were then armed and trained. The principal parachuting grounds were also in this zone.

Officers and NCO's from the regular and reserve army asked to join us. The small Maquis and resistance groups were divided into four battalions called Bonnet, Chabanne, Bernard (of Limoges) and Gagner (the four best Maquis chiefs).

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Officer and NCO's were placed in proportion among the battalions and mixed very well with the Maquis chiefs. The strength of these four battalions was soon six thousand men. A regular officer was attached to each battalion chief to act as technical adviser for operations and each battalion was allotted a zone for its encampment, recruiting, supplying etc.

Team "Ian" exercised exactly the same functions as a regimental commander commanding a regiment, being responsible for the direction of military operations but leaving the questions of supply and requisitions as the responsibility of the battalions chiefs who also dealt with disciplinary matters having received only directives on these subjects.

Two hospitals were formed. We recruited nurses and surgeons. We requested the material and medical supplies necessary for their work. The offices of the milice at Confolens and Angoulême were rifled and this permitted us to have the names of suspected persons. People in this latter category were held in two concentration camps if no definite proof against them could be found.

From the financial point of view, the battalion Bonnet depended on the resistance movement of the Vienne and the battalion Bernard on the FTP group of Limoges. The Chabanne and Garnier battalions had no funds. Team "Ian" was contacted by M Le Breton, surnamed Lambert, who had been sent from Paris into the center of France to study the situation of the Maquis and to see to their needs. We went over the financial question together and it was decided that, after agreement with the FFI offices in Paris, we could arrange a loan, without interest, under the form of a list of subscriptions and covered

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by the bond of the bank of Algiers. At this time, we asked London to authorize the funds of the FFI in Paris. M Le Breton went back to Paris and informed us through a letter sent to Madame Le Breton who was living at St Claud, near Angouleme, that the loan had been granted. It amounted twelve million francs. A list of the subscribers was compiled under the care of the "mairies" signed by the mayors and Maquis chiefs and kept by the treasurers of the Maquis Chabanne and Auger.

We were also contacted by Colonel Degas, late commander of the 502nd tank regiment and late chief of the resistance in the Charente who, being tracked by the Gestapo, had had to leave Angouleme for Paris. He put himself at our disposition and rendered us many services by reason of his knowledge of the department and his people. Our bastion gradually grew larger and by the end of July comprised La Rochefoucault, Charente, Joucet, Confolens, Chabonnet, St Mathieu, and Montbron. A perfect telephonic network was working connecting us with parties in other zones and allowing us to contact Angouleme, Limoges, Ruffec and Sivray. Our liaison was kept up by motor-cycle and carrier-pigeon. We had regular information an hour or two after every operation. Overrun posts were quickly repaired with barricades of trees and observation posts installed. All our troops were transported by lorry or car. A base from which reconnaissance was made on La Bracon, Angouleme, the road and railway Paris-Bordeaux and the surrounding country, was also set up.

The gendarmeries of Confolens, Ruffec, La Rochefoucault came to the Maquis to set up a military police charged with enquiries. Workshops were set up to make uniforms with requisitioned material. During this reorganization and between military

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operations, we were still looking for further people to arm and organize. The chief of the resistance in the Dordogne asked us to go and see him and told us his lack of arms. We requested a thousand arms for him.

Through Colonel Degas, we contacted the Maquis and resistance groups situated in the western and southern part of the Charente and we requested two hundred arms or ground "Citron" - five hundred arms on ground "Raisin". On 19 August, we requested a thousand arms on ground "Pêche". On 20 August, we requested six hundred arms on ground number 25. All these last demands were never satisfied.

Military Operations after 20 July

These became increasingly more numerous and varied. They had always been plentiful. Sometimes we attacked the enemy on the road and in their pockets, sometimes we blew up railway lines, bridges and trains and sometimes we ourselves were attacked.

Every night, sabotage teams blew up the rails and the bridges on the lines between Angoulême-Civray and Angoulême-Saintes, bazookas. In order to repair the damages caused by the Maquis, the Germans decided to clean out the region "des terrorisés". On 20 July, eight hundred Germans, well equipped and armed with heavy material, pierced our defenses and established themselves at Champagne-Mouton, entrenching themselves in the camp surrounded by barbed wire entanglements and ditches. Before we had time to interfere, they took numerous hostages, threatening to shoot them and burn the town if the Maquis attacked. For five days they sent out patrols to try and reconnoitre the Maquis emplacements and

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in order to stop the concentration of our troops, two other small columns started to harass us from La Rochefoucault and Montbron. On 22 July, two hundred of the enemy descended on St Claud.

We entrenched ourselves before them with four hundred men. They refused to fight and disengaged themselves. Owing to the fact that the Germans had cut all telephonic communications, information did not reach the other elements of resistance soon enough to enable them to encircle this column.

On 26 July four hundred Germans attacked the Garnier battalion near Ambernac. This battalion was not yet perfectly armed and organized and was obliged to withdraw several kilometers. The Germans pillaged Ambernac, burning farms and shooting civilians. We went there immediately and on seeing the disorder sent for reinforcements which came. This was a normal operation, at the end of which the Germans, harassed for four days, were obliged to retire to Confolens taking with them their wounded and about fifty dead. Our losses were eight killed and ten wounded.

The rest of the Germans from Champagne Mouton together with the reinforcements from Angouleme and Ruffec arrived in a column of a thousand men, including militia, well armed with mortars heavy machine guns, and all the necessary means of transport. They attacked us along the right shore of the Vienne trying to encircle us by descending to Chabonnais, while another strong column made a diversionary attack on us at La Rochefoucault.

The existence of the whole of our organization was at stake and a retreat was anticipated on the Dordogne in case

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of absolute necessity.

Fortunately, the column marching on Rochefoucault ran into the path of our barrage and lost itself in the woods. Harassed by us, they could not penetrate our positions and had to disengage themselves. The column descending on Chabonnet could not cross the Vienne. The bridges were badly damaged and the Maquis, although young and with no previous experience of the firing line, were well trained by their leaders and armed only with FM, Stens, carbines, rifles and grenades, did not give way under the mortar and machine gun fire. The enemy had to retreat and go back to Champagne-Mouton after having burned a whole district in Chabonnais and shooting a few civilians. The losses were numerous on both sides, about two hundred Germans and eighty French.

The Germans, in retreating, had cut all our telephone lines and laid ambushes for our motorcyclists. The south of our zone was cut off from the north. We had to decide to encircle Champagne-Mouton or to draw out the enemy to a place where we could annihilate them. It is for this reason that, although Champagne-Mouton and the surrounding districts was occupied by the enemy, we decided to go to the southwest of the Vienne in order to learn the needs of our Maquis, give them the order to come down to the south driving back the enemy and to establish liaison with the Maquis Garnier and Chabbonne. We had also contacted the head of resistance at Vienne to inform him of the action taken. Our itinerary had to be guarded by elements of volunteers at the dangerous points.

We set out, a complete team, with our chauffeur and an

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information agent. The radio set and personal belongings were in the truck, codes, papers and money were hidden in different parts of the car. We arrived at Pleuville where we had only thirty more kilometers to go to Champagne-Mouton. We ran into a column of 400 Germans who had left Champagne-Mouton. We ran into a column of who, having come upon our route, made an ambush. When we arrived in the middle of the town, three German machine guns and mortars opened fire on us at very short range. Our FM opened fire. In spite of violent fire from enemy, Captain Delorme, slightly wounded in the cheek, manoeuvred to turn the car and save the personnel and the accompanying apparatus and papers, during which, in order to facilitate the task, Major Gildee, 1st Sergeant Bourgoin, the chauffeur Mandinaud and the agent Verry, fired on the enemy. The car was hit and stopped. We left the car, crossing the alleys and houses, pursued by the Germans and their continuous fire. It was at this moment that Major Gildee helped Captain Delorme who was in difficulty. Major Gildee got out of the right side of the car and took refuge in a passage and finding himself alone, he returned to look for and call Captain Delorme who was in a position behind the car in order to fire and he could not see where to take refuge, the street being swept by fire and the doors of the houses locked.

This service rendered was immediately recompensed, for when cornered against a bolted door by enemy fire, Captain Delorme succeeded in undoing the bolt and opening it from behind, thus letting Major Gildee and the agent Verry retreat with him. Six hundred meters away from Pleuville we arrived at a farm

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where there was a group of twenty Maquis with small arms and a Bren gun. We returned with them to Pleuville to attempt to seize the papers, codes, money and wireless sets, and to find out what happened to our other two friends. 10 meters from the car we were again spotted by the Germans who fired on us with FM and mortars. In face of this, we were forced to abandon our material and again retreat into a wood where we were encircled from sixteen hour to twenty-two and a half hours. The Germans never ceased firing and set fire to the bushes. We remained there but at 2230 hours we succeeded in passing between two German outposts. At daybreak, the Germans, who had not ceased to fire, ransacked the woods and the houses in Pleuville from top to bottom. As they were unable to find us, they set fire to eighteen buildings. The next day, agent Verry returned by bicycle to the places occupied by the Germans and heard that 1st Sergeant Bourgoin had been killed in a field, hit by three bullets. The chauffeur Mondinaud was wounded by a rifle burst in the stomach, just as we were getting out of the car, still firing. The Germans caught him and crashed his head, although he was still alive.

After this incident the Germans were afraid of encirclement and abandoned Champagne-Mouton to return to Ruffec and Angouleme. The team "Ian" found their wireless set hidden in a farm and serviced by an old radio officer of the Mercantile Marine, named Renault. We resumed our work in the field.

These hard days when events and the enemy dominated us all, were recompensed by happy days when the enemy suffered heavy losses without being able to take any action against us,

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in spite of the presence of Italian, Russian and Hindu troops who were responsible for the safety of the national highways. Every day ambushes prepared by groups of the company, according to the size of the mission, put out of action two hundred and fifty lorries and German vehicles and killed fifteen-hundred to two-thousand Germans. A number of senior officers were among the victims. Our actions demoralized the Germans and incited the Italians, Russians and Hindus to desertion. Leaflets in various languages were distributed. Among the acts of sabotage and ambush prepared for the enemy, several facts deserve to be mentioned. On 18 August an ambush enabled us to take possession of all the papers from the Spanish Consulate in Paris addressed to a Spanish Minister, Mr Le Querica. We had the papers translated by a competent person. The documents of interest to the Allied Nations were summarized and addressed to London. We were unable to send them on account of lack of Liaison and transport, but as we later learned of General Bertin's passing through Cognac on his way to contact General de Gaulle, we sent him the diplomatic valise.

An unexpected attack on the camp at Broconne put seven Germans out of action. To the north of Ruffec an armored car and nine lorries were demolished, a hundred and forty Germans killed and wounded at a cost of thirty one dead and thirtythree wounded on our side.

Solid barricades had been erected on the Paris-Bordeaux main road and across smaller roads leading northwards.

On the 27 August, hearing that we had ordered the bombardment of the Braconne camp, the Germans abandoned the place which was immediately occupied by our troops and served

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as bases of departure for Angouleme.

In order to take Angouleme, we demanded reinforcements in the Haute Vienne and Dordogne, so as to encircle completely the town which was held by six or eight thousand men, for the most part Italians and Hindus who were not much inclined to fight. They were trying to escape towards the north in spite of being completely surrounded by a considerable number of Germans well armed with machine guns, rifles and heavy arms. We particularly feared the arrival of a large German column equipped with armored cars which, according to ill-founded information was then in the Bordeaux-Toulouse-Angouleme area. We set up a small headquarters consisting, among others, of the chiefs of the Maquis of Charante, Haute Vienne and Dordogne, and decided to take Angouleme. During the night the infiltration began and in the early morning, after fairly heavy fighting which, however, caused few casualties, Angouleme was occupied. In the two days which followed, the various nests of German resistance set up in the town, were wiped out. Pushing on to the north, west and south, the Charente battalions successively occupied Ruffec, Cognac, Barbezieux and Saint Jean. All the little villages situated in this region were occupied. At Ruffec the Germans returned three times to the attack in an attempt to take the town, but were unsuccessful. Next the Maquis of Charente intended to encircle Royan. Civray was occupied by the troops for the southwest Vienne which had been armed by us. The mission which we had set ourselves - to liberate Charente - was realized. We had even passed it since the greater part of Maritime was liberated also.

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After the capture of Angouleme in the Charente, a headquarters of the FFI was set up for the purpose of ensuring security, police organization, administration and agreement between the various FFI groups. Colonels Driant and Adeline were in charge of the troops and our work was finished. Before asking to be returned to London we accomplished two last missions.

After having heard from doubtful sources that the Germans Colonel Polmann, who was in charge of the Royal garrison, would possibly negotiate with American or French officers of the regular army, we revealed our presence. Not wishing to enter territory occupied by the FFI, he arranged an interview at his headquarters, 15 kilometers behind his lines, on 9 September at 5 p m. We went there in a car displaying the American and French flags and a white flag. At the first outpost we were met by a German Captain, detailed to escort us. The interview lasted an hour and a half, but finally the German Colonel, who appeared very calm and sure of his troops, informed us that he had orders from the Fuehrer to defend the Royan region and that he was solidly installed there and that he would on no account surrender. The second mission was undertaken regarding landing grounds. The Cognac ground could take planes of any tonnage, the ground at Saint Jean D'Angellie planes of fifteen tons at the most, but I anticipate that it will soon be repaired and able to receive more.

Recompenses and Decorations

There are many to whom should be awarded the Croix de la liberation and the Croix de Guerre, both because they

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have taken part in the resistance for two years and helped us to form the nucleus of the larger Maquis organization which was armed by us, and because during all their days of ambush on the road and railways they caused serious losses to the Germans and also because they had helped us by working less spectacularly but none the less usefully to effectuate all that we have done in the southwest of Vienne and Charente. At the moment we may mention Chabanne, Bonnet Bernard de Limoges, Verry, Bourgoin (our wireless operator who was killed) and Mandinaud (our Chauffeur who was killed).

Resume

In the southwest of Vienne and in the department of the Charente, which consisted only of a few small Maquis or poorly armed groups, we recruited six thousand armed men (we should have been able to get together twenty thousand if arms had been supplied).

We armed and organized four thousand of them with the aid of arms dropped by parachute and weapons taken from the Germans. For three months we harassed German convoys on the roads, destroying material, killing their men, blowing up railways, derailing trains, holding up transport causing German columns to become targets for aerial bombardment and liberating during our periods of activity and area equal to one third of the department of the Charente, finally freeing the whole of the Charente, all its large towns and a large portion of the coast. A large part of the merit is due to the chiefs of the Maquis and to those who helped us to create our organization.

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Financial Statement

Received ----- 250,000 Frs and 100 Dollars

Expenses

Lost in automobile in ambush ----- 100,000 and 100 Dollars
Food - - - - - 50,000
Expenses Limoges and Angouleme - - 50,000

W/T operator was killed in action on 3 August and all money, crystals and codes were on his person.

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JEDBURGH

Operations, Team GilesTEAM GILES

Jedburgh Team Giles was the seventh team to be dispatched to France from the UK.

Members of Team

The members of Team Giles were:

Captain Bernard M.W. Knox, AC (732) (US), code name: Kentucky.

(Captain Paul Lebel) (French), code name: Loire.

(Sergeant Gordon H. Tack) (W/T), code name: Tickie.

Area to Which Dispatched

Team Giles was dispatched on the night of 8/9 July to the Finistere area, France.

Background of Resistance in Area

Team Giles was being dispatched to the neighborhood of the SAS team Dingson. This SAS team was in close contact with Jedburgh George, (733) the new Delegeue Militaire Fonction, and F Section's agent Fernand (734).

The original SAS team, accompanied by Fernand, had been sent to the field on 5 June. They made contact with resistance and by 8 June had contacted 3,500 men. On the night of 9/10 June a reinforcing SAS party together with Jedburgh team George were dispatched to this base.

On 13 June word was received from Samwest and Frederick, (735) an SAS party and Jedburgh team in the Guingamp area, that they were unable to maintain an organization in the area and were falling back on Dingson.

Large quantities of supplies had been delivered to the Dingson base and reports showed that there were 2,300 armed men in the area. Also, all the railways were out of action with the exception of one single track.

(732) War Diary Vol 11 p 555
 (733) See pp 39 this Vol
 (734) War Diary Vol 3 p
 (735) See pp 33 this Vol

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On 14 June George reported successful progress in his area, but suggested dispatching Jedburgh teams to the Finisterre and Loire Inferieure areas to develop resistance. Fernand had reported that there were 8,000 men in the Finisterre area to be organized but they were without arms.

Purpose of Mission

The specific mission of team Giles was to organize resistance in the Finisterre area. No offensive action was to be undertaken however, unless instructed to do so by SFHQ.

Method of Dropping and Reception Committee

The team was to be dropped to a non-moon reception committee arranged by F Section, with Jedburgh George's Eureka, if he could move it to the Finisterre area. If this were impossible, they would be dropped to a bonfire reception to be arranged by George.

Equipment

The team was dispatched with the standard Jedburgh load. Also, 15 containers and 6 packages were to be dropped with them.

Scale of Air Support Likely

Future air deliveries would be sufficient to arm the groups contacted by the team. However, not more than 3,000 were to be recruited without further reference to SFHQ.

Communications

The team was dropped with 2 W/T sets with instructions to establish contact with the Home Station as soon as possible.

Arrangements were made for an agreed message to be broadcast over the BBC at specified times. This would serve as a means of identification to any group the team might contact.

Operations, Team Giles (Cont'd)

Finance

Each Jedburgh officer took 100,000 French francs and 50 American dollars with him. The W/T operator took 50,000 French francs and 50 American dollars.

Relations with Other Allied Units

Special Airborn Services. At the time the team was dispatched there was no SAS unit in the area. However, it was possible that at a later date such a unit might be established in the area. In this case, the team would assist in establishing the base and assisting them in any way possible. If a large SAS base were established later in this area, it might be possible that the team would be placed under its command.

Other Jedburgh Parties. Each Jedburgh team came directly under the command of SFHQ. However, it would be valuable to contact other teams working in the same area, as team George was, since they would be able to provide additional information concerning the area and help in establishing the necessary contacts for developing resistance there.

An Allied Mission. Should an Allied mission be dispatched to this area later, the team might be placed under its command.

Allied Forces, If Overrun. If overrun by Allied Forces, the team had instructions to report to the headquarters of the nearest Allied unit and ask for the intelligence officer of the unit. No details of their work were to be given even to this officer, but they were to ask him to forward them to the nearest SF Staff. This staff would identify them and pass them back to SFHQ.

Action

Upon Arrival in the Field. As soon as possible after

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arriving in the field the team would report on the organization, strength, and arms of resistance in the Finisterre area. They would also report on the possibility of controlling an area into which daylight deliveries could be made at a later date.

If Withdrawal Should Become Necessary. If enemy action in the area became too great for the team to remain and carry on its activities, they were to make arrangements to report to the SAS Dingson base, after having first informed SFHQ of their intention.

If Captured. The team took no cover story with it to the field, so in event of being taken prisoner they would be taken as soldiers in uniform performing their ordinary military duties. Every established law of warfare would apply to them and they would give their name, rank, and serial number only.

Information Provided to Team

The following information was given the team before being dispatched:

1. Enemy order of battle in the area.
2. Information regarding dumps and storage areas.
3. Police and Gestapo locations.
4. Information of previous operations in the area.- stores delivered, available arms, recent messages received.
5. List and description of other Allied agents operating in the area:
 - a. Rado, an RF section agent trained in parachute work and sabotage (736).
 - b. Rateau, an RF agent (737).

(736) War Diary Vol 3 p
 (737) War Diary Vol 3 p

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JEDBURGHS

Operations, Team Giles (Cont'd)Summary of W/T Messages Exchanged9 July From Giles (738)

"Arms already distributed in Maquis 200. The situation at Finistere is not as informed. Brest region impossible for the moment. Send three teams for regions Morlaix, Quimper and Quimperle, repeat Quimperle. Giles is installed in the region of Chateauneuf. He is going to contact the chiefs at Finistere who will follow to co-ordinate airfields if possible for each team. Send a million."

10 July From SFHQ (739)

"Have received your message of the ninth. Teams Francis and Gilbert parachuted on the night of 9/10 into the regions of Quimper and Quimperle. We are holding back on sending the third team to the Morlaix area until we hear from you. With it you will get your million. Thanks a lot for rapidity of contact."

11 July From SFHQ to Giles (740)

"The teams for Quimper and Quimperle have already left. We are sending, beginning to-morrow, a first team Hilary for the area of Coadri, destined for the region east of Morlaix. The code will be Peche. A second team is Horace. If the latter cannot work just now in the Brest region, it will begin its activities to the north of your zone in order to prepare its installation in the zone west of Morlaix. Signal Eureka or by bonfire. Alain will be on the reception committee."

12 July From Giles (741)

"Situation Finistere as follows. Coast regions including Brest impossible. Only way is to work out from center. Reception ready from Wednesday on. Send BBC message. Crack signals will only be sent if we wish to scrub."

12 July From Giles (742)

"Have not found packages 26 containing radio and tackles equipment. Drop replacement on Poire. Just learned of arrival of other teams. Second message is from team dropped at Coadri. Their radio broken. Send arms to Framboise and Pomme reception arranged."

14 July From Giles (743)

"Our receiver lost in forced move. Essential send ground Poire."

(738) C-4863/1 9 Jul 44
 (740) C-5310 11 Jul 44
 (742) C-4945/5 12 Jul 44

(739) C-3815 10 Jul 44
 (741) C-4942/4 12 Jul 44
 (743) C-25/7 14 Jul 44

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15 July From Giles (744)

"On no account use ground La Lune Brille sur le Dolmen. Ground searched by Boche and messages too well known."

15 July From Giles (745)

"Received 2 loads on Peche yesterday. Boche arrived just too late. Do not use Peche again until further notice."

16 July From Giles (746)

"General report. Our region Chateaulin Chateauneuf. Maquis affiliated to FTP. We are in process of arming and organizing them in companies with orders to remain quiet. So far orders obeyed completely. Men excellent. Have had contact with Department Chief of Liberation but his organization has such incredibly bad security that we do not like to touch it. In any case it does not count for much in this area."

17 July From Giles (747)

"Have with us Canadian airman shot down over Brest a month ago, Flight Lieutenant Brown. Send instructions on escape route immediately. You dropped 6 containers on Framboise. All found - ground safe. Drop some more. No drop on Cerise last night."

18 July From Giles (748)

"Frederick encircled but escaped. Radio lost. Tackies package found. Chute did not open. Send entire package quickly. Set smashed to hell."

19 July From Giles (749)

"Cerise ready but do not repeat until asked. Received 45 containers, 2 Jed teams and 3 French officers. Sending 1 Jed to Maquis Plou Rach Fromboise to work on Morlaix. Other to Maquis St Segal Pomme to work on Brest. Repeat broadcast of 17th on new groups. We destroy old ones at once. Too near Jerry to file them. Our losses 17, Boche 23."

22 July From Giles (750)

"Have been informed that Berthaud, Chief FFI Department, has complained to London of our activities. We think he complains that we have based our action on FTP in our zone. True enough because in our region resistance is mostly maquis FTP. We are in same Maquis as Department Chief FTP who is in liaison with Berthaud. This arrangement was made at an interview between us and Berthaud. Discussed situation yesterday with Ogden Smith and they agree with us. Expect this evening meeting with Berthaud. to settle."

(744) C-69/9	15 Jul 44	(745) C-72/10	15 Jul 44
(746) C-115/13	16 Jul 44	(747) C-157	17 Jul 44
(748) No number	18 Jul 44	(749) C-232/19	19 Jul 44
(750) C-279/22	22 Jul 44		

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Operations, Team Giles (Cont'd)22 July From SFHQ to Giles (751)

"Firstly we confirm that Jedburghs should organize parachute drops in agreements with FFI Departmental. Second we approve of the work of Giles with FTP who are integral part of the FFI. Third we count on the comprehension and patriotism of more of them for action and full agreement. We are happy to have made contact with Berthaud with whos fine activity we are acquainted."

24 July From Giles (752)

"Have moved for fourth time. Jerry getting on our tail."

24 July From Giles (753)

"Following objectives for bombardment have been visited. Agent of ours says information is reliable. Map references all on France over 50,000 published by War Office 1943. 1st headquarters north coast defenses, Chateau des isles in part 2 kms north of Les Neven west of road Les Neven - Plouneour Trez reference sheet 2 map 2 Landerneau square 0820. Second battalion with all its transport along both sides of road in wood in curve of road Landerneau - Les Neven, 1 km northwest of Landerneau, reference sheet 2, Landerneau square 1205. Third parachutist cantonment in wood east of road Chateaulin - Quimerch, 6 kms due north of Chateaulin in reference sheet 3 Gee 5 Chateaulin square 2481."

25 July From Giles (754)

"Saw Berthaud today. Everything fine."

25 July From Giles (755)

"Received and distributed 4 loads. Money and radio received and Francis got his last night. Have 1 radio complete, 1/2 million and 2 carbines for Gilbert. Team Horace sent into Brest area by arrangement with Berthaud. No idea whereabouts Hilary. Send more boots they are essential for Maquis. Some of our company march in sabots. Have set up medical service for evacuation of wounded to Quimper by 2 Quimper doctors. Please send some USA cigarettes for Giles. We are rolling our own."

26 July From Giles (756)

"In grave danger. Missed broadcast last night. May miss tonight's. Boche concentrating all round us."

26 July From SFHQ to Giles (757)

"Our congratulations medical organization. Are pleased your understanding with Berthaud."

(751) C-5980 22 Jul 44
(753) C-401/29 24 Jul 44
(755) C-427/31 25 Jul 44
(757) C-6006 26 Jul 44

(752) C-378/28 24 Jul 44
(754) C-406/30 25 Jul 44
(756) C-482/34 26 Jul 44

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Operations, Team Giles (Cont'd)27 July From Giles (758)

"Received message for Gilbert. Why send it to us, he has a receiver. Still have Gilbert's radio. Liaison cut owing to following events. Boche began concentrating in Chateauneuf area beginning this week. 5 SWP were captured and FTP maquis became almost uncontrollable. In order to avoid worse trouble we were forced to allow one section to attempt rescue by ambush. Without our knowledge other maquis did the same thing. Only result so far has been skirmish on route Quimper-Chateauneuf. Two dead on either side. This was provoked by a group acting independently of us. Our position here very dangerous. In general FTP are getting very hard to control and we may not be able to do it much longer. Berthaud informed us message for Bretagne has been changed. Is so please tell us new one. Repeat that FTP are reaching boiling point and explosion may occur if Boche continues to hunt them."

28 July From Giles (759)

"Trying hard to get Gilbert's set to him, but liaison extremely difficult in this area."

28 July From Giles (760)

"Our situation in center becoming difficult. Even without our taking offensive action the Boche knows what is happening in the area. We have information that he is preparing large scale action against the maquis of the center. His information comes from the Feld-gendarmerie who are stationed here at Chateauneuf and Chateaulin. Since our arrival with the total cessation of offensive action the Feld-gendarmerie has had leisure to patrol and get precise information. If they bring large forces into the area against us open war will break out in the center. The only way out we can see is to carry out widely dispersed small scale actions against the Feld-gendarmerie so as to prevent them circulating in the countryside. If they cannot get precise information, they cannot mount important operations against us. Please think it over and give a decision fast. We are convinced that if the Feld-gendarmerie is allowed to work unhampered for a little while longer, Jerry will start combing out the maquis in the center. In that case we repeat open war will break out. If we can keep the Feld-gendarmerie on the hop, they will never know where to strike."

28 July From Giles (761)

"FTP companies well adapted to small operations but lack training for manoeuvre and attack. One of French officers dropped on Cerise whom we sent to an FTP company as instructor has assumed command of the company at their request. He is doing wonders with them. This seems to be the answer to the problem of making real military units out of maquis. Send us more young officers for maquis of central Finistere. They will also help us keep the boys down until D-day. Situation calm again here for the moment."

(758) C-520/35 27 Jul 44
(760) C-553/39 28 Jul 44

(759) C-544/26 28 Jul 44
(761) C-564/37 28 Jul 44

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JEDBURGHS

Operations, Team Giles (Cont'd)28 July From Giles (762)

"Target for today. Chateau Gai in woods immediately south of river Aulne 3½ kms due south of Chateauneuf. Chateau if 2 kms southwest of St Gouazec and 3 kms south of Laz. There is a small lake in front of Chateau. Chateau is rest home for Brest submarine crews and also observation point for local repression troops. All the terrain south of Laz is denied to us because it is under observation from Chateau. Urgent for us since this terrain is our last way of retreat. Please give it the works."

28 July From SFHQ to Giles (763)

"Do not hesitate to move when in danger. You must avoid in any circumstances to enter into action until operations start. Message for D-day unchanged."

28 July From Giles (764)

"Inter-departmental chiefs FTP whom we saw 10 days ago suggested dropping Jed teams in Ile et Vilaine. They can hide Ile et Vilaine. The Gestapos in Brittany. They have sent us three drop grounds with message and safe assurance that reception committee will be waiting. If you don't send Jeds, you can always send arms."

29 July From Giles (765)

"Sadly disappointed at your answer to our 35. You did not answer our question at all. We are not thinking of our own skins but of success of operation. We repeat in words of one syllable, if Boche attacks maquis in this area, no power on earth can stop a general explosion. They can only attack if they have precise information. They can only get precise information through Feld-gendarmerie. It may be already too late. Information this morning Boche about to install 25 companies between Callac and Chateauneuf. At least 500 at Chateauneuf. Our liaison is being completely cut by action of Feld-gendarmerie. Messengers are arrested, tortured and shot every day. In these circumstances our work is becoming almost impossible. Central Finistere a powder magazine which needs only a spark and the Boche is going to provide the spark. As for moving when we are in danger, we have moved five times since our arrival. But 15 armed companies in the center. Cannot keep moving all the time. We have managed to keep maquis quiet until now but if they are attacked, nothing can stop open fighting in Finistere."

29 July From SFHQ to Giles (766)

"Cannot say when your targets will be bombed though they are on the list. Two Jed teams just arrived in Ile et Vilaine."

(762) C-581/40 28 Jul 44
 (764) C-588/38 28 Jul 44
 (766) C-4354 29 Jul 44

(763) C-6031 28 Jul 44
 (765) C-622/43 29 Jul 44

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30 July From Giles (767)

"Our information on Boche espionage in center confirmed today by Berthaud. He estimates 5,000 Boche for operation. Only way we can see to avoid open warfare is to withdraw completely all armed companies from area Chateauneuf Chateaulin. Withdrawal must be fast. We propose to hide 7 companies in region east of line Scaer-Roudouallec-Spezet. Companies of north to stay in place since they are almost at frontier of Cotes du Nord. If Boche comes after us there, we will either retire into Morbihan and Cote du Nord or fight. For latter eventuality please be ready to drop us loads. If necessary in daylight."

30 July From Giles (768)

"Thanks for chateau. First reports say half demolished. Many Boche hit. Big party night before in chateau. Possible important officers were hit. Couldn't have been better."

30 July From SFHQ to Giles (769)

"We quite agree about action by small groups against field gendarmerie. Only mistake in interpretation made you interrupt all operations. Must keep enemy in danger everywhere ceaselessly by guerilla action, that is to say, generalized mobile offensive action by surprise and refusing large scale battle."

2 August From SFHQ to Giles (770)

"Allied forces advancing into Brittany. Most important maintain present harassing activity but prevent general flare-up until you get order."

2 August From Giles (771)

"Chateautrev area almost completely destroyed. Boche has evacuated it. Number of casualties closely guarded secret but sure it is high."

2 August From Giles (772)

"Message from Francis. Major Ogden Smith killed. Radio wounded. Le Zachmeur safe. Because of papers Ogden Smith was carrying, do not drop on any of Francis grounds until you hear from him. He asks for 2 planes with equipment for ground Brochet."

2 August From Giles (773)

"Situation - our Hq Plessis 2 kms southeast of Laz. Intend to stay here unless they send 3 regiments. Are in position to protect dump ground Ananas from which we

(767) C-652/46 30 Jul 44
(769) C-6053 30 Jul 44
(771) C-812/56 2 Aug 44
(773) C-837/58 2 Aug 44

(768) C-663/47 30 Jul 44
(770) C-4491 2 Aug 44
(772) C-821/59 2 Aug 44

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will send arms to Gilbert for coast. Have 3 companies in immediate area. Limits of our zone of action. First, south limit by arrangement with Gilbert - line Douarnenez Briec Gourin. North line Daoulas Sizun Berrien. East line Carhaix and department limit. We have companies north of our north line but liaison with them is difficult. Boche concentration against us now seems unlikely. One of our groups yesterday made reconnaissance of remains of Chateautrev area. We were fired on by Boche and killed 17 of them without loss."

2 August From SFHQ to Giles (774)

"Desire send you Jedburgh team from Thursday 3rd August. You should arrange all necessary FFI contacts. Give us urgently ground on which you can receive team."

2 August From SFHQ to Giles (775)

"BBC action messages passed tonight. Urgent you remember these are signal for concentrated guerilla activity but not for open warfare. Above passed to all Jedburghs in Brittany and SAS."

2 August From Giles (776)

"Received message Napoleon. No contact with Colonel Heomault. Lack arms and ammo. Going over to offensive tonight."

3 August From Giles (777)

"Germans moving in large numbers Chateaulin, Chateauneuf, Carhaix on foot, cycle and horse cart. Send aircraft."

3 August From Giles (778)

"4 loads received on Paire. Only one on Ananas. Please repeat Ananas tonight with 4 aircraft at least. Please send package for Giles. Information that parachutist division from Chateaulin and Sizun is leaving Finistere."

3 August From Giles (779)

"Armande drop successful. 1 company armed region Guerlesquin. Detailed report on Scrignac incidents 4 Germans dead and probably 16 wounded."

3 August From Giles (780)

"Boche move to east held up in Morbihan. Columns stuck on and near road Chateaulin, Chateauneuf, Carhaix. Send aviation. They can't miss."

(774) C-6101 2 Aug 44
(776) C-874/61 2 Aug 44
(778) C-894/62 3 Aug 44
(780) C-916/67 3 Aug 44

(775) C-6106 2 Aug 44
(777) C-884/61 3 Aug 44
(779) C-896/63 3 Aug 44

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3 August From Giles (781)

"Information from prisoner captured today. Second parachutist division on move from Douarnenez to Brittany front. Yesterday were 2 kms west of Chateaulin. Today at 6 p.m. they were 3 kms from Chateauneuf. Moving in carts and on foot. Prisoner says their morale is good.

3 August From SFHQ to Giles (782)

"This was General Koenig's message to all resistance groups giving information on procedure when overrun by Allied troops."

4 August From Giles (783)

"We have cut the road between Chateauneuf and Carhaix by blowing bridge where road crosses Amone near Landeleau. Ambushes and guerilla attacks on all side roads. Please bombard troops on road tomorrow."

4 August From SFHQ to Giles (784)

"Essential that advancing Allied troops have military intelligence. Therefore arrange for maximum thirty your men who know district well to move towards Allied front line by various routes covering as large area as possible. They should bring with them information on enemy dispositions. Most important items are first, preparation of fortified lines of defense; second, troop concentrations with identification if possible; third, targets likely to be fairly permanent; fourth, artillery emplacements; fifth, tank harbors; sixth, defended points; seventh, machine gun emplacements; eighth, petrol dumps; ninth, ammunition dumps; tenth, enemy headquarters. They will be enlisted on arrival and will act as guides to forward units. They should ask for the nearest division G-2 of the first soldier they meet. On arrival at divisional headquarters they must ask for G-2 branch. No password must be mentioned until divisional headquarters specifically ask for it. When asked for they will give Angouleme as password."

4 August From SFHQ to Giles (785)

"Top speed of Allied advance necessitates immediate orders for maximum activity by resistance. Important you continue notify us all enemy concentrations for bombing attack. Give enemy no respite where possible for you to attack them. Put into immediate operation plan for guides with Angouleme password as already given you."

5 August From SFHQ to Giles (786)

"After passage allied armor resistance be prepared mop up remaining enemy elements and provide organized

(781) C-933/69	3 Aug 44	(782) C-143	3 Aug 44
(783) C-956/70	4 Aug 44	(784) C-175, C-176, C-177	4 Aug 44
(785) C-207	4 Aug 44	(786) C-243	5 Aug 44

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JEDBURGHS

Operations, Team Giles (Cont'd)

protection for Allied lines of supply and communications. First priority present missions. You will be informed of lines to be protected at appropriate time."

5 August From Giles (787)

"Received your messages. Orders of General Koenig sent to all companies. Guides for advancing Allied forces already en route. You can drop Jed team on Poire. We have not received message stating their mission. Situation Finistere - Boche evacuating. 2nd parachutist division now out of Finistere. According to prisoners taken yesterday it is heading for Nantes. We have attacked it all along its route. Liaison extremely difficult for us now but will do our best to get orders to all concerned. What instructions for Jeds when overrun."

5 August From Giles (788)

"Elements of German forces proceeding east along road Chateaulin, Chateauneuf, Carhaix. Have turned back and are heading west. We are attacking them all along the road. Just learned that important elements of 2nd parachutist division are quartered in villages of Reunchonpuns and Poulargarront. Both villages one and a half kms northwest of Chateaulin."

5 August From SFHQ to Giles (789)

"Bridge destruction road Chateauneuf, Carhaix noted. Presume this was before General Koenig's orders reached you. Remember preservation of permanent works now priority task. Specific target for preservation is repeater station at Carhaix."

6 August From Giles (790)

"Bridge Landeleau destroyed before receipt Koenig's orders. No orders received on demolition in any case. Will do our best for Carhaix but you might have mentioned it before. Contact yesterday with US advanced column which reached Chateauneuf. Believe it has retired to Gourin. Boche has blown bridge over Aulne on road Chateauneuf Scaerr. We will attempt to stop him blowing bridge Pont du Stanc. We asked Berthaud 5 days ago for plan of demolition prevention but without result. Our information on Carhaix. 2000 Boche there. Town strongly fortified. 400 armed FFI for outside town. You asked us to preserve repeater station. Presume you mean railway station. 2nd Boche parachutist division in small detachments all over our area using guerilla tactics. Our liaison is extremely difficult."

(787) C-1063/73 5 Aug
(789) C-282 5 Aug 44

(788) C-1060/74 5 Aug 44
(790) C-416 6 Aug 44

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JEDBURGH

Operations, Team Giles (Cont'd)6 August From Giles (791)

"Carhaix - cannot promise much because of our situation. We are in middle of Boche parachutist division which has taken to the countryside. Liaison between our companies can only be maintained by heavily armed motorized groups which have frequent casualties. We have no real contact with FFI of Carhaix. They were armed by Francis. We could muster men to go to Carhaix but not all of them would get there and the result could easily be complete disaster. If you wish us at all cost to send our men there we will try but they will have to go on foot as we are almost out of petrol. Give instruction."

6 August From SFHQ to Giles (792)

"Resistance headquarters Brittany under command Mission Aloes. Mission parachuted in Cotes du Nord night 4/5 August to Frederick. They ask for contact with FFI Finistere. Send post box urgently. Jedburgh Ronald parachuted same night to Gilbert with mission to liaise with FFI to whom he will transmit Aloes orders. Ronald has contact with London and with Aloes. Confirm if you have received our message indicating action you should take when overrun."

7 August From SFHQ to Giles (793)

"Resistance are requested by army command to do everything possible to protect following roads after cavalry and motorized divisions have passed well in advance other elements. First, route Rostrenen - Carhaix - Brest; second, Pontivy - Gourin - Carhaix - Chateaulin - Brest. Protection should be carried out only by organized units."

7 August From SFHQ to Giles (794)

"We did mean repeater and not railway station. Repeater station is part of telephone system."

8 August From Giles (795)

"New Hq Chateautrev area. Do not strafe. Contact yesterday with US Forward unit at Rostrenen. Daily liaison from now on. Situation Finistere - plenty of Boche left, mostly parachutists here. Will not surrender. Yesterday had prisoners third parachutist division from Huelgoat. We need more arms for job."

9 August From Giles (796)

"Visited Aloes yesterday. Do not understand mission of Jedburgh Ronald. We have undertaken to hold open road Carhaix, Chateaneuf, Chateaulin, Daoulas. Will try to find organization at Huelgoat. Have had no contact with Berthauld since Napoleon had message except constant

(791) C-1117/76 6 Aug 44
(793) C-509 7 Aug 44
(795) C-1251/78 8 Aug 44

(792) C-6149 6 Aug 44
(794) C-510 7 Aug 44
(796) C-1291/79 9 Aug 44

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demand for reinforcements for Quimper. We sent what we could but it wasn't much. News of fighting around Quimper is hard to get but there seems to have been a mistake made down there. Cannot see strategic importance of Quimper for moment."

9 August From SFHQ to Giles (797)

"Main function of Jedburgh Ronald is to provide direct communications line with Aloes and transmit Aloes orders to resistance groups."

10 August From Giles (798)

"Chateauneuf, Sizun, Brassparts, Pleyben, Coray in hands of FFI."

10 August From Giles (799)

"Are surrounded by several superior officers named by FTP. What importance are we to attach to these Lt Colonels. Up till now we have worked with them as equals though they rather look down on us. What attitude should we take toward them. Average age of FTP colonel is between 23 and 33. They are not exactly brilliant in the military line but are good talkers. They seem to be worrying mainly about their share of the gravy."

11 August From Giles (800)

"Chateaulin in hands of FFI."

11 August From Giles (801)

"Still don't know what a repeater station is but it hasn't been blown up. Carhaix in hands of FFI."

11 August From Giles (802)

"Consider our mission here finished. Center region free of Boche and Aloes is going to take charge of troops. Aloes is going to set up house just near us tomorrow. Please send instructions."

11 August From SFHQ to Giles (803)

"Here are instructions for you when overrun by Allies. As Allies have given military status to FFI you can accept a command from FFI if such proposed. Meantime continue mopping up operations guarding roads to enable military to advance etc. As soon as your mission is finished, report to us. Will then arrange with Aloes for your return here."

(797) C-672 9 Aug 44
(799) C-1378 10 Aug 44
(801) C-1441/85 11 Aug 44
(803) C-911 11 Aug 44

(798) C-1392/83 10 Aug 44
(800) C-1440/84 11 Aug 44
(802) C-1467/86 11 Aug 44

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11 August From SFHQ to Giles (804)

"Congratulations for protecting repeater station. For your information it is part of central telephone exchange."

12 August From SFHQ to Giles (805)

"Have forwarded text your message to Aloes. If he has no further need of you will arrange for your immediate return here. Awaiting Aloes decision."

13 August From Giles (806)

"Presquille de Crozon occupied by 12,000 organized Boche armed with mortars and artillery. They recaptured Otneault this morning and have attempted to retake Chateaulin. Please strafe them. We are trying to get American armor from Morlaix but don't think we have much hope. What about sending us some paratroops."

14 August From Giles (807)

"Boche sending out patrols from Crozon. Have contacted Americans at Morlaix and they do not have enough force to help us. We shall need more arms. Send them daylight. Our headquarters now in Chateauneuf."

14 August From SFHQ to Giles (808)

"Regret all air operations to Brittany from here finished. Consult Aloes for requirements. He has contact 3rd Army for urgent supplies."

4 September From SFHQ to Giles (809)

"Mounting sea operation to Benodet south of Quimper at midday on Wednesday 6th September. You should return on this operation complete with all equipment. Contact Aloes for instructions."

Report on Team Upon Return from Field - 8 July - 9 September 1944

Preliminaries. The team was alerted and briefed by Major Horton on 16 June. Its mission was to organize and arm the resistance in Finistere. General Koenig saw the team before it left, and emphasized the importance of sending back information, since very little was known about the FFI of Finistere. Just before the team actually left, Captain Lebel was called to London, and asked to agree on a BBC message which would be

(804) C-938 11 Aug 44	(805) C-1015 12 Aug 44
(806) C-1633/87 13 Aug 44	(807) C-1687/88 14 Aug 44
(808) C-6222 14 Aug 44	(809) C-4824 4 Sept 44

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the signal for the large-scale attack on the Boche in Brittany. He suggested Le Chapeau De Napoleon Est-il Toujours A Perros-Guirec and this suggestion was adopted. After one abortive trip over the DZ on 4 July, team Giles finally got away from Harrington in a B-24 at 1100 hours 8 July.

The Drop , 8/9 July. The jumping order was Knox, Tack, Lebel. The pilot reported seeing the lights about 0100 hours and the hole was opened. For the next twenty minutes we circled round trying to find the lights again but since we had agreed with the pilot that he would drop us blind if necessary, we were not too worried as we were going to get out anyway. Finally he saw the lights, and dropped us in as good a run-in as I have ever seen. Knox and Tack landed fairly close together - Captain Lebel joined us after two or three minutes. We were welcomed immediately by a group of very excited, very young Frenchmen, all of whom we had to kiss in turn.

We were finally greeted by the organizer of the reception committee, M. Arzel, who is now adjoint to the Prefet of Quimper. Arzel explained to us that the FFI in Finistere were rather disorganized as a result of the capture and execution of twelve of their leaders during the previous week. Among those executed, was Poussin, one of the men we were to contact. He proposed to send us to a maquis somewhere outside Chateauneuf-Du-Faou, the chief of which was a very capable man.

The Reception Committee. Meanwhile the reception committee had been gathering up the containers, and packages, and we were just preparing to break out our rucksacks and move off in true Jedburgh style, groaning under the weight of pack,

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weapons, and wireless set, when we noticed three cars and a large truck. This Maquis, it seemed, was motorized. They loaded the containers on to the truck, chutes and all, and about 0430 hours in the morning the convoy moved off, German rifles sticking out of all the windows, in the direction of Chateauneuf. We kept to the back roads, but the three of us were not a little worried, especially by the truck, which made as much noise as a Sherman tank. At one point we moved through the town of Briec, and halted for fifteen minutes in the main street while one car went back to look for some stragglers. The last part of the journey was done in broad daylight.

The Maquis, when we finally reached it, turned out to be a group of approximately fifty men, living in a small wood about 3 kilometers west of the village of Laz. Their chief was away in Cotes-Du-Nord, trying to get arms, and the 2-IG, a peasant named Lebras, who had been a regular soldier, was in charge.

First Days in the Maquis, 9-12 July. This Maquis was fairly well organized, and the distribution of arms went off fast and smartly. Captain Lebel and Knox organized a defense system round the CP and spent the rest of the day inspecting the position and instructing the men in the use of their new arms. Lebras sent a Liaison man into Chateauneuf to call out 50 more men to complete the company.

We were very happy and very busy, but we were not in contact with men who could provide us with dropping zones and reception committees on the scale which we knew necessary. But there was nothing to do but wait until the leader returned

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from Cotes Du Nord.

That afternoon we listened to the BBC messages, and heard the original message that had signalled our arrival - "La Lune Brille sur le Dolmen." We were rather worried at the prospect of going back to the same dropping zone, but decided to risk it. How we got away with this second reception I shall never know. It was a much heavier load this time, the men were exhausted, we were still loading containers on the truck in broad daylight. We finally got away, and safely back to the CP.

We found out later that morning that 300 German paratroops had arrived in Laz five minutes after we had gone through and that they were searching all the farms in the area. We sent this information off to London by Pigeon, since we were afraid that the paratroops might have a DF car with them. The pigeons had been parachuted all over the area the night before. This message apparently never reached its destination.

The paratroops didn't find us, and during the course of the day we armed another Maquis which was based on the woods around Plessis, to the east of Laz.

First Contact. Yves Legal, the leader of this Maquis finally returned on 11 July. He turned out to be FTP military leader for the center of the department. He had under his orders Maquis and potential Maquis all over the department. We explained our mission to him and asked him for drop-grounds and reception committees in every possible direction. We settled at once two grounds for two Jedburgh teams, one for Brest and the other for Morlaix. These two grounds Pomme and Framboise were used later for drops of arms.

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We took the decision, since we had made this very useful contact, to stay in the center of Finistere and make out of it a strongly armed base from which the arming of the coast areas could be carried on. We communicated this place to London.

Pecche. Meanwhile we learned that two Jedburgh teams for South Finistere had been dropped on the night of the 9-10 July. We did not know that one of them had dropped near Coadri, where we had arranged our first arms drop. This was ground Pecche. By the time our drop was made, 14 July, the ground was blown, and the reception committee was attacked by the Boche the next day. The German casualties were out of all proportion to ours and to the amount of material which they took. As a result, they did not send any punitive troops into this area, the Scaer region, again.

Drop Grounds. Meanwhile the machinery had been started by Legal, and the heads of the different Maquis of Finistere started to come in to our HQ. They would give us the co-ordinates of a drop-ground, we would instruct them in the procedure of our reception committee, and make them repeat it to us to be sure they understood. We would give them a BBC message, and send them on their way. Since there were obviously going to be so many drops, in so many places, we had to trust to the leaders to run the receptions by themselves. Without exception, they did well. Of all the drops organized by Giles, with the one exception of Pecche, there was not one which left any material in the hands of the Germans.

So many men came in that we got to repeating our lecture on reception committees in our sleep. During this period we organized, and sent off to London, the following grounds,

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Poire, Cerise, Framboise, Orange, Abricot, Raisin, Amande.
All of them were served.

Lieutenant Colonel Berthaud. On 12 July we were visited by the FFI chief of Finistere, commandant - now Lieutenant Colonel Berthaud. He was Poussin's successor, and had his HQ at Quimper. We explained our plans to him, agreed to keep in liaison with him through Legal, and parted in friendly fashion. After his second visit, we had to shoot one of the men in his car, who was a known Gestapo agent. Berthaud had given him a lift in his car, and he had followed Berthaud into our CP. We decided, in view of this, and several other indiscreet actions of Berthaud's, to have as indirect a liaison as possible with him.

First Move. On 13 July we were visited by the Maire of Laz who told us that large German forces were in the area looking for us, and that the map their commanding officer was using had red marks against the name of the farm where we were taking our meals. So that night we moved. The company (now 100 men) marched across country to the farm Lesren and the next night to Kernour, a very high plateau in the vicinity of St Thors, which dominated the country for miles around. In this place we managed to stay until 20 July.

In the course of the move we lost our receiver, but recovered it next day. We sent one message blind, and were glad to see it in our file when we returned.

Visit by FTP Commanders of Brittany. While we were at Kernour, about 15 July, two FTP departmental chiefs came to see us. One of them was a young man of 24, Chevalier. He is now a Lieutenant Colonel, right hand man to Berthaud in

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Quimper. They gave us some very interesting facts about the history of resistance in Brittany, and we were finally able to win them over to our policy, which was, as ordered, to arm, organize, and wait for the message. They were naturally inclined to begin using the arms at once, but after several long discussions with us, they finally announced gravely that they were in agreement with the plans of the Allied High Command.

They also promised to send us dropping zones in Ile el Vilarve which they said was the weakest department in Brittany. These grounds were sent to London, and I think, were served.

Cerise. One evening as we listened to the BBC and checked off our messages we heard Fifi A Une Bouche En Cerise - a message which we had been expecting for a long time. But it continued - Fifi Recevra La Visite De Neuf Amis Ce Sois. So one of us had to go there, and in a car, since it was much too far to walk. Captain Lebel went in the end, and received Jed teams Horace (810) and Hilary (811) as well as three French parachutist officers - Equation, Egalite, Equivalence. So our problem now as to get the Jed teams off to their areas - Brest and Morlaix respectively. The next day, I was to go over to Cerise with a convoy and pick up Horace, then take them up to Lannedern, the nearest Maquis we had to the Brest area. But that evening one of the suspected millicens whom we were questioning escaped, and we had to move that night. We crossed the canal, and set up in a valley about 3 kilometers from Lennon. That night I went over to Cekise (it was near Peniti) and brought team Horace over to our HQ since our arrangements for transport to Lannedern had broken down. Captain Lebel got them away the next night, after almost

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running into a paratroop patrol on the Chateaulin-Chateauneuf road. That same day, Hilary had started for the North. So now all five teams were working in Finistere.

Flight-Lieutenant Brown. We were joined about this time by a Canadian pilot who had been shot down over Brest, and was wandering through Brittany. Since the escape route had broken down since 6 June, we kept him with us, and he was a great help to us - he worked with Sergeant Tack on the ciphering of messages. When we sent him off to the American troops on 6 August, we were very sorry to see him go.

Medical Service. While at Lennon we finally organized the medical service which was to save so many lives during the operations to come. Doctor Belin of Briec, who had already evacuated one of our wounded from Kernouk, set up a hospital at his home in Briec, and Doctor Ollivier Henri, a surgeon of Quimper, placed himself at our disposal for operations. These two men were to save many French lives in the period between 4-12 August - and one American soldier, who was left for dead by the Germans outside Chateauneuf, was cared for by Doctor Belin, and operated on by Doctor Henri. He was eventually returned to the US Army in a convalescent state. These two men worked for over a month in an area which was always thick with German troops.

Meeting with Francis. While at Lennon we made contact with Captain Lezachmeur and Major Ogden-Smith who came to see us. There was some confusion about zones of action, which we cleared up on the spot. We had a full discussion on the policy to pursue and came to complete agreement on all points. This was the last time I ever saw Colin.

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More Grounds. During the whole of this period we were organizing arms drops on an ever increasing scale. How we managed to get them all over without German interference I shall never understand. It may be that there were so many widely dispersed that the Boche never managed to catch up with them. Most of our grounds were thoroughly searched by the Boche one or two days after the drop.

Information Service. From Lennon we sent out a number of volunteers, all of them technical men, either army or curliaw, to gather military information on specific areas. One group was sent off to look for a possible landing place on the north coast, and one to pick up likely targets for air. This latter group brought back some extremely good targets which we sent off to London. One of them was a German CP for the north coast defences which I understood was later dealt with by the RAF.

Another Move. We were informed of increasing German activity in our immediate area - in particular, German patrols in Lennon, two miles away. The Feldgendarmerie had installed itself in force in Chateauneuf-du-Faou. All our information from Chateauneuf spoke of German preoccupation with our activities. So we decided to move again, this time to the north, across the Pleyben-Chateauneuf road. The move was carried out at night, and as a result of the breakdown of a peasant cart in a narrow road, Sergeant Tack, Flight Lieutenant Brown and Captain Knox had to carry the radio equipment. We arrived at our new destination - the farms of Dint, Prenhout and Langolen, at about 0400 hours.

Hunted. That morning we learned that German paratroops

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had arrived at Lennon, and were searching the whole area. We put outposts in position to observe the Pletben-Chateauneuf road, where the first signs of German concentration against our new position would be visible. That afternoon we learned that five men from our Maquis who were passing near Lennon on a mission to get food, had been captured by the Feld-gardarmerie. One of them was a radio operator, who had been working with Sergeant Tack.

Obviously we had to move again, but the country north of us was very unfavorable. There was only one place to go - back across the canal to Kernoux. Unfortunately, Legal was away organizing the distribution of arms which had been dropped on Poire, so we had to organize the move ourselves. We started at nightfall, and as we moved south to the Chateauneuf-Pleyben road, we saw German signal flares ahead of us. They were answered by others in the Chateauneuf direction, and others were seen in the direction of Pletben. Lebras, who was in command of the company, took a section ahead to investigate, and did not return. We did not see him until two days later. So we were left with two-thirds of a company which was absolutely without cadres, and which was exhausted by the march of the night before. We led them a considerable distance west across country and then cut across the Pleyben Chateauneuf road. As we crossed we saw many more flares ahead of us; the Boche seemed to be holding the whole line of the canal. Our immediate problem was to get through Lennon, since we had arrived in a road which went right through the town. There was no question of going across country any more. The men were already tired out, it was late, and we had many more miles to cover.

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Operations, Team Giles (Cont'd)

Lennon. As we approached the town, we sent a small party ahead to reconnoitre. They went ahead and five minutes later we caught up with them; they were afraid to go any farther. We realized that we were going to have to lead them ourselves. They were too frightened and leader less to be of any use to us that night. So the reconnaissance of Lennon was made by Captain Lebel, Captain Knox and Sergeant Tack, with the Jed set on our backs. Luckily there were no Germans there, we found out next morning they had left an hour or so before. As we moved out of the town we heard trucks moving on the Pleyben road to our north.

The Canal. The same formula was followed at the canal. We had chosen to cross at Pont Ty-Men, simply because it was the nearest bridge. Jedburgh Giles had to cross it first, and then the others came across. There were no troops guarding it, God knows why. They were guarding the lock, 1000 yards down stream, where we had originally intended to cross. Just after we crossed the bridge we heard machine gun and rifle fire behind us. We made a forced march for two miles and then sat down to rest.

Night March to Kernour. It was now about 0230 hours and we still had a long way to go. We decided to make a forced march all the way there. The men dropped off behind us one by one, and when we arrived, about 0700 hours there were only 8 of us left. The others had been unable to stand the pace, and had hidden in barns along the road. This incident shows the defects of these troops. They had no physical stamina, and once separated from their real leaders, they disintegrated. To balance these defects, they had remarkable qualities, which they were to show magnificently a few weeks later.

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Ambush on the Quimper Road. We were awakened that same morning by the bursting of grenades and machine-gun fire. A battle was taking place on the Quimper road, 1500 meters away. It was one of the ambushes we had set to intercept the transport of our five prisoners to the Kommandatur at Quimper, where "investigations" usually took place. Evidently, from the sound of the battle, it had not been successful. As the survivors came back to us, they told us that one of their members had disobeyed orders, and fired on a truckload of German troops coming from Quimper. The Germans, after killing our Bren-gunner, had returned to Quimper. They would certainly come back and search the area, and as we counted our men and arms we felt very low. We had fifteen men and two Bren guns. Luckily for us the Germans searched the country to the south of us, but never quite reached our position. After shooting several farmers and burning some farms, they withdrew.

German Concentration. From this moment on, we began to get more and more information on German troop concentration in our area. This information was all confirmed by Lieutenant-Colonel Berthaud, from Quimper. By this time we had about 2000 armed men, organized in companies, living in the Maquis in Central Finistere. If the Germans did concentrate troops in the area and begin a drive, nothing could stop a general explosion. And this we were under orders to prevent.

The Chateau. Our position, and all the surrounding countryside, was dominated by the Chateau de Trevarez, which was occupied by a German garrison, who maintained an observation service from the roof. In view of the German concentration we could not overlook the possibility that we might be forced

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to move by day, and in that event we would be watched from the chateau. We therefore asked London to bombard it. On 30 July, early in the morning, it was dive-bombed by three RAF planes. We learned afterwards that the whole population of Chateauneuf had run out of church to watch the proceedings. The chief of the Feldgendarmerie of Chateauneuf, Alber Ehrharot, had promised the citizens that there would be a surprise for them before Sunday. He hadn't expected this one. The whole population was jubilant. The Germans had put on a huge party the night before, and had been caught quite literally, with their pants down. The number of dead was kept a closely guarded secret, but when we occupied the chateau ten days later, there were still a lot of them under the ruins. We could smell them. On 31 July, in view of renewed German activity in the area we moved again, this time back to our old haunts, west of Laz, to the village of Plessis.

Plessis. This was to be the HQ from which we carried on the attack on the 2nd Parachutist Division. We did not leave it, until central Finistere was liberated from the Boche. Our first move was to carry out a reconnaissance in the grounds of the chateau, in the course of which seventeen Germans were killed. The Germans evacuated the ruins the next day. On 2 August we received a message from Captain Lezachmeur telling us of the death of Major Ogden-Smith. We sent a message to London cancelling all his grounds, since the Germans had found papers on his body.

Meanwhile our arms-drops continued. From Plessis we organized the drops on Groseille, Noisette, Noix, Ananas, Prune, Mandarine, Fraise. Ground Ananas was almost in our backyard - we had two battalions around it, and intended to

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fight instead of moving if we were attacked. We had one drop on it on 2 August, and on the evening of 3 August, since we expected four planes, we prepared fires, for the reception. On this particular occasion, many of the local peasants had asked to be allowed to come to the "parachutage". To their surprise, and ours, the "parachutage" took the form of a strafing attack by a JU 88, armed with four cannon. We could not get the fires out in time, and the German plane was able to make two runs. Luckily, there were no casualties.

Le Chapeau de Napoleon. On 2 August we learned that the Zwerte Fallschirmjager Division was on the move from its base in the Chateaulin area eastward along the road to Carhaix. They were on foot, on bicycles and in horse-drawn carts. We were very much tempted to attack them, but this would have been contrary to our orders. But that afternoon we heard the message we had so long been waiting for - and the attack on the 2nd Paratroop Division began.

The Second Paratroop Division. We had seven companies in position along the main road, and they were immediately given orders to begin harassing attacks on the 2nd Division. In order to get instructions to the companies north of the road, we had to send armed groups in cars to rush across, firing and throwing grenades, at unimportant crossroads. Most of them got across, but in one of these expeditions, the young brother of Legal was killed. The head of the division was already in Carhaix, and in order to prevent any more of them getting through we destroyed the bridge near Laneblau. This was accompanied by a large-scale ambush which forced the Germans to leave the road and strike into the countryside. After two days of attack all along the road, the division

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turned back, concentrating in villages between Pleyben and Chateaulin. Its advance guard stayed in Carhaix.

Prisoners. In the course of these attacks a considerable number of prisoners was taken. Captain Knox together with Legal interrogated them. They were all from the 2nd Paratroop Division, and all of them Hitlerites to a man. They admitted to the atrocities they had committed, refused to believe that the Americans had taken Rennes, refused to discuss the Hitler regime and refused to explain why they had French jewelry, money, and identity cards on them. They were all very young, (one of the worst was only 17) and they were all subsequently shot by the FFI. Even if we had wished to prevent this shooting, we would have been powerless. These men had burned farms and farmers with their wives and children all the way along the main road.

The Royal Navy Arrives. Some days before, following orders from London, we had sent east about thirty FFI to contact American forces and act as guides. On 4 August one of them came in proudly in a jeep with an officer of the Royal Navy and an officer of the Royal Marines. They were very surprised to see us, and explained that they were heading for Brest. We told them that if they had kept on their road to Chateauneuf they would certainly have been killed, and gave them a guide to take them by another route. It was very nice to see them, and I hope they finally got to their destination safely.

First American Troops. The next day another guide brought in two jeeps and their officers, part of the 86th Reconnaissance. They had run into a patrol of the 2nd Paratroop Division on the road between Chateauneuf and Pleyben and had been separated

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from their unit. We got them back into contact with Lieutenant Bordges, their CO. Meanwhile the population of Chateauneuf, seeing American troops go through the town, behave like the war was over and hung out French flags. A spirit of premature optimism was also abroad among the troops.

Germans came back to Chateauneuf. Our fears were justified only too soon. That same night a detachment of the 2nd Paratroop Division, on its way back from Carhaix, entered the town, killed the cure, and massacred about 50 civilians. The next day, a similar detachment ambushed an American column coming into Chateauneuf from Scaer. They destroyed all the vehicles except those which they drove off for their own use, and killed all the personnel except three, who were later picked up and brought in by our men.

We would like to state here that London knew the exact location of our HQ and should have informed US advanced units in the area of our whereabouts. If the CO of that reconnaissance column had been able to contact us, he would never have run into the ambush. As it was, nobody knew of our existence. In all my contacts with US officers later, I did not find one who had any idea there were allied parachutists working in Finistere.

Move to Chateau - contact with Aloes. On 7 August we moved to the Chateau de Treverez. The day before Captain Lebel had gone off to Kerrien to make contact with Aloes. He returned to the chateau, charged with the mission of centralizing all information on the enemy in Finistere, a job which he carried on until our departure from Brittany.

Central Finistere cleared of Boche. During the next days we learned that the 2nd Paratroop Division had moved

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north to Brest, and had been harassed all along its march. Prisoners were still being brought in from all sides, and from them we learned that all German forces had received order to make for Brest, the Presqu'ile de Crozon and Lorient. By 10 August, Chateauneuf, Chateaulin, Pleyben, Carhaix, Huelgoat, Sizun, Brassparts, Briec were all free of the enemy.

Crozon. The only place in our area where there were any Germans left was the Presqu'ile de Crozon. Here there were a great many, and we began concentrating all the FFI troops in our area across the neck of the Crozon peninsula to prevent them breaking out. Captain Knox made a trip to Morlaix to try to raise gasoline from the US Army. There he made the acquaintance of the 17th Cavalry Squadron, who were later to work with us in the Crozon peninsula.

Colonel Eono. Colonel Eono and his staff arrived in the area about this time and set up HQ at the Chateau de Kerrion, near Pleyben. Captain Knox was asked by Colonel Eono to arrange an interview with the general commanding the attack on Brest. Captain Knox drove to Plabennec and there met team Horace. The interview was arranged for the following day.

Brassparts. The next morning Colonel Eono and Captain Knox set out for Plabennec via Brassparts-Sizun. As we approached Brassparts we met the commander of the FFI company which had been left in Brassparts. He informed us that the Germans had that morning attacked Brassparts and liberated 130 of their prisoners. He had got out and was going back for reinforcements. We immediately drove into the town, found the Germans gone, and the town in a state of complete panic. The Germans had thrown grenades into the house which

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had served as FFI headquarters and killed two women there. They had attacked the town with two American armored vehicles, no doubt the ones they had captured at Chateauneuf.

Plabennec. We proceeded on to Blabennec without further incident, and Captain Knox was left as Colonel Eono's liaison officer with General Taylor. He arranged for the delivery of 2000 gallons of gasoline to the FFI and also went on some patrols with Major Somers of team Horace. (812). Upon return to Pleyben he learned that all of Colonel Eono's headquarters was about to return to England, and Captain Lebel and Captain Knox would act for him as G-2 and G-3 combined.

St Renan. Captain Knox was so little pleased at this prospect that he returned to Plabennec and amused himself by working with Major Somers on a project to get the Brest garrison to surrender. Major Somers and Captain Knox tracked down a French chaplain who had come out of Brest and who had received a message for the American command from prominent naval officers in Brest. We took him back as far as we dared towards Brest, and promised to pick him up next day at Saint Renan which was no man's land. (In fact we came under shell fire before we ever got there.) He was to contact the men who had given him the message and get one of them to come out and talk to General Taylor. When we went back to get him next day we ran into fifteen Germans in Saint Renan, so we evacuated it hastily and waited for the chaplain outside. He eventually turned up, but had been prevented from entering Brest by a patrol of German paratroops.

Chateau de Kerriw. During this time Captain Lebel had been working as G-2, and organizing an information service on the

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German positions in the Crozon peninsula. He obtained very accurate and detailed information, which Captain Knox was able to pass on the General Middleton's G-3, after seeing General Middleton personally. (General Middleton is commanding general VIII Corps.)

US Troops for Crozon. Finally General Middleton sent some troops down to the Crozon peninsula - the 17th Cavalry Squadron, under Colonel Lindquist. Jedburgh team Giles worked the liaison between the US Cavalry and the FFI headquarters was at Plomodiern just at the foot of Menezhom, the hill which dominated the whole position. The town was under constant fire from 88's and mortars until the capture of Menezhom some days later.

Crozon Offensive. The 17th cavalry squadron, later reinforced by the 15th, and backed up by the FFI began an offensive with the limited objective of reducing Menezhom and St Nic. In this action the FFI and the US Cavalry co-operated magnificently, and before Giles left Finistere the whole peninsula up to Telgruc-Sur-Mer was in our hands. In the course of this action the members of the team came into contact with the enemy on the St Nic Road and at St Marie Du Menez Hom. When we left, the offensive had come to a standstill.

APPENDIX 'A'Drop Grounds operated by team Giles

<u>Ground.</u>	<u>Location.</u>
Pêche	Coadri
Poire	St. Guazec
Pomme	St. Segal
Framboise	Plourach
Amande	Scrignol

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Raisin	Scrignac
Orange	La Feuillee
Ananas	Plessis
Groseille	Pleyben
Cerise	Peniti
Prunelle	Huelgoat
Mandarine	Briec
Noix	Huelgoat

APPENDIX 'B'Commendations

Yves Legal - Chateauneuf Du Faou. Sergeant in the French Army - captured in 1940. Escaped from Germany. In resistance movement since 1941. 6 months in prison at Rennes. Department organizer of FTP. In his work with us showed courage, ability and unquestioning loyalty. Took part in the fighting on the Crozon peninsula. A young man of great ability, courage, future.

Doctor Belin (Briec) and Doctor Olliviek Henri (Quimper). Under conditions of illegality organized a medical evacuation service hospital and surgery. Treated many of our wounded and later saved the life of an American soldier who had been left for dead on the Chateauneuf road.

Team GilesAPPENDIX 'C'

Team Giles consisting of Captain Knox, US Army.
 Captain Lebel, French Army.
 Sergeant Tack, British Army.

Signals report compiled by Sergeant Tack, G.H. This is entirely a signal report and has no connection with the main report. The Jed set is, I think, about the best set possible for our particular job. It's portability and the fact that there are no batteries to worry about are two important advantages which make the set simple and easy to work. I myself, am fully satisfied with the Jed set and shall be glad

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to do any jobs in the future with it.

I would like to thank and congratulate the operators at 53C for the good work that they did for me. In all, eight-nine messages were passed on our cypher, and I can say that in very few cases did I meet with any trouble in passing these messages. This is quite an achievement, because at least five of these messages were over two hundred groups. and about fifty per cent of the remainder over one hundred groups. About thirty-eight messages were received and with the exception of one they were sent in perfectly readable Morse.

I found that a good signal (QSA4 or QSA5) could be received on an aerial that was put up with common sense, with of course careful tuning of the receiver.

I found that, on the broadcast (2100 GMT) atmospherics and interference combined to disturb the signal badly and the best strength was QSA 3. Under these circumstances I had to ask for a repeat during sked times on several occasions. I was greatly gratified when, with one exception, all messages were sent during sked times. I found also-that my frequencies were extremely good without exception. Although my emergency frequency was very near BBC I had no trouble at all.

I should like to end by again thanking the staff of 53C for there excellent cooperation with me.

Cipher. As a large percentage of all encoding and decoding was done by me I shall make a small report on the same. The one-time pad is the perfect code for our J93. The means of encoding on this system were counted as part of our most important equipment and never under any circumstances

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let out of my sight. We did not use the vocabulary in any of our messages because we found that although we saved space we lost time. With an average of two messages a day to encode and one a day to decode we found time to be most important.

The first few messages from home were encoded in French and these messages we had trouble in decoding. The remainder however worked out very well indeed with the exception of five completely indecipherables. These five messages were obviously a bad slip on someone's part because the "pages on which they were encyphered had already been used once." We did not remove, under any circumstances, pages from the pad which had not been used. These five messages were received as part of a batch of thirteen taken during two skeds on one day. When these messages were taken we had reached page seventy-two of our pad. These messages were encoded before page sixty-two.

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JEDBURGHS

Operations, Team Giles (Cont'd)Financial Statement

Captain Knox Received -----	100,000 Frs
Hotel, food etc expenses (after 3 August) -	40,000
Emergency payments to FFI*-----	30,000
Civilian clothes and identity papers -----	7,000
Bribes**-----	10,000
Lost in field jacket M-1943 -----	10,000
	<u>97,000</u>
Unaccounted for -----	3,000
Total -----	<u>100,000 Frs</u>

*Made necessary by the fact that French HQ sent us 500,000 francs when we needed at least 10 million.

**To agents, guides etc.

Lt Lebel Received -----	100,000 Frs
-------------------------	-------------

Expenditures

Aid to Maquis
Civilian clothes and false identity card
Living expenses

Remaining -----	0
Sergeant Tack Received -----	50,000 Frs
Hotel bills from 3 August on -----	40,000
(This includes food etc)	
Civilian suit and false identity papers ---	7,500
Food for one month in Maquis -----	2,500
(This includes cigarettes, etc)	
Total -----	<u>50,000 Frs</u>

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Operations, Team Felix

TEAM FELIX

Jedburgh team Felix was the eighth team to be dispatched to France from the UK.

Members of Team

- (Captain J Kennevel, (French), code name "Carnavon"
- (Captain J J Marchant, (British), code name "Somerset"
- (Sergeant P. Calvin, (British), code name "Middlesex"

Area to Which Dispatched

Team Felix was dispatched on the night of 8/9 July to the Cotes du Nord area in France.

Background of Resistance in Area

Team Felix was being dispatched to the Brittany section of France where two Jedburgh teams were already operating - team Frederick (813) in the Cotes du Nord area, and team George (814) in the Loire Inferieure. There were also two SAS bases operating here - Dingson (815) in the Morbihan section, and Grog (816) in the Loire Inferieure.

From reports received from these groups it was estimated that there were the following resistance groups in the Cotes du Nord:

Number of Resistants --	2,500
Armed -----	900
SAS -----	75
To be armed -----	1,600

Purpose of the Mission

Resistance had been very active in Brittany. Since large supplies of arms and materials had been sent out, it had been possible to maintain the cutting of communication lines despite strong oppressive measures by the Germans. No controlled area had been established as yet, however.

Declassified by *062147*
 Date *23 January 1979*

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It was planned to bring resistance to its maximum effectiveness during the month of July. In order to accomplish this ten Jedburgh teams were being dispatched. Team Felix was to work in the Cotes du Nord area with team Frederick.

During the first part of the month no action was to be undertaken, but stress was to be placed on organizing and arming resistance groups. About the middle of July a senior French officer would take over command of all resistance in Brittany and guerrilla operations would begin. The signal for the beginning of these operations was the following BBC message:

"Le chapeau de Napoleon est-il toujours a Perros-Guirec".

Team Felix's specific task was to organize resistance in the east part of Cotes du Nord on the basis of groups of 100 men. Also the team would investigate possible landing grounds in the area both for Lysander and Dakota operations. The possibility of sea operations for supplying the area was also to be studied.

Method of Dropping and Reception Committee

The team was to be dropped to a reception committee organized by Frederick.

Equipment

Standard "A" load and standard Jedburgh packages.

Scale of Air Support Likely

To establish increasing numbers of resistance groups in the Brittany area the command was planning 620 sorties, totalling 780 tons of stores, during the month of July. However, the team was still advised to be careful about the numbers they organized. One group was to be established and armed before a new one was attempted.

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Operations, Team Felix (Cont'd)Communications

The team was dropped with a Jedburgh W/T set with instructions to establish contact with the Home Station as soon as possible after arriving in the field.

Finance

Each of the officers took 100,000 French francs and 50 American dollars. The W/T operator took 50,000 French francs and 50 American dollars.

Relations with Other Allied Units

FFI. When Guerrilla activities began, Colonel Eono (817) would arrive to take command as chief of the FFI in Brittany. Until the arrival of this French officer, the team would be under the command of Commandant Bourgoin, (818) FFI chief in this area.

Other Jedburgh Parties. The team was being dropped to a reception party organized by team Frederick.

Allied Forces, If Overrun. In case the team was overrun by Allied forces they had instructions to report to the nearest unit and ask for the intelligence officer. They would give none of the details of their work to this officer, but merely ask him to forward them to the nearest SF Staff. This staff would identify the team and pass them back to SFHQ.

Action

Upon Arrival in the Field. The team was to start organizing resistance groups immediately upon its arrival. The total number of effectives to be armed was about 1,600. The specific groups to be armed was to be decided jointly with the FFI. Caution was to be taken against organizing larger groups than could be armed.

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(818) War Diary Vol 3 p

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JEDBURGHS

Operations, Team Felix (Cont'd)Communications

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If Captured. The team went into the field with no cover story. If taken prisoner they were in the position of a combat soldier in uniform. All the laws of war should apply to them. Therefore, each member of the team would give his name, rank and serial number only.

Information Provided to Team

The following information was given to the team prior to its being dispatched:

1. Enemy order of battle in the area.
2. Location of enemy dumps and depots.
3. Sitrep on Jedburgh team Frederick, the team arranging for their reception.

First Word from Field

On 10 July Felix reported his safe arrival in the following W/T message (819):

"Have arrived safely with all containers and money for Fred. Spare receiver smashed. Have contacted local partisan chief."

Summary of Messages Exchanged

10 July From Felix (820)

"Require maps 1/50,000 St Malo, Dinan, St Meen, Mur du Bretagne. Also complete receiver. Paratroop unit moving on foot east from Lanballe east Planguenoual."

11 July From Felix (821)

"Have not yet managed to contact Bourgoin, believed in Finistere. Hope to meet Fred Friday Legoursax. Making recce. Dinan, Plancouet, Lamballe. Partisan leader reports number resistance underground Arez area approximately 7,000."

11 July From Felix (822)

"Require arms load A for 500 night 17/18."

12 July From Felix (823)

"Have contacted local leader of Dinan and Plancouet. Dinan 1,000 unarmed, being organized. Plancouet 500 organized armed. Require 500,000 francs for each. Population very friendly."

(819) No code number	10 Jul 44	(820) C-4889/6	10 Jul 44
(821) C-4923/2	11 Jul 44	(822) C-4927/14	11 Jul 44
(823) C-4964/8	12 Jul 44		

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JEDBURGH

Operations, Team Felix (Cont'd)13 July From Felix (824)

"Bridge at Lancieux prepared for demolition. Can prevent demolition of bridge, Plancoet. Required 2 aspirants as instructors and saboteurs."

14 July From Felix (825)

"Require 2,000,000 francs Maquis Le Chat. Also three Eureka's. Suggest cash be dropped on Aspirand."

15 July From Felix (826)

"SAS dropping Jugons area. Stores cannot be received on ground Ancelot. 200 or 300 German troops in Chateau Ranllion, 3 kms S W Jugon."

19 July From Felix (827)

"Frederick attacked 4 or 5 days ago has lost all except arms, crystals, ciphers. Wants radio from me. Send radio complete ground Mossi."

20 July From Felix (828)

"Visited maquis Bois de Bougere, 96 kms SW Broons. Numbers 120 armed, 30 nucleus arms and Viviane. Three Americans there, names Diggers, King, Carestri. Crew Liberator bailed out St Meen 8 June. Also seen 1 Russian captain and 10 deserters with arms in maquis."

23 July From Felix (829)

"Frederick's radio smashed. Chute failed. Have sent on your messages. Will take 4 days to reach Fred."

28 July From Felix (830)

"Have contacted Francois. Urgent need for Jedburgh team for region between Frederick and us. Send him on ground Foulah with 2,000,000 francs. Necessary for men already in maquis."

29 July From Felix (831)

"American lightning pilot buried Ploubalay 24 July. Named Swarl Wurst."

30 July From Felix (832)

"Received notes on sea operation. Have sent on to Marceau and Fred. Money handed to FFI local chief. Thanks for mail etc. Send map sheets Dinan. Lost them."

(824) C-1/41 13 Jul 44
 (826) C-71/42 15 Jul 44
 (828) C-242/79 20 Jul 44
 (830) C-573/28 28 Jul 44
 (832) C-675/40 30 Jul 44

(825) C-40/30 14 Jul 44
 (827) C-205/62 19 Jul 44
 (829) C-334/7 23 Jul 44
 (831) C-619/36 29 Jul 44

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Operations, Team Felix (Cont'd)31 July From Felix (833)

"Have seen today Francis, Gavin and Guy. After difficulties certain groups of resistance have succeeded in contacting chiefs FFI."

1 August From Felix (834)

"Contacted 3 Americans and sent them to maquis Bougue Neuf. Names Lt Hendrikson, Mustang pilot; Lt Keeler, 505 Paratroops; Lt Foginder, Thunderbolt pilot."

1 August From Felix (835)

"Diola attacked just before reception. 6 Partisans 1 SAS killed. Cannot accept further drops Diola. Repeat Viviane instead."

1 August From Felix (836)

"Four civilian cars set on fire by Allied fighters last 2 weeks, including cars of an FFI chief and man who sheltered pilots."

1 August From SFHQ to Felix (837)

"In view allied advance your area now highest priority. Inform us all grounds you require served to complete armament. Avoid guerrilla actions until receipt further orders which follow soon."

1 August From Watermark to Yankeeoodle (838)

"Nearest organized area in Brittany is eastern Cotes du Nord where Jedburgh Felix is. He reports 4000 to 6000 men of whom half are armed dispersed in 5 battalions at Jugon, Dinan, Plancoet, Pleneuf, Colliner. His Hq is near Megrit 6 kms SSE Jugon. His zone action is the line Matignon, Jugon. He has armed the area east of line Pleneuf, Collinee. What instructions do you wish us send Felix and can you give any indication time when action might be required."

2 August From SFHQ to Felix (839)

"Allied advance now expected to be rapid in your direction. Greatest importance attached to preservation of road St Brieuc, Lamballe, Dinan. You will prevent enemy carrying out demolition of road bridges, culverts, etc. on this road and also on secondary roads in this area. Report if you require assistance and your prospects of success in this task."

2 August From Felix (840)

"Details effectives - Jugon, armed 1150; Dinan armed

(833) C-718/37 31 Jul 44
(835) C-770/48 1 Aug 44
(837) C-6086 1 Aug 44
(839) C-4483 2 Aug 44

(834) C-771/47 1 Aug 44
(836) C-772/49 1 Aug 44
(838) C-DRO/148 1 Aug 44
(840) C-826/51 2 Aug 44

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150, non-armed 1800; Plancoet, armed 600, non-armed 900; Pleneuf, armed 750, non-armed 100; Collinee, armed 450, non-armed 200. Total armed 3100, non-armed 3000."

2 August From Felix (841)

"Can prevent demolitions on roads. Cannot prevent destruction important road bridge Dinan because Dinan area non-armed. Assistance for this task required. Bridge already mined. Strength enemy Dinan Approximately 300."

3 August From Felix (842)

"Operations night 2/3 August. Attacked two large convoys leaving Dinan. Have 45 prisoners. Our losses 9, one wounded."

4 August From Felix (843)

"Two large convoys attacked region Plancolt. 10 prisoners taken. Withdrew following attack against Germans. Our losses 10. Germans retiring toward the west."

4 August From Tapdance to Underfoot (844)

"Have contacted Felix. Felix protecting road Dinan - Jugon - Lamballe. Resistance protecting road Lamballe - St Brieuc - Guingamp. Resistance will protect road Guingamp - Morlaix."

5 August From Felix (845)

"Can occupy Dinan. Urgently require dropping."

6 August From Felix (846)

"Jugon occupied by resistance since last night. All roads to town blocked."

7 August From SFHQ to Felix (847)

"Confirm the arrival Etat Major Brittany and Colonel Eono night 4/5 on Frederick. Name of Eono mission is Aloes. Dispatched the same night a Jed team named Daniel to act as liaison with FFI Cotes du Nord."

7 August From Felix (848)

"Contacted Major Bartlett, 3rd US Army at Jugon today at 1130 hours."

7 August From Felix (849)

"Urgently need money for maquis. Send 2 million on Sara. Require arms for Dinan."

(841) C-850/56 2 Aug 44
(843) C-987/57 4 Aug 44
(845) C-1037/59 5 Aug 44
(847) C-457 7 Aug 44
(849) C-1197/66 7 Aug 44

(842) C-922/54 3 Aug 44
(844) C-127/53 4 Aug 44
(846) C-1105/60 6 Aug 44
(848) C-1184/64 7 Aug 44

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"Contacted task force attacking Dinard. Have given all available information on defenses. FFI forces guarding road Dinan-Jugon-Lamballe-St Brieuc. Harassing remaining Germans on coastal sector."

12 August From Felix (851)

"Have visited 50 wounded our hospital Broons. Urgently need medical supplies."

12 August From SFHQ to Felix (852)

"Regret cannot send air operations just now. You should contact advance elements 3rd Army your region and ask them to assist you with necessary medical equipment. Is quickest method of obtaining it. Tell us urgently if you have any difficulties."

14 August From Felix (853)

"400 Germans left in the Gap Frehel. Refuse to surrender. Now have 1000 FFI to prevent them leaving and obtaining food. We are shelling them with captured artillery. Have contacted 8 Corps who will assist when possible."

15 August From Felix (854)

"Strong American forces arrived yesterday evening. After shelling this morning German garrison surrendered to FFI. Casualties 2 wounded."

17 August From Felix (855)

"Contacted 8th Corps, 3rd American Army. Will not supply medical equipment requested in name of Felix for FFI."

18 August From Felix (856)

"Operations Jugon since 2 August. Attacked and captured convoy. 226 prisoners. Captured 15 cars, 26 trucks, 45 horses, 1 cannon, 150 guns, 1 ton ammunition, 10 tons miscellaneous. Our losses 8 killed, 10 wounded."

18 August From Felix (857)

"Operations Pleneuf since 2 August. Germans convoys attacked. 24 prisoners, 8 cannons, 80 tons munitions captured. Our losses 7, wounded."

19 August From SFHQ to Felix (858)

"Congratulations of General Koenig to the groups of

(850) C-1318/69	9 Aug 44	(851) C-1535/65	12 Aug 44
(852) C-2606	12 Aug 44	(853) C-1666/69	14 Aug 44
(854) C-1741/72	15 Aug 44	(855) C-1919/76	17 Aug 44
(856) C-2001/80	18 Aug 44	(857) C-2017/83	18 Aug 44
(858) C-1812	19 Aug 44		

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Jugon and Pleneuf. Contact Aloes who will return you to us. Heartiest congratulations for magnificent work."

20 August From Felix (859)

"Operations Dinan since 2 August. Captured radio, depots, munitions at St Meen. 59 Germans killed, 356 prisoners. 4 cars destroyed, 24 captured. Our losses 15, 7 wounded."

20 August From Felix (860)

"Job finished. Cannot contact Aloes. If no contrary order we leave next Tuesday with Aguirec."

20 August From SFHQ to Felix (861)

"General Koenig's congratulations messages directed at the group at Dinan too. We understand that you will return Tuesday if there is no other order. We agree with this and are warning Aloes."

Report of Team Upon Return from the Field - 8 July to 23 August 1944

Mission. Team Felix was alerted on 7 July and briefed in London on 8 July. Their mission was to organize and arm resistance in the eastern half of the Cotes du Nord, to find landing grounds, and if possible a suitable place on the coast for the landing of stores for the resistance. Contact was to be made with Frederick and Commandant Bourgoïn (SAS).

Dropping. The team was dropped to a reception committee 3 kilometers northeast of Jugon on 9 July at 0045 hours. Five aircraft containing arms were also received by this reception committee which was laid on by Frederick, though he had not seen the ground.

Order of jumping: Captain Kernevel, Captain Marchant, Sergeant Colvin.

There were no casualties on landing. We found the reception committee well organized and efficient, especially in view of the fact that a main road ran along one side of the ground 300 meters away and a battalion of Germans were resting

(859) C-2199/5 20 Aug 44
 (861) C-6284 20 Aug 44

(860) C-2200/86 20 Aug 44

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for the night 1 kilometer away.

We consider that the stick of which we were a part was too large (12 containers, 3 men, 5 packages, 2 bicycles). This caused a delay of 2½ hours before our packages were located.

First Contacts. We contacted on the dropping ground Francois (Civilian FFI Chief Cotes du Nord), Yves (Civilian FFI Chief Cotes du Nord East) and Jean (Military Chief Cotes du Nord East). They appeared to be unaware that a team was dropping to them.

We were conducted to a house 1½ kilometers away while the reception committee collected the containers etc with carts.

At 0900 hours 9 July we met for the initial conference, Francois, Yves, Jean and Hector (862) (Resistance leader from Plancoet). After telling them of our mission, they gave us the picture of Resistance in the area and we discovered that there was no unified FFI but that different organizations (FN, FTP, Liberation, AS, ORAF) were working separately. Nevertheless FN and FTP (both chiefly left organizations) formed 80% of the resistance. Therefore, we decided to visit each sector of our area and to contact the chiefs of the different elements of resistance. We had the full agreement of Francois, Yves, and Jean that no point of view other than purely military was to be considered.

Nobody had heard of Commandant Bourgoin (SAS) and we were unable to make contact with him. The only SAS known in the region was a Lieutenant Fouquet whom we tried repeatedly to contact, and who never contacted us, and who during the

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whole of our work hindered us considerably by issuing orders clashing with ours.

Method used for Movement. From the start we made it a rule never to stay in one spot for longer than 48 hours. We carried with us the radio and the minimum personal equipment (quite heavy enough).

Equipment carried:-

Carbine, Pistol belt with compass magazines
Rucksack containing part of radio
Sleeping bag
Washing kit
Socks, shirt

Note: We each bought a good map case before we left which we found invaluable.

All the remaining equipment was hidden near Jugon. For each stage we only had with us the local leader whose area we were crossing and one guide who knew the area well and who went ahead when crossing main roads, railways, etc, and when we approached villages, a method which proved very satisfactory. The local leaders were well known in their areas and were able to introduce us to leading members of the resistance, mayors, cures, gendarmes, etc. We always moved by day in uniform, spending the nights at farms. We were unable to avoid contact with farmers and peasants while en route but our meetings had a considerable effect on morale. We had no trouble obtaining food and shelter for which we always paid.

First tour of the Area.

10 July Left Jugon for Trelivan
Contacted Herve (Chef Civile FFI for Dinan).
Selected dropping ground SARA.

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- 11 July Trelivan - Boursuel.
 Contacted Hector. Selected Dropping ground Bambara.
- 12 July Boursuel - Tregomar
 Contacted Alexander (French Intelligence Agent).
 Selected Dropping ground Mossi and agreed Mildred.
- 13 July Tregomar - Seignac
 Contacted Squadron Leader Smith (SAS) and Le Chat (Liberation Leader) and tried to get understanding between Jean and Le Chat.
- 14 July Seignac
 Contact with resistance members from Collinee.
- 15 July Seignac - Dolo
 Contact with resistance members from Lamballe.
- 16 July Dolo - Jugon
- 17 - 18 July Jugon First dropping Sara night 18/19 July.

The first tour gave us an idea of the numbers to be armed, numbers of dropping grounds, and ideas for military action when required.

Second tour of the Area.

- 19 - 20 July Jugon - Dolo.
- 20 July Dolo - Seignac
 Inspected Maquis in Bois de Bougeneuf.
 Contacted resistance leader of Collinee.
 Organized the Broons area and agreed the dropping ground Viviane.
- 21 July Seignac - Plumaudan
- 22 July Plumaudan
 Visited Maquis at Bois d'yvignac. Contacted various leaders. Agreed dropping ground Toucouleur. Contacted Herve (Chef Dinan) and organized Dinan area.
- 23 July Plumaudan - Languenan
 Contacted leaders of various groups.
 Organized area north of Dinan.
- 24 July Languenan
 Selected dropping ground Lobi (2)
- 25 July Languenan - St Potan
 Recontacted Alexander. Contacted Henri (Civilian Chief FFI Pleneuf) and Andre (Military Chief FFI Pleneuf Sector)

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- 26 July St Potan - Henanbien
- 27 July Henanbien - La Poterie
Contacted Marcel (Leader Lamballe) and
arranged for liaison with Pleneuf sector.
- 28 - 29 July La Poterie - St Igneuc - Jugon
Contacted Francois with message from
Marceau, Military Chief FFI, Cotes du Nord.
- 30 July - 1 August Jugon
Contacted by Guy (863) and Gavin (864),
and agreed to include Dinard in our
area.

Organization and Armement on 2 August 1944Training and Liaison

1. Organization.

The area was organized by us into five sectors of
battalions.

- a. Jugon (Pletan - Plelan - Yvignac - Broons)
- b. Dinan (Dinan - Caulnes - Evran)
- c. Plancoet (Dinard - Ploubalay - Langnenan - Boiseul -
Matignon)
- d. Pleneuf (Sable d'Or - Henanbien - Lamballe)
- e. Collinee (Moncontom - Collinee - Merdrignac)

Each sector contained a variable number of coys composed
as follows:

Coy Headquarters, 3Pls of 25 men each, one sabotage section
of 15 men.

Except for the two Maquis, of which we have already spoken
and which existed before our arrival, all the coys were local
and remained dispersed in their homes.

2. Numbers and Armament.

Before our arrival the numbers of resistance armed was
approximately 300.

(863) p469 this Vol
(864) p444 this Vol

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<u>Sector</u>	<u>Numbers FFI</u>	<u>Numbers Armed</u>
Jugon	1200	1150
Dinan	2000	150
Plancoet	1500	600
Pleneuf	900	750
Collinee	600	450
	<u>6200</u>	<u>3100</u>

The five dropping grounds by which Dinan could have been armed Bambara, Lobi (Two), Toucouleur (Two) were successively refused by the RAF on account of flak, although we signalled that there was no flak for at least 10 kilometers round these grounds. This accounts for the small numbers armed in the Dinan sector.

We received altogether 46 aircraft in 15 days, 21 others which were laid on for the first week in August were too late due to the rapid advance of the American forces.

3. Liaison. Our Headquarters was formed near Jugon and liaison was maintained with sectors principally by girls on bicycles, owing to the difficulty for men to pass the checks frequently made by the Feldgendarmerie.

4. Training and Morale. The morale was excellent as was shown by the results achieved. These would, however, have been a great deal better had we had instructors for each company or at least each sector to instruct in the use of the various arms received. It was impossible for us, a single team, to give more than a smattering to very few. We asked several times for Aspirants whom Colonel Eono had told us were available. Probably half the killed in our area lost their lives due to faulty handling of weapons, particularly the filling of Bren magazines.

There seemed to be a lack of trained officer material in

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the resistance forces. As an example, M Tassel, leader of Jugon Coy, was killed in an ambush and it was necessary to spend a complete day collecting the coy together again.

Operations after 2 August 1944. While touring the area we found that it would be possible to attack all the small German posts in the inland districts (Dumps S/L etc). The coast, heavily fortified and held, was to be blocked and cut off from movement inland. The fortifications at Pleurtuit (Dinard), which the Germans had been preparing for more than a year against attack from inland, were to be merely watched, as it had been unable to arm Dinan and Dinard. All the communications were to be cut and permanent ambushes placed along roads to harass convoys and destroy any small groups.

This programme was put into effect on the evening of 2 August 1944 when the BBC message "Le chapeau de Napoleon est-il encore a Perros-Guirec" was received. We then had 30 coys composing of 3100 armed men.

The following is a brief summary of operations.

Jugon Four attacks on important convoys, numerous ambushes, Jugon occupied, destruction of observation post at Megrit destroyed.

Dinan Capture of radio station at Caulnes intact. Capture of food dump (8000 tons) at St Meen. Capture of ammunition dump at Le Hingle.

Plancoet Capture of coast defences at St Cast. Derailment and attack of ammunition train. Numerous attacks on convoys, and the pushing of the Germans back to Cap Frehel.

Pleneuf Capture of coast defences between Valandre and Erquay and the pushing of the remaining German forces back to

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Cap Frehel where they withdrew behind mined defences.

Collinee Attack on a column of 600 - 700 parachutists which were halted for 6 hours in front of Merdrignac where 6 hostages were shot in retaliation. The same column was attacked at Moncontour where 13 hostages were shot.

The Germans still remaining were hunted down and all our forces were put to protecting communications following a request from the 3rd American Army.

12 coys were moved to Cap Frehel to prevent the Germans there (400) from obtaining food in the local farms and village of Plevenon. We were able to shell Cap Frehel with two captured 76 mm guns (FOO Captain Kernevel) and we learned later that one German was killed and six wounded by our fire. We had already contacted 8th Corps and asked for assistance which arrived the next day, and after heavy bombardment the garrison surrendered.

The results obtained were amazing considering the lack of instruction and training as armed bodies, and lack of necessary clothing etc. Too few socks and boots were sent to us, and the large proportion of the boots were of too large a size. One cannot ask men to fight in wooden clogs.

Our German prisoners were held by us under control of FFI. All engineers and personnel trained in lifting mines are at present clearing the coast and Cap Frehel of mines of which "S" mines are predominant.

Liaison with American Forces. Complete coordination was established between us and the advanced American forces. On 6 August we were contacted by Major Bartlett (865) liaison officer between 3rd Army Headquarters and FFI.

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The French liaison officers with advanced American units seemed to be almost totally ignorant of the existence of the FFI, its organization and its role. In fact we met one Civil Affairs Captain at Dinan who did not know the name of General Koenig or what the initials FFI stood for. However, we found him very cooperative.

The American forces were very complimentary on the work of FFI in the area, who, they said, had taken the place of their infantry during the advance.

SAS. There were no large SAS forces in our area, only single officers and NCO's working alone. We have already spoken of Lieutenant Fouquet. We contacted at Seignac Squadron Leader Smith, who appeared to be doing exactly the same work as a Jedburgh, but with orders very different from those which we received. He advocated the forming of Maquis and had given orders to the groups of resistance which he controlled to take to the Maquis. This had already taken place in some areas and there were considerable Maquis unarmed.

It had already been proved that Brittany as a whole and Cotes du Nord in particular were not suitable areas for Maquis, by reason of the ease with which the whole area could be controlled by mobile troops. A few days after our arrival the Maquis in the forest of Boquin was surprised by a German battalion and was only able to escape with losses and the abandonment of the greater part of their stores. The same thing occurred a few weeks later in the Maquis of the forest of Hardouinais. As a result of these events, the small Maquis in our area were disbanded and sent home by their chiefs who agreed to our theory of local companies staying at home till required and having their weapons hidden near

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their dwellings. Only in two cases were the conditions in the countryside favorable for Maquis. These we have already mentioned - Bougeneuf (120) and Bois d'Yvignac (20).

In our briefing we were instructed that resistance activity was to be of a minimum while the arming of the area was in progress. However, sabotage by the SAS continued to be carried out in the area south of Dinan and the area of Legouray, causing increased surveillance and repressive measures during this difficult period which forced resistance leaders, "refracteurs", repeatedly to move.

It is impossible to have two different organizations both arming resistance in the same area. The arming and preparation for combat is of vital importance and it is essential that a unit whose job is that of sabotage and guerrilla activity should rest under the orders of a Jedburgh team whose job is armament and organization.

Most of the small bodies of SAS did not have wireless communication and continued to work according to obsolete orders refusing to listen to more recent ones from London.

Radio. Communications were good, and a very high standard was maintained.

With two schedules per day, we thought it necessary not to transmit more than twice from one spot, and this theory proved correct, as at Dolo on 20 July the very field which we had been operating in was searched half an hour after we had left. We had given instructions that all slow moving vehicles were to be carefully watched.

It is suggested that Broadcasts sent by hand should be kept at the same speed as those put out on the tape, as

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interference causes split letters.

We found that the set could be set up and working within 5 minutes and dismantled in the same time.

Messages written in French were easier to decipher than those in English due to the French language having more conformity than English, even when deciphered by the English member of the team.

84 Messages were sent ---- total of 3285 groups.

Approximately 50 messages received -- total of 2375 groups.

Notes on Briefing. We found the briefing extremely quick and as we were told two days before we went to London to be briefed that we were going to the Cotes du Nord, we feel that we could have got in one more day's briefing in London.

More information about the different resistance organizations (FN, FTP, AS Liberation, etc) should have been given since it was extremely easy to be tactless due to lack of knowledge when in the field.

It should not have been necessary to have had to ask the navigator of the aircraft 15 minutes before take-off time where we were dropping; surely this information could have been made available at the briefing.

Maps of the area in which we were to work were not available except for Michelin, and were not received till we had been in the field for 3 weeks although demanded in our second message (10 July).

Notes on the Political Situation and Resistance Parties.

We never departed from our attitude of strict neutrality concerning political matters, although our opinions were asked for several times. We also refrained from giving any opinions

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on civilian affairs, especially on the question of collaboration. In any case it was impossible to have the same outlook as those who had lived under German rule for four years, and who had witnessed occurrences of collaborations since 1940, of which we heard numerous stories.

Nevertheless we learned a great deal about the political and civilian reorganization. It was plain that the greater part of the resistance was formed by parties of the Left. The FTP seemed to be essentially Communist. The FN, the largest resistance party in the Cotes du Nord, was of communist origin, but its scope had widened considerably, embracing members whose political views were Right, members of the Regular Army who declined to consider political questions, and priests, etc. The parties AS and Liberation were essentially Right, but their numbers were rather small. In the Cotes du Nord the FN was the movement which most desired common union as FFI. The FTP, however, wished to preserve their individuality. For example on 21 August we received an order from a Colonel Courtois, Chef FTP Cotes du Nord, whom we had never heard of or been told about before. His orders ran parallel with those given by Lieutenant-Colonel Marceau, sole Chief FFI recognized by Frederick and us in the Department.

We were given a sure lead on the political feeling by the fact that all the dinners at which we were invited to preside during our last week, were invariably finished with "God Save the King", "The Marseillaise", and the "Internationale".

The leaders both civil and military sent by the Provisional Government were not in all cases accepted, and some of them should probably be removed from office. We give as examples Colonel Glohen, Commandant of the St Brieuf Sub Division,

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who was handicapped by lack of prestige, and the Mayor of Dinan.

In conclusion, however, we are able to say that the greatest wish of a Frenchman is to eliminate graft in political and municipal affairs, an impression which we gained during our stay of 7 weeks in France.

General. When requests are made from the field it is appreciated if in lieu of the stores, a telegram could be sent explaining the reason for their non-arrival, e.g. Aspirants and money.

When we left, we were expressly told that our relatives would be informed after three weeks that we were overseas and would subsequently be informed at intervals that we were still alive and well. In the cases of Captain Marchant and Sergeant Colvin no such messages were sent at all, leaving their relatives without news for 7 weeks. This we consider to be a gross breach of the agreement made and we trust that future Jedburgh teams will not be so treated.

Conclusion. In conclusion we should like to say that we found the mission extremely interesting and our sole regret is that we could not have been sent earlier into this area, where the possibilities were so great.

Financial Statement

Received -----	250,000 Francs
	150 Dollars
Expenses	
Food -----	15,000
Lodging -----	5,000
Hotel (Jugon) -----	4,000
Car repairs -----	5,570
Petrol -----	1,200
Assistance to American pilots	
Joining maquis -----	5,000
Senegalese and Russians freed by us @--	2,500
Miscellaneous -----	4,150
Total -----	42,420
Returned -----	207,580

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Operations, Team FrancisTEAM FRANCIS

Jedburgh team Francis was the ninth team to be dispatched to France from the United Kingdom.

Members of Team

The members of team Francis were:

- (Major C. M. Ogden-Smith) (British), code name "Dorset"
- (Captain (then Lieutenant) G. le Zachmeur) (French), code name "Durance"
- (Sergeant A. J. Dallow) (British), code name "Groat"

Area to Which Dispatched

Team Francis was dispatched on the night of 9/10 July to the Finistere area of France.

Background of Resistance in Area

SHAEF, working through EMFFI, planned the maximum use of resistance in Brittany in order to create the greatest possible diversion in the area. This would call for the fullest possible support of the resistance elements.

SAS had considerable personnel in Brittany in close contact with resistance forces. At this time two Jedburgh teams, Frederick (866) and George (867), were working in Brittany. Jedburgh Giles (868) had been operating in the department of Finistere since 8 June. There were known to be very large resistance forces in Finistere.

Purpose of Mission

Jedburgh team Francis was one of four teams being dispatched to the department of Finistere to organize resistance. Each team was assigned a different area of the department in which to set up its headquarters and work.

The principal task of the teams was to find dropping grounds and to set up reception committees by means of which they would be able to receive arms and stores for the resis-

(866) p 33 this volume
(868) p 323 this volume

(867) p 39 this volume

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tance forces in this region. The size of groups organized was to be limited by the amount of arms received. Organization of large groups was to be discouraged. Rather, the aim of the team was to be the creation of dispersed units of not more than 100 men. Particular attention was to be given to partly equipped units who were otherwise effective.

For the time being attacks against German troops, except when necessary to fulfill orders from the High Command, were to be avoided. General guerilla action against the Germans in Brittany was to begin on the passage of the following BBC message: "Le chapeau de Napoleon est-il toujours a Perros Guirec."

Method of Dropping and Reception Committee

Team Francis was to be dropped to a reception committee organized by Jedburgh Giles on the same ground Giles had been dropped on if arrangements could be completed by 9 July. If no word was received from Giles by 10 July, two teams would proceed to a ground designated by Grog (869) in the northwest of Morbihan. The remaining two teams would await a reply from Giles until 11 July when they would also proceed to Grog.

Communications

Team Francis was dispatched with a W/T set and instructed to establish contact with headquarters as soon as possible after arriving in the field.

Finance

Each officer took 100,000 French francs and 50 American dollars. The W/T operator took 50,000 French francs and 50 American dollars.

Relations with Other Allied Units

Along with the other Jedburgh teams in this area Jedburgh

Operations, Team Francis (Cont'd)

Francis would come under the command of Commandant Bourgoin, (870) commander of SAS troops this area, while in the field. However, if necessary they would commence their assignment before they had contacted Commandant Bourgoin.

A large military mission was being sent to the field in the near future under the leadership of Colonel Eono (871). This mission was to take over the command of all resistance forces in Brittany. The team would be notified of the arrival of this mission and its whereabouts.

Allied Forces, If Overrun. When overrun by Allied forces, the team was instructed to report to the nearest Allied unit and ask for the intelligence officer. They were to give no details of their work to even this officer, but merely ask him to forward them to the nearest SF Staff. This Staff would identify them and pass them back to SFHQ in London.

Action

Upon Arrival in the Field. Upon arriving in the area assigned for operations, the team would arrange for the establishing of reception grounds and reception committee. A minimum of three dropping grounds was to be furnished headquarters with one free dropping area as a further safeguard. This was to be an isolated piece of country into which arms and stores could be dropped blind in event of the aircraft failing to find the designated dropping zone.

The team was to select landing grounds suitable for gliders in areas which could be held against enemy attack. Beaches were to be selected for sea supply operations and possibilities of arranging coast reception committees was to be investigated.

If Withdrawal Should Become Necessary

If the team completed its mission and its return to England

Operations, Team Francis (Cont'd)

was desired, a message informing it to proceed would be sent through regular channels or through an operator of another circuit whom headquarters would put in touch with the team.

If Captured. The team took no cover story to the field with it. Consequently, if taken prisoner, they would be taken as soldiers in uniform performing their ordinary military duties. Every established law of warfare would apply to them. Therefore, they would give their names, ranks and serial numbers only.

Information Provided to Team

The following information was provided to the team prior to its departure for the field:

1. SAS establishments in Brittany
2. Resistance elements in Finistere
3. Enemy troops in Finistere

First Word from Field

Francis announced its arrival in the field in the following W/T message dated 11 July (872):

"Scattered landing owing to bad drop. Lost contact Dorset (Ogden-Smith). Know however he is safe. Will try to find him. One rucksack destroyed. Contact established local resistance chiefs. South of my region is organized but not armed..." Asks for stores of arms, new rucksack, generator.

Summary of Messages Exchanged

11 July From Francis (873)

"Poussin taken by Gestapo beginning of July."

12 July From Francis (874)

"Contact established with chief of department yesterday. Team Gilbert should contact Derger. District chief not yet seen. Difficult to contact Bourgoin. Still no news of Dorset. Resistance looking for him actively. Hope to find him."

15 July From Francis (875)

"Impeccable information by Rateau. Two tankers at

(872) C-4915/6 11 Jul 44
(874) C-4953/25 12 Jul 44

(873) C-496/2 11 Jul 44
(875) C-75/15 15 Jul 44

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Goulet about to be sunk as block ships. Bressing defended to last man. Hq and 500 paratroops newly at Cast near Chateaulin."

16 July From Francis (876)

"Urgent you reply soonest possible to all requests sent. Gestapo hot. Receptions difficult to alert at short notice."

16 July From Francis (877)

"Anxiously awaiting messages from you. Broadcasts very difficult to receive. Please say something definite. Atrocities shocking - making receptions hazardous. 265th Infantry Div baggage train leaves area by carts Monday via Hennebont-Vannes-Redon. Division follows soon by bicycle. Mission progresses well and confidently."

17 July From Francis (878)

"Reliable. 25 SAS shot by Milice Maubian. Marienne prisoner. Moving towards Carhaix tonight by foot. Owing to difficult liaison necessary to have warning phrase three days before Napoleon phrase."

19 July From Francis (879)

"Was not aware of conditions of present inactivity. Are still carrying out military sabotage, please advise them. Hectic morning dodging Boche. Half million francs urgent to Murareigne - also generator handle and cigarettes."

21 July From Francis (880)

"We have seen Knox and Lebel. In complete accord with policy, terrain, etc."

21 July From Francis (881)

"Urgent you confirm that a warning phrase will be given three days before Le Chateau."

22 July From Francis (882)

"Note urgently when two or more grounds close together, dropping must be spaced by two days or more. Boche search and attack after most drops. Security difficult."

23 July From Francis (883)

"Send Putois, 2 rucksacks filled necessities for 27 area. All power cut by Boche. Radios rare. Where is Eureka. Impossible we parade countryside as Piccadilly."

(876) C-96/98	16 Jul 44	(877) C-124/96	16 Jul 44
(878) C-149/11	17 Jul 44	(879) C-197/16	19 Jul 44
(880) C-264/20	21 Jul 44	(881) C-267/21	21 Jul 44
(882) C-313/25	22 Jul 44	(883) C-855	23 Jul 44

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Operations, Team Francis (Cont'd)24 July From Francis (884)

"We are near Quimperie. Essential send aircraft to Musaraigne very soon to bolster morale. Instruct aircraft not to waste time over target area."

25 July From Francis (885)

"Sitrep to day. Hq A, Musareigne, independent of any formation. Contacted all ground leaders and chief of department. All parties in agreement and understand orders of Colonel Eono. 3,000 effectives organized, 40 in dispersal. Maquis expect to more than double total on D-day. Large proportion Maquis armed and trained. Small reserves of arms being made in all areas. Carhaix-Scaer-Guiscriff-Chateaneuf and wide area fairly well armed. Remery to south lack arms almost entirely due to Gestapo, etc. These coastal areas must be served from Rat, Musareigne, etc. grounds. We have traversed 200 kms. by foot and cycle to Guiscriff-Etostmois. Now visiting southern area. All chief demand warning phrase before Napoleon. Morale excellent. One Gestapo destroyed. Our good wishes to Col. Musgrave."

25 July From Francis (886)

"No praise too high for Sergeant Dallow. His courage, devotion to duty and industry remarkable."

26 July From Francis (887)

"Situation warm. Send messages blind if we do not come up. There's a war on."

2 August From Francis (888)

"Allied forces advancing into Brittany. Most important maintain present harassing activity but prevent general flare up until you get orders."

2 August SFHQ to Francis (889)

Message signalling start of increased guerilla activity in Brittany.

3 August SFHQ to Francis (890)

General Koenig's order to all commanders in Brittany giving instructions in regard to contacting approaching Allied forces.

3 August From Francis (891)

"Major Ogden-Smith killed. Radzo wounded. Le Zachmeur safe. Because of papers Ogden-Smith was carrying do not drop on any of Francis' grounds until you hear from him. He asks for 2 planes with equipment for ground Brochet."

(884) C-371/2 24 Jul 44
(886) C-433/12 25 Jul 44
(888) C-4482 2 Aug 44
(890) C-137 3 Aug 44

(885) C-409/5 25 Jul 44
(887) C-498/15 26 Jul 44
(889) C-6107 2 Aug 44
(891) No number 3 Aug 44

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"Dorset killed in combat. Dallow and Le Zachmeur safe and well."

5 August From SFHQ to Francis (893)

Message to all Jedburgh teams in Brittany instructing them to preserve all permanent installations wherever possible.

9 August From Francis (894)

".....Scaer and surroundings freed by FFI."

9 August From Francis (895)

"Established liaison with Scaer this morning. All okay. Going this afternoon to Quimperle and Bannalec."

10 August From Francis via Gilbert (896)

"Am trying to contact Colonel Eono today. Yesterday went to Quimperle. All goes well. Bannalec, Scaer, Gouin, Lefaouet, Carhaix, the same."

11 August From Francis (897)

"Contacted Aloes. He has assigned us the job of organizing in our region an information service regarding Boche resistance. No broadcast received for last week. Also Gilbert."

16 August From Francis (898)

"We continue the mission organized by Aloes. At Quimperle we have started an information service to give the Americans the battery sites and the number of troops at Lorient. This information is either given direct to the American division attacking Lorient, or through Aloes, according to the pre-arranged plan."

19 August From Francis (899)

"We are organizing with a naval lieutenant from London naval units. Impossible to obtain arms through Admiralty. Can I count on parachuting. Reply quickly."

19 August From SFHQ to Francis (900)

"We are forwarding to Admiralty; air operations in Brittany practically stopped. Aloes mission is preparing action at Crozon; necessary that sailors contact Aloes to coordinate action."

(892) C-1027/11 5 Aug 44
 (894) C-1301/3 9 Aug 44
 (896) C-1412/13 10 Aug 44
 (898) C-1809/29 16 Aug 44
 (900) C-1839 19 Aug 44

(893) C-6138 5 Aug 44
 (895) C-1336/21 9 Aug 44
 (897) C-1458/99 11 Aug 44
 (899) C-2084/100 19 Aug 44

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"Team Francis wishes to return to London. We do not have any more work. Wish to return for second mission."

25 August From Francis (902)

"For first time French sailors have been formed by me into Marine groups in accordance with agreement between Aloes and Major Lucas, Lignes, Quimperle today."

31 August From SFHQ to Francis (903)

"We have asked Aloes to permit you to return to London. Upon receipt of this message we give you permission to return. We suggest you return by sea from Quimper."

7 September From SFHQ to Ronald (904)

"For Aloes - Le Zachmeur asks to return by boat from Benodet. We are willing and have informed him through Gilbert."

17 September From Bolo to Watermark (905)

"Jeds Francis and Gilbert report their work finished in Brittany and request furlough. Please inform us of disposition."

Report of Team Upon Return from Field - 9 July to 9 September

This report will be divided into three parts, 1 - Activity of the team; 2 - Criticisms and suggestions; 3 - Information on FFI and their relationships with United States Forces.

1. Activity of the Team

Operations of the team can be divided into three major parts according to dates. Part I from 10 July to 3 August during which the action was prepared; Part II from 3 August to 10 August during which action took place; Part III from 10 August to 9 September during which we received tasks and orders direct from Colonel Eono.

Part I - 10 July to 3 August. The southeast region of Finistere which had been allocated to us comprises two entirely different zones, one we will call "A" where there were

(901) C-2279/24 22 Aug 44
(903) C-4099 31 Aug 44
(905) C-119/47 17 Sep 44

(902) C-2758/6 25 Aug 44
(904) B-3032 7 Sep 44

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relatively few Germans with a few Maquis who were organized but unarmed. The Germans had a garrison which varied from 100 to 200 at Carhaix, 180 at Scaer. Their strongest place was Lefaduet which was considered to be the center of the so-called "anti-terrorist" movement of the southeast Finistere (200 - 500 men). The other zone which we will call "B" was closer to the Atlantic Wall and could not shelter any Maquis. We only had there an organization which was well organized comprising cadres living in small groups of two or three in the country, and other people living at home. These people were always at close call. The garrisons for the following places, Rosporden - Bannalec - Quimperle, amounted to about 300 men. In fact, all the villages south of the road Rosporden - Lorient had fairly strong garrisons composed mostly of Russians.

Our plan of action was the following: visit each Maquis, check its organization and see to its armament. So much for region "A". For Zone "B" more important in view of the proximity of possible objectives we will have to work with the chiefs to make an arms dump. For both regions impart to the chiefs the spirit and intentions of Colonel Eono and organize more instruction on the new armament which would be forthcoming.

We made up for this purpose a small team of six men (Francis, chief patriot, Deneville, patriot second radio Leguyader, SAS Maurice Myodon, the latter having become separated from his unit), which would remain at the limit of the two zones and would be able to move fairly quickly at night either on foot or cycle.

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We managed fairly easily for Zone "A" but for Zone "B" we encountered serious difficulties. We had two unfortunate drops, one at Bannalec, the other at Pontaven, which proved that it was impossible to carry on air operations in the south and we decided to carry on only in the north and pass the armament received by road. When the operations took place the south was not so well armed as the north.

The numerous journeys which were necessary to accomplish our task resulted in several brushes with the enemy and we had to deplore some heavy losses. Of the team of six, three were killed in combat (Major Ogden-Smith, SAS Myodon, chief patriot Deneville) and one was seriously wounded (second radio Guyader. I insist, however, on the absolute necessity for us to move about as it was the only means we had to check up on the army dumps and rapid organization of our groups.

The succession of operations which took place will now be given in the form of a diary.

9 July - Briefing

10 July - We jumped at 0210 hours. Owing to a misjudgement, three members of the team landed in a wood. Major Ogden-Smith was unable to contact the reception committee and lost himself. A rucksack was lost. I made contact with the chief of the sector at Quimperle who had organized the reception committee. I decided to make our command post in a grotto situated 4 kilometres from Quimperle and the property of a patriot chief, Deneville, who will form part of the small mobile group previously mentioned. During the afternoon, I made contact with two lieutenants who were acting as second in command to the chief of the sector, orders were given to them to find Ogden-Smith. We tried in vain to make radio contact.

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11 July. Initial contact - QSA5 send first message. Established with Loyer two arms dumps for zone "B" with contents of containers received night 9/10 July.

12 July. Made contact with the chief of the sector of Sear, David, who requested a drop on ground Guide; he gave me the results of arms received with team Charron. I made him form three Maquis of 90 men each who would remain near Sear. I made contact with the departmental chief Berthaud, who fully agreed with our mission. We decided to inform them of the operations BBC message down to the "Chef d'arrondissement". The Chief d'arrondissement at Carhaix, alerted the previous day, came to see me. He asked for two drops which would be sufficient to arm his men which would be formed in Maquis as soon as reception was affected.

13 July. Berthaud asked me to affect W/T transmission for Gilbert (906), their set having been damaged when dropped. I sent a message submitting five grounds for them.

14 July. Major Ogden-Smith was found by the resistance. He had managed to hide from the German patrols. During briefing in view of the lack of information we had made a rendez-vous in case of loss at the village of St. Fiacre near Faouet which at the time we did not realize was the center of the anti-terrorist movement.

15 July. Made contact with the agent Rateau, a grand woman who brought us excellent information on Brest which we transmitted to London. Team Gilbert asks us to insist for a new W/T set. The drop on Guide was badly done. We never received Ops 1, 2 and 3 from London and we cannot realize how the people of Sear could have been informed. From the report which the chief of the arrondissement, David, the

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FTPs had been alerted - we do not know by whom. They proceeded hardly armed to the ground. The cargo of the first drop was not sufficient to arm the FTP. Three planes dropped their cargo and during the work of collecting containers 300 Russians who had arrived from De Faouet began to open fire. David hurriedly brought out our uniforms and with the help of the Maquis managed by some clever manoeuvring to get away the FTP and then his own men. There were some heavy losses and 24 patriots were killed. Fifty Germans were killed, including 15 officers. However, they obtained 50 of the containers.

With the rest of the armament we managed to equip a large FTP Maquis and David reinforced his two existing Maquis. We transported sufficient arms for 80 men at Bannalec where we had an unarmed group.

16 July. Made contact with Giles (907) near Chateauneuf.

17 July. Moved by night and arrived Guisgriff. The enemy moved into the village in lorries and stopped in front of the house where we were staying. We just managed to escape and left again by night for Chateauneuf. During the afternoon we contacted the chief of Guisgriff, Lieutenant DeKerville of the SAS for whom we requested a plane. His Maquis was already armed. We organized at Guisgriff a company of trained men who could remain at home and would each have a rifle. We also organized a second FTP Maquis and placed at its head a lieutenant and requested for them one cargo of arms. Contacted David and demanded arms for them.

18 July. We arrived at the emplacement of the Maquis St. Thoïs who had moved during the night but had left behind a small detachment who warned us that their location was known to the Germans. We moved off.

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19 July. Remained in a small wood on our guard. Major Ogden-Smith and I during the afternoon found Giles.

20 July. Left by cycle for Quimperle as a team of six. Five kilometres after St. Thoïs crossing the road Chateau-neuf - Quimper we came face to face with some feldgendarmes in a car and empty truck - we exchanged a few shots killing a feldgendarme which made the remainder retire. We continued on foot.

21 July. Hidden and resting in a wood.

22 July. Visited a Maquis belonging to Lieutenant De-Kerville who had received during the night of 21 July three planes, which enabled him to increase the Maquis to 300 men spread over three sections - 100 men each - several kilometres apart.

23 July. Remain with the Maquis. They were extremely well organized. Made a mental note that we could make full use of this the day operations took place. Contacted the chief d'arrondissement of Gourin on whom Guisgriff depends. Asked for a drop for him.

24 July. Returned to our command post at Quimperle. No drop had been received and we insist to obtain satisfaction. The ground Musareigne we had submitted so often was destined to be the base of supplies for the whole of the region "B". The situation in region "A" is now as follows: At Carhaix, arms for about 500; at Sear, also 500; at Guisgriff, 300. Total 1300. In region "B" there were only 200 men.

25 July. An unlucky drop at Pontaven in the center of zone "B", and the planes arrived at dawn - distribution of arms a long which cannot be undertaken. Containers are hidden but discovered during the morning by the Boche who took away the arms for 300 men. These were later recovered near

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Bannalec when we captured the place at the beginning of August. At Bannalec a drop had to be cancelled owing to troop movements. We saw our planes but did not light up for them. After these two unlucky attempts we decided to cease all droppings in zone "B" and leave them any accessories from zone "A" or ground Musareigne.

26 July. Discovered the previous day that our post is surrounded by 600 Germans who had arrived from Quimperle and were commanded by a colonel. Our team of six managed to escape without causing suspicion.

27 July. We passed without incident through a German group of about 40 men who were hiding, an unusual custom for them, in a wood.

28 July. The enemy searched the territory and discovered ten empty containers. A small Maquis of about 50 men, stationed 5 kilometres from our command post, was surrounded but managed to escape killing five Germans but losing two men. The W/T set dropped on a ground of Giles, which had been dropped the previous day and brought to this Maquis to be given to us fell into German hands. The money was saved. From this date will begin a series of active operations in zones "A" and "B" which will disorganize considerably zone "B", already the weakest. The chiefs who were hunted lose their liaison and they will require a week in order to re-establish themselves. The Germans arrest General de Torquort, aged 75 and shoot him. The general wrongly accused of being chief of the patriots refused to say anything. He was a relative of Deneville. During the evening Deneville, with the intention of saving our equipment hidden in the grotto which we used as command post, was caught in an ambush and killed. We decide to go to Carhaix. We started off by foot and arrived during the night at an isolated farm of Nuerrien.

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29 July. At 2030 hours, due to treason, we are encircled by 100 Germans and after a short fight Major Ogden-Smith is wounded and killed. SAS Moyodon is wounded and killed. The second radio seriously wounded managed to escape. Sergeant Dallow and Le Zachmeur are safe but have lost contact. The W/T set is safe but dispersed.

30 July. Carried on throughout the night to rejoin Maquis of Guisgriff without news of my comrades.

31 July. Arrived at Guisgriff during a drop of six planes. Had sent by cart the following night 30 containers to Quimperle - Bannalec and 30 near Carhaix, also a receiver for Francis. . . . Sear informed me that they had received a drop of one plane and Guisgriff two planes. Our strength was now brought up to 3000 armed men. Collected the W/T set and Sergeant Dallow and received confirmation of the death of Major Ogden-Smith and SAS. Asked Gilbert to pass a message as the Major had on him our secret papers and documents and in a sack was a map giving all our DZs.

1 August. From this date the Germans of Du Faouet and Sear who thought they had discovered the emplacement of the Maquis on the map searched the countryside from 4 in the morning until 8 at night. Unfortunately, in the region of Guisgriff and Sear were grouped five grounds and nearly 10 Maquis and it was miraculous that in this game of hide and seek there were no brushes with the enemy.

2 August. Our command post is denounced and the farm where we were hiding is surrounded. We manage to escape.

Part II 3 August - 10 August. Found our W/T set and Sergeant Dallow and left Guisgriff for Sear. All the roads are cut, Germans leave Sear after a short fight and remain

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at Mellac, a village six kilometres from Quimperle. At Sear I make up a large group of 500 men. Lieutenant Colonel le-Tallec of the medical service sets up a hospital. We requisition some lorries and with petrol which we had hidden we manage to transfer from one point to another approximately 200 men.

4 August. Our task is to cut the German retreat of Lorient, the road Quimper, Quimperle, Lorient. A company from Sear is sent to attempt to move the Germans out of Mallec. They had eight killed and fell back at Quimperle. At night I am informed by Bannalec that lorries were evacuating the large dump of Kerlugarlic. They had forced their way through after a few losses. I reinforced the ambush which had been prepared and took command. At 0030 hours Germans reached our positions held by a hundred men, two lorries were set on fire and the Germans turned back taking their dead with them. The fight lasted three hours. A group at Quimperle attacked near D'Arzano a Russian convoy inflicting losses. We had 2 FFI killed.

5 August. A group at Bannalec liberated a town after a happy coup-de-mains on the small German post near the station. Five Germans were killed and eight taken prisoner. During the afternoon Captain Mercier de Rosporden urgently required reinforcements, the town having been attacked by a strong Russian column. As everybody at Sear was engaged, I sent him in lorries 150 men from Guisgriff under the orders of Lieutenant DeKerville. After severe losses the Russians were repulsed (a report on team Gilbert should refer to this as they participated (908)). Lieutenant DeKerville was killed in battle. The whole of my zone was now almost free of

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Germans. On patrol we proceed to mop up a few isolated groups and took about 150 prisoners. Berthaud informs me that Gilbert and Ronald (909) are at Quimper.

6 August. We take part in the siege of Quimper. The enemy attempted to leave in convoys but this was stopped - 400 FFI encircled the town where there are 400 Germans. At dawn a convoy of three lorries was destroyed resulting in eight enemy killed. We send out a patrol to pick up the lorries.

7 August. The enemy attempts to leave Quimper during the afternoon. A convoy of about 10 lorries leaves in the direction of Brest, is completely destroyed. A second convoy of carts manage to leave Quimper in direction of Loueron. This was later destroyed.

8 August. With Gilbert and Ronald we enter Quimper which is liberated.

9 August. Endeavor to contact Colonel Eono at his command post near Mur de Bretagne. We see Colonel Passy who gives each Jedburgh team of Finistere the mission of gathering information in its zone. This information would be collected by Ronald who would inform the Aloes mission (910) whether there were any resistance pockets we were unable to cope with.

Part III

10 August. We organize the following four sectors for gathering information: Carhaix, Sear, Bannalec and Quimperle.

11 August. No report on Carhaix. Five isolated men at Sear. At Bannalec a few prisoners have been taken. With regard to Quimperle, this being the most important, I decide to go over there myself and take as assistant an officer from

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the reserve, De Lepino, who managed to do so well that the 6th United States Armored Division, which were later in the siege of Lorient, sent him two liaison officers. With the financial assistance of Aloes we send some women into Lorient who bring back vital information. In a week we manage to send in about 10 missions. We were able to give the United States forces the exact position of 80 of the gun sites and the strength of the whole of the defensive system surrounding Lorient. The FFI at Quimperle are holding an important sector and I bring in from Sear 250 men. This brings our force up to 400 men with the United States Army.

16 August. Colonel Eono authorizes me to regroup the sailors. I made contact at Quimper with Lieutenant De Vaisseau Delsuc and we recall the sailors and on 19 August have 500 trained but unarmed men. I request for Delsuc some arms from the Admiralty to be dropped.

19 August. We arm with mortars and small automatics the whole of the detachment. Colonel Eono desires that we arm 10 boats at Douamenez to prevent the Germans leaving Crozon for the Pointe du Raz. Five boats are armed with bren guns.

20 August. First naval patrol.

21 August. I proceed to Quimper to organize with Loyer that units be relieved by sailors. Report by Commandant Lucas.

24 August. A unit composed of 80 sailors having officers and NCO's is made up and goes into the line at Quimper. This unit will be relieved by sailors which from the 24th will hold a sector on their own. Patrol activity.

25 August. A detachment of NCO Marines collects some 20 mm. machine guns from boats which had been beached during a recent naval engagement. We recapture six.

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28 August. Colonel Eono names a naval officer for the liaison Army - Navy. Our task is accomplished. We insist to return to United Kingdom. We cease radio contact.

9 September. Embark at Benodet for England.

2. Criticisms and Suggestions

Air Deliveries. It was impossible to maintain a secrecy of delivery of arms by air for the following reasons:

- a. The planes usually arrived too late which made collection and camouflage of the containers difficult.
 - b. The planes never arrived in a group; they were mostly spaced by $1\frac{1}{2}$ hours or even 1 hour. This entailed about 2 hours work for the reception committee.
 - c. The planes had the deplorable habit of sending Morse which was of no use except to help the enemy observers who were installed in all the neighboring church towers.
 - d. The plane often turned three or four times over the DZ before deciding to drop its containers 600 metres away from the lights.
- (Our cables of the 18th and 20th requested remedy to errors and we also asked the planes to make a small diversion on another objective.)

I feel confident that in our zone the enemy was often quite aware that a drop was going to take place but without knowing exactly the location.

Demands for Arms. We never received what we asked for. All our cables requested piats, mortars and smoke grenades. We never received any. The pressing need for boots for our men did not seem to have affected London very much. There was an instance of the Maquis at Guisgriff, where 40 of the

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men had made footwear with old rags.

I must bring to the notice also the great difficulty there was in moving and the danger in transporting equipment. This accounts for the bitter tone of some of our cables when we were informed that 500,000 francs or a wireless set we wanted was on a ground 90 kilometres from our command post.

It would have been much more to the point for us and our men if the packing of the containers had been made up with tobacco rather than with thousands of bandages.

W/T. We are satisfied with the Jedburgh set and I wish to underline the excellent work which had been given by Sergeant Dallow. The broadcasts were very difficult to read owing to atmospherics or our own movements at night. We were obliged to use a crack signal requesting repetition of the last broadcast. We were once detected at our command post near Quimperle on 25 July.

Jedburgh equipment. Excellent

3. Organization

The FFI of my zone were organized in the following manner - one chief of the department, one chief for the district who organized the Maquis.

The relationships between FTP and FFI were cordial in our zone and union between them into a single command was easily affected.

The FFI gave every satisfaction in the war of ambush which Colonel Eono desired, the Germans really left in fear of the terrorists. All the prisoners were unanimous in acknowledging this. In some of the defensive works on the Atlantic Wall I have seen alarm bells which were for use only against terrorists. This fear which the Germans had of

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the FFI at times worked against us (for example at Concarneau.) The Boche was willing to give himself up to the Americans but fought to the last man against patriots.

The Germans in fighting against parachutists made use of methods which were almost unbelievable if they had not been seen. They acted as follows: They burned all farms which had sheltered patriots or parachutists and shot the farmer. All farms within certain distance of a combat zone were treated in the same way.

These methods which terrorized the French peasant, whose farm is more to him than his life, also acted on the emplacement chosen by the Maquis for their ambushes when they were no longer governed by their terrain as we were taught at Milton Hall, but influenced more by districts where retaliation was likely to be less heavy. The peasants, however, were very courageous and I have never known one to refuse hospitality.

Against the Maquis German action was as follows: All the wounded killed, all the prisoners were shot after terrible tortures, the feldgendarmes at Quimperle seemed to delight in tearing the eyes out of prisoners and the dead and replenishing them with potatoes. I found at Quimperle instruments of torture still covered with blood, clubs which had been used for breaking legs, bands with sharp points which were pressed round the head and an instrument whereby the patient was hung up by his hands or his feet.

Against the parachutists the Germans have not used torture, to my knowledge; they were satisfied with not taking prisoners (Major Ogden-Smith, SAS Maurice Myodon) who were shot in cold blood while wounded and while in uniform.

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The civilian prisoners, often after frightful torture, were shot in secret having previously dug their grave. We found trenches containing about 20 corpses. The body of General de Torquort, grand soldier of 1918, was found near Quimperle.

The relationship between FFI and United States Forces was excellent. The Americans appreciated the right value, their easy penetration to Brest and Lorient without firing a shot. The Americans distributed to the FFI the armament which they had taken from the Germans.

There was one thing which did affect the FFI deeply and it was the care which the Americans showed to their German prisoners. It was very painful when we had been fighting for a month without boots to see prisoners being given new boots, and when you have not smoked for years to see prisoners receiving packets of American cigarettes.

The FFI in Brittany were entrusted with several important sectors notably the Crozon peninsula, where the 2nd Parachute Division was near Brest and the whole of the Leita river also the southeast part of Quimperle.

Supplementary Report by Sergeant Dallow on the Fight at Querrien

On 29 July team Francis with an SAS sergeant and one patriot (radio assistant) were at the farm of Kerboyec. For two or three days the Germans had been looking for us but we had managed to elude them; sometimes, they had been extremely close but we were lucky.

At the farm, during daytime, we stayed in a ditch which was overhung with thick bushes - about 100 yards from the farm.

At 9:10 that evening we received the alarm that the Germans were coming and at the same time we heard the German

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lorries. Immediately I picked up the receiver, transmitter (with crystals) and my carbine and began to run with two patriots along the ditch. But it was rather awkward with so much equipment that I gave the receiver to one of the patriots (it was never seen again). About 50 yards along the ditch I decided to mount the bank and go into the next field, but on reaching the top of the bank I slipped and fell into the ferns and brambles. Firing had already begun so it was impossible to get out of my "hiding place" without being killed. I remained where I was and hoped for the best. The transmitter and my carbine were about two yards away from me and I was certain the Germans would find them. At any moment I expected to be found myself.

I lay in this place until 2300 and as it was getting quite dark I decided to get out. For about 5 minutes I watched the farm burning and listened to the Germans laughing and joking. Then I hid by the road and watched the German trucks go past (about 15 minutes later). I was now alone with no compass, no map and only a .45 colt. So, taking the course which I judged to be north, I started walking. I saw the stars twice during the night and altered my course accordingly.

The next day I managed to find a Maquis group and stayed there for about 3 days until Captain le Zachmeur located me and I rejoined him.

The SAS sergeant deliberately threw his life away, apparently in order to help us to escape. He stayed behind and fired all his ammunition. He was then shot by the Germans.

Major Ogden-Smith was killed trying to escape but it is almost certain he killed or wounded four Germans. He was

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first badly wounded and then instead of being taken prisoner he was shot through the head.

The radio assistant was very badly wounded, but he hid in the river with only his nose showing for about 4 hours. He then walked for about 10 kilometers and collapsed at a farm. He was taken to a hospital, with a cover story, and he is now okay.

The farmer who was an old man of 71 was killed by bayonet as soon as the Germans entered the farm.

Report by Captain le Zachmeur on the Death of Major Ogden-Smith and Maurice Myodon, SAS

On 29 July at the farm of Berbozec in the hamlet of Guerrien, Finistere, where the team Francis plus SAS Maurice Myodon, the patriot Le Guyader, and two other patriots were surrounded following treason by a detachment of approximately 100 feldgendarmes which had come from Quimperle. The Major and the SAS were seriously wounded at the start of the action. Dallow managed to shelter for two hours in the actual scene of the battle and despite a German search was not found. The patriot Guyader although seriously wounded managed to hide in a stream for 4 hours and afterwards, despite his wounds, did 6 kilometres on foot to find shelter.

Having had the luck of killing the captain in charge of the operation which caused a certain amount of confusion and which I managed to profit by, I escaped through the German lines.

The W/T set which we had split up between three of us in the team was safe except the receiver which was with the Major. We subsequently procured another receiver.

Conditions under which Major Ogden-Smith and SAS Myodon were killed now follow in detail.

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The Major seriously wounded in the stomach by a burst of fire and unable to move gave himself some morphia and applied first aid. He was deliberately shot by the Germans. The SAS wounded by a grenade (fracture of the leg and arm), dragged himself in front of the Germans in order to allow his comrades to retire. He fired four magazines, killing and wounding quite a number of the enemy. Being then out of ammunition he shouted to the Germans as follows, "You need not be afraid, I have no more ammunition." The Germans then approached and ordered hands up; they got hold of him, fired a burst of sub machine-gun into him and finished him off with a bullet in the temple.

Major Ogden-Smith and Myodon were both in uniform and wore the insignias of their rank.

The Germans burned the farm, killed the farmer, a Mr. Fiche, aged 72 years with a bayonet in his back, took away all the farmer's goods and drove off the cattle. The Germans stole everything off the corpses in the way of jewelery, money, boots and effects. They forbade their burial and exposed the bodies the whole day in front of the farm. The next day the Germans came back and buried them, but forbade them to be taken to the cemetery. The Germans were commanded by an officer, a captain, according to witnesses whom we killed during the fight. His two subalterns were Feldwebels of the Feldgendarmerie of Quimperle, well known in the region for the atrocities which they had committed against patriots. Details of their identity are as follows:

Feldwebel Walter Rulsam - his address in Germany is

Stuttgart
Nene Weinsteige - 6

Feldwebel Ficher - address unknown

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They retired to Lorient. A copy of this report was given to Colonel Eono of the Aloes mission requesting him to inform the United States forces of the units who were attacking Lorient.

The witnesses of the double murder are:

Patriot Fiche, son of the farmer

Mlle. Fiche, daughter of the farmer

Sergeant Dallow heard them shout "Hands up".

We were given away by a Belgian collaborator who lived a few kilometres from there and who while walking in the country had seen us. He sent his wife to Quimperle to inform the feldgendarmes, and it was she who was in the car leading the detachment to the spot. The Belgain, his wife, and his eldest son were executed on my orders by the patriots two days later.

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427877
RETURN TO RECORDS CENTER
IMMEDIATELY AFTER USE
JOB 56-72 BOX 14

4612

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BOOK IV

GLOSSARY

INDEX OF PROPER NAMES

(A glossary of code names, code words, etc., and an index of proper names for Volume 4, Books I to IV inclusive are contained in Volume 4, Book IV.)

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JEDBURGHS

Operations, Team GilbertTEAM GILBERT

Jedburgh team Gilbert was the tenth team to be dispatched to France from the UK.

Members of Team

The members of team Gilbert were:

(Captain C. G. Blathwayt) (British), code name "Surrey"

(Captain (then Lieutenant) P. Charron) (French), code name "Ardeche"

(Sergeant N. Wood) (British), code name "Doubloon"

Area to Which Dispatched

Team Gilbert was dispatched on the night of 9/10 July to the Finistere area in France.

Background of Resistance in Area.

SHAEF, working through EMFFI, planned the maximum use of resistance in Brittany in order to create the greatest possible diversion in the area. This would call for the fullest possible support of the resistance elements.

SAS had considerable personnel in Brittany in close contact with resistance forces. At this time two Jedburgh teams, Frederick (911) and George, (912) were working in Brittany. Jedburgh Giles (913) had been operating in the Department of Finistere since 8 June. There were known to be very large resistance forces in Finistere.)

Purpose of Mission

Jedburgh team Gilbert was one of four teams being dispatched to the Department of Finistere to organize resistance. Each team was assigned a different area of the department in which to set up its headquarters and work.

The principal task of the teams was to find dropping grounds and to set up reception committees by means of which

(911) See p33 this volume
(912) See p39 this volume
(913) See p323 this volume

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they would be able to receive arms and stores for the resistance forces in this region. The size of groups organized was to be limited by the amount of arms received. Organization of large groups was to be discouraged. Rather, the aim of the team was to be the creation of dispersed units of not more than 100 men. Particular attention was to be given to partly equipped units who were otherwise effective.

For the time being attacks against German troops, except when necessary to fulfill orders from the High Command, were to be avoided. General guerrilla action against the Germans in Brittany was to begin on the passage of the following BBC message: "Le chapeau de Napoleon est-il toujours a Perros Guirec."

Method of Dropping and Reception Committee

Team Gilbert was to be dropped to a reception committee organized by Jedburgh Giles on the same ground Giles had been dropped on if arrangements could be completed by 9 July. If no word was received from Giles by 10 July, two teams would proceed to a ground designated by Grog (914) in the northwest of Morbihan. The remaining two teams would await a reply from Giles until 11 July when they would also proceed to Grog.

Communications

Team Gilbert was dispatched with a W/T set and instructed to establish contact with headquarters as soon as possible after arriving in the field.

Finance

Each officer took 100,000 French francs and 50 American dollars. The W/T operator took 50,000 French francs and 50 American dollars.

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Along with the other Jedburgh teams in this area Jedburgh Gilbert would come under the command of Commandant Bourgoin, (915) Commander of SAS troops in this area, while in the field. However, if necessary they would commence their assignment before they had contacted Commandant Bourgoin.

A large military mission was being sent to the field in the near future under the leadership of Colonel Eono (916). This mission was to take over the command of all resistance forces in Brittany. The team would be notified of the arrival of this mission and its whereabouts.

Allied Forces, If Overrun. When overrun by Allied forces, the team was instructed to report to the nearest Allied unit and ask for the intelligence officer. They were to give no details of their work to even this officer, but merely ask him to forward them to the nearest SF Staff. This Staff would identify them and pass them back to SFHQ in London.

Action

Upon Arrival in the Field. Upon arriving in the area assigned for operations, the team would arrange for the establishing of reception grounds and reception committees. A minimum of three dropping grounds was to be furnished headquarters with one free dropping area as a further safeguard. This was to be an isolated piece of country into which arms and stores could be dropped blind in event of the aircraft failing to find the designated dropping zones.

The team was to select landing grounds suitable for gliders in areas which could be held against enemy attack. Beaches were to be selected for sea supply operations and possibilities of arranging coast reception committees was to be

(915) War Diary Vol 3 p
(916) War Diary Vol 3 p

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investigated.

If Withdrawal Should Become Necessary

If the team completed its mission and its return to England was desired, a message informing it to proceed would be sent through regular channels or through an operator of another circuit whom headquarters would put in touch with the team.

If Captured. The team took no cover story to the field with it. Consequently, if taken prisoner, they would be taken as soldiers in uniform performing their ordinary military duties. Every established law of warfare would apply to them. Therefore, they would give their names, ranks, and serial numbers only.

Information Provided to Team

The following information was provided to the team prior to its departure for the field:

1. SAS Establishments in Brittany
2. Resistance Elements in Finistere
3. Enemy troops in Finistere

First Word from the Field

Team Gilbert announced its arrival in the field via Giles in the following W/T message: (917)

"Radio broken. Receiver working. Send sets and three carbines for Gilbert urgent. Include one plane load on dropping ground Guide where SAS received us."

Summary of W/T Messages Exchanged

12 July From Gilbert via Francis (918)

"Establish contact soonest possible 5 kms SW Quimper. FFI strength in area whole Finistere 20,000. Our area 5,000. Advise you tomorrow many reception committees. No message received from you yet."

(917) C-4949/1 11 Jul 44

(918) C-4974/5 12 Jul 44

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Operations, Team Gilbert (Cont'd)20 July From Gilbert via Giles (919)

"Incidents on Venus Cours, operations on ground Guide. 20 Boches and 20 patriots killed. Lost 8 tons material. Necessary for secret and successful operation that orders given to Jed to organized droppings be agreed by department FFI. From DeBernhand, Departmental leader FFI, Finistere to EMFFI."

24 July From Gilbert (920)

"Urgently require you inform us immediately when and where you propose send radio transmitter, complete MFD and USA carbines. Radio reception OK. Important know when you will be ready to begin operation dropping arranged for us by Francis. Answer to our questions needed urgently. Broadcast to us."

26 July From Gilbert (921)

"As soon as possible carry out dropping arranged for ground Veau. Our HQ situated in area of it. Urgent need moving to new position after receiving arms."

27 July From SFHQ to Gilbert (922)

"Message to Gilbert telling him that arms and transmitter were dropped to Giles on ground Pomme."

28 July From Gilbert (923)

"Containers safely received Veau. Nothing received Giles although in good communication with us."

30 July From Gilbert (924)

"If you are able without difficulty Chef Finistere urges changing phrase. Too many know it. Further he requests most urgently that you give him warning 48 hours in advance of signal for given operation."

30 July From Gilbert (925)

"Acknowledge receipt of your operation 6 of 21 received Giles. Ground Guide cancelled Francis because Boche near region prepared. Kiuec requested drop using his BBC message. Will be sent to you for the same ground. All smiles now."

30 July From Gilbert (926)

"Arm trawlers now in Concarneau harbor. Arrived yesterday."

31 July From Gilbert (927)

"Cancel grounds BBC messages Milton and Fraises."

(919) C-249/2 20 Jul 44
 (921) C-455/25 26 Jul 44
 (923) C-562/18 28 Jul 44
 (925) C-671/20 30 Jul 44
 (927) C-699/26 31 Jul 44

(920) C-379/1 24 Jul 44
 (922) C-6015 27 Jul 44
 (924) C-656/33 30 Jul 44
 (926) C-670/30 30 Jul 44

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Coastal area is unsafe for dropping unless defended by strong force. This impossible until areas armed. Propose supplying from group grounds guarded and at present safe, ground Brie. Hope request drop every other day."

31 July From Gilbert (928)

"Number 14505 ENFL 43 Cpl Madeb Joseph, Commando number 10, with us."

1 August From Gilbert (929)

"Urgent - have you news of Francis. Rumor two British killed battle Quimperle Saturday 29th."

1 August From SFHQ to Gilbert (930)

"Last cable from Francis date 17 July. Try to give more information."

1 August From Gilbert (931)

"Chef Finistere asks for Jedburgh team to be sent his disposal for communications London. At present he has to chase us around. Not urgent as present system works. Difficult for Jed team now because Chef still civilian. But important once operations start."

2 August From SFHQ to Gilbert (932)

"Allied forces advancing into Brittany. Most important maintain present harassing activity but prevent general flare up until you get orders."

2 August From Gilbert (933)

"Now almost certain Major Ogden Smith and Sergeant Dallow killed. Lieutenant Le Zachmeur safe, hope joining us. Boche took drop Pont Aven, so best cancel for moment all drops asked by Francis."

2 August From Gilbert (934)

"Ildices Boches prepare depart. Three trains munitions each evening toward Redon."

3 August From SFHQ to Gilbert (935)

"General Koenig's message to all commanders in Brittany giving instructions on how to contact the advancing Allied armies coming into the area."

4 August From SFHQ to Gilbert (936)

"Advancing Allied troops lay great stress on military intelligence. Please arrange for maximum of 30 your men who know district well to move towards Allied front line by different routes covering as wide an area as possible."

(928) C-700/21 31 Jul 44
(930) C-6088 1 Aug 44
(932) C-4492 2 Aug 44
(934) C-858/32 2 Aug 44
(936) C-178 4 Aug 44

(929) C-761/18 1 Aug 44
(931) C-781 1 Aug 44
(933) C-830/91 2 Aug 44
(935) C-145 3 Aug 44

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They should be able to supply information on enemy dispositions. Following are items of greatest interest: preparation of fortified lines of defense; troop concentrations with identification if possible; air targets likely to be fairly permanent; artillery emplacements; tank harbors; defended points; machine gun emplacements; petrol dumps; ammunition dumps; enemy headquarters. They will be enlisted on arrival and will act as guides to forward units. The first soldier they meet should be asked to direct them to nearest division G-2. On arrival at divisional headquarters they should ask for G-2 branch. No mention of password must be made until divisional headquarters specifically ask for it. The password to be given when asked for is Angouleme."

4 August From SFHQ to Gilbert (937)

"In view of rapid Allied advance orders for resistance are for maximum activity. All isolated detachments should be attacked and all measures taken to complete demoralization of enemy. Give us information of all bombing targets, particularly enemy concentrations too strong for action by yourselves. Take immediate action to set guides in motion with Angouleme password as already advised."

4 August From Gilbert (938)

"Boche column 50 vehicles on road Quimper Rosporden going east. Fluid battle Rosporden in and outside town. Can you help from air. Patriot forces have vehicles and may reinforce from north. Most patriot vehicles carry a flag no matter what color. Hope break off action."

5 August From Gilbert (939)

"Chef Finistere urges help asked our 30 of 5th."

5 August From Gilbert (940)

"Great battle Quimper. 2000 Boche hold center town. We control countryside. Believed Boche will surrender Allied show of force. Parachutists can drop 2 kms east of town. Signal safe land 3 fires on each course."

5 August From SFHQ to Gilbert (941)

"It is now high priority task to preserve all permanent works in your area from destruction. This in addition to specific targets already given to you. Any harassing activities must therefore be carried out without blowing up major works. One specific target for preservation is Quimper repeater station."

6 August From SFHQ to Gilbert (942)

"US Army has sent following request. Do everything

(937) C-6125 4 Aug 44
(939) C-1061/44 5 Aug 44
(941) C-6137 5 Aug 44

(938) C-995/38 4 Aug 44
(940) C-1047/200 5 Aug 44
(942) C-321 6 Aug 44

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possible for next two days to hold and preserve bridges along main roads Lorient-Quimperle-Quimper."

7 August From Gilbert (943)

"Boche always trying to escape from Quimper. We are short of ammunition must have supplies today. Drop anywhere on road Quimper to Coray, 1 km east of town. Drop signal or no signal. Include 2-inch mortar plus HE. Even 1 platoon of men will help."

7 August From SFHQ to Gilbert (944)

"Saddened by news Ogden Smith. Colonel Eono and Etat Major were parachuted Cotes du Nord night 4/5. Name mission - Aloes. Same night Jed team for liaison Ronald dropped on Gilbert. Ronald in direct radio contact with Aloes."

8 August From Gilbert (945)

"Sure information - 1400 hours 7th - Boche column 5000 men including armor and artillery moving west on road Plonevez de Faou to Chateaulin. Request Recce and action. Question heading Brest or Quimper."

8 August From Gilbert (946)

"Boche column broken out Quimper on route to Brest. RAF please."

9 August From Gilbert (947)

"Sorry RAF found no target but we thought they would not come like your help and arms, so we did the job ourselves. Send today by daylight 1 km east of Quimper on road Quimper to Coray. Boche garrison ordered to Brest. We expect attack. We all feel you let us down. Too little, too late."

9 August From Gilbert via Francis (948)

"Can supply complete plan of Brest defences. Tell Americans send liaison to TAEF with the agent if their present information lacking. Lysander landing next message. Boche concentrating Chateaulin from south."

9 August From SFHQ to Gilbert (949)

"Do not understand. Sent three aircraft night 7th. to Coary. Successful drop reported. Have sent aircraft whenever asked for and when points were accepted. Cannot therefore understand your grouse."

(943) C-1191/195 7 Aug 44
(945) C-1246/53 8 Aug 44
(947) C-1305/39 9 Aug 44
(949) C-5176 9 Aug 44

(944) C-6158 7 Aug 44
(946) C-1259/49 8 Aug 44
(948) C-1337/19 9 Aug 44

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JEDBURGHS

Operations, Team Gilbert (Cont'd)9 August From Watermark (950)

"Can you contact Gilbert. Believed to be in St
Thois W37. States he can supply complete plans Brest
defenses."

11 August From Gilbert (951)

"Concarneau, Bemodet, and Audierne garrisons will
surrender to Allied forces. Made contact Americans
Quimper. Am sending future information daily Colonel
Eono and Americans."

11 August From Gilbert (952)

"Pluguffan aerodrome southwest Quimper landing strip
now ready for Lysander. Well flagged. Can land by day
without further notice."

11 August From Gilbert (953)

"Boche dispositions hundreds follow: Incarneau 3;
Benodet 11 including 5 sailors; Audierne 3; remainder
seem to be concentrating Crozon peninsular. May be
5000. Intention not yet known but all Boche in our area
received orders join battle Brest."

11 August From Gilbert (954)

"Pluguffan will soon be ready for transport aircraft.
Send air liaison now."

11 August From SFHQ to Gilbert (955)

"Serum requested by being sent by air to be delivered
Major Broussard. He is attached Aloes mission. Contact
him with Aloes."

12 August From Gilbert (956)

"German destroyer in shore near Plozevet southeast of
Pont Croix. Not known if damaged."

12 August From SFHQ to Gilbert (957)

"Reference Pluguffan. Your information very interesting.
Pass this to 3rd Army liaison with Aloes. Congratulations
good work. Aerodrome will be used in case necessity."

14 August From SFHQ to Gilbert (958)

"Impossible do any more air operations from here.
For urgent needs contact Aloes who is in direct contact
3rd Army."

(950) C-748, C-749, C-750, C-751 9 Aug 44

(951) C-1461/92 11 Aug 44

(953) C-1447/21 11 Aug 44

(955) C-976 11 Aug 44

(957) C-1017 12 Aug 44

(952) C-1436/16 11 Aug 44

(954) C-1460/100 11 Aug 44

(956) C-1522/97 12 Aug 44

(958) C-6220 14 Aug 44

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Operations, Team Gilbert (Cont'd)16 August From Gilbert (959)

"Pluguffan. Have seen Aloes. Liaison 3rd Army lacking at present. He wants you pass information 3rd Army and demands air liaison forthwith at Pluguffan. Landings strip 800 yards running east to west now ready. Increasing to 1200. Aerodrome is on hill and there are no trees. Hope other runways ready soon."

17 August From Gilbert (960)

"Boyer area Crozon gaining confidence. Today they attacked Brass parts north of Pleyben and recaptured over 100 prisoners. In future without American troops they certainly take the initiative. The FFI cannot do the job assigned unless we have arms and ammunition. We realize your planes are in demand, but warn you that good work may be undone unless arms are received. You may send any number of planes by day or night to our dropping ground Roquefort Foen without notice. You can cancel all other ground for our area but send all you know to Roquefort east Quimper. Send bazookas and 2-inch mortars. Acknowledge this message and state your policy as regards Arts. I cannot state too strongly that all is not finished in Finistere. Chef Finistere endorses vehemently this message."

17 August From SFHQ to Gilbert (961)

"Received your grounds. Confirm immediately if you have grounds capable to receive Dakota by day or night. If so give coordinates and all necessary details. Policy is not to drop supplies by air Brittany but 3rd Army have been instructed to supply FFI with captured equipment and arms. Will do our best to mount Dakota operation but contact 3rd Army through Aloes for arms. Awaiting your reply on Dakota ground."

18 August From Underfoot to Watermark (962)

"Jed Gilbert Anthrax have not yet received serum here. Sevets says need for 2 litres and injection accessor imperative. No Army services in the organization able to supply. Suggest you lay on Dakota ops Pluguffan field which is reported by RAF officer on the spot as suitable."

18 August From Watermark to Underfoot (963)

"We are advised by ADLS serum picked up on air strip morning 12 August and receipted for by a Staff Sergeant Raymer. Check and advise us."

22 August From Gilbert (964)

"No serum anthrax yet received. Liaison Aloes no news of it. Becomes more urgent daily. Send by air

(959) C-1799/50	16 Aug 44	(960) C-1903/21	17 Aug 44
(961) C-6254	17 Aug 44	(962) C-2018/4	18 Aug 44
(963) C-1734, 1735	18 Aug 44	(964) C-2439/303	22 Aug 44

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Pluguffan by day. Required serum anti-Charbonneux, 25 ampoules human, 500 ampoules animal. Other medical requirements - serum anti-gangrene 200 ampoules; serum anti-diphtheria, 2,000,000 units. Notify action taken."

23 August From Gilbert (965)

"8 barge-like ships in port. Arrived from Lorient. Boche loading stores and munitions all night. We can do nothing. Hope you can. Expect they leave tonight."

26 August From SFHQ to Gilbert (966)

"Cannot mount operation to Pluguffan as all aircraft being employed elsewhere. Are sending your medical requirements by SAS who are doing deliveries to Vannes airfield. Parcel has been addressed for Gilbert. Can you send someone to collect. Should go Vannes airfield which is at Meucon 5 kms north Vannes. Ask for officer commanding 4th French paratroop battalion on airfield. He has been instructed to keep package for you."

27 August From Gilbert (967)

"There is not a submarine in Concarneau harbor. I am there. The thing is a bit of building. This cancels rumor was signaled to you. But traffic continues by sea between and Lorient or further."

27 August From Gilbert (968)

"Pluguffan landing strip running northwest to southeast 1200 yards. "T" sign will be displayed. And Dakotas with munitions and small arms please. Concarneau taken by FFI 25 prisoners. Boche escaped by sea. 2 ships sunk."

27 August From Gilbert (969)

"3 Boche ships left Audierne heading Lorient. Passed Lesconils south of Pont Labbe 0830 hours this morning."

28 August From SFHQ to Gilbert (970)

"Two packages medical stores dispatched to Vannes airfield Sunday night. Have now been able to obtain remainder your order serum anti-Charbonneux. This being dispatched Tuesday morning by same means. This includes necessary syringes etc. All packages have been addressed as in your 24 of 26 August. Will be held for you at Vannes airfield. Confirm as soon as you have collected."

29 August From Gilbert (971)

"Aircraft dropped load Rospoden 1 south of Coray."

(965) C-2585/88 23 Aug 44
(967) C-2549/61 27 Aug 44
(969) C-3172/2 27 Aug 44
(971) C-3124/7 29 Aug 44

(966) C-6337 26 Aug 44
(968) C-2750/87 27 Aug 44
(970) C-6369 28 Aug 44

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Both gathered by our old maquis, so situation saved. One load dropped Carhaix gathered by Giles. Road Quimper Coray patrolled all night. We all waited all night after BBC message. No real grouse. Tongue in cheek after terrific and completely successful battle on road to Brest. Situation easier. Got guns from Rennes. Short of SAA but don't worry. Move north tomorrow."

30 August From Gilbert (972)

"My headquarters now Ploeven 1171. Difficult obtain ammunition 303. When you have Dakota available, urge you mount operation Pluguffan. Include grenades and rifles. Our strength and ammunition is being wasted in futile attacks."

30 August From Gilbert (973)

"2 packages received from Vannes. Human serum charbon also gangrene and diphtheria. Animal serum and syringes not received. Can receive anything Benodet. Include 303 ammunition and arms for Crozon front."

31 August From SFHQ to Gilbert (974)

"Glad you received first two packages serum. Third package containing animal serum and syringes will be sent to Benodet together with arms and ammo requested soonest possible. Will confirm date operation next cable. We are cabling Aloes to send back all Jedburgh teams in Finistere for redispach elsewhere. Be prepared return Benodet operation bringing complete radio equipment with you."

1 September From Gilbert (975)

"Have finished here as Jedburgh but am filling liaison gap between Americans and French in Crozon battle southwest sector. If you really have other mission make order clear because yesterday I told Aloes I would stay till fighting over."

2 September From Gilbert (976)

"When we return England have good type Frenchman wants to come too. He has fought with us. Mother English. Wants to join Jeds or Navy. May we bring him if okay this end."

3 September From SFHQ to Gilbert (977)

"You seem to be well employed. Agree you remain in Brittany for the moment. Understand from Aloes that Lieutenant Charron wishes to be attached to 2nd Armored Division. We agree provided he works in your area and

(972) C-3314/21 30 Aug 44
(974) C-4096 31 Aug 44
(976) C-3625/61 2 Sept 44

(973) C-3313/22 30 Aug 44
(975) C-3550/1 1 Sept 44
(977) C-6448 3 Sept 44

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provided he is not permanently separated from you so that you may all return together. Sending ship Benodet Wednesday 6 September. Operation bringing remainder of serum medical supplies and ammo. Have sent all instructions to Aloes. Regarding your French friend. As all recruiting now stopped, regret cannot employ here. So do not bring him back."

6 September From Gilbert (978)

"LeZachmeur asks urgently orders to return to London. Repeat orders to Aloes. Reply in time for him catch boat."

7 September From SFHQ to Gilbert (979)

"We agree LeZachmeur returning by boat. Are cabling Aloes via Ronald to allow him to return."

13 September From Gilbert (980)

"Serum, medicaments and ammunition safely received. By next boat if any send chocolate, soap, cigarettes, tobacco for my troops. Can give to those in forward positions in number 1000."

15 September From SFHQ to Gilbert (981)

"Understand you are in Paris. Capitaine Prevost has asked that Capitaine Charron stay with Colonel Eono. We agree but rest of team should return London soonest possible via SF Detachments. You must bring all radio equipment with you."

18 September From Gilbert (982)

"Have not been in Paris for 12 years and am always with French forces Crozon peninsula as already advised. Liaison very necessary. Will return when battle finished unless receive earlier order. Charron went Paris liaison with Aloes. Now back here."

18 September From Gilbert (983)

"Hospital ship Rostok captured by British off Lorient and now in Plymouth. Has Gestapo agents aboard. French authorities want them. Can send someone to identify."

19 September From SFHQ to Gilbert (984)

"Can you send in message particulars enabling us identify agents aboard Rostock. Please also give us names of persons able to identify."

19 September From SFHQ to Gilbert (985)

"Please send a one priority man who can identify agents."

(978) C-4056/99 6 Sept 44
(980) C-4690/11 13 Sept 44
(982) C-140/21 18 Sept 44
(984) C-2323 19 Sept 44

(979) C-330 7 Sept 44
(981) C-1760 15 Sept 44
(983) C-150/3 18 Sept 44
(985) C-2412 19 Sept 44

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on Rostock. Notify us name under which traveling and if possible place of arrival. If in difficulty, send him to Grandville to come back with SHAEF courier."

22 September From SFHQ to Gilbert (986)

"We consider your mission finished and desire you return London at once. Contact SF Detachment your area who will put you in touch Colonel Jackson in Paris for return UK. Are urgently awaiting your reply on agents aboard Rostock."

22 September From Watermark to Bolo (987)

"Send Gilbert to UK via Colonel Jackson, 79 Champs Elysees, Paris."

From Report of Team Upon Return from the Field - 9 July to 27 September 1944

Briefing: Saturday and Sunday 8 and 9 July, by Major Horton, excellent, but of necessity rather hurried.

Zones of activity were agreed between Teams Hilary (988), Horace (989), Francis (990) and Gilbert, but unfortunately Giles (991), having left a day earlier, was ignorant of this zoning.

Our mission was to organize resistance in southwest Finistere, the boundaries fixed were not to be too hard and fast, but were to be determined by the actual situation when we got there. There was to be no offensive activity until the phrase "Le Chapeau de Napoleon est il toujours a Perros Guirec" was received when Brittany was to "blow up". We were not given the exact pinpoint of our drop (we were told southwest of Coray but dropped at Coadri on Ground Guide).

Before briefing was finished we were told we were to leave for Harrington. It was a bit of a scramble to get off in time, particularly to find correct maps.

We were well taken care of at Harrington. Airborne at

(986) C-2904 22 Sept 44
(988) See p
(990) See p 382 this volume
(991) See p 323 this volume

(987) C-2908 22 Sept 44
(989) See p

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2300 hours. Crew first class. Uneventful trip. Pilot found ground at once.]

Arrival and First Impressions. Arrived near Coadri at 0100 hours. A very bad drop as aircraft was going too fast and rather low. All packages, except that containing Eureka were smashed either completely or partly. Our transmitter and one receiver were badly broken and all our carbines useless.

The reception committee was large, 200 men of whom about 100 were armed. Two members of SAS (French) were there and pillars of strength. There was much talking, smoking and flashing of lights. Morale was very high.

During the collection of containers, two truckloads of Boche passed by the road about 150 yards distant. They appeared to see or hear nothing, and by the morning the ground was cleared without incident, all smoking, talking etc, having now stopped.

On landing we had at once made it clear to all the leaders on the ground that there must be no offensive activity until orders were received. The reason for this was readily understood, and the Boche at the cross roads was left under observation but in peace. (We found out afterwards that the Boche had got the ground and BBC phrase from papers taken off Captain Poussin whom they had captured).

[Meanwhile we set out on foot with small party of baggage men. There seemed to be Boche patrols at every road junction who fired disconcerting green lights which later we realized must have meant "nothing seen". We spent the rest of the night in a ditch several kilometers away, where we were met

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next morning and taken to a farm where all the local resistance chiefs came to see us throughout the day.

We explained General Koenig's policy, and the necessity of avoiding large groups. However, this was already organized, men were called into the maquis when arms were available or about to arrive.]

The Boche at this period knew that parachutages were going on, but did not realize the scale of organized resistance in Finistere. He concentrated on standing patrols on roads by day, and a mobile patrol at night if parachutage was suspected.

[German forces were fairly evenly dispersed over Finistere, but the grounds inland were more suspect than possible grounds nearer the coast. He had good observation posts and was confident that parachutages of any size could not go undetected. There were a lot of Boche about, but the country side was ideal for avoiding them. Traitors were very rare in Finistere; any there were from Belgium or Alsace. Every Gendarme was in the resistance and communications and intelligence excellent as a result.

There was a curfew at 9 o'clock (double summertime), every house had to show a list of those living there, and farms giving food to strangers were burned. It was useless to deny having seen patriots. The only way a farmer could save his farm was to admit having seen "three or four terrorists armed with knives and an old pistol". This usually saved the farm and called off the hunt. We introduced this cover story on quite a large scale.

We encoded a message asking for transmitter and carbines

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to be dropped, and sent it to Giles to send off. We also sent a note to Francis asking him to encode similar message for us as a check. Jungle telegraph was excellent, so good that London assumed Giles, Gilbert, and Frances were in the same place and sent a pathetic message telling us to scatter!

Giles sent our message off on the 11th, and Francis sent a message on the 12th.

The center of all resistance and communications was Quimper which was stiff with agents, battalion commanders etc, and we decided to go to a chateau 5 kilometers southwest of the town where there was good cover and possible escape route across the river Odet to the country round Gouesnach. At this chateau it would be easy to see the chief of Finistere, Colonel Berthaud, and all the Chiefs from round about, without arousing suspicion by an otherwise general exodus to see us in the country, the majority of the resistance having not yet taken to the full maquis pending arrival of arms. This chateau was owned by a great patriot, M Joncour, a builder who spoke German fluently and appeared openly as a collaborator with the Germans. He could get practically anything he wanted from them including intelligence. He even had electric light continually in his house.

[On the first afternoon 10 July we were confronted suddenly by three sets of civilian clothes, and a private car. We were expected to set out straight away through Quimper. Everyone was a little sad when the English element refused and said they'd rather walk, but half an hour later when the car without us was stopped and identities checked by the Boche a much higher view was taken of English caution. Morale was a little too high just then.

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That night we slept in another ditch as the Boche was searching the farms. 20 Maquis guarded us. We hadn't slept for 36 hours and it did us good.

Next morning we set out for Quimper in M Joncours lorry covered in sacks of charcoal, wood and other horrors. He had obtained a special pass from the Boche for the journey, so we felt fairly secure (except everytime we stopped). We passed through Quimper and reached his chateau safely.]

11 to 21 July. Our headquarters was thus established 5 kilometers southwest of Quimper in M Joncours chateau. Although very near the Boche, I don't think it could have been equalled at this stage of operations.

From the wood we could see the Boche pass at 50 yards, and we could watch them on Pluguffan aerodrome. (We got a complete plan of the fortifications from Joncour and later on FFI took the place and put it in working order again).

The first afternoon we met Commandant (now Colonel) Berthaud, chief of resistance in Finistere. (He had worked underground since 1940). We arranged everything with him. During the next few days we saw all important members of the FFI including agent "Rateau", who was a splendid person.

[During this period everything went according to the book, good dropping grounds were found and signalled to London. Intercommunication in our area was now perfect, i.e. from Quimper to anywhere in our zone, and also to Giles and Francis. Even when they were on the move we could get them via police channels.

We made recce of line of withdrawal and buried all our kit in the wood ready to slip out without involving Joncour.

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We had now only to wait for our radio transmitter. Then we could set out on our tour of our area, without having to keep in immediate touch with Giles or Francis.

None of the five grounds asked for us via Francis were acknowledged or served. No message was received from London indicating that they were doing anything. The set was not received till 28 July. We worked continually on our transmitter, calling in two marine radio mechanics but without success. (Finally I got to the root of the trouble, and made up an improvised eight point coil switch making contact with London 25 July.)

During this period there was an unfortunate incident near Scaer, as a result of which the Boche was even more alert and tiresome.

Giles in contact with FTP and thinking, as a result of his briefing, that he had a general commission for all Finistere asked for a parachute at Scaer for FTP. Colonel Berthaud, Francis, and Gilbert were ignorant of this choice of ground which we had abandoned as too dangerous; it being under continual Boche observation. There was a battle and heavy loss of equipment, though the situation was saved and a large number of Bren guns recovered by the prompt action of Captain Mercier's FFI maquis of Rosporden who came to their assistance.

This superimposing of parachutages was very dangerous, and was finally cleared by a meeting between Major Colin Ogden-Smith (Francis), and Giles. The FTP were very brave and certain companies later did excellent work, but they lacked regular soldiers, and were difficult to control at the time.

Through the untiring work of Captain Bernard Knox (Giles),

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they were eventually brought into line with FFI policy and command, and all personal and political problems were smoothed out.

22 July to 3 August. On 22 July, although we still had no radio transmitter we moved into full maquis. [We had reason to believe that our testing of the radio had been detected and we were sick of being "in an office", and wanted to make sure we had at least one striking force for "D" day.]

We joined Captain Mercier's maquis of about 200 men at Moulin l'abbe but moved that night by forced march to Kereovet about 4 kilometers northwest of Coray, because of Boche troop movements. This maquis was first class and later grew into the size of a regular battalion.

During this period we spent a very happy existence with Mercier, gun-running by truck at night, and organizing local companies of the maquis, some training where necessary, and all the other joys of maquis life.]

We received a parachutage near Point Croix (Munster) on 26 July, which was sold by a traitor. There was a battle, but one third was saved. Later on all was recovered from the Boche.

On 22 July we received parachutage on ground asked for us by Francis on "Veau". [It went without a hitch, even without smoking or talking.]

On 29 July there was a parachutage announced for Langolen, (asked for by Giles), but nothing had arrived by 0430 hours. Captain Charron, however, succeeded in signalling one plane which was off course and drop was made in our "back yard".

On 2 August we heard the phrase "Le Chapeau de Napoleon est il toujours a Perros Guirec" at midday, and also a para-

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chutage announced for that on Brie (old ground Veau). We decided to move to Langolen after receiving this parachutage, which was to arm companies from Concarneau and Quimper, but although the night was fine no aircraft was heard and we arrived at Langolen in daylight, 3 August. [This failure to deliver arms caused much unnecessary danger to 400 men who had left their homes for the maquis.]

It was during this period, 22 July to 2 August that a change came over the Boche. He was continually losing small patrols (and we were gaining arms): he was afraid to move about unless in large numbers, and began to concentrate in and around towns nearer the coast. This made us virtually masters of the country and villages, although he would every now and then send a powerful force and occupy a strategic village for a day and a night. (As we were always informed, this did not matter much.) But at the same time all parachute grounds by the coast which had been reasonably safe in the early days were now much too thick with Boche, and we had to cancel them all. [Further the Boche had started to arrest men in these towns (for compulsory work), and this often affected important members of the resistance who were waiting to be called into the maquis.]

We therefore changed our policy, 22 July. Our plan was now to receive all parachutages centrally under protection of Mercier's maquis, while several groups of 100 men each came from each coast town designated to take over the arms and stay in the Maquis.

This we succeeded in doing, not much by virtue of parachutages made, but by reason of the German arms and equipment

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we captured off the Boche, and the depots of arms and ammunition we unearthed in the towns.

[Unhappily, even towards the end of the Finistere campaign, there were still companies of regular soldiers and sailors not fully armed. It was to the incredible bravery of the Breton that the operation owed its success. Everything turned out perfectly because of the risks the Breton took to arm himself. Had we received arms in accordance with our requests, many well organized, but unarmed companies could have been turned into fighting units at a much earlier date, and could thus have been in a position to carry out actions against the Boche on a greater scale and in the critical early days of fighting.]

3 to 8 August. Intense Fighting. We were now at Langolen, and said goodbye to Captain Mercier's maquis, who moved off that night to take and hold Rosporden, an important town astride the main road Quimper to Quimperle. They were brilliantly successful in battles which lasted on and off for several days.

Our role was to arm and assist the maquis of Quimper organized in eleven companies, total 1100 men.

We formed an arms dump at Langolen for cleaning and distributing arms.

On night 4/5 August team Ronald (992) arrived with more arms, and went with us next evening to join Colonel Berthaud's headquarters outside Quimper. [During 5 August, Captain Charron went to Scaer and arranged for reinforcements for Rosporden battle and with Lieutenant Trumps had a good shooting match in Rosporden.]

During the day we bagged a Boche patrol.

(992) See p

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Late that afternoon we handed over Langolen to Commandant Philippot and drove [(like a choir boys outing)] to Quimper, where Colonel Berthaud's headquarters was about 1 kilometers northwest of town. It was now realized that we were completely masters of the country side. [All Boche isolated troops were disposed of, and there remained Boche garrisons, terrified, in the larger towns, Quimper, Douarnenez, Audierne, Benodet, Fouesnant, Concarneau. They were very mixed forces, a large proportion were Russians or sailors.]

That evening 5 August, before the forces investing Quimper were properly disposed or fully armed, about 15 truckloads of Boche broke out on the road to Rosporden. We killed quite a lot of them with LMG fire at about 800 yards, across a little valley, but the convoy never stopped. Fire was returned but was not effective. [It was like a field firing exercise and morale was very high.] The Boche got as far as Rosporden where they were shot to blazes by Captain Mercier's boys.

Next day 6 August we organized ourselves and strongly held all approaches to Quimper. At the request of Colonel Berthaud, Lieutenant Trumps ~~(993)~~ (USA), Captain Charron (France), and Captain Blathwayt (British), signed a demand to Boche garrison to surrender. Not unnaturally they refused, thinking we were FFI pulling a fast one (and how right they were).

[That afternoon we had a private Boche hunt, and got four weedy looking specimens. (At this stage it was possible to take and keep prisoners).]

Colonel Berthaud was worried about Boche at Douarnenez and at Concarneau, who were behaving disgustingly, so at his request Gilbert wrote two [very British] notes telling them that

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if they continued to do damage to the towns, or mis-treated civilians or prisoners, they would all be shot as criminals.

[And to his eternal shame he signed himself GOC South Western Sector).] The extraordinary thing was that although not very sure of the authenticity of the order, each garrison at once agreed with FFI on the spot to make a truce till the arrival of Allied Forces, to which they would surrender.

At Douarnenez, both sides profited by this truce, and left the town.

The FFI were hopelessly outnumbered, and were withdrawn by Colonel Berthaud to help with Quimper, while the Russians sought to hide their identity by going to Audierne, where they did no further harm.

By 7 August we had closed in to the eastern suburbs of Quimper and had a spirited battle at a road block. The Boche arrived in large trucks sandbagged, hoping to drive straight through. We knocked out three trucks and the rest withdrew leaving about 8 dead. They counterattacked with mortar fire, but never came again; a most successful action.

[The situation was now a bit serious, there were still 400 Boche in Quimper, and we were very short of ammunition. We sent an urgent appeal to London for supplies, BBC message was heard, but the planes dropped supplies many miles away. (Instead of dropping on the road Quimper-Coray, the whole length of which was patrolled, they dropped one load at Carhaix one near Tournay, and one at Roeporden. The former was collected by Giles, the last two by Captain Mercier next day.)]

That evening we got a note from the Boche saying "Sorry we did not believe your note, but now we know you are allied

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troops, we will talk tonight." (They had seen allied officers at the road block battle). Gilbert went with Berthaud to a rendezvous in the suburbs, where a gloomy message was received, that "they had just had orders to go to Brest, and that they would do so at 11 o'clock next day cost what might." We decided to take this arrogance literally and laid the hell of an ambush on the road to Brest.

At 11 o'clock on 8 August out they came, and the battle went on till 7 p m, when the Boche were either dead on the road (about 60), or scattered and having their throats cut in the countryside. The Bretons fought like hell, and skillfully (only 9 killed and 15 wounded). It was an honor to be with them. No Boche vehicle got further than 2 kilometers from the town. [A column on horse carts also broke out west towards Audierne and was shot up all the way by small parties of FFI. Eventually it fizzled out. The Boche fought bravely, but stupidly.] In all we had only about 100 prisoners from this battle, nine lorries destroyed, and about a dozen captured intact. The electricity plant, post office and installations, were mined and booby-trapped, but were not blown owing to action by agents.

Francis joined us later at Quimper.

9 August to 20 September. Containing Boche in Concarneau, Audierne, and Crozon Peninsula.

9 August. A German column from Benodet, tried to make north to Brest via Quimper, but thought better of it, and turned back.

10 August. It was reported that they were not behaving well, so a note was sent by "GOC Southwest Sector".

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[A Lysander landing strip was now ready at Pluguffan airfield. Captain Charron went to see Aloes and Giles.]

Concarneau was bombarded by the Navy, and many Boche threw their arms into the sea expecting a landing.

[Two Americans (something to do with RDF or wireless) arrived at Quimper in a jeep doing a round tour.]

11 August. The Boche in Benodet, tried to move east via Fouesnant to Concarneau. There was a battle north of Fouesnant in which 7 lorry loads were destroyed, and one gun captured. They burned during the action several houses at Fouesnant but only a few stragglers got through to Concarneau.

Sea battle that night off Audierne. One German destroyer on shore off Plozevet. Sent note next morning telling them to give up which they did after a few rifle shots.

Visited Pluguffan aerodrome which was now ready for Dakota.

13 August. Captain Charron went to Rennes, 3rd Army, in search of arms, petrol, etc.

14 August. Saw propaganda outfit on the way to Brest. (2 French, 2 British, 3 Americans).

15 August. Contacted Aloes at Pleyben. Found that he had no liaison with third Army at this time.

Saw Naval Intelligence Commando under Lieutenant-Commander Job on his way to Brest.

16 August. Boche raid at Brassparts, to north of our zone in Giles area. They came out from Crozon with armored cars and recaptured 130 prisoners.

[Boche morale going up with non-arrival of Americans. At request of Colonel Berthaud, sent strong message to London asking for ammunition etc.]

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Saw 3rd Army Liaison at Quimper. (American Captain and 2 French officers). Told them of Pluguffan and of Crozon situation etc.

Saw Colonel Stevens (3rd Army liaison with Aloes), and discussed situation with him. He said something was going to be done. American Civil Affairs arrive in Quimper. 15 men.]

Concarneau: 16 August. American propaganda unit and a few tanks arrived at Concarneau, after taking several outposts (100 prisoners taken without a fight). They talked with Boche, and unfortunately gave them until next morning to think out their reply.

The Boche made good appreciation of American strength, and Nazi element was strong, so, next morning, 17 August, they refused to surrender. The Americans put a few shells into the town, knocking out Ack Ack 20 mm Gun, and then went away, to the dismay of the French who sent a complaint to Rennes. Concarneau had hitherto been fairly quiet, now it was like a wasps nest.

[Captain Mercier's battalion and other companies under his command were investing the Boche.

That afternoon Lieutenant Trumps and Gilbert at the request of Colonel Berthaud arranged a further parley with the garrison commander, a sailor. We were accompanied by our radio operators and a Frenchman Bertrand (dressed as British). The rendezvous was fixed at La Maison Blanche, a white house at a cross roads on top of a rise on 'No Mans' land'. We had been there 10 minutes when the Boche opened up on us with mortars, Ack Ack 47, and 20mm, and even anti-tank. We found temporary cover, but Lieutenant Trumps was cut by a mortar splinter, and was bandaged up by Sergeant Esch. Our car, which was on

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the cross roads flying the Union Jack, was under heavy fire, and great credit is due to Bertrand, our chauffeur, who started it up. We all jumped in and drove off like hell, fortunately down a conveniently sloping side road.

That night the German Commander gave himself up to the French and apologized, saying he had been displaced in command by a Gestapo who had shot us up.

The Americans came back that evening with more tanks.

18 August. At request of the American colonel, Gilbert took the tank commanders on a recce and found forward firing positions for them.

[The tanks were in position by 1500 hours. Lieutenant Trumps (right flank), with self-propelled guns, and Gilbert (left flank) with tanks led them into position accompanied each by 30 FTP (excellent chaps these), but, as several hundred French had already moved into forward positions, it was only an unnecessary hazard as tanks drew much fire. (The Americans insisted on close protection against Boche bazooka ambushes'.) Concarneau was evacuated by civilians by 1600 hours.]

Intense fire was exchanged from 1600-1645 hours, and then was intermittent till 2000 hours, when the tanks withdrew. The Boche was more intense than the Americans, though two Boche guns were destroyed. Our tanks suffered no damage, but French forward patrols suffered heavily from Ack Ack and mortar fire, one killed and thirty wounded (mostly lightly). Two Americans were wounded. The worst incident was the withdrawal of the American tanks which was without warning. Gilbert was near command tank digging a hole when the order came over the wireless to the tanks "withdraw now". There was no

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notice given to French troops, whose positions were now known by the Boche, nor was it indicated when they were to withdraw.

It took Gilbert half an hour to get the order to "work back to original positions." The Boche fire was now intense owing to departure of tanks, which they speeded. Fortunately all the French had good covered routes back, but about 100 men were afraid to move ^{were} and isolated. ~~but~~ With the example of a sergeant of the Foreign Legion, we got them out of their burrows and back without casualty. [We had to go back and look for 4 missing but did not find them. As we afterwards discovered they had wisely withdrawn by a concealed route.] On return to headquarters we heard that the propaganda radio equipment had been shot up, as we had forecast, while being used against the Russian Sector. Lieutenant Trumps had had a tough time disengaging his troops which he eventually succeeded in doing.]

19 August. The Americans put some shells into the town; this time without French assistance, and from further back.

20 August. 0200 hours the Americans departed, this time finally, on another mission, and the situation became quiet. The FFI now started distributing pamphlets by agents to the Boche soldiers, trying to get them to give themselves up, and some did so. It was apparent during the next few days that the Boche was preparing to leave by sea. He was also preparing demolitions. In particular he intended to destroy the fishing fleet.

[The RAF made a reconnaissance and we stood by with the "S" phone, but nothing happened. The Boche main positions were in the strongly fortified key peninsula of Cabellou which

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dominated the town. The French could have easily taken the town, but it would have been bombarded by the guns on Cabellou where were most of the Boche in casemates. [The French had already in fact fought their way into the center of the town, but had withdrawn for that reason.] On night of 24 August, one casemate was taken by FFI resulting in 25 prisoners, and, owing to a brilliant idea of Captain Mercier and to chance, the Boche who had long been preparing to leave, fled headlong without firing their demolitions. Mercier fired lights of many colors all along the perimeter, and as chance had it an RAF reconnaissance plane dropped a parachute flare. Several other puzzled planes joined in and dropped flares, and the Boche left in a panic blowing only two small useless holes in a quay. The fishing fleet, the preservation of which was our primary aim, was left intact. [Two Boche ships sank but we never found out if it was done by the Boche; anyway they were not a hindrance to shipping. Boche tried to land further east but were shot up by another battalion and made off again further depleted.]

25 August. We searched for mines and booby traps with success.

Captain Charron ^{had} returned on the 24th after a most successful trip to Rennes. ~~He~~ brought back many guns, anti-tank, MMG, and mortars for the Crozon front.

27 August. 400 Boche broke out from Audierne, and made for north coast to embark for Crozon and Brest. The French let them get to the coast and then closed the trap and annihilated them, taking 200 prisoners. The officer in command blew his brains out. This officer was wanted as a war criminal for many

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acts of torture etc. Not one Boche embarked (all killed or prisoners). French lost 15 killed, and 25 wounded. [Team Gilbert was sorry to miss the battle but was taking a day off in the sea.] This Boche disaster made the problem of containing the 13 casemates at Audierne simple.

29 August. [Three Boche ships loaded with munitions, having left Audierne, passed Lesconil at 0830 hours heading east. London QSL'd message QSQ at 0945 hours.]

Gilbert moved to Ploeven, the headquarters of Commandant Philippott commanding troops on south west sector of Brest-Crozon Battle. American task force "A" had arrived, an excellent formation under General Ernest, a splendid soldier and diplomat. Their artillery shots were good, and they were quick to take on ground targets indicated to them. Artillery cooperation with 4 Thunderbolt aircraft had first class results against casemates.

On our sector the Boche line ran roughly from St Nic to the Menez Hom a dominating hill feature.

30 - 31 August. [After the usual adventures] A French gun (Boche 105 Howitzer type) got a direct hit on Boche wireless control casemates on the Menez Hom. and after only patrol pressure the Boche withdrew during night 31 August further west.

1 September. Saw a rapid unopposed cavalry advance 15 kilometers to ridge east of Telgruc in which two armored cars, a French battalion commander's civilian car, and Gilbert's motorcycle combination, strove to get first to the spoils of battle. The French battalion commander's won, Gilbert was last. A Boche 105 was found intact, and 100 Boche in outposts gave themselves up without a shot. We got two small anti-tank

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guns and enough small arms to arm another company of French.

The Boche main position behind the ridge was for three hours in ignorance of our arrival. Some Thunderbolts arrived and we showed our position with orange smoke.

When main forces came up (American and French), patrols pushed forward through Telgruc and after only slight opposition, a line was established on favorable ground 3 or 4 kilometers to the west.

3 September. [Telgruc was bombarded by United States Fortresses and Marauders. The east end of Telgruc was razed, killing 60 Americans, 25 FFI, and 20 civilians. The fault was grave:

1. The mission had been called off and acknowledged by air force on 1 September.
2. There never was any real Boche opposition in the village.
3. The pilots took no notice of the orange smoke and orange panels which showed our line the moment aircraft was heard. They were much too high, and there was no Ack Ack.
4. An hour later they returned and bombed and machine-gunned from lower while ambulances were collecting the wounded. Gilbert mercifully was late that morning and was on the road to the east.

The advance for that day had to be called off.]

Ground liaison between French and Americans was always friendly and cooperative, but we found something going wrong, e.g., Americans would push forward cavalry patrols and the FFI thinking it was an advance would confirm. When the patrols withdrew the French found themselves in front and rather bewildered. On going into the matter thoroughly, we discovered that there was

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no real liaison between Task Force headquarters and the French headquarters and that no orders were ever given to the French as a result. [Gilbert was not with Colonel Eono who was in command of all the FFI, but only with the southwest under Commandant Philippott.] After ^{was corrected} this all went well. [Lieutenant Trumps stayed for a while at American headquarters and Gilbert stayed with Commandant Philippott, who was now in command of all FFI on the Crozon front (5 battalions in all). From then on the FFI and Americans knew what the other was doing or could do. The fact that the FFI were not under command of the American General did not create the difficulties that might have been expected.]

8 September. Ammunition and medical supplies arrived by boat at Benodet.

5 - 12 September. Much detailed intelligence from behind German lines, but no progress to speak of.

13 September. American 8th Division Infantry moving up.

[A good American liaison officer arrived, ~~but~~ he had difficulty with his general staff, who did not appreciate the good work done by the FFI, or their value as fighting troops.] General Ernest's task force A remained, but the GOC, 8th Division Infantry, was in command of the sector.

14 September. Heavy American guns ranging and vigorous Boche counter battery fire. Lateral Road Argol to Halte d'argol unhealthy.

[It was now obvious that the Infantry were too thick on the ground, and it was arranged to withdraw French onto coasts north and south as flank protection, leaving, however, two fighting French patrols of 200 men each on each flank to "follow"

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the American advance. This practical withdrawal from the battle was very sad for the French, but they quite understood the necessity.

15 September. American attack starts but Boche gunnery very good and battle developed into artillery duel. Only slight progress was made. [Very good information ^{came} from behind lines, ^a detailed report on American shelling and bombardment, inter alia, that Naval guns on Gouin were knocked out and no Boche in town of Crozon, but 2000 civilians.]

17 September. British Navy arrives Benodet with many welcome stores including 400 pairs boots.

18 September. Big American push to west of Crozon, where 30 civilians were killed by shelling. FFI patrols on either flank distinguished themselves (contrary to orders) by finishing up 2 kilometers in advance of Americans and taking over 500 prisoners.

[Big guns were moved up for use against remaining Boche in Pointe d'Espagnol and Brest, which soon fell.]

19 September. Mopping up. Task force A moves south in direction of Audierne, last Boche point of resistance.

20 September. Boche gave up by 3 p m after shooting an American under white flag, and being soundly shot up by General Ernest's tanks. Only one other American casualty. 13 Casemates ^{were} ^{with} in all taken about 300 Boche. Our zone was now clear of the Hun.

21 September. [Received news that Captain Charron and Sergeant Wood hurt in motor smash near Rennes. Wireless transmitter smashed.] Had arranged to return with Navy on 24th, but received orders via SF to return via 9th Army and Paris.

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Collected Sergeant Wood and started home 24 September.

25 - 26 September. Rennes. Saw Captain Charron who will be in American hospital 2 months.

27 - 28 September. Paris and Home to Hendon.

Note. Apart from the Crozon peninsula in the north and the Casemates at Audierne, the whole of our zone was cleared by the FFI without American assistance, though the threat of allied forces was very useful in the early days. In fact the Americans never entered the southwest corner of Finistere until the last day when they took the Audierne Casemates.

Political Note. Although it was not part of our mission to report on the political situation, the following is of interest:

1. The communists in Finistere were always true patriots, firstly French, secondly Breton.
2. The Germans in 1940 had tried to make capital out of the Breton separatist movement, but with their arrival it completely disappeared - the Breton is primarily a Frenchman, a fact which is not generally appreciated.
3. Everyone, even the communists, were pro de Gaulle, because he represented the spirit of France in the early days. They understood, however, the unwillingness of the Allies to Recognise his provisional government so as not to "force it on the French," but deplored the lack of informed opinion.
4. The Breton is 200% pro British.

Parachutages Received:

10 July. On "Guide" west of Scaer. 3 planes

17 July. On "Guide" approximately 1 plane load saved after battle.

26 July. On "Munster" between Point Croix and Douarnenez,

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2 planes.

27 July. On "Veau" southwest of Coray, 2 planes.

29 July. At "Langolen" 1 plane.

East of Quimper. 1 plane.

4 August. On Camembert. 1 plane - Ronald.

7 August. (Rosporden. 1 plane.
(Toureh. 1 plane.
(Carhaix. (taken by Giles) 1 plane.

8 September. Benodet. 1 boat load (6 tons).

17 September. Benodet. Royal Navy (Medical supplies
pairs of boots).

15 September. Fouesnant. German parachute.
(24 Bazookas several hundred
iron crosses 2nd class).

Total number effectives armed by this means and from
captured dumps and prisoners:- 3,000 - (Plus)

Financial Statement

Captain Blathwayt - Received 100,000 Frs

Expenses	
Paid out to members of Maquis for special services or comforts -----	10,000
Hotel bills, food, car expenses etc in Finistere -----	13,000
Battle Expenses (Bazooka) -----	3,350
Expenses on way home via Paris -----	2,000
Sundries, necessities and unnecessaries -----	1,650
Total -----	30,000
Returned -----	70,000

Sergeant Wood - Received ----- 50,000

Expenses	
Hotel and food in Paris and Brittany -----	24,000
Repairs -----	6,000
Petrol -----	5,000
Loans to 3 RAF personnel who crashed behind the lines -----	10,000
Total -----	45,000
Returned -----	5,000

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JEDBURGH

Operations, Team GavinTEAM GAVIN

Jedburgh team Gavin was the eleventh team to be dispatched to France from the United Kingdom.

Members of Team

The members of team Gavin were:

(Major D. Jeanclaude)(French), code name "Shilling"

Captain William B. Dreux, Inf (U.S.) ~~(994)~~, code name "Sixpence"

(Second Lieutenant G. Masson)(French), code name "Halfpenny"

Area to Which Dispatched

Team Gavin was dispatched on the night of 11/12 July to the northern part of the department of Ille et Vilaine in France.

Background of Resistance in Area

Team Gavin was being sent to the Brittany area where resistance forces were being organized extensively. Maquis groups had been reported in the Rennes/Vitres area of Brittany, but there was no definite information on them. Jedburgh George ~~(995)~~ had reported 4,000 partisans in the Redon section who were in need of arms.

There were several Jedburgh teams in this area at the time team Gavin was being dispatched, and plans were being made to send more teams. Team George had been dropped on the night of 9/10 June to the Morbihan section but had since moved to the area around Loire Inferieure. An additional Jedburgh team was being dispatched to this latter area.

Team Frederick, ~~(996)~~ also dispatched on the night of 9/10 June, was operating in the western part of the department of Cotes du Nord. Another Jedburgh was being sent to work in

(994) War Diary Vol 11 p 554
(996) p 33 this volume

(995) p 39 this volume

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the eastern part of this department.

Team Giles (~~997~~) was dispatched on 8/9 July to work in the Finistere area and plans called for four additional teams to be sent to this same department.

Purpose of Mission

In cooperation with SFHQ's over-all plan for organizing resistance groups to the greatest possible extent in the Brittany section, Jedburgh team Gavin was being dispatched with the particular assignment of organizing and arming resistance in the Ille et Vilaine department.

Specifically its task was to organize the department for the reception of stores and equipment for 2,500 men.

Method of Dropping and Reception Committee

The team was dropped to ground "Hamac" between Mayenne and Alencon where a reception of bodies had been made shortly prior to the departure of the team.

Scale of Air Support Likely

The team was informed that it could expect substantial supplies of arms. These would be confined to standard loads, however, the contents of which were explained to the team.

Communications

The team was dispatched with the regular Jedburgh W/T set with instructions to establish communications with headquarters as soon as possible. They were furnished with code names and BBC messages for reception grounds.

Finance

Each Jedburgh officer took 100,000 French francs and 50 American dollars. The W/T operator took 50,000 French francs and 50 American dollars. At the request of Colonel Eono (998) an additional 500,000 francs was supplied to the team.

(997) p 323 this volume
(998) War Diary Vol 3 p

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Operations, Team Gavin (Cont'd)Relations with Other Allied Units

Special Airborne Services. There was an SAS group operating in the Morbihan section of Brittany. Should the team encounter this or any other SAS group it was to assist them as far as possible, but it would not come under their command.

Other Jedburgh Parties. All of the Jedburgh teams operating in the Finisterre, Morbihan and Cotes du Nord sections of Brittany were to be under the command of Commandant Bourgoin (999), commanding officer of the SAS group in Brittany.

An Allied Mission. The team would be directly under the command of EMFFI. At the outbreak of guerilla activities Colonel Eono, a French officer, would be dispatched to the field. Upon his arrival to take command the team would come under his direct orders. The team was introduced to Colonel Eono before its departure.

Allied Forces, If Overrun. If the team was overrun by Allied forces, it was instructed to report to the nearest Allied unit and ask for the intelligence officer. They would give no details of their work to anyone, not even to this officer, but merely ask him to pass them to the nearest SF Staff. This Staff would identify the team and pass them back to SFHQ.

Action

Upon Arrival in the Field. Upon arrival the team would be placed in contact with persons who would arrange for its movement to the Ille et Vilaine area and for its making contacts with the resistance leaders in that department. These leaders would be of assistance in establishing other groups.

Attacks against German troops were to be avoided, except when necessary to fulfill orders from SFHQ. If attacked by superior enemy forces, the team would break off action and

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Operations, Team Gavin (Cont'd)Summary of W/T Messages Exchanged13 July From Gavin (1001)

"Guy okay. Set not working."

15 July From Gavin (1002)

"Have contacted regional and local chiefs who are cut off from Ille et Vilaine. Meeting fixed tonight with FFI chief west block to make amove which has become difficult through enemy activity. A gendarme says Rommel's headquarters is at Bagnoles de l'Orne."

16 July From Gavin (1003)

"Yesterday contacted chief regional chief of staff and head sub-division No. 4 who state police repression extremely brutal and effective. Resistance after many setbacks is on its feet again but unable to await Allied action very long. Cut off Ille et Vilaine 6 June. Awaiting results of contacts to move out which is difficult because of uniform."

18 July From SFHQ to Gavin (1004)

"Understand your difficulty very well. Would like you to go along with Guy, and arrange a dropping ground west northwest town of Mayenne. We will then send by parachute, (1) agent pseudo Compas with mission south of Domfront. Prepare necessary contacts, (2) radio sets for Guy."

22 July From Gavin (1005)

"We understand mission. Contacted headquarter region M. Ille et Vilaine situation confused, main Maquis now as Mayenne. No contact for our move out. Maquis of Mayenne department number 8,000 living by XIX or sedentary. Regional headquarter propose work for Maquis. Reply urgently. Are very hampered by uniform."

23 July From SFHQ to Gavin (1006)

"For Guy. Allied base at Morbihan informs us their contact with suspect named Adolis Lucien de Guehenno. This Adolis is looking for a Captain Smith. He says he has been sent by Deschamps. Holds British Officer's identity card in mane of Deschamps. Inform us urgently if you know this Adolis."

24 July From Gavin (1007)

"Don't know Adolis. Deschamps sack lost in drop. Had no identity papers."

24 July From Gavin (1008)

"Contact with Delegeue Fonction. Contacted Trouye for Guy."

(1001) C-4993/2 13 Jul 44
 (1003) C-119/5 16 Jul 44
 (1005) C-295/5 22 Jul 44
 (1007) C-370/8 24 Jul 44

(1002) C-65/3 15 Jul 44
 (1004) C-4022 18 Jul 44
 (1006) C-4145 23 Jul 44
 (1008) C-393/15 24 Jul 44

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Operations, Team Gavin (Cont'd)25 July From Gavin (1009)

"We have contact for our mission Guy/Gavin. Leaving immediately for six days. No longer working with Mayenne. Observed disagreement between headquarter Marie and FTP. 4,000 armed Maquis in Mayenne. Regional headquarter lacks liaison."

31 July From Watermark to Underfoot (1010)

"No direct W/T contact yet with Guy. Believe his W/T sets lost or smashed. Have sent him some messages via Gavin. Have received seven messages from Gavin since his dispatch. Three of these were in undecipherable code. Guy and Gavin both unsettled in field. Neither have received any arms or stores since dispatch. Under circumstances we do not feel they can undertake any intelligence missions at present without seriously interfering with their primary missions rearming and organizing resistance in their areas. Sorry we can't be more help to you on your first mission. Hope future will be more fruitful."

1 August From Gavin (1011)

"Received radio for Guy. Contact with department head of resistance. 4,000 men."

2 August From SFHQ to Gavin (1012)

"Allied forces advancing rapidly your direction. Task now preservation not destruction. Prevent enemy demolitions roads and railways. Intelligence of extreme importance to advancing troops. Select volunteers with local knowledge to meet advancing troops and report enemy dispositions. They should ask for Division G-2 and give password Angouleme when G-2 contacted."

3 August From SFHQ to Gavin (1013)

"Agree new mission for you and Guy. Necessary you return London. Ask to be sent to G-2, then to be put in contact with SF Det of Army headquarters whom we are advising. You will then be returned here."

4 August From Gavin (1014)

"Guy Gavin at Combourg. Organizing mopping up of district in liaison with Allied forces. No news Drone since mix-up with Germans. Instructions understood."

5 August From SFHQ to Gavin (1015)

"For Guy. Cancel order to return. Continue to assist Allies as long as you can fulfill useful military job. Then advise us and we will send you new instructions. Tell us who Drone is."

(1009) C-415/16 25 Jul 44
 (1011) C-769/12 1 Aug 44
 (1013) C-6116 3 Aug 44
 (1015) C-241 5 Aug 44

(1010) DRO/143 31 Jul 44
 (1012) C-4485 2 Aug 44
 (1014) C-965/50 4 Aug 44

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disperse. General guerilla action against the Germans in Brittany would begin on the passage of the following message during the BBC French news broadcast: "Le Chapeau de Napoleon est-il toujours a Perros-Guirec."

If Withdrawal Should Become Necessary. If conditions in the area to which the team was dispatched should become completely untenable, it should inform headquarters. Thereupon the team would attempt to make its way to one of the surrounding resistance areas.

If Captured. The team went into the field with no cover story. If taken prisoner the members were taken as soldiers in uniform performing their ordinary military duties. Every established law of warfare would apply to them and each should give his name, rank and serial number only.

Information Provided to Team

The following information was given to the team prior to its departure:

1. Enemy order of battle in the area.
2. Location of petrol and ammunition dumps.
3. Knowledge regarding existent airfields and other defenses.
4. Police and Gestapo locations.
5. Topography of the area.
6. Location of strategic roads and railways in the area.

First Word from Field

On 13 July Gavin reported his safe arrival in the following W/T message (1000):

"Arrived safely with all containers and equipment.
Great difficulty in moving to assigned area."

(1000) C-4986/1 13 Jul 44

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Operations, Team Gavin (Cont'd)

7 August From Underfoot to Watermark (1016)

"Warn Jed Gavin that Dronne of Jed Guy will be at Gendarmerie in Combours awaiting his team from 1700 on his codes."

10 August From Gavin (1017)

"Working in liaison with 83rd Div Inf. Carrying out mopping up of region between Cancale and St. Malo. Drone found."

10 August From SFHQ to Gavin (1018)

"Received cable regarding present job. Advise us as soon as mission finished, as you should then return London immediately."

14 August From Gavin (1019)

"Continuing mopping up St. Malo region in liaison with 83rd American Inf Div. Troops, 120 patriots."

18 August From Gavin (1020)

"Job finished. Are at Cancale. Looking for SF Staff. Give its locality."

18 August From Watermark to Underfoot (1021)

"Jed Gavin completed task and ready return UK. Inform him to contact you Rennes or Le Mans. Please expedite return soonest."

19 August From SFHQ to Gavin (1022)

"Headquarters SF Det No. 11 either at Rennes or at Le Mans. Ask for Colonel Powell, G-3 Division, SF Det No. 11 3rd Army. Have you any news Guy."

Report of Team Upon Return from the Field - 11 July to 19 Aug

> [Team Gavin's report is included with team Guy (1023).]

- | | |
|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|
| (1016) number 24 7 Aug 44 | (1017) C-1374/90 10 Aug 44 |
| (1018) C-808 10 Aug 44 | (1019) C-1656/111 14 Aug 44 |
| (1020) C-1983/110 18 Aug 44 | (1021) C-1745, 1746 18 Aug 44 |
| (1022) C-1841 19 Aug 44 | (1023) p 469 this volume |

Operations, Team Andy

TEAM ANDY

Jedburgh team Andy was the twelfth team to be dispatched to France from the UK.

Members of Team

(Major R.A. Parkinson) (British), code name "Fife"
(Commandant J. Vermeulen) (French), code name "Carlow"
(Sergeant R. Loosmore) (British), code name "Lundy"

Area to Which Dispatched

Team Andy was dispatched on the night of 11/12 July to the Haute Vienne area in France.

Background of Resistance in Area.

Team Andy was dispatched to assist Ellipse, (1024) the Delege Militaire Regional of Region R 5, in organizing resistance in the Haute Vienne.

This area had originally been part of the Hector circuit, a very active circuit with a good sabotage record. Upon Hector's arrest in May 1944 the circuit was taken over by his lieutenant Samuel (1025). At this time the circuit was split in two sections, -- the Hector section being the Indre area, and a new organizer, Hamlet, (1026) taking command of the Haute Vienne area.

Hamlet had some success in disrupting enemy lines of communication, but he had not taken effective action against the roads in the area due to lack of supplies. He had, however, recently received a large-scale daylight delivery of containers and it was thought that he would be able to carry out this task effectively. He had established a large and powerful maquis organization.

Samuel organized the Indre into three sections, the

Operations, Team Andy (Cont'd)

northern part in charge of Marie, ~~(1027)~~ another of Hector's lieutenants; the southwestern part in charge of Jedburgh Hugh; ~~(1028)~~ and the southeastern part in charge of Jedburgh Hamish ~~(1029)~~. This completed Samuel's work in the Indre, so he was sent to organize the Vienne area. To assist him in this task Jedburgh Ian ~~(1030)~~ was dispatched.

Another London-trained organizer, Barthelemy, ~~(1031)~~ was also working in the Haute Vienne area. He had been sent in to take charge of a specific group and had succeeded in establishing a number of independent circuits.

Purpose of Mission

The specific task of team Andy was to assist Ellipse in the organization of resistance elements in the Haute Vienne area. However, no large scale offensive action was to be undertaken until instructed by SFHQ.

Small coup-de-main parties were to be established for the purpose of cutting rail lines. Also, the team was to investigate and report on the possibility of their controlling an area for large scale daylight deliveries of stores. At a later date they were to report on the possibility of controlling an airfield or a suitable landing ground for supply operations.

Method of Dropping and Reception Committee

The team was to be dropped to a reception committee, organized by Ellipse.

Equipment

The team was dropped with the standard Jedburgh load, twelve containers and 5 packages.

(1027) War Diary Vol 3 p
(1029) See p 46 this Vol
(1031) War Diary Vol 3 p

(1028) See p 17 this Vol
(1030) See p 54 this Vol

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Scale of Air Support Likely

SFHQ was planning to send a minimum of 15 sorties during the July moon period. However, the team was instructed not to incite any general uprising which would require a greater quantity of stores than could be supplied.

Communications

The team was dropped with two W/T sets with instructions to contact the Home Station as soon as possible. Should its own channel fail, contact would be established through one of Ellipse's W/T operators.

Arrangements were made for the broadcast of a prearranged message over BBC in case the team should want to identify itself to any group it might contact.

Finance

Each officer took 100,000 French francs and 50 American dollars. The W/T operator took 50,000 French francs and 50 American dollars.

Relations with Other Allied Units

Special Airborne Services. The team was to assist any SAS parties they might encounter, but they would not come under their command.

Other Jedburgh Parties. It would be possible for the team to request and received additional Jedburgh teams in this area, if they were needed.

An Allied Mission. The team was to assist any such mission in every way possible. The question of command would be decided by EMFFI.

Allied Forces, If Overrun. When overrun by Allied forces, the team was instructed to report to the nearest Allied unit

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and ask for the intelligence officer. They were to give no details of their work to even this officer, but merely ask him to forward them to the nearest SF Staff. This Staff would identify them and pass them back to SFHQ in London.

Action

Upon Arrival in the Field. Upon arriving in the field the team was to get in contact with Ellipse and learn from him the general situation of resistance. As early as possible, the team was to report back to SFHQ on the organization, strength, arms and state of FFI in the Haute Vienne area.

If Withdrawal Should Become Necessary. If the team found the Haute Vienne area too dangerous, it would attempt to move the resistance elements eastwards; first, to the Creuse region where supplies could be obtained and, finally, to the Massif Central where it could hold out indefinitely.

If Captured. The team took no cover story to the field with it. Consequently, if taken prisoner, they would be taken as soldiers in uniform performing their ordinary military duties. Every established law of warfare would apply to them. Therefore, they would give their name, rank, and serial number only.

Information Provided to Team

The following information was provided to the team prior to its departure for the field:

- a. Enemy order of battle in the area.
- b. Location of ammunition and petrol dumps.
- c. Location of police and Gestapo organizations.
- d. Topography of the area.
- e. Location of airfields, defenses, roads and railways.

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f. List and description of other Allied agents in the area. The following being the most important:

1. Ellipse, Delege Militaire of Region 5.
2. Diametre, alias Astronome, Chef ORA, in Region 5.
3. Baron, Chef d'Operations, Region 5.
4. Fourche, Sabotage Instructor, Region 5.
5. Patre, W/T Operator, Region 5.
6. Peruvien, alias Jacky, W/T Operator.

First Word from the Field

Team Andy announced its arrival in the following W/T message dated 13 July: (1032)

"Hurt on landing. Were dropped at a low altitude. Fife has a double fracture of left leg, Carlow sprained his right ankle. In several days I hope to be in shape to contact Ellipse. Fife will rest up, already installed in safe house until his removal possible. Have contact with Surcouf and Croc. I will follow up contacts."

Summary of Messages Exchanged13 July From Andy (1033)

"Broken left foot (Vermeulen) precludes walking for three weeks. We move by car every day to avoid discovery. Fife will be out of action for two months. Ellipse is coming to contact us in several days. American Dugroll with us. Send instructions."

13 July From Andy (1034)

"Lundy (Sgt Loosmore) lost all. Please replace, especially underclothes, bush shirts, socks."

16 July From Andy (1035)

"Very surprised no instructions received. Cable immediately what you want to do with us."

18 July From Fighting French to Andy (1036)

"General instructions: You are subordinated to Delege Militaire Regionale and attached as liaison officer to Chef FFI of Department. You must make contact with these groups; assist Chef FFI in setting up cadres in maquis; according to regional facilities for feeding them, the

(1032) C-4988/42 13 Jul 44
 (1034) C-5/20 13 Jul 44
 (1036) C-5948 18 Jul 44

(1033) C-4/39 13 Jul 44
 (1035) C-95/7 16 Jul 44

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numbers in resistance groups must not exceed from 100 to 500; allot to each resistance group an area where it can withdraw; with local Chefs look for dropping grounds; arm each group from arms you will receive; work out coordination of groups; avoid, as far as possible, open encounters with Boche until you receive other orders; sabotage acts against railways and lines of telecommunication must be carried on from this date by Resistance Chefs in their own areas in agreement with Chef of FFI. This is to confirm your promotion to Major."

23 July From SFHQ to Andy (1037)

"For Carlow. We have had your news about Croc. We are hoping for your immediate return. While waiting put your radio at the disposal of Croc. Warn Fife that we will bring him back as soon as possible."

28 July From SFHQ to Andy (1038)

"Following for Loosmore. In view exfiltration of Carlow and Fife you are transferred to Ellipse's Hq. You will pass Ellipse's traffic and receive his broadcasts. Further instructions will be sent to you. Please acknowledge and confirm action taken."

2 August From Andy (1039)

"Loosmore's transfer to Ellipse Hq understood but have not seen Ellipse for a week and nobody knows where he is. Suggest you send no more messages for him until contact him or his Lieutenant Croc. Devaugelas, the Milice Chief, was here yesterday."

3 August From SFHQ to Andy (1040)

"We are asking Ellipse and Croc to contact you soon."

26 August From Andy (1041)

"Concentration Boche region Bourges."

26 August From Andy (1042)

"Why don't you say something. You give us no information, no arms, nothing. We might as well burn our radio. Column after column of Boche pass under our nose but incapable of hitting them. Very bad for morale and your name stinks with the French and us."

28 August From SFHQ to Andy (1043)

"We have told Hugh to dispose of Group Patrick to best advantage depending on situation in region. You make arrangements with Hugh to use Patrick group in your circuit. Any good use made of Group Patrick is agreeable to us. Please consult Colonel Obolensky and Hugh."

(1037) C-4140 23 Jul 44
(1039) C-831/9 2 Aug 44
(1041) C-2873/25 26 Aug 44
(1043) C-6366 28 Aug 44

(1038) C-6027 28 Jul 44
(1040) C-6118 3 Aug 44
(1042) C-2828/9 26 Aug 44

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28 August From Andy (1044)

"We wish to use plan Andy because reception far better than plan Ivor. Sked times more convenient. Please cancel Ivor as soon as you like."

28 August From Andy (1045)

"So-called British officer, radio and 10 Frenchmen on way to Paris. Members of saboteurs organization as assigned by Captain de la Roche. First officer called Lionel or Edouard of French descent. Came describe Ringway Jump school minutely. Please confirm bona fides."

29 August From SFHQ to Andy (1046)

"Lionel or Edouard is very well known agent our organization on special mission. Give him all possible assistance and 'laissez passer' to enable him to travel through other maquis on his way north without hindrance. Thanks for cooperation."

29 August From Andy (1047)

"Germans are mutilating and killing our wounded with kicks and rifle butts. We are executing an equal number of prisoners as reprisals. Could you have this broadcast to prevent further occurrences."

30 August From Andy (1048)

"Armored train at Bourges hit by bombs 2 days ago but not destroyed."

30 August From SFHQ to Andy (1049)

"Cannot send any more parachutages as all aircraft being used for northern France but sending Dakotas on La Martinerie Chateauroux. Make arrangements with Hugh for part of the stores. Make record of German units and name of their officers responsible for atrocities."

31 August From Andy (1050)

"Request bombardment railway Vierzon-Bourges particularly at junction 12 kms northeast St Florent William 19. Numerous German convoys will pass in route Issoudun-Bourges via Charost and St Florent. We are in ambush but request bombardment also."

31 August From SFHQ to Andy (1051)

"Understand you have two Dakota grounds but cannot read names. So far we only have information on grounds La Martinerie Chateauroux and Le Blanc airfield. Both are near you region. Operations are planned both these grounds but are held up owing German troop movements."

(1044) C-2988/70	28 Aug 44	(1045) C-3046/5	28 Aug 44
(1046) C-3695	29 Aug 44	(1047) C-3237/10	29 Aug 44
(1048) C-3274/42	30 Aug 44	(1049) C-6386	30 Aug 44
(1050) C-3370/30	31 Aug 44	(1051) C-6402	31 Aug 44

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Operations, Team Andy (Cont'd)31 August From SFHQ to Andy (1052)

"Have cabled Hugh asking him to dispose of Group Patrick to best advantage according situation your area. Make arrangements with Hugh for work of Patrick group with you. Agree to any good use. Act in consultation with Colonel Obolensky and Hugh."

31 August From Andy (1053)

"Numerous German convoys between us and Hugh. Send arms for 10 containers plus heavy arms and petrol. Warn us date of arrival. Cannot receive on own grounds for reasons of transport."

1 September From SFHQ to Andy (1054)

"Captain Crown returning probably tomorrow by Dakota via Limoges. Will answer your various questions."

2 September From Andy (1055)

"About 3000 Germans passing through our district main lines in withdrawal road and railway Bourges-Nerondes-Nevers and road Bourges-Blet-Sancoins. Suggest bridges over all junctions as good targets for RAF."

2 September From SFHQ to Andy (1056)

"Please send urgently total number German prisoners now your area and inform us possibilities for their concentration in camps. Also require details destruction to permanent works, mines, etc. carried out by Boche together with particulars any destruction prevented due your protective action."

2 September From Andy (1057)

"Boche now all around us not only on main routes indicated in our 43. Circulation very difficult in consequence particularly to Hugh. Can you say where exactly is Hugh and what news from his area. Chateauroux and Le Blanc are not in our area as you think and are very difficult to reach."

3 September From Andy (1058)

"Still harrying and delaying Boche convoys. Send aircraft to attack routes - Bourges, Avord, Nerondes; Bourges, Blet, Sancoins; St Amand, Charenton, Sancoins. Another division will pass through here."

4 September From SFHQ to Andy (1059)

"We must have following particulars on Sergeant Long!... full name, nationality, service number, date incorporated in FFI, date and place of birth. Meanwhile have made

(1052) C-6403 31 Aug 44
(1054) C-6421 1 Sept 44
(1056) C-6431 2 Sept 44
(1058) C-3737/33 3 Sept 44

(1053) C-3405/12 31 Aug 44
(1055) C-3611/82 2 Sept 44
(1057) C-3629/17 2 Sept 44
(1059) C-6468 4 Sept 44

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preliminary application for decoration. Information Boche convoys passed RAF for action. Still hoping send you parachutage on ground Gabin."

5 September From Andy (1060)

"Railway workers in Cher report proposed arrival of FFI from Allier to occupy Bourges. In our opinion this is ridiculous at the moment and we shall prevent it unless ordered otherwise by you."

5 September From Andy (1061)

"Stations at Vierzon and Bourges destroyed. Also works at Bourges officially reported. With feeble facilities we have, thanks to your neglect, we are unable to do much prevention but are watching carefully Bourges airport and Allied bridges."

5 September From Andy (1062)

"Saw Hugh yesterday who promised us first two Dakota loads received. Also saw Obolensky who insisted he must stay round Eguzon although his junior officers were all for joining us. Do your best to persuade him. Situation here quieter and present batch of columns mostly through. Team hit two divisions and after that little more. Harassing continues and another 20 prisoners taken yesterday."

5 September From Andy (1063)

"Particulars on Sgt Long will follow soon. Please send mail in parachutage on Gabin for both Bill and Landy."

6 September From Andy (1064)

"Almost one complete Boche division on road Ligne, St Amand, Sancoins. Send bombers to blow bridge at Mornay."

7 September From Andy (1065)

"Vierzon, Lahun sur Yevre and Bourges occupied by FFI on north and south Cher. Very big column of Boche left Lignerès direction St Amand-Charenton. Send aircraft."

8 September From Andy (1066)

"We want backing by RAF. Not one single plane has helped us yet. Your 17th asked for Drome but please hurry up. Still 10,000 Boche in routes indicated."

9 September From Andy (1067)

"Please reconfirm BBC messages and letters for Gabin. Bridge at Leveudre southeast Sancoins blown by us. Main Boche route Chateauneuf, Levet Dun, Blet, Sancoins. Bill alias Dantec still at Orleans. We now have 12 jeeps and group of French SAS. Good show."

(1060) C-3886/31 5 Sept 44
(1062) C-3896/56 5 Sept 44
(1064) C-3997/61 6 Sept 44
(1066) C-4187/98 8 Sept 44

(1061) C-3895/58 5 Sept 44
(1063) C-3955/52 5 Sept 44
(1065) C-4082/72 7 Sept 44
(1067) C-4269/96 9 Sept 44

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Operations, Team Andy (Cont'd)9 September From Andy (1068)

"Murat impossible because of Boche. Send aircraft to Boyer. Do not send planes to Murat tonight."

9 September From SFHQ to Andy (1069)

"Cancelling Murat but regret too late to send on Boyer today."

9 September From Watermark to Yalelock (1070)

"Andy reports 9 September main German route now Chateaufort sur Cher L 90 Levot, Mol, Dun sur Auron M10, Blet M21, Sancoins M40."

10 September From SFHQ to Andy (1071)

"Sorry unable send operation on Boyer last night but hope you collected thirty containers on Gabin. Will try serve Boyer non moon, also Murat when you give okay. Use strongest lights possible."

10 September From Andy (1072)

"Nothing on Boyer last night don't know about Gabin yet. What was the trouble, very disappointing. Contacted Alec who is trying to fix Dakota ops for us. Excellent night of ambushes. About 30 killed and ditto wounded. Prisoners mostly foreigners. 4000 SS at Dun sur Auron. Kindly tell Allier to stay put as they are trying to enter Cher without liaison."

11 September From Andy (1073)

"Negotiation for the surrender of all enemy troops between Chateaufort and Decize almost concluded between German general and Colonel Martel. (one sentence garbled here) Cease fire ordered for 9 o'clock tomorrow. Benuepino with me will meet German general at this same hour. Desire official agreement with the conclusion of this negotiation."

13 September From Andy (1074)

"Conference between German general and Benoit and Colorb and representative from Indre and Colonel French representing 3rd American Army held on 11th. Decided to commence withdrawal of enemy troops with arms to Tombecote. Troops will be disarmed and have transport taken over by Americans south of Loire."

13 September From Andy (1075)

"Birth place and date not essential. Name and grade were Sergeant Chef Waslong."

(1068) C-4315/99 9 Sept 44
(1070) C-807/C822 9 Sept 44
(1072) C-4349/10 10 Sept 44
(1074) C-4647/36 13 Sept 44

(1069) C-811 9 Sept 44
(1071) C-6515 10 Sept 44
(1073) C-4419/7 11 Sept 44
(1075) C-4648/38 13 Sept 44

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13 September From Andy (1076)

"Containers received on Gabin and 24 and 30 packages on Boyer. Thanks but no mail or cigarettes."

13 September From SFHQ to Andy (1077)

"Please make detailed summary of your activities up to the present and hand to Ellipse, Delege Militaire Regional, for transmission to us. All Jedburgh teams now being grouped in Fontenay area to attack Germans at La Rochelle and you should consult Ellipse regarding your future movements."

16 September From Andy (1078)

"From Loosmore. Both officers had left before your message arrived. I try to contact special force officers with the Americans in the north. We have never seen Ellipse."

17 September From SFHQ to Andy (1079)

"One plane was sent to Gabin night 15th. Advise if you received 15 containers petrol and mail."

17 September From Andy (1080)

"Containers, petrol and mail received, thanks. Consider your 24 rather misleading since it came the day after the parachutage. Officers returning tomorrow."

19 September From SFHQ to Andy (1081)

"We want you back UK soonest. You should make arrangements with SF Staff, Paris for your return UK through normal channels."

19 September From Andy (1082)

"Contacted Ellipse in Paris. No instructions re La Rochelle. Have no means of transport for such an enormous move. Saw SF Staff in Paris who are getting instructions for us. Please send us some details as we are back in Chergos. Were occupied with surrender of 18,000 Germans till 16 September."

20 September From Andy (1083)

"Will arrive Paris tomorrow with luck."

23 September From SFHQ to Andy (1084)

"We are cancelling Andy plan from 25 September by which time you should be in Paris. Crystals should be taken to Paris and W/T equipment that cannot conveniently be move should be stored safely for collection later."

(1076) C-4707/37 13 Sept 44
 (1078) C-4962/54 16 Sept 44
 (1080) C-123/74 17 Sept 44
 (1082) C-252/92 19 Sept 44
 (1084) C-3037 23 Sept 44

(1077) C-1472 13 Sept 44
 (1079) C-2063 17 Sept 44
 (1081) C-2346 19 Sept 44
 (1083) C-326/24 20 Sept 44

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From Report of Team Upon Return from the Field - 11 July to 28 July 1944

Mission: Our Mission as given at the briefing was:

1. To assist Ellipse in the organization of Haute Vienne.
2. To maintain 'coup de main' parties for the disruption of the four railways converging on Limoges.

[With regard to (1) I was reasonably happy, but would have appreciated more information on the general policy for our area, this, apparently, was not forthcoming at the time of briefing, yet 48 hours after our arrival in France we received a 10 point plan of operation for the area which was excellent. It gave the policy, under 10 headings, to be followed, leaving the details to be done by us. This was straightforward and was wholeheartedly agreed with by Ellipse when we eventually met him and talked it over with him.

The Briefing: I consider (and said at the time) that our brief was much too long and bulky. Too much space was taken up with descriptions and locations of possible targets most of these were known about, by the Maquis, from whom full details could be obtained, if and when necessary.

Action at Airport: Satisfactory, except for carrying of the pack, which I believe has now been discontinued. I now consider it essential for the jumping team and the aircraft crew, together, to be finally briefed for the drop, this will help to ensure:

1. Correct recognition signal to be given by reception committee.
2. Height of drop.
3. Order of despatch. Bodies, containers, packets.

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Dropping: Generally bad - after I had agreed with pilot that we should jump first and maintain the lights for the containers. When No 1 went to jump, the hole was blocked by container static lines (had he jumped then I am certain he would not have reached the ground alive). I managed to partially block the hole with one leg and the dispatcher caught him by the shoulder and so prevented his exit. We made another circuit and were told it was now OK. On receipt of the dispatcher's order Commandant Vermeulen and ~~myself~~ jumped, and ~~we~~ both estimate the time of being parachute-borne at not more than 10 seconds before we hit the ground, Vermeulen receiving a severely injured foot and ~~myself~~ a double compound fracture of the left leg. Sergeant Loosemore, who was to jump No 3 told me afterwards that when he attempted to go the static lines had become disarranged and he nearly went out head first. He was pulled out by the dispatcher, the aircraft made another circuit, and he jumped without mishap.

Reception Committee: Owing to my injury I was not able to watch or help the reception committee, but all stores, less two packages, were collected.

Contacts: I contacted the chief of the reception committee at the farm I had been carried to - he knew Georges Croc (Ellipse's Adjutant) and arranged for him to see us that morning which he did, expressing surprise to find us in Indre when we were going to work in Haute Vienne. He sent a message to Ellipse, who visited us 8 days later.

Activities: Once I hit the ground I realized that my leg was broken. I was found by two partisans and carried to a farm house and made comfortable on the kitchen table. I was the first of the team to arrive inside; the farm was crowded

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with workers plus 4 agents who had arrived half an hour before us. I was immediately introduced to an American Air Force pilot 2nd Lieutenant Carl Bundgaard of 505 Squadron, Fighter Group USAAF who had baled out about a fortnight previously. This officer stayed with the team and returned to England with me. After about 15 minutes, Carlow was carried in suffering from badly damaged foot. In less than an hour a doctor arrived and examined us both, putting my leg in temporary splints. We were then taken in two cars to a chateau about 15 kilometers away, everyone being armed with small arms and grenades. We arrived without mishap at approximately 5 o'clock. [We then enciphered our first message to London for the first sked. About mid-day Croc arrived and we had a long talk. At about 2 p.m. the doctor and a surgeon arrived, and set my leg, and put on a plaster cast.]

We stayed there two days and nights before being transported to a Maquis battalion in the woods (near Preuilly) where we again stayed two days and nights being well fed and guarded. This battalion was attacked by the Boche after we left, but they managed to get away with only a few casualties. We left the woods in a three-car convoy, everyone again being well armed. The journey was about 18 kilometers, over open stretches of road. [We drove nose to tail through close country. We opened out to 100-150 yards interval. At sharp corners the leading vehicle waited for number 2 to catch up before he continued and number 2, for the last car before he moved on. This procedure was adopted when we went through villages and small towns. There was only one incident on the journey - we saw a car approaching and all trained our weapons on it. The occupants must have thought we were Germans because the

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car stopped and four men jumped out, quickly climbing a wall at the side of the road, disappearing out of sight, at which we all breathed a sigh of relief and continued our journey. We travelled only on second class roads and tracks. We arrived at the farm and Carlow and myself were put into a bedroom on the ground floor - Lundy and Carl, the American, going into a loft above the farm. They took the W/T set with them and sent all our messages from there. Carl working the generator. The aerial was only up during the sked times. This was our final safe house and during our stay we had many visitors including, Crawshay, Legrand, Croc and Ellipse.

> [It was decided that Carlow and I should return to England and that Lundy would remain as W/T operator for Ellipse.]

[This proposal was sent to London. We were also regularly visited by the two daughters of Mr Alec Balfour. They resided in the area and did very useful work for the Maquis, being able to move about the countryside on foot, cycles, or horseback, without raising suspicion. They did much to help us maintain our morale and provided us with many unexpected comforts for which we were extremely grateful. Normally somebody visited us each morning to give us the local news but on this particular morning it was past mid-day and nobody had called and we wondered why until we heard bursts of machine gun fire coming from the village about 1½ kilometers away. The farmer said he would send his sons to try and find out what was going on, while we filled our rucksacks and collected our equipment together. While we were doing this the farmer's wife rushed into our room, very white faced and exclaimed "Messieurs les Allemands sont la." Carlow and I happened to be

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alone at that moment, Lundy and Carl were in the loft getting the set and their equipment. Carlow was out of bed first and out of the window by the time I reached the window he was well on the way to the woods, hopping on one leg. I half jumped and half fell out of the window and on hands and knee made for the woods. Owing to the extreme heat at the time, I was wearing only a pair of white pants, what with those and a white plastered leg I did not feel too inconspicuous. I had gone a few yards when Carl caught up with me - picked me up and carried me at the double to what turned up to be a dried up swamp about 100 yards long by 50 yards wide. Just before he got me to cover there was another burst of machine gun fire and he stumbled and fell, I thought he had been wounded but luckily this was not the case. He had tripped bringing me to the ground with him with rather a bump. Carl then dragged me into the bushes. By this time Lundy had arrived with the first lot of kit. These were hidden under bushes. Lundy and Carl made four journeys to the farm before all the stores were with us in the swamp. Spasmodic firing was still coming from the village, but we had not seen any enemy. By this time I had got my battle dress on and we were all armed so I ordered positions of observation to be taken by Carl and Lundy at the other end of the swamp and that Carlow and I would watch our end. Nobody was to open fire on the enemy unless he was being attacked personally. If that happened individual attempts to escape must be made.

We took up our positions and waited. Soon after the farmer approached and told us a fight had taken place in the village and that the Germans were coming along the road about 200

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yards from the farm. He wished us luck and went back to the farm. We could then hear the lorries stopping and starting and knew they were not far away and after some considerable time the convoy started and moved on out of hearing. After a while the farmer came to me again and confirmed all that we had heard saying they had searched the woods on the other side of the farm, getting practically to the farm, but had then returned to their lorries and had driven off. He told us that in the village fight the Prince Murat, and his chauffeur had been killed. His death was a great blow to us all - the Prince had at all times done his utmost to help us. He was in charge of all the convoys in which we were carried about the countryside.

We spent 10 hours in the swamp before returning to the farm when darkness fell. We left all our kit in the swamp, (less arms and washing kit), in case of further emergency. During the next week or so we had a few more scares, but as our retreat was now organized we felt reasonably secure from everything except an organized raid on the farm, which we considered, unlikely owing to the extreme vigilance of the local people.

We then learned that a plane was coming for us and with a great deal of regret we left the farmer and his wife who had been kindness itself to us all. We had a three hour drive to Le Blanc aerodrome where we awaited the arrival of the plane, and at 0100 hours we heard a plane's engines and after exchanging signals the plane touched down and we were carried aboard. We were airborne at 0135 hours, the plane having spent seven minutes on the ground. The journey home was uneventful and we touched down at 0445 hours, 28 July 1944.

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Citations: I have already made a recommendation, elsewhere in respect of Sergeant Loosemore (Lundy). I should also like to bring to notice the very fine example set by:

2nd Lieutenant Carl Bundgaard, 505 Squadron, 339 Fighter Group USAAF who became an active member of our Team. Nothing, at any time, was too much trouble for this officer. He assisted Lundy with the coding and decoding of our messages, worked the generator on all skeds, the last time for 1½ hours without relief. It was due to his efforts I was safely hidden in the swamp and I shall always be grateful for what he did for me and the Team.

I should like to take this opportunity of expressing my thanks to all the French people I came in contact with during my stay in France. They risked their lives by taking me into their homes, giving me the best of care and attention, also to the Doctor and Surgeon, who attended me and visited me so many times to ensure that I stood a reasonable chance of recovering.

To the elderly ladies and young children who showed their friendship in so many little ways I say "Thank you", and sincerely hope that my Mission on their behalf, was not entirely fruitless.

Financial Statement

Received (Sergeant Loosmore)	50,000 Frs
(also with Team Ivor)	
Expense	
Lost, or probably stolen	14,000
Expenses at farm before return of	
Fife and Carlow	2,000
Expenses at farms after return of	
Fife and Carlow	10,000
Kit bought to replace my own lost in jumping	5,000
Lent to Corporal Le Bar	5,000
Lent to Private Jaffre	3,000
Lent to Private Hoff	3,000
General tips to generator men, bodyguard, chauffeur, etc and farewell party to Sous/Officers	3,000
Expenses in Paris	4,655
Total	49,655
Returned	345
	50,000 Frs

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JEDBURGHS

Operations, Team GuyTEAM GUY

Jedburgh team Guy was the 13th Jedburgh team to be dispatched to France from the United Kingdom.

Members of Team

The members of team Guy were:

(Captain A. Dhomas) (French), code name "Dronne"
 (Captain A. A. Trofimov) (British), code name "Gironde"
 (2nd Lieutenant J. Deschamps) (French), code name "Dordogne"

Area to Which Dispatched

Team Guy was dispatched on the night of 11/12 July to the southern part of the department of Ille et Vilaine in France.

Background of Resistance in Area

Team Guy was being sent to the Brittany area where resistance forces were being organized extensively. Maquis groups had been reported in the Rennes/Vitres area of Brittany, but there was no definite information on them. Jedburgh George (1085) had reported 4,000 partisans in the Redon section who were in need of arms.

There were several Jedburgh teams in this area at the time team Guy was dispatched, and plans were being made to send more teams. Team George had been dropped on the night of 9/10 June to the Morbihan section but had since moved to the area around Loire Inferieure. An additional Jedburgh team was being dispatched to this latter area.

Team Frederick (1086), also dispatched on the night of 9/10 June, was operating in the western part of the department of Cotes du Nord. Another Jedburgh was being sent to work in the eastern part of this department.

Team Giles (1087) was dispatched on 8/9 July to work in the Finistere area, team Gavin (1088) was being sent to the northern part of Ille et Vilaine, and plans called for three additional

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teams to be sent to the Brittany area.

Purpose of the Mission

In cooperation with SFHQ's over-all plan for organizing resistance groups to the greatest possible extent in the Brittany section, Jedburgh team Guy was being dispatched with the particular assignment of organizing and arming resistance in the Ille et Vilaine department.

Specifically its task was to organize the department for the reception of stores and equipment for 2,500 men.

Method of Dropping and Reception Committee

Team Guy was dispatched with team Gavin to ground "Hamac".

Scale of Air Support Likely

The team was informed that it could expect substantial supplies of arms. These would be confined to standard loads, however, the contents of which were explained to the team.

Finance

Each Jedburgh officer took 100,000 French francs and 50 American dollars. The W/T operator took 50,000 French francs and 50 American dollars. At the request of Colonel Eono (1089) 500,000 additional francs were supplied to the team for operational use.

Relations with Other Allied Units

Special Airborne Services. There was an SAS group operating in the Morbihan section of Brittany. Should the team encounter this or any other SAS group it was to assist them as far as possible, but it would not come under their command.

Other Jedburgh Parties. All of the Jedburgh teams operating in the Finisterre, Morbihan and Cote du Nord sections of Brittany were to be under the command of Commandant Bourgoin, Commanding Officer of the SAS group in Brittany.

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An Allied Mission. The team would be directly under the command of EMFFI. At the outbreak of guerilla activities Colonel Eono, a French officer, would be dispatched to the field. Upon his arrival to take command the team would come under his direct orders. The team was introduced to Colonel Eono before its departure.

Allied Forces, If Overrun. If the team was overrun by Allied forces, it was instructed to report to the nearest Allied unit and ask for the intelligence officer. They would give no details of their work to anyone, not even to this officer, but merely ask him to pass them to the nearest SF staff. This staff would identify the team and pass them back to SFHQ.

Action

Upon Arrival in the Field. Upon arrival the team would be placed in contact with persons who would arrange for its movement to the Ille et Vilaine area and for its making contacts with the resistance leaders in that department. These leaders would be of assistance in establishing other groups.

Attacks against German troops were to be avoided, except when necessary to fulfill orders from SFHQ. If attacked by superior enemy forces, the team would break off action and disperse. General guerilla action against the Germans in Brittany would begin on the passage of the following message during the BBC French news broadcast: "Le Chapeau de Napoleon est-il toujours a Perros-Guirec."

If Withdrawal Should Become Necessary

If conditions in the area to which the team was dispatched should become completely untenable, it should inform headquarters. Thereupon the team would attempt to make its way to one of the surrounding resistance areas.

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If Captured. The team went into the field with no cover story. If taken prisoner the members were taken as soldiers in uniform performing their ordinary military duties. Every established law of warfare would apply to them and each should give his name, rank, and serial number only.

Information Provided to Team

The following information was given to the team prior to its departure:

1. Enemy order of battle in the area.
2. Location of petrol and ammunition dumps.
3. Knowledge regarding existent airfields and other defenses.
4. Police and Gestapo locations.
5. Topography of the area.
6. Location of strategic roads and railways in the area.

First Word from Field

Team Guy's safe arrival in the field was reported in the following W/T message from Team Gavin (1090):

"Guy okay. Set not working."

Summary of W/T Messages Exchanged

(Team Guy's W/T set was smashed on the drop so his communication was poor.)

3 August From SFHQ to Guy (1091)

"You and Gavin must return London to study new mission. Have yourselves sent through G-2. Then request to be sent to SF Det of Army Hq who is being advised by us. Send similar instructions Gavin."

5 August From Guy (1092)

"Contact made with American Jed. Requests Felix to cover communication lines on march to Brest."

7 August From Guy (1093)

"Mission finished. Dronne is joining me. Awaiting orders. Broadcast impossible send message over skeds."

(1090) C-4993/2 13 July 44
(1092) C-1028/28 5 Aug 44

(1091) C-6117 3 Aug 44
(1093) C-1201/7 7 Aug 44

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Operations, Team Guy (Cont'd)10 August From SFHQ to Guy (1094)

"As your mission is finished contact SF Detachment to have yourself returned to London urgently."

From Report on Activities of Teams Guy and Gavin - 7 July to 23 Aug 44

The following report covers the activities of teams Guy and Gavin, who worked together in Brittany. This report was prepared by the team members and dictated by Captain Dreux.

Mission

Both teams were alerted on 7 July and briefed in London on 8/9 July. The mission of the two teams was to go to the department of Ille et Vilaine, team Gavin having the sector north of Rennes and team Guy having a sector south of Rennes. Both teams were to locate fields suitable for dropping men and materials and to organize and equip the resistance groups in the area. No action was to be taken until a signal was received from London. We were told that all contact had been lost with resistance groups in Ille et Vilaine since March 1944 and that we would have to establish our own contacts. No information whatsoever concerning resistance groups or conditions in Ille et Vilaine were given us at the briefing.

Action at the Airfield.

Both teams were taken to the airdrome and Gavin took off in a Liberator at 1040 hours and Guy took off at 1045 hours. The crossing was uneventful and we arrived over the dropping ground at approximately 1330 hours. Team Gavin was dropped several hundred yards away from the field and team Guy was dropped half a mile away. In both cases the planes were not flying in the direction of the lights. Nevertheless all members arrived safely with only minor bruises.

We were dropped near Courcite in Mayenne which was about

(1094) C-809 10 Aug 44

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75 miles from the area where we were to work. [As will be shown later, this caused us considerable difficulty.

We had bad luck with the packages. Guy's radio set was smashed, the three carbines belonging to the team were also smashed and the rucksack belonging to Deschamps was lost.]

Establishing Contact

We were received by a reception committee headed by Barbier from the BOA for the department of Mayenne. We were taken to a nearby farm where we spent the rest of the night and day and on the night of 12 July we moved, Gavin going to the home of the cure Courcite, while Guy went to a resistance just outside Courcite.

In the meantime we had seen Roger of the BOA who was head of the BOA for four departments and Graffier the DMR of the BOA for the western region. They told us they had no contact whatsoever with Ille et Vilaine since early March 1944.

On the night 14 July we moved out of Courcite and went to a farm house near St. Thomas. When we arrived at the farm we still had been unable to establish contact through the BOA. At this point Major Jeanclaude got into civilian clothes as best as he could, although he still had to wear his army boots. He had no identity papers whatsoever. He made several long bicycle trips during the next seven or ten days in a vain effort to establish contact. On 15 July he saw a Colonel Michelin who was head of the staff for M region. He met him at Rouez, 4 kilometers south of Sille le Guillaume. He also saw General Rodolph, head of the sector M.4. Michelin said he would try to establish contacts for us in Ille et Vilaine.

[On 21 July Major Jeanclaude had an appointment with Michelin at the same place, but Michelin did not come.]

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On 20 July Major Jeanclaude saw Colonel Laboureur, one of the leaders of the resistance in Mayenne. Colonel Laboureur suggested that the two teams work in Mayenne.

On 23 July Major Jeanclaude saw Laboureur at Epineux, 7 kilometers southeast of Sable. A man named Fonction was there, Fonction being the military representative for the M. sector. They told Jeanclaude that they had contact with the southern sector but no contact with the northern sector of Ille et Vilaine. It was then decided that Gavin would work in Mayenne, while Guy would leave to go to the southern sector of Ille et Vilaine.

On 24 July we contacted Dennis of the Maquis at St. Mars 7 kilometers east of Courcite. Dennis, apparently a British agent, immediately put us in touch with Tanguy (Lulu), the leader of the FTP for the departments of Orne, Manche, Mayenne, Sarthe, Ille et Vilaine, Cote du Nord and Morbihan.

Much to our surprise [and disgust] we learned from Dennis that there were two dropping grounds in Ille et Vilaine which had been used and that we could have been dropped there. On 30 July Dennis arranged to have another radio set dropped on one of these grounds for team Guy.

The question of establishing contact, of moving ourselves and our equipment, namely our rucksacks, radio sets and two Eureka's to Ille et Vilaine proved to be the curse of the entire operation. [For some reasons, which we still do not understand, headquarters in London had, or could have had, contacts with Ille et Vilaine since FTP were operating there and receiving material by parachute. Similarly instead of being dropped 70 or more miles from our sector we could have been dropped directly in Ille et Vilaine on one of the fields which Dennis knew of and had used, or at the worst we could have been dropped in the Cote du Nord where another team had been dropped and there

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we would have been closer to Ille et Vilaine than we were when we dropped near Courcite.

We noticed that there was apparently quite a bit of friction between FTP and Dennis on the one hand and Michelin Laboureur and General Rodolphe on the other. Barbier had received orders from his leaders not to let us get in contact with Dennis or FTP. As a result we wasted eleven precious days while Jeanclaude was forced, at considerable risk to himself, to make long bicycle trips throughout Mayenne in a vain effort to establish contact. When contact was established, it was not established through BOA who were not even able to furnish Jeanclaude with civilian clothes or false papers, but through Dennis and FTP.

So much for the question of establishing contact. The difficulties of moving 75 miles across enemy-held country to work in our assigned sector should be stressed. We were in an area in which the Germans were very active and being in uniform we could only move by night. Even if we had been in civilian clothes and had had false papers, we could not have moved during the day and carried our equipment, since we would have attracted attention. This meant we could only move at night during the hours of darkness, giving you about 6 hours. When you have to consider the weight of the equipment to be carried and the fact that walking at night we covered about an average of $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles per hour, it can readily be seen that moving 75 miles is a slow and tedious process. Furthermore when you carry all that equipment you are not in a very good position to defend yourself should you stumble on a German patrol. It is probably true that in a region where the resistance groups control an entire area the question of moving 75 miles with considerable equipment

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would not be so difficult. But in an area such as Mayenne where there were no Maquis and where the Germans were very active, the problem of moving was indeed a difficult one.

During the time that we waited in our hide-out near Courcite while we sought to establish contact, Barbier had provided us with young men of the resistance who acted as bodyguards and "Jacks of all trade". These young men were named Emile, Louis and Marcel. When we did move off Marcel, Emile and Louis came with us to help carry our equipment.

Situation in Mayenne

There were no Maquis except 30 men in the Maquis of St. Mars. There were supposedly about 4,000 men, most of them living in farms as farm laborers. There were some arms that had been stored and not distributed.

There was no action against the enemy except by a small group of three or four men of the FTP working to harass enemy communications.

There was no contact or liaison between FTP and other resistance. There was considerable friction between the leaders, so much so that Michelin and Laboureur had ordered Barbier not to put us in contact with Dennis and Tanguy.

Situation in Ille et Vilaine.

According to Laboureur they had had no contact with Ille et Vilaine for three months. The gestapo was very active and rendered resistance activities extremely difficult but not impossible.

However, Tanguy and FTP had been organized for two years and had been working for one year. They had been very active in the region of Bazouges and Antrain. An attempt had been made to set up a Maquis at Broualan but this Maquis was

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immediately attacked by the Milice and had to disperse. The ^{FTP} ~~FTP~~ men fought with arms they took away from the Germans or stole from them. They used explosives which they likewise had to take from the Germans and detonators which had been made by chemists (drugists). [Tanguy said that they had had no contact with London but had been receiving a little material since July through Dennis. Tanguy said that resistance groups other than the ^{FTP} ~~FTP~~ lacked leaders, were not armed, had done no work at all, had no contact or liaison.]

Movement to Ille et Vilaine

We left on the night of 25 July having previously arranged to send all our baggage except our arms and rifles, which we kept with us, in a doctor's car. The car took this material to Nyort which we were to reach on the second night.

Tanguy had arranged to have a guide for us and we left on 25 July in uniform. We reached Hardanges where we were put up in a safe house. The next night we reached Nyort where again we were put up in a safe house. All these arrangements having been made by Tanguy. At Nyort it was decided that Major Jeanclaude and Captain Dhomas should change into civilian clothes and bicycle with Tanguy. They were to go with bicycles to Ille et Vilaine to contact people designated by Tanguy. While Jeanclaude and Dhomas thus went ahead to speed up the arrangements, the rest of the party was to follow on foot travelling at night.

The following night the rest of the party which I headed, reached a point 1 kilometer from Gorron where we were to have been met by a guide. Unfortunately, no guide was there because of Gestapo activity at Fougerolles. The guide was to have come from Fougerolles and was to lead us back there. There being no

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guide, and since it was getting light we hid as best we could off the road and I sent Louis to procure a bicycle and go back to Nyort to pick up lost contact. However we were fortunate in regaining contact through a man named Rossiginol and he explained why the guide had been unable to meet us. Rossiginol took us to a safe house for the night while we waited to find out what the next stage of our journey was to be. The following day we were still waiting to find out where we were going. In the meantime we had got into contact with two gendarmes Placard and Leray who were most helpful. In fact much more so than Rossiginol who was rather a dangerous man because he talked too much. Tanguy in the meantime had arranged to send us a guide who was to take us to Le Ferre in Ille et Vilaine, that is to say he was to lead us near there. We were to meet Tanguy at Le Ferre. Meanwhile we had decided that travelling on foot and at night was entirely too slow since time was very important, so we arranged through a Frenchman in Garron to buy a second-hand car for which I paid 10,000 francs. The car was to be delivered to us at a side road near Gorron about a mile and a half away. That night at about 1030 we set off to pick up the car. We found the car along with the person who was selling it and two civilians. We pushed the car into the road and were about to get it started by pushing it when suddenly a German TCV rolled up and eight Germans surrounded the car which was blocking the road. The others had seen the German vehicle at the last second and had been able to escape and hide in a nearby hedge but Lieutenant Masson, Marcel and I, who were in uniform, were unable to get out of the car before the Germans were on top of us. This was a rather ticklish situation inasmuch as the Germans had their weapons in their hands

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and we had not. We got out of the car and got our weapons out and I was about to fire on the Germans when I suddenly realized that they were quite confused and did not grasp the situation very well and, therefore, that it might be possible to slip away without having to fire. The leader of the German patrol kept asking me questions in German to which I replied by okay and various uncomplimentary English expressions all of which evidently puzzled him very much. As it turned out, it was a good thing I decided not to fire because this would have certainly given the alarm and even had we been able to knock off a few Germans and escape, we would later have been hunted and it would have been practically impossible for us to reach Le Ferre as we did.

I later learned that shortly after we left, the Germans did send some patrols to investigate and were firing but they could not have been firing at us because at that time we were some distance away.

To continue, I told Marcel to slip away and this we did. I still do not know how we bluffed our way out of that one but we did.

Eventually the Germans left having pushed our car off to one side. Before leaving I had given the order that in case of difficulty we were to reassemble afterwards by means of whistle signals and that in case we were unable to reassemble, those who were unable to contact the rest of the group were to report back to the last safe house.

After the Germans disappeared we immediately got out of the hedge and reassembled, all except Trofimov and Louis who had been the first to disappear. We spent half an hour looking for them and giving whistle signals but were unable to

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to contact them. Since time was all-important and unless we were able to establish contact with Tanguy next day as arranged we would be in a very difficult situation, I decided to move off so we got in the car which the Germans had conveniently left and drove off through Colombiers. We passed under the noses of German sentries in the streets who let us by without stopping us. The car had been camouflaged with branches so as to resemble a German vehicle as much as possible.

The balance of the trip was uneventful since when we passed Germans the car worked wonderfully and only broke down when there were no Germans near by. Early next morning we reached a spot near Le Ferre and our driver drove on to Le Ferre and saw Major Jeanclaude and Dthomas who had come there and told them where we were. We went to a safe house which we had learned of purely by chance. When we went back for the car two days later we found it had been taken by Germans or civilians, I do not know which.

However I consider the car was well worth the price because it enabled us to cover the last 60 miles of our journey in one night whereas had we been walking it would have taken at least four nights. And as previously stated, time was an important factor.

Report by Captain A. A. Trofimov of Team Guy

Gorron. On Sunday, 30 July, we were scattered by a German patrol just as we were setting off for our next RV. I, together with one partisan, Louis, was unable to rejoin my group. We returned to the point de repli, a safe farm. From there we moved to another farm leaving instructions to send on to me any of the others who might follow.

On Monday gendarmes Leray and Plassart informed us that

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the others had managed to continue with their journey. I sent Louis to Le Ferre, the rendezvous, to try and contact the others.

Louis returned on Tuesday having failed to contact the others. I then got into civilian clothes as the whole area was packed tight with Germans.

On 2/3 August received from gendarmes Leray and Plassart a civilian identity card and refuge card, thereby enabling me to watch the roads and find out exactly what equipment the Germans were retreating with. With Louis we went into Gorron and found out what preparations were being made to defend the place. We discovered the exact positions of the machine guns. There were 4 - 500 SS to defend the town, 2 large tanks, 2 semi-tracked cars. The civilians were forced to remain in the town by barricades on all exits.

On Friday I sent Leray to the American headquarters at Landivy with all possible information. That night the Americans made a first tentative attack on the town. Louis and I went into the town during the attack and watched their preparations. The town was not taken that night.

Together with a guide I set off Saturday for Landivy. Enroute I met a Major Ward at Lezare with an advance American patrol. We discussed the methods by which Gorron could be taken. He went to his headquarters and returned with the information that they did not know when or by which unit Gorron was to be taken. I decided to return immediately to Gorron. At Saint Coulomb I met Lieutenant Colonel Frank M. Oliver of the 106th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, who was to attack Gorron. We discussed the best way of approaching the town, which was by a road hardly protected at all. At 7 p.m. we entered the town,

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after a small exchange of rifle fire, but the town was taken without a single shot fired on it.

I showed the colonel which route the Germans who had fled at the last moment had taken, and attached myself to Major Ward to act as interpreter for civilian problems. The gendarmerie worked very well indeed taking control over the excited people.

On Sunday I set off for the headquarters 1st United States Infantry Division where I met Major Maxwell Rosenthal, G-3 (Operations). He told me that he had only received the information I sent back after Gorron was in American hands.

From there I went to the headquarters, Third Army, finding it extremely difficult to locate SF Staff. I gave my report.

On Monday I rejoined team Guy at Combourg.

In the meantime our personal belongings and radio remained camouflaged near Nyort and were to be transported to us as soon as possible. However, the two Eureka's had been taken by two women agents working with Tanguy and were likewise to be brought to us, but unfortunately when we were finally able to begin to straighten out, both the Eureka's and the women had vanished.

As previously stated Jeanclaude and Dhomas had gone ahead in civilian clothes without any identity papers whatsoever to establish contact. They went to Fougerolles and on 27 July at 8 o'clock in the morning the Gestapo encircled the town. Jeanclaude and Dhomas were lucky in being able to escape, having been warned that the Germans were coming seconds before they arrived. Jeanclaude and Dhomas were, of course, exceedingly fortunate because the slightest examination would

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have revealed that they had no identity papers and from that point on their future would not have been a particularly happy one. Also they were travelling in an area where the Gestapo and Milice had both been very active.

Jeanclaude contacted Tanguy at Landivy and on the 29 July contacted the various leaders of the resistance elements at Ille et Vilaine at Tintac, 12 kilometers southwest of Cambourg. Jeanclaude and Dthomas immediately located 6 fields for parachuting. On the 30th they went to Dinard and contacted leaders of the FTP and also team Felix at Jugon in the Cote du Nord.

On 31 July Dthomas and Jeanclaude joined the balance of the group, except Trofimov and Louis, near Le Ferre.

Work Done in Ille et Vilaine

On 1 August we left Le Ferre and moved to St. Christopher 16 kilometers southwest of Fougere; there we stayed with the cure who had led the resistance in that area and had been very active.

Next day we went to Combours and found that the Americans were already there. Several days prior we had learned that the Americans were advancing rapidly down towards Avranches but we had not expected to be overrun quite so soon. We spent the period from 1-6 August at Combours. During this time we saw Major Broussard and also contacted various resistance members of the FTP in the northern sector of Ille et Vilaine.

On 3 August Captain Dthomas was asked by a member of the SF Staff to go to the headquarters of the 6th Armored Division at Loudeac and there he was told that the resistance groups could serve a very useful purpose by rounding up all the Germans in the area, patrolling and generally acting as covering forces to guard the lines of communication while the 6th

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Armored Division ploughed ahead very rapidly. We undertook this work with the following groups: Louvigne du Desert, Antrain, Bazouges, Combours, Bonnemain, St. Pierre de Plesguen, St. Dommineuc, Tinteniach, Montours.

[During the course of this operation these groups succeeded in taking 1400 prisoners, who were for the most part taken to Tinteniach and Combours. On 6 August we were told that there were still some Germans resisting in the area of St. Pierre de Plesguen about 11 kilometers west of Dinan and that these Germans were in a position to harass our own lines of communications. Therefore Captain Dhomas and I led a group of about 50 from St. Pierre de Plesguen east. We encountered no Germans whatsoever. When we reached the outskirts of Dinan we saw that both bridges were blown up and that the Germans had evacuated the city. Captain Dhomas and I decided to leave the group and go ourselves to Dinan and investigate. We took the guide with us, and we were the first Allied officers to enter the city which had just been evacuated by the Germans. President Roosevelt could not have received a finer welcome than we did.

We contacted leaders of resistance in Dinan, explained the situation and told them what their mission should be. We came back across the river and ran into an American tank destroyer outfit which had just reached this area and was engaged in firing on some scattered Germans.]

On 7 August we learned from the leader of the Tinteniach group that the 83rd Infantry Division, with headquarters at St. Pierre, approximately 4 kilometers north of Chateauneuf, was very anxious to have the assistance of resistance groups in that area. We immediately drove to the headquarters of

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the division [and there saw Major J. C. Hanrahan, the representative of the Civil Affairs Administration with the 83rd Division. He was very glad to see us and explained to us that they had already had a little help from resistance in the area but that the groups needed centralized control and leadership. We told him that that was exactly what we could furnish and he took us to see the CO of the Division, General Macon. We spoke with General Macon, General Farenbaugh, Colonel Boyle and Colonel Drauthoff, the latter being the chief of staff.]

→ General Farenbaugh was very glad to see us and explained that we could render valuable service by patrolling and holding the area from Cancale east St. Malo while the division attacked the German defences at St. Malo and St. Serven.

[General Macon was a little worried about small German craft near St. Malo and possible enemy infiltration in the sector we were to hold. We told the General we would be only too glad to undertake to do this for him provided we had the necessary rations, etc. We were furnished with "C" rations for the men, blankets, gasoline, captured German rifles and machine guns and grenades, etc. In the meantime we had sent for the various resistance groups, among them the Combours and Tinteni groups. The Combours group was composed largely of Senegalese and Algerians who had been prisoners of war and had escaped. They had no arms whatsoever. The next day we had a total of a little over one hundred men and we left for Cancale. We led patrols east of St. Coulomb. We saw no Germans. The following day we pushed on to La Guimorraia where we set up headquarters. In the meantime we had kept in close liaison with the 2nd battalion of the 329th Infantry which was

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in the sector south of us and with Colonel Thompson of the 60th Engineers who were operating in and south of Cancale. By keeping liaison with the troops actually in the field we were able to occupy and patrol important sectors which would otherwise have been left uncovered. We had orders to have outposts at observation points along the coast, to patrol constantly and to push ahead until we encountered German resistance. On 9 August Captain Dhomas led a patrol of approximately 15 men to Rotheneuf and encountered no Germans. In the meantime I led a patrol of approximately 15 men towards La Bastille about 1 kilometer south of Rotheneuf. We had been warned that the German anti-tank line ran through there and that the Germans had pillboxes and machine guns installed there, but I decided to push ahead to investigate whether the Germans were still manning those positions. We advanced to about 100 yards of the anti-tank line and I pushed on ahead to a good observation point but I could see no sign of the Germans. However, we soon realized that they were there because we came under machine gun fire, two of our men being wounded. The patrol withdrew.

That night we established ourselves at Rotheneuf keeping our posts along the coast and scouting the roads which led up to 1 kilometers west of Rotheneuf. This fortress was held by the Germans and was attacked the following day by the 2nd battalion of the 329th Infantry Division. We were helpful in being able to point out the various routes leading to the fort. In fact Jeanclaude went with one of the attacking companies. The fort fell to the Allies that afternoon. We were then ordered to send patrols south and east of Fort Lavarde in order to clean up isolated German resistance. We sent out these

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patrols and during the course of the operation four of the men, including Lieutenant Cormier a French reserve officer, ran into an S-mine and were wounded. Lieutenant Cormier was very severely wounded.

After completing these patrols we were asked to move our men, who number approximately 115, south to occupy positions along the east bank of the river Rances. We were to establish outposts there, send out patrols and prevent any German infiltration across the river from the west of the bank, while the 83rd Division attacked towards Dinard from the south. We moved our men in position keeping in close liaison with the 329th Infantry. However shortly after we learned that progress on the west bank had been unexpectedly rapid and there was no longer any need for a covering force on the east bank. The only remaining position was at the citadel of St. Malo which position was being attacked by advanced columns of the 83rd Division. General Farenbaugh thanked us for the work he had done and agreed that we should send back the men to their homes.

Feeling that our work in Ille et Vilaine was terminated, we communicated with London accordingly. We then contacted the British 2nd Army near Vire and they arranged for our dispatch home on board an LCI.

Conclusion

Unfortunately we were never really able to accomplish our mission as contemplated. I think we were able to render valuable service to the 6th Armored Division and to the 83rd Infantry Division, but this was not in line with our mission. The reasons we were unable to accomplish our mission are the following:

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1. We were dropped approximately 70 miles away from the area where we were to work although we could have been dropped in the actual department or in the Cote du Nord at a field closer to our area.

2. We were sent out without any contacts and the BOA were unable to establish any for us. Also we had no information whatsoever either at the briefing nor could the BOA in the field give us any. Nor could they provide us with civilian clothes or false papers.

There were contacts with Ille et Vilaine but we had to make these ourselves with the FTP. In addition the work that we had to do in establishing contact and trying to organize resistance in that area could have been done by agents and not by a Jedburgh team operating in uniform.

It was only two days before our return to England that Major Jeanclaude was able to contact Major Adam, leader of the FFI in Ille et Vilaine and he gave Major Adam a report on our work. This meeting took place in Rennes.

In Ille et Vilaine the resistance groups worked very effectively. They took over 1400 prisoners and destroyed over 100 trucks. The assistance given the 6th Armored Division and the 83rd Infantry Division was very much appreciated by the commanding officers and their staffs. It was only resistance groups that fought.

As regards the radio, the two operators report that occasionally they worked with operators at the home station who were rather mediocre and not aware of our difficulties. During certain skeds it was impossible to work because of interference. The two operators say that on the whole the operators of 53 worked very well.

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Personal Note by Captain Dreux

I cannot close this report without a word of praise for the work done by Major Jeanclaude and Captain Dthomas. They did excellent work under very difficult conditions and at great personal risk. They were at their best when the going was toughest. I particularly want to stress the work of Major Jeanclaude. It has been my privilege to work with and under some exceedingly fine officers but, in my opinion, he tops them all.

Financial Statement for Teams Gavin and Guy

Received -----	500,000 Frs
Expenses	
Groupe de Combourg -----	40,000
Groupe d'Evran -----	50,000
Groupe de Saint Pierre -----	15,000
Groupe de Saint Dominic -----	5,000
Groupe de Saint Meloir -----	10,000
Groupe de Vieux-Vy -----	2,000
Groupe de Cancale -----	10,000
Groupe de Saint Coulomb -----	5,000
BOA Mayenne -----	23,000
Total -----	160,000
Unaccounted -----	4,000
Returned -----	336,000
	500,000 Frs

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By *[signature]* NARA, Date 9/5/89

MILITARY SUPPORT MISSIONS

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FIGURE 36


By SD/EO NARA. Date 9/5/89

SCALE 1:2,000,000 OR 40.5 MILES TO 1 INCH


MPH	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100	110	120	130	140	150	160	170	180	190	200	210	220	230	240	250	260	270	280	290	300	310	320	330	340	350	360	370	380	390	400	410	420	430	440	450	460	470	480	490	500	510	520	530	540	550	560	570	580	590	600	610	620	630	640	650	660	670	680	690	700	710	720	730	740	750	760	770	780	790	800	810	820	830	840	850	860	870	880	890	900	910	920	930	940	950	960	970	980	990	1000	1010	1020	1030	1040	1050	1060	1070	1080	1090	1100	1110	1120	1130	1140	1150	1160	1170	1180	1190	1200	1210	1220	1230	1240	1250	1260	1270	1280	1290	1300	1310	1320	1330	1340	1350	1360	1370	1380	1390	1400	1410	1420	1430	1440	1450	1460	1470	1480	1490	1500	1510	1520	1530	1540	1550	1560	1570	1580	1590	1600	1610	1620	1630	1640	1650	1660	1670	1680	1690	1700	1710	1720	1730	1740	1750	1760	1770	1780	1790	1800	1810	1820	1830	1840	1850	1860	1870	1880	1890	1900	1910	1920	1930	1940	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010	2020	2030	2040	2050	2060	2070	2080	2090	2100	2110	2120	2130	2140	2150	2160	2170	2180	2190	2200	2210	2220	2230	2240	2250	2260	2270	2280	2290	2300	2310	2320	2330	2340	2350	2360	2370	2380	2390	2400	2410	2420	2430	2440	2450	2460	2470	2480	2490	2500	2510	2520	2530	2540	2550	2560	2570	2580	2590	2600	2610	2620	2630	2640	2650	2660	2670	2680	2690	2700	2710	2720	2730	2740	2750	2760	2770	2780	2790	2800	2810	2820	2830	2840	2850	2860	2870	2880	2890	2900	2910	2920	2930	2940	2950	2960	2970	2980	2990	3000	3010	3020	3030	3040	3050	3060	3070	3080	3090	3100	3110	3120	3130	3140	3150	3160	3170	3180	3190	3200	3210	3220	3230	3240	3250	3260	3270	3280	3290	3300	3310	3320	3330	3340	3350	3360	3370	3380	3390	3400	3410	3420	3430	3440	3450	3460	3470	3480	3490	3500	3510	3520	3530	3540	3550	3560	3570	3580	3590	3600	3610	3620	3630	3640	3650	3660	3670	3680	3690	3700	3710	3720	3730	3740	3750	3760	3770	3780	3790	3800	3810	3820	3830	3840	3850	3860	3870	3880	3890	3900	3910	3920	3930	3940	3950	3960	3970	3980	3990	4000	4010	4020	4030	4040	4050	4060	4070	4080	4090	4100	4110	4120	4130	4140	4150	4160	4170	4180	4190	4200	4
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AS OF 18-7-44

●- SPECIAL MISSIONS



By J. L. NARA Date 4/5/89



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By *AD* NARA Date 9/5/89

Operations, Team Harold

TEAM HAROLD

Jedburgh team Harold was the fourteenth Jedburgh team to be dispatched to France from the United Kingdom.

Members of Team

The members of team Harold were:

- (Major V. E. Whitty) (British), code name "Ross"
- (Lieutenant P. Rimbaut) (French), code name "Tyrone"
- (Sergeant H. Verlander) (British), code name "Sligo"

Area to Which Dispatched

Team Harold was dispatched on 15/16 July to the Vendee region of France.

Purpose of the Mission

SAS had received permission from SHAEF to dispatch 2 SAS officers to the Vendee area for the purpose of establishing a small base which would later be reinforced by SAS troops. Jedburgh team Harold was dispatched with this operation, known as Dickens ~~(1095)~~, to assist in establishing this base and calling up and arming a small group of FFI in the region.

Method of Dropping and Reception Committee

The group was to be dropped to a non-moon bonfire reception if this could be arranged. Otherwise they would be dropped blind near Cholet.

Scale of Air Support Likely

The resupplying of this group was to be handled by SAS, but Jedburgh Harold was advised to limit the recruiting of FFI members since this was not an area which could hold out if developed with large arms deliveries.

Communications

The team took one Jedburgh W/T set and one spare receiver with it and was advised to establish contact with the Home

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Station as soon as possible after arriving in the field.

Finance

Each Jedburgh officer took 100,000 French francs and 50 American dollars. The W/T operator took 50,000 French francs and 50 American dollars.

Relations with Other Allied Units

Special Airborne Services. The team was being dispatched with an SAS group with whom they would work very closely, but they remained under the command of EMFFI headquarters.

Allied Forces, If Overrun. When overrun by Allied forces the team was instructed to report to the headquarters of the nearest Allied unit and ask for the intelligence officer. They would give no details of their work to him but merely ask him to forward them to the nearest SF Staff, who would identify them and pass them back so SFHQ in London.

Action

Upon Arrival in the Field. The team was to give all assistance possible to SAS in establishing their base. Also they were to assist SAS in cutting the railway lines from Niort to Nantes. Lastly, they were to organize small groups of FFI to assist them in carrying out their mission. As soon as they arrived they were to report to headquarters on the organization, strength and arms state of the FFI in the Vendee region.

If Withdrawal Should Become Necessary. If the team should at any time find its position untenable in the Vendee area due to enemy action they would withdraw with their groups to the Charente area to the east, which Jedburgh team Ian (1096) was operating.

If Captured. The team took no cover story with it to the

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field, so if taken prisoner they would be taken as soldiers in uniform performing ordinary military duties. Every established law of warfare would apply to them. Therefore, they would give their name, rank and serial number only.

Information Provided to Team

The following information was provided to the team before it was dispatched to the field:

1. Topography on the Vendee area.
2. Enemy order of battle.
3. Resistance elements in the Vendee area.

First Word from Field

Word of team Harold's safe arrival in the field was received in the following W/T message from the SAS troops dated 16 July: "Jedburgh team and two officers from 3 French Battalion dropped at 8490 west of Parthenay night 15/16."

Summary of W/T Messages Exchanged

23 July From Harold (1097)

"Set and all equipment destroyed. Send new set as soon as possible to ground R01."

26 July From SFHQ to Harold (1098)

"Remainder of Dickens party land tonight at Le Bois D'Anjou. Contact them as soon as possible. When we know you are in contact with them we shall send you W/T equipment."

4 August From Harold (1099)

"Set and all equipment destroyed when landing. Parachute of containers did not open."

5 August From SFHQ to Harold (1100)

"Delighted hear from you at last. On receipt of pinpoint will send radio equipment and stores. State number of people to arm, their and your location, your contacts."

7 August From Harold (1101)

"Set received. Do not understand why it was dropped

(1097) C-851 23 Jul 44
 (1099) C-998/4 4 Aug 44
 (1101) C-1165/14 7 Aug 44

(1098) C-6008 26 Jul 44
 (1100) C-6139 5 Aug 44

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40 miles away from me without warning. Have contacted resistance chief of 5 departments, also resistance groups formed in areas already waiting further orders. Some successful operations carried out."

7 August From SFHQ to Harold (1102)

"Remind you that if you require help can send you Jedburgh teams. Give us grounds for their reception and arrange necessary contacts for them. Send at once grounds for arms deliveries and indicate number of men deliveries to each ground can arm."

9 August From Harold (1103)

"Departments controlled by chief contacted area Deux Sevres, Vendee, La Vienne, Maine et Loire, Loire Inferieure. Two parties here FFI and FTP. Am trying to merge them into one. Too much talk at present."

10 August From SFHQ to Harold (1104)

"Your ground near Secondigny accepted. Will dispatch Jedburgh to you tomorrow. Will add number of aircraft after message."

11 August From Harold (1105)

"Okay good show. Send as many Bren guns and ammunition as you can, also explosives and medical supplies but not another team. SAS in Foret Danjou attacked by 1000 Boche. Casualties at present not given."

12 August From Harold (1106)

"Containers safely received, also equipment. Advised you not to send another team because of Boche attack. Ambushed convoy, killed 30 Boche, destroyed 8 vehicles."

13 August From SFHQ to Harold (1107)

"Owing number of FFI to be urgently armed we have decided to send Jed team Tony in spite of your cable. Want at all cost hinder withdrawal of German troops in the southwest. Tell us at once if it is possible to parachute Tony tomorrow night on new ground given in your 10th."

15 August From Harold (1108)

"Pauline is okay. Please explain where you want team to go as I have nothing for them to do here. Suggest Vendee very useful there."

15 August From SFHQ to Harold (1109)

"Please pass following message Chefs FFI your region. At the request of 3rd American Army General Koenig orders

(1102) C-490 7 Aug 44
(1104) C-804 10 Aug 44
(1106) C-1559/93 12 Aug 44
(1108) C-1716/49 15 Aug 44

(1103) C-1279/20 9 Aug 44
(1105) C-1444/56 11 Aug 44
(1107) C-1162 13 Aug 44
(1109) C-1373 15 Aug 44

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FFI to supply active patrols along following roads -
 Nantes-Nozay-Blain-Redon and Blain-Nort-Ancenis."

16 August From Harold (1110)

"Have moved headquarters situated in area of Fenioux.
 Harassing Boche everywhere but require urgently arms on
 all grounds."

16 August From SFHQ to Harold (1111)

"Expect Jedburgh Tony from tomorrow night on Pauline.
 Tony will work in Vendee. Will you arrange all necessary
 contacts for him. General Bordeaux region very penetrat-
 ed by Gestapo. As this general may be compromised we or-
 der you to cut all contact with him and those who put you
 in touch with him. This is an order."

17 August From SFHQ to Harold (1112)

"Have warned you to beware resistance elements Bor-
 deaux as these have been penetrated by Gestapo. Are mak-
 ing enquiries regarding security of Moraglia and Triangle.
 Will let you know result soon as possible."

18 August From Harold (1113)

"Jed team, all containers received safely. Why did
 you not send valves as requested. Have no spares. Using
 one borrowed and owner wants it back. Why do you ignore
 all our requests."

19 August From SFHQ to Harold (1114)

"Have received official nomination Colonel Moraglia
 Chief FFI region Ebernard. You can work in safety with
 Moraglia and Triangle. Advise Tony."

19 August From Harold (1115)

"Ten trains about to leave St. Rochelle for Poitiers
 via Miort. Destroyed only crane in area big enough to
 move locos. Big convoys daily from Bordeaux to Miort and
 Poitiers. Tell RAF. Beg you send us equipment urgently.
 Can do terrific damage."

20 August From Harold (1116)

"Acknowledge receipt of messages giving position of
 Boche division and troop trains and convoys. Boche des-
 troying dumps all round us."

20 August From Harold in Vendee (1117)

"Another team Caesar has arrived here from La Vienne
 to take over from me. Is this on your orders. They can
 get arms etc. in 48 hours. Chiefs of FFI now pass all
 messages by them. I am discredited because my messages

(1110) C-1849/21 16 Aug 44
 (1112) C-1537 17 Aug 44
 (1114) C-1840 19 Aug 44
 (1116) C-222/67 20 Aug 44

(1111) C-1431 16 Aug 44
 (1113) C-2036/53 18 Aug 44
 (1115) C-2145/26 19 Aug 44
 (1117) C-2329/89 20 Aug 44

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to you produce no results not even answers. SAS get supplies, Caesar gets supplies, I get nothing not even an answer. Have 3000 trained men and no arms. Have given you 9 grounds. 9 aircraft on each tomorrow night if work to be successful. Also SAS have been ordered to organize Vendee resistance."

25 August From Harold (1118)

"Glad to know we may get supplied soon. Have derailed train at Parthenay. Many Boche killed but lacked guns to do job completely. This is main escape route for Huns. Give me guns quickly and none will escape. Raided dump and took 40 tons of food stuffs. Blew up Hun lorries. Good show."

25 August From Harold (1119)

"Department being flooded by Huns. Hostages taken, villages shot up to ensure safe passage for convoys. 10,000 Huns in Vendee. Half by the sea, half between Nantes, Angers Hq at St. Michelle near Fontenay. Enter here soon. SS Division at Thouars. If you don't send arms soon it will be too late."

26 August From Harold (1120)

"Between 40 and 60 thousand Huns with 250 tanks assembling in area Thouars, Cholet, Loudun to attempt break through shortly."

27 August From Harold (1121)

"Had conference with Prefet of Department and all chiefs. They wish me to send you the following: first, instruct Colonel Bernard not to send his men into this department from La Vienne; second, instruct SAS to curtail activities of 2 officers Poisson and Fournier who are causing much trouble by interfering with partisans; third, request immediate delivery of 800 Brens, 2500 Stens, 2500 rifles, 80 piats ammo grenades and petrol."

29 August From Harold (1122)

"Have just received this message from Chief of department that work of organization is useless. Reason as follows - I asked you for arms. First you ignore my requests, then you send me four planes full of medical supplies and bullets and not a single gun of any sort. Operation fixed for tonight had to be cancelled. You have endangered all our lives and made me a fool. Name Jedburgh mud. Do you think we fight with bandages."

31 August From SFHQ to Harold (1123)

"Are looking into question of stores sent to you and will revert. Are considering sending stores for you by sea on coast of Vendee. This is only means of supply

(1118) C-2653/16 25 Aug 44
(1120) C-2842/18 26 Aug 44
(1122) C-3175/19 29 Aug 44

(1119) C-2778/8 25 Aug 44
(1121) C-2990/21 27 Aug 44
(1123) C-4101 31 Aug 44

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as aircraft have been diverted elsewhere. Confirm if you could receive material by this means. Necessary instructions have been given to SAS. Are also passing message to Colonel Bernard."

31 August From Harold (1124)

"For no reason Huns shot up town of Ruffec publicly killing Major Bernier together officers and 2 soldiers. Huns commanded by Lieutenant Stephan and NCOs Halmseippel and Sultan Khan, all of the 13th Indian Inf Coy. For BBC. Huns by occupying Les Sables Dolonne they hold Rochefort and La Rochelle solidly. We have seized Niort but doubt ability to hold it owing to lack of arms."

1 September From Harold (1125)

"Huns increasing daily here. Movement very restricted for us. 12,000 Huns coming south from Thouars. Not feasible to fetch stores from Vendee."

2 September From Harold (1126)

"Re General Morraglia - you found he was all right and passed a message to that effect. Now rumor arises that he is traitor condemned to death. Rumor originates from most troublesome type named Samuel in Lavienne who intrigues politically and aims to split parties. I think he is SAS. We had also welded FTP and FFI into one. Now FTP commanded by communists are trying to break away using this rumor as weapon as Colonel of Department was appointed by Morraglia. Please treat as urgent and deny using same BBC phrase as before and give Samuel bowler hat."

3 September From SFHQ to Harold (1127)

"Emphasize most strongly Samuel is one of our most experienced and most trusted officers who has our entire confidence. If position Moraglia affects your own work you must consult Triangle who is DMR your region. He can give you information subsequent to our telegram of 19 August. Will try mount Hudson or Dakota on your ground south of Perigne as soon as we have necessary aircraft. In meantime are mounting sea operation end of next week. This must be shared by you and Tony as in view high priority air operations elsewhere in France cannot do parachute operations your area. Are you in contact with Tony. He is arranging beach and will give you all details."

5 September From SFHQ to Harold (1128)

"Tony informs us he hopes contact you today. Should he miss you contact him through David who is Chef FFI of Vendee. Mounting sea operation to Les Sables D'Olonne from Wednesday 12th September. Operation bringing arms and material for you and Tony. Tony has all details. Keep in touch with him."

(1124) C-3444/90 31 Aug 44
(1126) C-3612/55 2 Sep 44
(1128) C-6475 5 Sep 44

(1125) C-3570/19 1 Sep 44
(1127) C-6450 3 Sep 44

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Operations, Team Harold (Cont'd)5 September From Harold (1129)

"Please give me authority to deal with Samuel, Bernard, etc. who are intriguing with communists and causing great mischief. FTP directed by communists are breaking away from FFI and Samuel who is their tool. Proposes to set up government under Bernard to control Deux Sevree, Vendee, and La Vienne. Men of FTP willing to cooperate with FFI but their chiefs and powers like Samuel and Bernard causing trouble. Essential get General Koenig to authorize FFI party directed by Bordeaux instead of communists from La Vienne."

5 September From Harold (1130)

"Received deputation from Charente, Vendee, Maine and Loire, also from Triangle. Necessity for unity of command essential. Some recognize Triangle, some Moraglia, some nobody. They have asked me to clarify position and to obtain arms for them. Can now receive by sea, also on north aerodrome on which I have men working. With your sanction propose to coordinate all these departments and administer them. This seems to be their wish. Still Huns about. Need for arms still urgent, also a cashier with funds to administer financial side."

7 September From Harold (1131)

"Sorry about Samuel. Have not met him yet but had to back up my chiefs who complained to me about him. They do not like having orders from him nor his proposed government which I suppose is sanctioned by you. If so we shall have 4 regional chiefs - Triangle, Moraglia, Ledoux and Samuel, each with his own following. Niort aerodrome ready to receive squadron or more of fortresses."

7 September From Harold (1132)

"Adoiras at La Rochelle with 4 or 5 thousand men. Will surrender to Allied force but not to FFI. Certain amount of armor there also. 4000 Huns area of Royan. We shot up convoy near Niort, captured vehicles and prisoners. Tell Austin to go back to Dordogne and control his maquis, some of whom are acting like bandits here."

7 September From SFHQ to Harold (1133)

"Description Samuel's activities quite inconsistent with Samuel we know and described to you. There may be two Samuels. Send us fuller particulars and also investigate carefully course of rumors which do not apply to Samuel we know. We have cabled Samuel asking if he can clarify situation. Have no information here on Captain Luoet from Charente."

8 September From Harold (1134)

"30,000 Huns area St Nazaire ready to attack direction unknown. 10,000 more regrouped between Poitiers and Chateauroux ready to attack probably direction Tours."

(1129) C-3876/21 5 Sep 44
 (1131) C-4083/33 7 Sep 44
 (1133) C-394 7 Sep 44

(1130) C-3971/14 5 Sep 44
 (1132) C-4125 7 Sep 44
 (1134) C-4195/15 8 Sep 44

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Operations, Team Harold (Cont'd)9 September From SFHQ to Harold (1135)

"Mounting sea operation to Les Sables D'Olonne from tomorrow Sunday. Ship will arrive about midnight and will unload at first light Monday morning. Will bring 15 junior French officers for you and Tony to help with training your groups."

13 September From Harold (1136)

"Stores safely received from ship - very happy. Now can you give us petrol. This is very urgent as we are sending strong forces into Vendee and Charente to block Huns in La Rochelle."

16 September From Harold (1137)

"Contacted Triangle who is area Chiumoffe. Why then do you appoint another Chief Bernard who is useless. Region would now be working smoothly if it were not for the adventurers from La Vienne like Bernard and Blondel who are incompetent and disloyal and sponsored, I regret to say, by Samuel - your Samuel."

20 September From Harold (1138)

"Have formed 3 battalions of 800 men each - 2 already in barracks, 1 for regular Army the others for duties locally and in Vendee. Cannot arm 3rd battalion unless you can send stores quickly also petrol. Very urgent we are almost as a stand still. Situation improving but much work to be done. Very interesting."

29 September From Harold (1139)

"La Rochelle being reinforced garrison about 20,000. 15 tanks arrived there by sea yesterday. Boche becoming more aggressive."

1 October From Harold (1140)

"Stores received by boat but very limited quantity and no petrol. Cannot you send me 2 Hudsons to Niort like the SAS had recently. Huns sending troops from Royan and Rochefort into La Rochelle by road and boat. Attacked and shot up petrol area Mauze. Huns in civvies infiltrating into department. Captured 8 recently."

2 October From Harold (1141)

"Sending you complete plans of La Rochelle by plane. 4000 Huns entered town from Pornic. Are now entrenched on La Pallice German Hq at Chateau Baraize near Aytres. 17 Ack ack guns brought in from Saleu and 4 more from St Maurice. We have petrol for 3 days more only. Situation critical."

(1135) C-756 9 Sep 44
 (1137) C-29/22 16 Sep 44
 (1139) C-1017/24 29 Sep 44
 (1141) C-1203/85 2 Oct 44

(1136) C-4722/95 13 Sep 44
 (1138) C-369/36 20 Sep 44
 (1140) C-1155 1 Oct 44

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"Notices in La Rochelle warning civilians to leave town as food situation critical. Huns also short of food. They will probably try to retake Surgeres and Rochefort to improve supplies."

8 October From Harold (1143)

"Thank you for your efforts re aircraft. Good show, bad weather but hope for better conditions soon. Send arms as well as petrol. If you can, also send uniforms. Very cold here. Huns likely to attack to link up with their troops at Royan. Probably surge Mestor for reason of food supplies. They now send out patrols 1000 strong. Two submarines arrived from Marseilles making total of six now in La Pallice. Estimate that of the recent regiments 5000 came from St. Nazarre and about half that number from Pt Degraives."

10 October From Harold (1144)

"Greatly disappointed you do not understand urgency of situation here. In La Rochelle are 20,000 Huns with eighty tanks of which 6 are Tigers from Goering Division near Bordeaux. Against them are about 9000 French badly armed and poorly clad with nothing but their courage to keep them going."

11 October From Harold (1145)

"Protest most strongly against this treatment. Mission Shinoile has ordered me not to interest myself any more in La Rochelle sector and has sent Jed team Frank here to replace me and take my wireless set. He has also ordered 15 planes on Niort airfield with supplies for Adeline. What have I done to deserve this and why must I take orders from Shinoile and Captain Isaacs. Demand immediate explanation."

11 October From Soud Ouest to Harold (1146)

"Present allocation of arms was sent by sea. We have since sent you petrol and are sending 2 more planes of petrol. There are no more arms available for you at present but hope send you more later. You will not hand over W/T equipment to Frank who is to work through Shinoile. Shinoile has been told you are not under his orders but cooperation is expected from you both."

12 October From Soud Ouest to Harold (1147)

"Have now learned that Hudson loads of heavy arms were handed over to you by pilot. These arms were not intended for you and we repeat petrol only being sent you at present. If you have not yet handed over these arms to Eminence you will do so forthwith. Remind you good relations are of vital importance at present stage. If you cannot work harmoniously with Shinoile and Eminence, you will have to be withdrawn."

(1142) C-1283/59 3 Oct 44
 (1144) A-441/55 10 Oct 44
 (1146) Number 35 11 Oct 44

(1143) A-414/89 8 Oct 44
 (1145) A-447/28 11 Oct 44
 (1147) Number 36 12 Oct 44

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13 October From Harold (1148)

"Your information about Hudson loads of heavy arms quite incorrect. Suggest you make sure of your facts before accusing. Your reprimand about lack of cooperation most unfair. Shinoile has his agents here who meet all planes. Because the transport arrangements devolve upon me that does not mean I steal other people's arms."

14 October From Yalelock to Watermark (1149)

"Lieutenant Rayon who we believe to be an SIS agent has returned here enroute to rejoin Jed Harold with Ordrede mission from Gallimand but no British credentials. Le Jeune is away and no one at Invalides knows anything. SIS disinterested needless to say. Am I authorized to help him on his way. Believe Carleton Smith may be partially in picture. Reply urgently."

18 October From SFHQ to Harold (1150)

"All Jeds in SW France. Starting 18 October General Delarminat newly designated commander of French forces for operations against Germans on the west coast. Will make an inspection tour. Give him complete cooperation and report to him."

20 October From SFHQ to Harold (1151)

"Sorry not able to send Jed set and code to Frank. Furthermore at the briefing they were told not to work directly with us but through Mission Shinoile. Will do our best to supply arms, clothes requested with further ops. Waiting impatiently for news from Rochefort. Good show."

25 October From Harold (1152)

"Have returned from Rochefort. Naval Officer Borden sen commanding Harbor police at La Rochelle. Entered Rochefort recently. He is in liaison with a group of FTP at Surgeres Povoides as Spaniard. Klassen, Chief of Boche secret service also entered Rochefort as a Belgian speaking excellent French. Several German agents in Rochefort equipped with false identity cards and usually speaking fluent Spanish. Senior French officer commanding depot at Rochefort very suspicious as he recently reinforced the French telephone line to La Rocherie which is connected to the main Nantes-Bordeaux line. There are 6 other points of leakage which I am blocking. Will arrest whole gang when rounded up. Armored again accompanied by four tanks left La Rochelle Monday via Aytres and St. Pierre. There are three armored trains in La Rochelle station armed with 88s and heavy machine guns."

6 November From SFHQ to Harold (1153)

"Following instructions from General de Larminat."

(1148) A-487/40 13 Oct 44	(1149) C-1842/2 14 Oct 44
(1150) A-479 18 Oct 44	(1151) A-550 20 Oct 44
(1152) A-709/14 25 Oct 44	(1153) A-1360 6 Nov 44

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All American and British Jedburgh officers and all radios must prepare to return to London immediately. Final orders for return will be sent upon receipt of route from SHAEF. Possibility all personnel may have to report to 6th Army group for interrogation. French officers alone are to stay disposal of General de Larminat. Colonel Carleton Smith leaving this week to contact French officer for briefing."

7 November From SFHQ to Harold (1154)

"Major Whitty to report immediately for interrogation on Niort situation to G-3 Hq, 6th Army Group at Vittel. Then return to London via Major Hamilton, Hotel Cecil, Paris. Sergeant Verlander and Lieutenant Isaac and Sergeant Heeney to report now to Major Hamilton to be returned to London. All above personnel to proceed immediately. W/T should be brought back."

From Report of Team Upon Return from the Field - 15 July to 7 Nov

Mission

Team Harold was to act as link for the SAS with their organization in England and transmit their messages for them; to aid them as much as possible; to organize and arm the units of local resistance in the region; to cut all the railway lines and communications north and south - Nantes to Poitiers.

Summary of Events by Date

16 July. We set out at 2230 hours from Fairford for the area Vendee/Deux Sevres accompanied by two SAS officers, Captain Burt and Lieutenant Poisson. The exact spot chosen for the dropping was the forest of Labsie on the borders of the two departments.

17 July. At 0130 hours we jumped from our Sterling bomber, having been informed that we were over our exact dropping zone, in the following order: Poisson, Burt, Rim-baut, Verlander and Whitty. This was a blind drop from a height of about 100 meters, but the whole group landed safely. [We had no information about the country and no

(1154) A-1413 7 Nov 44

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one was there to meet us. Dropping last, Major Whitty was surprised to see a light immediately below him.. Half a minute later he found himself in the yard of a bakery, in the middle of a village.] The navigator of the plane had made a mistake in his calculations - we were twenty miles northeast of our correct dropping zone. [His companions had dropped in the fields on the outskirts of the village and were all right. Our packets were dropped on a signal from Major Whitty, but the parachutes of two failed to open. One crashed on a tree, the other on the roof of the bakery. Wireless, kit, clothes, equipment etc. were smashed or lost. Lieutenant Rimbaut and Major Whitty spent one hour of fruitless search in the village for the missing packet (the one on the bakery roof). The Boche were in the village at the time so we buried all the parachutes and started to march southwest by compass, though at this time we had little idea of our exact position. At 5:00 in the morning we evaded a Boche patrol and hid in a field of corn. We stayed here for the remainder of the day. Our position was then one rucksack between three of us and no W/T set, clothes, or equipment. In the afternoon Lieutenant Rimbaut, the only one with civilian clothes and the proud possessor of the only rucksack, went into the nearest village and succeeded in establishing contact with a friendly farmer. His sons bought us something to eat, and in the evening gave us a guide and explained our bearings to us.]

18 July. We marched southwest that night and in the early morning came to a farm where we were hidden in a cowshed. Unfortunately, the guide, proud of what he had done, drank too much in the local cafe and started to talk. The

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result was that we were chased from our living place and had to take to the woods again. [Notwithstanding, we made a reception committee with the five of us, since we were now near the ground we had chosen for our dropping zone. No planes came, however, despite the fact that the SAS officers stated that they expected their own men on that very ground.

19 July. We were contacted by another man, also a member of the local resistance, who said the Gestapo were alerted and looking for us because of the talk of our former guide. We marched again that night but managed to stage another reception committee, which was also fruitless.]

20 July. [We were introduced to two more resistance members by name, Michonneau and Goujeard, who later became our devoted friends. Michonneau was captain of the group of Absie, and Goujeard his lieutenant. We marched that night to the forest of Labsie, our original goal, which was six kilometers from our intended dropping zone.

21 July. We passed our first message by means of Lieutenant Goujeard who rode through the German lines on his bicycle with the encoded message in his pocket to be passed by Samuel's ~~(1155)~~ post in La Vienne. The message requested that a new set be sent, gave coordinates of the landing ground and the BBC phrase "Le roi est au parc bleu", thus indicating that we could at least listen to the BBC. Goujeard was a local electrician of Labsie and gave us a set. We made our camp in the wood and organized a reception committee every night. Several planes came but none for us.]

22 - 30 July. [We passed three other messages requesting a set and supplies and eagerly listened for the BBC phrase. It never came - nor did the set.

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Captain Burt, SAS, fell ill and had to stay in bed, so we evacuated him to the house of Goujeard's sister where he was well cared for, at great risk to her. We were by now getting to know other members of resistance groups, including the head of the FTP party, Michel, and a Colonel Ledoux, who stated he was in charge of the resistance of five departments. Actually, we found out later that he was merely an FTP political agent, or communist, responsible for organizing the FTP in five departments. He was never trusted by us - nor was Michel, who by later events proved untrustworthy.

Towards the end of this period, about the 30th, we were given civilian clothes and false identity cards. Lieutenant Rimbaut and Major Whitty purchased bicycles and were thus able to circulate in the open during the day and to attend conferences held by Ledoux and Michel, because for a time they were believed to be the real leaders of the only resistance group in the area. These conferences also enabled us to contact dissenters, who introduced us to other leaders of other groups. Thus we found out that Ledoux and Michel were nothing but communist agents, taking everything we parachuted and some from Samuel for themselves to arm the communist section. The FFI as a whole were not armed at all, since the communists took the lot. With this knowledge we then took charge of all goods parachuted and distributed them to the FFI or AS, as opposed to the communists. By this means we discovered Chaumette and armed his men, who had previously received nothing. We called a meeting later of the prefet, the president of the committee of liberation,

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Chaumette and Michel. We announced our policy of refusing to arm the communist party unless they acknowledged Chaumette as leader and became FFI instead of a purely local organization.

30 July - 6 August. During this period ~~also~~ we examined and chose nine different grounds for receiving supplies. We also organized a motorized group or "flying squad" for rapid action. With this group we had several encounters with Boche convoys and shot up two patrols near Bressuir - Parthenay.

On 3 August at night we entered St. Maixent in civilian clothes, proceeding from the fields where we had been hiding. We had local people as guides. Five sentries were posted on the road leading to the station, so a party of five was sent forward to reconnoitre and dispose of the guards. Actually as it turned out, the station was practically deserted with no organized patrols or guards. But it must be remembered that practically no resistance had been shown in this area prior to our arrival owing to lack of supplies and organization. Consequently, at that time the Huns were lulled into a sense of security. In a few weeks they changed their attitude considerably.

[The operation was an exact model of one conducted while training at Milton Hall.] The approach to the power house and pump was [therefore] very easy and the charges were placed in the orthodox way without interruption. The power house, water pump, and station installations were all blown up.

[We still had received no wireless set and no BBC phrase acknowledging receipt of our messages so we were getting very worried.]

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5 August. We cut the railway line Niort - Poitiers and derailed the train. [Also, we machine gunned the survivors but were too weak to do much damage. The place chosen for this was one of those delightful villages in French Correz where the line traverses the road. One side of the road was banked high with trees and bushes, but unfortunately the other side was flat. The only obstacle was a canal or ditch. However, the main idea was to cut the line, not to make an ambush. Charges were placed some 150 meters from the corner described. - The impact was such that the line, including the curved rails (which are more difficult to replace), was torn up for a considerable distance and the train was derailed and spread across it and the road. Boche casualties were 11 dead and 35 wounded.] The line was out of operation for two days. We were pursued by the Boche with dogs, but luckily the wood was too big to be searched by a small party. After this we decided to lay low for a time, but Poisson, an SAS officer, left us for Bois d'Anjou where he hoped to find some of his men.

[7 August. At long last our new W/T set arrived. It had been dropped forty miles away from us with supplies for the SAS, one of whom brought it to us. No BBC phrase was ever heard. However, no spare valves or parts were sent, and no food or rucksacks.]

11 August. We received our first parachutage which was most satisfactory, although the percentage of gas capes sent was rather high, especially since we needed more Brens. We had to refuse to receive another Jedburgh team because of Boche activity. The wood was surrounded by 1,000 Boche, 80 of whom were killed and 87 wounded. There were patrols

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along all main roads so movement was very difficult.

12 August. We ambushed a convoy near Parthenay, destroying 8 vehicles and killing 30 Boche. [This was done through the cooperation of the group from Parthenay and the flying squad from Secondigny. A small Boche convoy directed on Poitiers was arrested by the simple process of having trees felled across the road and shooting up the convoy from the side. Some vehicles escaped but were chased by the flying squad, which shot up two.]

15 August. Our second satisfactory parachutage was received. Also, we received Jedburgh team Tony (1156), whom we later dispatched to the Vendee. We were now forced to move our headquarters further south owing to Boche activity.

We were visited by Colonel Moraglia from Bordeaux who asked us to pass a message to General Koenig for him accrediting him as our area commander. At this time there was another area commander, Triangle, but we received a reply to our message accrediting Colonel Moraglia.

16 August. Contacted Chaumette, head of the FFI, and decided to support him.

21 August. We received the information that ten trains were about to leave La Rochelle for Poitiers, so we cut the line in five places and destroyed the only crane in the area big enough to move a locomotive. One train was derailed and five days ^{were} ~~was~~ required for repairs to the line. [By this time a highly efficient information service had been organized and this information was passed to the groups operating in the south of the department.]

24 August. We derailed a train at Parthenay by spragging the points of the lines. The operation was very simple and

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perhaps more effective than explosives. We also raided a Boche dump and took forty tons of foodstuffs. [The Huns were about to move south at this time and were starting to move their supply dumps. Some stores were already loaded on trucks. These were driven away by the group from Parthenay.]

27 August. Received eight planes full of bandages, web equipment, haversacks and socks.

31 August. At this time the Huns start^{ed} reprisals. They shot up the town of Ruffec and publicly executed six officers and 2 NCOs. We assembled in force and seized the town of Niort, driving out the Huns. Later, however, we were forced to withdraw due to lack of arms. The general movement of the Boche was in the direction of Poitiers but a skeleton headquarters and administrative posts were left at Niort.

1 September. 12,000 Boche from Thouars started infiltrating south. Movement by road was very difficult so we began to consider the possibility of getting stores via the Vendee.

2 September. The local Maquis of Labsie, directed by the SAS, shot up a German ambulance, killing three Boche. [The SAS have seriously hindered our work by attempting to organize resistance groups themselves without being qualified to do so, or informing us.]

3 September. The Germans took reprisals on the town of Labsie for the shooting up of the ambulance. While shooting up the village, they were interrupted by our flying squad who^{ch} caused them to disperse.

12 September. Received stores from Les Sables d'Olonne

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by boat. We now have adequate forces so we sent off a force into Vendee against La Rochelle.

13 September. We took Bressuire and Parthenay and re-took and occupied Niort. The Maquis suffered 50 casualties but the enemy had double that number. We prepared the airdrome at Niort for Dakota operations, lifting mines and filling up holes.

18 September. We were now confronted with the problems of the FTP and FFI. With the departure of the Boche, the French became disorganized and disagreements arose. This was settled by reforming the 114th Infantry Regiment and including in it two companies of FTP and two companies of FFI. Instantly they forgot their differences and became French soldiers, irrespective of political creed.

20 September. Three battalions of 800 men each were in training in barracks.

6 October. We were warned for the fourth time that we could expect Dakotas on the Niort airdrome. For the fourth time we staged a reception committee, but again we were disappointed.

11 October. We were joined by team Frank (1157) with orders from Mission Shinoile for them to supplant us in the area. [We protested against this.]

20 October. Went to Rennes to ask the Americans for supplies. They gave us 5,000 gallons of gas and promised to give us a daily supply of food, clothes etc., if permission was secured from SHAEF. [This permission was not obtained so equipment was secured from General deLarminat.]

1 November. A report was received of leakage of information from Rochefort to La Rochelle. Upon investigating,

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some Boche in civilian clothes, disguised as Spaniards, were found. Consequently, we cut the branch line to La Rochelle.

10 November. Lieutenant-Colonel Carleton Smith arrived and preparations were made for departure to England. *(end here)*

14 December. Previously reported at Vichy but was recalled to Niort where we organized and formed a training school for our officers.

19 December. Returned to England.

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TEAM HORACE

Jedburgh team Horace was the fifteenth team to be dispatched to France from the United Kingdom.

Members of Team

The members of team Horace were:

Major J Summers, Cav, (US) ~~(1158)~~ code name "Wyoming"

(Lieutenant G Levalois (French), code name "Somme"

T/3 W Zielske (US), ~~(1159)~~ code name "Dime"

Area to Which Dispatched

Team Horace was dispatched on the night of 17/18 July to the Finistere area of France.

Background of Resistance in Area

SHAEF, working through EMFFI, planned the maximum use of resistance in Brittany in order to create the greatest possible diversion in the area. This would call for the fullest possible support of the resistance elements.

SAS had considerable personnel in Brittany in close contact with resistance forces. At this time two Jedburgh teams, Frederick ~~(1160)~~ and George, ~~(1161)~~ were working in Brittany. Jedburgh Giles ~~(1162)~~ had been operating in the Department of Finistere since 8 June. There were known to be very large resistance forces in Finistere.

First Word from Field

Team Horace announced its safe arrival in the field in the following W/T message dated 18 July ~~(1163)~~:

"Arrived safely with all containers and equipment. Contact established with Giles. No contact made yet with our partisan group. Moving to new positions our area tonight. Hilary okay but were unable to find radio. 3 Bretons okay."

(1158) War Diary Vol 11 p 588
(1160) p 33 this Vol
(1162) p 323 this Vol

(1159) War Diary Vol 11 p 628
(1161) p 39 this Vol
(1163) C-162/1 18 Jul 44

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Date 23 January 1979

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Operations, Team Horace (Cont'd)Summary of Messages Exchanged19 July From Horace (1164)

"From Hilary through Horace - All operational and personal equipment lost. Searching area. Situation in northeast unknown."

20 July From SFHQ to Horace (1165)

"Congratulate you on making rapid contact. For Hilary 'Are worried by disappearance of radio. Preparing replacement of your material and will send it to you by first operation'".

22 July From Horace (1166)

"Brest area difficult. Many leaders captured or driven south. Still unable to contact Berthaud. Will continue blind if cannot contact him by tomorrow. Urgent you give us contacts or agent between Brest and Morlaix."

25 July From Horace (1167)

"Am 5 miles northwest of Brest. Came 40 miles in wine barrel. Living in foxhole middle of Boche. Made contact 5,000 partisans in homes. No maquis."

25 July From Horace (1168)

"Further message from Horace requesting stores and a Jedburgh set."

25 July From SFHQ to Horace (1169)

"Are aware of difficulties in your sector. Cannot give you contacts between Brest and Morlaix. Try to find them first through the three officers who left with you and secondly through Berthaud with whom Giles is in contact."

26 July From SFHQ to Horace (1170)

"Your 5 of 25th most interesting. In which conditions do you intend to arm these 5,000 men? Have they already been contacted by other elements who come from London. Give us news about our three friends gone with you."

27 July From Horace (1171)

"Brest area well organized. Will arm by making small arms dumps over area. They have not been contacted by other elements from London. 3 Bretons put in contact with Berthaud, not seen since my 11 of 27th."

(1164) C-202/2 19 Jul 44
 (1166) C-315/3 22 Jul 44
 (1168) C-417/11 25 Jul 44
 (1170) C-6010 26 Jul 44

(1165) C-5958 20 Jul 44
 (1167) C-428/20 25 Jul 44
 (1169) C-6001 25 Jul 44
 (1171) C-513/29 27 Jul 44

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Operations, Team Horace (Cont'd)27 July From Horace (1172)

"Went 20 miles in wine barrel again. Truck had flat and Germans helped driver change wheel. Wow. Try to send several drop grounds Friday."

28 July From Horace (1173)

"Brest leader says can take Brest and save most of dock area from within if get arms. In few days I will request 300 walki-talki radios, 500 pistols with silencers, 3000 coulie incendiary, 303 ammo. This special equipment known as Wyoming supply. Can you supply and have ready on call. Will also request 2 Jeeps with MG mounts and MGS when this starts. How about it? Glider and drop grounds tomorrow."

31 July From Horace (1174)

"My opinion, if this show is still on arming Brest area important enough to risk planes. You must decide. Any ground this area has flak to approach. Grounds proposed far as possible from Flak. I have no way of transporting arms distance. Can only move containers by hiding in horse cart. Suggest you earnestly reconsider grounds refused and find a way to get planes."

1 August From Horace (1175)

"Our area Brest plus Plovescat. Hq is around Clio area but always moving. Area has about 5,000 all unarmed 2000 in Brest, 3,000 rest of area. Suggest Hilary work area of Morlaix. Tell us if you want us work area between Landivisiau and Morlaix."

1 August From SFHQ to Horace (1176)

"Bringing utmost pressure to bear get arms to ground in spite flak. Action to preserve port installations Brest highest priority. Detailed instructions follow. Arrange all possible contacts Brest so that you may be able to act when order is given shortly after receipt equipment."

2 August From SFHQ to Horace (1177)

"Allied advance now expected to be fast in your direction. You will coordinate all resistance west of the railway line Plouescat, Sizun road to Le Faou. Your main task will be to prevent enemy demolitions in the port of Brest. Greatest importance also attached to preservation of road Brest-Morlaix. You will prevent enemy carrying out demolition of road bridges, culverts, etc, on this road and on secondary roads in this area and especially Plougastel viaduct. Report what the Germans dispositions are to destroy this viaduct. Report

(1172) C-541/27 27 Jul 44
 (1174) C-711/50 31 Jul 44
 (1176) C-6092 1 Aug 44

(1173) C-586/31 28 Jul 44
 (1175) C-766/5 1 Aug 44
 (1177) C-4488, C-4487 2 Aug 44

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if you require for that or any other purpose SAS personnel or an operational group strength 15 men. If so how many and where can you receive them. Report any other requirements and prospects of success in above task."

2 August From SFHQ to Horace (1178)

"BBC action messages passed tonight. Urgent you remember these are signal for concentrated guerrilla activity but not for open warfare. Above passed to all Jedburghs in Brittany and SAS. Instead of road targets given you yesterday your highest priority targets is preservation of bridges, tunnels, viaducts and all other major works on railway line Lamballe-St Brieuc-Morlaix-Brest. We require send you tomorrow night 3/4 August party of 120 SAS whose task will be to stiffen your resistance groups and delay all enemy movements into and out of Brest and if possible preserve Morlaix and Plougastel viaducts. Will use Melpomene unless you prefer other point. Acknowledge and confirm."

2 August From Horace (1179)

"Postpone drop ground Uranie until further orders. Boche near."

3 August From Horace (1180)

"Send arms 300 men Saturday, 5 August."

3 August From Horace (1181)

"Do not send messages in French. Send in English. Embarrassing when I have collaborator translate your French for me."

3 August From Horace (1182)

"You must serve grounds Venus and Calliope at once or we cannot handle Brest."

3 August From SFHQ to Horace (1183)

"General Koenig's orders to all commander in Brittany giving instructions about contacting the advancing Allied Forces."

4 August From Horace (1184)

"Zielske superior under difficult conditions. I recommend him promotion 1st Sergeant at once."

(1178) C-6110 2 Aug 44

(1180) C-927/80 3 Aug 44

(1182) C-926/83 3 Aug 44

(1184) C-959/77 4 Aug 44

(1179) C-866/9 2 Aug 44

(1181) C-847/6 3 Aug 44

(1183) C-149 3 Aug 44

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Operations, Team Horace (Cont'd)4 August From Horace (1185)

"Boche making 2 14,000 ton tankers ready to sink in Brest Goulet. Were only two large boats in harbor Bues."

4 August From SFHQ to Horace (1186)

"Military intelligence is of highest importance to advancing Allied troops. Therefore arrange for up to 30 your men with good local knowledge to move towards Allied front line by various routes covering as wide front as possible. They should bring with them information on enemy dispositions. Here are most interesting items: preparation of fortified lines of defense; troops concentrations with identification if possible; air targets likely to be fairly permanent; artillery emplacements; tank harbors; defended points; machine gun emplacements; petrol dumps; ammunition dumps; enemy headquarters. On arrival they will be enlisted and will act as guides to forward units. They should ask the first soldier encountered for the nearest Division G-2. On arrival at divisional headquarters they must ask for G-2 branch. They must not mention password until specifically asked for it by divisional headquarters. When asked for password they will give the following "Angouleme".

4 August From SFHQ to Horace (1187)

"Owing extreme rapidity American advance give immediate orders maximum activity by resistance. If enemy concentrations render attack by you impossible give us particulars for aerial bombardment. Put all plans in action for preservation installations port of Brest and railway works already sent you. Remind you importance intelligence and setting in motion guides with Angouleme password."

4 August From SFHQ to Horace (1188)

"Are dropping SAS party tonight Melpomene. If we receive alternative ground nearer to targets in the meanwhile we may use this instead. In any case urgent you mount receptions both grounds as both may be used simultaneously. Please note Zielski promoted 1st Sergeant effective 10 July."

4 August From Horace (1189)

"Send SAS troops Saturday, 5 August. Send arms 300 men same ground."

5 August From Horace (1190)

"Boche forcing civilians leave Brest but many

(1185) C-962/85 4 Aug 44
(1187) C-205 4 Aug 44
(1189) C-999/7 4 Aug 44

(1186) C-172 4 Aug 44
(1188) C-206 4 Aug 44
(1190) C-1048/99 5 Aug 44

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passive defense remain. Heard Boche started sabotage last night. Is still not too late for us to save much of port area if you serve grounds Venus, Calipe, Orphee, Raisin tonight."

5 August From SFHQ to Horace (1191)

"Many thanks news tankers in Brest harbor. Target passed to air force but if you have good swimmer who could place charge of plastic with magnets on hull you should try to attack yourselves."

5 August From Horace (1192)

"Boche general hq commanding Brest is 4th house on left from road leading north from Ecole Navale."

5 August From SFHQ to Horace (1193)

"Please consider as high priority task the preservation of all permanent works throughout your area from destruction. This is in addition to specific targets already given to you. Therefore all harassing activities must be carried out without blowing up major works. Specific target for preservation is repeater station at Landerneau."

6 August From SFHQ to Horace (1194)

"Confirm we shall serve Venus tonight. BBC message passed 1730 and 1915 transmissions. Will also try and deliver same ground tomorrow so stand by. Resistance Brittany commanded by Mission Aloes dropped night 4/5 to Frederick, Cotes du Nord. Same night Ronald dropped to Gilbert, Finisterre. Ronald in charge liaison FFI with Aloes whose orders he will transmit to them. Ronald has direct contact with Aloes by radio."

7 August From SFHQ to Horace (1195)

"Army command ask resistance to take all steps to protect road St Brieuc-Guingamp-Morlaix after cavalry and armored divisions have passed well in advance of other elements. Protection should be carried out only by organized units."

8 August From SFHQ to Horace (1196)

"Reported air attack yesterday two freighters Brest harbor. Presume these were tankers reported by your 4th. Can you confirm with details results."

8 August From SFHQ to Horace (1197)

"Aloes mission wishes obtain from you daily report situation and numbers your effectives armed and unarmed,

(1191) C-240 5 Aug 44
(1193) C-280 5 Aug 44
(1195) C-507 7 Aug 44
(1197) C-6175 8 Aug 44

(1192) C-1049/98 5 Aug 44
(1194) C-6156 6 Aug 44
(1196) C-576 8 Aug 44

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state of arms and ammunition, means of transport and communication, names of chiefs and state of morale. Pass this information through us."

11 August From SFHQ to Horace (1198)

"Aloes very anxious contact you. Send us letter box urgently."

18 August From Horace (1199)

"Enemy forced us leave equipment but later recovered. Now with Allied Hq coordinating resistance work. Armed French with captured arms."

20 August From SFHQ to Horace (1200)

"Hilary asks you to contact him at Landerneau."

20 August From SFHQ to Horace (1201)

"Hilary has asked us to inform you that political-military situation at Landerneau is grave."

30 August From Horace (1202)

"Levalois spending time on French affairs. Zielske coordinating French and fighting with Americans. Brest fight slow and tough. French doing good job cooperating with Americans in wiping out overrun enemy pockets. Tuesday we finished off 2 fortified areas in continuous fighting since Saturday. Continue mission until Brest area cleared up."

31 August From SFHQ to Horace (1203)

"Glad to hear from you. Congratulations good work. Agree you continue mission until Brest area cleared up. Confirm as soon as you have finished so that you may be returned to London."

14 September From Bolo to Watermark (1204)

"Jed Horace team arrived Bolo. Will dispatch to SHAEF FWD 15 September. Please advise Major Black arrange transport to UK."

From Report of Team Upon Return from the Field - 17 Jul to 15 Sept 44

General Comments

Equipment. Good and no important changes are recommended.

As a matter of personal choice, 1st Sergeant Zielske and Major Summers traded their carbines for M-1 rifles. We both wore the regulation parachute jump suit the entire time. This uniform was satisfactory but the new green combat suit M-43

(1198) C-910 11 Aug 44
(1200) C-1940 20 Aug 44
(1202) C-3271/73 30 Aug 44
(1204) C-4808/132 14 Sept 44

(1199) C-2046/78 18 Aug 44
(1201) C-1941 20 Aug 44
(1203) C-4100 31 Aug 44

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is better both for color and serviceability. Civilian clothes and identity cards should have been available for those who wished them. The Jed radio set did everything and more than was hoped for.

Dispatching. Very Good. We jumped from a Halifax manned by a Canadian crew. There was no mixup of any kind from the fitting of the parachutes to the time we jumped. Our mussette bags and carbines were tied on the outside of the parachuted packages and dropped without damage. We were dropped on the field we wanted to hit and all of our containers and packages were fairly well together. Generally, it all went just the way we had practiced in training.

Communications. Very good. The entire radio and code plan was well worked out and successful with us. The Vocab was of no use and we used the one time pad almost entirely. All of us worked together on the coding and decoding, 1st Sergeant Zielske did all of the sending and receiving. Major Summers wrote all of the messages. 1st Sergeant Zielske did superior radio work under very difficult conditions. Usually it was not possible to go outside of our safe houses and aerals and antennas had to be set up inside. Not once was a transmitting antenna erected that might be termed a suitable operating antenna. We operated several skeds from a deep valley and another time very near a high-power line. However, during the best of conditions, the emergency channel was extremely bad for reasons unknown. Normal skeds were always dependable and were worked successfully. All messages we received were decodable. Although the air was jammed by the Germans, we could usually understand BBC messages.

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Method of Operating. We generally moved by night and hid during the day. We had no choice but to place ourselves in the hands of and trust a certain few individuals. They made arrangements for safe houses, guides and contacts. Since the leader of the Brest Arrondissement, who had been forced into hiding himself, remained with us, we felt that nothing would intentionally go wrong. A headquarters was set up and operated as such wherever we moved. Messengers were used to deliver instructions over our area and to arrange a rendezvous if we wished to talk to some leader. Orders from London were passed on to the necessary French leaders and were always carried out. The people we personally worked with gave us excellent cooperation and went out of their way to help. This was because we were the only means they had of getting arms and because we represented the headquarters and the plan that would rid them of the Germans.

Considering the continuous attacks by German repression troops, the Brest Arrondissement was well organized. It was organized to the extent that second-in-commands had taken over where leaders had been killed or arrested and fairly good unity maintained. Since D-day the Germans had been very active, and in one town alone, Lesneven, six resistance leaders were killed or arrested during June. Without exception, every Maquis group attempted in this area was wiped out by the Germans. Therefore, the members of the resistance were forced to remain underground and continued in their normal life. They received instructions by our messengers going to group leaders, who in turn passed it down the line to his men by word of mouth. Information went up the same way. But the

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German repression methods succeeded to the extent that many individuals were definitely afraid of the Germans; afraid of what he knew would happen to his family if he were caught. This reduced the effectiveness of the resistance in taking action against the Germans.

The resistance in our area numbered approximately 5,000 members, 3,000 of whom were inside Brest. Many of those in Brest were working for the Germans in the arsenal and in the dock area. In the country outside Brest, small dumps of arms and ammunition were created. These dumps were for 10 or 12 men and only they knew its location. Our only means of transporting arms was by horse carts. A container would be hidden in the hay on the cart and moved in that manner. As for arming those inside Brest, those working for the Germans could carry their own small arms in with them as they were never searched since they had special passes. A few civilian trucks were bringing in supplies for the Germans and in these could be hidden larger weapons. Until the American troops broke through and pushed down to Brest, roads were open and those working in the city were allowed comparatively free movement during the day.

We had very little political complications within the resistance groups. Except for a small group FTP, all organizations had joined the FFI. After the American troops arrived, the FTP group evacuated Brest and moved to Landernau where they participated in the Crozon peninsula fight. However, some political difficulty was later experienced at Landerneau caused by another group of FTP who came in from various parts of Brittany. They refused to consider themselves under the Brest leader. This group of FTP was finally attached to the Morlaix

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Arrondissement by Colonel Eono.

Inter-communication was very slow and difficult in our area. There were German patrols and garrisons in practically every town and village. In addition, throughout the country there were large permanent concrete fortifications, airplane observation posts, radio stations, AA batteries, radio direction finding stations, and various other German installations. Curfew was at 2100 hours and strictly enforced, German patrols being under orders to shoot anyone on sight after that time. Curfew was lifted at 0600 hours and during the day people were allowed to go about their normal business unmolested. Travelling by auto was only allowed to those in possession of special permits. These permits were issued mainly to doctors and drivers of civilian trucks operating for the Germans. Travelling by bicycle was almost impossible as the Germans were confiscating any bicycles they encountered on the roads. This meant that to get a messenger there and back to a place 15 miles away usually took 24 hours.

Supply by Parachute. Very successful on those grounds served when and as we requested. Drop grounds were chosen with three main considerations: AA fire, proximity of German troops, accessibility to resistance people to be supplied. Reception committees were organized and the reception committee leader instructed on how to conduct the operation. The leader was given the code phrase for his ground and told to listen to every BBC broadcast. We also listened to all broadcasts at headquarters and messengers sent out to reception committee leaders as a double check when grounds were served. Pits were dug and camouflage near every ground so that containers

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could be temporarily buried. However, from the very beginning many of our drop grounds were refused because of flak. There were AA batteries all over our area and we had chosen the best possible grounds. London headquarters had to decide if the supplying of resistance in the Brest area was important enough to risk planes. It was finally decided to serve the grounds around Brest, but it was too late. The Americans forces had already arrived and the battle for Brest was on. All roads into Brest were blocked, civilians evacuated, and it was impossible to get arms to the resistance inside the city. Actually only a few of the arms on these drops went into the hands of the French. We had time to supply only about 1500 with arms by parachute before the Americans arrived. From then on we armed the resistance with captured German weapons and eventually had our area well armed. To the best of our knowledge, no planes were lost as a result of enemy AA fire on any drop grounds served in our area.

Value of French Resistance. Through the years of German occupation, the resistance had been gathering intelligence and information about the enemy and his installations. Detailed and very excellent maps were made and everything of a permanent nature was accurately and correctly plotted. We actually turned over to Lieutenant Colonel Michell, G-2, 6th Armored Division, a full suit-case of reports and maps. They continued to gather information during the entire campaign. Individuals often walked through the German lines and made personal reconnaissance for the American unit. Guides were sent out to meet the advancing American troops and many of these guides remained with the units who picked

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them up for the rest of the time.

When the 6th Armored Division arrived, they found it impossible to cover the entire front and they had both flanks exposed. The resistance forces were used to set up a line of security patrols on both flanks. This they successfully did. Later, the division was pulled out on another mission and left a containing force consisting mainly of 2 battalions of infantry. This task force set up a defensive line between the towns of Guesnoe and Guilpevas. They were up against an estimated 30,000 Germans and the situation was not very good if the enemy ever found out the 6th Division had pulled out. The French forces were given the mission of keeping the enemy from finding this out and they accomplished the mission. A counter-reconnaissance screen was set up in a complete semi-circle around the American force from Point de Corsen on the west coast to the southeast coast below St Divy. The Germans sent out continuous reconnaissance patrols, but none got through the resistance screen.

When the 8th Corps moved in and attacked Brest, the French forces were used in conjunction with the 2nd Ranger Battalion in cutting off and cleaning out the Le Conquet area, the area west of Brest. They were used mainly as security on the exposed flanks of the Rangers and to contain by-passed German pockets until American troops could attack.

When the signal for the resistance to attack was given in our area, they ambushed the enemy where they could and freed most of the towns and villages. They attempted an attack on one fortified area, but were repulsed with heavy casualties.

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From then on they contained strong positions until properly equipped troops could attack. The resistance kept the lines of communication open for the advancing Allies and were especially valuable in keeping the supply road open for the 6th Armored Division during the first few days after it arrived. They themselves freed many of the towns and villages. However, the resistance did comparatively little fighting in our area. First, they were not armed soon enough, there was no time for training in the use of their arms, the Germans withdrew into their fortified positions as soon as the Allies started coming, and they came two days after the signal for attack was given to the French. But the resistance was of great value in performing suitable missions of reconnaissance, intelligence, counter-reconnaissance screen, and holding forces. And last, they were definitely of great nuisance value. Just their presence in an area kept German patrols out. No small enemy patrol could ever be safe by itself, and if the resistance couldn't attack strong positions they could and did keep the Germans from coming out and getting away. The Germans were afraid of the resistance forces, and they had reason to be. The armed forces can never fully appreciate the value of the French resistance until they must fight the enemy in an area where there is none.

Daily Events

17 July. We went to the airfield and emplaned. The trip over was uneventful except for running into a thunder storm and the plane was hit in the tail assembly by lightning. Major Summers led the team out and all had a good landing on the field intended. We were met by Captain Lebel of team

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Giles (1205) and after some delay, went to a nearby farm from where we drove by auto to a Maquis about 10 miles south of Huelgoat.

18 July. Established contact with London on the first radio sked. A girl messenger was sent to Captain B M Knox, Inf, (1206) to arrange for our contacts to the north in the Brest area and also for transportation if possible. In the evening she returned and said she was unable to deliver the message. Captain Lebel left that night to take care of the matter personally.

19 July. No word was received from Captain Knox and ~~Lieutenant~~ Lebel and we began trying to make our own contacts to the north. [We talked to several people, some of whom had left our area, and all were very discouraging about our being able to go there. We received word that our presence in the area was known in the nearby villages, and also that the Germans had already posted a reward of 1,000,000 francs for information leading to our capture dead or alive. We began to feel that it was about time to leave.]

20 July. Still no word from Giles. [Talked to more people but were unable to make any definite contacts in our area. Received word from another source that the Germans knew we were somewhere in the area.] About midnight Captain Knox arrived and took us by auto to a Maquis further north. However this group had been forced to move by the enemy and we couldn't contact them. We returned with Captain Knox to his headquarters. [

21 July. Talked to some people who had been forced to

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leave the Brest area, and all were very discouraging. They said there were no more Maquis groups in the area. All of those formed had been wiped out by the Germans and the French Milice which was under the command of a Frenchman named Corre. They said many of the leaders had been killed, arrested, or driven out since D-day, including Rossignot and Poussin, the main chiefs. They warned us not to try to operate in that area, especially in uniform, and suggested we try to accomplish our mission but not personally going there. This suggestion was of course impossible and we decided to get there one way or another.

A rendezvous was made with the Maquis leader to the north for tonight. We left on foot but were forced to return by an enemy patrol. Later that night, the Maquis leader got through and picked us up in his auto. It was so dark that it was necessary to turn the car lights on in order to drive, but we reached our destination without encountering any further trouble.

22 July. This Maquis leader had no contacts in the Brest area, and spent the day in trying to locate someone who might be able to help.

23 July. Sent messengers out trying to make contacts for us in our area but received no word from anyone.

24 July. We finally decided that if no contact was made we were leaving the next night for Brest regardless. The only guide we could find who knew the back roads and who was willing to go was a 14 year old boy. However, in the meantime and unknown to us Captain Knox and Lebel had notified Commandant Berthaud, leader of Finistere, who in turn had told the Brest Leader to do what he could to get us into his

Operations, Team Horace (Cont'd)

area. The leader of the Brest Arrondissement was at the time Commandant Somm-py (Maitre Garlon). His plan to get us into our area turned out to be that of hiding us in wine barrels for the trip.

25 July. That evening, two Frenchmen we had never seen or heard of, and neither had anyone in the Maquis we were with, came to us saying they had been sent by someone, none of us had ever heard of. They said they would hide us in wine barrels and deliver us to our area. The two men were very much in a hurry as their truck permit was good only up to 9 o'clock. It was a two hour trip, and it was then 6:30 o'clock. Major Summers immediately made the decision that we would go. It was a truck load of wine being delivered to the Germans in Brest. The wine had just been emptied from three of the barrels, and we placed ourselves in these. The 40 mile trip was made in two an half hours, during which time we were completely miserable in mind and body. If the unknown Frenchmen were not collaborators, then probably some German patrol would find us, and if neither of the two happened, then surely we would suffocate inside the barrels. The truck was stopped several times by German patrols but the drivers papers were in order and was allowed to proceed. After what seemed years, we arrived at our destination in a wood about 5 miles northwest of Brest. We spent the night in a foxhole in the wood. A German observation tower was very near and other positions all around. Although we had finally reached our area, the situation didn't seem too good.

26 July. Early in the morning, the leader of the Brest Arrondissement, Commandant Somm-py came to see us. [He was

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able to give us one drop ground but could do nothing more until he obtained his suitcase in which was all of his information and reports. 1st Sergeant Zielske had to set up his radio about 25 yards from a high-power line, which made it very difficult, but he got his messages through. We left that evening for a safe house Somm-py knew, which was about three miles northeast of Lesneven. We again rode in the wine barrels, and this time the truck had a flat tire in the middle of St Divy, which was held by a strong German garrison. As a matter of fact, a German patrol helped the driver change the tire. After what seemed a very long time, we finally started moving again and arrived at our destination. It was still daylight and so we put on civilian clothes to make the last part of our journey to the safe house. The truck driver was Victor Corre of Guesnou and his helper was Daveaux of Ploudalmeaeau.

27 July. We received word that the messenger who was to bring us the important suitcase in which was all the information, had been arrested by the Gestapo. We made plans to leave and spent the day trying to find out if the suitcase had been found with the messenger.

28 July. We received a rumor that the messenger had been released and we decided to stay one more day in hopes of contacting him. We obtained and sent in another drop ground.

29 July. The messenger was released by the Gestapo today and brought us the suitcase. Sent in more drop grounds and made plans for the attack on Brest. Told London of two tankers Germans planned to sink and block the Brest channel.

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Later watched bombers sink these tankers where they could do no damage.

30 July. Sent in more drop grounds and requests for arms. [Too many people knew the location of our headquarters and we noticed German patrols working the area. One patrol passed within 20 yards of the barn we were hiding in and we decided it was wise to leave. We left at night and moved to what had been a German barracks about 6 miles away.]

31 July. Message from London stated that our most important drop grounds around Brest had been refused because of flak. [This was extremely disappointing as we knew how short the time was for us to get the resistance armed. We could obtain new grounds but it would take at least several days. Then too, any new grounds would be just as close or closer to AA batteries. Our only hope was for London to reconsider and serve the grounds proposed.]

Word came that the Germans were moving back into these barracks and we left at night for an old mill about 7 miles westward.]

1 August. Received word that the Allied advance was soon expected in our direction and we made plans for the attack in our area.

2 August. Sent out messengers with instructions to leaders in the area. Our safe house was at the bottom of a deep valley which made radio communication very difficult. [However, Sergeant Zielske managed to get through on every sked and passed and received his message successfully.] The transmitter broke down but Sergeant Zielske repaired it and soon had it back into working condition.]

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3 August. Received arms dropped on several of our grounds. One plane load of containers dropped on ground Enterpe actually landed in the trench they were to be buried in, a few hundred yards to the side of the drop field. Our plans for Brest have been completed with a good chance of success. All we need is the arms to be dropped at once as requested.

4 August. One drop ground served is only 2 miles from our safe house and the Germans are searching the area. We receive the attack message and put our plans into operation the best we can. Some groups have not yet received their arms and there is nothing they can do. That night we hurriedly left in a captured German car without having time to decode 5 messages just received. The car broke down and we abandoned it, finishing the journey on foot. Until this time we were under orders to avoid combat and keep the resistance from declaring themselves.

5 August. [Finished decoding the messages about 5:30 this morning and in the last message we found we were supposed to receive SAS personnel on one of our grounds the night before. However, BBC had notified us of a drop on that ground and the reception committee was actually there.] We sent out guides to meet the advancing Allies. Resistance groups ^{were} ~~are~~ attacking German patrols with reasonable success. Ambushes were particularly successful. We set up a guard around our headquarters and began working more in the open.

6 August. German columns were moving all around and we couldn't tell whether they were going to meet the Allied advance or where were running from it. [We still had some parachute drops to be made nearby and we hoped to keep the

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Germans from locating our headquarters. But there had been some shooting and German reconnaissance cars had us located. We prepared to move and just as we were leaving that night a German cavalry troop moved into the farm yard. We hid everything except the radio, which was later left behind, in some bushes and spent the night running around through the bushes and trees and finally got away.

7 August. Shortly after dawn, we heard tanks on a road about 400 yards from the woods we were hiding in. It turned out to be the American Forces and we went out to meet them.

Major Summers reported to the commanding officer and told him of known German positions, road blocks, and the best route to his destination. Maps and detailed reports were turned over to the Division G-2, Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell. The FFI was used to cooperate with the American CO as he desired. 2nd Lieutenant Rutherford T Walsh, FA, SF Staff, was contacted and he said he would return us to London. Major Summers refused as our mission was far from completed.

When Major Summers joined the American column, he told Lieutenant Levalois to remain where he was and he would be picked up in an hour. One hour later Major Summers returned for Lieutenant Levalois but he couldn't be found. Sergeant Zielske returned again about midnight.

8 August. Major Summers and Sergeant Zielske were attached to the G-2 section of the 6th Division and coordinated the FFI with the G-2. Commandant Somm-py was in hiding and out of contact with his companies and so Major Summers worked directly with resistance leaders in gathering information. A German artillery battery moved into the area where Lieutenant

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Levalois and Somm-py were and they were forced to leave. Lieutenant Levalois was unable to contact American troops and stayed with a Maquis near Lesneven.

9 August. French messengers were worked back and forth from Brest and brought very valuable information. [By this time, the 6th Division was completely surrounded and we were fighting on a 360 degree front. A Russian captain reported into the PWE and said he and his entire company had deserted from the Germans on the north coast and wanted to fight for the Americans. Major Summers told the Russian to put his men in civilian clothes and placed them under the command of a resistance leader in the area. These Russians had been taken prisoners in 1941, were put in German uniform in 1943 and used as coast defense troops along with regular German troops. They had been in contact with the resistance for some time and waited their opportunity to desert. This Russian company later proved to be the best fighting company in the resistance in our area.]

10 August. Lieutenant Levalois put on civilian clothes and reported to Major Summers who obtained a uniform for him. Lieutenant Levalois went to contact some French leaders.

[About 10 o'clock at night, the G-2 gave Major Summers the mission of making a reconnaissance of the Brest Le Conquet road, which was then some 30 miles behind the enemy lines. Specifically, the G-2 had heard that the Germans were evacuating Brest toward Le Conquet and it was imperative that he know if this was true. He left it up to Major Summers to figure out how to get down there and back. This mission was accomplished.]

11 August. The town of Plabenne was permanently in

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American hands and FFI headquarters was set up there. Lieutenant Levalois went to Plabennec where he remained working with the civil affairs detachment and translating French intelligence reports into English. These reports were then sent to Major Summers. Sergeant Zielske and Major Summers remained with the American Forces and worked directly with the resistance groups. A counter-reconnaissance screen was set up protecting the more exposed west flank of the division.

12 August. The resistance had a strong German coastal position surrounded in the north at St Pabu and although they were unable to attack, they were able to keep the Germans from getting out. The German commander told the French that if they did not leave he would take reprisals against all civilians within his area. The G-2 replied to him that if he carried out his threat we might be forced to turn some 2,500 German prisoners over to the resistance to guard. The German reconsidered and said he would surrender to the Americans but not the French. The G-2 sent Major Summers, Sergeant Zielske, a German-speaking American sergeant, and French-speaking American ~~American~~ lieutenant to see that this was done and to interrogate the German commander. This was done and the St Pabu garrison of 280 Germans surrendered without further fighting.

13 August. [The above mentioned four continued searching out German pockets and moving the French forces southward.] By working directly with Maquis leaders we were able to accomplish what we wanted. The area west of Brest was cleaned out down to a line running east from Point de Corsen, where a fortified area continued to hold out.

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14 August. The 6th Division pulled out on another mission and left a task force of mainly 2 battalion of infantry and 2 battalions of artillery to contain Brest. [Sergeant Zielske and Major Summers reported to the G-2 of this force, Major Burgess, and continued coordinating the FFI with them.

The task force CO was rightly concerned about what would happen if the German force of over 30,000 ever found out how few Americans were there.] A counter-reconnaissance screen was set up around the containing force. The resistance forces were completely successful in this mission and although they had considerable fighting with German patrols, none ever broke through. They Germans never did find out that the 6th Division had pulled out.

Lieutenant Levalois was still living at Plabennec working at FFI headquarters and had contacted Colonel Eono. (Aloes Mission) (1207).

15 August. Commandant Louis (Louis Faucher) took command of the FFI in the Brest Arrondissement and gave us splendid cooperation. The G-2 put Major Summers in command of the MII unit to coordinate the FFI with them. A complete intelligence report of the Brest situation was turned over to the American 8th Corps when it arrived.

16, 17, 18 August. Verified French reports of German patrolling, continued collecting information and checking French screen.

19 August. Late in the evening asked American CO if we could blow the water-line supplying Brest. Sergeant Zielske and Major Summers drove to Landernou and obtained the location of the pipe line and the best place to blow it.

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Located an engineer demolition crew and blew the line.

20 August. Captain Bernard W Knox, AC ~~6208~~ came into our area and we worked together for the next two days. [Word came in through a French patrol from a French padre that a German colonel and major wanted to desert Brest and report to the American General. The G-2 asked Major Summers to see what he could do about it and he and Captain Knox went together. They finally located the padre in Lanilis, who stated his information came from a German chaplain whom he had worked with a few days before in the city of Brest. The padre said he would return to Brest and attempt to bring the Germans as far as the last German lines if we would go in and pick them up from there. The padre was also to get us some specific enemy information about the German positions. We drove him toward the enemy lines in the west sector where there was only German patrol activity. About one mile north of St Renan, we came under fire of the Graf Spee Battery which we were later to learn so much about. Just in front of us a car was thrown in the ditch by a near miss and the padre asked to be let out and he would continue on foot. At that time St Renan was held by the Germans and we agreed to rendezvous with the padre there the next night at the hotel.]

21 August. Captain Knox and Major Summers spent the day checking the FFI line with Commandant Louis. [In the evening we approached St Renan to make our rendezvous with the padre. There had been some fighting around the town and our information was that no German troops were there at present. Since we encountered no trouble we drove in, backed the jeep in an alley about a block from the hotel and proceeded on foot. About

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this time some excited Frenchmen ran to us saying a German patrol was waiting to ambush us. We jumped in the doorways not knowing just where the enemy was. People were running all over the place, back and forth across the street. We noticed a French woman pointing at us and motioning toward a building. We later learned that she was a collaborator who had given us away. It turned out to be a German patrol of 40 waiting to ambush our jeep. Since we had stopped, the enemy then came out after us. We saw them approaching and Captain Knox and the American Lieutenant Knipe were trying to clear the street of civilians but it was impossible for us to handle the situation. We waited for the padre at the edge of the town and finally located him. He had been inside the main enemy lines but had not been able to bring the German officers out. However, he did have the information we wanted.

22 August. The American 8th Corps moved into position to attack Brest and the small containing force was relieved. Major Summers and Sergeant Zielske reported to the Corps G-2 to continue coordinating the French forces with the Americans.

23 August. [The job of obtaining information had been completed and Major Summers worked with the Corps G-3 from now on.] The French forces were to coordinate with the 2nd Ranger Battalion in the mission of cutting off the German forces west of Brest and capturing the Le Conquet area.

[Lieutenant Colonel Rudder commanded the Rangers and Major Summers worked directly with him for the rest of the time.]

24 August - 9 September. This period was the battle of Le Conquet. [Major Summers and Sergeant Zielske were in

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continuous front line combat during this time.] One of the main objectives was the Graf Spee Battery, which consisted of four 280 mm coastal guns, three of which could and did fire in any direction. [This battery came under high and low level air bombing, dive-bombing and strafing; it was shelled by the british Battleship Warspite, it was shelled by all types of artillery in the 8th Corps from 8 inch guns down to 4.2 chemical mortars and one 280 mm gun still continued to fire until the night before the position was taken. The casualty producing effect of the 280 mm was light as compared to the 88 mm, but the moral effect was tremendous. After about ten days steady of it, each man thought those big guns were firing directly at him. The Rangers had 92 casualties out of 300 in this battle, the French had 9 out of about three hundred.]

On 27 August, 2 Ranger companies [and the Russian company] attacked the Point de Corsen fortifications.

[German positions were all heavily mined and some were booby trapped. One fortification had the miniature anti-tank "doodle-bugs". In two known cases, unsuspecting Germans set off their own booby traps. Three Germans opened the door to an abandoned under-ground concrete barracks and were blown 50 yards away. Another time, a German coming toward us, opened a gate and was killed.]

Commanding the Rangers
Lieutenant Colonel Rudder was given the mission of cutting off and destroying a German force of over 2,000 in concrete emplacements. His Ranger Battalion numbered 300 and Commandant Louis had about the same number of FFI under the direct command of Lieutenant Le Bars of Le Conquet. The Rangers were used to do the fighting and the French to guard the flanks and rear.

[At times the 300 Rangers covered a 2,000 yard front, one man

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deep and no reserve. Every man was committed into the battle including clerks and command post personnel. Sergeant Zielske offered his services and performed any job they wanted from standing guard to leading tanks around the flank.]

The Rangers advance was finally halted. The German artillery from the Graf Spee position near Lochrist was causing so much trouble firing into the backs of the main attacking force on Brest that a large task force was sent to destroy the Le Conquet peninsula. When the infantry battalion on our left went into position, we were able to take up the advance again. On 8 September, the infantry battalion on our left ran into strong fortifications and their advance was pretty well stopped. Lieutenant-Colonel Rudder wanted to get the battle over with and he and Major Summer led the Rangers into the Graf Spee position and then right on around into the rear of the main German defenses, and the battle was over 9 September. Six heavily fortified concrete positions had been taken and over 1250 German prisoners.

10 September. Moved back into an assembly area, turned the Le Conquet position over to the FFI.

11 - 13 September. Our job was completed and there was nothing more for the French force to do in our area. Made arrangements with the 8th Corps to return us to the Ninth Army.

14 September. Picked ^{up} Lieutenant Levalois and reported to Ninth Army. On 15 we were returned by air to England.

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Financial Statement

T/3 W. Zielske --- received - - - - - 50,000 Frs

Expenses

Given to runner to be cashed
for smaller change but he
never returned - - - - - 5,000
Food - - - - - 6,000
For information from guides - - - - - 2,000
Unaccounted for - - - - - 1,170
Total - - - - - 14,170
Returned - - - - - 35,830

50,000 Frs

Major John Summers --- received - - - - - 100,000 Frs

Expenses

Food - - - - - 3,115
Guide - - - - - 1,000
Total - - - - - 4,115
Returned - - - - - 95,885

100,000 Frs

Lieutenant Levalois - - - received - - - - - 100,000 Frs

Expenses

Food and lodging - - - - - 5,000
Civilian clothes - - - - - 3,000
Transport - - - - - 1,000

Total - - - - - 9,000
Returned - - - - - 91,000

100,000 Frs

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JEDBURGH

Operations, Team HilaryTEAM HILARY

Jedburgh team Hilary was the sixteenth team to be dispatched to France from the United Kingdom.

Members of Team

The members of team Hilary were:

(Lieutenant E Marchant) (French), code name "Charente"

1st Lieutenant Philip H Chadbourne, Inf (US) (1209),
code name "Nevada"

(Lieutenant R Pariselle) (French), code name "Kopek"

Area to Which Dispatched

Team Hilary was dispatched on the night of 17/18 July to the Finistere area of France.

Background of Resistance in Area

SHAEF, working through EMFFI, planned the maximum use of resistance in Brittany in order to create the greatest possible diversion in the area. This would call for the fullest possible support of the resistance elements.

SAS had considerable personnel in Brittany in close contact with resistance forces. At this time two Jedburgh teams, Frederick (1210) and George, (1211) were working in Brittany. Jedburgh Giles (1212) had been operating in the Department of Finistere since 8 June. There were known to be very large resistance forces in Finistere.

First Word from Field

Jedburgh Horace (1213) announced team Hilary's safe arrival in the following W/T message dated 18 July (1214):

"Hilary okay but were unable to find radio."

Summary of Messages Exchanged19 July From Hilary (1215)

"Still hunting 1 pack and 3 carbines. Hope to have contact with NE and move tomorrow."

Declassified by 062147
date 23 January 1979

(1209) War Diary Vol 11 p 592
(1211) See p 39 this Vol
(1213) See p 512 this Vol
(1215) C-227/1 19 Jul 44

(1210) See p 33 this Vol
(1212) See p 323 this Vol
(1214) C-162/1 18 Jul 44

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Operations, Team Hilary (Cont'd)20 July From Hilary (1216)

"Made contact with Chief Liberation Carhaix."

21 July From Hilary (1217)

"Our position 10 kms east Huelgoat. Contact established with Chef FFI Morlaix. Organizing maquis of Poullaouen. Studying important budget question. Searching for grounds but weather holding up operations."

22 July From Hilary (1218)

"Boche in area of Sornignac because of FTP action, hindering our activity."

24 July From Hilary (1219)

"Large operations in north depend on nucleus formed by Dakar. Hindered by non-cooperation of local chiefs. No existant over-all organization our area."

25 July From Hilary (1220)

"Why no Dakar? Waiting ain't fun. Now in a maquis 12 kms north of Plouigneau."

27 July From Hilary (1221)

"Have arranged contact between Chefs liberation and FTP. Principal agreed for one command of region. Nothing from Bourgoin mission. Always on the move and always south of Plouigneau."

28 July From Hilary (1222)

"Sornignac evacuated and occupied by 300 Boche and Milice."

29 July From Hilary (1223)

"Attacked yesterday. Few casualties. Withdrew as ordered. Now in maquis 5 km northeast of Plouigneau."

29 July From Hilary (1224)

"Tell Horace Germans have established Cordon, Daoulas, St Sauveur, St Theg, Morlaix. Beware of small roads."

30 July From SFHQ to Hilary (1225)

"Have warned Horace that Boche have established Cordon, Daoulas, St Sauveur, St Theg, Morlaix. Require urgently results about Sornignac bombardment."

(1216) C-245/2 20 Jul 44
 (1218) C-305/4 22 Jul 44
 (1220) C-424/9 25 Jul 44
 (1222) C-547/16 28 Jul 44
 (1224) C-642/19 29 Jul 44

(1217) C-280/1 21 Jul 44
 (1219) C-374/8 24 Jul 44
 (1221) C-524/15 27 Jul 44
 (1223) C-621/18 29 Jul 44
 (1225) C-4380 30 Jul 44

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30 July From Hilary (1226)

"Thanks to RAF. Results of 32 plane raid on Scrignac as yet unknown. Situation dangerous. Unarmed maquis invite trouble. Please rush droppings."

31 July From Hilary (1227)

"No news on Scrignac yet. Will need million francs as soon as have protected ground. No resources for liberation of north FTP. Maquis already indebted for supplies too. Will let you know when can receive."

31 July From Hilary (1228)

"Scrignac results mediocre. Mostly Boche night exercises Munition depot blown up. Several trucks burned. Losses in men known, as they are hidden."

2 August From SFHQ to Hilary (1229)

"One allied advance will probably be rapid in your direction. You will coordinate all resistance in Area Lannion, Belle Isle railway to Landivisiaux railway to Plouescat all inclusive. Your main task will be to assist in preservation of Morlaix viaduct. Resistants alone cannot prevent demolition. Reconnoitre and report preparations made by enemy. Advise what is required to prevent demolitions. Report if you require assistance of SAS personnel or an operational group giving numbers required and where you can receive them. You will also prevent the enemy from carrying out demolition of road bridges, culverts, etc concentrating first on road Landivisiau, Morlaix, Belle Isle and on secondary roads. Report urgent any grounds you require to be served and we will do our best."

2 August From SFHQ to Hilary (1230)

"Allied forces rapidly advancing. Intelligence is of extreme importance to advancing troops. Select volunteers to meet them. Volunteers must have local knowledge and be able to report enemy dispositions. They should ask for division G-2 and give password Angouleme when G-2 contacted."

2 August From SFHQ to Hilary (1231)

"BBC action messages passed tonight. Urgent you remember these are signal for concentrated guerrilla activity but not for open warfare. Above passed to all Jedburghs in Brittany and SAS. Instead of road targets given you yesterday your highest priority target is preservation of bridges, tunnels, viaducts and all other major works on railway line Lamballe-St Brieuc-Morlaix-Brest."

(1226) C-682/21 30 Jul 44
 (1228) C-738/23 31 Jul 44
 (1230) C-3 2 Aug 44

(1227) C-721/22 31 Jul 44
 (1229) C-4490 2 Aug 44
 (1231) C-6109 2 Aug 44

Operations, Team Hilary (Cont'd)

2 August From SFHQ to Hilary (1232)

"Hope send you Friday party four officers 30 other ranks American operational group. Their main mission is preservation Guimiliau viaduct and organization preventive action against Germans retiring on Brest. Send ground urgently as near Guimiliau viaduct and organization preventive action against Germans retiring on Brest. Send ground urgently as near Guimiliau as possible and be prepared to provide guides and information."

3 August From SFHQ to Hilary (1233)

"General Koenig's message to all commanders in Brittany giving instructions about contacting advancing Allied forces."

4 August From Hilary (1234)

"Morlaix viaduct not mined. Observation assured defense in making. Hope to be able to receive OGs on ground near Guimiliau tonight. Will send ground soon as possible. Will also send ground today for Morlaix OGs. 7 trains men and materiel left Morlaix for Quimper way of Landernau night of 3/4. Greatest concentration of Germans in Finistere believed at Sizun. Send 2 loads AA and 2,000,000 and Chads sack to Kankan."

4 August From Hilary (1235)

"Send 1 OG and 1 load AA to Brazaville tonight or tomorrow night. Hope to be there ourselves. Guides to Morlaix will be there."

4 August From SFHQ to Hilary (1236)

"Speed of American advance necessitates immediate orders for maximum resistance activity. Above all give us targets for aerial attack which you cannot deal with yourself. Guides with Angouleme password should be set in motion immediately. Urgent you soonest particulars grounds Guimiliau."

4 August From Hilary (1237)

"Reception ready for Guimiliau OG at St Likis. Ground protected. Guides and armed men ready there. Viaduct not mined."

5 August From SFHQ to Hilary (1238)

"In addition to specific targets already given to you for preservation it is now high priority task to preserve from destruction all permanent works in your area. Therefore any harassing activities must be carried out without blowing up major works."

(1232) C-6113 2 Aug 44
(1234) C-952/31 4 Aug 44
(1236) C-201 4 Aug 44
(1238) C-281 5 Aug 44

(1233) C-147 3 Aug 44
(1235) C-973/32 4 Aug 44
(1237) C-1007/27 4 Aug 44

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JEDBURGHS

Operations, Team Hilary (Cont'd)7 August From Hilary (1239)

"German troops massed between Plouneven Nouedec and Plounevez-Mouedec National Highway for 3 or 4 kilometers. It looks as though the Boche wants to stay around here."

7 August From Hilary (1240)

"600 enemy at Morlaix ready to surrender to Americans not French. Same said of 1000 at Plounevez Moedec. Can you tell Americans to do something now."

8 August From Hilary (1241)

"Protection road Morlaix-Brest difficult. Have only few armed companies in that area. Actions still going on in areas by-passed by Americans."

10 August From Hilary (1242)

"We are at Morlaix. Military and civil situations complicated. Mopping up in the district by Americans and patriots. Regrouping of forces taking place. Political troubles. American support very good. Report will be sent soonest possible. Impatiently await government officers. Urgently need money."

11 August From Hilary (1243)

"Charente, Military Head for Morlaix to try coordination FTP difficulties. Trying contact Colonel Eono. Send urgently 2000 uniforms and 2000 brassards. Give money and instructions amount pay and aid to volunteers."

11 August From SFHQ to Hilary (1244)

"Please reply to our cables. Have asked for news officers dropped near St Likis night 5/6. Aloes anxious contact you. Send us letter box. Stay with Hilary until overrun. When able contact advance elements and ask to be taken to SF Detachment. All here are well and send love. Glad to have news of you."

12 August From Hilary (1245)

"Parachutists region okay."

12 August From SFHQ to Hilary (1246)

"Very glad news 12 parachutists. What has happened to their radio. Will you pass their messages until it is working."

(1239) C-1183/38 7 Aug 44
(1241) C-1275/40 8 Aug 44
(1243) C-1471/73 11 Aug 44
(1245) C-1524/44 12 Aug 44

(1240) C-1208/39 7 Aug 44
(1242) C-1399/41 10 Aug 44
(1244) C-912 11 Aug 44
(1246) C-1044 12 Aug 44

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Operations, Team Hilary (Cont'd)14 August From Hilary (1247)

"OG parachutists dropped August 5th mission accomplished working with maquis. Have no radio. No news from you. Sent 6 messages through General Ernest, commander task force A. Need radio, also arms for maquis. Drop same place Guimiliau. Contact us through Hilary."

15 August From SFHQ to Hilary (1248)

"Until government officials arrive contact Aloes on all questions civil affairs."

18 August From SFHQ to Hilary (1249)

"Berthaut Chef FFI Finisterre has been sent large sum from here. You should contact him for financial assistance. He is with Aloes. Impossible to do any more air operations to Brittany from here."

18 August From Hilary (1250)

"FFI organization now taking place and control FTP liberation Landivisiau, Plouneour, Morlaix, Plestin. No possibilities. When effective movement takes shape will send details. Urgent your aid if you wish results."

18 August From SFHQ to Hilary (1251)

"Warn Horace that the political and military situation at Landerneau is grave. We need medical material urgently."

19 August From SFHQ to Hilary (1252)

"It is difficult to aid you from here. Again we ask you to establish contact with Aloes. We are warning Horace."

20 August From Hilary (1253)

"For Horace. Contact Hilary at Landerneau."

22 August From Hilary (1254)

"For Hilary. Horace okay in contact 8th American Corps."

31 August From SFHQ to Hilary (1255)

"We desire that you return to London as soon as possible. Bring with you all your radio equipment. Proceed to the 3rd Army and ask to join the SF Detachment with the 12th Army group. We are warning them of your arrival. We have warned Aloes."

2 September From SFHQ to Hilary (1256)

"We are mounting a sea operation next Wednesday from."

(1247) C-1649/48 14 Aug 44
 (1249) C-1670 18 Aug 44
 (1251) C-2025/56 18 Aug 44
 (1253) C-2215/60 20 Aug 44
 (1255) C-4098 31 Aug 44

(1248) C-1375 15 Aug 44
 (1250) C-2012/55 18 Aug 44
 (1252) C-1818 19 Aug 44
 (1254) C-2412/62 22 Aug 44
 (1256) C-4697 2 Sept 44

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JEDBURGHs

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Benodet near Quimper to bring back to London the Jedburghs in Finistere. Urgent you let us know if you can return with them. Bring all radio equipment with you. Congratulations on good work."

From Report of Team Upon Return from the Field - 17 Jul to 2 Sept 44

Mission

[Team Hilary was alerted at Milton Hall on 2 July for a mission in Brittany, our area being specifically the department of Ille et Villaine. Our area, however, was changed to Finistere the day before we left for London, 7 July. We were briefed upon our arrival in London and were prepared to go over the ninth, but weather and one thing and another held us up for a week.] Our mission was to drop on a reception committee arranged by team Giles south of Huelgoat, and proceed from there to our proper area ~~and~~ to work organizing and arming the resistance. This entailed ~~principally therefore~~ the finishing of dropping grounds, and the sending to London by radio of our requests for arms. We were further told to keep the resistance in abeyance in order that the Germans would not be aware of the extensiveness of the arming that was going on in Brittany.

Finally on the night of the 17th we were dropped on the reception committee that had been arranged for us. [We were in the plane about three hours, an uneventful though tense three hours. We made one bad pass at the field, and fortunately Marchant didn't follow the orders of the dispatches for he yelled the command "go" when the red light went off, but the given didn't come on. The next pass did the trick all right and out we went.] We all landed hard but safely, except for Marchant who gave his head a good bounce and was a bit stunned for two days. [The instant I hit the ground

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twelve Frenchmen were on my back trying to tear off my chute, slapping me on the back, and generally just plain raising hell. We begged them to be more silent, but to no avail. They claimed that the Germans were afraid of them. Captain Lebel of team Giles (1257) met us on the field and escorted us to the local Maquis. It was hard to believe, but we were back in France and it was grand feeling, believe me.

Conditions as we found them in Finistere

The general picture in Finistere to say the least was confused upon our arrival. The exact numbers of Maquis, their location and their strength was not known. The disposition of the enemy was difficult to ascertain. The resistance groups called FTP were the best organized, if one can apply the word organize here, while the group called Liberation were completely disorganized and in many cases non-existent. At least the FTP had taken to the Maquis and were armed with a few German pistols.

Liberation, on the other hand, were still living at home and working as usual, hiding what arms they might have had. This fact in addition to their political differences, for FTP was communist or socialist, while Liberation was non-political, made for bad feelings between the two groups in some cases extreme bad feelings. FTP groups were usually young men with no military training whatsoever, while Liberation had older, more cautious, former soldiers as its men. Once organized and armed, Liberation groups were more easy to control, but regardless, much must be said for both. The extent of training everywhere was deplorable. Men carried pistols and Sten guns, ^{loaded} ~~evaded~~ and cocked in their belts.

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Grenades were thrown about carelessly, and so forth. At odd moments one would suddenly hear a shot, to find out later that it went off by accident. This we experienced everywhere. All had an intense hatred for the Germans; their loyalty and faith could not be doubted for a moment. We were received everywhere as heroes; the uniforms we wore had a great effect on their morale.

Life in the Maquis

We stayed for two days in this first Maquis we saw near Ceat-cod, looking for our equipment that had been badly dropped. At last we found two packs and the radio, but 1st Lieutenant Chadbourn's pack and the three carbines we never found. While there we tried to establish contact with the north, that is with our area. This was difficult for little was known about the north, and the Germans throughout the area seemed to be moving constantly from place to place. Finally we did arrange for our transportation to a village just north of Paulhoven, where there were quite a few men in a Liberation group that is living at home. A local doctor drove us there in a car with all the doors and windows taken out. To say the least, the trip was hair-raising for twice the car stopped on us with motor trouble and we had to go through the town of Paulhoven crossing the main road, Carhaix - Morlaix. But the trip was made without any encounter with the enemy and we arrived at our safe-house, a small farm.

We stayed at ^athis farm gradually getting contacts with the north, and sending to London by radio the locations of glider landing grounds and dropping grounds in that area. After four days it was obvious we could no longer stay there, 30

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[however, for talk had spread throughout the countryside of our presence and it was sure to come to the wrong ears eventually. We had tried to move north to a Maquis near Scriquac after two days, but had run into a German cordon just south of Scriquac. We were warned of this just in time and turned back. Well, after four days there we pushed off on foot with a

couple of guides, definitely not professional guides by the way. ^{we made} making our way to a FTP Maquis just south of Querlesquin.

[This trip took us all night for we had to circle far to the east away from Scriquac. We came close to several German patrols but were never seen by them. It was extremely hard to keep the guides from talking and why we weren't caught up at times was beyond us.] We arrived at this FTP Maquis at dawn, the men ~~too~~ just coming in from a reception committee.

Here we stayed for four days, finally being driven out by an attack of Germans and French militia. As far as organizing and arming the resistance we really got started here. [sending in landing fields to London, and contacting all the leaders and would-be leaders of Maquis and would-be Maquis respectively.]

Most of our time here was spent in talking and ciphering. On the afternoon of the fourth day a group of twenty men from a Maquis in the Colesdu had taken refuge from a German attack in this Maquis of ours, bringing the Germans in on their tail. When the Germans, roughly three hundred, and well armed, attacked us from the south, we packed up our equipment and started to move slowly towards the northwest. We had gone down into a valley when suddenly firing opened up in front of us on the side of the valley. [Apparently, we thought, we were surrounded.]

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We then hastily made for the east expecting to run into fire at any moment, but it never came fortunately.] Once more we were on the move to another Maquis further north, and again by a very circuitous route. The engagement cost us one lightly wounded, the Germans two trucks and several killed and wounded, and the French civilians two burned farm houses and several hostages taken.

After a night of marching in drenching rain, we arrived at our new Maquis, as yet only partly organized and completely unarmed. It was situated on a very steep side of a valley, heavily wooded, three miles north of Le Peuttron. This was to be our last Maquis until the Americans overran us. Life here was indeed very rugged, for they had few men and practically no arms or money. We had several alerts while here but either the enemy turned back or couldn't find us in such rugged country. The greatest part of our work in arming and organizing Maquis was done here. We received a constant stream of Maquis leaders and liaison agents all day and night. Many of the liaison agents incidentally were young girls; girls of an unbounded courage. We had many droppings all over our area during this period, the last week of July and the beginning of August. [We repeatedly asked for 1st Lieutenant Chadbourn's equipment to be dropped but it never came. Having no sleeping bag, nor any change of clothing didn't exactly add to the general comfort, but it couldn't be helped.]

Finally our long-sought BBC phrase came over the radio and we sent out orders and instructions to all our Maquis in the area. Our orders from London were to hinder the German retreat to Brest, to disorganize them by guerrilla warfare,

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and to prevent any enemy demolitions of bridges, viaducts, railways, or roads. At the same time our area was changed by London from a north-south axis to a square bounded by Belle-Isle-en-Terre, Landivisiau, Lannion, Plouescat. This was bad news for us, for it meant giving away areas where we had worked and knew the people and the ground, while taking on new areas about which we knew little or nothing. If the change had come a week sooner it would have been much easier for us. In any case road blocks and ambushes were going on all over the place, and at night more arms were being received to arm the men who came flocking to the Maquis as the Americans turned west from Poures down the Brittany peninsula. The general picture in our area of Brittany at this time, the first week of August, was extremely confused. The Germans started going east and then had to turn and go towards Brest. A company of troops occupying a town, for instance, would leave one day for the front, the French would consider the town as freed, decorate it with flags and carry on in general, and two days later back would come the same Germans going west this time. The consequences in many cases were extremely tragic, with people being tortured and killed and houses being burned to the ground.

[Really, it was hard to know exactly where one stood vis-a-vis the American and German troops for rumors were flying fast and furious.]

For the next few days team Hilary [didn't see much of each other, for there were so many things to do that we] had to split up. I, Chadbourn, went down to Le Pouttron where we were protecting a large viaduct and with thirty men organized a

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road ambush for the Germans that were expected to retreat down the main road, Paris - Brest. Soon after we were in position we saw our first Germans, ten men on bicycles. Bren gun and rifle fire finished them off with no trouble. For two full days they kept trickling up and down the road in trucks, cars, motorcycles, and on bicycles. The exact number of dead is difficult to know for some of the trucks were able to run the ambush, but there weren't many alive if they did get away. [The Germans are amazing soldiers in many ways as we were quickly to find. Even though their truck might be shot up and stopped cold in the middle of the road under heavy fire from us from all sides, they would continue to fire back at us until they were all dead. This happened several times.]

Near the end of the second day a battalion of anti-aircraft and heavy-machine guns moved up the road into our ambush. It was obvious that they had been warned of our presence, for they sent patrols around in back of our positions and then let the column move forward. As soon as we opened fire they located us planted on both sides of the valley overlooking the road and then it really started.

They opened up with their 47mm anti-aircraft guns at point blank range, and at the same time their patrols were attempting to surround us. All this time I was advancing along the side of the hill towards the front of the ambush to see exactly what was going wrong. I had advanced several hundred yards when a burst of machine gun fire crackled into some straw piled a few yards above me on the side of the slope. I took good cover immediately, and with my binoculars could

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easily see at least thirty Germans running along the top of the hill across the valley and going towards Le Pouttron. If they had gotten there before we could have gotten out they would have had us bottled up for good, and so I hastily blew the signal for a withdrawal, emptied my next to last carbine magazine on the Germans I could see running across the valley; and then beat it myself. The Germans chased us for a couple of miles taking pot shots now and then, but we all got away safely back to our Maquis.

The next day this whole battalion after very brief fighting surrendered to the American tanks who came down the road. But I am sure that by our actions there on the road for two days we helped considerably in speeding the American advance. [What losses the Germans suffered is impossible to know exactly; we ourselves got away with two dead and four wounded.]

When the Americans overran us we went by car to Morlaix, [a large and very nice town] Here for the next three weeks we worked [hand in glove] with the United States 17th and 15th Cavalry Squadrons, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth Lindquist. The colonel appointed [Captain] Marchant the French military governor of the entire area dominated by Morlaix. The difficulties he encountered in his work cannot possible be imagined. [In the first place the whole town had gone completely berserk; they were going to hand over the mayor, change the government and kill all collaborationists they could find on the spot.]

Furthermore many people who had never been in the Maquis were now sporting home-made arm bands and a German grenade on

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their belt. The Americans required that the city proper, the viaduct, the prison, and the German hospital be guarded by the French leaving their tank troops free to roam the surrounding countryside and round up isolated pockets of by-passed Germans. I myself worked as liaison between the French and the Americans, being one of the few people there who could speak both languages well.] By really extremely prudent and conscientious hard work Marchant succeeded in getting all our Maquis organized in towns and villages in companies and battalions, and sent them out daily as tank infantry which the Americans needed badly particularly in a country with so many hedges. [He was always bothered with civil problems, for everyone there turned to him as having lived in the Maquis and yet being completely impartial and having no politics as they say. We organized a large motor pool of repaired German and French cars and trucks; the Americans gave us enough gas to squeeze along on.]

When the 17th Cavalry was replaced at Morlaix by the port Quartermasters and salvage workers we realized our work there had ceased. We moved all our troops, then numbering near two thousand, toward Brest and the Daoulas peninsula where the Germans were still resisting. [We then came into contact with Colonel Leue and his mission, but we rather had the impression that he had arrived too late to really understand the feeling of the man in the Maquis.] ~~In any case~~ We stayed out there near Brest until the areas assigned to us had been cleared of the enemy and then we were recalled to London. /

[We were told to find the Third Army and then the 12th

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Special Forces Detachment (1258) with the 12th Army Group. We had our own car fortunately, for we only found what we wanted, the SF Detachment, until we got to Versailles. To say the least our reception was badly handled. There were lots of officers and men there who didn't even seem to know how to get us fed and housed. After two months in the bushes we had suggested to us, on the outskirts of Paris, capital of France, a tent to sleep in. Needless to say we all went to Paris and returned the next day to Versailles. From there we drove to the coast near Bayeaux where we emplaned for England, our mission ended.

General

We feel ourselves very lucky in being among the few who had a real Jedburgh mission. Had we been dropped any later than we were our work would have been almost negligible, for it is surprising the time it takes to establish contact. Our mission was a very interesting one indeed we feel. We feel further that we acquitted ourselves well of all missions we were given here in London and over the radio. Personally I was lucky to have Marchant and Pariselle as my partners. Pariselle's work couldn't have been better, and he showed a great deal of courage. As for Marchant, my views coincide with those who knew him in the Maquis and in Marlaix. For his age he showed a remarkable ability in organizing and directing the French. He has an astuteness beyond his years. Many of those people over there we shall never forget naturally, but all of us agree that it was the poor people in every instance who were more willing to help. The rich felt they had too much at stake in many cases. But the Bretons are

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a wonderful race; they're either all against you or all for you.

Financial Statement

Lieutenant Chadbourne ---received ----- 100,000 Frs

Expenses

Lost in pack when dropped - - - - - 50,000

Food and lodging - - - - - 45,000

Returned - - - - - 5,000

100,000

Captain Marchant & 2nd Lt Pariselle - - - - 150,000 Frs

Expenses

Food, lodging and pay to the Maquis - - - 144,860

Returned - - - - - 5,140

150,000

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JEDBURGH

Operations, Team GeraldTEAM GERALD

Jedburgh team Gerald was the seventeenth Jedburgh team to be dispatched to France from the UK.

Members of Team

The members of team Gerald were:

Captain S. J. Knerly, FA (U.S.) (1259) code name, Norfolk.
(Lieutenant J. L. Beaumont, (French) code name, Suffolk.
First Sergeant B.E. Friele, (U.S.) (1260) code name, Selkirk.

Area to Which Dispatched

Team Gerald was dispatched on the night of 18/19 July to the Morbihan area of Brittany, France.

Background of Resistance in Area

Resistance had proved fairly strong in Brittany with almost continuous attacks against enemy communications being maintained. There had been notable instances of the rising up of the population, especially since the arrival of SAS troops. It was estimated that there were 9,000 resistants in the Morbihan area, 4,000 armed.

There were two SAS bases in the Morbihan area - Dingson and Grog. These were commanded by Commandant Bourgoïn, who was in command of all resistance groups in Brittany including the Jedburgh teams sent in. There were two Jedburgh teams operating here - George (1261) in the Loire Inferieure and Frederick in the Cotes du Nord. Arrangements were being made to send nine additional teams to Brittany in the very near future.

Purpose of the Mission

It was the intention of SHAEF to develop resistance in Brittany to the maximum by 1 August in order to render the greatest assistance to the Allied Forces. Team Gerald was

(1259) War Diary Vol 11 p 590
(1260) War Diary Vol 11 p 626
(1261) See p 39 this Vol

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being dispatched to replace team George (now moved to the Loire Inferieure) in organizing resistance in the Morbihan area.

The team would assist existing resistance groups in carrying out tasks required by SHAEF. They would organize new groups limiting the numbers according to the amount of arms available. No action was to be started until ordered from SFHQ. This order, which would be the signal to start guerrilla action, would come in the form of a coded message to be broadcast over BBC. This message was: "Le chapeau de Napoleon est-il toujours a Parros - Guirec?"

The team would make arrangements for suitable dropping grounds so that deliveries of arms could be carried out. If possible it would endeavor to secure a controlled area so that daylight deliveries could be made.

Method of Dropping and Reception Committee

The team was to be dropped to a reception committee arranged by SAS base Grog or Dingson.

Scale of Air Support Likely

Depending on the availability of reception facilities, it was planned to send 1 sortie per 100 men organized - 1 heavy weapons load per 500 men. A tentative schedule was set up as follows:

Initial sorties	50 sorties
Resupply	90 sorties
Heavy weapons	18 sorties
Total	158 sorties

Communications

The team was to be dispatched with a Jedburgh W/T set with instructions to establish contact with headquarters as

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soon as possible after arrival. Should their own channel fail, contact could be established through SAS channels.

Finance

Each Jedburgh officer took 100,000 French francs and 50 American dollars. The W/T operator took 50,000 French francs and 50 American dollars.

Relations with other Allied Units

Special Airborne Services. The team was to be dropped to an SAS reception committee and arrangements would be made with them as to the division of the area for organization of resistance groups. Until the arrival of a special Allied mission the team would be under the command of Commandant Bourgoin, commander of all SAS in the area.

An Allied Mission

Arrangements were being proposed to send a mission of Allied officers to the field from whom the orders of the Allied High Command might be transmitted to the various resistance groups. Upon its arrival the team would come under its command. If intercommunication in the field proved impossible, instructions would be sent direct to the team, as well as to the mission.

Allied Forces, If Overrun

If overrun by Allied Forces, the team was instructed to report to the nearest Allied unit and ask for the intelligence officer. They would not give any details of their work to him but merely ask to be passed to the nearest SF Staff. This staff would identify the team and pass it back to SFHQ.

Action

Upon Arrival in the Field. Upon arriving the team would contact SAS or FFI officer, through whom the Chef de Departement

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would be reached. The team would report their arrival to him and give a rough estimate of the territory they were sent to organize.

If Withdrawal Should Become Necessary. If the team should have completed its mission, or if its return to the UK was desired, instructions for exfiltration would be sent through the team's normal radio channels.

If Captured. The team went to the field with no cover story. If taken prisoner they would be taken as soldiers in uniform performing their ordinary military duties. Every established law of warfare would apply to them, so each member of the team would give his name, rank and serial number only.

Information Provided to Team

The following information was provided to the team prior to its departure for the field:

- a. Enemy order of battle in the area.
- b. Location and description of airfields, dumps and storage areas, and defenses.
- c. Information and location of police and Gestapo in the area.

First Word from Field

On 20 July Gerald reported his safe arrival in the following W/T message: (1262)

"Arrived safely but have lost Eureka. Will not receive broadcast tonight."

Summary of W/T Messages Exchanged21 July From Gerald (1263)

"We are in Cote du Nord waiting contact with de Plant. Much enemy passing from Brest and Morlaix to Loudeac and east. Composed of flak and Marine Infantry."

(1262) C-229/22 20 Jul 44

(1263) C-291/17 21 Jul 44

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JEDBRUGHS

Operations, Team Gerald (Cont'd)24 July From Gerald (1264)

"For next dropping send 300 battledress and boots sizes 7 to 9. Send cigarettes coffee, sugar and 2 million francs."

25 July From SFHQ to Gerald (1265)

"Ground Mary refused because of flak. We ask you to suggest other grounds."

26 July From Gerald (1266)

"Send quickly new Jed set."

27 July From SFHQ to Gerald (1267)

"Hope to serve both Jean and Ubangui tomorrow two aircraft each."

28 July From Gerald (1268)

"Impossible to assemble enough men at such short notice due to dispersion. Send 2 aircraft on Joan with Jed set, clothes, bazookas and mail, rations tomorrow. Send rest Sunday on Ubangui."

1 August From Gerald (1269)

"Contents of 3 planes received. No articles ordered were sent. All of Morbihan are formed. Can you send clothes and shoes. Have two battalions each of 500 but must have uniforms, shoes and dough for them. Are ready for tasks."

2 August From SFHQ to Gerald (1270)

"Allied forces advancing into Brittany. Most important maintain present harassing activity but prevent general flare up until you get orders."

2 August From SFHQ to Gerald (1271)

"Message signalling the beginning of increased guerrilla activity in Brittany."

3 August From SFHQ to Gerald (1272)

"General Koenig's message to all commanders in Brittany giving instructions regarding contacting approaching Allied Forces."

4 August From SFHQ to Gerald (1273)

"The message requesting assistance be given military intelligence regarding the team's area, known as Angouleme password message."

(1264) C-396/38 24 Jul 44
 (1266) C-472/66 26 Jul 44
 (1268) C-858/10 28 Jul 44
 (1270) C-4484 2 Aug 44
 (1272) C-141 3 Aug 44

(1265) C-4202 25 Jul 44
 (1267) C-6017 27 Jul 44
 (1269) C-787/72 1 Aug 44
 (1271) C-6112 2 Aug 44
 (1273) C-928/52 Aug 44

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Operations, Team Gerald (Cont'd)4 August From Gerald (1274)

"Premier success important. In spite of being annoyed with SAS we have mounted a dropping. 2 trucks destroyed 40 Boche killed. No losses for us. Magnificent work."

7 August From SFHQ to Gerald (1275)

"Message telling of the dispatching to the field of Mission Aloes with Jedburgh Ronald as the liaison unit."

11 August From Gerald (1276)

"Contacted and guided one combat command to Finisterre. Saw SF and Division Hq. From them got task to organize entire maquis to guard supply lines. It is being done with 3,000 men. Norfolk is liaison officer with Division and as such controls movements of all. We have captured Huns, been blown out of a jeep, been sniped at. Hq. is now in Pontivy. Are also helping civil affairs. How we doing?"

12 August From SFHQ to Gerald (1277)

"Delighted hear from you. Congratulations good work. As you are not yet in contact with Aloes Mission send us immediately post box where Mission can contact you. Aloes is situated near Quimper and is in charge organization resistance Brittany. Inform us immediately your military mission finished. We will then send you instructions."

13 August From Gerald (1278)

"Contacted Aloes 2 days ago. Situation under his control. Our task finished. Have had no mail, no fags, no nothing. Beaumont slightly wounded. Are all alive by the grace of God. Can we go home. Friele happy with captured Boche radio station."

14 August From SFHQ to Gerald (1279)

"We have cabled Aloes today and if he agrees we will arrange for your return this country. All air operations Brittany from this country stopped. For all requirements you should contact Aloes."

16 August From SFHQ to Gerald (1280)

"As your military mission now terminated you may return London. Contact Third Army and ask to be taken to SF Detachment who will make necessary arrangements your return."

(1274) C-984/85 4 Aug 44
 (1276) C-1330/15 11 Aug 44
 (1278) C-1628/12 13 Aug 44
 (1280) C-6243 16 Aug 44

(1275) C-477 7 Aug 44
 (1277) C-1016 12 Aug 44
 (1279) C-1255 14 Aug 44

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Operations, Team Gerald (Cont'd)17 August From Underfoot to Watermark (1281)

"Gerald reported. Will forward through 12th Army group tonight."

18 August From Yalelock to Watermark (1282)

"Entire Jed team Gerald here. Will try to get them on scheduled 1800 plane from strip T2. Arrive Northolt 1900. Hornaday escorts. Advise by 1500 where to deliver. Have transport meet at airport."

Report on Team Upon Return from Field - ¹⁸ July to 23 August 1944

Mission. [Team Gerald was alerted on 7 July and was briefed in London on 8/9 July.] The mission of the team was to contact Commandant Bourgoin, and to arrange with him to divide Morbihan, and to organize resistance. The sphere of action of Gerald would be in the northern sector of Base Grog in the Department of Morbihan.

[Action at the Airfield. On 12 July Gerald was with Captain Young, the dispatching officer, at Fairford for the take off. On 16 July they left Fairford and went to Harwell. On the night of 17 July the plane was loaded with 24 containers, 4 paniers and the three men. The plane was on the runway revving up its motors to take off when the signal was given to get out of the plane. Later we learned that the reason the mission had been cancelled at that time was that the dropping ground was unsuitable for men.]

Dropping. The ~~next~~ ^{of} night 18 July, the Stirling took off at 1030 hours DBST. The passage from England to France was quiet. [Ten minutes before the dropping time we put on our parachutes, which had previously been fitted, and were hooked up. We were in this order in the plane, Beaumont, Friele, Knerly, the first having a leg-bag of about 80 lbs. On the command "Action stations - go" Beaumont found that the leg-bag was too heavy and had difficulty getting out of the

(1281) C-1971/71 17 Aug 44

(1282) C-1988/49 18 Aug 44

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plane. He got out followed by Friele, but Knerly was tangled up in the dispatcher's attachment to the plane. Getting out of the plane he was tangled up in his rigging lines and his parachute was twisted. By the time the parachute was untwisted he had landed on a road, severely spraining his ankle. Beaumont and Friele landed withing 15 yards of each other a short distance from the reception committee on good ground. After some 15 minutes all of team Gerald was intact.]

Action on Arrival. We were received by a company of the 4th Battalion of the FFI which at that time was commanded by Colonel Robo. [On landing, all four paniers were lost. Three were recovered in the morning, which included our equipment and our radio, but the Eureka was never found. The search for the Eureka lasted until the next afternoon.] This entire operation took place within 1,000 yards of a German camp numbering about 200 men. [It was not until we returned to England that we learned that the Eureka had not dropped from the plane properly and had had to be jettisoned over the Channel.]

We took with our equipment the following sums of money: Our personal money plus 3,000,000 francs in packages of 1,000,000 each, plus checks for 3,000,000 francs in a sealed envelope which was destined for the SAS operating in Morbihan. One hour after we landed that money was turned over to a representative of Commandant Bourgoïn.

The next morning we were guided to a group that was to be our protection for the rest of our stay in Brittany. The name of this group was Surcouf. This was a group of 15 men whose average age was 22 years. It was commanded by a regular army sergeant who had fought in 1940, and had been evacuated

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from Dunkirk, and who had returned to France to fight again.

We were sent with this group, for our own protection at that time, quite a distance (about 10 kms) from the dropping ground. Our quarters at this time were just on the northern side of the border between Morbihan and Cotes du Nord. [That same day we transmitted our first message saying that we had arrived safely but that the Eureka had been lost.]

Contacts. On 20 July we started to contact various resistance leaders in the vicinity with the aim of establishing close liaison with Gerald. This was done as a precaution in case contact with SAS should be difficult. Our contacts within the next 4 to 5 days consisted of Colonel Robo commanding the 4th Battalion of the FFI, Commandant Morvan commanding the 2nd Battalion of the FFI, M Ferrier who commanded a homogeneous organization of which he was the patron and ostensibly commanded. This was a loosely organized, rather poorly equipped group of 5,000 to 6,000 men. Our contacts within the next two to three weeks were Thierry, Marcel, and the confidence man of Maurice, Le Couraly, FFI, who commanded a Battalion in the region of Gueneme and Gourin.

[If it had not been necessary to contact Bourgoin, as was given in our briefing, we could have had under our immediate control two battalions, and by immediate control we mean that two hours after receiving any order from London that order could have been transmitted and carried out. Besides that, we had one other battalion with which we could have established contact within six hours to carry out any orders which were given.]

On 24 or 25 July Beaumont, having arranged a rendezvous with Bourgoin, changed into civilian clothes, and with falsified

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papers proceeded to the rendezvous 60 kms from where we were staying. In doing so he passed through Pontivy, which at that time was occupied by approximately 500 Germans, and arrived at the rendezvous half-an-hour ahead of time, waited two hours for the contact with Bourgoin, who did not turn up. [We were mad, and thoroughly disgusted with SAS tactics. The stories which we heard of the SAS led us to believe that the work that they had been doing was contrary to all aid which should have been given to the resistance. It seems that in action they actually took command of resistance in the area, whereas the mission of the Jedburghs was merely to advise, and take over leadership only in instances where it was needed.]

Three or four days later, contact with DePlante was established, and they were completely in agreement at that time with the work we had already done. We made it clear to them that as Jedburghs we would operate independently. He was in accord.

Organization of our Battalions. As far as was possible the battalions were autonomous units, [that is to say that the chief of the battalion ran his battalion exactly as he saw fit, and that we interfered with that part of the work just as little as possible. We asked what they wanted with regard to arms, supplies, etc. and they made it very evident to us that their main needs were clothing, shoes, coffee, sugar and money, and anti-tank weapons.]

The men in the region with which we were interested were mostly those who had left on the day of the landing in Normandy of the Allied forces. Some had been in the Maquis for over a year, but the great majority had entered the Maquis

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then. These men ranged in age from 17 to 60, the average age being about 26.

They had been armed somewhat through the BOA and in some instances by the SAS. Their armament was not complete.

We had been told before leaving by Colonel Eono that it was the habit of Bretons to pay for whatever they got. Consequently, we arranged to pay the battalions, at least to start with, in the following manner:

Each soldier received 200 francs per month, plus 1,000 francs for his wife, plus 600 francs for each child. We also endeavored to pay for their food while in the Maquis.

Having turned some 6,000,000 francs over to De Plante we had only 750,000 francs left for our own personal use. 400,000 francs of that was spent in a short time. In a telegram we asked for 2,000,000 francs which never arrived, consequently we had a small amount of resources, and could not undertake to pay all three battalions if money was not sent; however, we think that they were satisfied.

Morale of Soldiers in the Maquis. We were very interested in the question of morale. We were surprised and greatly pleased to find that despite four years of German domination their morale was as good as it was. Never once, when having to ask for volunteers, did we not get 100 per cent response.

[We were interested in the effect that the bombing of several large towns had on the civilian population. They were convinced that the bombing was justified and that it was the fault of the Germans who were there; they took it with great fortitude.

The people, peasants and small town families, were most kind and most helpful in selling us food and giving us protection, and supplying us with invaluable information.]

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Work Which We Did. We had a group, the members of which had been soldiers in the French engineers, which was commanded by one Raillard, a 2nd Lieutenant in the French reserve. They were concerned with communication sabotage in our area. They destroyed necessary railroad communications, telephone communication and in general made a nuisance of themselves.

On leaving England we were given a sentence on receipt of which to start a general uprising in our area. That communication came 24 hours late. We had heard a rumor that American forces were advancing into Brittany, consequently we gave restricted orders to start attacking convoys and generally harassing the Germans. On the night of 3 August we, with our section, took to the road. The following is a description of the action which took place:

We placed ourselves on the road from St Caradec to Pontivy hoping to contact the Germans coming down that road.

In placing ourselves in the road we had no idea from which direction they would come, consequently we split up our force of 12 men which included all of team Gerald into forces, armed as follows:

Each force had one Bren, 25 magazines, 4 Stens and 1 carbine.

We also carried, perhaps more hopefully than wisely 12 pounds of 808, plus cordex, Bickford detonators and ignitors. We thought that if possible we would blow a tree in the path of the convoy, thus stopping it. Again more by luck than by brains, we decided to blow a tree just at the north end of the road, expecting the Germans to come from the north. Knerly and Friele placed the charge on the side of the tree

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and attached to it a piece of Bickford 2" long. We blew the tree just in front of the convoy, killing some of the Germans and partially demolishing the first vehicle. The convoy consisted of three vehicles, two of which were troop carrying vehicles and the third was a volkwagen. We had two signals arranged, the first for opening fire was the sound of the explosion, and the second, for retreat, was a long blast on a whistle. The Bren opened fire on the convoy, and the action lasted four minutes.

The net result, which was ascertained the next day from a farmer who had helped to clear away the debris, or rather was forced by the Germans to clear away the debris, was two cars destroyed and thirty Germans killed, including one officer, and 15 wounded; our penalty was nothing. [except that we were a little nervous.]

Liaison. Our liaison was established by two men in our group who could still travel inconspicuously, plus two women who lived in Pontivy and who gave us useful information. Our liaison was fast, efficient and trustworthy.

[Only on one occasion did any other people visit us at our HQ which was in a very small wood, and it turned out to be a good lesson, because this man who came to visit us was the liaison agent of Colonel Robo and was caught by the Gestapo the same afternoon with Colonel Robo. They were both taken to Pontivy and severely beaten, and it was later discovered that the liaison agent told the Gestapo everything they wanted to know. The Gestapo in Pontivy knew that there was in the area a team of three persons who were known by the following names: Captain Steve, Lieutenant de Beaumont, Sergeant Freddy,

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the French not being able to pronounce the surnames of the first and last members of the team. They also knew that we had a radio in the area. Two hours after Colonel Robo and the liaison agent were arrested, news was brought to us and we immediately packed up our gear and left for an area which had already been reconnoitred as a possible hideout. The next day our area was visited by a force of approximately 100 Germans. They found nothing.

Our movements in changing our quarters were often made by day, taking advantage of the terrain. We never stayed in an area longer than five days and were continually moving in the area Mur de Bretagne, Loudeac and Pontivy. As a result of moving around, our HQ was never taken; not more than two people outside the group ever knew where we were, and those who knew could be trusted.

Our personal actions against the Germans consisted of small attacks on roads and against vehicles, and then running away. Our other actions consisted of the patrolling of the roads and keeping in touch with Pontivy, which was the center of action for the Germans, in the hope of transmitting information on to the Army when it moved into Brittany.

Having just attacked this convoy, we doubled sentries that night and sent out small parties to reconnoitre our entire area to see if we were being chased by the Germans. At 11 o'clock in the morning two of our patrols returned very excitedly saying that they had seen American tanks. They could not believe this, and we did not believe it. The last news we had of the Americans was that they were in Avranches. Nevertheless, we immediately packed up all our equipment and the

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radio and stored it in a farm about 6 kms away. Three hours later we met an advanced column of Combat Command B which was advancing to Brest. They asked us for information on the roads, so we went with them. [We had with us at that time some of our money that was left, our personal armament, some extra clothes and our codes.] We were given a jeep and with it guided the column through St Conac to Finisterre. We were at the head of the 6th Armored Division advancing along the main road to Brest from Rennes. [Consequently we personally liberated about eight French towns. At several towns we were met by the Mayor and presented with bottles of champagne and kissed by hundreds of French girls, and every three miles along the road we had to stop and shovel out the flowers.]

Arriving at Carhaix we were shot at by machine gun fire, which just missed us, and the column was stopped for one and one-half hours while a small pocket of resistance was wiped out by tanks. We could not enter Carhaix that night because there was a garrison of 1,500 Germans which held that critical town.

[That night Captain Knerly met Colonel Read who commanded ^aby Combat Column. He asked me to come to Brest with him to serve as interpreter and aide.]

From Carhaix, (the column having by-passed it) we went north to Morlaix advancing past the town of Le Cloitre. We were fourth in the town. The first vehicle was a reconnaissance vehicle, followed by four jeeps, the third being ours. Coming up a small rise in very open country the reconnaissance vehicle was struck and immediately started to burn. There were casualties among the troops in the first vehicle. There were mines in

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the road, the surface of the road was loosely covered with them, and just as we got out of the jeep to dive into the ditch the car was hit by a shell which turned out to be a 75-mm gun. The jeep immediately caught fire, and two extra gas containers went up in flames destroying everything. It was at this point that Beaumont rose and went to the left side of the road where there were some Germans who wanted to surrender. He took seven prisoners, of which one tried to get away. [Result six prisoners. One of the prisoners advanced with his hands over his head as had the others, but as he approached us his hands went down to his pocket. Result: one .45 slug in the leg. On searching him we found two grenades. Further result, one bayonet wound.

These German prisoners were just like the previous dead Germans we had seen. They were poorly clothed, very dirty and very young. They formed part of a regiment that had been sent up to harass the 6th US Division and they had formed part of a line from Morlaix to Carhaix and Quimper. This Division got through the line.

At this point Gerald left Combat Command B and returned to the SF representative at Division. At division we contacted General Grow, Commanding General of the 6th US Armored Division. He put us in touch with Lieutenant Colonel Drosty. We explained the situation in Morbihan to him as regards the lack of unity between SAS and Jedburghs due to jealousy between the two factions (that is our opinion).

[(A short time after the BBC message was sent we received word from SAS that all resistance in the area would be under their command. We defied this order.)]

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Lieutenant Colonel Drosty assumed command of all the Maquis in Brittany. He sent me as his representative to organize all Maquis with the aim of guarding his lines of communication to Avranches.

We returned to Pontivy having established liaison with him, and with a written order from General Grow.

Arriving at Pontivy we immediately contacted De Plante and laid down the law. He was not willing, but he was afraid of the power Drosty held. Consequently for the next week all actions by the Maquis in the area were under the control of team Gerald. [I need not add that the relations between Gerald and SAS were strained.]

Our Actions in Pontivy. [We had not been in radio contact with London for 4 or 5 days, and as a matter of fact when we did receive a message there were 3 or 4 blank pages in our pad. On returning to London we learned what these messages were, and fortunately all instructions given to Gerald were carried out 24 hours before they were sent.] We were told to give all aid to the Division going through. [Quite unnecessary as two-thirds of Gerald was American and one-third almost American.]

Colonel Drosty was very satisfied with the work we had done. Here is what we did:

We immediately dispatched the three battalions over which we had immediate control to the main road from Brest to Rennes with these instructions: Patrol the roads in groups of five or ten, establish sentries at all cross roads, and warn any convoys passing of German actions that may have been seen. SAS was charged with guarding the roads south of the main road. Our sentries guarded the road and its borders to about

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1 kms in depth on each side from Carhaix to St Meen.

[In Pontivy we established an office in the Bureau of Civil Affairs to facilitate liaison with Division. That liaison was never necessary because the job was already done. At Pontivy we helped the Civil Affairs people with their job and were of more assistance to them because we knew the town, we knew the people and we knew what had gone on in the town. We, in instances, told them who had collaborated and who to trust and who not trust.

Wireless operator Friele was constantly on the look out for a proper radio station in the town. We located a chateau that had been the radio center for Brittany. Friele moved in and used the station to transmit his messages. He used a Jedburgh set which was attached to a huge aerial and had only to touch the key to get QSA 5 from London.

On 18th at Pontivy, after conference with a representative of Aloes, (1283) we left ~~Pontivy in an automobile that had been given to us by some people.~~ ^{for} We went as far as Rennes where we contacted SFHQ who relayed us to General Bradley's advance HQ. There we met General Seibert, who was G-2 to General Bradley, and who was very interested in the work we had done. We gave him all the information we could about the situation in Brittany and especially in Morbihan. [In repayment, he gave us a bottle of Cognac.] From there we obtained transport to the main HQ of the Third Army where we contacted SFHQ which was at that time north of Coutance. [We arrived at 10 o'clock in the morning on 18 August and we left at 3 o'clock for the airport.] At 6 o'clock in the evening we left for England and arrived here at 6:55. We met Major Young at approximately

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7:30 at an air drome just outside London, and were taken to London.

Criticism - Radio. It is advisable, in taking a radio along, to take also collapsable aerial because it takes a great deal of time to get the radio itself working thoroughly, despite the fact that on landing the transmitter was in good condition. The receiver was totally demolished, but fortunately we had taken two. The broken receiver later was destroyed and buried.

Messages from London as a result were often trite and from 24 to 40 hours late; that is to say, any action contained in a message, other than those we laid on in two reception committees, was already carried out by the time messages were received.

We asked that messages be written in English to facilitate deciphering. In a number of cases they made deciphering particularly difficult by sending them in French.

Reception Committees. Reception committees were as a rule only fair, - the planes dropped haphazardly in two instances. It would be advisable in a telegram to state the approximate time at which a plane would arrive. It is a most disheartening feeling to sit at a field, an open field, bordered by two roads heavy with German transport and wait there for a period of time which endangers not only the reception but the lives of the men involved. In one instances we waited until 2:30 in the morning and finally left leaving, as security, two men just in case. Fortunately one of these men took the situation in hand when we heard an air plane and with the other man made the reception committee. The lights were as

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follows; one flash light just flashing any letter and the other light being a cigarette lighter 20 yards away. The plane dropped containers. Later when asked what signal he had given the man said that he had just flashed his torch. This was particularly dangerous that night because in a wood 1500 meters away was a German supply depot. The containers were hurriedly camouflaged and the contents dispersed early next morning. In a second instance we waited for three planes, two dropped perfectly but the third was attracted by another letter which was flashed some 15 km north of our reception ground. This entailed a round trip of some 35 kms crossing the main road full of German convoys to find out whether that plane had dropped two million francs we had ordered plus bazookas and other material. On investigating the contents of their containers we found that the plane destined for us carried in one panier women's underclothing, silk stockings and shoes. We cannot explain how this came about. In fact, all containers that were sent to us contained material that we had not ordered. If SFHQ feels that a Jedburgh team is qualified to go into the field and are qualified to use their own judgement, please send them if possible what they order and not what they think they need. As a result some places in France are buried with about 60 bayonets of the last war, items which we could not use. We ordered the following Material:-

Bazookas, mines, tire bursters, another Jedburgh set to replace ours, clothes for the men, shoes and two million francs. Not one item was delivered. The question of clothes, I cannot stress the moral factor involved in sending clothes to these

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Maquis. I have seen people fight with clothes they had worn and had been wearing since the war started. I seen people fight in wooden shoes with straw for stockings. We had promised them that we would clothe them and pay them. Fortunately, in spite of not being able to carry out our promise, they responded most willingly to anything that was asked.

Our Comments on the Briefing. The briefing was excellent as pertains to military dispositions in our area. The terrain given in the briefing was altogether incorrect. We were told that the terrain would be much like England: it was not. The country was perfect for guerrilla warfare - the area being divided into very small plots of land, averaging about half an acre surrounded by dykes 4 feet high, on top of which grew vegetation.

We avoided woods as much as possible and preferred to stay in small clumps of trees within which we made small houses. The only things that could possibly give us away were traitors or the smoke from our fires. We were never found.

Further Comments on SAS. From what we gathered at the briefing we knew before we started that contact with the SAS and liaison with them would be most difficult. On arriving there we found this to be absolutely true. Perhaps contrary to our orders avoided them as much as possible but as I have stated before liaison with them was effected. Jedburghs and SAS cannot work together. We heard that Frederick (1284) had the same difficulty. They should be used, in our opinion, strictly as OG groups of fighting men. Their fighting qualities were excellent but as for diplomacy and tact and organization, Jedburghs are much better.

(1284) See pp 33 this volume.

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The SAS in Brittany made our task harder because of pitched battles which they had had with the Germans. It was no secret to the Germans in that area that SAS were operating there, and later it was no secret that there was a team of three persons with a radio operating north of their base.

One item that may interest any committee investigating atrocities was that at Pontivy. Working in small forces, we conducted many investigations about collaborators and atrocities. (This of course is not a Jedburgh task but I felt that helping the American authorities beside my work for Colonel Drosty could be of some assistance.) In the course of my inspections, I investigated a school house at Pontivy, which was the one building that was completely destroyed and gutted by the Germans before they evacuated the town. This school house contained the Gestapo and Feldgendarmarie Headquarters for Morbihan. Just outside the school we found, or rather it was pointed out to us, the body of a man that had been completely burned beyond recognition. I saw this body 24 hours after the fire. A young French boy scout had found the body and he brought us dog tags of an American soldier that had been found lying on the side of the neck of the body. Under the body we found a knife which we believed to be of American make. Note that the dog tags were not found on the body but on the side. The result of my investigation was turned over to the Provost Marshal of the 6th Armored Division and he relayed the information to G-2.

At Pontivy we also helped with the interrogation of collaborators or of German prisoners of war. From one officer we also learned and ascertained the effects of the

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ambush that has already been stated earlier in this report, he having been part of the convoy. Purely for interest sake there were not many collaborators in that area but we trusted no one, even after we were in Pontivy, the liberated town.

General Conclusion. The mission was interesting, exciting and we were dammed lucky. We accepted much more responsibility than was given to us in the briefing. If we did wrong, we are sorry. In our team, we had constantly a spirit of cooperation between the three members, and I feel sure that the three of us will be life-long friends, having faced the same dangers and having done our job to the best of our ability.

Financial Statement

Received -----	250,000 Frs
Additional -----	500,000
For SAS -----	6,000,000

The latter sum was turned over on landing.

The 500,000 was spent in salaries and food for the Maquis.

About 38,000 was in Pontivy, 200,000 was lost in jeep along with our weapons and some of our clothes.

Remainder turned for - about 12,000 Frs.

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Operations, Team DanielTEAM DANIEL

Jedburgh team Daniel was the eighteenth team to be dispatched to France from the UK.

Members of Team

(Major (then Captain) K. D. Bennett) (British), code name "Apotre"

(Captain (then Lieutenant) P. de Schonen) (French), code name "Argentier"

(Sergeant R. Brierley) (British), code name "Florin"

Area to Which Dispatched

Team Daniel was dispatched on the night of ^{4/5}5/6 August to the Cotes du Nord area of France.

Purpose of Mission

There were many Allied groups in Brittany at this time organizing resistance. A mission known as Aloes (1285) with Colonel Eono in charge was to be dispatched to take command of the entire area as soon as the message for the increasing of guerrilla activity was given. Team Daniel was being dispatched with Mission Aloes to provide the liaison link between it and the commander of the Cotes du Nord department.

Method of Dropping and Reception Committee

The team was to be dropped to a reception committee organized by Jedburgh team Frederick. (1286)

First Word from Field

Team Daniel's arrival in the field was announced in the following W/T message from Frederick dated 6 August:

"Drop of mission last night complete success. Contacts made with FFI. Americans reported at Callas this morning."

(1285) War Diary Vol 3 pp
(1286) p 33 this Vol

Declassified by 062147
date 23 January 1979

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Summary of W/T Messages Exchanged

7 August From SFHQ to Daniel (1287)

"We have an important mission for you in Chateaudun region. You will return here as soon as possible. This mission will be done in civilian clothes and by volunteers only. We ask you to inform us immediately which of you three will volunteer. Inform Aloes."

9 August From Daniel (1288)

"Mission completed. Start preparations to return soonest possible."

10 August From Daniel (1289)

"At Underfoot. Transport arranged by Ayr for Argentier Apotre. Arriving Heston 12 hours, 11 August."

(Jedburgh team Daniel returned to the United Kingdom on 11 August to be dispatched on another mission. On this new mission they were known as team Gregory.)

Report of Team Upon Return from the Field - 5 August to 11 August 1944

Our mission was to effect a liaison between mission Aloes and Chef Departemental du Cotes du Nord.

We left on ~~the~~ 4 August with the mission Aloes. Daniel was alone in one aircraft with several packages and containers.

The journey to France was uneventful except for our losing one package, which dropped through the hole without its parachute owing to a sudden movement of the airplane.

We received the command to run in at 1245 hours and jumped at 1247 hours. When we landed we found ourselves in a small field with a winding river in its center and we could hear a lot of noise.

We found ourselves being received by about 100 youths between the ages of 16 and 21, almost unarmed and without a leader. They had heard the noise of the aircraft and had lit two fires in the hope of finding some arms dropped to them.

(1287) B-1787 7 Aug 44

(1288) B-3493/16 9 Aug 44

(1289) B-3568/12 10 Aug 44

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It was quite obvious that we had not dropped on the right dropping ground; no arrangements had been made for us and we were not expected.

We were directed by this Maquis to a local Headquarters. When we arrived we found four wounded officers and sergeants of the SAS who had been there a month and a half.

We waited until early morning and then proceeded by car to the headquarters of Frederick situated about 12 kilometers away.

When we arrived at Frederick's we found Colonel Eono's mission all there. They had all dropped on Frederick's ground on the night before.

[We had made arrangements with the four SAS officers that our packages and containers, which had not all been found the previous night, would be kept at their headquarters and retrieved later. They were not packages belonging to the team.]

We reported to Colonel Passy and Colonel Eono and spent the rest of the morning getting ourselves organized. That afternoon Aloes moved to Kerien, where they installed themselves in a school. Frederick stayed, since he was situated in the Maquis 6 kilometers north of Kerien. We stayed with the Frederick headquarters.

During the next few days it became evident that our mission of liaison between Chef FFI and the Aloes mission was not possible as the Aloes mission, Jedburghs and Chef FFI were constantly touring Brittany on their own jobs and were for a great part of the time together.

[We found ourselves at Frederick's headquarters with little

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or nothing to do and occupied ourselves with anything of urgency which arrived in the absence of other people. We made visits to Colonel Eono's headquarters trying to find some kind of a job which would occupy our time.]

During this time the situation in Brittany was as follows:-

The Boche were completely disorganized and existed only in scattered groups of varying sizes. The main ones being at St Brieuc and Guingamp. Others were reported to be at St Connan and along the north coast at Plestin. The two groups at St. Brieuc and Guingamp were by far the largest.

The Maquis were performing admirably, though the speed with which information and orders could be passed was not sufficiently fast for them to be able to keep contact with all the groups of Germans. Therefore, there was a certain amount of German activity not under surveillance.

The Germans intention at this stage seems to have been to reach the larger towns and to await the arrival of the Americans. They did not wish to surrender to the Maquis. Other Boche were making attempts to get to the coast, presumably to try to get embarked.

Three actions of some importance took place while we were there:

1. At St Brieuc the Germans were occupying the aerodrome and a small part of the town. They had among them considerable numbers of white Russians. It was decided to attempt to get them to surrender. The instigator of this plan was a Colonel of an American reconnaissance column which had just entered St Brieuc. The parlementaire party in a jeep under the white flag consisting of an American Colonel, Commandant Duperier,

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an interpreter, a local resistance personality, approached the aerodrome to parley with the Russians and Germans. They were fired on by anti-tank guns which set fire to the jeep, killing the French resistance chief, badly wounding Commandant Duperier and slightly wounding the American colonel. The two wounded were retrieved by a patrol later on during the night. Next day another attack on the aerodrome at St Brieuc resulted in occupying the position and killing nearly all the Germans and other resistance forces there.

2. The next event was that a party of 200 Germans moved from St Connan and took to the minor roads moving in horse transport taken from the peasants. They moved northeast possibly with the idea of going to St Brieuc or rejoining the German lines to the east. Their advance up to Kerien, was in my opinion, entirely accidental; they had no desire whatsoever to meet the Maquis. In fact, they were using the minor roads to avoid the Maquis. The headquarters at Kerien were warned of their approach and prepared to ambush. The result of the action which was carried out by the officers of the headquarters led by Colonel Passy, was that the Germans were dispersed into the country leaving all their stores and transport behind. One of them was killed and four wounded, one of whom committed suicide before being taken. The Germans were troops of the 2nd Paratroop Division who had been in Tunisia. The two French guides who had probably been forced by the Germans to lead the column were also killed.

3. The third action was at Guingamp. Again an attempt was made by the American colonel in a jeep under a white flag, to get the Germans to surrender. This time he was killed.

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The Americans later attacked the Germans and took the town. The Germans fleeing in small parties towards the west, were reported over the region of Guingamp/Plouaret.

During this time we heard of hard fighting at St Malo but as it was outside the zone of our departmental chef FFI we have no precise information about the fighting there.

The following day 45 German custom officials were brought into Kerien and interrogated and sent to St Brieuc to the American prison camp. Some had come from Guernsey and the Channel Islands.

Jedburgh Headquarters

Frederick's Headquarters was composed of:-

Major Wise
Captain Aguiroc
Sergeant Kehoe
M Marceau (departmental chef du region)

There were also six convoyeuses, all of whom were school mistresses; a Maquisard calling himself Joseph who was in charge of provisions for the Maquis; two gendarmes on bicycles who were liaison agents; and a small floating population of chauffeurs and Maquisards undertaking various duties.

This collection of personnel seemed to work admirably. The work of the convoyeuses was deemed by all of the utmost value and importance. The women had undertaken tasks of the greatest difficulty and danger, such as conveying of orders to distant maquis, conveying of money and information all over the department, reconnaissance and any general duty involving movement in German towns and villages. They travelled about 125 kilometers daily on bicycles, and were in general a magnificent aid to the headquarters organization. The same can be said of the two gendarmes.

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The Headquarters was situated some 200 meters from a farm where the cooking and water for the Headquarters were obtained. The Headquarters had been badly worried during the period prior to 4 August by SS anti-parachutists and had on three occasions escaped from the surrounding Boche, but with the loss of almost all equipment and twice with the loss of wireless sets.

It is very difficult indeed to maintain a Maquis Headquarters even in the densest part of the country side without attracting the attention of the Boche, sooner or later, because of the continual passage of information, arms and ammunition to and from the Headquarters. Various measures were taken to eliminate this danger, such as having report points 1200 meters from the actual Headquarters by moving at least once a week, but this did not seem to be wholly efficacious.

The amount of actual treason among the Maquis is negligible but some harm is done by careless talk, over-enthusiasm and general exuberance.

The Maquis companies or groups in the region varied considerably. By far the best were commanded by SAS. One in particular, Robert, was completely dressed in battle-dress, organized in infantry sections and well disciplined. Others such as the one to whom we were dropped consisted of very young boys with no leaders and armed with only one sten gun per 5 or 6 men. They were badly dressed and badly in need of boots. However, this particular maquis was armed with the arms dropped by our aircraft on the night 4 August and later fulfilled a sufficiently useful purpose by guarding the Aloes main Headquarters at Kerien.

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The spirit and morale of the Maquis and whole population in Brittany was more than 100 per cent. Food and drink was only too easy to obtain with the exception of coffee and bread.

In general, the work of the Maquis in Brittany was of greatest value to the Americans, not from the point of view of numbers of Germans killed but from the fact that the Germans were hunted by day and night by trained Maquis and were never able to set up proper defence positions against the American troops.

[I can see no reason why this state of affairs should not repeat itself where Maquis find themselves in contact with Allied members of Allied forces.]

On 7 August, we received a telegram from London telling us to return with the utmost haste to fulfil a mission at Chateaudun. We waited until the morning of 8 August before going to Mur de Bretagne where the Aloes Headquarters was partially moved. We informed Colonel Eono of our orders and received permission to return to England. [We then made our way to the three-roomed Headquarters of Colonel Powell. We were admirably treated and arrangements were made for Captain De Schonen and myself to be flown to England the following morning. These arrangements were facilitated by the fact that a plan to drop an American parachutist into the Chateaudun area with a mission of liaison with the American air forces in that area, would have been of the greatest value.] We arrived at Heston [after a flight, which the pilot later told us was risky, at 1600 hours] on 11 August 1944.

I forgot to mention that in order to find Third Army Headquarters we approached an American AA site, showed our

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passes signed by General Koenig and asked for assistance. We were made prisoners of war and were not released until we reached brigade headquarters during which time we were disarmed in a suspect area. We agreed to submit only for the sake of speed.

I would also suggest that the number of packages and containers and their contents in an aircraft should be made known to all personnel jumping with them.

Operations, Team GregoryTEAM GREGORYMembers of Team

The members of team Gregory were:

(Major (then Captain) K.D. Bennett) (British)

(Captain P. de Schonen) (French)

(Sergeant R. Brierley) (British)

Area to Which Dispatched

Team Gregory was dispatched on the night of 4 September to the Jura/Doubs area of France.

Purpose of Mission

An Allied Mission known as Etoile (1290) was being dispatched to 2 Battalion SAS in order to provide liaison between the SAS and FFI commanders and to ensure coordination of SAS operational plans with those of the FFI. Team Gregory was to be dispatched with this mission to provide the communications link with headquarters.

Communications

The team was dispatched with two Jedburgh W/T sets and instructed to establish contact with headquarters as soon as possible upon arriving in the field.

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Relations with Other Allied Units

Mission Etoile to which the team was attached would place itself at the disposal of Planete (1291) DMR and Regional Chef FFI.

Action

Upon Arrival in the Field. Immediately upon arriving the mission would get in contact with Planete and set about coordinating the activities of the SAS group and the FFI under him.

First Word from Field.

Team Gregory announced its safe arrival in the field in the following W/T message dated 5 September: (1292)

"Arrived safely leaving at once for Abel. Promised jeep did not arrive so obtained one from Hevlin. Petrol difficult area."

Summary of Messages Exchanged

7 September From Gregory (1293)

"In area Baume Les Dames which is now in hands of Germans. Situation very confused. Were badly ambushed yesterday afternoon. 4 wounded. Astor, Bennett, de Schonen shot. Portalis seriously. Astor asks not inform family yet. Suggest no families be informed till I signal you further. Not yet traced Theodule. Proceeding Abel soonest. Give us by return his latest location and latest situation."

7 September From Gregory (1294)

"Send most urgently day or night on Ground Lemuy Orange. Include 3 inch mortars if possible. If by day 3 smoke fires in triangle. If by night 3 bonfires. This operation needed immediately to prepare advance on Belfort of 3rd French Division and at urgent request General Duval. Have instructed Marksman transfer maximum weapons this area. Vital at present. Know we can count on you to arrange."

8 September From SFHQ to Gregory (1295)

"Will do best send operation Lemuy tonight. Agree no information to families yet. Best wishes for speedy recovery of wounded. Hope you have no more ambushes. Abel still at Fort Lomont. Contact address for Pascal

(1291) War Diary Vol 3 p
(1293) C-4120/24 7 Sept 44
(1295) C-515 8 Sept 44

(1292) C-3867/5 5 Sept 44
(1294) C-4111/12 7 Sept 44

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at Montecheroux 5 kilometers southeast Pont de Roide.
Do not go through Pont de Roide, occupied by Boche.
Password: 'Je demande le commandant Paul de la part de
l'oncle Sam.'

8 September From SFHQ to Gregory (1296)

"Herewith further information daylight. Time of arrival
0840. Fires to be lit 0730. You and or Jed Basil must
come up on emergency channel to confirm this immediately.
If we do not hear from you before 0200 we cannot give okay
to Air Force. Confirm also no enemy flak and see to it
that friendly flak stays friendly."

8 September From Gregory (1297)

"In view impending battle Belfort consider valuable
tasks as working in liaison with General Duval. Essential
use armed jeeps. Urgent by day or night with jeeps on DZ
Leguy or Aigu. Also jeeps from Barker should proceed
here soonest."

8 September From Gregory (1298)

"Submit following. Should be brought to attention
SHAEF. On order of civil authorities Dijon 16 Boche
prisoners were executed today as reprisal against
atrocities carried out by Germans. This appeared in
Pontallier."

8 September From Gregory (1299)

"Have instructed Marksman to send urgently arms for
3000 men. Have sent transport to collect. Confirm to
Marksman that you agree as these arms not needed further
by him but vitally wanted by Arcia to equip fully trained
battalions ready to go in action in support General
Duval soon as received."

9 September From Gregory (1300)

"Everything okay for day operation."

9 September From Gregory (1301)

"Contacted Abel and Stockbroker and had conference
with both. Sent you message their channels re their
urgent requirements. Abel has had rough time and is
tired. Met trouble same day and same spot as us. Amby
not impressed Jedburgh Basil. Are neither well organized
or competent. Carew is away and taken codes with him
thus hampering operator. Besancon reported in our hands,
also Baume Les Dames. Fighting in Dole. Portal is
now out of danger. Unable to use others now. Evacuated
for the moment."

(1296) C-6503 8 Sept 44
(1298) C-4172/17 8 Sept 44
(1300) C-4250/10 9 Sept 44

(1297) C-4141/8 8 Sept 44
(1299) C-4208/36 8 Sept 44
(1301) C-4284/21 9 Sept 44

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Operations, Team Gregory (Cont'd)9 September From Gregory (1302)

"Operation huge success. 86 planes dropped. Containers not yet counted. Very few chutes failed to open. Thanks a lot. Consider this area armed. To assist us tell us where other droppings took place. Any further news jeep parties."

9 September From SFHQ to Gregory (1303)

"Delighted success day operation. Congratulations to Gregory wireless operator. You would never have got planes if he had not been so efficient. Regret bad report Jed Basil. Second Jed going out to them today. Loyton mission has had tough time. Severely attacked. Have asked for jeeps to move over from Barker. Glad about news Portalis. For information, Americans advancing rapidly north Besancon-Belfort line. Last heard of in region Montbozon. Received your cables via Abel and are coping. Is whole situation in Pascal's area confused by inefficient command? If so can you suggest anything to improve it."

10 September From SFHQ to Gregory (1304)

"Yours was only daylight drop yesterday. Night droppings continue to Emile in Haute Saone and to Stockbroker. Air Force reports yours was best organized daylight ever. If you lack men anywhere, we could give immediate instructions to young Alsations interned in Switzerland to pass Jura frontier in small groups. Up to 1500 men available. Good soldiers-well organized. No arms. Suggest speedy preparation new large scale operation to arm these and others in Maiche area. Ground must be 20 kilometers from Swiss frontier."

10 September From SFHQ to Gregory (1305)

"Contact with Ligne is through Boulaya alias Barthelet who can be contacted through new prefect Belfort."

11 September From Gregory (1306)

"Abel at present crippled owing to lack transport. Situation so fluid that impossible carry out SAS tasks without this. Urgently require jeeps armed or unarmed so that Abel can carry on good work. Morale excellent but they cannot keep up advance let alone harass enemy. Excellent opportunities for SAS work but mobility essential at this stage of battle. Impossible reach Brian at present."

11 September From Gregory (1307)

"Americans occupied Baume Les Dames and Clerval. Advanced elements in Pompiere. Germans in Pont de

(1302) C-4299/45 9 Sept 44
(1304) C-863 10 Sept 44
(1306) C-4421/40 11 Sept 44

(1303) C-780 9 Sept 44
(1305) C-984 10 Sept 44
(1307) C-4424/48 11 Sept 44

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Operations, Team Gregory (Cont'd)

Roide holding road to Porrentruy and all areas north. Owing to fluid situation am having to change plans somewhat. Impossible get behind lines in transport and intend to infiltrate to Loyton. Will possibly recross lines on foot but progress so slow that overrun before anything can be achieved. Shall therefore continue operate in area forward troops and await chance reach Loyton when opportunity offers. Am informed Jed Rupert captured by Gestapo. Matiere and 12 others arrived on Le Muy. Aspirant Degourville broke leg. Is in Salins hospital. Rest of party now attached to Orcia. Had long talk with Theodule now in Besancon. Emile is north of Besancon. Would like put on record excellent work done by Theodule. Same applies to Alfred. Strongly recommend his promotion to Captain. We knew about Gregory. Glad see you realized he saved day operation due criminal negligence Basil."

11 September From Gregory (1308)

"We asked Xavier to send arms and not men first, owing transport difficulties, second, necessity do quickly, third, our few men well trained disciplined and being local boys know this area perfectly, fourth, we believe in not leaving large forces armed in liberated areas where they will soon become a problem, fifth, morale necessity giving all French men possibility helping push Boche out of France. Xavier told us he had no possibility disarming his men which shows lack discipline. Again remind you FFI discipline specially when composed of large percentage FTP never very good. Ask you reconsider position and urge you cable Xavier to send at least Vickers and mortars to Dacia. This force being immediately under General Duval we would feel happier about it. Will see Pascal reference your proposal. Reference Alsations, will arrange soonest large delivery. Can we count on day operation about 100 planes within one week. This for our information and to enable us make plans."

11 September From SFHQ to Gregory (1309)

"Try and give us picture of whole area. What ops should we close down. What operators and organizers should be sent home. Would you like to evacuate your wounded by Xavier air service. Is Alfred with you. Do you consider Nicholas could be sent home."

11 September From Gregory (1310)

"Please explain to Brigadier Turk thought he understood job to be done by armed jeep crews. We urgently require jeeps to enable Abel to be mobile. If jeeps can be sent could employ remainder of Brians boys."

(1308) C-4499/38 11 Sept 44
(1310) C-4445/34 11 Sept 44

(1309) C-1092 11 Sept 44

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Would appreciate sitrep on SAS to clarify my mind. McLeod to Abel. Says cannot send jeeps before 14 days. Can you explain. Also says depends on decision Koenig future employment. Please amplify. And vows to keep myself in picture and would be grateful your assistance in this. Otherwise one's opinions become valueless."

11 September From Gregory (1311)

"Reference jeep parties, am working in close touch Dual and working out plan in conjunction with him. Please therefore send all parties to report to me. Strongly urge this to avoid confusion which otherwise must arise."

12 September From Gregory (1312)

"Cancel all stores ops this area except Stockbroker and Emile. Reference sitrep, will revert. Consider wounded now evacuated to safe area. Are better not moved at present. They are getting as good treatment as at home and risk of setback due air trip not justified. Alfred now back Lons le Saunier. Suggest when new Jed takes over from Basil W/T operator Jed Basil relieves Nicholas who can then be released. Consider important you retain W/T link with Bellroche at present."

12 September From Gregory (1313)

"Had further conference General Eager today. Have attached Abel to his Division Hq. They will carry out SAS tasks in front advancing forces. Confident they will be employed fullest advantage. General Eager most friendly. Hope you approve my action."

12 September From Gregory (1314)

"David evacuated by 45th US Division Clearing Station. Now well back and I cannot contact. In good hands. Off danger list. Morale excellent and conduct throughout first class. Suggest you inform family at your discretion. Do not worry, he is okay."

13 September From SFHQ to Gregory (1315)

"Jeeps from Harrods left today for your rendezvous. No reply received from Bourgoin regarding squadron. Understand sending of jeeps to Abel from UK depend on decision of Koenig regarding future employment of 3rd and 4th French Battalions. McLeod and Collins in France seeing SHAEF and Koenig about this. EMFFI considering six or seven jeeps allocated to Orgeat mission to you for own use until you conveniently pass them on to this mission. Difficult area. Boche doing utmost to delay advance over Moselle. Two new panzer Divisions reserve quality identified. Franks agrees to eight parties, total 48 men being dropped to attack roads and railways east of Metz-Nancy area. Parties to Join Yanks on completion. EMFFI agree to Abel being placed under

(1311) C-4452/15 11 Sept 44
(1313) C-4608/2 12 Sept 44
(1315) C-1470 13 Sept 44

(1312) C-4607/42 12 Sept 44
(1314) C-4609/7 12 Sept 44

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Operations, Team Gregory (Cont'd)

General Eager. Tasks 4th French present area nearly completed. If other decisions allow, would you recommend whole battalion with 50 jeeps move to your area. Could you guarantee suitable tasks by Yanks. Our job practically finished. Hope to hear more when Collins returns. Good hunting Douglas."

13 September From SFHQ to Gregory (1316)

"Does your 18 of 12 mean no armed jeeps needed. Glad good news of wounded. Are sending arms to Le Russey maquis frequently but only have contact via Berne. Have suggested Jed Henry goes there. Also that that area be dumping ground for arming and infiltrating Alsations. What do you think. Who is new Jed taking over from Basil. Basil's operator has now recuperated his French officer and is working regularly. Says he is in touch with Theodule. Feel that Nicholas, Alfred and Theodule should return by Xavier air service."

14 September From Gregory (1317)

"Have seen Colonel Fournier Chief of Staff of Boulaya. Our views are in complete agreement. Boulaya would like following questions answered. Must recruitment be continued in areas already liberated. Should he organize FFI in mobile units. Do you agree to disarming purely local units as soon as possible. Can he accept officers of Armee armistice who have joined only recently. Answer urgent. Will see Boulaya and Ligne tomorrow and will then send you complete report."

14 September From Gregory (1318)

"Send Alsations immediately to Camp OS Valdahon but only if you can supply arms. They should report to officer commanding camp. Their reception already prepared. They would work directly under General Duval through Orcia. If any aspirants send them as leaders and instructors badly needed. Pascal still requires arms for 5000 men so please keep on supplying. Suggest you send other 2000 men of Roman to Boulaya area north Besancon. Will send rendezvous tomorrow. Is French Captain LR-E ADC to Koenig still available. If so would like him to fill gap left by casualties. Besancon air field now working and available for Dakota operation. Already used by American transports camp. Send urgently by Dakota 1 armed jeep. Promised by Brigadier. Indispensable our work as quite number our contacts still behind lines. Are sure you realize we would never have suffered casualties with proper transport and that our work still handicapped lack armed jeep. Fill up plane with Vickers. Dijon occupied yesterday. Line fluid from Mirebeau Gray to Vesoul. Vesoul being attacked by Americans. Rougemont held strongly by Germans, line then running through Lisle sur Le Doubs, Pont de Roide and road east to frontier. Still some pockets of resistance south this line."

(1316) C-1379 13 Sept 44

(1318) C-4784/27 14 Sept 44

(1317) C-4757/50 14 Sept 44

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Operations, Team Gregory (Cont'd)14 September From Gregory (1319)

"Please give me okay on Heron. Understand from Brian okay but story very odd and full of untruth. Is he one of Langleys men or Darlings. If so ask Darling give me his views Heron stating if reliable worker."

15 September From SFHQ to Gregory (1320)

"Approve all arrangements made by you for further operations Abel. Saw Koenig yesterday. He considers present operation will be over very soon and considers equipping of 3rd battalion on a jeep basis a wasted effort. Shall not therefore send additional jeeps of 3rd battalion but might be able to send some of 4th battalion to operate your area."

15 September From SFHQ to Gregory (1321)

"As soon as contact is made with Allied armies Kilmartin must return. This is an order."

15 September From Gregory (1322)

"Hope jeeps can be arranged as essential for our work. Are Orgeat parties all now in France. Consider no difficulty find employment for all jeep parties. Understand Barker and Spencer also coming. Who commands Harrods. Please keep me informed future SAS liaison section. All goes well with us but cannot reach Brian for movement. Movement behind lines now extremely difficult as Huns both numerous and nervous. Also plenty Gestapo and Milice who have fled with retreating army."

15 September From Gregory (1323)

"Had long interview with Ligne and Boulaya. Both impressed us as most capable and efficient. Boulaya in addition to his organizing has showed utmost bravery last few weeks. Following report is consensus opinion us all.. Orcia, young, energetic, ambitious but somewhat erratic and hot headed. Is now doing good work. Two of his battalions engaged, 3rd being formed. His attitude in the past few weeks has caused considerable concern civilian authorities and he should be carefully controlled. Now working on General Duvals right flank and should therefore occasion no concern for the moment. Pascal, hard working and sincere. Somewhat difficult to handle. Has managed complete unity his groups. They have done since D-day some very valuable work such as liberation of Plateau de Maiche and Montagne du Lomont. Now working on General Duvals left flank and have contributed today capture of Pont de Roide. Theodule, extremely brave, slightly handicapped by his youth. Working in close liaison with Orcia but at same time maintaining best relations Boulaya. Is ably assisted

(1319) C-4776/60 14 Sept 44
 (1321) C-1829 15 Sept 44
 (1323) C-4918/53 15 Sept 44

(1320) C-1735 15 Sept 44
 (1322) C-4939/60 15 Sept 44

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by local Captain Gilles. Emile respected and admired by all. Has done outstanding job with Boulaya and Ligne. His courage, organizing abilities, tact and understanding perfect. He has also kept absolutely to his job which is not always the case as regards others. Consider he is worthy highest praise. His work now finished. Would like to go home. Will send him back next Dakota. Same should apply Alfred, Theodule, Nicholas, also Pascal as soon as his work is over. Ligne and Boulaya would like soonest definite instructions about future use FFI when overrun. Should they disarm and disband all groups or must they organize either in "battalion de marche" men who wish pursue fight outside this area or keep them on spot as "battalion territoriaux" to help maintain order. Would like your decision soonest. Meanwhile Alsations expected Valdahon. Romans should contact Boulaya at Besancon who is prepared to receive his 2000 men to work with American 6th Corps probably in area west Belfort. Chabot and his 1000 men awaited by Pascal at Le Russey Cantonement. When are they due to arrive."

16 September From SFHQ to Gregory (1324)

"Here are directives asked for. FFI can fight alongside troops possibly as organized units or Corps Francs; might be used in temporarily local liberated regions for policy and home guard duties; go home after giving up arms to responsible FFI Chief. These three possibilities - it is left to DMR to decide with which group he should apply which policy. Dakotas no longer available for resupply. Koenig agrees fourth and part of third French battalions continue work under 7th Army as long as required."

16 September From SFHQ to Gregory (1325)

"No SAS operations in Germany planned as not considered vital. Bourgoin might be used to guard L of C and assist mopping up war criminals if 7th Army agree. British jeep parties might proceed with Yanks up to Rhine then probably return UK. All trying meet arms requirements despite weather. Wallace overrun and Loyton probably 17/18th. Conan commands Harrods and Ditcher."

17 September From Gregory (1326)

"Nairne and 4 jeeps arrived. Hoping arrange disposal today. Will revert. Am discussing with Nairne best disposal of Conan force."

17 September From Gregory (1327)

"Aspirants now used as instructors by Orcia. They would prefer fighting job. Have informed Boulaya who can take them over."

(1324) C-1963 16 Sept 44
(1326) C-78/57 17 Sept 44

(1325) C-1964 16 Sept 44
(1327) C-79/70 17 Sept 44

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JEDBURGHs

Operations, Team Gregory (Cont'd)18 September From Gregory (1328)

"Harrods now with us. Have arranged their attachment with 45th Division. Mercer, Nairne also here and of great assistance. Will probably arrange similar attachment Conan force if his proposed tasks with General Bethouart do not materialize. General Eager most impressed SAS and stock very high here."

18 September From Gregory (1329)

"If definitely no immediate employment for Conans force with French army Broad arranging attachment General Eagle to 45th Division who has immediate assignment. Broad seeing Conan and Berthouat, com 2nd French Army Corps, tomorrow 18th. Jeeps delivered to Sicaud today. Commencing work at once under General Eager. Americans enthusiastic Sicauds work."

18 September From Gregory (1330)

"When may I expect reply reference Heron. He is at present acting assistant to Brian. Essential therefore position be clarified soonest. Is Besancon Dakota operation impossible. Please send stuff asked for to Xavier and advise us so can collect."

19 September From Gregory (1331)

"For your information and regarding question future use FFI, General Bethouart with full approval General DeLatre de Kassigny has decided employ FFI in battalions in proportion 1 per regiment. These special battalions only used for guerrilla warfare and mopping up. When they are better trained, armed and equipped they would gradually be given normal military tasks. Men of Orcia and Pascal also groups coming from south such as battalion de la Chartreuse could be first to be used this way."

19 September From Gregory (1332)

"Had long interview General Bethouart today. Discussion primarily with reference to employment Conan force. Wishes to retain Conan so do not propose to proceed further with alternative plan for Conan force to serve at 45th US Division. General Bethouart extremely short of reconnaissance personnel and vehicles. Has requested to transmit to General Koenig his most urgent request for armed jeep squadrons to assist him. Please notify us Koenigs decision soonest. Jeep problem therefore more acute than ever. Would stress that this is an official request from General Bethouart to General Koenig. Besancon airfield is now in full official use with squadron Spitfires and 9 Dakotas. Cannot decision therefore be reconsidered."

(1328) C-159/68 18 Sept 44
 (1330) C-161/80 18 Sept 44
 (1332) C-239/82 19 Sept 44

(1329) C-151/19 18 Sept 44
 (1331) C-240/85 19 Sept 44

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Operations, Team Gregory (Cont'd)21 September From Gregory (1333)

"Excellent groups 200 men in vicinity St Loup. Have done well with captured German equipment but badly need arms. Were up to now working with SAS party."

21 September From SFHQ to Gregory (1334)

"Boulaya returned safely. Is at present getting instructions from Koenig. Will pass these soonest. Anticipate order disband FFI. Are sending back unemployed Jeds via Amberieu or Paris as they think fit. Theodule and Paul must return on Monday's plane. Have passed them this order via Jed Basil. Would be grateful if you could reinforce it. Have also told Pascal and Martin to return leaving command Pascal group which has now retired from the line to Franconite and suggest remainder of Jed Brian should stay there temporarily to aid Franconite. Policy is to withdraw as many British and American agents as possible from France soonest. Are trying to lay on regular Hudson service to Amberieu organized at air field by 4 SFU for their purposes for return of British agents and missions with their equipment. Presume you will stay till Boulayas return and then come home. There will probably be no more operations to your area. Alsations will report to Commandant Berion at Valdahon who is being told to organize Filiere from Le Roussey to Valdahon. Alsations will be armed if necessary by recuperated armament of FFI."

22 September From Gregory (1335)

"Please instruct 4 French party report to Major Johnston, Jed Brian, at Sancey le Grand who is acting as liaison with me. Mercer, Nairne at Morteau also in contact with me. Suggest Emile who is outstanding officer should see Collins whom he knows. Thanks news David. If possible send him best wishes from us all."

22 September From Gregory (1336)

"Contacted Goodfellow. Having further talk tomorrow. Would appreciate your views re further employment SAS. Any amount valuable work to be done particularly with jeeps. Understand from Goodfellow that you wish all SAS return to England soonest. Is this the case. Had news of Wallace who appears to have done well."

22 September From Gregory (1337)

"Please inform Jed Brian that I am at Sion, 6 kilometers south Vezelise. Would like him to contact me soonest as arranged. Expect contact Planete tomorrow. Situation south and east Nancy very fluid."

(1333) C-489/90 21 Sept 44
(1335) C-516/96 22 Sept 44
(1337) C-511/92 22 Sept 44

(1334) C-2783 21 Sept 44
(1336) C-512/27 22 Sept 44

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Operations, Team Gregory (Cont'd)23 September From SFHQ to Gregory (1338)

"Abel reports employment with 45th US Division not satisfactory and suggests going to LeClerc. Abel further reports that the men are tired and suggests rest and reorganization. He has been instructed to contact you. Please investigate and advise."

24 September From SFHQ to Gregory (1339)

"Theodule and Paul arrived London yesterday. Reference future use FFI Boulaya leaving London tomorrow for your part of the world and has full instructions. Confirm Pascal and Martin should return. Will let you know when 4 SFU organize Amberieu air service. Meanwhile the way out is via Major Hamilton, Hotel Cecil, Paris, or possibly Lyon Bron where Storrs is organizing Hudson operations Thursday. Paris route more reliable as many people already at Lyon Bron waiting to come out and operation not taking place until Thursday. Last night's operation scrubbed because of bad weather. Could not stop BBC message in time. Operation on for tonight if weather favorable."

24 September From SFHQ to Gregory (1340)

"Bourgoin ordered your area forthwith to come under command Bethouart on arrival. State whether parties under Conan and Sicaud any longer performing useful function. If not consider they should be amalgamated and regrouped. Have they any transport."

25 September From Gregory (1341)

"Went to Camp Valdahon. Advance party 200 Alsations plus 8 officers under command Captain Baumeister arrived today. Rest of group about 1500 arriving before end of month. Force will be under command of Commandant Georges and will work in 2 battalions attached to French 9th DIC. Instructors from 3 Division already attached to them. Please expedite remainder of arms soonest. Have asked Baumeister to provide 5 Alsatian volunteers to be infiltrated via Switzerland. Have fixed it with Jacques Robin and Swiss. 1 of 2 radio operators could be added to this party. They would contact chief of Alsatian movement resistance now in Mulhouse. This might prove most useful if done quickly. Do you approve. If so, will go ahead immediately and keep you posted."

25 September From Gregory (1342)

"For your information Camp Valdahon up to now was awful mess - no discipline and containers pillaged continuously. Have sent report to Fournier, Chief of Staff Boulaya. Situation now under control as camp under supervision French 9th Division. Please note we will

(1338) C-3036 23 Sept 44
 (1340) C-3196 24 Sept 44
 (1342) C-755/51 25 Sept 44

(1339) C-3915 24 Sept 44
 (1341) C-751/26 25 Sept 44

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ask only for few special operations which we deem indispensable and count on you giving them priority as these requests always backed by French Army commanders."

25 September From Gregory (1343)

"Before passing on news to Bethouart may I be informed please present strength personnel and jeeps of Bourgoin. Please inform Nairne impending arrival. Bourgoin should not contact Bethouart till he has seen myself and Nairne. Contact via Jed Brian who is in touch with both of us. All here heartily reciprocate."

25 September From SFHQ to Gregory (1344)

"Can we pass bombing targets and sitrep information to you for immediate transmission to 7th US Army."

26 September From SFHQ to Gregory (1345)

"Fully agree your plan of infiltration via Switzerland. Advise however that you provide radio operator with plan for direct communication with Sainfoin. Boulaya on his way with all information concerning this problem of communication and other matters. Go ahead and keep us posted."

27 September From SFHQ to Gregory (1346)

"Brian requests money urgently. Could you supply him with necessary. Are you no longer in contact with Brian."

28 September From Gregory (1347)

"Ref arms for Alsatiens - 4 aircraft quite insufficient. Tell us where we can retrieve arms from demobilized FFI bearing in mind necessity proportion heavy arms. Message from Theodule noted. Will inform Captain Gilles. Seeing Brian today and will give him money."

12 October From Gregory (1348)

"Important you fix Paris contact soonest. Vanderstricht away so suggest notify Millet. Restrictions in Paris now severe and had great trouble yesterday smoothing out misunderstanding between Gendarmes and one third SAS. If I had not been available matter might have assumed absurd proportions."

12 October From Gregory (1349)

"Would be grateful of news of Mayer, also Wake. Are they still in France. Would like to contact if in Paris."

(1343) C-757/93 25 Sept 44
(1345) C-3435 26 Sept 44
(1347) C-919/4 28 Sept 44
(1349) A-473/29 12 Oct 44

(1344) C-3267 25 Sept 44
(1346) C-3552 27 Sept 44
(1348) A-472/62 12 Oct 44

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Operations, Team Gregory (Cont'd)13 October From SFHQ to Gregory (1350)

"Captain Cameron has been in Paris for some days. Contact him through Hq British Army Staff, Paris."

19 October From Gregory (1351)

"Leaving for Nantes with military attache October 21. Expect return Paris in about 4 days. Have made all necessary arrangements for Kallenborn."

19 October From SFHQ to Gregory (1352)

"Understand position fully explained by letters Cliffe given you. Position job command with Prendergast okay if SHAEF agrees new appointment. Suggest no immediate advantage you returning UK. Agree you work temporarily Paris. Can send Sergeant Kallenborn to assist you report. If you get new appointment Paris suggest you take it as Collins has no suitable work here but thinks there might well be staff G-1 work in connection with French battalion. Later on if opportunity arises employ these units fully."

25 October From Gregory (1353)

"Have now returned Paris. Can receive Kallenborn any time. During recent visit Nantes with military attache had long talk with Colonel Felix, commanding FFI, working with Americans at St Nazaire. His forces desperately in need warm clothes and blankets. General Maloney, commanding US Division, confirms and states does not believe can keep FFI in line unless something is done. Colonel Felix states can send ship to England to fetch clothes etc. if you can supply. His forces approximately 5000 men and total FFI in Loire Inferieure approximately 13,000. Feel case both genuine and urgent as men actually in line. Can you arrange. Will inform Vernon."

28 October From Gregory (1354)

"Is it okay for me to keep Sergeant Brierley of Jed Gregory here for another few days. I do not, of course, want to prejudice his future employment elsewhere."

28 October From SFHQ to Gregory (1355)

"Morel due arrive Paris Monday. Will bring Penicillin with him."

(1350) A-328 13 Oct 44
 (1352) A-497 19 Oct 44
 (1354) A-927/59 28 Oct 44

(1351) A-597/76 19 Oct 44
 (1353) A-819/18 25 Oct 44
 (1355) A-938 28 Oct 44

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Operations, Team Gregory (Cont'd)Report of Team Upon Return from the Field

The Mission Etoile, ^{to which team Gregory was attached,} (1356) after a lot of difficulty with weather and dropping grounds, finally left ~~this country~~ in a Dakota aircraft from Harrington on ⁴ September 1944.

Our destination was a Maquis-held airfield near Gex. The load consisted of one jeep and the nine members of the mission with kit and a small quantity of stores.

The intention of the mission was to make its way north to the region where it was originally intended to go - namely the Vosges just north of Belfort, where we were to meet and work with an SAS mission under the command of Colonel Franks.

The flight and the landing were uneventful and unopposed and the district in which it took place was firmly held by the FFI. We stayed the night here, or what remained of it, and set off the following morning in the jeep and a prison van given to us by the local organizer. The area was reported generally free of Boche and was in fact quiet. We were delayed by tire trouble during the afternoon and arrived about ten o'clock at Lons-Le-Saulines which was the Headquarters of the US Seventh Army. We stayed here for the rest of the day and that night procured more suitable and reliable transport.

The following morning we set off in a convoy of motor vehicles, the jeep leading and a private car and station wagon following.

We visited some FFI headquarters during the day on our way to Baume-les-Dames. We picked up an FFI chief who undertook to guide us; he was in his own car and led the convoy.

Near Baume-les-Dames we heard heavy firing, which was identified as French Artillery in action. As we approached,

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we overtook a long column of French transport belonging to a regiment of Tirailleurs who were covering Baume-les-Dames. Baume-les-Dames was being held by a strong force of Boche with artillery and one or two Tiger tanks.

We waited here for more than an hour getting information as to the roads ahead of us and then started off towards the north along a road which was under mortar fire.

Some ten kilometers further on, I, as driver of the third vehicle in the column, saw the other two stop at a place where the road started to dip away into some woods. Captain de Schopen was driving the car behind me. I started to slow down when we were fired upon by a German light machine-gun from the rear. The gunner was an excellent shot and the first burst of ten or fifteen rounds hit my car fair and square; I was hit in the back and my left arm became useless. I tried to drive on but found that the engine had been hit, so I shouted to the others to get out. The car was still moving and as I fell out of the drivers seat I trapped my foot under the rear wheel. Captain Portalis was near me and seemed able to crawl, though he told me he was badly hit. We both crawled away to cover. We were being shot at continuously from the moment of the first burst until we got to cover where the rest of the mission were waiting. We then gave each other first aid and waited to see what would happen since we had seen some American armored cars down the road. There must have been some considerable number of troops in the vicinity. Within half an hour of being ambushed we heard machine-gun and mortar fire being brought down on the the Boche position.

We were then taken back to a village some five or six

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kilometers away and handed over to an American ambulance. Those wounded were, myself, left shoulder penetrated, shrapnel in right shoulder; Captain Portalis, four wounds in back and neck; Captain de Schonen, slight head wounds and right shoulder; Captain Astor right shoulder penetrated.

The remaining members of the mission, Lieutenant-Colonel R. Broad, Le Commandant Morrel, Captain Kilmartin, Sergeant Brierley, Private Thompson were untouched.

Captain de Schonen behaved with great courage in assisting others during the period after we were ambushed.

Financial Statement for Team Daniel

Received ----- 250,000 Frs

Expense

Given to the Maquis ---- 150,000
on order of Captain
Aguirec and Colonel
Marceau

Given to 2nd Radio ----- 25,000
(Mission Aloes)

Given to Sergeant Brierley 25,000

Given to Captain Bennett - 25,000

Spent on living in the - 25,000
maquis by Captain
de Schonen

Total ----- 250,000 Frs

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Operations, Team RonaldTEAM RONALD

Jedburgh team Ronald was the nineteenth Jedburgh team to be dispatched to France from the United Kingdom.

Members of Team

The members of team Ronald were:

1st Lieutenant Shirley R Trumps, Inf (US) (1357), code name "Boursier"

(Lieutenant J Dartigues) (French), code name "Boutton"

Technical Sergeant Elmer B Esch, (US) (1358) code name "Pound"

Area to Which Dispatched

Team Ronald was dispatched on the night of ^{4/5}~~5/6~~ August to the Finistere area of France.

Purpose of Mission

Team Ronald was being dispatched to provide the liaison link between mission Aloes (1359) and the commander of the Finistere department.

Method of Dropping and Reception Committee

Team Ronald was to be dropped to a reception committee organized by the SAS base Dingson (1360).

Communications

The team was dropped with a Jedburgh W/T set and instructed to establish contact with the Home Station as soon as possible after arrival in the field.

Finance

Each officer of the team took 100,000 French francs to the field. The W/T operator took 50,000 French francs.

First Word from Field

Team Ronald announced its arrival in the field in the following W/T message dated 6 August (1361):

"Arrived well but dropped on Gilbert by mistake. Am going to make contact with Giles and Chief FFI."

Declassified by *062147*
Date *23 January 1979*

(1357) War Diary Vol 11 p 583
(1359) War Diary Vol 3 p
(1361) B-3187 6 Aug 44

(1358) War Diary Vol 11 p 610
(1360) War Diary Vol 3 p

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FIGURE 37
Lt. Trumps, Lt. Dartigues, and Sgt Esch



FIGURE 38
Mission ALOES at dinner before departure

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FIGURE 39

Colonel Eono, Junior Commander Fox, ATS, before
departure of ALOES mission



FIGURE 40

Part of ALOES Mission

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Operations, Team Ronald (Cont'd)

Summary of W/T Messages Exchanged

7 August From SFHQ to Ronald (1362)

"Learn on good authority Huelgoat not controlled. Have advised Aloes and Giles. Please nominate responsible FFI in accord with Berthaud and Giles."

9 August From Ronald (1363)

"Contact impossible at Ecaloe. Have sent two messages blind. Still no contact with Giles."

11 August From SFHQ to Ronald (1364)

"Have just received message from Tapdance of SF Detachment stating they are in contact with Aloes and Gilbert. Confirm that they are also in contact with you, Francis and Berthaud."

18 August From Watermark to Yalelock (1365)

"Jed Ronald requests urgent bombing Fort of Le Cabellou, one km south Concarneau. Civilians evacuated. Incendiary bombs necessary."

21 August From SFHQ to Ronald (1366)

"For Trumps. Give details of wound and his condition. Bombardment of Cabellou cannot take place now. Trying to get it."

22 August From Ronald (1367)

"Consider Serbons more useful could undertake second mission elsewhere."

22 August From Ronald (1368)

"Trumps wounded when advancing on Var le Meuxaires. Boche at Concarneau."

28 August From Ronald (1369)

"Radio operator Dumas wounded the 16th in region of Dierne. A month in hospital is necessary."

2 September From SFHQ to Ronald (1370)

"Sea operation Benodet will take place Wednesday, 6 September around noon. The boat will carry munitions, 303 serum anti-Charbonneux and medical material. Warn Giles, Hilary and Lt Dumas to be ready with all radio equipment. We will send you instructions tomorrow for

- | | |
|----------------------------|--------------------------------|
| (1362) B-1776 7 Aug 44 | (1363) B-3466/11 9 Aug 44 |
| (1364) B-1964 11 Aug 44 | (1365) C-1743 - 1741 18 Aug 44 |
| (1366) B-2455 21 Aug 44 | (1367) B-4706/82 22 Aug 44 |
| (1368) B-4707/13 22 Aug 44 | (1369) B-190/10 28 Aug 44 |
| (1370) B-2953 2 Sept 44 | |

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Gilbert and Francis. Give us a meeting place. Confirm that there are no mine or other obstacles in the sector. For Ronald - you will remain with Aloes until instructed otherwise and your radio will pass all his messages."

4 September From SFHQ to Ronald (1371)

"For Aloes - we learned from the American army that Hilary is going to return by their means. We have given consent for Gilbert and Horace to remain in Brittany for the moment. Then we suppose that you are going to send by Benodet Giles and Sergeant Dallow of Francis and Lieutenant Dumas."

4 September From SFHQ to Ronald (1372)

"Because of very bad weather the boat will not arrive at Benodet until Wednesday evening. Warn everybody to be ready then."

5 September From SFHQ to Ronald (1373)

"For Aloes. Received your two cables on the bombing of Telgrue. We passed it to the Air Force. We suppose you have warned the Americans directly. Because of bad weather the boat will not arrive at Benodet until Thursday evening."

7 September From Ronald (1374)

"Received your message. We are sending by Benodet Giles, Dallow of Francis, Lt Dumas."

8 September From Watermark to Yalelock (1375)

"Ronald reports 6 September urgent action by warships is required on very important target consisting of batteries on Cap de la Chevre. Neutralization of batteries will open the approach to Couarnenez bay."

9 September From Ronald (1376)

"Request that team Ronald excluding Lt Dartigues return to England. Our work here is completed. Cannot work under present circumstances."

10 September From SFHQ to Ronald (1377)

"You constitute our only means of communication with Mission Aloes. Essential therefore you remain for present. Give us details difficulties which make work impossible. Perhaps we can remedy them."

(1371) B-2975 4 Sept 44

(1373) B-2999 5 Sept 44

(1375) C-647 - 648 8 Sept 44

(1377) B-8700

(1372) B-8595 4 Sept 44

(1374) B-955/63 7 Sept 44

(1376) B-1056/10 9 Sept 44

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Operations, Team Ronald (Cont'd)13 September From SFHQ to Ronald (1378)

"For Aloes. Everybody arrived safely on Benodet. We are mounting still another operation Benodet with material asked for by Captain Murray. The operation will take place in three parts. The first boat will arrive at noon the 15th. We want Ronald to return by the third boat and Gilbert to return by the second if his work is finished."

13 September From SFHQ to Ronald (1379)

"To Ronald for Aloes. Because of the favorable turn of events in Brittany General Koenig requires you for another assignment and asks you to rejoin him as soon as possible. In this case you will no longer have need of team Ronald. Have them return by the sea operation which will take place next week at Benodet. Concerning team Gilbert inform us immediately if there is always work for them in Brittany."

15 September From SFHQ to Ronald (1380)

"We understand from Captain Prevost from Paris that Lt Dartigues wishes to remain with Colonel Eono. We are willing. The rest of the team should return to London by way of the SF Detachments."

Report of Team Upon Return from the Field - 5 Aug to 15 Sept 44

Mission. Our primary mission was to contact Berteau, Chef of FFI in Finisterre and serve as liaison between him and the Aloes mission.

Our secondary mission was to furnish units with as much information about the enemy as possible and to help in the organization of Maquis.

Dropping. At the airport we added a French officer, Lieutenant Dumas, to our team. He was to be our radio operator for the purpose of contacting Aloes.

We departed from the airport on the night 4/5 August and at approximately three o'clock we jumped into France. Everyone arrived safely with all equipment.

I talked to the lieutenant in charge of the reception committee and found that they were not expecting us. We

(1378) B-3260 13 Sept 44
(1380) B-3252 15 Sept 44

(1379) B-3189 13 Sept 44

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Operations, Team Ronald (Cont'd)

found out later that we had jumped in the wrong area and to a different Jed team.

We spent the night in the woods and the next day contacted Berteau in the vicinity of Quimper.

Radio Communication With Aloes. Unable to contact Aloes by radio. Tried for several days but never was successful. We solved that question by having motor liaison with them.

Seige of Quimper. The FFI had surrounded the town encircling 400 Germans who were garrisoned there.

We received word that the Germans in the town would surrender to the Americans so I decided to have a talk with the German commander. I wrote a letter telling him that I was in command of an advance guard of armored unit and that my forces were on the outskirts of the town ready to attack and that he should come to our headquarters to receive the terms of surrender. I gave the letter to a French policeman who brought it to the German headquarters. I had demanded that they send a reply within two hours.

After receiving the letter the Germans sent out patrols and found out that it was a bluff and sent back the following reply that they will surrender only to the Americans when they arrive.

We joined up with the Maquis troops and were fighting in the streets of Quimper. After three days of street fighting the Germans attempted to leave the city and reach Brest. They were ambushed all along the road and very few reached their destination.

Rospordent. Captain Charron of Jed team Gilbert (1381) and myself went to Rospordent to contact the officer in charge

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of the Maquis in that vicinity while we were in the town, which had been liberated the day before. We heard gun fire on the outskirts of the town. In a few minutes all the streets were deserted, Captain Charron and I climbed to the upper floor of a large house where we could cover the street. There were three trucks packed tight with Germans who were standing at attention and firing at everything within sight. At this time all hell broke loose. We began throwing Grenades and firing like hell. The Maquis troops were all in positions in houses and I don't think one German escaped.

Battle of Concarneau. The French forces had bottled 300 Germans in the town but could not get them to surrender. An American task force came up and fired a couple of rounds hoping that this would make them surrender.

The Germans refused and the task force left. The next day Captain Blathwayt and I were asked by the French to talk to the Germans who had requested to speak with the Allies. Taking with us our radio operators we went to a designated house and had no sooner sat down when the Germans opened fire on us. I was hit in the forehead by mortar shrapnel and Technical Sergeant Esch, my operator, administered first aid on the spot and we were soon able to retreat to our own lines. I was taken to a hospital in Quimper and quickly patched up.

The following afternoon I returned to Concarneau and found out that the American task force had returned with reinforcements. I contacted the colonel in charge and with the help of a French agent, we gave him the exact positions of every gun in the town. The colonel explained that he had no infantry

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to protect his tanks. I told him that I could get some Maquis troops who would gladly do the work. I succeeded in getting the men and took thirty with me and went with the task force A on the right side of the town, thirty more going with Captain Blathwayt on the left. The tanks got into their firing position and I placed the men where they could best protect the flanks of same. The Germans put down a terrific fire. The tanks were ordered to take up alternative positions. After the tanks were in position, I told my men to retreat to the line of tanks. Several of the men were slightly wounded and we succeeded in getting them back to the first aid station.

A couple of hours later the American task force was told to proceed to another front still leaving Concarneau in the hands of the Germans.

Concarneau fell three nights later when an aircraft flew over the city and a French officer went all around the countryside firing flares. The Germans, thinking this a big attack, boarded ships and took off for Lorient.

Information. Lieutenant Dartigues had organized a system of reconnaissance and information which was of great benefit. He had agents to go into occupied towns and report back all information to him. All was consolidated and all first hand information was there when needed. It was furnished to the Americans and French in the area and this system helped very much with the destruction of the enemy in this area.

Crozon Peninsula. I was sent to work with task force A under the command of General Ernest, serving as liaison between Colonel Eono (Aloes mission) and the Americans. I worked with G-2 helping to interpret and also obtaining

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Operations, Team Ronald (Cont'd)

as much information as I could from Frenchmen who came from behind the enemy lines.

On 6 or 7 September Colonel Eono left for Paris and I, with my operator, started on our return to England.

Radio Communications. On our dropping, two of our receivers were broken. Technical Sergeant Esch through his own initiative found some German equipment and fixed his receivers. Although our frequencies were clouded with German traffic and the BBC, he was always successful in getting his messages as he could speak German. He also proved to be a very good soldier under enemy fire. On several occasions sent messages through while under enemy fire regardless of the danger.

Audienne. Lieutenant Dumas, taking with him several men, went on a patrol through the enemy lines. He was quite a distance in advance of his men when he was fired on by a German machine gun nest. He returned the fire immediately, doing away with some of the enemy. Looking around he found himself with only one man, the rest had left. Lieutenant Dumas continued firing until he was hit by a bullet which took two fingers off his left hand. When he realized he had been hit, he ordered the man to leave but he refused. The two succeeded in returning to their own lines where Lieutenant Dumas was taken to a hospital.

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Operations, Team Ronald (Cont'd)Financial Statement

Lieutenant Dartigues --- received ----- 100,000 Frs

Expenses

Food and lodging	30,000
Car maintenance	30,000
Clothing	10,000
Miscellaneous	5,000
Total	75,000
Returned	25,000

Lieutenant Trumps --- received ----- 100,000 Frs

Expenses

Food	25,000
Clothing	8,000
Other items	8,000
Lost	4,000
Gave to French	15,000
Lodging	15,000
Total	75,000
Returned	25,000

First Sergeant Esch --- received ----- 50,000 Frs

Expenses

Food and hotel bill	23,000
Clothes	2,000
Wages for two helpers	7,500
French radio repairs	370
Transportation	1,800
Maquis agent	6,000
Entertainment of Maquis officers	9,000
Total	49,670
Returned	330

TEAM DOUGLAS

Jedburgh team Douglas was the twentieth Jedburgh team to be dispatched to France from the United Kingdom.

Members of Team

[The members of team Douglas were:]

(Captain R A Rubinstein) (British), code name "Augure"
(Lieutenant J Ronglou) (French), code name "Anachorere"
(Sergeant J D Raven) (British), code name "Half Crown"

Area to Which Dispatched

Team Douglas was dispatched on the night of 5/6 August to the Morbihan region of France.

Purpose of Mission

An Allied mission known as Aloes ~~(1385)~~ was being dispatched to Brittany to take command of all resistance forces operating in this area. Team Douglas was to be dispatched with this mission to provide the liaison link between Aloes and the commander of the Morbihan department.

Method of Dropping and Reception Committee

Team Douglas was to be dropped to a reception committee organized by the SAS base Dingson ~~(1385)~~.

Communications

The team was dropped with a Jedburgh W/T set and instructed to establish contact with the Home Station as soon as possible after arrival in the field.

Finance

Each officer of the team took 100,000 French francs to the field. The W/T operator took 50,000 French francs.

First Word from the Field

Team Douglas announced its safe arrival in the field in

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Operations, Team Douglas (Cont'd)

the following W/T message dated 7 August (1384):

"Arrived safely but Germans warned. Guide arrested and search made. No sign organized local group in area. No contact made with area headquarters yet. Local bridge blown Sunday."

Summary of W/T Messages Exchanged9 August From Douglas (1385)

"Reported that Boche leaving Port Louis for Bordeaux along the coast in small boats of thirty to forty. Air attack requested."

9 August From Douglas (1386)

"All money with department chief. Contact with Aloes intermittent. Are air ops okay."

13 August From SFHQ to Douglas (1387)

"Your requests for air attack were forwarded immediately to Third Army who allocate aircraft. They do not always tell us here when they attack targets as program very heavy."

14 August From SFHQ to Douglas (1388)

"Cannot do any more air operations to Brittany from here. In absence contact Aloes. You should contact elements Third Army your area and pass urgent needs to them."

17 August From SFHQ to Douglas (1389)

"Confirm urgently if you can receive sea operation required material on beach region Etel. At same time give us location enemy strengths this region. Are you in contact SF Detachment Third Army. If not send us post box where they can touch you."

17 August From Underfoot to Watermark (1390)

"Will supply Douglas with captured material soonest we get authorization. Inform us where he wants arms delivered. May request guide when route is known."

17 August From Douglas (1391)

"We are now situated at Vanne. Plane believe mosquito crashed at Illeaux Moins night 13/14. One body found - Flight Lieutenant Stanley Harrison."

(1384) R-3263/3 7 Aug 44
(1386) B-3502/8 9 Aug 44
(1388) B-2093 14 Aug 44
(1390) C-1884/1 17 Aug 44

(1385) B-3462/9 9 Aug 44
(1387) B-201/2 13 Aug 44
(1389) B-2262 17 Aug 44
(1391) B-4141/23 17 Aug 44

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JEDBURGHS

Operations, Team Douglas (Cont'd)18 August From SFHQ to Douglas (1392)

"Navy desire make use of Port La Trinite. Tell us urgently if town still occupied by Boche. If so, can you liberate it with or without naval cooperation. This would consist of landing marines to reinforce FFI. Understand there is German naval battery at Quiberon Point. Is this correct. If so how strong. Could you deal with it. Send us any information Boche locations and strengths La Trinite area. Have you had satisfactory response Third Army to arms request. If not, send us ground where you could receive Dakota night or day."

18 August From Douglas (1393)

"Due to Boche advance east Etel and Mala Chappe unusable. For airplane or glider operation use airfield Meucun 5 kilometers north Vannes. Runway thousand yards. Must give time of landing for men work on field."

18 August From Douglas (1394)

"Are studying all possible means to supply you with arms including Dakota and sea operations. Also by direct supply through American Third Army. Assume from your 19 that operation by sea is impossible between Lorient and Quiberon. Let us know whether possibilities of sea operation between Quiberon and mouth of River Vilaine. Purpose of sea operation is to land material on beach from boat."

18 August From Douglas (1395)

"La Trinite freed, Plouharnel, Capnac, Loc Mariaquer freed. Booby traps at Loc Mariaquer being lifted. Quiberon Point held by 100 Boche. Between Ponthievre and Plougarell two or three thousand Boche. Battery of guns at north of peninsula protect Lorient. Caliber 340. Fort Penthievel big garrison with guns of 137 caliber. Belle Isle 500 Boche and 7 batteries of 105 and 194. Houat and Hiedic freed."

20 August From SFHQ to Douglas (1396)

"SAS are flying aircraft to Vannes airfield from tomorrow Monday with arms and material for Dingson. Presume you are in contact with Dingson and will share in these deliveries. Confirm that this is so as will not mount Dakota for you until we receive your reply."

22 August From Douglas (1397)

"100,000 Bren round. Supplies of ammunition needed urgently. 400,000 Bren, 200,000 sten, also 400 sten chargers. Third Army supplies nil. Require 100 Bren

(1392) B-2288 18 Aug 44
(1394) B-8146 18 Aug 44
(1396) B-243 20 Aug 44

(1393) B-4180/27 18 Aug 44
(1395) B-4247/34 18 Aug 44
(1397) B-4573/45 22 Aug 44

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JEDBURGH8

Operations, Team Douglas (Cont'd)

guns, 50 mortars with ammunition. To restore faith in Jeds request most urgently that you deliver soonest possible. What are we to do with five agents."

23 August From Douglas (1398)

"Aloes moved out of W/T range. No contact for four days. Hence all information in area is in hands of Third Army and Dingson can resupply FFI. There is no work for Jeds. Demand return on supply aircraft for real mission in east."

24 August From Douglas (1399)

"Urgently request replies today to our questions in our signals two. One, subject five agents and subject return for real mission."

From Report of Team Upon Return from the Field - 5 Aug to 24 Aug 44

The team was briefed during 4 and 5 August 1944 and during this period was joined by 2nd Lieutenant J Peignot for interior communications with Aloes.

The team left for Fairford airdrome on 5 August. [On arrival it was found that the teams' packages were in transit and would not arrive before take off time. The decision to jump without them or to wait was left with the team who decided to go on the guarantee that packages would follow the next night.] Take off was at 2200 hours. [The dropping point was not known to the team until take off time - this meant arranging any emergency RVs while in the air. (It is felt that the DP should be made known as soon as possible in order that an opportunity for proper study of the maps may be given).] The flight was uneventful. No lights were found and the team returned to Fairford where it spent the remainder of the night. [on the floor of the officers' mess.]

The following day, 6 August, the team went to Keevil airdrome and took off at 2315 hours in a Stirling with 15 SAS troops, reinforcements for Dingson. The team had nine

(1398) B-4577/48 23 Aug 44

(1399) B-4687/50 24 Aug 44

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Operations, Team Douglas (Cont'd)

packages - three for the Jeds and six for the Aloes operator who took 3 B-2 sets, 8 accumulators. This large amount of kit hampered the teams' mobility throughout its stay in France. These packages were carried by a second Stirling owing to their number and the presence of the 15 SAS.

The map reference for dropping was given this time 30 minutes before take off but turned out to be 12 miles south of the reception committee. This resulted in 50 minutes searching during which AA fire struck the plane with the team at "running in" and the hole open. Violent evasive action was taken resulting in chaos in the plane and all static lines became entangled. Despite this the team jumped well, the Stirling being an ideal parachuting aircraft.

The reception committee was made up of at least 150 persons of all ages and both sexes and Captain Leblond who represented the SAS.

The SAS troops jumped with rucksacks attached as leg bags. (This is suggested as excellent for Jeds who then need only have one package for wireless.)

Eight packages only were found that night and only six of these could be taken in the lorry conveying Jeds and SAS from the dropping ground to the Morbihan resistance headquarters. To get here it was necessary to take a boat from Nostane, but there was not room for the packages - only six of which could be got on the lorry, the other two remaining hidden at the dropping ground.

Packages were therefore hidden in a house in Nostane and the Jeds guided by a girl, who was arrested next day, to a camp of workers some two miles away. An RV was arranged

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JEDBURGH3

Operations, Team Douglas (Cont'd)

for the next morning.

The team was not satisfied with the security here and at dawn hid in woods nearby. The RV did not materialize and fearing to lose contact Rubinstein and Ranglou went to the house in Nostane where the kit was concealed and arrived ten minutes after a German search party had left. Luckily, the owner having heard of the girls arrest had dispersed the kit and though one package was found its significance was not understood.

The team moved to a hide out for the night but found it impossible to prevent casual contact with civilians. Ranglou had arranged an RV with the house owner to gather the kit to a central hide that night 6/7 August. Contact with the resistance headquarters was kept through the same person.

Before dawn 7 August the team moved near the equipment and found a B-2 set with which the first messages were sent.

This day the team found it impossible to avoid civilians despite several moves. That evening the house owner brought the good news that the team was to be taken to FFI headquarters that night. Even so, it was necessary to leave some equipment hidden and portions of this had disappeared when, much later, a search was made for it.

The civilians who helped us at this period and who agreed to hide packages were not members of the Maquis but their spirit was of the highest order.

The headquarters was the house of M Tristan, deputy for Morbihan and the patron of local resistance. Here contact was made with Lieutenant Colonel Bourgoïn and Lieutenant Colonel Maurice, and the 5,000,000 francs was delivered to Maurice (1400).

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JEDBURGHs

Operations, Team Douglas (Cont'd)

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Operations, Team Douglas (Cont'd)

These two chiefs confirmed what we had been told from the beginning, that it was too late for further large scale guerrilla operations, for all the Germans had withdrawn on Lorient. The liaison and cooperation between them was first class and the area was well organized. They were not keen to cooperate with Colonel Eono and so not very enthusiastic at our arrival. All orders given at briefing for recognition of partisan to United States forces and for volunteers to take local information through United States lines had already been put in hand by SAS.

On 8 August the team moved to a small oyster farm where for over a week it remained. The remaining 3 packages were received here, one of which contained the Jed set. The transmitter had been badly buckled but worked when the broken valve had been replaced. Contacts with London were good and ciphers worked well. With Aloes, however, it was only intermittent and there were many cipher difficulties. This was found later to be due to the pressure of work and lack of staff at Aloes headquarters.

During the period 8 to 15 August. Headquarters were chosen for the SAS and FFI at Vannes. The Jed team moved to the town FFI headquarters at around 17 August. Here contacts were made with United States liberating forces.

Brigadier Macheod of SAS interviewed the team to ascertain position in Morbihan which he found unsatisfactory from the point of view of command. As a result of this he visited Colonel Eono with Ranglou the following day.

[At this time owing to London's refusal to mount an air-operation of urgently needed supplies for SAS and FFI faith

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JEDBURGHS

Operations, Team Douglas (Cont'd)

in the Jedburghs fell and Colonel Maurice relied almost entirely on liaison with Dingson who could still mount air operations for his supplies and had little to do with the team. No orders or messages were being received from Colonel Eono.]

Five agents of the BOA without contact or money reported to the team in Vannes and asked for instructions. Details were sent to London but it was six days before any reply was received despite repeated reminders. It was noticed at other times that queries would be left unacknowledged for several days before any reply was sent and on two occasions urgent reminders had to be sent.

The only work the team was doing at Vannes was the collection and passage of local information on the beach defenses and German situation between Lorient and the mouth of the river Vilaine. This was done, but the French were surprised that this information should be required since Naval officers and pilots of the area had, they said, already been sent to London and further, Third Army were fully informed.

Once an United States Marine Corps colonel was met doing the same work at the same ground.

Since the last radio contact with Aloes was about 18 August, three days later Rubinstein and Ranglou went to Mur de Bretagne, Aloes' last known location, to find they had moved out some days previously towards (it was locally said) Brest. It was then considered that the team could have no possible mission left in the area. Radio contact with Aloes was never reestablished.

[Unknown to the team, who were still demanding supplies for the FFI from London, this work was being duplicated by

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Operations, Team Douglas (Cont'd)

Dingson and because of this again a delivery was delayed but made finally on 24 August when Dingson supplies to FFI fell below expectation.]

The team believed that once the supplies required had been delivered there could be no further work left and so asked and were granted permission to return on the home flight and arrived back on the evening of 24 August.

The following concluding points are mentioned:

1. It would seem that the team would have been very much more valuable to the FFI and built up much better contacts for use with Colonel Eono if it had dropped some two months earlier. As it was we were regarded as "after the battle troops". Jeds seem far more valuable during the organizing stage and only of local tactical value in battle since communications over a big area - even as well organized as Morbihan - are very slow.

2. The 1/200,000 scale colored maps could be most useful in place of, or with the Michelin.

3. FFI need badly tobacco and clothes.

4. Accumulators were supplied for Aloes W/T. Hand charging was very difficult. Hand generators for the B-2 as for the Jed set should be used or since mobility is already lost with accumulators, a petrol charger.

Operations, Team Douglas IITEAM DOUGLAS II

Jedburgh team Douglas II was the sixty-first Jedburgh team to be dispatched to France from the United Kingdom.

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date *23 January 1977*

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JEDBURGHs

Operations, Team Douglas II (Cont'd)Members of TeamThe members of team Douglas II were:

(Captain R A Rubinstein (British), code name "Augure"

(Captain J Ronglou (French), code name "Anachorere"

Technical Sergeant John Van Hart (US) (1401) code name "Half Crown"

Area to Which Dispatched

Team Douglas II was dispatched on the night of 15/16 September to the Aisne/Doubs/Jura area of France.

Purpose of Mission

Team Douglas II was being dispatched with an Allied mission known as Serpolet (1402) to work with the organizer Ligne (1405). They were to assist local commanders of the FFI, particularly by the provision of communications both between groups in the field and between the resistance groups and London.

First Word from the Field

The first message from Douglas was received on 20 September, 5 days after the team's dispatch (1404):

"Cannot hear Home Station on main frequency, this is no picnic."

Summary of W/T Messages Exchanged22 September From SFHQ to Douglas (1405)

"Herewith present decisions: Ambel and Masson to be infiltrated through Switzerland. Lt Barnes will return to Paris 79 repeat 79 Champs Elysees reporting to Capt Higgins. Gellard will go to Paris SFHQ Hotel Cecil. Camp and Thornton to Paris, 79 Champs Elysee. Peignot with Jed Jim will go to Transmission Center of Seventh Army. Jed Timothy less Ambel and Jed Douglas return to London."

23 September From Douglas (1406)

"Urgent messages from us already sent by Sanfoin. Reply soon as possible. Still not hearing you on sked."

(1401) War Diary Vol 11 p 638
(1403) War Diary Vol 3 p
(1405) B-3608 22 Sept 44

(1402) War Diary Vol 3 p
(1404) B-1643/4 20 Sept 44
(1406) B-1797/11 23 Sept 44

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Operations, Team Douglas II (Cont'd)27 September From Gascon via Bataclan Violet (1407)

"Fixed center at Besancon maintained. Pass all traffic through Bataclan Violet. French officers of Orgeat Mission should be put disposal Veuvieme. Give assent for Captain Ronglou repeat Ronglou of Jed Douglas and Captain Fay repeat Fay. Barthezet and Max arrived."

From Report of Team Upon Return from the Field - 15 Sept to 28 Sept 44

The team was briefed during its stay of several days at ME 65 prior to 15 September 1944 when it went into the field.

Departure was from Harrington airdrome on the night 15/16 September. Arrangements were well organized and the dropping point made known well in advance. The team, part of mission Serpolet was in the first of six Liberators dropping to the ground that night. The flight was uneventful and the team jumped and landed well.

The reception committee was well organized and found immediately by the teams' aircraft. A high percentage of packages fell without parachutes; the team lost 2 out of 3 and of the nights operations 7 out of 30 were lost. Some packages fell with unopened chutes and some were without chutes at all.

When all the drops had been completed the team was conducted to Reugney where billets had been arranged for all personnel. The next morning the leader of Serpolet went to Besancon to contact the leader of mission Orgeat (1407) while the personnel unpacked the packages dropped with them. Facilities for storage were given at Reugney.

Team Douglas found that its Jed W/T set was completely smashed and two haversacks damaged and a message to this effect was sent to London via Jed Timothy (1409). A B-2 from Serpolet

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JEDBURGHS

Operations, Team Douglas II (Cont'd)

stores was issued to Douglas.]

The territory was already under Allied control and it seemed as though the mission had lost its purpose through the long wait [at ME-65] due to bad weather.

When the Serpolet leader returned on 18 September he stated that in all probability the team would return at once to London since there was no work to be done. Serpolet mission then went into Besancon.

From contacts made by mission Orgeat it was learned that Allied troops in this area were very short of information regarding the enemy. It was, therefore, decided to send forward Serpolet less Major Gellard, the leader, as far as possible to gather as much information as possible and to pass it to Orgeat and London.

The team then moved forward to Lisle sur le Doubs, where they arrived on about the 20 September, the first Allied troops there.

Serpolet now consisted of: Team Douglas; Captain Fay (French); Captain Steve W. Thornton, Jr. (US) (1410); 2nd Lieutenant Astier (French).

The team was now on the fringe of the very heavily defended and thickly occupied area southwest of Montbéliard. To collect information, patrols were sent forward consisting entirely of Serpolet personnel or in conjunction with forward troops. In this way Serpolet personnel were the first Allied troops into Blussanc and La Pretiere both small villages to the east of Lisle. Further information came from the questioning of civilians, especially from those who had infiltrated through the lines. Contact was also established with the

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division headquarters in the area: 1st Gaullist Division
Forces Francaise Libres; and 9th Division Colonial Infantry.

These divisions immediately requested from us information on Belfort and the Vosges area and explained in outline their plan for the capture of Belfort. They gave their approximate routes of advance and named specific tasks for the FFI. This was immediately passed to London. Some of the information could be immediately supplied and the rest was requested from London.

[But despite further requests no answers or acknowledgements were received this was similar to what was experienced in Brittany.] Instead ^S some days later an order to return to London was received.

[This was unfortunate, for had London supplied information direct to these forward divisions via Douglas the information would have arrived one whole week quicker than by normal channels. For this reason the divisions were anxious that we should stay with them. As things turned out they d'spaired of us.]

Serpolet withdrew from L'Isle about 28 September. Captain Ronglou and Captain Fay had contacted their old regiments in 9th DIC and remained at Besancon while the necessary authority for them to rejoin their old units could be obtained. Captain Fay mad~~e~~out a report on the work of Serpolet which he gave to Colonel Robert then OC mission Orgeat.

The remainder of the personnel left stores with Colonel Robert and returned via Paris to London where they arrived 4 October 1944. /

At no time did Douglas hear London on the scheduled frequencies. It was always necessary to use the emergency link.

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Operations, Team Douglas II (Cont'd)

It is suggested that inquiries be made as to whether the Douglas plan was being worked.

In the hilly region in which the operation took place lateral communication by B-2 was not satisfactory over 40 kilometers.

Financial StatementTeam Douglas

Sergeant J D Raven --- received - - - - - 50,000 Frs

Expenses

Food, accommodation and use of
private generator - - - - - 3,000

Returned - - - - - 47,000

Captain Ronglou --- received - - - - - 100,000 Frs

Expenses

Given to 2nd Lt Peignot (Mission Aloes) - - 25,000
Spent in France - - - - - 5,400

Returned - - - - - 69,600

(Captain R A Rubinstein) --- received - - - - - 100,000 Frs

Expenses

To Aloes W/T operator - - - - - 25,000
Spent in France - - - - - 4,800

Changed into pounds in England for
immediate use - - - - - 1,200

Returned - - - - - 69,000

Team Douglas II

Captain Rubinstein --- received - - - - - 100,000 Frs

Expenses

Living expense - - - - - 4,000

Tires and repairs for motorcycle - - - - - 1,500

Journey to Berancon - - - - - 1,000

Living expenses in Paris - - - - - 4,000

Miscellaneous - - - - - 2,500

Returned - - - - - 87,000

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Operations, Team IvorTEAM IVOR

Jedburgh team Ivor was the twenty-first Jedburgh team to be dispatched to France from the United Kingdom.

Members of Team

The members of team Ivor were:

(Captain J. H. Cox) (British), code name "Monmouth"

(Lieutenant Y. M. Dantes) (French), code name "Selune"

First Sergeant Lewis F. Goddard (US) (1411), code name "Oregon"

Area to Which Dispatched

Team Ivor was dispatched on the night of 6/7 August to the area of the Cher south of St Amand.

Background of Resistance in Area

Jedburgh Hamish, (1412) who had been dropped on 12/13 June to the Chateauroux-Chatterault area in the Indre department, had asked for a Jedburgh team to assist him in organizing resistance in south Cher to St Amand. It was estimated that there were about 1200 Maquis in this area but they were poorly equipped and not well organized.

Purpose of the Mission

The primary task of team Ivor was to organize and work with the Maquis around St Amand. They were to organize these maquis into units of not more than 100 men. As soon as possible they would submit the largest possible number of dropping grounds that could be used for resupplying the groups.

Method of Dropping and Reception Committee

Team Ivor was to be dropped to a reception committee arranged by Jedburgh team Hamish.

Communications

Team Ivor was dropped with one W/T set and one spare receiver with instructions to establish communication with

(1411) War Diary Vol 11 p 613
(1412) p 46 this Vol

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Home Station as soon as possible.

Finance

Each of the officers took 100,000 French francs and 50 American dollars. The W/T operator took 50,000 French francs and 50 American dollars.

Relations with Other Allied Units

Other Jedburgh Parties. Team Ivor was being dispatched at the request of team Hamish and would work closely with them, but they were to remain under the command of EMFFI.

Allied Forces, If Overrun. When overrun by Allied forces the team was instructed to report to the nearest battalion intelligence officer and ask him to pass them to the division intelligence officer who would be able to identify them and pass them back to SFHQ London. They would give no details of their work to anyone except a properly identified SF Staff representative.

Action

Upon Arrival in the Field. The team would contact Hamish on arrival and coordinate with him the limits of southern Cher in which they were to work. They would report to headquarters as soon as possible regarding the organization, strength and arms situation in this area.

If Withdrawal Should Become Necessary

Should the team's position become untenable due to enemy activity, they would immediately communicate with SFHQ who would advise them as to the best group to fall back on. If contact with London could not be established, they would go into hiding until communication could be established with London or another Jedburgh team.

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FIGURE 41

1st Sergeant Goddard, Major Jaycox (briefing officer)
 and (Captain J. H. Cox)



FIGURE 42

1st Sergeant Goddard, (Captain J. H. Cox), and Lt.
 Y. Dantec) - Jedburgh team Ivor

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FIGURE 43

Last instructions at Harrington for Lieutenant C. T. Barnes and Major John Rees



FIGURE 44

1st Sergeant Goddard preparing his leg bag

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FIGURE 45

Members of Mission ALCES before departure



FIGURE 46

Captain Cox fitting parachute

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Mission ALOES

FIGURE 47



Captain Cox of team Ivor

FIGURE 48

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Lieutenant Dantec of team Ivor

FIGURE 79

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Sergeant Goddard having parachute fitted FIGURE 50



Sgt. Goddard, Captain Cox, Lt. Dantec and the parachute fitter FIGURE 51

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Operations, Team Ivor (Cont'd)If Captured

The team took no cover story with it to the field. If taken prisoner they would be taken as soldiers in uniform performing their ordinary military duties. Every established law of warfare would apply to them. Therefore, they should give their name, rank and serial number only.

Information Provided to Team

Before being dispatched to the field the team was furnished the following information:

1. Topography of the area to which they were being assigned.
2. Names and descriptions of Allied agents working in the area.

First Word from Field

Jedburgh team Hamish announced team Ivor's arrival in the following W/T message dated 7 August (1413):

"Goddard killed. Do not know how but he died instantly upon hitting ground. Chute opened but not completely. Legbag still on him. Radio completely broken. Burial tomorrow."

Summary of W/T Messages Exchanged8 August From Ivor (1414)

"Contacted chief of our region. General situation uncertain but great possibilities. For example 9 companies Ancien Premier immediately available NW of St Amand. Well organized and trained but no arms."

9 August From Ivor (1415)

"Left Hamish. Now established in own region."

9 August From Ivor (1416)

"Arrange rendezvous with Ellipse."

11 August From SFHQ to Ivor (1417)

Ellipse is traveling. Will arrange contact on his return."

(1413) C-1171/55 7 Aug 44
 (1415) C-1317 /3 9 Aug 44
 (1417) C-6199 11 Aug 44

(1414) C-1240/1 8 Aug 44
 (1416) C-1309/4 9 Aug 44

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Operations, Team Ivor (Cont'd)11 August From Ivor (1418)

"Send arms and money immediately. Delay affecting morale."

13 August From Ivor (1419)

"Important contacts made Bourges. Report airfields Bourges and Avard repaired. Report mine fields and trenches under construction round Bourges. Armored train and big Boche food depot 2 kms east Bourges."

13 August From Ivor (1420)

"Colonel Benoit, our chief, desires instructions re attitude to Premier Regiment contacted at St Armand. They give us arms etc and propose help. We propose profit under Colonel Addison after elimination bad types."

13 August From SFHQ to Ivor (1421)

"Elements of 1st Regiment of France can assist maquis with arms but should be integrated with FFI. Should accept orders from FFI Chiefs. Have advised Frank to utilize the best means in order to protect Eguzon."

14 August From SFHQ to Ivor (1422)

"Colonel Benoit must come to agreement with Ellipse, Delege Militaire Regional, who is representative of General Koenig in the field."

15 August From Ivor (1423)

"Loosmore arrived. All containers including crystals received but dropped in wood. Please send other loads as requested immediately."

15 August From Ivor (1424)

"Local partisan activities as follows. Constant attacks on railway Montlucon to Bourges and Bourges to Issoudun and Bourges to La Guerche, also Canal du Berry. First line mentioned now abandoned."

15 August From SFHQ to Ivor (1425)

"We understand German 159th Division is moving to battle area in north. Try to stop or retard this unit."

17 August From Ivor (1426)

"Our lack of arms extremely serious. For God's sake speed up dispatch."

(1418) C-1490/8 11 Aug 44
 (1420) C-1600/6 13 Aug 44
 (1422) C-1301 14 Aug 44
 (1424) C-1755/96 15 Aug 44
 (1426) C-1880/10 17 Aug 44

(1419) C-1586/13 13 Aug 44
 (1421) C-6213 13 Aug 44
 (1423) C-1754/67 15 Aug 44
 (1425) C-6230 15 Aug 44

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Operations, Team Ivor (Cont'd)17 August From Ivor (1427)

"Still no Ellipse. Difficulties of Indre FFI personnel and relations with Premier Regiment of France settled."

17 August From Ivor (1428)

"Please arrange meeting for us with Antoine War Office. Also still urgent Ellipse."

17 August From Ivor (1429)

"Have found 2 carrier pigeons dropped by parachute. Carried message demanding information Boche dispositions. Shall we reply."

18 August From SFHQ to Ivor (1430)

"Understand RAF sending out large numbers of pigeons over occupied territory. All information regarding enemy dispositions which you send us is passed immediately to RAF. It is okay however for you to give RAF information via pigeons. Have asked Antoine to contact you via Hamish. Ellipse is traveling at present but has been requested to arrange contact with you upon return your area."

19 August From Ivor (1431)

"Battle getting very near. Have you any orders. Please give further dope on 159th Division."

19 August From SFHQ to Ivor (1432)

"These are the orders. First, as long as enemy is active continue guerrilla warfare on their lines of communications and their rear. Second, when allies arrive in your circuit ask for intelligence officer who will put you in touch with our SF Staffs and give password 'Jeanne D'Arc. Understand 159th Division in south and expected to move north."

20 August From Ivor (1433)

"Boche evacuating our region direction Bourges, Moulins. Continuous and numerous ambushes. Several lorries destroyed. Patrols as far as outskirts of Bourges. Airport held. Pyro-aechnic works destroyed by Boche but with aid of FFI north Bourges we are trying to repair this destruction. Work cannot continue without further arms and ammunition."

22 August From Ivor (1434)

"Excellent day of ambushes. Much damage done, but work must end due to lack of ammo and arms. Plenty of

(1427) C-1944/2 17 Aug 44
 (1429) C-1945/45 17 Aug 44
 (1431) C-2078/50 19 Aug 44
 (1433) C-2257/32 20 Aug 44

(1428) C-1943/5 17 Aug 44
 (1430) C-1721 18 Aug 44
 (1432) C-6266 19 Aug 44
 (1434) C-2424/11 22 Aug 44

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work to be done so for Christ's sake send arms, ammo and especially bazookas. If you like send by day. Loosmore here. Change to plan Andy from Midnight Thursday."

23 August From Ivor (1435)

"Train of 1000 Boche including 60 lorries 15 kms east of St Amand about to withdraw to Charenton. Incapable of attacking ourselves due to lack of arms but can you send aircraft to bomb this excellent target."

24 August From Ivor (1436)

"Boche appear to be regrouping in area Vier zone Bourges. 400 tanks and armored cars reported in a region Mehun sur Yevre 15 kms northwest Bourges. Concentration of troops in camp of Vivac. 'Good target.'"

25 August From Ivor (1437)

"Discontinue plan Ivor. Andy only on plans."

26 August From SFHQ to Ivor (1438)

"Not clear. If Sergeant Loosmore with you his traffic can be dealt with by you on plan Ivor. Therefore plan Andy will now be cancelled in order to free our overcrowded frequencies. Confirm."

27 August From SFHQ to Ivor (1439)

"Do not think we have abandoned you. You can expect aerial bombardments daily on escaping German columns on various roads so watch out for our planes. Advise you to make arrangement with Hugh via Hamish for weapons to be delivered by Dakota operations."

17 September From Yalelock to Watermark (1440)

"Jed team Ivor accompanying Colonel Bertrand to Orleans. Return Paris 3 days and will proceed London. Captain Cox of Jed Ivor wants to know if no more missions laid on for him may he rejoin his regiment 94 RA direct."

17 September From Underfoot to Watermark (1441)

"Jed team Ivor mission completed sent Paris for return."

18 September From Watermark to Yalelock (1442)

"Captain Cox must return UK. Policy is that all Jed personnel return UK before reassignment."

22 September From Yalelock to Watermark (1443)

"Following personnel ETA Hendon flight - Sergeant Picinich of OG team Lindsay; Theodore and Paul; Jed team

(1435) C-2499/25 23 Aug 44
(1437) C-2765/30 25 Aug 44
(1439) C-6353 27 Aug 44
(1441) C-111/18 17 Sept 44
(1443) C-601/67 22 Sept 44

(1436) C-2687/39 24 Aug 44
(1438) C-6342 26 Aug 44
(1440) C-89/83 17 Sept 44
(1442) C-2200 18 Sept 44

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Ivor; Lt Lucas of Jed team Philip; Lt Voillery and Lt Bourguiere of Jed team Stanley. Balance OG team Christopher not coming until 24 September. No space."

From Report of Team Upon Return from the Field - 6 Aug to 22 Sept

Dropping. We were dropped in the Cher Sud on ground Paris near Beddes north of Chateau Meillant and were received by team Hamish. We were dropped badly outside the ground in a dis-used gravel pit.

First Incidents

1. Radio operator Goddard was killed in parachuting. His parachute was open but his leg bag was still attached to his legs and all the material in the leg bag, including wireless set, was out of order. There was, however, no question that his static line was not attached to the plane. This detail was quite in order.
2. Stumbling in a hole with his revolver armed in his hand, "Selune" fired a shot which passed through his leg just above the knee.
3. "Monmouth" fell on the edge of another hole and sprained his foot.
4. This slight damage was looked after and treated by the doctor in Hamish's Maquis group.
5. On ~~the~~ 7 August Goddard was buried in the village of Beddes with military honors. Through Hamish we contacted Colonel Benoit, Chief of the partisans in the region where we were to work, who immediately gave us the local picture. In the south Cher there were three resistance organizations which at this time had little liaison with each other: 1) The Premier Regiment d'Infanterie, 2) the Combat Organization, and 3) FTP.

Le Premier Regiment D'Infanterie. Premier Regiment

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d'Infanterie, the ancient regiment of Cambrai commanded by Bertrand, alias Benoit, alias Dupin, alias Bordure, was stationed in the south Cher after the armistice. The recruitment of men was from Cher and areas north. The regiment was disbanded 20 November 1942, but many arms were hidden with a large part of the equipment and materials. The personnel dispersed but retained liaison. Officers took up jobs in various regions but returned to make contact with the colonel and with the men who remained in the region. The soldiers were "refractairs" hiding themselves in farms. The colonel eliminated all elements unsufficiently active or who were afraid, but pursued by the Gestapo, the Colonel left the area. His activities were continued by Commandant Rochere who gathered together a small team of officers and carried out acts of sabotage. But all activity was disorganized by the following events:-

1. About 10 June Benoit was sent to Morvan by Comac to organize the Morvan group. There he had difficulties with the DMR Diagramme and was only able to return clandestinely on 20 July.

2. Action of the Milice and Gestapo, such as the arrest of Commandant Rochere on 1 July and the discovery of certain depots.

Benoit began to reorganize his regiment in three stages:

Preparatory period. The principle was to have an active core with small cadres for forming future units. These represented 200 officers and men. They carried out patrols and sabotage activities and coup de main attacks, with targets such as the railway line Montlucon - Bourges - Issoudon, Bourges - La Guerche and the Berry canal.

Period of mobilization. Lasting eight days during which

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elements still in liaison were received into the cadres for training and during which system of requisition was got underway.

Period of Combat. To commence as soon as organization was well trained and acting on the orders received from London.

Combat Organization. A committee of liberation for the south Cher existed with headquarters at St Amand directed by Van Kaver alias Surcouf with Lieutenant Blanchard second in command. On 6 June they revolted at St Amand and occupied the town for two days killing 20 milicien. The German parachutists came down from Bourges, seized and executed 40 people and set fire to ten houses as reprisals. The whole resistance organization withdrew to La Creuse where a large proportion were massacred. During the affair of Bourgneuf only very few returned to regroup under the command of Lieutenant Chaillot in the area of Culon. They numbered about 150 and were badly armed and poorly organized.

FTP. They were commanded by Captain Hubert and numbered about 500 men and were dispersed in the western area of the Cher. They also had withdrawn to the Creuse but had returned almost intact. They were blamed by the other resistance elements for not having rendered much assistance. At this time they had little contact with the other groups and were chiefly concerned with political activities.

As a consequence of the events of 6 June and the reprisals which followed, the whole organization of the FFI was more or less destroyed, retaining no organized directive and the FFI organizations of neighboring departments were to be found in the Cher. For example, the department of the Indre had

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annexed almost the whole region west of the river Cher.

As a result of the departure of Benoit and the arrest of Commandant Rochere, the organization of the Premier Regiment d'Infanterie was late in starting.

Situation of the Enemy.

Germans. Occupied Bourges in strength also Vierzon, Avord aerodrome of Lurcy Levy. Two to three hundred men guarded the tunnel at Nerondes and the town of La Guerche. They also had a radio location post at Bannegon. They were ready to cause trouble on the signal of the Milice. They had patrols on the roads and direct control of circulation. Observation planes were sent over our region.

Milice. Some were at St Florent, Sancoins and St Amand. They were detested by the population and did not dare to circulate in the country very much.

1^{er} Regiment De France. Two battalions reduced in men and armament were stationed at St Amand and Dun-Sur-Auron. They were commanded by Lieutenant Colonels Ardisson and Aublet. They guarded the entrance to these towns. Colonel Benoit was able to make contact with certain elements to encourage their desertion. Many of them were indifferent and only saw in their incorporation in the 1st Regiment a means of avoiding transportation into Germany. While others, excluding definitely pro-Nazi elements considered themselves still bound by oath to Petain.

These elements and their activities were at the mercy of the Germans who could disarm them at any moment they so wished. There were even one or two engagements between them and the Maquis.

Civilian Population. In general the civilian population was favorable to the resistance and assisted it in its work

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except on the ancient line of demarkation, particularly in the area of St Just.

Gendarmerie. The gendarmes worked entirely on behalf of the maquis, some working in units like the "Provost", others in the towns where they assisted us and gave us valuable information about the enemy.

Exposition of Our Mission [and Factors concerning it]

We explained to the colonel the main points of our mission, eg, liaison between the FFI in the field and General Koenig's headquarters in London; the passing on of orders and instructions from headquarters received by wireless; the selection of dropping grounds for reception of arms and equipment. We explained also the wishes of headquarters for guerrilla tactics against the enemy in our area, for the present moment only on a small scale. We also indicated the organization of the Maquis groups as desired by London. [Regarding this point we must state that we already found some excellent officers and cadres and we had to intervene in the matter of organization very seldom, always keeping in touch with the situation. Our relations with the officers were always of the best.)]

From these facts we decided with the colonel, that the period of preparation was over and that we should commence the second period of mobilization. We asked the colonel to arrange for us to contact Chaillot and Hubert. Our departure for our area of activity was arranged for 8 August. We were to go to a command post prepared for us by the colonel. We asked Hamish if he could assist us in the passing of arms while we waited our own parachutages. He

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was able to give us 20 Brens with ammunition and the containers which were dropped with us. These only contained rifles and Stens. (We would like to mention here that our relations with team Hamish were always excellent and Colonel Benoit was very grateful for the aid which they had given him before our arrival).

Details of Period 8 - 15 August. We moved into our PC in the Chateau at Frappon near Saulzias on 8 August. Our system of security was well organized and we had a personal guide and vehicle. We were surrounded by five groups of Maquis but during this period we found liaison difficult.

[We were obliged to work the set ourselves on certain frequencies which our crystals permitted and any urgent message we sent over to team Hamish to pass for us. On 12 August we received word from Hamish that a radio operator for us had arrived at his PC. We went over to fetch him on the 14th and found Sergeant Loosmore, the ex-operator of team Andy. (1444). On 19 August we received by parachute a new set of crystals and with these and our new radio operator our communications worked well. Later on, on 28 August we changed from plan Ivor to plan Andy, as the sked times and frequencies were more convenient.]

Personal Contacts. Being slightly wounded "Selune" and "Monmouth" found liaison very difficult and all contacts were made at our own PC. We did manage on one occasion to visit one of the neighboring Maquis groups and were very well received. Before leaving London we were given as one of our first tasks to contact Ellipse, our DMR, as soon as possible. We arranged a "boite aux lettres" for contact with him which we communicated to London immediately but Ellipse never made use of

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it. Benoit had been trying for several weeks to contact Ellipse himself but without success.

On 13 August we made contact with the chief of the FTP, Captain Hubert, commanding FTP in the Cher, and Renandin commanding FTP in the region of Vierzon. We explained to him our mission and requested unity of action from him from a military point of view under the command of Colonel Benoit, who seemed to us the obvious commander, by reason of his personality, for the whole region. At first he was unwilling to cooperate and desired that his FTP group should be allowed to work on its own but after discussion of the general situation he agreed with our point of view and our liaison with him was always good. Later in the day we contacted Chaillot accompanied by Elie. The latter had always been in the area and had completed the important part of the composition of this Maquis group, but was completely incapable of commanding the 150 odd men of this group. [He seemed to us to have no qualities, neither physical nor moral. Whereas, Chaillot impressed us very much and was very good in the general picture.] As events progressed Elie receded more and more into the background as Chaillot took control. This group was known as the FFI company Surcouf-Blanchard. They were very willing to submit to the coordination of their military activities under Benoit.

On the same day we also met Lieutenant Daoudal who had been sent from the Creuse and carried a message signed by Lieutenant Colonel Francois according to which the south Cher was to be placed under the orders of La Creuse which was commanded by this Colonel Francois. Mission Burgamot was working in the Creuse. [and it seemed extraordinary to us that in our

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briefing orders no mention had been made of this subject.]

[Therefore,] Our reply to Lieutenant Dauodal was that pending more precise information we would disregard this message.

We were also able to meet in the presence of Benoit the two Colonels who commanded battalions of the Premier Regiment de France, Colonel Aublet and Ardisson. They were willing to join the resistance but only when the German forces became less numerous in the area, when the miliciens had left, and if they could retain their own command. However we made them understand that their present situation was untenable and that to get a better cooperation with the other FFI groups it would be better if they withdrew from their command.

Benoit entirely agreed and requested that certain officers and men with pro-Nazi sentiments should be arrested. Colonels Aublet and Ardisson at first refused but after long discussions agreed to our point of view. For the present, arrangements were made that they should give us certain arms and ammunition including four machine-guns and that they should allow us free passage through the towns of St Amand and Dun-Sur-Auron and they would retain a neutral attitude vis-avis the Maquis.

Period from 14 to 19 August. From the reports sent in we learned that the mobilization was well under way, units were taking up their position and Benoit had divided his sector into three zones east, west and south. The Maquis was not being attacked by the Germans but on 14 August the Germans sent a motorized column of 300 men into St Amand where they remained during the whole day. They disarmed the gendarmes but left the battalion of the Regiment de France undisturbed. When they left St Amand they took with them all the Miliciens up to Bourges.

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On the night of the 14th we received our first parachutage. On the 15th "Selune" left with the colonel in civilian clothes to make personal contact with units of the Premier Regiment d'Infanterie. On 15 August Benoit received a message coming via colonels (commanding FFI Cher Nord) from COMAC requesting his (Benoit's) immediate return to the Morvan.

We were shown the message and suggested it was much too late now to start a complete reorganization over there whereas there was such urgent work here already well prepared. However, we sent word to London requesting their decision and they replied we should ask Ellipse. Not a very helpful reply since we and Benoit had been doing our utmost to contact this personage for the last four weeks.

We found the 3rd Battalion already nearly complete as regards numbers. Sections were dispersed about the zone and a system of requisition for material and transport well on foot. The Chantiers De Jeunesse was less well organized and was in serious difficulty from the point of view of material, many of its depots having been taken and its cadres imprisoned. Also its leader had just had an accident. However a plan was made to assist them. Our presence had an excellent morale effect on the men and all the cadres were given a general picture of the situation and the principles of our mission. The resultant hope for the rapid arrival of arms was very great and raised their spirits tremendously.

"Selune" returned with the colonel to the PC on the 16th and Monmouth informed them of an incident which had occurred in the meantime. Certain elements coming from the East Indre on the orders of one Commandant Robert had encircled a battalion

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of the RF at Dun with the intention of disarming them and taking them off to the Indre. Colonel Aublet refused on the grounds of arrangements agreed with ourselves and Colonel Benoit. On account of his attitude these units from the Indre withdrew but their intrusion had a serious effect on the attitude of the RF who no longer desired to retain their relationship with the FFI if they were so poorly coordinated. With a view to these incidents we decided to go to see Hamish to deal with this question of the RF and east Indre working in our area of the west Cher. We discussed the question with them and decided to go together and see Commandant Robert whose PC was at Crevan 60 kilometers away. Robert informed us that these points were unable to be decided by him and it was decided that the following day we should go together with him and Benoit to see Surcouf and team Hugh (1445) near Le Blanc. This contact was made on the 17th where it was decided that on the subject of the 1st RF, the Indre should not intervene again with the two battalions in the Cher. It was decided, also, that certain sapper elements from the battalion of RF at Dun should go and join the RF elements in Indre to assist them in their attack on Chateauroux. The region of Chateau Meillant was to remain under the command of east Indre and the region of Ligniere - St Florent would be commanded by the present delegate of the Indre who would be under the order of Benoit.

On returning to our PC on 17 August we found Daoudal who had returned from La Creuse. He carried a message from Commandant Revez indicating that Ellipse would be in La Creuse on the 18th and suggesting that one of us should come down to

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meet him. "Selune" departed the next morning with Daoudal and met Revez and Ellipse on the 19th. "Selune" described the situation in the Cher Sud and Ellipse agreed with the decisions taken. But a) Reference the 1 RF he requested they join the maquis but disband their present units and that they eliminate any suspect elements. b). Reference attachment of Cher Sud to La Creuse, he did not wish to interfere with arrangements already made but specified in a written order that orders by La Creuse for the Cher should only be of a general administrative nature and that orders from London should have priority over orders from La Creuse. Lieutenant Colonel Francois intervened to say that even so he desired that no decisions of a military nature should be taken by Benoit. Such a request was inadmissible and showed a complete lack of understanding of the situation and if carried out risked the upsetting of all resistance organizations already on foot. Ellipse left Bill a free hand to decide this question and we retained our original plans to coordinate all efforts in our area under the command of Benoit.

On the question of Benoit's return to the Morvan, Ellipse stated he was too far away to make a decision and left Bill to decide as he thought best.

Period 20 August - 15 September. When Bill returned from the Creuse, Benoit explained to him the events occurring during his absence. From the military point of view:

1. 1er R I now ready. Comprising ten companies divided under command of two officers for zones west and east. Total strength of about 1200 with auxiliary services. Armament, obtained chiefly from regiment's arms depots, comprised 50

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1. LMG's, 500 rifles; of these only 11 Brens and 100 rifles had been received from London. 20 Brens had come from Hamish. Morale was excellent.

2. With elements of 1ere RF Benoit decided to form a 33rd Demibrigade (under the flag of the 33rd RI hidden by 1er RI). This demibrigade was also to include certain "chautiers" and new recruits. Units of the 1er RF were split up in this new unit. The unit was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Trousseau. Strength 500 men, 20 LMG's, 250 rifles.

3. Company FFI "Surcouf" with 150 men, 10 LMG's, 80 rifles or stens.

4. FTP had been considerably strengthened and known as "Regiment populaire Berrichon" including all FTP elements in the Cher. They had just attacked a depot of arms in the east Indre made by Lieutenant Colonel Robert, and taken 60 Brens. (Personally we do not blame the FTP for their capture of arms from a stock being kept for a purpose purely hypothetical.)

Their strength was about 1000 - 1500 and not badly armed.

Enemy. Germans had left area south of Bourges but were still occupying Bourges and Avord. However from information received from Bourges and FFI north Cher, the Germans intended evacuating their towns on 19 or 20 August towards Sancergues. The FFI north Cher had asked Benoit to occupy part of Bourges and Avord camp but he was against this, considering it likely to be used as a resting place by the withdrawing Boche columns. He was however in favor of advancing to the approaches of the town and in particular occupying the airfield. This was agreed.

During the whole period which follows, the area between

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and including Bourges and St Amand was to be the corridor by which all the German columns withdrawing from the west passed. Their main axes were:

1. North. Chateauroux, - Issoudin, - Charost, -
St Florent, - Bourges - (Here they would halt and rest, to
continue on 3 main routes:-
 - a. Bourges - Sansergues - La Charite.
 - b. Bourges - Nerondes - La Guerche - Nevers.
 - c. Bourges - Blet - Sancoins - St Pierre Le Moutier.
2. Center - (the least used) Issoudin - Chateauneuf
- Dun - S - Auron - Blet - Sancoins - St Pierre.
3. South - Chateauroux - Lignerres - St Amand -
Charenton - Sancoins - (St Amand was also
much used as resting place.)

Except for two critical periods the Germans never used these three axes simultaneously and only seldom travelled on the smaller roads. Thanks to his excellent telephonic liaison with east Indre and his battalion commanders, and to information supplied by gendarmes posts, Benoit was kept continuously in touch with the movements of the columns, thus being able to avoid contact where opposition was too great while attacking at points more vulnerable. Night and day every day without stop there were ambushes on the roads, isolated Boche lorries were destroyed, and from time to time there were multiple attacks well coordinated on large columns.

Diary of events during this period

20 August. Bourges airport occupied and an engagement at the approaches to Bourges. Poor information on the numbers of enemy in the town. ^WWith a DR and car we reconnoitre with

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Benoit, ourselves. Stopped at bridge over Auron at entry to Bourges where there was a German post. Contacted a police post where we learned that there were more boche in the town still than we thought. Benoit decided to hang onto airport and set up an observation post in petrol refinery to watch entrance.

Sergeant Tixier with 10 men remained there for one month always furnishing us with excellent and accurate information on Boche movements.

A heavy engagement took place near St Just on a motor convoy of 300 Boche. Our wounded were massacred by the enemy who suffered heavy losses and set fire to three farms.

Column of 1000 Boche arrived at St Amand from Chateauroux.

21 August. Another engagement at St Just. One of our officers killed. Lieutenant La Forcade, who acted with extreme gallantry. On request from Benoit, we asked London for decoration of Legion d'Honneur for this officer. We never received a reply and therefore requote his citation of our message number 41:-

Message from Andy. Dated 1 September 1944.

"Notre 41 Benoit de Koenig. Proposition pour croix de Chevalier de la Legion D'honneur a titre posthume au Lieutenant De La Forcade. (Brillant Officer) le 21 Aout au cours de la mission Dentrleon avec des elements de resistance a pris part spontanement a une operation contre un groupe ennemi. Mortellement blesse au cours de l'action."

The convoy leaving St Amand was attacked at five different places. Ten vehicles were destroyed. Were able to see the engagement where elements of 1st Regiment Francaise bore themselves very well under fire. 30 prisoners were taken.

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22 - 23 August. During these two days we had difficulties with the 1^{er} Regiment Francais. Lieutenant Colonel Aublet ordered units of his regiment to return to Dun and St Amand. The cause of this attitude was as follows. An officer coming from Vichy brought news that Petain had been seen taken prisoner by the Germans, that while in captivity he had managed to send word to his troops to fight the Germans. The situation could not but cause trouble. For example, some patrols of Regiment Francais were attacked in error by the Maquis; Aublet had two officers arrested who had been in liaison with us for some time. Benoit ordered 1^{er} Regiment Francais to be surrounded; Aublet, Ardisson and certain suspect officers and men to be arrested. We must point out the bad conduct and attitude of Lieutenant Colonel Aublet who was at the root of all this trouble. Benoit decided that he should be tried by Conseil de Guerre.

24 August. One company attacked Avord, but it was solidly occupied by Boche. We suffered losses and wounded afterwards mutilated and killed. As reprisals we executed an equal number of Germans and placed their bodies in their lines with a notice indicating we should continue to do the same each time.

25 August. Made contact with Agent Le Contre of French BCRAM. He worked on a radio set and proposed assisting us if we needed him.

Information from near Vierzon informed us of the presence of 400 tanks or armored cars in the area Vierzon - Mehun-S-Yevre. These, however, never passed through our sector.

26 August. Lack of ammunition becoming serious. Benoit

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decided to reduce number of ambushes in consequence.

[London implored to send re-stock to us, but requests completely ignored, not even answered. We were obliged, therefore, to seek help from Battalion Dubreuil in East Indre.]

27 August. At last a parachutage, but yielding [almost unique-stens and field dressings,] unsatisfactory weapons with which to attack columns of lorries and armored cars.

28 August. Attack on five armored lorries by small group. Exceptional gallantry shown by Sergeant^a Chef Waslong who destroyed 2 lorries by grenades, being seriously wounded in the operation. [We sent proposition for his decoration with Medaille Militaire, but received no reply, only some stupid questions about the man whose name they had got quite wrong.]

29 August. Interception of strange convoy of seven tourist cars containing soi-disant French agents and saboteurs headed by British officer and radio operator, the former calling himself Lionel or Edouard. They came from Tarbes and wished to get to Paris. "Monmouth" interrogated them and eventually was assured of their bona fides. Allowed them to pass - telegram to London for confirmation which was received the next day.

30 August. Message from London telling us no more parachutage, but possibility of Dakota operation. We immediately contacted Le Contre who gave us some grounds already used and agreed by RAF. [We passed these with code names and messages to London and never heard one single word further about the matter. Thoroughly disgusted.]

31 August. Received message from London telling us to

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contact Hugh (1446) and obtain share of arms sent to them by Dakota; also to arrange with Hugh and Lieutenant Colonel Obelensky, AUS, (1447) disposal of Group Patrick (1448). All this very difficult as Hugh 150 kilometers away with Boche thick on roads in between. [London persistently gave impression that they considered Hugh as being about 5 kilometers away from us.]

1 September. Learned from Indre of the approach of some very large convoys of Boche some 20,000 strong. Arrival of British officer, Lieutenant Davidson of 1st SAS, announcing some French SAS groups around Bourges.

2 September. Monmouth to Le Blanc keeping to small roads. Contacted Scipion who announced that no Dakotas had arrived yet but promised us a share when they came. Saw Obelensky who refused to leave his area although tranquil and although his junior officers were all for coming over to us right away.

This period was some of the most critical ever for the south Cher. The whole zone was covered with Boche, who started to attack the Maquis, and even came within 500 meters of Benoit's command post. Benoit passed order for everyone to stay put in their woods. Boche columns contained many colored troops such as Hindus and North Africans who massacred civilians, raped women and burned down farms and houses.

From interrogation of prisoners we realized how utterly ignorant they were of the war's progress, many of them being unaware of the fall of Paris.

3 September. Contacted Mission Bergamote (1449) and team James (1450). Had finished their work in the south and proposed

(1446) p 17 this Vol
(1448) War Diary Vol 4-A p
(1450) p 742 this Vol

(1447) War Diary Vol 11 p 16
(1449) War Diary Vol 3 p

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assistance for us. Benoit considered assistance unnecessary from point of view of manpower but requested arms. Rewez informed us that London had promised them parachutages and we arranged with him that they should be devoted to us. [We informed London of this arrangement, but results only arrived much later.]

4 September. Decision that "Selune" should go with Commandant Boyer Vidal (one of Benoit's officers) to see Colonel Bourgoin, commanding 4th SAS and, also, St Paul alias Antoine, War Office Agent at Orleans. Transport difficult as it involved crossing line of Boche convoys east of Bourges, and 48 hours were necessary for the journey.

5 September. "Monmouth" learned that elements from Montlucon were wishing to come up through our area to attack Bourges without liaison with us or any enquiries. With Benoit we decided to obstruct this ridiculous proposition, if necessary by force, since we knew that the time was not ripe yet.

The Germans destroyed the station at Bourges, Vierzon and Mehun-S-Yevre and according to reports abandoned finally the northern axis of withdrawal.

6 September. "Selune" and Boyer Vidal contacted:-

1. Colomb, Chef of North Cher.
2. Allais, alias Oxford, of team Alec (1451) who had just been seriously wounded during an ambush.
3. St Paul at Orleans; who agreed to help us and pass us arms.
4. Colonel Bourgoin of 4th SAS; who considered his work in North Cher finished, and agreed to come and help us in the

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south, but requested General Koenig's authority.

In consequence "Selune" and Boyer Vidal decided to go to Paris to see Koenig on this matter.

7 September. Bourges, Vierzon and Mehun-S-Yevre evacuated by Germans. On agreement and coordination with Colonel Benoit's and Colomb's groups entered these towns.

The column of 20,000 Germans already reported arrived at Lignerres.

At Paris "Selune" and Boyer Vidal saw General Koenig who agreed the employment of SAS groups by us and again promised us arms.

8 September. On return journey Boyer Vidal saw General Delmas at Orleans, commanding Military Region 5, who gave commandment of subdivision Militaire of Bourges to Benoit.

At Briare "Selune" passed on General Koenig's orders to Colonel Bourgoin regarding employment of SAS. Learned that they were already engaged south of Bourges and had contacted Benoit.

9 September. Engagements with the leading elements of the column of 20,000 Germans.

"Selune" and Boyer Vidal arrived back at Bourges. Contacted Lieutenant G C Thomson (1452) of team Alec, who passed some arms to our men in Bourges. Here they learned of a message dropped from an American plane for the benefit of the German columns, stating "The American General commanding at Tours demands that General Elster, commanding the German convoys, should stop the movement of these columns". We had, however, received no information about these negotiations.

10 September. Boyer Vidal received a telephone message

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from Colonel Chammel, alias Martel of Indre, asking if Benoit could guarantee safeguard of heavy material abandoned by the Germans. This was the first intelligence we received of the surrender of the Germans.

Benoit got in touch by telephone with Martel who put him in the picture concerning the surrender.

11 September. "Cease Fire" was ordered by Benoit and effected for 0900 hours.

Benoit and "Monmouth" passing through Levet still occupied by Germans armed, went up to Bourges to meet Major MacPherson of team Quinine (1453) who had come from the Allier to find out the decisions made regarding the Boche in his department.

However, the negotiations which lead up to the armistice had been made when the German columns were still in the Indre, and were made by the Americans coming from 150 kilometers away who were not aware of the situation.

On 11 September the situation was as follows: The Germans were in three columns on the axis Chateauneuf - Levet - Dun - Blet - Sancoine. The head of the columns had already crossed the River Allier; the center was round Dun and Blet and the tail end with General Elster was at Chateauneuf.

These columns were to halt and then march Free up to the River Loire, starting on 12 September at midnight. But all this involved numerous problems and difficulties of which the Americans seemed to have no idea. Three problems were dealt with during an interview which took place on 11 September at the Mairie at Arcay between Benoit and General Elster. Also present were Lieutenant Colonel Colomb from North Cher, Major MacPherson, "Monmouth" and "Selune" and Lieutenant

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Colonel French representing the general commanding 9th American Army: General Elster was accompanied by 1 staff officer and an interpreter. The problems discussed and the decisions reached were as follows:

1. All the units both Maquis and German had not yet been able to be informed of the "cease fire" order and engagements were still taking place. Therefore, it was decided that two liaison officers, one French and one German, should go together to convey the orders to all personnel involved. Considering the time this would take, Benoit requested a 24 hour postponement of the commencement of the march north, and stated that he could not guarantee that there would be no incidents in the meantime. This solution was agreed by Elster.

2. Benoit requested that during the march, all towns, and all contact with the civilian population by the Germans should be avoided, likewise all requisitioning and even buying should be forbidden. This point was only agreed on with difficulty by the German general.

3. The Germans were to be supplied with food by the Americans from 14 September and their wounded were to be taken in charge by the Americans at Chateauneuf on 12 September.

12 September. Benoit contacted A French air force Colonel commanding squadron "Patrie" which had arrived at Bourges. Arranged with him the German columns should be surveyed by his aircraft.

A German soldier killed a French civilian, whereupon Benoit demanded that he be tried by a German military tribunal and executed by the Germans.

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13 September. From midnight the march north began. At St Amand liberation ceremonies took place and civil offices were conferred by the Prefet of Bourges.

14 September. With Benoit we decided to go and overtake one of the German columns to see how the march was progressing. Overtook about 5,000 of them seemingly in good order, but with machine guns mounted and ready for action at the side of the road and AA guns all set for action on trucks.

We decided to go up to Paris with Benoit.

15 September. Contacted SF staff at Cecil Hotel and asked for instructions. They told us to return in 3 or 4 days time.

17 September. Returned to Bourges, where we learned of message from London to go and organize attack on La Rochelle, but the distance was prohibitive and we had no means of transport to get men there.

Benoit contacted General Bertin, commanding FFI south of River Loire.

18 September. Went up to Orleans to attend presentation of units of our Maquis before General de Gaulle. → INSERT BLOCK ON PAGE 659

19 September. Received message ordering our return to United Kingdom.

21 September. Arrived Paris.

23 September. Arrived London and contacted Staff at Bryanston Square.

Situation at the time of our departure

One or two isolated groups of 10 - 15 Germans were dispersed in the woods and being sought out by the Maquis.

All miliciens and collaborators were being sought out and taken.

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In the area of Mareuil-sur Arnon the constitution of a dissident force of royalist origin (Action Catholique de Charette) was taking form, under command perhaps of Colonel Aublet. Benoit was seeing about this matter.

Civil administration posts were already set on foot:

1. Counite de Liberation Departementale under Marcel Plaisant.

2. Prefet and sons prefet.

3. Counite de Liberation in all towns were concerned with municipal questions. Robert from the Indre still considered certain areas of west Cher as being under his personal control.

4. Milices patriotiques organized.

Military Administration. Benoit had received instructions from War Ministry to form one of five new divisions of which the corps would be formed from the 1er RI and 33 Demi Brigade, with also a regiment of FFI and FTP and certain elements of artillery and air force.

Benoit transferred one of his adjutants to Headquarters sub-division Bourges under command Lieutenant Colonel Sarraut. Lieutenant Colonel Colomb was concerned with matters FFI.

From our own reliable sources of information we calculate that approximately 150,000 Germans passed along the three main axis between 20 August and 15 September. London was kept continuously informed of the progress of their withdrawal and the movements of the columns, but we received no assistance from them whatever. The only occasion when they achieved any results was when they sent three Lightnings over which proceeded to shoot up some FTP lorries killing

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20 and wounding 30 men, although the lorries were clearly marked with white stars. Whenever else aircraft came, except for one occasion, there was nothing there.

General remarks and criticisms

1. Time and again we asked for information from London, it being often simpler for London to send us information concerning movements west and north of us than for us to go and find out ourselves, since circulation was never easy. But never did they give us any help.
2. Before leaving London, we were told to find out requirements in arms and materials, communicate these to London, and we should receive all we wanted. We did this immediately but in six weeks, to arm approximately 5,000 men we received but 5 aircraft, one of which dropped precisely one package, and the rest almost solely stens and first field dressings. They might as well have sent us knitting needles. The poor service very nearly had serious effect on the morale of the men. London explained that they had to confine their services to the northern areas, but our comrades from there complain of the same lack of supplies.
3. The gentleman who dealt with our telegrams seemed, among other things to have little idea about the geography of France. For instance, one day we asked for information about the Allier and received a typical reply "who is Allier rpt Allier?"
4. When there was an important decision to make on a question of organization we would ask London's advice, giving our suggested solution, and they would always reply that we must contact "Ellipse rpt Ellipse Delege Militaire regional representative of General Koenig in the field", as

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if Ellipse were in the next door office whereas he was 300 kilometers away and always on the move and as if we had never heard of this man or his functions. Thereby, they wasted our valuable time by making us decipher all these unnecessary details.

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Between 20 August and 18 September we had:

- 75 German vehicles destroyed and
- 500 Boche killed, whose bodies were actually found by the partisans. Many others were taken on in the trucks by the Germans and from reports from leaders of ambushes we can count a total of approximately 15,000 Germans killed in all. Many wounded were treated in the Allier.
- 250 Boche were taken prisoner and kept in a prison camp by us.

In the same period FFI losses were:

→ 90 killed or massacred and 110 wounded.

6. We must point out some of the atrocities committed by the Boche:

About 100 farms were burned down along their route of withdrawal.

They would fire at random on civilians on the roads and in the fields.

Numerous cases of rape by some Hindu troops occurred on 2 and 3 September in the towns of Dun Blet and Sancoins.

Our wounded, who had to be left behind when an ambush broke up were found later mutilated and killed by kicks, rifle blows and knife wounds.

The German columns were composed of all arms of service infantry, artillery, air force etc. Therefore, no blame can be attached to any particular unit. The partisans took it on themselves to execute justice and executed an equal number of German prisoners to the number of wounded mutilated.

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7. We must also point out the fantastic armistice terms which the Americans arranged with the final German column under General Elster. In the cinemas and newspapers the Americans took all the glory for this surrender. The Germans were to traverse 100 kilometers still fully armed and equipped with transport, 100 kilometers of territory where we were forbidden ever to set up observation posts. Thus the population was exposed to all the atrocities of which the Boche had proved themselves capable and, in fact, three French men were killed during the march. The French seriously wonder when the Americans will realize that the Boche is not a gentle lamb and that all stories of their atrocities are not mere propaganda.

By overtaking one of the three columns we were able to see how the least untoward incident could have caused fire and bloodshed over a large area of the countryside, for what could 6,000 Frenchmen poorly armed and trained, do against 18,000 well armed and properly trained and grouped Germans. The Americans comfortably stationed north of the Loire did not seem to realize this point of view, and the pictures on the cinema showing the incident of a German General handing over his pistol to an American General in Hollywood style, bear out this impression. But all this is very far from reality and from a certain point of view one might say criminal.

Conclusion

Our mission was to organize and arm the Maquis, but we found ourselves in the midst of resistance units already well organized. So from this point of view our job was

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mainly only one of liaison for the purposes of coordinating the activities of our own region with those of neighboring regions and to make known all around the situation in our sector.

From the other point of view, that of arming the Maquis, it was extremely fortunate that the officers had had the foresight to bury many of their arms, since it would have been totally impossible to work with the few stens and first field dressings which was all we received from London. To supplement supplies we were forced, on our own initiative, to seek arms from our more fortunate comrades in neighboring departments. This system of begging we found most distasteful. If we went into the field too late to receive arms, why were we told that this was one of our jobs? With a little help from London we could have done a really first class job. The Germans were trying at all costs to reach Germany before the route was cut in the east, and far fewer of them would have reached the Fatherland if London had not let us down on so many scores.

Report of Sergeant Loosmore, W/T Operator

I dropped into France the night of 12/13 July, with Fife and Carlow of the team Andy (1454). The static lines were tangled inside the plane, so that I fell into the hole while my legs were still caught up in them and had to be pulled back into the A/C. I jumped on the following turn, and hit the ground after a few seconds, but not too hard, and without oscillation. The maquis helped me to my feet and told me that my two comrades had broken their legs, but my other four friends were unhurt. These "other four" were, I

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believe, agents and left before I arrived in the farm house.

Fife was lying on the table, with an inch of bone sticking through his leg. He was very cheerful and did not want morphia. I came back half an hour later and saw that an old French doctor was splinting the fracture. Fife was in agony, and begged for morphia, which appeared to have little or no effect.

No one had expected us, but they were glad to receive our containers. I found our radio and the rucksacks of the other two. My spare receiver and rucksack were never found; at least I never saw them.

That same night we were taken to Chateau de Bois and stayed there two days. A surgeon set Fife's leg in the afternoon, and attended to Carlow. Fife was in great pain for two days afterwards and couldn't sleep.

I set up my Jed set in a barn and passed my first messages. I was greatly helped by Lieutenant Carl Bundgaard, who turned the generator for me and helped in the encoding. Carl had been with Hugh (1455), previously and had learned coding from them.

Our second move was to a school for training Maquis recruits. It was rather too near the road, so we moved again the next day to a farm near St Gabriello where we stayed until the Hudson operation. We were marvellously well treated, and received presents and visitors from all the area. While at this farm we saw Ellipse, Cree, Martin, Prince Murat, Franc and Crown of team Hugh. The maquis intelligence service found several spies in the village, and took two "doubtfuls" to a detention farm in case they should inform on us.

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We had a falso alarm one morning when the farmer's wife rushed in crying that the Germans had come. (The farmer beat her for it!). Actually they were 600 yards away. Carl carried Fife to a dry swamp, and dropped him on the way, shifting the plaster on his leg and dazing him with pain. Carlow made his way out himself while I packed up the radio and collected all our kit, helped by two maquis who appeared from nowhere, and Carl, who come back after he had hidden Fife. We heard some shots and saw a barn on fire. Later we heard sustained machine-gun fire and thought a battle had started. Actually it was the Germans mutilating the bodies of Prince Murat and his chauffeur with explosive bullets.

Fife and Carl were really magnificent - Carl risked his life by staying with us although we tried to persuade him to take off on his own since he was in civilian clothes and liable to be taken for a spy. We returned to the farm after dusk, leaving the equipment in the swamp. A few days later the Hudson arrived.

It is impossible to speak too highly of Fife's behavior. He created a tremendous impression through his unflinching good spirits, was willing to return to England only after much persuasion, and was genuinely heart-broken at finding himself unable to help the Maquis. When he left the whole household cried, and for days afterwards visitors came to ask about him.

I was left to wait for Cree, who was to take me to Ellipse, and expected to go the next day. However, Cree came back to say that the house he had intended for me was no longer safe, and asked me to wait two more days. I did not see him often after that, but heard that his car had been taken and the

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chauffeur killed. Six maquis nearby were informed against and taken by the Milice, and the farmer became nervous and asked me to leave, after a Milicien had called at the farm while I was out. I lived in the swamp, and my meals were brought out to me or I was told when the farm was safe and I could eat there.

I sent QUG (I am in imminent danger) through a misunderstanding. I thought the farmer had said the Germans were enquiring for me at the farm, and actually he had said "The Germans are enquiring for a British parachutist at all the farms".

That same afternoon the maquis took me to team Hugh, who intended to transfer me to Ellipse, but in the meantime I was transferred to team Ivor, and after finding them lived happily ever after!

Financial Statement

Lieutenant Dantec ----received ----- 100,000 Frs

Expenses

Given to partisans for service ----- 50,000
Personal expenses ----- 10,000

Total ----- 60,000
Returned ----- 40,000
100,000 Frs

Captain Cox ----received ----- 100,000 Frs

Expenses

Paid to Maquis leader for payment of
men - - - - - 15,000 Frs
Paid to leader of FTP group for
same purpose - - - - - 15,000
Share in hire of car and petrol
expenses - - - - - 10,000
Board and lodging - - - - - 8,115

Total ----- 48,115
Returned --- 51,885

100,000 Frs

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Roll 8

Target 4

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~~SECRET~~
By auth: CO, Hq & Hq Det,
O of Strategic Sv,
European T of O, USA,
Initials J.F.S.
Date 14 March 45

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WAR DIARY

Special Operations Branch,
Office of Strategic Services

London, England

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JEDBURGHS

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JEDBURGH

Operations, Team AlecTEAM ALEC

Jedburgh team Alec was the twenty-second Jedburgh team to be dispatched to France from the UK.

Members of Team

[The members of team Alec were:

1st Lieutenant G. G. Thomson (US) (1456), code name "Cromarthy" Caps

Lieutenant B. Allet (French), code name "Oxford" Caps

Staff Sergeant John A. White (US) (1457), code name "Colorado" Caps

Area to Which Dispatched

Team Alec was dispatched on the night of 9/10 August to the Loire et Cher area of France.

Background of Resistance in Area

Team Alec was to be dispatched with a reconnaissance party of 8 men from 1 SAS Regiment whose mission it was to report on the possibilities of receiving up to half a squadron of 1 SAS Regiment to operate against the railway lines Vierzon-Tours-Vierzon-Orleans and report on enemy movement in the area. The team would work under the control of the organizer Antoine (1458), who headed an important Resistance organization in this area.

Purpose of the Mission

Team Alec was dispatched with an SAS party to provide a link between them and the resistance groups and help Antoine in organizing and arming the FFI in the South Loire and Cher regions. Would

Communications

The team was dropped with one Jedburgh W/T set and one spare receiver with instructions to contact the Home Station

(1456) War Diary Vol 11 p 640
 (1457) War Diary Vol 11 p 622
 (1458) War Diary Vol 3 p

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Operations, Team Alec (Cont'd)

as soon as possible.

Finance

Each of the officers took 100,000 French francs and 50 American dollars. The W/T operator took 50,000 French francs and 50 American dollars.

Relations with Other Allied Units

Operational Groups. Should the team encounter any OG parties they would assist them as far as possible but would remain under the command of SFHQ.

An Allied Mission. Should an Allied Mission be dispatched at a later date it was possible that the team would be placed under its command.

Scale of Air Support Likely

It was anticipated that there would be no difficulty in supplying the team's area with the arms and equipment they required.

Action

Upon Arrival in the Field

The team was to contact the organizer Antoine upon its arrival and arrange details of their mission with him.

If Withdrawal Should Become Necessary

It it became necessary for the team to withdraw, further instructions would be send to them from SFHQ.

If Captured

The team took no cover story with it to the field. If captured they would be taken as soldiers in uniform performing their ordinary military duties. Every established law of warfare would apply to them and they would, therefore, give their name, rank and serial number only.

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Operations, Team Alec (Cont'd)Information Provided to Team

The following information was provided to the team prior to its dispatch to the field:

1. Enemy order of battle.
2. Topography of the area.
3. General outline of resistance organizations in the area.

First Word from Field

Team Alec announced its safe arrival in the field by the following W/T messaged dated 10 August: (1459)

"Arrived safely. Contacted Colon, chief of maquis Ducher. Hope to contact Antoine today or tomorrow. SAS recce party with us. Two rucksacks lost. Hope to get them today."

Summary of W/T Messages Exchanged

11 August From Alec (1460)

"Have not yet managed to contact Antoine. Hope tomorrow. We are east of point Vierzon. Do you want us to move west."

12 August From Alec (1461)

"Will remain Colon Cher zone Nord. Germans moving east passing Loire, Tracy, Cosne, Ambusees tonight our area."

12 August From Alec (1462)

"Felix radio useless. Electric installations cut. Send urgently petrol, engine. Passing his message. What phrase for all out guerrilla activity Cher area."

12 August From Alec (1463)

"Contacted Antoine. Will stand Cher Zone Nord. Antoine wants Jed team area west Salbris Vierzon road. Ready to receive them as soon as possible on Nectarine."

13 August From Alec (1464)

"All arrangements complete receive 20 SAS Haggard on Scrooges. Will use Haggard eureka serial 1134. Antoine wants 2 troops SAS (1) area between following points - Tours, Orleans, Vierzon ready to receive on Loite (2) East Orleans Vierzon road to bend of Loire and south Bourges, the remainder of Haggard."

(1459) C-1415/12 10 Aug 44
(1461) C-1537/89 12 Aug 44
(1463) C-1551/88 12 Aug 44

(1460) C-1506/10 11 Aug 44
(1462) C-1539/7 12 Aug 44
(1464) C-1590/92 13 Aug 44

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Operations, Team Alec (Cont'd)

13 August From SFHQ to Alec (1465)

"Agree you stay Cher Zone Nord. Regret impossible send other Jedburgh team Antoine's area."

13 August From Alec (1466)

"From Antoine - Felix temporarily out of action. Albin has stores men arms. Have given instructions when I saw him having reconnoitred well. Intends withdraw on me same time as enemy. Will give operator to Le Blanc. Saw Jed team Chateameillant. Little trouble with local men who want attack in force. Saw Corps too. Have fixed things."

13 August From Alec (1467)

"From Antoine - Felix temporarily out of action. Have contacted Jed team landed Mandarine. Will get on well, staff officers Colon in Cher and east road. 20 SAS Haggard received. Want urgently 40 more. Am dividing in 3 groups. Send on Banane. Will receive with head lamps. Send men only."

14 August From SFHQ to Alec (1468)

"For Antoine - to prevent wire crossing, please deal with all SAS matters through Haggard. Latter arranging reception SAS troops. What is wrong with Felix. Can he still take broadcast. Thanks news Albin. Agree his plans. Le Blanc is Pierre Charlier who took over from Etienne. We are out of touch with him and fear he may have been arrested."

14 August From Alec (1469)

"Organization Cher. Chef Colon with 1 chef des maquis and 4 Lieutenants who command 4 areas. Nerondes - 250 armed, need arms 250 more. Vierzon - 200 armed, need arms 500 more. Bourges unarmed 150; Sancere - 300 armed, need arms 200 more. Total armed 750, unarmed 1100. Maquis groups 15 men well organized."

17 August From Alec (1470)

"Enemy convoys passed here heading in direction of northerly direction. All roads damaged. Turning away men from joining maquis."

20 August From Alec (1471)

"Boche moving out Cher Zone Nord. Blowing up Bourges. Maquis on all outskirts Bourges waiting for moment to take city over. Enemy moving from north and west through city but situation indicates that they will pull out today or tomorrow. Can you give us up to date information armies movement with reference our position and whether we can go on with plan to enter Bourges."

(1465) C-1161 13 Aug 44
(1467) C-1638/8 13 Aug 44
(1469) C-1699/68 14 Aug 44
(1471) C-2173/90 20 Aug 44

(1466) C-1637/71 13 Aug 44
(1468) C-1271 14 Aug 44
(1470) C-1965/19 17 Aug 44

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JEDBURGHES

Operations, Team Alec (Cont'd)

21 August From Alec (1472)

"Situation Bourges changed. Germans using city as escape route for troops coming from southwest and west. Maquis ambushing all routes around Bourges. Occupation city unfeasible at moment. Can you send arms and ammunition Scarabee urgently. Maquis doing enormous damage against Boche using escape route. Arms ammo shortage becoming acute here."

25 August From SFHQ to Alec (1473)

"For Antoine - Your Loiret groups should take up positions close to Loire with priority concentrations Gien and Orleans. This to guard armies southern flank. Prevent infiltration small German groups. Give warning approach stronger forces. Army require destruction bridges at Gien."

26 August From Alec (1474)

"6 men received safely. Plane with money had 12 Roman candles. All weapons destroyed. Disgusting waste. Need more arms to guard Army's south Flank."

26 August From Alec (1475)

"Bridge destroyed Gien. Sancerre bridge only one still in use. Maquis holding it in force. FFI liberated area east Loire inclusive La Charite. Gien bridge blown by Germans week ago."

26 August From Alec (1476)

"FFI vehicles shot up by our planes. Have ordered all vehicles painted tactical sign 5 pointed star in circle. Have air forces regard this."

27 August From Watermark to Yalelock (1477)

"Jed Alec again reports FFI vehicles strafed by our planes. Has ordered all vehicles painted with five pointed star in circle. Asks please have Air Force regard this."

28 August From Alec (1478)

"Situation is fluid. Bourges roads from south and west jammed transport. Have contacted local American 12 Corps established liaison. Received bazookas, petrol from Army. 20,000 Germans expelled Bourges today. Air support urgent. Bourges strategically important gap between armies south closing traffic this way."

28 August From Alec (1479)

"Maquis groups operating in the area doing good work."

(1472) C-2349/29 21 Aug 44
(1474) C-2843/11 26 Aug 44
(1476) C-2887/68 26 Aug 44
(1478) C-3073/31 28 Aug 44

(1473) C-6325 25 Aug 44
(1475) C-2844/13 26 Aug 44
(1477) C-3217 27 Aug 44
(1479) C-3074/59 28 Aug 44

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JEDBURGHES

Operations, Team Alec (Cont'd)29 August From Alec (1480)

"Bourges not captured. FFI all around Bourges. Convoys still passing from Bourges to Nevers. 4 trains arrived at Bourges today. La Charite held in force by SS."

30 August From Alec (1481)

"What remains 2 panzer divisions 9 and 11 passing Bourges-La Charite-Nevers. Railway Bourges-Nevers working off and on. Can RAF do it. Will mark with lights our number 35."

30 August From SFHQ to Alec (1482)

"Please answer urgently the following question re the Loire bridges in your area. First, which bridges can you protect or destroy on order from us. Second, which bridges or temporary crossings erected by enemy are still intact."

31 August From Alec (1483)

"Bridges actually in use are La Charite Sancerre bridge across Bourges-Nevers line. La Charite staunchly defended by SS. We can protect or destroy the Sancerre bridge - the Aulium bridge north Sancerre."

31 August From Alec (1484)

"From Colonel Dupin in command 33 Half Brigade. Urgently require radio personnel fully equipped to liaise with RAF to obtain direct air support for intensive operations against Bourges Nevers road by Half Brigade."

1 September From Alec (1485)

"Send 200 tins of condensed milk with medical supplies. Germans passing continually on foot from Bourges to Nerondes station to take train for Nevers. Germans concentrated at Osmoy."

1 September From SFHQ to Alec (1486)

"Blow up Sancerre bridge preferably at night. Keep us informed results. Good luck."

2 September From SFHQ to Alec (1487)

"Air Force report St Solange too small for landing Dakotas and Hudson. Will drop medical supplies via Antoine. Condensed milk quite impossible, sorry. It is now urgent that you prevent all German transport going east or northeast by increasing activities ambushes and rail and road blocks."

(1480) C-3242/59 29 Aug 44
 (1482) C-3909 30 Aug 44
 (1484) C-3482/10 31 Aug 44
 (1486) C-6427 1 Sept 44

(1481) C-3292/15 30 Aug 44
 (1483) C-3376/97 31 Aug 44
 (1485) C-3584/2 1 Sept 44
 (1487) C-4562 2 Sept 44

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Operations, Team Alec (Cont'd)4 September From Alec (1488)

"Sancerre bridge blown night September 1. Enemy harassed day and night. Captured German officer with plans withdraw 16 Division south Orleans area. Have delivered it to 3rd Army."

5 September From Alec (1489)

"Battle yesterday Lesaixdangillon. 40 Boche killed, prisoners or wounded. Oxford badly wounded. Operated on today - doing well - in good hands. Other two scared but safe."

7 September From Alec (1490)

"Bourges liberated by FFI today 0900 hours."

8 September From Alec (1491)

"No need for further parachute operations. War over here. Bourges airdrome damaged slightly will be repaired ready for use Saturday 9 August. Dimensions 1500 meters by 500 meters. Lighting system prepared for night runway. Prepared to receive administrative officers here as from Saturday."

8 September From Alec (1492)

"Airfield at Bourges attacked, ready to begin tomorrow. Allied administrative mission required urgently. Can I do anything to help in meantime. Medical services being organized. Need equipment by air. Sending list tonight."

9 September From Alec (1493)

"Bourges liberated by FFI. Have contacted Jed Ivor today. Needs arms area south Bourges. Many Boche near Essodin and Dun. Send Dakotas Bourges Drome during daylight. Am handling arms for Ivor."

11 September From Alec (1494)

"Dakotas, 9 Lightnings landed Bourges last night. Airfield okay for all planes. Night landings, fires flanking runways - green light landing - end red light. 20,000 Boches south of Bourges have surrendered to American General in command at Tours. Cher Zone North and South now clear."

12 September From Alec (1495)

"Have many wounded. Send surgical supplies for 50 bed hospital. Can take as many Dakotas as you can send. 20,000 Germans surrendering beginning tomorrow marching north through Cher to Orleans Beaugency Meron Loire. Will

(1488) C-3795/6 4 Sept 44
 (1490) C-4090/101 7 Sept 44
 (1492) C-4184/8 8 Sept 44
 (1494) C-4460/2 11 Sept 44

(1489) C-3918/76 5 Sept 44
 (1491) C-4173/74 8 Sept 44
 (1493) C-4327/18 9 Sept 44
 (1495) C-4553/20 12 Sept 44

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be met there by Americans laying down arms there. This means marching through territory liberated by FFI. Arrange by American General at Tours. Consequences may be dangerous. Difficult for people to see Germans surrendered with arms."

12 September From Alec (1496)

"Bomb Group AAF on Zone 7. Landed safely Bourges. Minor repairs to ship. Expect return 13th or 14th. If not will advise."

17 September From SFHQ to Alec (1497)

"Consider that your mission is now completed and your team should return England earliest bringing with them a list of addresses of Jed chief helpers where they can be contacted later. Get in touch with DMR to take over your forces. Put all W/T equipment in safe place for later collection and for passage home contact Major Alastair Hamilton, Hotel Cecil, Paris, who will make arrangements. Advise us date of departure your circuit."

18 September From Alec (1498)

"Leaving for Paris 20th. Awaiting operation Oxford. Antoine wants me stay with him for operations east. Please send Dakota promised. Badly needed."

21 September From Alec (1499)

"Send Dakota with medical supplies to Dr Pierre Malgras at Bourges during daylight. Malgras rendered great service to us and others do this as great favor. Closing down tonight - going Paris tomorrow. Leaving Oxford under care of Malgras."

25 September From Yalelock to Watermark (1500)

"Following personnel Hendon 1600 hours 25 September flight. Captain Thompson or Jed Alec."

Report of Team Upon Return from the Field

Mission: To accompany a reconnaissance party of SAS to Loire et Cher; to provide the link between SAS and resistance groups contacting Ventriloquist (Antoine).

Arrived Cher Zone Nord night of 8/9 August. Met by chief of FFI. Dropped 60 miles east of area intended in briefing.

Met Antoine 12 August 1944. Decided to remain in present

(1496) C-4593/91 12 Sept 44
(1498) C-166/19 18 Sept 44
(1500) C-737/50 25 Sept 44

(1497) C-2047 17 Sept 44
(1499) C-470/26 21 Sept 44

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area to help arm and organize the FFI in that district.

Night of 12 August. First action with Germans moving east looking for crossings on River Loire. All roads leading to Loire as far south as Nevers blocked.

Results 13 August. 10 vehicles and 50 Germans destroyed.

15 August: Accompanied column on reconnaissance of Maquis groups. Approximately 1,200 men armed, divided into 600 Maquis and 600 civilian FFI living in small towns in area. Found it possible to arm another 3,000 and sent messages each day asking for parachute drops.

From 14 August to 21 September, received arms for another 800 men bringing the total armed to 2,000.

14 August: Whole bend of Loire occupied in force by Germans. Many different types of units which seemed to have lost contact with the bulk of the German army evacuating eastwards. These units were looking for crossings on the Loire to go east. Position of American army to the north apparently not known by the Germans. These troops were not well armed and travelling in every type of conveyance including bicycles and horse drawn vehicles. The Germans here came from the south through Bourges, Bierzon, Chateauroux, and Portiers from the south and southwest of France. This movement on their part resulted in one thing - Germans were cornered in the bend of the Loire. FFI in Cher ambushed every road with good results, especially on roads leading north from Bourges.

Morning of 18 August bulk of German troops, 16,000, realized their situation and began moving south to cross the

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Loire at La Charite and Nevers. Principal routes used Argent, Bourges, La Charite and Nevers and all small routes moving south through Cher to the routes leading to crossings La Charite and Nevers. Every road in area blocked and extremely good work done through exact figures are not available.

Night of 19th area cleared as far south as Bourges and we were able to cast aside the clandestine and come into the open. The same night the Germans began destroying all installations of military importance in Bourges. Commandant Colomb, Chief of FFI decided to move into Bourges on morning of 21st. I advised against it and turned out to be right.

At 1200 hours on the 21st the situation in Bourges had changed. There were some 5,000 Germans billeted in the city forming a temporary defensive strong point. It became evident that the Germans were holding Bourges as the center of an escape corridor to the crossings of the Loire. Several prisoners were taken at this time and units identified. It was evident from the information that the great bulk of Germans in western and southwestern France were planning to use this corridor.

21 August: We regrouped our forces on all roads approaching Bourges. Made liaison with Colonel Benoit (Bertrand) commanding the 1st Regiment of France in the Cher Zone Sud where Jed team Ivor (1501) was located. Colonel Bertrand undertook to block the two roads leading south from Bourges to Dun, Bourges to Levet and Bourges Saucouins.

22 August: Germans began to protect convoys with a few armored cars and light cannon. This was to no avail and maquis on routes did excellent work killing and capturing an average of 50 Germans a day.

(1501) See p 629 this Vol

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23 August: Movement of enemy convoys on roads continues. Bourges, commanded by a Lieutenant-General and defense plan organized to keep roads open to the river crossings on Loire.

24 August: Armored German train of seven cars running on line Bourges, Nevers, shooting up farms and killing peasants in the fields. Road cut by SAS and maquis under command of Oxford. Train immobilized for 3 days. Asked for RAF to come and bomb it. No answer received. Train now somewhere east of River Loire.

25 August: Northern area of Cher filled again with the Germans who had moved east from Orleans, Tours, Vierzon and Triande. Our forces surrounding Bourges hurried out and sent north to deal with this situation.

26 August: Cromarty (Thomson) went across Loire River by port at Ouzeur Sur Loire and contacted 35th American Division. While there he met Major General Eddy. Gave the G-2 at Corps information of southern flank of 3rd Army. In return I was given 17 bazookas and 500 bombs, medical supplies and 1,000 gallons of gasoline. Returned across river on the 27th with the supplies which we ran through the Germans in northern area all without any enemy interruption.

28 August: Returned again to continue liaison with 3rd Army. The German evacuation continued and the whole area filled. The enemy appeared lost. At this time General Patton became worried about this great mass south of the Loire and ordered all bridges to be blown on the Rivers Loire and Allier. The night of 28 August we blew up the bridge at Soucerre. I stayed there for the night as I was unable to return to our headquarters at Menetou Salon by car due to the enemy strength. On the 29 August the position was the

Operations, Team Alec (Cont'd)

same and I finally returned on bicycle to Menetou. During these three days some 200 or 300 prisoners had been taken and a number of enemy killed.

30 August: The German withdrawal continues. The morning of the 30th one of the lieutenants of the Maquis, Lieutenant Jacques Bourlier of Bourges attacked the leading vehicle of a German convoy. He took the car and the occupants, drove down the length of the German convoy in order to bring the information to our headquarters. It was the car of the convoy commander, a German Major. This Major had all the plans of the withdrawal of the German 16th Division from our area to Germany, giving all check points, billeting areas and final rendezvous. This information was passed immediately to G-2, 3rd Army. I don't believe the 16th Division ever got back to Germany. The night of the 30th Lieutenant Bourlier was taken prisoner and three days later shot by the Germans in Bourges. For this great act and for the useful information to the United States Army, I strongly ask for a decoration for this man. He has a wife and children in Bourges and to them it would be the difference between light and dark.

31 August: German withdrawal continues:

1 - 3 September: Continual harassing of German troops on all roads with the help of allied fighters who did great work on the roads.

4 September: The culmination of our activities against the Germans took place in a village called Les Aix Augillon. At 1500 hours in the afternoon we assembled our forces outside the town. The forces consisted of 20 maquis and 4 jeeps of the French 4th Battalion parachutists under command of Captain

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Larral. We sent two German prisoners in with a white flag to tell the 150 Germans in the town that their position was hopeless as all the roads were blocked. Shortly after the two prisoners returned with the answer. The German Commander was not prepared to surrender. Captain Larral ordered his jeeps into the town and the two sections of maquis infiltrated into the town on the right and leftflanks. We were with the right section. The town was cleared in one hour with few casualties to the maquis. The number of Germans killed was 40 and 18 prisoners were taken. After the town had been cleared the force went north to try and clean up the small pockets which had run out of the town. Captain Allot was with the right section and I went with the left. What went on after was a complete mess. No one knew where anyone else was. The maquis are not trained for this type of warfare, lacking completely in systems of signal and runners. The remaining Germans scattered themselves all over the countryside and we attempted to seek them out but with small success. Captain Allot walked into a group of Germans, was seriously wounded and given first aid. That night we occupied the town and made an all round defense system. At 2300 hours the scattered groups of Germans sent up flares to try and locate one another. Over the next three days they surrendered in small groups. As a result of this we were able to occupy the city of Bourges on 6 September.

6 September: Entered Bourges at 1100 hours. The city went mad and continued so for 5 days. That afternoon I went to the aerodrome which had been badly bombed and the main runway which had been repaired after the bombing had been

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blown up by the Germans. The morning of the 7th had 2,000 workmen on the cement runway, and by the morning of the 9th the runway was completely repaired and ready to receive planes. The morning of the 10th 4 Lightnings arrived out of gas. As I had found 10,000 gallons of aeroplane spirit at a large airfield, Avord, I was able to load them up and send them on their way. One Lightning had crashed a few miles away, the pilot was safe and the plane slightly damaged. On the 11th we received a Fortress badly damaged from flak over the Rhine. Repaired in 36 hours and filled with gas, it went back to England with the salvageable parts of the Lightning. After this parade of aircraft, the RAF still questioned the suitability of the field for Dakota operation.

9 September: Moved our forces south where there were still 20,000 Germans. Many scraps with our Group and Group of Jed Team Ivor.

12 September: We were suddenly told that the 20,000 Germans had surrendered to General Macon, Commanding 83rd Division of the 9th Army, and that the Germans would march north with their arms to surrender to the Allied Army at Orleans, Beaugeury and Mer sur Loire. The principal routes and the largest amount of Germans were in my area and Jed Team Ivors area. [Neither French Commander had been warned or liased with. The American General had dealt with a Colonel Martel in an area where there were no Germans. His jurisdiction ended with the Indre and these Germans were in the Cher.] Fortunately, after contacting the Germans and the Americans, we got a postponement of movement for 24 hours in order to warn the maquis in the area. Had this not been done, I am

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sure there would have been many serious incidents. As a result of their postponement, the march passed off with but few difficulties, though in three occasions the Germans did their nice trick of booby trapping our dead.

[There seems first of all to have been a complete lack of liaison and a complete lack of knowledge of the situation in France. I was told by one American Colonel that civilians, meaning the French, were not allowed to have arms, and the carrying of arms was illegal. I had to enlighten him on the fact that General Eisenhower had recognized the FFI as combatant troops and that for some 10 months we had been arming these people with American and British arms. However, the Germans surrendered and the whole show passed off. This movement ended on the 17th.]

17 - 21 September: Awaited Dakota operation with surgical supplies which came on the 23rd. Left for Paris on the 22nd.

Summary

The first 10 days was clandestine and from then on over most of the area, we were able to open up and use automobiles. After the taking of Montargis by the American swift advance - the Germans began to evacuate from the area, first the gestapo and milice and then the troops. Local troops had left by 20 August.

The 2nd phase - Area once again filled with troops, all of whom were retreating from the west and south west of France. These, on the whole, were disorganized and mixed with few officers. They lacked information of the bridges on the Loire most of which had been blown.

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3rd phase. It became evident that Bourges was the center of the escape corridor for the Germans coming from south and west, being able to cross the Loire at La Chante and Nevers. The defense of the city was organized by a corps commander.

4th phase 6 September, the Germans abandoned the protection of the Bourges corridor and ran for home. This seems to have been the plan of the 16th Divisional Commander. That was the only unit we saw that was well organized. We captured the plans for its withdrawal into Germany. This was immediately dispatched to 3rd Army.

5th phase. Bourges cleared and Germans in west, south and southwest abandoned. On 12 September, 18,000 Germans surrendered, having given up all hope of return to Germany. This Group had come from the Pyrenees, presumably the last troops in the general evacuation.

Unfortunately my mission was a month too late. The area, though organized, had much room for improvement. Much depended on the choice of under officers, which in my estimate, were bad. Had we been there a month or two earlier they could have been regulated, for these were men who with a little training could have made good officers. It was really too late to start cadres when we got there. But all the mission was not a failure for we were able to get arms and supplies for the advancing armies.

Contact with Headquarters

Communications: Excellent throughout.

Reactions from Home HQ. Slow and incomplete. Shortly after my arrival it became evident that we were not going to receive much assistance from London. Messages were not answered and often when answered were 4 or 5 days late. Fortunately

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my mission was able to make contact with 3rd Army north of the Loire. The first contact made was on the night of 23 August with 35th Division which had advanced units at Ouzuer sur Loire. Then fortunately I met General Manton S. Eddy, Commanding 12th Corps, whom I knew. In return for information concerning 3rd Army's southern flank I was given offer of material for our forces south of the Loire. 3rd Army gave me 17 bazookas the first in the area, and 500 bombs, medical supplies - first in the area and badly needed and gasoline to keep the mobility needed for ambushing the Germans on the roads. The Bazookas proved their usefulness the next day and continued good work until the last German was cleared from the area.

Once liaison had been established it was kept up and any information concerning the enemy posted to them rather than London. This was especially true of air targets of which there were many as the roads were continually jammed with German traffic moving east. The air cooperation worked successfully.

In all there seemed to be a lack of interest on the staff at this end, a machinery too small for the large job undertaken or a lack of trained personnel handling the various circuits. We realized the situation and felt that the only remedy would have been to get teams in earlier nearer D-day even though supplies were not forthcoming. This would have given time to complete organization and form cadres to train the maquis for war. Coming so quickly with so many teams at once overwhelmed an organization that was used to handling a very few teams. If this is tried again in another theater, I feel these points

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will be valuable. With or without arms, the Jeds were and could have been a great success had they been put in earlier and spread over a longer space. A strategic role rather than a tactical role was their real purpose and use.

The air forces did a good job on the whole - though I had one Liberator with 12 containers, none of whose parachutes had opened. The parachutes remained in their bags. Apparently the crew had forgotten to attach the static lines, resulting in all arms and ammunition in 12 containers being completely destroyed.

Financial Statement

Lieutenant Thomson and Staff Sergeant White

Personal use -----	250,000 Frs
Left with Captain Allet in hospital at Bourges -----	100,000
Spent for food, lodging and travel during our stay of 2 months in field -----	45,000
Returned -----	105,000

Additional Report

For Antoine -----	1,500,000 Frs
For team use -----	500,000
Gave FFI -----	350,000
Stolen from car on 25 August -----	100,000
Returned -----	50,000 Frs

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FIGURE 52

Capt Charles Brown of
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Operations, Team LeeTEAM LEE

Jedburgh team Lee was the twenty-third Jedburgh team to be dispatched to France from the United Kingdom.

Members of Team

~~The members of team Lee were:~~

Charles E. Brown, III
Captain/~~G-R Brown~~ (US), Cavo (~~1504~~) code name "Pice" *caps*

Captain N Vigulier (French), code name "Sous" *caps*

2nd Lieutenant A Chevalier (French), code name "Reis" *caps*

Area to Which Dispatched

Team Lee was dispatched on the night of 9/10 August to the Haute Vienne department of France.

Background of Resistance in Area

Resistance in the Haute Vienne department had reached a considerable degree of organization and in some parts a reasonable state of armament. In order to stiffen this resistance half a troop of 3 French Parachute Battalion SAS was to be sent to this department.

Purpose of the Mission

Team Lee was dispatched with an SAS group and was to work with the F Section organizer in this region, Salesman (~~1504~~). They would provide communication with headquarters and liaison with resistance.

Method of Dropping and Reception Committee

The team was to be dropped to a reception committee organized by Salesman.

Communications

One Jedburgh W/T set and one spare receiver was dropped with the team. Contact with the Home Station was to be established as soon as possible after arrival.

(1504) War Diary Vol 11 p 567
(1504) War Diary Vol 3 p

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The team's W/T operator was to provide the communications link for the SAS group and would in all cases remain with this party.

Finance

Each of the officers took 100,000 French francs and 50 American dollars. The W/T operator took 50,000 French francs and 50 American dollars.

Relations with Other Allied Units

Special Airborne Services. Jedburgh team Lee was to be attached to the SAS party and would be under the command of the Salesman mission.

Allied Forces, If Overrun. When overrun by Allied forces, the team had instructions to report to the nearest intelligence officer. They would give no details of their work to this officer but merely ask him to forward them to the nearest SF Staff. This Staff would identify them and pass them back to SFHQ London.

Action

Upon Arrival in the Field. The team would be at the disposal of the Salesman mission upon arriving in the field and would carry out such special tasks as directed. In particular, these were to harass enemy movements on the roads and railway lines.

In organizing the resistance groups formation of large units would be discouraged and only guerrilla activity would be undertaken against the enemy.

If Captured. The team took no cover story to the field. If taken prisoner they would be taken as soldiers in uniform performing their ordinary military duties. Every established

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law of warfare would apply to them. They would, therefore, give their name, rank and serial number only.

Information Provided to Team

The following information was provided to the team prior to its departure:

1. Enemy order of battle in the area.
2. OG and other Allied forces.
3. Resistance elements in the area.
4. Topography of the area.

First Word from Field

Team Lee announced its arrival in the field in the following W/T message dated 10 August (1504):

"Arrived safely with all containers and SAS safe too. Apologies about sacks. Explanation later. We are with Hamlet."

Summary of W/T Messages Exchanged

11 August From Lee (1505)

"Our and Monty Jed sets smashed. Send immediately 2 sets very well packed to Framboise in Salesman circuit. Warn us by broadcast using B-2 set now. We dropped 2 miles from lights."

11 August From SFHQ to Lee (1506)

"Happy you all arrived safely. Virgile will probably loan you a W/T set until we dispatch new ones."

12 August From Lee (1507)

"Maquis very well organized in this area. 3 groups each about 2000 control all of department. Except Limoges armament good. Greatest need is petrol for essential liaison and transport between groups SAS. Send urgently maximum petrol to existing fields in circuit."

13 August From SFHQ to Lee (1508)

"It is reported from a reliable source that German cars have been observed in the Limoges region. These cars fly French flags and have been picking up men on their way to join the Maquis."

(1504) C-1410/1 10 Aug 44
(1506) C-8198 11 Aug 44
(1508) C-1189 13 Aug 44

(1505) C-1468/2 11 Aug 44
(1507) C-1562/3 12 Aug 44

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13 August From Lee (1509)

"In ambush of armored train 2 SAS killed and 1 prisoner. Intend visit all maquis in region with Hamlet when petrol arrives. Jed team Alexander arrived here. Liaison with Creuse will be established shortly."

15 August From Lee (1510)

"Jed team Alexander made contact and left for Creuse yesterday. Only possibility Dakota ground already surveyed by Faust. When Limoges is taken, airfield will be available. Lack of petrol for liaison prevents effective effort against enemy."

15 August From SFHQ to Lee (1511)

"German 159th Division reported on move northwards to battle zone. Make maximum effort prevent or hold them up."

16 August From Lee (1512)

"All dispositions possible already taken to prevent or to ward passage of troops and to contain. About 600 men German garrison in Limoges. Road blocks and permanent ambushes on all principal roads. Personally assisted in construction of anti-tank ditch and mine field on road 20 south of Limoges. Request answer about petrol."

17 August From SFHQ to Lee (1513)

"Sorry about petrol but we are limited by Air Force to two containers per aircraft as leakage is hazardous to safety of plane. You should receive four petrol containers on Hamlet's ground Poire tonight."

18 August From Lee (1514)

"Command of FFI in department given to Colonel Guingoin, leader of FTP, by accord between Ellipse and Hamlet. Headquarters being set up with all groups represented. All military decisions will be taken by this Hq. Limoges encircled by ambushes and road blocks. Do you know where 159th Division is now."

19 August From Lee (1515)

"Thanks for petrol. Same amount on each plane will be just enough. Don't stop sending. What about Jed set trying with Hamlet to bring Gardes Mobile over to resistance."

19 August From SFHQ to Lee (1516)

"We are looking into possibilities of capturing and holding Limoges aerodrome before even freed from Germans."

(1509) C-1615/4	13 Aug 44	(1510) C-1769/6	15 Aug 44
(1511) C-6232	15 Aug 44	(1512) C-1829/7	16 Aug 44
(1513) C-1588	17 Aug 44	(1514) C-2041/9	18 Aug 44
(1515) C-2118/11	19 Aug 44	(1516) C-1865	19 Aug 44

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Although at the moment nothing definite decided we want to know if you could do this and how long you think you could hold out in present conditions. If you consider plan feasible, let us know immediately. How much notice you would need to carry this operation out. 159th Division somewhere in south and supposedly moving north."

21 August From Lee (1517)

"Situation radically changed. We will ourselves be in Limoges with Hamlet after 1300 GMT today negotiating surrender German garrison so cancel mosquito operation."

26 August From Lee (1518)

"Moving to area between Angouleme and Poitiers to verify reports much German armor and infantry. Be ready send bombers immediately on request."

1 September From Lee (1519)

"Information on German withdrawal requires you maintain bombing on following roads. Ruffec-Poitiers-Chateauroux, Ruffec-Civray-Gencay-Bonneuil-Pleumartin. Require heaviest bombing possible Tournon-Chateauroux-Issoudun road, Pleumartin-Charost-Bourges. Germans heading for Loire crossings at Cosne-Nevers-La Charite."

2 September From SFHQ to Lee (1520)

"Have asked Air Force for repeated bombardment of retreating enemy troops and convoys. Please send urgently details numbers German prisoners your region and what arrangements possible for their concentration. Also require details destruction permanent works carried out by Boches and destruction prevented owing your action."

2 September From Lee (1521)

"Angouleme liberated September 1st. We returned Limoges after making ambushes with SAS and American OG about 20 kilometers north of Angouleme. No enemy remains in this region and our mission here seems to be finished. We are leaving for Indre soon as we get petrol."

5 September From SFHQ to Lee (1522)

"You have no right to order your team home without instructions from this office. Should we give you such instructions, who would handle communications for Samson SAS group. Germinal Mission leaving today or tomorrow for Limoges. You should contact him at Hotel Moderne, Limoges. He will give you instructions."

5 September From Lee (1523)

"Have moved to Le Blanc in Department of Indre with

(1517) C-2267/14 21 Aug 44
(1519) C-3599/21 1 Sept 44
(1521) C-3542/22 2 Sept 44
(1523) C-3917/23 5 Sept 44

(1518) C-2888/18 26 Aug 44
(1520) C-6434 2 Sept 44
(1522) C-7 5 Sept 44

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Hamlet SAS and OG. Killed 3 Germans and took 5 prisoners in operation yesterday. We are ambushing in vicinity Mesnieres sur Brenne where last German elements are en route toward the east."

7 September From Lee (1524)

"Latest information indicates large convoys on highway Issoudun, Lignieres, Chateauneuf sur Cher. Suggest heavy bombardment soonest."

8 September From Lee (1525)

"We are following Boche column moving east. We are now vicinity Chateauroux. Had 2 engagements in last 3 days, 1 with bicyclist patrol at 40 yards range. We got several. Cannot understand your assumption we were ready to take next plane to London. Will contact Germinal soonest."

11 September From Lee (1526)

"We are in Limoges. We have contacted Germinal and are receiving instructions from him."

11 September From SFHQ to Lee (1527)

"Following your good work around Chateauroux, you should now contact Ellipse with view to joining Moses and carrying on the good work with him in area Issoudun, Lignieres, Chateauneuf."

12 September From SFHQ to Lee (1528)

"Further to our 21 of 11th. In view rapidly changing situation you should after contacting Ellipse also contact Adiabatique, Chateau de la Gueriniere at Loudin who will direct you to Fontenay area."

13 September From Lee (1529)

"Have received instructions from Germinal. "Pice" returning London soonest. "Sous" and "Reis" remaining at disposition of DMR in Limoges. "Sous" and "Reis" leaving with SAS for La Rochelle under orders of DMR."

14 September From SFHQ to Lee (1530)

"We are not informed source of announcement over BBC that La Rochelle taken. Our latest reports state that Germans still hold town in force. Please send immediately report on situation. We are pressing for immediate bombardment or attack by other means. If situation unchanged these are your orders. First concentrate your groups around Fontenay, second blockade La Rochelle."

(1524) C-4159/25 7 Sept 44
(1526) C-4451/28 11 Sept 44
(1528) C-1252 12 Sept 44
(1530) C-1654 14 Sept 44

(1525) C-4179/26 8 Sept 44
(1527) C-1091 11 Sept 44
(1529) C-4726/29 13 Sept 44

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Operations, Team Lee (Cont'd)14 September From Lee (1531)

"SAS Samson and Dickens regrouped in Cognac area. They are in contact with London by Dickens radio. "Sous" and "Reis" returned Limoges and remaining at Ellipse disposal. "Pice" coming back home soon."

16 September From Lee (1532)

"Sous" and "Reis" left Cognac for Limoges on 13th after SAS Dickens and Samson regrouped. Both SAS now in area Fontenay operating for La Rochelle. SAS have radio contacts with home. All maquis forces were grouped around La Rochelle. Have no other news than BBC reports about La Rochelle. "Sous" and "Reis" gone to Paris. Will contact Colonel Vernon with agreement of Ellipse."

23 September From SFHQ to Lee (1533)

"We are cancelling Lee plan on 25 September. You should take crystals with you. W/T equipment which you cannot move should be left in safe place for later collection."

From
 →

Report of Team Upon Return from the Field - 9 Aug to 25 Sept 44

We left Keevil airport in England, taking off in a Sterling Bomber at 2245 hours 9 August. There were two planes in the flight, one containing thirteen French SAS, the other containing ten French SAS and ourselves. We jumped to field Franboise at 0115 10 August. We three jumped in the first stick and landed two miles from the lights. I jumped with a leg bag containing our Jed radio set. The jump was satisfactory, although I had never jumped with a leg bag attached to one leg only, and in spite of the fact that the twenty foot long strap on the bag wrapped around my neck and also that I slipped forward in my harness and so could not properly pull down on my front lift webs. We were dropped from eight hundred feet, which, in my opinion, was too high. But I landed in a field and after an uncertain twenty minutes, picked up a French farm boy who guided me to my reception. The radio in the leg bag

(1531) C-4783/30 14 Sept 44
 (1533) C-3034 23 Sept 44

(1532) C-4960/37 16 Sept 44

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was completely smashed, as was also one dropped in a package. By mistake, the rucksacks and radio set of Captain Montgomery's team were dropped in addition to our own. That same night we contacted Major Charles Staunton, British Army (code name Hamlet) (1534), as ordered. He was living outside the village of La Croisille sur Briance, about thirty kilometers south-east of Limoges and this was to be our base until we moved into Limoges.

The first day 10 August was spent in making contact with London. We borrowed a B-2 set and got our first message through on our second schedule of that day. Subsequently we always used the B-2 set with batteries and nearly always made contact, although several broadcasts were missed due to jamming and bad atmospheric conditions.

We missed the ambush of the armored train which took place at 0815 hours on the 11th below Salon-la-Tour because we were absent when the others left for the operation. The ambush ended up disastrously, however, with the death of two SAS and of Captain William F Larson, Inf (1535) commanding the American OG (1536). One SAS man was also taken prisoner and subsequently freed by us from the prison of Limoges. The ambush was laid at night and no one noticed an electric wire lying down over the tracks one hundred yards to the north. When the train arrived it stopped before the wire some three hundred yards short of the ambush. A sentinel walking up the tracks noticed a poorly concealed SAS man and a Maquis officer with him. They did not shoot him but allowed him instead to return and bring up a light machine gun squad which sprayed the position. Everyone withdrew in considerable disorder,

(1534) War Diary Vol 3 p
 (1535) War Diary Vol 11 p 693
 (1536) War Diary Vol 4-A p 22

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although the track was blown and as a result the train returned to Limoges. I inspected the terrain on the afternoon of the 11th, and identified the body of Captain Larson. He was buried with as much ceremony and military honors as possible on 12 August.

Captain Vigulier and ^I~~myself~~ discussed at length with Major Staunton the entire resistance movement in the Haute Vienne, organization, state of armament, morale, record of operations. It became clear that if we sent in fields and asked for parachutages we would merely hamper rather than abet the existing program, so in that respect we confined ourselves to asking for droppings on existing fields. At that time the need for gasoline was much more important than arms, and nearly every message we sent for the first two weeks mentioned this fact, as we were helpless without vehicular transportation for liaison and transport purposes. I do not know if this urgent need was recognized by London; all I know is that we barely had enough petrol to go into Limoges to negotiate for its surrender.

At the time of our arrival the resistance movement in the Haute Vienne was relatively strong. German garrisons remained in Limoges and at St Leonard and the wolfram mine nearby. The maquis more ^{or} less controlled the rest of the department except for these two spots and an area of about ten kilometers around Limoges, in so far as circulation was relatively safe elsewhere except on main highways. Nothing, however, prevented the Germans from making sorties at will. They would be harassed and were thus forced to circulate through the countryside in considerable strength. One could say that the railroads no longer operated, as they were cut and kept cut. Our intelligence on proposed rail movements was excellent, as all

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FIGURE 53

Capt Charles Brown talking to a German captain captured
in Limoges



FIGURE 54

Capt Charles Brown in a jeep in France

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French railway personnel worked with the resistance.

The ~~Francs-Tireurs~~^{ex} ~~Partisans Francais~~ ~~were the backbone~~
~~of~~ ^{constituted the majority of} the resistance in this department. By our best estimates they numbered about 5500 armed men. [There were Armee Secrete and ORA groups, but these were in a great minority.] Major Staunton, taking the view that he should arm all these that really wanted to fight, concentrated his efforts on arming the FTPF, disregarding the communistic tendencies of their organization and the possible dangers to post war security. I mention this in passing, because I have been questioned myself by Frenchmen and heard criticism of this action. I was and am entirely in agreement with his policy, as these were the men who really wanted to fight and who did the work.

Their leader ^{was} ~~is~~ Georges Guingoin, whom I met on the 12th. He was subsequently appointed leader of all FFI in the department by the DMR (code name Ellipse). I must say that in his relations with us he never allowed any political considerations to interfere with the military plans which we made in common - he, Major Staunton, Captain Viguiet, and myself. In the days that followed, we were to see him almost every day.

From the beginning, Captain Viguiet and I worked in closest cooperation with Major Staunton. On the thirteenth we received a report that the German garrisons south of us were planning a push northward to join up with the Limoges garrison, and the same time we heard the first of many reports that the Germans were preparing to break out of Limoges. We decided to push military operations to the limit, as the climax seemed approaching for our area. With Guingoin, we decided to

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alert all his resistance groups and cover all the roads leading in and out of Limoges.

On 14 August, Major Staunton, the OGs and SAS and ourselves, blew up the bridge at St. Leonard, as this was the only real objective on the natural route of withdrawal from Limoges which the Germans would take, since the other main routes passed directly through strongly held Maquis territory suitable for ambushes. The operation was carried out silently and although several hundred Germans were just outside of the town, they knew nothing until the explosion occurred. Captain Viguiet and I made the reconnaissance with two Maquis guides. The OGs executed the demolition. The bridge was guarded by four unarmed French civilians whom we held until after the demolition and then released.

From the 15th till the 17th, we were busy part time in constructing a very wide and deep anti-tank ditch on the Route Nationale 2500 meters north of Fombelaux 35 kilometers southwest of Limoges. Mines and traps were laid, trees felled for several hundred meters on either side, all side roads were blocked and the bridge at St Germain les Belles nearby blown up. Our efforts were increased by receiving on the 16th a telegram from London stating that the German 159th division was moving northward in the vicinity. During this three-day period we kept in constant touch with Guingoin, and our work was made easier when he was appointed leader of all the FFI in the department by the DMR on the 17th.

As matters seemed to be coming to a head, with consistent reports that the Germans were preparing to break out of Limoges, we decided on the 18th to ask for a mosquito bombardment of all

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the barracks of Limoges occupied by the German garrison. This would be followed by an attack of limited scope by the resistance groups ranged immediately around the city, in order to secure as much arms, material, and gasoline as possible, and to demoralize the enemy. We asked for this bombardment on our emergency frequency.

At the same time, we wanted to persuade the Garde Mobile and Garde Mobile de Reserve, which numbered twenty-six squadrons (i.e. three thousand men) to come over to the resistance, as this would facilitate our job immeasurably. Although outwardly they seemed obdurate in their intention to obey the orders of Vichy, and hence to defend the blockhouses on the outside perimeter of Limoges, we had information that certain officers were willing to negotiate. At dusk on the eighteenth, we met a lieutenant colonel of the Garde a few hundred yards outside of the first road block on the outskirts of Limoges. We opened the discussion and it soon became clear that this officer had not made up his mind and was stalling us off.

Guingoin issued an ultimatum looking toward a definite answer the following day. At this moment we saw a camouflaged vehicle coming towards us down the hill from the direction opposite to Limoges. Someone shouted "les Boches" and everyone separated and ran like hell. Actually it was a Maquis group which was on its way into the city to shoot it up, in true Chicago gangster fashion, from their car which they had painted to look like a German vehicle. When we realized our mistake and recovered, the lieutenant colonel of the Garde had disappeared. The outcome was successful in the end, however, as the entire Garde quitted the city the night before the surrender.

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The mosquito bombardment called for on the 18th and due to take place on the 21st was cancelled in great haste on the evening of the 20th when Guingoin came to inform us that the German general commanding the garrison had expressed a desire through the medium of the Swiss consul, M. Jean d'Albis, to negotiate with Allied representatives. We had been hoping for this eventuality from the first, and our tactics of tightening the ring around Limoges were designed to increase the impression among the Germans that they were cornered.

With a laissez-passer signed by the General, we entered Limoges on the afternoon of the 21st to negotiate with General Gleiniger. The meeting itself, was carried out with the utmost dignity and formality on our part. Major Staunton as senior officer was the spokesman, and representative of the British Army; Captain Viguiet represented the Free French, a Captain Guery represented the FFI and I represented the United States Army.

At the conclusion of the meeting, we went outside the city to notify Guingoin and to tell him that his men could move into the city at eight o'clock to round up the prisoners. We then started back into the city to return to M. d'Alois' house until such time as we should proceed to the Motel de la Paix with him and sign the terms which the general had already accepted verbally.

At 1915 hours, however, shooting broke out in the city. It sounded like German fire exclusively. We presumed that part of the garrison had refused to obey the order to surrender and were fighting among themselves. We hastened outside the city a second time and told the FFI to wait until we went in

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ourselves and sent back word. As we approached the city once again, we turned into the highway to see six German trucks fifty yards away returning into the city. Fortunately, we had not been a few moments sooner as they would have been behind instead of ahead of us. All we had was our sidearms. We learned later that they had tried to break out but were forced to return when they reached a road block.

We entered the city by a different route than the one agreed upon in order to avoid any possible ambush, and reached the Hotel de la Paix to find a great crowd assembled outside and the Germans within anxiously awaiting our arrival to protect them. We were met by Captain Stoll^(German) who told us that when the general had returned to issue his order of surrender, he had been arrested by the German police and taken away in a large convoy which had left the town by the Route Nationale 141 via St Leonard. He assured us that the general had kept his word in so far as he was able, and that he, Captain Stoll, had remained to carry out the terms for those that remained.

We immediately sent word to the FFI to move into Limoges in force and to secure the city and take prisoner any of the enemy who had not escaped. Although it looked at first as though only sixty prisoners were taken, the figures as checked by myself on an inspection of the prison camp at St Paul d'Eyjeaux later were:

Total enemy prisoners in German uniform:	341
Total German officers:	12
Total German soldiers:	65
Total Russians in German uniform:	264

This figure includes a small number of prisoners taken at St Leonard, which was mentioned in the terms, but does not include eight German women and thirty seven Russian civilians

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in families that were also working with the Germans. I have been unable to find out the number of Germans killed in the process of occupying the city and of rounding up the prisoners. And, of course, this does not include French civilians who worked either for the Gestapo or the Milice, as they were specifically excluded from the terms. Likewise it was impossible to assess the amount of material taken, since during the night of 21 August the confusion and lack of control was unimaginable and considerable pillaging of German stores occurred. Personally I tried to catch a few hours sleep from 0300 to 0700 the next morning in the Hotel de la Paix and was awakened every five minutes by someone either turning my room upside down, searching for loot or else asking me to identify myself.

There is, of course, no way of testing the veracity of the German Captain Stoll's story about what happened while the negotiations were being carried out and during the interim between the end of the parley and the time we entered the city. The fact remains that a large convoy started to leave the city around 1700 on the 21st, and inasmuch as the route from Limoges to St Leonard is impossible from the viewpoint of ambushing, they got through, having repaired the bridge we had blown. We originally estimated the garrison to be approximately fifteen hundred men. The entire Garde Mobile and Garde Mobile de Reserve left the city in the night of 20-21 August, aligning themselves on the side of the resistance.

The days that followed, the next day in particular, were marked by the confusion and disorganization concomitant with

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the liberation of a city of one hundred and twenty thousand population. Late in the night of the twenty-first, we visited the city prison and freed on the spot the SAS prisoner and Flight Sergeant T P Stirling, RCAF (bomber command) ASN R 159985, shot down the night of 31 May/1 June, whom we sent out on the first Dakota.

The following day I inspected the former Gestapo headquarters, where I saw a whip, a stick which had been used as a club, and blood stains on the staircase from top to bottom, and numerous not too pleasant photos. Incidentally, a few days later a body was disinterred from the garden of the house which had been hastily buried only a few inches under the soil and was unidentifiable. I also went out to the Limoges airport, which Captain Edgar Fraser was already working on. We were caught in the midst of considerable gunfire between Maquis and some of the enemy cornered in a few buildings. Everyone was still on edge and quick on the trigger, men running down the middle of streets firing pistols into windows without any regard for cover.

I also visited the prison again, and saw collaborators brought in, the sight of whom I will never forget. We all maintained complete aloofness from these proceedings which did not concern us. During this day the people were out for blood, and although crowds gathered and cheered as men and women both were arrested and none too kindly handled, what we feared most did not occur in my presence at least, namely the shooting of people on the spot, although this may have been done without our knowledge. Our principal worry at this time was to get the Maquis groups to leave the city and guard

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the approaches, as we were still uncertain as to whether German columns would attempt to pass through or not. This fear fortunately proved unfounded.

This terminated the phase of our mission during which, in addition to furnishing communications for the SAS, which has amounted to four or five messages in a month, we maintained the closest liaison with the resistance of the Haute Vienne, and practiced informally at first what we eventually constituted, namely an inter-Allied mission representing the American, British, and Free French military forces. From now on, our activities became more of a purely personal military nature. I was able to do some of the fighting which I had been forced to avoid previously.

At the suggestion of the DMR, we moved west to the environs of Angouleme on 27 August, with Major Staunton, the OG and SAS. We spent the first two nights at Chazelles, fifteen kilometers east of Angouleme, inspected the positions nearby, and got the distinct impression that the various groups were jealous of one another and none too keen on fighting, except the force commanded by Commandant Bernard, and FTPF leader under Guingoin, who was the finest leader of men I met in France. An interesting note is that here Spanish Republican and Russian flags were mounted on vehicles of several Maquis groups along with the French flag. After much argument it was decided that a joint headquarters with liaison officers from each group would be set up at La Rochefoucauld. At this time we began to hear explosions from the direction of the city, and to see flares at night, all of which confirmed our suspicions that the Germans were preparing to leave Angouleme.

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We had previously asked for a bombardment on two thousand Germans in the Foret de la Braconne ten kilometers northeast of Angouleme. We now asked for bombardment on the Route Nationale 10 from Angouleme to Ruffec, as this was obviously the axis of withdrawal for all troops quitting the Bordeaux area and southwestern France in general. They were holding Angouleme as the pivot until the tail of the column cleared.

We decided to mount our own ambushes, using the OG and SAS on the Route Nationale 10. Consequently, on the 29th we made a reconnaissance in force on that portion between Tourriers and Fenetre, about fifteen kilometers north of the city, but did not find a suitable position. The Germans were passing in force and holding Tourriers temporarily at least with several thousand men, who could easily cut us off in the event we attacked.

Two days later, we split forces to lay two ambushes, myself going with the OG, and Captain Viguier going with the SAS. Our own ambush took place at 2100 hours on the 31st on the Route Nationale 10 below the first crossroads south of La Chignolle. We left the trucks at Brie guarded by Maquis and proceeded on foot. I went forward as scout with two OGs. We stopped at Les Coussauds and the three of us made the forward reconnaissance for the position. We covered about five hundred yards to a position along a hedge one hundred yards from the highway, all the time hearing the Germans talking in a wood bordering the road to our left front and hearing and seeing the trucks going by. I would like to mention here that these two men never faltered or hesitated to follow me forward, even though there were open spots we were forced to cross ~~and~~

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and the rest was along hedges in the daylight. I am sure they felt as I did that if there were any sentry posts out we would be perfect targets. I would also like to mention that in all the work I did with the OG I worked in complete accord with Captain ~~Reider~~ Grunseth, (1537) their commanding officer. He even paid me the compliment later of asking me to command his men for a subsequent operation when he was forced to remain in the rear due to a badly sprained shoulder suffered in this operation.

When we reached our position, I sent one man back with the information, remaining in the position with the other. We had one bad moment when a truck broke down directly in front of us and unloaded its cargo of Germans.

Captain Grunseth moved up with one squad, leaving the other behind to cover our withdrawal. We waited in position for about four hours, during which time many single vehicles passed by plus Germans on bicycles and on foot, and a convoy of German ambulances. The party of Germans remained in the woods to our left front all this time firing rifles occasionally, but never it seemed in our direction.

When the convoy of trucks came by at 2100 hours we fired steadily for about one minute. I fired twenty-eight rounds of carbine ammunition into the rear of a truck full of Germans and everyone was firing just as fast as possible. Within forty-five seconds they were firing at least three light machine guns with explosive ammunition at us, in addition to small arms fire. We started to withdraw at the end of the minute. At first, the tracers were only about eight feet above our heads. Later the fire raised higher. We withdrew over

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one hundred and fifty yards of ground without cover, and over the rest using what cover we could get. It was getting dark so the second squad did not dare to give us covering fire.

When we reached the line of houses at Les Coussauds, we were still under fire, both automatic and small arms. Some Germans, trying to outflank us to the right, fired up the road with what sounded like machine pistols. We moved out cross country to Brie and entrucked for La Rouchefoucauld. We suffered no casualties, and although we did not linger to see the amount of damage done, I am convinced that it was considerable to German personnel. We heard cry out when we opened fire.

The following day, we heard that Angouleme had been liberated, so we were fortunate in attacking one of the last convoys to leave the city.

We returned to Limoges to hear from Major Staunton that he had received a message stating that we had already been ordered to go north into the Vienne or Indre with the SAS and suggesting that he do likewise with the OG. I mention this because we never received such a telegram, but naturally we all left for the north as soon as we got the petrol and stopped at Le Blanc in the Indre on the evening of 3 September.

The next morning we learned that the same column from Angouleme with additions from the Poitiers area was passing due east on the Route Nationale passing through Mezieres-en-Brenne, Chateauroux, Issoundun, Lignieres, Chateaufort and further eastwards in a race for the Belfort gap. We moved immediately northeast to the small village of St Michel, five kilometers southwest of Mezieres which was at that time held

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by the Germans. Having made liaison with resistance groups in the area, we received an unconfirmed report that fifteen Germans were halted at a chateau some two kilometers north of the village and a few hundred yards from the highway. We went forward by car to investigate, finding the information to be true. Some Germans were definitely at this chateau. We sent back for the OG and SAS trucks. We mounted an attack at 1500 hours on the chateau, the SAS assaulting and the OG covering. I personally commanded the OG except for those sent out on the flank with the Vickers LMG, who were with Major Staunton. We killed two Germans, and took six prisoners, all of whom were wounded, and two of whom died later. None escaped. We collected considerable arms and stores.

We then withdrew to a wood four hundred yards to the east on a hill which dominated the highway and reconnoitered an excellent ambush position for the evening. Two hours later, we heard a few rapid shots and some talking from the vicinity of the road. I immediately took Lieutenant Cutting, and 2 OGs to investigate. From an observation position we saw thirty to forty Germans deploying in a field on the other side of the highway and apparently preparing to outflank us in the woods. I immediately gave the order to withdraw, since we numbered only about thirty-five, and I felt sure that there were many more of the enemy than we could see. This was later confirmed, as at least one hundred and possibly twice that number of bicycle troops were sent out from Mezieres to investigate the firing which had lasted for six minutes at the chateau. We lost as a prisoner Captain Robert Mortier, Canadian Army, who separated from us without telling us where

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he was going and who was taken near the highway by the enemy. Fortunately he has since been liberated.

The next day we returned to the area and learned that the Germans were occupying the wood we had been in the day before. With the aid of two Maquis trentaines who were to contain the Germans in the wood, we prepared an attack on a nearby farm where a truckload of Germans had stopped. At this moment a twin engine light bomber (an A20 I believe) flew over us very low, as we were less than a mile from the highway where it had been strafing for some time. It returned a second time with its right engine on fire, banked sharply to land on a pond near us, tore off its wing, and crashed in a clump of trees near the edge of the enemy held woods.

We abandoned our original plan in favor of going to the scene of the crash to rescue any survivors. As we were moving along a path between two hedges six hundred yards from the forest, about six Germans started to cross an open field at the edge of the woods. We put a Bren gun into position and hit them all with Bren and small arms fire. Later a single German walked into the field and an OG hit him with the second shot of an M-1 rifle. As the Germans were clearly much closer to the spot than ourselves, and could move in cover while our approach was relatively open, we reluctantly withdrew. The plane burned and we have no information of any survivors.

In the morning of the sixth, we set out from Le Blanc to meet Lieutenant Colonel Serge Obelensky, AUS (1538) and his OG at the Chateau de Verneuil in the Foret de Lancosne about twelve kilometers southeast of Mezieres. We had met him the afternoon previous, and decided to work together. He was to

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mount an ambush during the night previous, and give us the latest information when we relieved him in the morning.

We set out with our car in front, followed by the SAS and OG trucks. At a crossroads some five hundred yards short of the chateau, we met a German bicycle patrol at a range of forty yards.

I was sitting in the rear seat on the right hand side of the car, and jumping out before it had stopped, I fired about eight rounds standing up in the road at this range. We always had two Brens facing forward on the trucks and they opened fire next. We killed one of the first three bicyclists. We saw four in all, although we heard a truck arriving, and suspected that others were concealed by a hedge along the road to our left front. Also a few shots were fired at us from a farm house on our right, and the enemy fired two red flares almost immediately. We withdrew and soon contacted Lieutenant Colonel Obolensky by another road along which he had been forced to withdraw from the chateau, which was occupied by the enemy overnight. We were forced to return to Limoges by car for more gasoline, and returning to Le Blanc, on 7 September we moved east following the end of the column as it had cleared Mezieres. The OG in the meantime received orders to leave us to join Lieutenant Colonel Obolensky. They were all fine men and commanded by a most capable officer.

On the eighth we reconnoitered the southern most of two communication routes leading directly from Chateauroux to Lignieres, and joined forces with a Maquis group of seventy men who were on the road between Ardentes and St Aout. We remained in position all the night of 8/9 September but nothing

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FIGURE 55

Canadian Members of Hudson which
Landed in Limoges on 7 Sept 1944




FIGURE 56

Capt Brown, OSS, with Members of
Swiss Consul in Limoges, Haute-Vienne

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passed and we heard that Chateauroux was evacuated by the Route Nationale to Issoudun during the night.

Knowing by BBC message that Captain William F Grell, USMCR (1539) (mission Germinal) (1540) had arrived during the night and having received instructions to contact him the soonest possible, we returned to Limoges on the ninth, and it was decided in conjunction with Ellipse that Captain Viguiet and 2nd Lieutenant Chevalier would remain with Ellipse at his disposition, while Captain Brown should return to London.

Conclusions

The following concerns several minor points which I have been asked to include in this report.

In regard to those people who helped me personally and our group in particular, it is most difficult to specify any individuals. Nearly all the resistance personnel and civilian population cooperated openly with us. A Commandant Marcel at Guingoin's headquarters, later appointed Intendant de Police in Limoges, was particularly helpful to the American personnel.

It is equally difficult to know those that worked against us. But for the "Blacklist" the Gestapo headquarters already described speaks for itself. In addition, I personally visited Oradour-sur-Glane on 25 August, where the entire village was burned to the ground and the population of fourteen hundred persons exterminated. This action was done by the SS Das Reich Division. Although more than two months had passed since the atrocity, I still saw bloodstains, human bones, bullet holes in the walls, burned out baby carriages and remains of phosphorus incendiaries, and the so-called graves where the Germans piled the remains of the women and children massacred

(1539) War Diary Vol 11 p 17
(1540) War Diary Vol 3 p

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in the church. The charred remains of the men who were machine gunned and set on fire in a barn were stuffed into wells and covered with rocks. I hope the pictures already sent to London are published. Such barbarism is unbelievable until seen with one's own eyes.

I have included in the body of the report all the information which I consider relevant concerning prisoners of war in this area.

In regard to the political situation upon my arrival and at present, ~~the vast majority of the people are openly communist.~~ I have heard the Internationale sung along with the Marseillaise; I have seen the clenched fist offered as a greeting and salute; and I have seen even such extreme banners in the streets as "Sans Stalingrad, pas de débarquement". I pass this on without comment as my job was a military one, and this is included upon request.

It is impossible for me to make an itemized expense account. I have spent money on food, personal needs, and have given quite a bit to allied aviators who were shot down and who needed funds while waiting to be evacuated by Dakota.

In conclusion I would like to mention the work of three people which appears to me particularly deserving, and whom I have only mentioned briefly in the body of this report. Major Charles Staunton has done an excellent job in this area, and in my opinion deserves a DSO. Captain Edgar Fraser has worked particularly hard and conscientiously on Dakota landing fields. 2nd Lieutenant Chevalier worked literally day and night making radio contact for our team, and many nights was up all night trying to get through on our emergency frequency.

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CONDITIONS DE REDDITION DES TROUPES ALLEMANDES DE LIMOGES A
UNE COMMISSION INTERALLIEE COMPOSEE DE:

G M STAUNTON Major British Army Representant en Haute-Vienne
de Haute Commandement des forces allies.
J GUERY Capitaine des Forces Francaises Combattantes.
C E BROWN Capitaine USA.

Remise le 21 Auout 1944 au Major General Gleiniger
Commandant des troupes allemandes de Limoges.

-
1. Les Unites Allemandes deposeront leurs armes et leurs ceinturons immediatement et sans delai et se rendront, encadrees par les elements des FFI au camp de Saint - Paul-d'Eyjeaux ou elles seront internees et soumises au regime des prisonniers de guerre confirmements au droit international.
 2. Les officiers, qui auront le droit de conserver leurs armes individuels seront transportes par camion a une residence d'internement qui leur est affectee exclusivement.
 3. Le Major General Gleiniger indiquera a la commission interalliee l'enplacement et la composition de tous les depots d'armes de toutes categories, de munitions et de carburants existant a Limoges et dans le departement de la Haute-Vienne, et s'engage a remettre tout le materiel intact ainsi que tous vehicules de transports ainsi que le materiel de laboratoire.
 4. Une compagnie allemande desarmee restera provisoirement a Limoges sous le commandement d'officiers allies pour charger sur les camions FFI le materiel de guerre decrit au paragraphe precedent.
 5. Tous les prisonniers, militaires ou politiques ainsi ou les otages eventuels, deteneus par les forces allemandes militaires ou civiles seront immediatement et sans delai remis entre les mains de la Ccommission interalliee et liberee.
 6. Le Major General Gleiniger donnera l'ordre a toutes les unites allemandes et similees (Feld Gendarmerie, S.D. Polizei Truppen et Uniformierte Eisen Barner) stationnees en Haute-Vienne, et notamment aux troupes de Saint-Leonard-Roblat et de la mine adjacente, de deposer les armes dans les meme conditions que celles de Limoges. Il facilitera le passage des officiers allies charges de transmettre cet ordre a l'officier commandant les dites troupes.
 7. Les officiers allies formant la commission donnent leur parole d'honneur de soldats que le traitement des prisonniers de guerre sera assure a toutes les forces allemandes deposant les armes sur l'ordre du Major General Gleiniger ainsi qu'aux Dames des services auxiliaires et de la Croix Rouges allemande.

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8. Les Forces Francaises de l'Interieur n'entreront a Limoges qu'apres le depart des troupes allemandes, exception faite des elements charges de l'encadrement mentionne au paragraphe 1. la Comagnie allemande desarmee mentionee au paragraph 4 sera evacuee sur le camp d'internement des que le travail de chargement sur camion sera termine.

9. Les troupes et services auxiliaires de nationalite non allemande, mais portant l'uniforme allemand, auront l'option soit d'etre internee sous l'uniforme allemand, soit de quitter cet uniforme.

10. Le Milice n'est pas incluse dans le presente offre. /

Financial Statement

2nd Lieutenant Chevalier - received ----- 50,000 Frs

Expenses

Food and lodging - - - - -	15,000
Purchase and maintenance of vehicles - - -	5,000
Purchase of clothing for FFI of Limoges - -	5,000
Paid to FTP officers - - - - -	15,000
Expenses in Paris - - - - -	<u>10,000</u>
Total - - - - -	50,000 Frs

Captain Charles E Brown - received ----- 100,000 Frs

Expenses

Food, personal expenses and living expenses - - - - -	30,000
Returned - - - - -	<u>70,000</u>
Total - - - - -	100,000 Frs

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JEDBURGH

Operations, Team JulianTEAM JULIAN

Jedburgh team Julian was the twenty-fourth Jedburgh team to be parachuted into France from the United Kingdom.

Members of Team

The members of team Julian were:

Major ~~F. H.~~^{A. H.} Clutton (British), code name "Stafford"

Lieutenant M. Brouillard (French), code name "Vermont"

C Q M S- T. S. Menzies (British), code name "Essex"

Area to Which Dispatched

Team Julian was dispatched on the night of 10/11 August to the Indre et Loire area of France.

Background of Resistance in Area

The team was being sent to the Indre et Loire region. Jedburgh team Hugh (1541) had organized and trained a number of first class Maquis groups in the Indre and had recently established contact with other resistance groups in the neighboring department of Indre et Loire.

Purpose of Mission

Julian's mission was to organize and train these potential resistance groups in the Indre et Loire under the direction of team Hugh.

Method of Dropping and Reception Committee

The team was to be dropped to a reception committee organized by Hugh.

Scale of Air Support Likely

The Indre et Loire region was to have high priority in regard to air deliveries. Hence, there should be no difficulty in supplying all the arms and material required.

(1541) p17 this Vol

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JEDBURGH

Operations, Team Julian (Cont'd)Communications

The team took a Jedburgh W/T set with instructions to establish contact with the Home Station as soon as possible after arriving in the field.

Finance

Each officer took 100,000 French francs with him. The W/T operator took 50,000 French francs.

Relations with other Allied Units

Other Jedburgh Parties. The team was to work under the direction of Jedburgh team Hugh, who was at this time DMR of the region.

Allied Forces, If Overrun. When overrun by Allied forces, the team had instructions to report to the nearest intelligence officer. They would give no details of their work to this officer, but merely ask him to pass them to the nearest SF Staff. This Staff would identify them and pass them back to SFHQ London.

Action

Upon Arrival in the Field. The team was to contact Jedburgh Hugh upon arrival. He would inform them of the general situation of resistance in the Indre et Loire area and put them in touch with the groups they were to work with. All open offensive action was to be avoided, except for continuous attacks by small parties on rail, road and communications targets, until ordered otherwise by London.

If Captured. The team took no cover story to the field. If taken prisoner they would be taken as soldiers in uniform performing their ordinary military duties. Every established law of warfare would apply to them and they should, therefore, give their name, rank and serial number only.

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JEDBURGHs

Operations, Team Julian (Cont'd)Information Provided to the Team

The following information was provided to the team prior to its departure:

1. Enemy order of battle in the area.
2. OG and other Allied forces.
3. Resistance elements in the area.

First Word from Field

Team Julian announced its safe arrival in the field in the following W/T message dated 11 August (1542):

"Arrived safely. Met Crown. Contacts made."

Summary of W/T Messages Exchanged11 August From Julian (1543)

"In liaison Maquis groups north road Loches-Chateauroux-Isoudun. Morale good. 250 armed but urgently require arms for 400 half trained men with good instructors. Will you arrange dropping early date."

12 August From SFHQ to Julian (1544)

Happy your safe arrival. Will send operations two aircraft to ground Mascara. Do you confirm letter Charlie and bonfires."

13 August From Julian (1545)

"Contact made La Scieure, chef region Nord Chateauroux. Has 100 armed men. Requires arms 400. Priority plat, rifles, explosives, tire bursters, boots, brassards. Can delivery of these be arranged early date Mascara. Hope contact today Francis, chef zone du Nord. Harassing operations enemy".

14 August From Julian (1546)

"Bonfires not practicable for present, due arrival in area 400 enemy troops."

15 August From Julian (1547)

"Hq Gestapo Limoges-Chateauroux concentrated Casir northeast Martinerie, Chateaulieul, Chateaudiors, 5 kms north Chateauroux. If RAF bombing stated time and day, partisans can deal with escapees."

(1542) C-1439/17 11 Aug 44
 (1544) C-1164 12 Aug 44
 (1546) C-1655/62 14 Aug 44

(1543) C-1487/21 11 Aug 44
 (1545) C-1605/31 13 Aug 44
 (1547) C-1734/95 15 Aug 44

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JEDBURGHS

Operations, Team Julian (Cont'd)15 August From Julian (1548)

"Contacted Francis. His zone Chateauroux-Chateauneuf-Bourges-Loches 1200 armed, 600 unarmed. Agent Marie appears to assist organization. Latter has list of code names approved dropping grounds. States delivery arms already promised but not received. Can delivery be made these ground. Arms, plastic, tire bursters, medical urgent. 2½ million francs required for troops pay."

15 August From Julian (1549)

"Operations since arrival-road ambushes enemy losses 50 killed, 37 wounded, 20 PWS, 11 trucks, 3 MGs, 1 AT gun. Our losses 6 killed, 6 wounded. Representations Julian spared PWS to date. Underground tel cable Toulouse-Orleans cut north Chateauroux. No trains running."

15 August From Julian (1550)

"What is position agent Marie. States she was sent SOE. Job did not materialize. Has been organizing Maquis this area past months. Is she to continue this capacity. May be useful."

15 August From SFHQ to Julian (1551)

"Your five passed to RAF. Will cope but impossible give day and time on account tremendous program. We understand German 159th Division is moving north to battle zone. Do all possible to delay or stop them. Anything you can do to help Marie appreciated. Belongs same organization and in charge northern part Indre. Suggest you work closely together."

16 August From Julian (1552)

"Will do all to delay division but have no plastic, tire bursters. When will 2 operations fixed for Mascara take place. Include plane load plastic. Serum anti gangrene required for wounded."

16 August From Julian (1553)

"Roads Chateauroux-Vierzon-Chateauroux-Bourges-Chateauroux-Valencay cut last night. 400 SS troops attacked section maquis yesterday. Our losses 10 killed, 10 PWS also 15 Germans were taken."

16 August From Julian (1554)

"Suitable ground Dakota Lysander operation 7 kms southwest Levroux. Good approaches, stubble, good drainage. Have forbidden ploughing."

(1548) C-1735/82 15 Aug 44
 (1550) C-1737/18 15 Aug 44
 (1552) C-1050/39 16 Aug 44
 (1554) C-1854/71 16 Aug 44

(1549) C-1736/57 15 Aug 44
 (1551) C-6234 15 Aug 44
 (1553) C-1252/20 16 Aug 44

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Operations, Team Julian (Cont'd)

17 August From SFHQ to Julian (1555)

"Your requirements noted. Will dispatch soon on Mascara. Ref your Dakota ground - do you have a graduate of the Dakota course with you who could send us a detailed clock ray description of the ground and handle the reception."

17 August From Julian (1556)

"No signs to date 159th Division. Very little movement on roads. 1 enemy truck destroyed, 2 Germans killed. Road Vallancay, Vatan cut last night. Germans after action Monday chopped up 4 maquis PWS alive. Maquis have treated their PWS decently to date. No explosives left to carry on continuous road block. When can supplies be expected."

18 August From SFHQ to Julian (1557)

"Can you give names and units of Germans responsible for atrocities. Operation to Mascara mounted for you but regret your area now given low priority which makes it difficult to send you many sorties."

19 August From Julian (1558)

"For Col Carleton Smith. Understood from Young before departure Crawshay promoted major. Can you confirm this Rank appears necessary for work he is doing."

20 August From Julian (1559)

"Unit responsible SS Chateauroux. Will try get further details. Subsequent reports indicate 30 Germans killed that action, bombardment RAF 17th. Chateaux Diors and Nieul destroyed. Martinerie damaged. Casualties reported very heavy. Railway station train 200 trucks destroyed."

20 August From Julian (1560)

"Germans burned 30 houses Valancy 18th. 6 civilians killed. Germans lost 12 killed and 1 truck."

23 August From Julian (1561)

"Very little enemy movement this sector. Ambushes up to 20th August resulted further German losses 30 killed, 9 wounded, 2 PWS. Our losses 9 wounded."

27 August From Julian (1561)

"Final figure German dead bombardment Martinerie 17 August 150 to 200. Majority enemy movement north of Cher. Enemy casualties sector Nord Indre approximately 50 daily."

(1555) C-6250	17 Aug 44	(1556) C-1910/24	17 Aug 44
(1557) C-6261	18 Aug 44	(1558) C-2107/99	19 Aug 44
(1559) C-2178/55	20 Aug 44	(1560) C-2176/17	20 Aug 44
(1561) C-2509/39	23 Aug 44	(1562) C-2943/52	27 Aug 44

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Operations, Team Julian (Cont'd)

27 August From SFHQ to Julian (1563)

"Inform your drivers to beware of our planes as we are planning intensive bombardments of escaping German columns."

28 August From Julian (1564)

"Are cutting railway every night south and southeast of Foret Grosbois 5 kms northeast St Aignan. Repair takes about 2 hours and there is generally concentration rolling stock St Aignan up to 0600 to 0700 hours GMT. If can arrange air attack between these hours on fixed date steps will be taken to cut line thoroughly. Cannot emphasize too strongly growing need for explosives, plate, bren as traffic north bank Cher considerable."

28 August From Julian (1565)

"Maquis now mostly carry white star roof vehicles. 200 liberated Senegalese now with maquis this area."

28 August From Julian (1566)

"From Marie through Julian. Request urgent air reconnaissance at St Aignan. 80 Hun lorries with anti-tank guns stationed at cross roads. Another Hun company arriving today."

28 August From Julian (1567)

"Enemy convoys road Tours-Vierzon daily between 0430 and 0700 and between 1600 and 1800 hours GMT. What about Air Force."

28 August From Julian (1568)

"Zery Oblique, 730396, Capt Davies USAF, 172574, Harry Taylor, 0899305, Polish Squadron Julian Lsyowski escapees. Can evacuation La Martinerie Chateauroux daytime be arranged. Several participants action Legrasse 16 August state Division Hermann Goerring engaged. Possibly interesting as thought Hermann Goerring Italy."

29 August From Julian (1569)

"Enemy convoy arrived chateau Vallengay. Demanded rations 1000 men, 400 horses. Probably continuing journey tonight so ambushes arranged accordingly. Meanwhile demand surrender sent commander."

31 August From Julian (1570)

"Julian proceeded Selles to meet Allied column expected 31 August."

(1563)	C-6350	27 Aug 44	(1564)	C-3037/32	28 Aug 44
(1565)	C-3039/84	28 Aug 44	(1566)	C-3102/29	28 Aug 44
(1567)	C-3136/45	28 Aug 44	(1568)	C-3137/37	28 Aug 44
(1569)	C-3196/68	29 Aug 44	(1570)	C-3338/50	31 Aug 44

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Operations, Team Julian (Cont'd)

1 September From Julian (1571)

"During past 24 hours continuous German convoys on road Ecueille - Valencey - Vatan eastwards."

1 September From Julian (1572)

"No sign Allied column Selles. Julian compelled La Coliniere 1 km south Selles hastily owing ill considered action maquis. Enemy losses 2 killed, 5 wounded, 2 staff cars burned - maquis 8 wounded. Reprisals village 2 civilians shot, 12 houses burned. All groups in our area running short ammo."

1 September From Julian (1573)

"Plane load received by Evette last night. Enemy blew railway bridge across Sauldre 4 km northwest Selles last night."

2 September From Julian (1574)

"Enemy placing anti-tank guns in quarries just north of bridge where route nationale 156 crosses sauldre northwest Selles."

2 September From SFHQ to Julian (1575)

"Please send details destruction permanent works carried out by Boches also details destruction of same avoided by your action. Also send numbers German prisoners your area and let us know any arrangements made for their concentration."

3 September From Julian (1576)

"Concentration PWS will be this Hq Foret de Gatine, Valencay. About 40 PWS at present but maquis not taking many. Maquis shot German captain yesterday reprisal butchery 6 wounded prisoners. Demolition railway bridge Sauldre now reported in complete but probable tunnel Montrichard destroyed. American reported Montrichard last night. 3 French officers representing Colonel Martel passed this Hq yesterday to contact them. Until delivery Crevette maquis ammo almost exhausted. 1 coy at present occupies St Aignan and in action SS troops."

4 September From Julian (1577)

"Francis informed Allied column expected arrive this area 31 August. Antoine informs Marie not to expect before 14 September. Does either know what he is talking about. Some clarification present military position would be appreciated. Liaison agents FFI this area made contact yesterday American elements Amboise-Blois-Montrichard. Apparently only American recce patrols south Loire. If FFI this area still to operate against enemy troops further supplies essential."

(1571) C-3495/61 1 Sept 44
(1573) C-3569/25 1 Sept 44
(1575) C-6432 2 Sept 44
(1577) C-3769/60 4 Sept. 44

(1572) C-3530/83 1 Sept 44
(1574) C-3627/76 2 Sept 44
(1576) C-3709/87 3 Sept 44

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JEDBURGHS

Operations, Team Julian (Cont'd)4 September From Julian (1578)

"Enemy road movement ceased this area during last 2 days. Ambushes roads Valencay-Lucay-Chateau-Vieux at Valencay-Selles report nothing last night. FFI occupying chateau at St Aignan. Contact with Americans. Have occupied towns north bank Cher from St Avertin to Selles, also Romorantin and other localities. 400 Germans Foret Amboise. Otherwise none reported. No further news troops reported Azay Le Rideau yesterday."

5 September From Julian (1579)

"Groups FFI Nord Indre last night occupied areas round Selles and Chabris. St Aignan reinforced. Enemy losses since 25 August ambushes area Valencay St Aignan Selles 196 killed, 10 PWS 19 trucks and 4 motorcycles destroyed or captured. Maquis losses 30 killed, 16 wounded."

7 September From Julian (1580)

"Contacted American patrol Romorantin Saturday and conducted American officers to Hq Col Martel. Have arranged meeting today Romorantin between Martel and OC, 329 American Inf battalion or staff officers, 83 Division with view obtaining closer cooperation. No enemy reported at area Cher."

8 September From Julian (1581)

"Colonel Martel met officers 329 American Inf Regiment today and explained position. 10,000 Germans expected shortly pass eastward through Chateauroux. Has at his disposal sufficient effectives to stop them if he has small support heavy weapons. 329 Regiment prepare to supply these if they can obtain sanction from 83 Div. Will you do all you can your end obtain this sanction. Most important quickly done."

8 September From Julian (1582)

"Situation changed since my 44. Thousands Germans reported. Some passed Chateauroux towards sea. At present no enemy east Poitiers. Martel has informed Americans support asked for not necessary at present. Truck mines and TNT from Americans reached Busencay today."

9 September From Julian (1583)

"Martin now at Limoges and handed over command troops Indre to Gustave. Part enemy troops reported in my 44 estimated 4000 still south Chateauroux. Seem disposed to surrender and would certainly do so if any American troops there. Gustave has renewed request support American heavy arms. Otherwise still no enemy."

(1578) C-3819/81 4 Sept 44
(1580) C-4092/7 7 Sept 44
(1582) C-4200/75 8 Sept 44

(1579) C-3909/2 5 Sept 44
(1581) C-4163/88 8 Sept 44
(1583) C-4280/31 9 Sept 44

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Operations, Team Julian (Cont'd)

9 September From Julian (1584)

"Francis has occupied Chateau de Valencay and proposes stay there despite protests Vanderkemp Conservateur Musees Nationaux. Have sent Vanderkemp via Americans to Paris to obtain order from Koenig for them to quit."

9 September From Julian (1585)

"10 packages received Dauphin last night. Thanks. Many Germans south Chateauroux. Passed eastwards Bourges last night."

9 September From Julian (1586)

"General Major Elster commanding approximately 20,000 Germans area Isoudun met Martel and American officer this afternoon agreed that his troops shall march to agreed point on Loire with their arms where they will surrender. Please no bombing or strafing missions this area unless requested by 83 Division."

10 September From Julian (1587)

"General Elster has now accepted conditions and his surrender with approximately 18,000 troops is complete. Can you instruct General Cochet instruct cease fire all FFI groups between line Chateauroux-Chateauneuf sur Cher Autun and River Loire."

11 September From Julian (1588)

"Visited German Hq Chateauneuf yesterday afternoon in civilian clothes with 1 American and 1 French officer. General Elster on zone staff of FO returned with us to Isoudun where he met General Macon, GOC, 83 Div. Main conditions surrender as follow. Germans to retain light armor including LMGs till they reach Loire. Will proceed in 3 columns to following points Orleans, Leau, Tency and Mer. Movement begins morning 12 September and all troops expected. 3 left present area evening 13th. Position Germans adequate to enable them reach Loire with own transport so local transport unlikely necessary."

11 September From Julian (1589)

"Do not think General Macon appreciates fully part played by Martel. Although Elster would not surrender FFI, military action of latter responsible for hopeless position Germans. Elster played trump card, fear irresponsible maquis groups, with great success and Macon has slightly exaggerated picture possible attacks by FFI groups on columns progressing Loire. Only groups that might shoot at Germans are isolated sections FTP. These have always been uncooperative, irresponsible and general nuisance. Hope this afternoon to get Farrel to use his influence with Alex, FTP commander this area, insure all his men refrain from aggressive action."

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|------------------|------------|------------------|------------|
| (1584) C-4281/16 | 9 Sept 44 | (1585) C-4306/87 | 9 Sept 44 |
| (1586) C-4329/22 | 9 Sept 44 | (1587) C-4404/70 | 10 Sept 44 |
| (1588) C-4441/1 | 11 Sept 44 | (1589) C-4443/82 | 11 Sept 44 |

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JEDBURGH

Operations, Team Julian (Cont'd)11 September From SFHQ to Julian (1590)

"Have suspended bombardment. If security permits suggest you advance up enemy column accompanied by senior German officer to notify Germans their surrender and likewise yourself contact all FFI groups to inform them of situation. Have just learned that 1700 Germans have surrendered at Issoudun."

12 September From Julian (1591)

"German woman, former interpreter Gestapo Blois, arrested by FFI. Has valuable information Gestapo organization and future intentions in France. Have sent to intelligence 83 Division. Am in close contact with Americans and will report events."

12 September From SFHQ to Julian (1592)

"Ventriloque alias Antoine fears incidents may arise in his region following passage of Germans who surrendered but kept their personal weapons. He has notified General Patton and Colonel Powell of this. We are cabling him that Germans retain their weapons under the conditions of their surrender. Try and put the representative General Macon of the 83rd Division in contact with Antoine who is at Orleans. As the FFI and Allied troops surround the German columns, this should prevent incidents. We are asking Antoine to contact you."

13 September From SFHQ to Julian (1593)

"Require detailed summary your activities up to date. This you should hand to Ellipse, Delege Militaire Regional, for transmission to us as all Jedburgh teams are being concentrated in Fontenay area for action against enemy at La Rochelle. You should consult Ellipse regarding your future."

13 September From Julian (1594)

"Will endeavor do as suggested in your 23 but Antoine at present flown to see General Patton. Evacuation Germans proceeding satisfactorily with only minor incidents."

14 September From Julian (1595)

"Saw Antoine on his return and took him to American staff officer hq. As conditions of surrender already agreed and in operation, none of modifications indicated by 3rd Army possible. Evacuation Germans proceeded yesterday without incident and should be complete night 16/17. Do not anticipate any incident SAS and FFI cooperating but Americans have declined any offers direct assistance in evacuation. The manner in which surrender arranged and carried out has created most unfavorable

(1590) C-6519 11 Sept 44

(1592) C-6527 12 Sept 44

(1594) C-4706/76 13 Sept 44

(1591) C-4580/29 12 Sept 44

(1593) C-1466 13 Sept 44

(1595) C-4745/9 14 Sept 44

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JEDBURGHS

Operations, Team Julian (Cont'd)

impression in French circles. Cannot say much in a signal but hope make report future date."

15 September From Julian (1596)

"Where can we contact Ellipse. As war in western France now finished, team Julian would like to go soon as possible some operational area."

15 September From SFHQ to Julian (1597)

"You can contact Ellipse at Limoges."

21 September From SFHQ to Julian (1598)

"Personal for Marie from Colonel Buckmaster. Want you to return UK soonest as no further work for you in France. As already advised bring with you British commissioned personnel. This means Tuteur, Henri, Marc. Bring with you all crystals and store in safe place W/T equipment not convenient to move now for collection later."

22 September From SFHQ to Julian (1599)

"We regret not being able to send arms but all parachutages of this kind have been suspended for your region. As soon as your mission is ended, you should go to 79 Champs Elysees, Paris. Your French personnel should report to Commandant Le Jeune at the Invalides. You should return to London to make a report."

22 September From Julian (1600)

"Handing over equipment General Fazters Forges to French. Not proceeding to plan as high authorities apparently undisposed implement promise made by General Macon to French. Vermeulin empowered by General Juin to accept transfer but Americans would not play. Proceeded with Vermeulen to General Collins GOC zone communications Le Man. Latter eventually sympathetic took us to General Simpson, 9th Army. Result both generals flying Paris for instructions horses and some transport being handed over and inventories made to debit lease lend. Meanwhile horses dying. Am soldier not economist but cannot see why French should buy back equipment stolen by Germans. Hope for decision re farms negotiations. At present rather above my level but have and will do all possible assist satisfactory conclusion as consider present situation not conducive harmonious relations with French. If you consider me sticking out neck too far, please inform."

25 September From SFHQ to Julian (1601)

"Quite right to report your difficulties to us but

(1596) C-4879/21 15 Sept 44
(1598) C-2767 21 Sept 44
(1600) C-578/89 22 Sept 44

(1597) C-1815 15 Sept 44
(1599) C-2855 22 Sept 44
(1601) A-84 25 Sept 44

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Operations, Team Julian (Cont'd)

this question of captured equipment concerns Allied High Command and French War Commissaire. Intervention on our part useless as both already informed. Your mission being terminated, you should report Paris as already instructed taking your crystals with you and storing in safe place for later collection W/T equipment not convenient to move. Cancelling your plan forthwith and this is our last message."

Report of Team Upon Return from the Field - 10 Aug to 25 SeptDiary of Events

1. Team Julian was briefed in London on 8 August 1944.
2. Mission: The mission was to organize and train resistance groups in the Indre et Loire, with which Hugh will put you in contact. Julian was to work under the direction of Hugh who was acting DMR.
3. The team was parachuted on the ground Mascara Vin de Fatma at Fredille, 10 kilometers west of Levroux. They were received by a reception committee, and all containers dropped by the sortie of 3 planes were duly received.
4. Julian was met by Crown of team Hugh and Colonel Surcouf, o/c AS Indre, Captain Conte, Commanding 2nd Sous secteur Indre du Nord. An explanation of the situation was given by Crown and Surcouf.
5. Julian was asked to contact, carry out instruction and coordinate action of the various maquis groups situated in the area North of line Loches-Chateauroux-Isoudun. Headquarters was provisionally established at St Martin de Lamps.
6. Day by Day Account

10 August. Conference took place with Captain Conte o/c 2me Sous secteur. Conte commanded three companies of about 200 men with arms, though many lacked training and were living in the woods. 1 company o/c Lieutenant Camille situated at Bois de Landais, 2 company o/c Lieutenant Chasseur

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JEDBURGHs

Operations, Team Julian (Cont'd)

Bois de Guilly, 3 Company, Lieutenant Andre, Bois de Fredille. Further recruitment was hindered by lack of arms, but had great possibilities. The Germans at the moment were occupying only larger centers such as Isoudun, Chateauroux, etc. It was agreed that an intensive course of training should be carried out as quickly as possible.

11 August. Training began in Bois de Landres, including use of explosives, grenades, Bren, Piat and Bazookas. Courses lasted two days and results proved most satisfactory.

13 August. Contact made with Lascieure commanding an independent company of 100 armed men and 400 unarmed men. He specialized in coup de main and sabotage operations. His men were well trained in this type of work. He emphasized the need of further arms in order to recruit to the full. Request was made to London for supplies for Lascieure.

14 August. Visited 2 and 3 coys at Fredille where further instruction was carried out on the night 15/16 and 16/17 August practical demonstrations of cratering roads were given. Julian accompanied demolition sections, and craters were made on road Levroux-Isoudun and Levroux-Loches.

16 August. Contact was made in Foret de Cracay with Commandant Francis, chef du secteur Nord Indre and with Marie, and SOE organizer who had been in the area since June. Francis commanded 1,200 men in 7 companies in the area Isoudun-Levroux-Loches. It was decided to form a joint headquarters as soon as possible and a school of instruction in the Bois de Landais. Francis complained that he was not receiving deliveries of arms promised, and Julian informed London of this. London replied that Francis's grounds were considered too

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Operations, Team Julian (Cont'd)

close to the area of operations.

17 August. Opening of courses of instructions for NCOs of whom about 50 received instruction, emphasis was laid on care in handling explosives and grenades.

20 August. Contact was made with Hugh at La Billarderie. Julian also met Colonel Surcouf and Colonel Arthur.

21 August. Movement of 16th German Division along Route National 76 on north bank of Cher caused DMR to order general movement of Maquis groups towards this area. Maquis of sous secteur Nord Indre took up position Mareuil, Chateaufieux, Selles Chabris. Julian moved to Captain Conte's headquarters at Chateaufieux.

Disposition:

- 1 Company Mareuil
- 2 Company St Aignan
- 3 Company Gouffi
- 4 Company La Vernelle
- 5 Company Chabris

Their instructions were to deny use of Route National 76 to the enemy.

23 August. Julian moved to Les Jumeaux, 1 kilometer from Valencay and established a joint headquarters with Commandant Francis.

24 August. The sudden occupation of Valencay by the Germans made it necessary to move to La Belle Etoile, 4 kilometers from Valencay.

26 August. Julian and Francis moved to Foret de Gattines as the Germans were at times unpleasantly close to La Belle Etoile. During this period two further courses

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of instruction were held.

29 August. Information received from Colonel Martel that an allied column was expected on the bridge at Selles-sur-Chere anytime after midnight 31 August. Commandant Francis was asked to occupy Selles as soon as the approach of the allies was signalled, in order to prevent the destruction of the bridge.

A company (Captain Robert) was sent to the area and Julian proceeded to La Coliniere, and guides were posted at the bridge to lead the column to Chateauroux on its arrival.

31 August. The expected column did not arrive and an imprudent action opened by the maquis compelled Julian to leave La Coliniere in haste and return to Foret de Gattines.

4 September. FFI occupied Selles, Chabris, and St Aignan. Valancay was also occupied and Francis established his headquarters at the chateau Valancay. As the chateau was the repository for art treasures and the country was not yet free from Germans, Julian pointed out the inadvisability of this move and on failing to persuade Francis, sent Van Der Kemp, Conservateur des Muses Nationaux, to Paris to get an order from headquarters for the FFI to evacuate the Chateau.

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Operations, Team Julian (Cont'd)Military Operations

The bulk of the military operations in the region were in the form of ambushes placed on roads likely to be used by the Germans. Where possible, details of engagements are given, though in many cases the reports received were confined to a statement of casualties inflicted.

12 August. Request made for RAF bombardment of Caserne de la Martinerie and the Chateaux de Diort and Nieul where the Gestapo of Limoges Poitiers and Chateauroux were stationed. It was hoped to coordinate this with an attack by groups of FFI at the same time.

Ambush on road Chateauroux - Levroux. Carried out by a section of 2 coy commanded by Lieutenant Andre at a point 3 kilometers south of Levroux. The Germans were in several lorries, the first of which were brought to a stand still by mines placed on the road. Brens were thus brought into action which, together with fire from troops hidden at the side of the road, completed the demoralization of the enemy. Enemy losses, 50 killed, 37 wounded, 20 prisoners of war. FFI losses, 3 killed.

A clash took place between Valencay and Vatan between a section commanded by Georges Moulin of the 1 Coy. 13 enemy were killed and two trucks destroyed. Fire was opened on the approaching enemy vehicles at a range of 80 yards.

An enemy convoy was ambushed between Lavernelle and the Foret de Gattines. Mines placed on the road were used to stop the convoy, which were unable to return the way it had come as the road was blocked in the rear. The enemy lost 36 killed and 5 trucks, 2 of which were put into running order again. The FFI lost 7 killed and 9 wounded.

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15 August. A German force of considerable strength attacked the 1 coy 1 Sous Secteur (Georges Prieur) in the Foret de Gattines. The attack was beaten off. It was impossible to estimate the enemy losses as they left no dead or wounded behind.

16 August. A ration lorry belonging to FFI, met a truck of 18 Germans unexpectedly on the road Levroux - Bouges. Fire was opened by both sides and a grenade was thrown into the German truck. German losses were 5 killed 7 wounded.

Ambush at Taille Aux Ruines on Route Nationale 732. 120 FFI commanded by an army chaplain Father Valucry attacked a convoy of 360 men who had just burned 40 houses at Valencay. They were part of SS Division Dasreich. The battle lasted 2 hours and the losses inflicted on the enemy were 76 killed and 120 wounded. The losses of the FFI were 28 killed. The pump house at St Aignan was destroyed.

17 August. Five enemy killed and two wounded prisoners taken in a lorry of SS troops attacked between Valencay and Villentrois.

18 August. Two hundred Germans in horse-drawn vehicles were attacked on Route Nationale 20 between Thenloux and Chatres, the German losses were 27 killed, 40 prisoners of war including one officer.

20 August. An ambush was carried out by 1 coy (Lieutenant Camille) on a convoy on Route Nationale 76 north of Chateaufieux. Eight Germans were killed and 20 wounded.

24 August. A small party of enemy with horse-drawn transport were ambushed between Lovroux and Loches. After the first burst of machine gunfire the Germans turned about, leaving 5 dead and 7 wounded. Ambush road Valencay - Villentrois resulted in 2 Germans killed.

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25 August. The Corps Franc of 1 coy attacked two German vehicles that were attempting to cross the Cher at St Aignan. Losses were inflicted on enemy. Two FFI were killed.

An ambush was placed at 300 yards from a blown up bridge on the road Meusnes - Gouffi and several small groups of Germans were engaged. The losses sustained by the enemy during these actions were 30 killed and 60 wounded.

29 August. Attack on convoy RN 136. Four Germans were killed. FFI sustained no losses.

31 August. FFI of Captain Roberts section were engaged with enemy at La Coliniere near Selles Surcher. The action started by one soldier opening fire without orders on a German motorized column. The FFI who numbered about 40 had limited supplies of ammunition at their disposal and were eventually compelled to withdraw before approximately 300 enemy. Enemy losses were four killed, including an officer and a WO, and seven wounded. The Maquis losses, 1 killed and 7 wounded. Two enemy staff cars were burned out. The enemy in reprisal burned about 10 houses in the village.

2 September. As a result of ambushes on the following routes - Chateauroux - Levroux, Levroux - Valencay and Valencay - Vatan, twelve enemy were killed and seven vehicles destroyed. The FFI suffered one casualty.

3 September. An attack on an enemy convoy between Chabris and Lavernelle by a platoon of 3 coy (Captain Emile) resulted in the death of 3 Germans. Eight others were wounded. FFI lost one killed. A German Captain was shot by the FFI as a reprisal for German atrocities at Valencay.

5 September. An action took place between Mareuil and Chateauvieux between a coy of Captain Conte and an enemy column.

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Operations, Team Julian (Cont'd)

The engagement lasted half an hour. The enemy casualties are not known as they removed their dead. FFI losses, 18 killed.

7 September. Contact was made with an American patrol at Romorintain and the patrol commander, Lieutenant Magill was taken to the headquarters of Colonel Martel. On the following day, the Americans sent Colonel Martel 100 anti-tank mines. One plane load of supplies was received on Crevette.

8 September. One plane load of supplies received on Crabbe and one on Carpe.

9 September. Two plane loads of supplies were received on Mascara.

10 September. Surrender of 19,000 Germans under General Major Elster to General Macon.

List of Bridges Destroyed by FFI During the Period of Operation

Bridge at Peguets.
 Bridge at Souveray, Road Faverole-Chateau-Roux.
 Bridge at Sarey Rod Sye-Chateauroux.
 Bridge at Soubry NR Poules.
 Bridge at Guefesnet Villentrois.
 Bridge at Lucay.
 Bridge at D'Entraigues RN 76.
 Bridge at Goudinerie.
 Bridge at Lauge.
 Bridge at L'Arche Villentrois.
 Bridge at Fesmont. Villentrois.
 Bridge at Tervery. Chatillon S/Cher.
 Bridge at Liallemandiere Road Lucay-Maloches.
 Bridge at Vicq.
 Bridge at Liange Lavernelle.
 Bridge at Road Chateauroux-Levroux.
 Bridge at Road Chateauroux-Lucay.

[Report on Events leading up to and following surrender at Isoudun of General Major Elster to American 83rd Division on 10 September 1944

On evening of 30 August 1944, Julian was informed by Colonel Charles Martel, officer commanding FFI department de L'Indre, that an Allied column was expected to arrive on the bridge Selles sur Cher any time after midnight 30/31

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August. Julian immediately proceeded to Chateau de St Eusice situated about 1 kilometer southeast of Selles and posted guides to contact this force on its arrival and thereafter to guide it to Chateauroux by such road as was still open to military traffic.

The expected column did not arrive and information was received on 4 September from Ventriloque alias St Pol that no American column could be expected before 14 September. At the same time it was learned that American patrols were operating in the area between the Loire and the Cher, and contact was made by Julian with an American patrol under command of Lieutenant Magill of 329th Infantry Regiment at Romorantain.

As contact between FFI and the American forces appeared to be of paramount importance, Julian proposed to Lieutenant Magill that he should come to Colonel Martel's headquarters. The latter was under orders not to penetrate enemy occupied territory south of the Cher, and was at first unwilling to do so. It was, however, pointed out to him that Colonel Martel's forces were at the moment in contact with German forces of considerable strength and that assistance in the form of some heavy weapons might turn the scale of battle. In any case liaison with the FFI was most desirable as latter might be in possession of information of considerable value to the American Army.

Lieutenant Magill therefore consented to come, and in company with Lieutenant Vanderwalle, a Belgian officer attached to the American Army, and Commandant Richmond, attached to Colonel Martel, the party proceeded in two jeeps to the Chateau de Palluah which was then headquarters of Colonel

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Martel. Colonel Martel explained that he had some six-thousand and well-trained and well-officered troops at his disposal, and that he was in action in the area between Le Blanc and Busancay, with a large force of Germans, who were seeking to pass eastwards through Chateauroux. Unfortunately, he had no heavy arms but stated that with a little support from these weapons he could hold the enemy indefinitely. Would the Americans be prepared to supply these?

It was suggested that the best means of organizing this would be to arrange a meeting between Colonel Martel and an officer of 83rd Division and Colonel Martel agreed to go to Romorantain on the following day and meet an American Staff officer at 1500 hours. The conference duly took place at Romerantain. 83rd Division was represented by Captain Callagan, a member of the Staff of Colonel Crayburn, OC, 329th Infantry Regiment. Colonel Martel again explained the position and Captain Callagan said that it would be possible to provide the support asked for, subject to approval being given by 83rd Division had been able to be present. Following this meeting Julian signalled London asking them to do all they could from that end to obtain the sanction.

During the next two days German troops gradually passed eastwards to area east of Chateauroux, in localities Isoudun, Chateauneuf, and towards Autun.

On 9 September, General Elster entered into negotiations with Colonel Martel, with whom he had been acquainted previously, through Captain Bois, a member of Colonel Martel's Staff. An American officer, Lieutenant Magill, was also there, but Julian was not present. As a basis for negotiation General

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Elster said that although he was not prepared to surrender to the FFI, he would do so to an American force, and added that he wished to be allowed to keep his light weapons until he had reached an agreed point on the Loire, where the arms would be given up. Colonel Martel was prepared to agree to this in principle and Lieutenant Magill immediately reported this to Julian, who informed London.

Julian then proceeded with Colonel Martel to Mer sur Loire forthwith where he met General Macon, COC 83rd Division. It was decided to ask General Elster to come to Isoudun at 1500 hours, 10 September to discuss terms of surrender with representatives of the 9th Army. On the morning of 10 September Julian and Lieutenant Magill went to Colonel Martel's headquarters and together they proceeded to the sous prefecture at Isoudun. From there Captain Bois, Lieutenant Vandawalle and Julian went by car to Chateauneuf where they were taken to General Elster's headquarters. General Elster said: "I am prepared to accept surrender on the basis proposed yesterday, as I can see no hope of ever reaching Germany. I cannot at the moment speak for all the troops under my command, as I have been unable to contact all of them. I can say without hesitation, however, that if any think otherwise and attempt to do so, they will soon be convinced of their mistake."

General Elster wished at first to conduct negotiations at his headquarters but was persuaded to come to Isoudun. He was conveyed by car to the sous prefecture, where it was discovered that the American representatives were General Macon, his G-2 Colonel French, and a staff colonel from 9th Army.

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Operations, Team Julian (Cont'd)

From the outset General Elster showed himself to be a very skilled negotiator and he succeeded in converting the exceedingly unfavorable situation in which he found himself into one of relatively great advantage. As regards the passage of his troops to the Loire, he emphasized again and again the dangers of irresponsible action by members of the FFI, and the imperative necessity of his men remaining fully armed. He referred to cases during the previous 24 hours, where officers and men under his command had been shot at by the FFI while in ^{the} pursuance of their duties. In view of the fact that he had not been prepared to surrender to the FFI, and that there was as yet no official armistice, his attitude was scarcely logical. At the outset General Macon had been quite prepared to accept assistance from the FFI for evacuation of the Germans as forces at his disposal were extremely small. During the course of the discussion his attitude changed entirely and he agreed with General Elster as to the desirability of asking the FFI to stand-off. His change of attitude is well illustrated by this incident. At the beginning of the conference, Captain Simon, commanding a detachment of French SAS, asked Julian to offer his service to General Macon for escort duties etc. I told General Macon, and the latter said that it was a good idea and would I bring it up later. When I did so subsequently, he turned down the offer flatly, saying that he knew that the SAS were good fighters but that they were not well enough disciplined and that he feared the Germans would not agree. On another occasion he spoke to me about saving the Germans from the blood-thirsty French.

As regards the retention of arms General Elster first

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asked whether he might keep his L M G's, to which Colonel Martel somewhat unwillingly agreed. I pointed out to General Macon, that as the question of transport and quick transference of the Germans to the Loire was ^amatter of importance, there was every good reason for their leaving their heavy arms behind. When the surrender was finally signed they were permitted to keep all their arms.

Throughout the discussions very little consideration was shown Colonel Martel, and on more than one occasion I had to ask for a point to be translated into French for him, as he speaks neither English nor German. From the outset Colonel Martel made it clear that, since General Elster had been forced to surrender by the FFI he expected arms and equipment to be handed over to the French. General Macon was quite explicit that this would be done. Colonel Martel said that these arms were needed urgently for operations against the Germans still remaining in the west-Bordeaux, La Rochelle etc. General Macon was apparently unwilling to recognize the fact that the FFI had been fighting these Germans for the past few weeks and that it was they who had reduced them to their present state. In point of fact, until after the surrender, no American soldier had ever seen any of General Elster's troops let alone fired a shot in anger. It may be as well at this juncture to say the general atmosphere in which the negotiations were conducted - that of two great gentlemen making an agreement in circumstances only marred by the presence of some troublesome Frenchmen who should not have been there anyway, created a most unfavorable impression among the French.

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It was agreed that the Germans should move to the Loire in three columns on Orleans, Beaugency and Mer, starting on the morning of 12 September. The date of departure was subsequently postponed to 13 September. Every effort was made by Julian to secure cooperation of the FFI to ensure the smooth running of this rather humiliating arrangement and this cooperation was generously given. The fears expressed by Ventriloque, save for a few minor incidents, did not materialize. The FFI would have willingly cooperated with the Americans in the same spirit, but the latter would have nothing to do with them. This is illustrated by the fact that no attempt was made to inform ^{the} officer commanding FFI Loire et Cher of the routes and halting places of the Germans on the way to the Loire, although all three lines of march passed through his territory. On the morning of 13 September, when the movement had already begun I went to see Colonel French, who was representing General Macon at German headquarters and asked him for this information, stating why. He replied that he could only give me part of this information as he only had a map of part of the area, and that the rest was on the German General's map. I had to make a second call in the evening in order to obtain it. On the second occasion I took Ventriloque who had just returned from a visit to General Patton with suggested modifications to the terms of surrender. Colonel French pointed out, quite reasonably, that surrender was a 'fait accompli' and that, since the original conditions had already been put into operation, it was scarcely possible to change them. Julian supported Colonel French in this. Lieutenant Thomson, ~~(1602)~~ another Jedburgh officer, was present

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at this meeting.

Sunday, 17 September, was the day fixed for the formal surrender of General Elster to General Macon at Beaugency. On this day all arms were to be laid down and it was understood that these would immediately be handed over to the French. On the evening of 16 September, Colonel Surcouf, Major Vermoulon, Major Carol (Beauregarde), Major Richmond, and Lieutenant d'Antraigues were sent by Colonel Martel to take over arms and equipment surrendered by the Germans. They spent the night at Valency and took Julian with them early next morning to Beaugency.

They were informed by the American Colonel in charge at this point that he was only empowered to hand over equipment to an officer who had been specially designated by General de Gaulle, as he could not be certain otherwise whether he was handing over to the right person. Surcouf, Vermoulon, Carol, and Julian proceeded at once to Paris, but owing to it being Sunday afternoon, the authority, signed by General Juin, could not be obtained till Monday, and a break-down delayed return to Orleans till Tuesday. On arrival at Orleans, contact was made with Colonel Crayburn, OC 329th Infantry Regiment, who telephoned headquarters 83rd Division, to say that the requisite authority had been obtained. 83rd Division replied that they were no longer in a position to give up the material as they had just handed it over to 9th Army. Colonel Crayburn kindly conveyed the latter ^{in g}stated that disposal of this equipment rested in the hands of Zone Communication and that General Collins, GOC Zone Communication would be in a position to deal with the matter. The party therefore

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proceeded to Headquarters Zone Communication Le Mans. General Collins was not at first very sympathetic, stating that it was not American policy to arm the French. Later he thawed somewhat, and put through a call to 9th Army. The reply came that the handing over of the horses and such vehicles as the Americans did not require might proceed, and that inventories of these for lease-lend purposes should be made forthwith. I told General Collins that I could not see why the French should have to ~~by~~ back equipment that the Germans had stolen, quite apart from the fact that the stuff was theirs by right of capture. He replied that most of it had probably been paid for by the Germans, and he was convinced that some of the horses had never been French horses. As General Collins had never seen them, I did not know what to reply to this.

However, on the following morning he took us to General Simpson's headquarter at Rennes. Only General Collins interviewed General Simpson and the two were closed ~~for~~ ^{for} more than half an hour. He told us afterwards that the handing over of the horses was confirmed, and that General Simpson was flying to Paris that afternoon for instruction on the other matter. General Collins later informed Major Vermoulon that he was himself going to Paris about this matter on the following day. I think that Major Carol, who speaks English, and has an engaging personality produced a very favorable impression on General Collins. General Collins gave us to understand that an answer would probably be forthcoming ^{at} Le Mans on the ^{following} Saturday, in order to get the reply, but it was impossible for Julian to accompany him owing to his imminent departure for London. At the time of leaving, Julian had not heard the result.

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A final observation on the manner in which the conditions of surrender were carried out is perhaps desirable. In many instances much was left to be desired. Reports to this effect have, I think, been given by other people. The impression on the local population was deplorable. Reports have been received of German and American officers fraternizing in Romorintain, and of German bicycles sold to civilians by the Americans at a hundred francs a time, and motor vehicles at 500 francs. Distribution of oranges and cigarettes are said to have been made to prisoners in front of civilians.

Appended are translations of two signed documents showing that the Germans broke the terms of the agreement, being aided and abetted on one occasion by an American officer. In conclusion, I can only say that the effect on Franco-American relations in this area has been most unfortunate, and I think the reasons for this will be clear to anyone who reads this report.

Translation

Forces Frances de l'Interior
Sous Secteur IV

16 September 1944
Lt Commanding 5 Comp
to
Capt La Lingerie, commanding
Sous Secteur IV

Subject: Report on disarming an isolated group:

I have the honor to inform you that at 1130 hours 14 September at Lury sur Arnon some civilians notified me that Germans were intimidating some farmers in the neighborhood of Quincy, in order to obtain food. I immediately proceeded to this spot with some men and ordered the Germans to be disarmed. As they were considered 'Prisonnieres sur l'honneur' I allowed them to continue their march.

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About an hour later, I received an order from Captain la Lingerie to give them back their arms.

I wish to point out that the order given me by my superior officer came really from Lieutenant Hamel of the Allied General Staff. I refused to give up the arms myself, and handed them over to the American Lieutenant Hamel for him to dispose of.

Signed: Lieutenant Louis

ADJ Chef Maguin

to

Captain la Lingerie, commanding
Sous Sectour IV

I was sent to recover arms and ammo thrown into the Cher by the Germans near the Pont de Quincy, and I went there with three men on the 14/15 September. From the bridge I could see some hand grenades and cartridges. We borrowed a boat and dived into the middle of the river from which we were able to recover:

- Cases of French and German cartridges
- 30 35 m shells
- Bands of MG ammo
- Mines
- Handgrenades etc
- A Twin machine-gun with pieces missing
- Rifles, all unserviceable except 3
- 3 pistols.

In the Chateau where the Germans had been billeted we found sabotaged ammo and SMG's, also found bits and pieces of weapons, almost everywhere the Germans had passed. On 16 September I went to Preuilly to recover a Polish MG which was slightly damaged but nevertheless capable of being quickly put into order.

Signed: Adjutant Chief Maguin

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Operations, Team Julian (Cont'd)

Signals Report

1. Team Julian was briefed for signals plan on afternoon 8 August 1944.
2. Two daily skeds were given of one hour duration in morning and half an hour in afternoon. An emergency sked was available at all hours. Broadcast messages at 1000 hours and 0200 hours GMT.
3. Throughout signal communications were entirely satisfactory, contact being established without difficulty and signal strength at all times 4/5. From 7 September onwards some interference was experienced. During the day's programme contact on emergency sked was made without difficulty but on night programmes contact was impossible. Broadcast messages were always picked up although interference at times was very bad.
4. Performance of Jed set was excellent. The set was used even in the inside of woods without affecting its efficiency. No mechanical troubles were experienced.
5. The only improvement to set suggested is a pedal instead of a handle as in this way the set can be operated without assistance from a second person.]

Morale and Efficiency of FFI

A spirit of great enthusiasm was evident throughout the Maquis, and the discipline for irregular troops was in many respects remarkable. Where the clothing position permitted, their turnout was smart and soldierly and their attitude towards their officers equally so. Some of the officers were regular officers of the old army, others NCOs, many of them exceedingly competent. The main weakness showed itself in

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the junior NCOs, many of whom had little more training or experience than the men. This led at times to too much talking and to delays which would not have taken place in the case of troops with well trained NCOs. The FFI were exceedingly courageous.

Treatment of Prisoners of war by FFI

At the beginning the FFI took prisoners and, considering the means at their disposal, treated wounded and unwounded with consideration. As time went on and it became obvious that all FFI captured by the enemy were shot like rabbits and in some cases tortured, their attitude changed. Many Germans were shot in reprisal, and towards the ^{end} no prisoners were taken.

Conclusion

It was evident to Julian from the outset that the team should have been sent at least 6 weeks earlier. Had this been done, and had all supplies that were asked for been sent, it is certain that the movement of Germans through the region would have been still further hampered, and might even have been brought to a complete standstill.

The arms and explosives supplied were barely adequate to keep the existing forces going, and at one time supplies got perilously low. It was impossible for this reason to arm new units - as for example some 250 ^Sengalese troops, for whom cadres of colonial officers and NCOs existed, but no equipment.

It only remains to say in conclusion that Julian was received every where in the same spirit of friendship and cordiality by members of the FFI and that every where was found the same desire to cooperate.

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The team Hugh at all times did all in their power to assist team Julian and relations with both Scipion and Crown were excellent. The arrangements made by Crown for the reception of Julian at Fredille were most satisfactory.

This report would not be complete without an appreciation of the work carried out in the area since June 1944 by Miss P. Witherington alias Marie alias Pauline, (603) an agent of the SOE. The excellent state of organization of Maquis troops in the area was largely due to her efforts.

Financial Statement

Received -----	250,000 Frs
Expenses	
Living Expenses - - - - -	22,000
Car and transport - - - - -	70,000
Donations - - - - -	18,000
Return of hospitality - - - - -	<u>120,000</u>
Total -- -- --	230,000
Returned - - -	20,000
	<u>250,000 Frs</u>

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JEDBURGH

Operations, Team JamesTEAM JAMES

Jedburgh team James was the twenty-fifth team to be dispatched to France from the UK.

Members of Team

The members of team James were:

1st Lieutenant John K. Singlaub (US), (1604) code name "Mississippi" *Caps*

Lieutenant D. Leb (French), code name "Michigan" *Caps*

Technical Sergeant Anthony J. Denneau (US), (1605) code name "Massachusetts" *Caps*

Area to Which Dispatched

Team James was dispatched on the night of 10/11 August to the Correze area of France.

Background of Resistance in Area

The department of Correze was situated in the region of which Ellipse was the Delege Militaire. Since 1943 Correze had contained maquis, its geographical situation being such as to make their existence possible. Since 1944 the Plateau de Millevaches, in the east of the department, had been continually rounded up by detachments of police and enemy units, but the maquis would split into small parties and regroup in the mountains.

Many more maquis groups had been formed in Correze, especially in the east of the department, since 6 June. These maquis had liberated the regions between Mareges, La Courtine et Aigurande. The region of Tulle had been liberated by Maquis also. Because of this an allied mission known as Tilleul (1606) was dispatched to the Correze. After a reconnaissance of the department revealed that all works such as bridges, viaducts and particularly the Barrage de Mareges were intact, the mission formed its headquarter at Millevaches. Communication

(1604) War Diary Vol 11 p 580
(1605) War Diary Vol 11 p 609
(1606) War Diary Vol 3 p

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from the mission stated the presence of 50 companies of 100 each in the north and 30 companies in the south, but they all required arms. A daylight operation had taken place on 14 July and 3500 men had been armed.

Rivier was the Chief FFI Regional in the area. His headquarters was between Meymac and Bugeat and he was in contact with Mission Tilleul.

Purpose of Mission

Team James was dispatched with a recce party of SAS, which consisted of half a troop of 3/French parachute battalion. The team was to provide the liaison with the resistance groups and a communications link with London.

Communications

The team was dropped with a Jedburgh W/T set and instructed to establish contact with the Home Station as soon as possible after arriving in the field.

Finance

Each officer of the team took 100,000 French francs with him. The W/T operator took 50,000 French francs.

Relations with Other Allied Units

The team was dispatched to work with the Tilleul Mission under whose command they would come in the field.

Allied Forces, If Overrun. When overrun by Allied forces, the team was to report to the nearest intelligence officer and ask him to forward them to the nearest SF Staff. This Staff would identify them and pass them back to SFHQ, London.

Action

Upon Arrival in the Field. The team was to contact the FFI chiefs in the area and agree with them on the best means

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for carrying out their assignment.

If Withdrawal Should Become Necessary. Should the team's position become untenable due to enemy activity, they should immediately communicate with headquarters who would tell them the best group to fall back on. If such contact was impossible, the team would go into hiding until such time as it could establish communications with another Jedburgh team or with London.

If Captured. The team took no cover story to the field.

If taken prisoner they would be taken as soldiers in uniform performing their ordinary military duties. Every established law of warfare would apply to them. Therefore, they would give their name, rank and serial number only.

First Word from the Field

Team James announced its arrival in the field in the following W/T message dated 12 August (1607):

"Arrived safely with all okay. Contacted Manometre. Will make plans with him tomorrow."

Summary of W/T Messages Exchanged

12 August From James (1608)

"Message for SAS. Landing okay but several kit bags broke loose because canvas was weak. 1 container missing. Maquis situation excellent beyond all hopes but will require more arms and ammunition."

13 August From James (1609)

"Jed set failure using radio of Tilleul. Must have a BMK 2 set with battery immediately. Send radio and 1 airborne carbine with SAS equipment."

14 August From James (1610)

"To SAS. Consider it essential that military command in the Correze be given to Tilleul to coordinate military action. Leaving this area soon need BMK 2 radio immediately."

(1607) C-1530/13 12 Aug 44
 (1609) C-1632/25 13 Aug 44

(1608) C-1570/22 12 Aug 44
 (1610) C-1654/10 14 Aug 44

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"Captain Wauthier to SAS Hq. All roads and railways from Correze cut. No enemy traffic possible. Garniron at Egleton attacked. Will fall before evening. Tulle and Ussel will be attacked after but will need mortars and pistols asked for immediately."

16 August From James (1612)

"Captain Wauthier to SAS Hq. 300 SS in Ecole National professionnelle. Building unmistakably of concrete - 3 stories with roof burned out. No flak. French troops bombarded and machine gunned without interruption by 10 German planes. Will be obliged to lift siege. Need RAF 16 August at 1000 GMT."

17 August From James (1613)

"Working with FFI and ASA, FTP since 14th in action against enemy strongly established in Egletons. Made liaison on 16th between FFI and SAS. German convoy of 4 scout cars and 50 lorries on road 89. Stopped at Egletons - 300 men and 50 SS troops. JU-88 and Boche Wolf bombed FFI on 15 and 16. Town of great importance to Germans. Rumored that Brive and Tulle surrendered. Mississippi gone to confirm. RAF of AAF support needed urgently at Egletons. Large building east of town with burned roof."

17 August From James (1614)

"German column of 150 lorries, 2 scout cars signalled from northeast on road 89 at La Quelle at 1000 hours, 17 August. It is help for Germans here. SAS and part of FFI ambush column northeast of Egletons. Send RAF immediately against column and garrison."

17 August From James (1615)

"To SAS only. Signaled from St Leonard, Haute Vienne, between 250 and 400 Germans are falling back to Clermont. Germans in Limoges ordered to fall back to Nancy and German police there to fall back to Clermont. All possible communication through Jeanette 99 instead of Tilleul or Jedburgh. Am going to Ussel."

20 August From James (1616)

"Bombing of school at Egletons one too late. German column from north broke through and liberated garrison in school at 10 a m yesterday. Germans also reported in Correze and Maymac."

(1611) C-1724/31	15 Aug 44	(1612) C-1791/50	16 Aug 44
(1613) C-1885/44	17 Aug 44	(1614) C-1908/11	17 Aug 44
(1615) C-1953/61	17 Aug 44	(1616) C-2175/33	20 Aug 44

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Operations, Team James (Cont'd)26 August From James (1617)

"To SAS Hq. Correze free for the moment. In Ussel awaiting orders."

28 August From James (1618)

"Several German columns from Bordeaux area moving east. One column of 2000 men now in Angouleme. Others may use route 89. Urgency of need for weapons asked for is increased."

30 August From James (1619)

"Having received no word from London we have obtained permission from Ellipse and to take one battalion army commanded by Nony, also 30 SAS from Correze to attack German columns passing through Indre, Lecher or Creuse. Will contact Bergamotte. Awaiting arrival of weapons for Nony on ground Paturon."

1 September From SFHQ to James (1620)

"Ellipse advises us you have contact with Nony. Make contact as soon as possible with Surcouf, chef Departemental, and Frank, of team Hugh, in order to discover arm conditions and supply the groups at Nony."

4 September From SFHQ to James (1621)

"Please tell us urgently your precise whereabouts."

19 September From James (1622)

"From Grell, Lt Col Vanderstricht. Cutting returning to London with movie films for processing and editing. He will await your further orders there."

24 September From James (1623)

"From Manometer. Please continue working theater of Paris plan as we are with column moving east on serious job."

Report of Team Upon Return from the Field - 10 Aug to 28 Sept 1944Mission

On 9 and 10 August Lieutenant Wastin, charged with briefing, stated that our mission would dissolve into two parts:

To give to the FFI all assistance in the form of organization, instruction, and armaments; to serve the means of liaison with London and an SAS party until they had their own means of assuring liaison between SAS and FFI.

(1617) C-2878/41 26 Aug 44
(1619) C-3267/50 30 Aug 44
(1621) C-6500 4 Sept 44
(1623) C-692/12 24 Sept 44

(1618) C-3038/48 28 Aug 44
(1620) C-4335 1 Sept 44
(1622) C-261/25 19 Sept 44

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Operations, Team James (Cont'd)General Ideas.

Before starting this report we are taking the liberty to remark that if there has been any work done by the James mission it is due to the excellent spirit of cooperation shared by all its members. We feel, however, that the results could have been far superior if:

1. We had been dropped on 6 June instead of 10 August.
2. If we had received the answers to our telegrams and the parachutings demanded.

Divisions

Our mission can roughly be divided in two parts:

1. Combat party.
2. Liaison party.

Journey and Landing Night of 10/11 August

We left Fairford aerodrome at 2300 hours. The journey was uneventful, but in this Stirling it was a tight squeeze with 1½ sticks of SAS and it was a pleasure when the moment came to jump. About 2 am our team, which was the last, jumped without any incident, about 1000 meters from the last reception fire. The Tilleul mission and 200 FFI welcomed us very warmly. The size of the fires indicated that the region was pretty safe. The reception was 3 kilometers from Bonnefond and about 20 kilometers northeast of Egleton, and was organized by Flight Lieutenant Simon of the RAF.

Making Contact 12/13 August

As the SAS had done, we temporarily established our PC at Chadebec, near Bonnefond which had the advantage of preserving good security because of the woods and lack of roads.

The first sked was attempted the morning of 12 August.

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Contact was very weak and it took both skeds that day to finally pass the short message. The next skeds we found it impossible to make contact with the Jed set. The operator used the radio (a B-II) of the mission Tilleul. On this radio we asked for a B-II set to be sent to us on a parachutage which we had asked for for the SAS. We also asked for two carbines to be sent to replace two that had been broken. The parachutage for the SAS arrived, but we received absolutely nothing. (This was our first introduction to the negligence of the London section). Fortunately, within a few days we were able to get a B-II radio set from the AS chief Hubert (1524).

Through the contacts with the FFI that we made immediately, we found the situation as follows:-

1. Geographical Situation. Very mountainous and wooded country. Running from the southwest to the northeast through the Correze is the Route National 89, joining Bordeaux, Clermont-Ferrand, Lyons.

2. Military Situation. German garrisons picked this route, with the intention of keeping it open for the possible retreat of troops from Bordeaux and all the southwest. These points of resistance were without mutual communication.

3. German Garrisons as at 11 August.

<u>Brive</u>	17 Officers.	476 O.R's.
	Armament:	12 20mm field guns.
		2 25mm field guns.
		3 Minenwerfers.

Tulle 800 Germans
Exact armament unknown.

Egleton 300 Germans including 50 SS troops.
Armament: 2 37mm A T Guns.

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2 4-wheeled Armored cars.

Ussel 150 Germans.

Exact armament unknown.

4. FFI. A numerous Maquis: one of the earliest formed in France. (There were FFI in this Maquis before November 1942). Their organization was found to be excellent. These Maquis were on both sides of Route 89.

Unfortunately this Maquis was divided most sharply by political considerations which promoted individual activity and destroyed any spirit of cooperation.

5. Armee Secrete. Very well grouped, well disciplined, but less well armed in general because of the fact that they were the second arrivals in the Maquis. The Armee Secrete is under the command of Patrick who directs the Brive group, which comes to about 2,000 men. Hubert, chief of the Corps Franc de Tulle and Duret chief of the AS of Ussel, are also under his order. Let us examine each of these groups as regards results and armaments:-

a. Patrick Group - 2000 men completely armed. This is explained by the fact that the Tilleul Mission supplied arms to Patrick, chief of the AS of Correze, and he began by equipping his own units first.

b. Hubert Group - 3220 men, about 1000 armed by material stolen from the Germans or received from Baron, having received nothing from the Tilleul Mission. Very good unit but insufficiently armed. [We asked in vain on numerous occasions for rifles to be parachuted for them.]

c. Duret Group - 1700 men. 72 Brens, 500 Stens, 370 rifles, 1200 grenades - only received 25 Brens from the Tilleul Mission.

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6. The FTP. Under the orders of the Chef Antoine (1625) who had just liberated the department of Lot. The men exhibited fanatical bravery but were only moderately reliable. [Certain chiefs having only too often a political axe to grind.] 4 to 5000 men completely armed by the Tilleul Mission and arms stolen from the Germans.

Operations on Hand on Our Arrival

1. Sabotages. The road 89 was cut in 2 places between Tulle and Egleton and in one place between Egleton and Ussel. The railway lines were all cut. The cut was made on the line Limoges - Brive by an American OG at the Pouget bridge south of Salon La Tour. On 11 August the sabotage of the Marege dam Hydro-electrical plant was carried out. There was sufficient electrical power to supply the Correze with light but not sufficient to run the Tulle armament works, and the trains in the southwest.

2. Purely military operation. On 11 August, when we arrived, the German garrisons at Brive, Tulle, Egleton and Ussel were completely surrounded. They appeared to make no attempt to come out, either because they were afraid of being ambushed or because, on the contrary, their mission was to hold various points of Route 89.

Patrick's men encircled Brive: Hubert with five of Antoine's FTP companies surrounded Tulle, closing well in on the 13th. Antoine's FTP and two of Hubert's companies encircled Egleton. Finally Duret with some FTP companies and his own men, surrounded Ussel.

In these circumstances, considering that the Maquis was fairly well organized and that the arms were provided by the Tilleul Mission, we came to the conclusion that we could be of

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greatest value by giving technical advice and leading the troops actually engaged in the fight.

Operations Carried Out

14 August. At dawn we heard that the Antoine FTP troops were about to attack Egleton, without fore-warning Hubert's two AS companies, ^{which} ~~who~~ formed part of the encirclement. The Germans quickly abandoned the town and took to the Ecole Professionnelle. It is a stone building with very deep cellars which, thanks to previous arrangements, was soon turned into a real fortress - against men equipped merely with rifles and Brens.

In this retreat the Germans forced about 30 civilians to accompany them, among whom was the head of the Ecole Professionnelle.

In their first transmission on the 14th, the BBC transmitted General Koenig's order "to attack between the Loire and the Garonne all German garrisons, however important they may be". This attack on Egleton, which started at dawn, fell into ^{the} legality and training *Sections of the school.*

Hubert, who was responsible for two companies of the AS decided to take part in the attack, and these two companies took one sector each in the system of the siege of the school.

At Brive, Patrick's AS with 9 companies of the FTP began to harass German posts.

Towards evening we reached Egleton, it was already dark, and we had to wait until the next day to make a proper reconnaissance.

15 August. At dawn we began our reconnaissance and came to the decision that the school would be hard to take with the means at the disposal of the FTP. (Brens, rifles and stens.)

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Only a perfectly mounted attack or a siege of long duration could succeed.

During our reconnaissance, an attic, which we were using as an observation post was quickly spotted by the enemy, alerted by movements of the FTP, who were closely challenging our passage. The enemy immediately opened up a concentrated machine-gun fire, during which Lieutenant Singlaub was wounded in the right ear and face.

[Here, in parenthesis, we should like to emphasise the joy of all the troops when they saw us among them.]

About 9 o'clock - 3 Germans Heinkel 111 dropped 9 bombs of large caliber on the attackers. Three Focke-Wulf came about 1300 hours to machine gun our positions and drop more bombs of a smaller size.

At 1800 hours one Heinkel 111 came back to drop 4 more heavy bombs. These bombardments against the Maquis, showed the importance that the Germans had attached to the garrison, while at the same time they were not using planes against the American tanks going to Paris.

In the morning attack, the enemy planes came in quite low to bomb and strafe. Consequently, their attacks were rather accurate and several casualties resulted. During this period both Lieutenant Leb and Lieutenant Singlaub organized a battery each of three to four Brens for anti-aircraft work. By having three or four guns under the control of one experienced officer it was possible to get more accurate and controlled fire. By giving the command to fire and the number of "leads" to these batteries, it was possible to conserve ammunition and increase accuracy. Although not known at the time, one Heinkel 111 was hit, killing several members of the crew,

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causing it to crash about 30 kilometers away near Ussel.

At about 1500 hours Captain Bisset of Mission Tilleul and Lieutenant Leb went to try and find Antoine, chief of the FTP in order to find out what his intentions were. They could not find him but found his chief of staff to whom they tried to explain that if the Germans are sending so many planes against the Maquis, it must mean that they attach certain importance to the garrison and that they may send troops from Clermont-Ferrand to liberate it. A quick attack was proposed in vain, because Antoine had definitely decided for a long stand.

During this time Lieutenant Singlaub remained with the front line troops giving instruction and helping with fire direction. In order to fire some two inch mortars which had been dropped to the SAS, Lieutenant Singlaub took up a position in the attic of a house about 200 yards from the German positions, to act as observer. It was possible from this point of vantage to bring down some effective light mortar fire on the enemy positions. While observing from the OP, the enemy fired several rounds through the building with an anti-tank gun from a concealed position. While continuing to observe for the mortars, we located the enemy anti-tank gun. The short supply of mortar ammunition was exhausted so Lieutenant Singlaub came down and took a bren gun and several magazines forward to an exposed position. From this position he brought down enfilade fire on the gun, killing or wounding all seven members of its crew.

Into this fighting in the afternoon the SAS added their weapons and excellent training. The presence of these fine

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troops gave the Maquis a morale boost which they needed very much. Unfortunately the SAS had one man killed (shot through the head) and one man wounded in the right eye.

16 August. Captain Wauthier, head of the SAS decided to intervene with his trentaine. The day before he had asked the RAF to bomb the school at 1700 hours today, and immediately, in the absence of the chief Antoine, he called the company heads together and had them adopt his plan, a little too quick in our opinion since he had not received a reply to his request for RAF support. His plan was as follows:

1. Around 4o'clock all the companies nearest the school would retreat 200 meters as a security measure.
2. Around half past four, the mortars and plats of the SAS would open up, obliging the Germans to take refuge inside the school.
3. Immediately after the bombardment, two companies led by Lieutenant Singlaub and Lieutenant Leb would attack.

The retreat took place successfully as did the mortar and plat fire; unfortunately, instead of the RAF we had the Luftwaffe like the day before, and the morale of the besiegers was very low. The attack, therefore, did not take place.

This time incendiary bombs were thrown on the town of Egleton, the Germans thus hoping to impress the Maquis. The town hall was fired as well as numerous houses.

During the whole of this hard day our role was to reduce the machine-gun positions, to seek out the line of fire of the enemy, to assist the company leaders to establish their plan of fire, and finally to bolster up the morale of these troops which had suffered much from these bombardments.

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In the evening the attack on Ussel was started by Duret who succeeded in setting the school on fire, in which the Germans had taken refuge. Threatened with extinction, the Germans surrendered.

Lieutenant Singlaub left about 2200 hours to represent the American Army at the arrangements for the unconditional surrender of the garrisons of Brive and Tulle. The Brive garrison turned over its arms that evening. The formal surrender of the German commander and of the 800 men at Tulle took place at 0800 hours the following morning. It might be added that these troops were quite cheerful as they brought in their weapons and seemed happy at the thought that the war was finished for them.

Lieutenant Leb remained in Egleton with the radio operator Technical Sergeant Denneau. From this town which was under bombardment continually by the Luftwaffe they sent another telegram requesting RAF action against the school. The exact coordinates and description of the school were included in the telegram.

17 August. The siege of Egleton continued without the enemy showing any signs of flagging, probably because through their radio communication with Clermont they knew that their liberation was near. Eventually, towards mid-day, Coriolan, the excellent intelligence officer who had been prominent in the surrender of Brive and Tulle announced that a German column was approaching from Clermont in the direction of Ussel. This column was about 150 vehicles and 2000 men strong, preceded by two armored cars.

We immediately signalled this intelligence to London, and then went to Antoine's headquarters. Here there was an atmosphere

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of chaos caused by an extraordinary report that the German garrison of Tulle had succeeded in extricating themselves and were coming in small groups from the southwest to take the the besiegers of Egleton in the rear. This rumor was without foundation, but it was impossible to make this clear to Antoine's staff. Instead of immediately raising the siege of Egleton school and preparing strong ambushes between Ussel and Egleton, which is the prime role of Maquis troops with their particular type of guerrilla arms, the siege was lightly thinned out to send three companies to guard the road from Tulle to Egleton against the mythical Germans escaped from Tulle. Towards 2000 hours the German column arrived in Ussel. Throughout this day the Luftwaffe action had continued at the same strength as in the preceding days. It was during these bombings that Technical Sergeant Denneau exhibited exceptional courage and ability to operate his radio under trying conditions. During his morning "sked" the Luftwaffe arrived and proceeded to drop high explosive and incendiary bombs on the town. The building in which he was operating was hit by an incendiary bomb. He calmly finished his sked and packed up his radio equipment and moved to another building. That evening he again went through his sked while under bombardment.

Lieutenant Leb went with an ambush party under the command of Commandant Mandou. He passed the night giving assistance and technical advice to these companies of Hubert that were making ambushes toward the northeast. Antoine had ordered ambushes prepared to the southwest against the non-existent "escapees" of Tulle. The group that Lieutenant Leb had placed were able to destroy some enemy vehicles and kill an unknown quantity of Germans.

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The civilian population of Egleton evacuated themselves during the afternoon to the surrounding wooded country under the threat of the approaching German column from the northeast. Late in the evening Lieutenant Singlaub and Technical Sergeant Denneau also left the town on foot and were able to take with them only their arms and radio. Unfortunately it was necessary to leave a good portion of the team's equipment behind.

18 August. At 1100 hours the team reunited at St Yrieux-le-Byotot. We learned then that the German column had entered Egleton and had liberated the imprisoned garrison. Naturally the besieging troops could do nothing against them and had dispersed rapidly. Towards 1900 hours the RAF violently and accurately bombarded the school with eight Mosquitoes. While the RAF is to be complimented on the accuracy of this attack, it arrived about ten hours after the Germans had left. As it was, only a few lorries and some equipment were destroyed and possibly a few guards. This bombardment, so long awaited, arrived at least one day too late. The day before it would have brought about the attack on the school.

Seeing this column deploying towards the southwest we decided to instal our headquarters more to the south and nearer to Tulle at St Pardoux. [That day, at 1800 hours shortly after the besiegers were obliged to lift the siege, the BBC announced triumphantly that the FFI of the Correze attacked the garrison at Egleton which fell. In our opinion there must be someone responsible for this order which stupified the whole of the Correze.]

19 to 20 August. The German columns which had bivouacked at Egleton for the night took the Tulle road where it fell into the territory of Hubert's companies who inflicted casualties

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of 25 dead and numerous wounded. This column which had left Egleton at 0600 arrived in Tulle at 1400, or 8 hours for a distance of 28 kilometers. As the German column did not find the garrison at Tulle (which had surrendered three days previous) they took the road back to Egleton where it was attacked again by Hubert's men who destroyed several more lorries. The Column then disappeared towards Clermont-Ferrand, losing two lorries by mines laid by Captain Wauthier, head of the SAS.

20 to 25 August. We remained at St Pardoux, held up for 5 days owing to car trouble. During this time we contacted Antoine, chief of the FTP who asked us to instruct his troops in the use of the 20 mm German cannon. On 23 August we tried to contact Ellipse (1626) in Meymac; unfortunately we arrived 24 hours after his departure for the Haute Vienne.

We reach the second phase of our mission which becomes a mission of instruction and liaison.

25 August. Hubert having asked us to come to his command post to give his men some instruction, we decide to go to Bach 5 kilometers to the north of Tulle.

25 to 28 August. Lieutenant Singlaub and Lieutenant Leb instructed these troops in the use of the bazooka, plat and in all of the German small arms that had been taken at Tulle and Brive. At the same time we came to the conclusion that these men who are perfectly organized and disciplined, could come out of the Correze which is now liberated, and move to the north. [We sent three telegrams asking for arms for the Hubert groups. We received none, not even a reply or an acknowledgement and gain the depressing impression that London was letting us down.]

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28 August. We went to Limoges and contacted Rivier chief FFI for R 5, also Ellipse DMR 5 to whom we explained the situation:

1. Correze completely liberated; very little chance for the Germans to come back. However, there are still ambushes at both ends of route 89 (Patrick at Brive, Duret at Ussel).
2. Hubert's troops are well organized but lack material; however, they are able to carry on useful military activities far from these bases.

After learning these facts, Ellipse decided to send another telegram to London asking for material, ~~(but that did not have any result)~~, and he outlined for us the mission given to Hubert, northeast of La Chatre. It was up to us to insure all liaisons. Furthermore we received the following mission; Mission James will accompany Nony (Hubert) it will then go to Creuse and put itself at the disposal of Mission Bergamotte on the road likely to be used by German troops in Indre, Cher, Creuse.

29 August. We were back at Hubert's headquarters. Hubert was preparing the departure of his men and was organizing a Bataillon de Marche. As he was lacking arms - which London still refused to send - he was obliged in order to equip 6 companies to disarm 6 others.

30 August. We left in our new car (the other one, a Rosengart, refusing to start) and we went in the direction of Creuse, in order to contact Major Rewez, chief of Bergamotte Mission, and to gather information required by Hubert.

1 September. We arrived in Gueret where we contacted Commandant Rewez. He told us that Creuse was completely liberated but that numerous German columns were crossing

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Indre and Cher. So, in company with Major Rewez, we immediately left in the direction of Indre and Cher.

Technical Sergeant Denneau was left in Gueret with the wireless operators of the Bergamotte Mission.

Very late at night we reached Le Blanc where we contacted Major Legrand of team Hugh (~~1627~~), which gave us a series of details of the lines of retreat of the Germans, Poitiers-Chateauroux. We also contacted the English Major Edouard and Lieutenant-Colonel Serge Obolensky, AUS (~~1628~~) commanding a team of American OG's whose mission was the defence of the Eguzon dam (~~1629~~).

2 September. We decided this time to reconnoitre the Cher. Near St Amand we contacted Lieutenant Dantes (~~1630~~) and Colonel Bertrand whose command post was in the middle of the German line of retreat to the east of Bourges. They gave us all details of the routes of retreat of the Germans from Chateauroux. This trip did not lack adventure as we had to use the roads utilized by the German columns.

3 September. We returned to Gueret where we met Captain Laurent, leader of Hubert's Infantry troops. We explained to him the situation in the Indre and Cher which we had just been through. The ambushing zone for these troops would therefore be the region located between Chateauroux, Issoudun, Chateauneuf, Lignieres and Ardennes in the Indre.

4 September. As Major Rewez found that this Hubert group was sufficiently well trained and informed to do a useful job alone, he decided to take us to form a very mobile column to attack the German columns. This column would be formed with material which he was going to London to collect.

(1627) p 17 this Vol
(1629) War Diary Vol 4-A p 69

(1628) War Diary Vol 11 p 16
(1630) p 629 this Vol

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6 September. We saw Ellipse, DMR 5 and Major Rewez explained his intention of forming a new light column with material which we were to go and get in London. Ellipse agreed and gave us permission to return to London.

10 September. We arrived in London on a Hudson Operation. Technical Sergeant Denneau was left in Limoges with all our equipment to await a message from us.

11 September. We gave a report to Colonel Carleton-Smith on the possibilities of selecting a new mission somewhere else. We agreed with him to abandon the idea of the "colonne legere" and to devote our activities to the new mission. It was necessary for Lieutenant Singlaub to return to the Correze to pick up several men that were to be used on the new mission and to get Technical Sergeant Denneau and our equipment.

18 September. Lieutenant Singlaub left for France on a Hudson operation and landed at Le Blanc where transport was waiting to take him to Limoges. Major Wise (1631) of team Frederick returned with Lieutenant Singlaub on this trip as he was also to be on the new mission. In the meantime Lieutenant Leb returned to Paris to make the necessary arrangements there.

20 September. Lieutenant Singlaub and Major Wise went into the Correze and contacted the necessary parties. Arrangements were made for their transport to Paris by auto.

It might be added at this point that while in the department of Correze we were approached by many individuals who implored us to make a report of the political situation there. They stated that the methods used by the political groups in power were just as frightening as those used by the Germans. While the political situation is not within the scope of our mission we would like to state that it, on several occasions,

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actually hampered our work. The two political factions refused to work together and often were working against each other. It was reported to me that the armaments plant at Tulle is now reconverted by the FTP to making weapons for themselves. The use that these weapons will be put to in "liberated" France can only be surmised.

25 September. Lieutenant Singlaub arrived in Paris with Technical Sergeant Denneau and men that they went after. Contacted Lieutenant Leb there and the men were turned over to the EMFFI by orders from Colonel Manuel.

28 September. Entire Team James returned to London by Plane.

Wireless Report.

Dropped on night of 10/11 August. Everything was in good order. Set up station on 12 August and made contact strength 3's in and 3's out. Took both skeds of that day to pass initial message. From then on could not make contact on Jed set. Used radio of Mission Tilleul for a few days until I was able to get a B-2 from the Maquis. After that contact was made every sked with 4's and 5's both in and out. Except for a few times when interference at home station was too heavy.

The coding on incoming messages was very good, with the exception of one message that was received two weeks late!

The first few days the encoding on our end was done by officers but when things began to pop they were kept busy all the time so operator had to hold down that job.

Antennas used were of varied lengths and directions. Found that antennae in line with base was most successful.

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Operations, Team James (Cont'd)

On the whole the wireless end of the mission of Team James was very successful.

All my frequencies were fine except the main which always seemed to have QRM 55 on top of my note. Home frequencies were fine. Emergency was very good and also very useful. It is a necessity in field work.

Operators at base were excellent and very good on response.

Financial Statement

Sergeant Denneau --- received ----- 50,000 Frs

Expenses
1 B-2 Set ----- 1,000
Food and lodging ----- 25,000
Transportation ----- 10,000
Helper in transportation of radio and
personal equipment ----- 5,000
4 days in Paris ----- 4,000
Stolen ----- 5,000

Total ----- 50,000 Frs

Lieutenant Singlaub and Lieutenant Leb
received ----- 200,000 Frs

Expenses
Food - - - - - 25,000
Lodging - - - - - 10,000
Purchase of Car No 1 - - - - - 30,000
Purchase of Car No 2 - - - - - 50,000
Maintenance of cars - - - - - 15,000
Given to distressed airmen - - - - - 25,000
Paid to informer - - - - - 5,000
Wages for driver - - - - - 7,000
Stolen, or lost at Egleton - v- - - - - 10,000
Miscellaneous expenses - - - - - 5,000

Total - - - - - 182,000 Frs
Returned - - - - - 18,000 Frs

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JEDBURGH

Operations, Team JacobTEAM JACOB

Jedburgh team Jacob was the twenty-sixth Jedburgh team to be dispatched to France from the UK.

Members of Team

[The members of team Jacob were as follows:]

Captain V.A. Gough, (British), code name "Arran" *Caps*

Lieutenant G. Baraud, (French), code name "Connaught" *Caps*

Sergeant K. Seymour, (British), code name "Skye" *Caps*

Area to Which Dispatched

Team Jacob was dispatched on the night of 12/13 August to the Vosges area of France.

Background of Resistance in Area

There were known to be large groups of maquis in the Vosges area, but up to this time they had not been armed by SFHQ due to the difficulties of range and the inability of the Vosges area to accept daylight operations. The Jedburgh team was dispatched to arm up to 7,000 men in the area and keep them thoroughly resupplied.

Purpose of the Mission

Jedburgh team Jacob was being dispatched in conjunction with as SAS unit to work with the maquis in the Vosges. They would assist in the organization, training and arming of these resistance groups in as clandestine a manner as possible.

Method of Dropping and Reception Committee

The team was to be dropped to a reception committee arranged by the FFI Maquis who would place them with a suitable maquis group in the area in which they were to work.

Scale of Air Support Likely

The team was instructed to arm up to 7,000 men in the

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Operations, Team Jacob (Cont'd)

Vosges area. This figure was not to be exceeded except by further instructions from headquarters owing to difficulties of resupply aircraft.

Communications

The team took one Jedburgh W/T set and one spare receiver. Contact with the Home Station was to be established as soon as possible after arriving in the field.

Finance

Each of the officers took 100,000 French francs and 50 American dollars. The W/T operator took 50,000 French francs and 50 American dollars.

Relations with Other Allied Units

Special Airborne Services. The team was being dispatched with an SAS unit and was to work in conjunction with them, but they were to remain under the command of EMFFI headquarters.

Action

Upon Arrival in the Field. The team would contact the resistance chiefs in the region upon arrival and assist them in organizing, training and arming the maquis. Recruiting was to be restricted in number to the amount of arms deliveries with 7,000 being the maximum number. No large groups which might attract enemy attention were to be organized and open offensive action was to be avoided at all costs.

First Word from Field

Team Jacob announced its safe arrival in the field in the following W/T message dated 15 August (1632):

"Landed safely. Skye damaged ankle. Fit in 7 days. Are using SAS operator. Have contacted Maximum who is trying to contact Planete for us. Meanwhile are with maquis group 2 kms south of Vexaincourt, in valley Celles sur Plaine."

(1632) C-1748/1 15 Aug 44

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Operations, Team Jacob (Cont'd)

Summary of W/T Messages Exchanged

15 August From Jacob (1633)

"Could not get radio contact yesterday. Sent message blind. Expect conference with Maximum and Planete today. Must march 5 miles from camp to send messages. Can only manage 1 sked per day at present."

16 August From Jacob (1634)

"Maximum and Planete not arrived yet. Maximum has 800 men, 600 are sedentaire. Only 50 armed. More news after conference. Broadcast not received."

26 August From Jacob via Tahitien (1635)

"Expect seven sticks Hq. Send three Jed sets and plans, codes plus new team. Equipment 3 officers, 8 others complete."

26 August From Jacob via Bataclan Noir (1636)

"Arms, ammunition, grenades urgently needed for 600 men. Can take maximum of 70 containers. Send also Jed set, 2 rucksacks. Area getting hotter daily."

5 September From Jacob (1637)

"Have not W/T set. Contacted SAS team Loyton here. Got them arrange arms drop on Pedal with you. Could not receive arms - were attacked on DZ - many casualties. SAS team Loyton having resupply drop here in few days. Please contact them and send me rucksack and further 100,000 francs. Food difficult."

6 September From Jacob (1638)

"Do not drop on Pedal tonight. DZ in Boche hands. Liaison with Maximum excellent until battle at Leon. Trying contact him to reorganize. Will then send you full situation report."

15 September From Jacob (1639)

"Skye captured 17 August. Reported shot as reprisal 20th. Please check with Red Cross. Connaught killed. I am now sole member of team Jacob. 100 maquis killed, 100 captured in same battle. Rest dispersed."

16 September From Jacob (1640)

"Sorry no news since 6th. Maximum okay but unable to operate. Huns watching him. Hope to have message for you from him in few days. Have rallied 200 maquis and armed them with arms given by SAS. Transmitter and

(1633) C-1749/4 15 Aug 44	(1634) C-1819/6 16 Aug 44
(1635) A-2043/9 26 Aug 44	(1636) C-210/A2039/C2851/18 26 Aug 44
(1637) C-3945 5 Sept 44	(1638) C-4017/060900 6 Sept 44
(1639) C-4894/141000 15 Aug 44	(1640) C-5/151900 16 Sept 44

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Operations, Team Jacob (Cont'd)

receiver you sent both broken on arrival. Think can manage by using SAS set. Chins up."

18 September From Jacob (1641)

"Have contacted 800 maquis under Marlier. Sent message with SAS yesterday for arms drop. Gave ground. SAS will liaise with you. Great difficulty working alone. Can't come up on regular skeds. Will come up on emergency when can. Please have your message ready for me on this channel. Have not had money yet. SAS having personnel drop to team here tomorrow. Please send money addressed to me with one of their officers."

19 September From SFHQ to Jacob (1642)

"Sending 100,000 Francs through SAS Loyton tonight. Acknowledge reception. Keep us posted on location and activities."

23 September From SFHQ to Jacob (1643)

"Urgent you give us soonest possible details death Skye and Connaught. Give details action with place dates. Must have information for Red Cross and families. Did you receive francs from Loyton. Have you contact with Maximum and Loyton. Keep us informed your position. Request you give us tactical information Quadrilateral, Strasbourg, Mulhouse, Belfort, Epinal. Realize your difficulties but you are most valuable in present area."

27 September From SFHQ to Jacob (1644)

"Please give us news of yourself. For Maximum-Jed Alastair now in area Epinal. Sends following instructions: one, recruit 50 men capable of guiding Allies armies to German border; two, split group into two units of 25; three, they must not attack until ordered to do so."

28 September From SFHQ to Jacob (1645)

"For Maximum. Planete wishes urgently Maximum, Cervelet, Reciproque to send in immediately grounds and conventions so that mission sent by General Montsabert in command 2nd Corps can contact them. Can you give us news of Reciproque. Did you receive money."

(This is the last contact had with Captain Gough, the only remaining member of team Jacob.)

(1641) C-175/16/1900 18 Sept 44	(1642) C-2324 19 Sept 44
(1643) A-25 23 Sept 44	(1644) A-115 27 Sept 44
(1645) A-127 28 Sept 44	

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JEDBURGH

Operations, Team Aubrey

TEAM AUBREY

Jedburgh team Aubrey was the twenty-seventh Jedburgh team to be dispatched to France from the UK.

Members of Team

[The members of team Aubrey were:]

Captain G. Marchant (British), code name "Rutland" *caps*

Captain (then Lieutenant) J. Telmon (French), code name "Kildare" *caps*

Sergeant I. Hooker (British), code name "Thaler" *caps*

Area to Which Dispatched

Team Aubrey was dispatched on the night of 11/12 August to the Seine et Marne area of France.

Background of Resistance in Area

The organizer Armand, (Spiritualist) (1646) had a powerful circuit in the Seine et Marne region. This department, which covered the eastern approaches to Paris, was of vital importance from the point of view of railway communications. Should the Germans fall back to the line of the Seine, it would be essential to disrupt as far as possible the concentration of their effectives to the east of the river by continuous attacks on communications and harassing guerrilla activity.

Purpose of Mission

Team Aubrey was to be dispatched to assist Spiritualist in the organization of the FFI. The team would provide additional means of delivering stores to the FFI and additional links between London and the FFI groups.

Method of Dropping and Reception Committee

The team would be dropped to a reception committee organized by Spiritualist.

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Operations, Team Aubrey (Cont'd)

Communications

The team was dispatched with one W/T set and instructed to establish contact with the Home Station as soon as possible upon arrival in the field.

Relations with Other Allied Units

Allied Forces, If Overrun. When overrun by Allied forces the team was to report to the intelligence officer of the nearest Allied formation and ask him to forward them to the nearest SF Staff. This Staff would identify them and pass them back to SFHQ, London.

Action

Upon Arrival in the Field. The team would contact Spiritualist as soon as they arrived and he would inform them of the general situation as regards to resistance in the area.

The team was to avoid open offensive action with the exception of continuous attacks by small parties on rail, road and communications targets until such time as they received orders from London.

If Captured. The team took no cover story to the field. If taken prisoner they would be taken as soldiers in uniform performing ordinary military duties. Every established law of warfare would apply to them and they should, therefore, give their name, rank and serial number only.

Information Provided to Team

The following information was furnished to the team prior to its departure for the field:

- a. Operational Groups, SAS and other Allied Forces in the area.
 - b. Resistance movements in the area.
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Operations, Team Aubrey (Cont'd)First Word from Field

Team Aubrey announced its safe arrival in the field in the following W/T message dated 12 August: (1647)

"Arrived safe with containers and material intact. Contact established with Spiritualist."

Summary of W/T Messages Exchanged

13 August From SFHQ to Aubrey (1648)

"Delighted to hear you. Agree your suggested movements but you must be careful in such a thickly populated area."

16 August From Aubrey (1649)

"Kildare at house. Spiritualist in Paris and Rutland also in Paris. Thaler ill with mumps in safe house near Meaux but can work radio from bed. Must emphasize that area designated to us is underground not maquis area, therefore impossible operate in uniform until military activity begins in said area. We two are being supplied with papers. For security reasons it is unlikely that Thaler will transmit more than once a week. Following position German fighter airfield about to be abandoned. Will arrange that it is cleared of mines before use by our planes. MM sheet 560 east 11 MM east OG 4050 MM north 54 G 40. 15 kilometers northwest Meaux. Boundary is west railway Paris - Villers - Cotterets. South against junction railway and third class road GZ 41 running northeast from village St Dard to join second class road on 331 which is north boundary. Number aircraft on field 80. Airfield not usable after heavy rain."

17 August From SFHQ to Aubrey (1650)

"Understood Armand had 1500 men in Meaux area. Would it not be better for you to work there than inside Paris. Thanks information on airfield."

19 August From Aubrey (1651)

"Team Aubrey okay and active. Kildare and Rutland able move freely in Paris."

19 August From Aubrey (1652)

"From Armand - SS and Schupo left for Metz. Have given orders to 500 men to take to maquis as later difficult to leave Paris. No offensive action will be taken without your orders. Always ready for SAS."

(1647) C-1553/60 12 Aug 44
(1649) C-1823/69 16 Aug 44
(1651) C-2125/20 19 Aug 44

(1648) C-1165 13 Aug 44
(1650) C-6248 17 Aug 44
(1652) C-2523/75 19 Aug 44

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Operations, Team Aubrey (Cont'd)20 August From SFHQ to Aubrey (1653)

"Very interested know what Kildare and Rutland have seen lately. Please report. Do utmost attack retreating forces but without moving your men from your sector. Interested fighter aircraft. Report strength models and whether you think they intend holding airfields or are just passing through. Tell us when contact established with Allied forces. Note Xavier and other grounds temporarily suspended. Understand Charly region impossible for receptions."

26 August From Aubrey (1654)

"Following from Armand. Concentration tanks 360 counted in wood of Ferriere sur Risle of important German headquarters installed in chateau of Mondapeine. Blaises ask send all traffic through Thaler. Planes at Nonige no longer bogged."

27 August From SFHQ to Aubrey (1655)

"Does this mean that Blaise has stopped working. Please confirm. Meanwhile will pass all traffic through Thaler. For Armand - Allied High Command asks us congratulate you on valuable information on enemy dispositions sent recently."

1 September From Yanky doodle to Watermark (1656)

"Captain Marchant and Sergeant Hooker of Jed team Aubrey at this Headquarters. Request instructions as to disposal. Lieutenant Telmon killed 27 August. Detailed report to follow."

5 September From Watermark to Yanky doodle (1657)

"Captain Marchant and Sergeant Hooker of Jed team are to return to UK. Please give ETA and place."

7 September From Yanky doodle to Watermark (1658)

"Jed team Aubrey returning UK through Yalelock."

Report of Team Upon Return from the Field

We left London at 1700 hours 11 August 1944 and drove in comfort to Harrington aerodrome some 150 miles away. After an excellent meal we settled down to watch some films as our plane was not due to leave until 0015 hours.

Everyone was extremely helpful, especially Junior Commander Davenport who accompanied us all the way from London. Our flasks were filled with rum, cigarettes were

(1653) C-6279 20 Aug 44
(1655) C-6354 27 Aug 44
(1657) C-6 5 Sept 44

(1654) C-2825/61 26 Aug 44
(1656) C-3493/66 1 Sept 44
(1658) C-4079/19 7 Sept 44

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pressed upon us and, being the first Jeds to leave in civilian clothes, we were photographed at every stage of preparation prior to the take off. The navigator of the aircraft showed us his route. We shook hands with the pilot and at 0015 hours exactly were airborne.

The efficiency of this American Liberator crew left nothing to be desired. We knew exactly where we were all along the route and had full confidence in the dispatcher sergeant, who gave us the order at 0155 hours exactly. We all landed well (although the descent seemed faster than usual) and were met on the field (near La Plessis-Belleville) by Major Armand (Spiritualist) in person. We walked with him to St Pathus while the remainder of the reception committee dealt with the containers and packages dropped by the other two Liberator bombers who flew with us that night. There were no Germans in the immediate vicinity, the nearest being at Montge, a fighter airfield.

We accompanied Major Armand to M Leridan's house where we ate, conversed and drank champagne until the early hours of the morning. Leridan was chief of resistance in the area and had organized his village of St Pathus of some 200 inhabitants into an efficient reception committee.

After dark on the same evening (12 August) we cycled cautiously to the neighboring village of Forfry. Curfew was at 2130 and anyone caught by the Germans was likely to be shot. At Forfry we went to the "safe house" of M Flechemer, a mechanic, who lived with his mother and small daughter. This house was clean and comfortable, which was just as well since the following day Sergeant Hooker came down with a mild attack of mumps. Since there were no Germans in the village, we

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fixed up an aerial to a pear tree and the invalid was able to operate his set from his bed.

Paris. On ~~the~~ 14 August it was decided, with London's approval, that Captains Marchant and Telmon should leave for Paris, in whose eastern suburbs Major Armand had recruited a potential force of 1500 men.

At this juncture it should be explained that the densely-built over area of the Paris suburbs was far better suited to guerrilla tactics than the sparsely wooded and gently undulating countryside of the Seine-et-Marne, at this time especially bare after the harvesting of the corn. London was cabled that the 1500 men could, if necessary, be moved to the Meaux area but in our briefing we were incorrectly informed that this Maquis was already in the neighborhood of Meaux, an impression which London maintained to the end.

Captain Marchant stayed with Major Armand in Paris and was able to move around freely. He was given Spanish papers; his accent was not good enough for him to be mistaken for a Frenchman. Daily he cycled to a garage off the Boulevard Yser where he gave lectures on sabotage to mixed groups of men including a percentage of gendarmes in uniform. To cut railway lines it was found best to combine a fog signal with one half hour time pencil means of initiation. As the lines were regularly patrolled and the charge might be seen and taken off, if no train passed within one hour, the time pencil caused the line to be cut before a patrol arrived. Train-derailing charges were placed on lines almost every night.

Since Captain Telmon was French he was invaluable as liaison officer between the various "centaines". He was

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provided with papers, a motorcycle, the necessary authority and travelled everywhere. He made several trips to Forfry and maintained contact with Captain Marchant.

Of the general state of affairs in Paris at this time (14-21 August) much could be written. No electricity, 2 p.m. curfew, street fighting at night, rumors and counter-rumors, and mass executions in the Bois-de-Boulogne are some of the outstanding features. Grenades were flung into any houses prematurely showing the French flag, and many people were shot on the streets for defying the curfew order. In the restaurants there was no shortage of food or wine. Better meals could be obtained than anywhere in London - at a price. A lunch of hors-d'oeuvres, Camembert cheese and peaches for three people cost about 4000 francs. Nevertheless all restaurants were crowded.

On 21 August it was generally agreed that the time had come to leave Paris and go back to the Meaux area. Movement was becoming increasingly difficult: two of our cousins had already disappeared between Paris and St Pathus, the Germans were in retreat on all roads leading out of Paris and the Gestapo was putting a close check on all civilian movement.

Return to Meaux Area. On 21 August, Captain Marchant and Blaise, (Armand's radio operator) left by bicycle to travel the 45 kilometers back to St Pathus. [The former wore his body belt containing the cipher silks but was unable to carry two one-time pads as they were too bulky to store on the body or hide on a bicycle.] After many narrow escapes these two arrived back at St Pathus after covering some 75 kilometers in all.

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On 22 August 250 German SS and Schutzpolizei moved into St Pathus and 150 Wehrmacht into Forfry where Captain Marchant and Sergeant Hooker were staying. Wireless transmission became difficult especially as the Germans had searched a village 2 kilometers away for a transmitter. We suspected that we had been inaccurately D/F'd and London must excuse us if we came up on the emergency link to avoid using our schedule frequency.

From the garden at the back of the house the ground rose gently to a crest, and some 200 yards away the Germans established an AA post manned by 2 men with a spandan MG and binoculars. We will always remember one transmission from this garden. The Germans could not see the transmitter from which they were screened by an apple tree but they could see us trying to fix the aerial to a pear tree from which it consistently fell. London only received us QSA 2 and the prolonged transmission took over one hour. Owing to the presence of the Germans, London was informed that no supplies could be received for the time being.

On 24 August the Germans left St Pathus and Forfry as rapidly as they had come and everyone breathed more freely. We sent messages confirming London that ground Xavier could again be used and we charged up the Eureka and S-phone batteries in preparation for an interlune reception. We had some 300 armed men available but if equipment was provided could place another 700 in the field. The Germans were retreating fast through our area and we feared that by the time extra arms and/or SAS troops arrived there would be no Germans left to fight. London seemed curiously reluctant to send us extra arms during the interlune period although we had repeated in several messages that we had Rigobert's Eureka

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"Asperge" and two S-phones in good order.

On 25 August Major Armand in his own initiative gave the order to take to the Maquis. Roads from Paris were then clear of Germans and the coast seemed reasonably clear. Almost simultaneously he received a message from London advising him not to give the order until the OK was given by them. He asked Captain Marchant whether he should cancel his orders and was advised not to as such a step would only cause confusion. Time and distance had to be borne in mind. On 26 August we put on uniforms for the first time since our arrival and awaited the arrival of the men under Captain Telmon who were unable to come that day owing to the presence of German Panzer units on the road. It is clear that Major Armand desired the men to come out by night in lorries and by diverse routes. Orders were given to avoid any offensive action against the Germans on the way.

Battle of 27 August. After a night in the woods we were informed at 0900 hours on 27 August that a convoy of some 20 vehicles had arrived at St Pathus. The journey from Paris had not been without incident as the convoy had had a fight with a small German column. Numerous Germans were killed, 40 ORs and three officers captured and the Maquis only had 1 killed and 3 wounded - a satisfactory if untimely action.

By 0930 hours the greater part of the convoy was installed along a sunken road bordering a lake in the wood of Rougemont between Olssery and Forfry. The position was not unreasonable for organized defence as to the south there was a medium-sized lake and the ground ran gently on all

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sides enabling an attacking force to be silhouetted against the sky line provided by the bare fields. To the west there was a thick wood and to the east marshy ground made the approach to the position impossible for AFV's except along the sunken road already mentioned.

Unfortunately there was no time to organize an adequate defense. Two vehicles of the convoy were attacked by a German armored car while still passing through Oiserry. Simultaneously a light tank from the north attacked those who had already arrived. All arms were still on the lorries and no one seemed certain where anything was. Only two Brens were in working order, two others being clogged with grease in the same condition as when they had left the factory. There were four piats with 12 bombs but no one, with the exception of the three Jedburghs, knew how they operated. Rapid lessons had to be given in the use of this weapon as also in the priming and laying of anti-tank mines on the western extremity of our position. This was also blocked by a saloon car which straddled the sunken road from the high bank to the lake.

The first skirmish lasted almost one hour, after which there was a lull of some 20 minutes. Our casualties were two killed and five wounded in this first plan of the action. One of the wounded had his jaw broken by a piat and later another minor casualty was caused by this same weapon.

During this 20 minutes it was decided that the only course open was to disperse and the thinning out began. Some fronts had to be presented as German SS troops and two more tanks had arrived, one of which was shelling us from the far

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Operations, Team Aubrey (Cont'd)

side of the lake. The one feasible line of retreat lay through a small wood to the east and then along the bed of the stream running out of the lake. If everyone had retired at once the Germans would have closed in on this stream and it is doubtful if there would have been many survivors.

By 1230 hours it was decided that the position was untenable as in addition to the shelling a third German tank had approached along the sunken road from the west. Although barred from approaching too close by the saloon car and mines obstacle, it made things pretty hot by an enfilading fire. Orders were given for a "sauve qui peut" and everyone made for the small wood in the east including the 40 German prisoners who by this time had captured their French guards promising them that they would not be shot.

Captain Marchant's escape to the wood was barred by three men and he ran off in the opposite direction. Fire from the German tank firing along the road discouraged pursuit. He dived behind one of the parked lorries and then entered the lake where he remained for eight and half hours hidden by some bushes on the bank. The Germans must have guessed that there were survivors in the lake as later they machine gunned the lake at water's level from both sides.

At 2230 hours Captain Marchant climbed out of the lake, rolled across the sunken road and up the bank on the opposite side. Twenty five yards to his right was a German tank backed against the wood. The intention of the Germans was clear. They had set fire to farms and haystacks for a radius of some 2 miles. Anyone coming out of the wood was silhouetted against the bright skyline. The corn stubble provided no cover.

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Jedburgh team Aubrey in dressing room at Harrington



Team Aubrey prior to departure with U.S. pilot

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
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Jed team prior to departure

FIGURE 59



Cept. J. Telmon (Fr.), Captain G. Marchant (Br.),
and Sergeant I. Hooker (Br.)

FIGURE 60

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FIGURE 6/

Captain Marchant (Br.), Sergeant Hooker (Br.), and
Captain Telmon (Fr.)

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Captain Marchant crawled for five hours until he was passed the brightest fire and then got up and walked ten miles north by compass to Nanteuil, where he sheltered in a farmhouse. The following night (28-29 August) he returned to Forfry as he was anxious for news.

On the 30th, American patrols arrived at Forfry and on the same day Sergeant Hooker came out from Paris in a jeep to find Captain Marchant.

We returned to Paris and thence via Normandy to England by air.

Known casualties in the action and retreat are some 86 killed. The Germans shot all our prisoners and wounded, including one nurse, and burned the corpses. German killed numbered some 45.

Captain Telmon was killed by a shell from a Tiger tank while assisting another nurse to escape along the bed of the stream already mentioned.

We would like to acknowledge the help given us by all members of the French community who assisted us not only at the risk of their own lives but also those of their families. If one name has to be mentioned it is that of M Leridan of St Pathus who, for four years a backbone of French resistance, was captured and shot by the Germans on 28 August.

Report by Sergeant I. Hooker of Team Aubrey covering the period he was separated from other members of his team

I arrived at the safe house in Forfry (Seine et Marne) on 12 August 1944. On the 13th Captains Marchant and Telmon left for Paris. I was in wireless communication with London most days except when German activity made it too dangerous

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to send. I posted at least two sentries everytime I transmitted. Flecherrer, the owner of the safe house, and a young lad named Andre Gagneux. They were most useful in this work and also for turning the generator handle. The Germans put a machine gun nest about 200 yards away on the crest of the hill which the road climbs leaving Forfry. From here they could see clearly the house where we were working except for one tree which blocked off just enough room to work in. I came down with mumps two days after I arrived and was rather unhappy for a few days. This probably explains why I did not answer on some skeds. I had no traffic anyway, but London sent QTC and eventually when I did answer asked for corrections of a message which I had sent two days earlier. Also, I sent a message asking for all traffic on my alternative day frequency and sent the numbers of the spare code books because we had left the others in Paris. I had reason to believe they had my main day frequency tapped as there were two German trucks floating around the area to get contact. I had to reply on my MDF for two skeds and I had sent the message asking for a change on the emergency link to get it more quickly attended to. The 2 o'clock broadcast was impossible to get as interference was so heavy and the 6 o'clock, though a very awkward time, was quite good at most times.

When Captain Marchant came back we spent two more days at Forfry and then went out with Major Armand (Spiritualist) to meet the Maquis. The first day the journey was impossible due to enemy tanks on the road.

On the second day the Maquis arrived at about 1100 hours and a battle ensued. I spent most of the time showing the Maquis how to load and fire Bren guns which incidentally were

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full of grease. I also showed them how to load and fire the 4 plats and helped to carry the wounded to safety. The German officers were helping our nurses most efficiently. The order was given to disperse. Captain Telmon helped one of the nurses and set off down the stream. I followed when the others had gone because I was directly under the orders of Captain Marchant and I wanted to see what he was going to do. He told me that he was staying and told me to head for the woods. Seeing no future in remaining, I went. I worked my way along this stream, and caught up to Major Armand. I stuck with him as I saw Captain Telmon advancing along the stream some 30 yards ahead. He disappeared round a bend and at that moment a shell exploded just where he was. I heard the nurse scream and thought Telmon had had it.

We thought we were cut off so I ditched my codes and waited under a bank. Armand was with me. I heard a tank just overhead and heard voices and the wireless Morse from inside, so we stayed put for about three hours. We reached Thomas's farm where we met the nurse who was with Telmon; her nerves were shattered and she was nearly hysterical. She told me that the captain in civilian clothes (Telmon) had been killed just beside her and another fellow with her described how Telmon collapsed when the shell exploded. We left them and Major Armand, some four others and ~~myself~~^I headed for the woods. We made our way along this stream for approximately another two kilometers. We were pretty exhausted as the mud was about 2 feet deep and we were advancing on our stomachs. We reached the woods and Major Armand gave out various orders. Two of us then set off for a safe house. On the way

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we met a young girl, Jacqueline de Baets, who asked us to her home. We arrived at this place (Mongloire par Puisieux) and bought some clothes, our uniforms being buried. We stayed there for one day. The next morning we heard a machine gun battle. We went out to investigate and found the American column advancing along the road to Doissons by devious routes. We got a lift to Meaux where an American CIC officer took us on to Paris where we went to HQ at "Les Invalides" where I got a change of clothes and Major Armand was sent back to London.

Financial Statement

Received -----	100,000 Frs
Recovered -----	33,000 Frs
Total	133,000 Frs

Expense	
Clothing -----	8,000 Frs
Expenses in Paris -----	6,000 Frs
Lost in Battle -----	76,000 Frs
Given to Escapee -----	15,000 Frs
Reward to finder	
of money -----	8,000 Frs
To owner of safe house -----	15,000 Frs
Incidental expense -----	5,000 Frs

Total	133,000 Frs
-------	-------------

Sergeant Hooker

Received -----	50,000 Frs
----------------	------------

Expense	
Lost in rucksack -----	35,000 Frs
Purchase clothing -----	8,000 Frs
Living expenses -----	7,000 Frs

Total	50,000 Frs
-------	------------

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JEDBURGH

Operations, Team AlanTEAM ALAN

Jedburgh team Alan was the twenty-eighth Jedburgh team to be dispatched to France from the United Kingdom.

Members of Team

The members of team Alan were:

Captain S N Cannicott (British), code name "Pembroke"

Lieutenant A Gairaud (French), code name "Ariege"

Corporal F de Heysen (French), code name "Kroner"

Area to Which Dispatched

Team Alan was dispatched on the night of 12/13 August to the Saone et Loire region of France.

Background of Resistance in Area

Well organized resistance groups existed at this time in the departments of Saone et Loire, Rhone and Northern Loire. In view of the importance of the communications leading north of northwest from Lyons, it was decided to reinforce these groups by parties from 3rd French Paratroop Battalion SAS. [Team Alan was to be attached to this group.]

Purpose of Mission

Jedburgh Alan was to be dispatched to the FFI Mission Canelle (1659) with half Troop 3rd French Paratroop Battalion. The team would provide the communications link between SAS resistance groups and SAS London. Also, they would take part in action designed to harass enemy movements on road and railway, in particular Lyons-Nevers and Lyons-Dijon.

Method of Dropping and Reception Committee

Team Alan was to be dropped to a reception arranged by Mission Canelle.

Finance

Each Jedburgh officer took 100,000 French francs with him.

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Operations, Team Alan (Cont'd)

The W/T operator took 50,000 French francs.

Relations with other Allied Units

There were no Operational Groups, SAS or Allied troops in the area. At all times the team's W/T operator would remain with the SAS party they were dispatched with, and they would cooperate in every way with this group. However, the team would remain under the direct responsibility of EMFFI.

Allied Forces, If Overrun. When overrun by Allied units, the team had instructions to report to the intelligence officer of the nearest unit. They would reveal nothing of their assignment to even this officer but merely ask him to forward them to the nearest SF Staff. This staff would identify them and pass them back to SFHQ, London.

Action

Upon Arrival in the Field. Upon arriving in the field the team would get in contact with the commanders of Mission Canelle. They would receive their specific assignments here.

If Captured. The team took no cover story with it to the field. If taken prisoner, therefore, they would be taken as soldiers in uniform performing their ordinary military duties. Every established law of warfare would apply to them. They would give their name, rank and serial number only.

Information Provided to the Team

The following information was provided to the team prior to its dispatch to the field:

1. Details of topography of Saone et Loire and the Railways Chalons, Saone, St Etienne.
2. Enemy order of battle.
3. Resistance movements in the area.

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Operations, Team Alan (Cont'd)First Word from the Field

Team Alan announced its arrival in the field in the following W/T message dated 13 August (1660):

"Reception as anticipated. Arrived at base in trucks. Few bags of SAS destroyed on drop. Security excellent for reception. OK to send replacements on de Montrecalle ground."

Summary of Messages Exchanged13 August From Alan (1661)

"Transmitter out of order on landing. Need a new one very badly."

15 August From Alan (1662)

"General Situation Gila region. For about 3 weeks there has been a zone practically controlled by maquis. Three small capitales Saint Benoux le National, Cluny, Charolles are limited to the north by a strong force of Germans at Montagny, to the east by the Saone Valley, to the west by the Canal du center, to the south with other groups."

15 August From Alan (1663)

"Total strength of armed even 4000. Potential strength to be armed 8000; grouped in to companies of 100 to 150 each. The others are stationary. Recent try by Germans to penetrate in Cluny coming from Macon was repelled with loss for the enemy."

16 August From Alan (1664)

"Ground cut off, urgent need of 3 and 2 inch mortars. Extensive sabotage on railway line between Lyon and Dijon. Regular sabotage between Macon and Chalons causing intensive traffic blockade of troops up to now. Nothing of importance to report between Lyon and Dijon because of reprisal on neighboring village."

16 August From Alan (1665)

"Plan for cutting roads, railways and telecommunication in area to be put in operation from 16 August. Railways to be cut all along line Macon-Chalons-St Gengoux-Nievres road. Macon-Chalons-Paray-Le Monial-Charolles-Chagny-Cluny-Chagny to be ambushed. Information needed urgent enemy convoys coming from south. No broadcast last night."

18 August From Alan (1666)

"To accord with Chief of Mission Canelle, the departemental commander of Team Alan, separates kroner temporarily from the other part of Arlege. Pembroke

(1660) C-1587/11	13 Aug 44	(1661) C-1622/12	13 Aug 44
(1662) C-1751/14	15 Aug 44	(1663) C-1753/15	15 Aug 44
(1664) C-1818/16	16 Aug 44	(1665) C-1821/17	16 Aug 44
(1666) C-2005/22	18 Aug 44		

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takes over command of battalion in south of the district. From now on Kroner transmits messages from the Chief of Mission Canelle as well as for Anthony team."

18 August From Alan (1667)

"Local Commander declares existing agreement with the Ain district, he also blocked off road. To Macon east of Saone. Important to verify."

21 August From Alan (1668)

"Chief Dusr of Roanne, signals Germans starting to evacuate Roanne in a hurry and especially 80 wagons of material from the arsenal. Germans are going to do their utmost to repair the only usable track between St Germain des Fosses Roanne St Etienne. They require it to be repaired by this morning 21 at 7 a.m. Ask for Allied air force cooperation to watch over the district and bomb numerous important objectives."

21 August From Alan (1669)

"One train and 15 wagons German personnel are in the station at Paray; 4 German trains went in Paray and Chagny, 1 of munitions 2 of Todt organization, 1 of material and munitions. Head of the train at the level crossing north Blanzay. All stopped by blown bridge at Akar. To be bombed before 2100 hours today."

23 August From Alan (1670)

"40 German trains are blocked between Montceau-les-Mines and Dijon by rail cutting with a lot of material and personnel. Informations collected from different reliable resources."

25 August From Alan (1671)

"On 21st, SAS cut off the railway line of La Palisse. La Palisse station destroyed by SAS. At 1 p.m. 33 kilometers south of Montceau, derailment of a train of German personnel, accomplished by SAS, and out of action for 2 days. Do not forget to transmit through Alan messages for SAS."

30 August From Alan (1672)

"Let me know urgently for Regional Commander, if we have to harass the enemy at all cost, or if we better limit our action to prevent too big retaliation on the civilian population."

1 September From SFHQ to Alan (1673)

"You must undertake very important action on enemy communications. Your attacks must be based on informations concerning movement of German convoy. However, our commander attaches first importance to have the railways and roads cut off permanently works of Lyon."

(1667) C-2004/23 18 Aug 44
(1669) C-2308/28 21 Aug 44
(1671) C-2809/35 25 Aug 44
(1673) C-6419 1 Sept 44

(1668) C-2277/26 21 Aug 44
(1670) C-2550/32 23 Aug 44
(1672) C-3351/29 30 Aug 44

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Operations, Team Alan (Cont'd)2 September From Alan (1674)

"Pembroke and Ariege still in command of 4th battalion Charollais. Kroner still with HQ SAS. Battalion has been moved to position 1 kilometer west of road Belleville Macon and has been in action on Route Nationale and railway for past week. Detailed reports have been sent into HQ SAS but will send our own reports of actions. Up to now we have received our instruction from HQ SAS with whom we are supposed to be attached."

4 September From Alan (1675)

"After liberation of Saone and Loire, should my SAS continue to assist the FFI. Please answer in the next 24 hours."

10 September From Alan (1676)

"Team Alan reunited. Kroner now remains with Pembroke and Ariege who are with FFI. Battalion now fully armed and motorized and attached to the first armored division of General DeLattre coming north with him. Battalion cooperated with armored forces in attack of Villefranche killing 100 and captured 1800. Sufficient materiel was obtained to fully motorize the battalion which will now constitute under the orders of the French armored division."

23 September From Alan (1677)

"Have contacted team Godfrey."

23 September From Alan (1678)

"Our FFI battalion now completed. Is 30 miles west of Vesoul. Carrying our mopping up operations and in one small action cooperated successfully with tanks. Hoping see German frontier soon."

23 September From SFHQ to Alan (1679)

"For Godfrey. If your mission finished get in touch with SF Staff. They have instructions for passing you back. Relieved to hear you are safe."

30 September From Alan (1680)

"Captain Stanley Cannicott was wounded by shrapnel on the 25th of September 30 kilometers west of Belfort. Splinter through his back and perforation of the intestine. Evacuated to the hospital at Lure. Operation successful. Satisfactory progress."

No date From Lupus (For Alan) (1681)

"Watermark from Dant Red. Jed Alan less Cannicott

(1674) C-3624/43 2 Sept 44
 (1676) C-4352/48 10 Sept 44
 (1678) A-128/52 23 Sept 44
 (1680) A327/55 30 Sept 44

(1675) C-3773/45 4 Sept 44
 (1677) A-127/51 23 Sept 44
 (1679) - 23 Sept 44
 (1681) B-2674/228

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From Dant Red via Lupus (1682)

"Captain Cannicott should arrive approximately 1400 hours 22nd. If weather delays departure, ambulance should wait every day at above time unless notified to the contrary."

18 October From Watermark (1683)

"Arrangements have been made for Jed Cannicott as soon as he arrives London."

✓ Report of Team Upon Return from the Field - 12 Aug to 18 Oct 1944

Mission

We were attached for our initial mission to Commandant Conan, chief of a SAS battalion whose intention was to contact the chief FFI in Saone et Loire.

13 - 16 August. At 0200 hours 13 August, we landed on a ground near St Gengoux-Le National with a group of 10 SAS.

During the days which followed we contacted all the local resistance people, while Commandant Conan reported to the departmental headquarters at La Vineuse to meet the FFI Chief, Commandant Ferent (Captain De La Ferte).

On the 16th, Commandants Conan and Ferent decided that team Alan would best be employed on its own, as the highest priority of work in the department was to organize and furnish with cargoes the five battalions. In addition, they should be supplied with arms. All arming was to be coordinated by Commandant Conan from that date, as hitherto it had been carried out by divers missions.

It was also decided that Captain Gairaud should take

(1682) B-2941/261

(1683) B-4259 18 Oct 44

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command of the Charollais battalion, otherwise called the Battalion "Claude" after the name of its creator. Captain Cannicott would be my number two. The radio operator, De Heyesen, would remain at La Vineuse at the disposition of Commandant Conan.

17 - 23 August. On the evening of the 16th we left La Vineuse. ^{With} Together "Claude", the chef of the sector of the Charollais where he had organized resistance since June 1943, ~~and~~ we would proceed to the regions of Charolles, La Cloyette Cluny, in the south of Saone et Loire to the west of Macon.

In this region Claude had for over a year been creating several Maquis ~~x~~ ever since a large action throughout the department on 8 June had cleared the sector of the small German garrison stationed there.

The strength of the battalion in armed men when we arrived was around 300, divided up into 5 companies recruited locally. The 5 companies were named Charolles, Beaubery, Matour, St-Igny and La Cloyette. Each one could count upon 50 armed men and was pursuing a policy of recruitment and training.

Towards the 20th, certain of the battalions had risen to about 650 men. Claude was very much the leader of the sector as he knew the region very well, as well as most of the men. We considered that to take away his command from him and let him merely occupy himself with supply questions, as had been decided at La Vineuse, would be both unjust and tactless. In common agreement we decided to share the command. This duality of command carried out with reciprocal good feeling was to give excellent results.

During this period Cannicott and Gairaud contacted all

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organizations in the area, as well as the companies of the battalions. We carried out the program of organization and training in preparation for battle. At that moment the mission of the battalion was to defend and cover the liberated sector of Saone et Loire, facing east between Cluny and St-Igny, facing west between Charolles and La Cloyette.

On 22 August, we learned from the intelligence service at Roanne, under Captain Moreau and Lieutenant Rimmel, who were in constant liaison with us, that the Germans were preparing to evacuate the town. We immediately embussed the battalion in lorries and advanced on Royanne, leaving only a few rear elements behind. When we arrived, the enemy had just left the town and we only had the purely platonic satisfaction of being the first FFI unit to enter the town. In addition, however, we found the clothing depot at Royanne very well equipped, and we collected 700 sets of clothing and equipment, which permitted us to equip the whole battalion in orthodox French uniform.

24 - 31 August. Although only half the battalion were armed, we began at last to pass from the defensive to the offensive against an objective which was allotted us - to harass the enemy communications along road and rail, between Macon and Belleville.

On the 23rd, the battalion was regrouped on the heights which dominate the valley of the Saone from the west, and we carried out daily reconnaissances while organizing an intelligence service, which was to keep us informed of the progress of large convoys and of the movements of enemy security elements.

Cannicott took special charge of all sabotage, in

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particular, in the destruction of the railway for which purpose he had two sabotage platoons. Gairaud took charge of all ambushes and attacks on the highway, together with the company commanders, who, with the exception of one, had practically no experience of infantry fighting.

Action started on the 24th with the destruction of a small bridge, which Cannicott blew up and by our first road ambush, in which we destroyed a German lorry loaded with troops.

On the evening of the 24th, in order to get nearer to our objective and thus wage a more effective warfare, the battalion descended into the plain and we installed our headquarters in the Chateau de Chaintre, a very fine observation post 2½ kilometers from the main highway Lyon-Macon.

From that moment, throughout the week we carried out destruction of the railway and road ambushes, in which we employed short range machine gun fire, followed by bazooka or plat fire, then a rapid withdrawal. For four days we inflicted the following losses on the enemy: 5 cars and 2 lorries completely destroyed; 12 vehicles badly damaged; around 250 German casualties. (An approximate valuation confirmed by information obtained in Macon on the arrival of wounded men in the hospital after each road ambush.)

Our losses during this period were only 2 killed and three wounded, but after 27 and 28 August the Germans in a fury revenged themselves on the civilian population, firing six farms and killing seven people. In addition, they installed standing patrols equipped with machine guns on the embankment of the railway. This last measure obliged us to attack convoys in groups of two companies, in order to obtain a greater

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concentration of fire the moment prior to our withdrawal. On the 30th, 31st and 1 September, we continued harassing operations, while the Germans attempted to repair a railway line by moving up a train drawing ballast, covered by fire of armored train. On 1 September the St-Igny company was engaged by this armored train and only succeeded by a miracle in withdrawing without any casualties other than a few wounded. The total losses inflicted on the enemy during this period amounted to 20 vehicles damaged or destroyed and about 300 men killed or wounded.

Liberation of Villefranche (3 September 1944). During the night 1/2 September, we received at last the complement of arms so long awaited. This was effected by Cannicott approaching an English Captain "Toto", who was head of the Mission at Cluny with the 1st Lieutenant Mason Starring, Cav^{alry} ~~(1684)~~. Thus we were able to arm the whole 650 men of the battalion.

The morning of 2 September we were alerted by the local command to move to the Villefranche region, in order to cut German communications to the north and south of the town. On the evening of the 2nd we established liaison to the south of Villefranche with the forward elements of the 1st French Armored Division, and at 1100 hours, 3 September, we entered the town with the 10th Destroyer Squadron commanded by Captain Gairaud, and we succeeded by the end of the day in becoming complete masters of the town. In this action we captured 2,400 prisoners including a number of officers and very considerable booty.

This operation had been claimed as a great success by the regular army, who have presented it as their most remarkable success, since the landing at St-Tropez. It would appear

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that the role of our battalion was left to fall into the shade for of the 2,400 prisoners, 1,800 were captured by our companies, and when Captain Gairaud received their commander, Colonel Kientz at Villefranche, he addressed the battalion in the following terms: "You are the battalion who saved our lives. Without you we would have been lost."

Attached to the 1st French Army. Directly after Villefranche Captain Ziegel (Claude) approached General Du Vigier, commanding the 1st French Armored Division, in order to ask him to attach our battalion to his formation for future operations. On the General's statement that he was unable to take this decision, I went to see General Carpentier, Chief of Staff to General De Lattre de Tassigny who attached the battalion to the 1st French Armored Division that date. (At this moment radio Claude rejoined the battalion.)

From 6 - 18 September the battalion participated with the 1st French Armored Division in the pursuit of the German rearguard, operating from the centers of Dijon and Langres.

15 September-1 October. Hard fighting to the east of Lure, in order to dislodge the Germans from the village and the woods where they had entrenched themselves in order to guard the Belfort stronghold. The battalion distinguished itself at Rouchamp, Frotey and Magny-d'Anigou, but together with the regular units with whom it was encadred it suffered severe casualties, 16 killed, 35 wounded.

It was during the attack on Magney-d'Anigou that Captain Cannicott was severely wounded by a shell burst in the back.

8 - 16 October. A company of the battalion was sent as a reinforcement to the sector of Thillot, to hold and con-

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solidate the Ramarchamp position. Our lines were thin, stretching the length of the woods and ramparts of the Vosges. We had fresh losses - seven killed and 30 wounded.

On 17 October Gairaud joined this company, leaving the rest of the battalion at Chagny for 15 days rest.

Financial Statement

Captain Gairaud --- received -----100,000 Frs

Expenses	
Living expenses -----	20,000
Contribution to the battalion of	
Charillais-----	60,000
Paid to battalion members-----	10,000
Miscellaneous-----	10,000
	<u>100,000 Frs</u>

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JEDBURGH

Operations, Team AlexanderTEAM ALEXANDER

Jedburgh team Alexander was the twenty-ninth team to be dispatched to France from the United Kingdom.

Members of Team

The members of team Alexander were:

1st Lieutenant Stewart J. Alsop (U.S.), AUS (1685),
code name "Rona". Caps

Lieutenant R. Thouville (French), code name "Leix". Caps

1st Sergeant Norman R. Franklin (U.S.), (1686),
code name "Cork". Caps

Area to Which Dispatched

Team Alexander was dispatched on the night of 12/13 August to the Creuse area of France.

Background of Resistance in Area

Team Alexander was to be dispatched to the Creuse region where the Delege Militaire was Ellipse (1687). There was also an inter-Allied mission called Bergamote (1688) operating here whose headquarters were situated southeast of Bourgneuf. This mission was to contact, organize and arm the Maquis groups in the department of Creuse. This was in the process of being done with dropping grounds having been submitted and several operations already taking place. The possible number to be armed in the Creuse was estimated at 25,000.

In July the enemy had attacked at dawn the headquarters of mission Bergamote with a strong force supported by artillery and tanks. The mission lost all its equipment but escaped and took up a new headquarters further south. The latest information received was that there were 12 coys of 100 men each, all armed and controlled by mission Bergamote. The remaining Maquis groups were in the act of reorganizing.

(1685) War Diary Vol 11 p 549
(1687) War Diary Vol 3 p

(1686) War Diary Vol 11 p 612
(1688) War Diary Vol 3 p

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date 23 January 1978

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Following the enemy attack, Ellipse, DMR of the region, and his assistant Croc went to Creuse and were there at this time.

Purpose of Mission

Team Alexander was being dispatched to act as liaison between members of the FFI and the SAS which was to consist of 30 men of the 3rd French Paratroops Battalion and provide them with a W/T link with London. They would also help in stiffening resistance and assist in the organization and equipment of resistance forces. In particular they were to harass enemy movements on roads and railways Perigueux-Limoges-Chateauroux and Toulouse-Limoges-Chateauroux.

Method of Dropping and Reception Committee

The team was to be dropped with a half troop of SAS to a reception committee organized by Croc.

Communications

The team was dispatched with a W/T set and instructed to contact the Home Station as soon as possible after arrival. Should their set fail, contact could be established through the set of mission Bergamote.

Finance

Each Jedburgh officer took 100,000 French francs and 50 American dollars. The W/T operator took 50,000 French francs and 50 American dollars.

Relations with Other Allied Units

The team was to be under the command of mission Bergamote while in the field and at all times the team's W/T operator would remain with the SAS party.

Allied Forces, if Overrun. When overrun by Allied forces the team was instructed to contact the nearest

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intelligence officer and ask him to forward them back to the nearest SF Staff. This Staff would identify them and pass them back to SFHQ, London.

Action

Upon Arrival in the Field. As soon as possible after arriving the team would contact mission Bergamote and the FFI organizers in the area with whom they were to work.

If Withdrawal Should Become Necessary. Should the team's position become untenable due to enemy activity they were to communicate immediately with headquarters, London, who would be able to advise them of the best group to fall back on. If impossible to make contact with London, the team was to go into hiding until communication could be established with London or another Jedburgh team.

If Captured. The team took no cover story to the field with it. If taken prisoner, they would be taken as soldiers in uniform performing their ordinary military duties. Every established law of warfare would apply to them. Therefore, they would give their name, rank and serial number only.

Information Provided to Team

The following information was provided to the team prior to its dispatch to the field:

1. Topography of the Creuse region
2. Enemy order of battle in the area

First Word from Field

Team Alexander announced its safe arrival in the field by the following W/T message dated 14 August (1689):

"Arrived - have contacted Hamlet. Making liaison with Bergamote and proceeding there soon as possible. For SAS - Stickerghy 9 arrived safely with many leg bags ruptured due to dispatcher's incompetence. Precise details follow. SAS proceeding to Bergamote."

(1689) C-1675/4 14 Aug 44

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Operations, Team Alexander (Cont'd)

Summary of W/T Messages Exchanged

14 August From Alexander (1690)

"Liaising with Bergamote. Cannot join them due to lack of petrol which Hamlet very urgently needs."

15 August From Alexander (1691)

"Joined command of Francois established by Bergamotte. Situation excellent. Maquis fighting enemy successfully throughout region but complete lack of petrol and hence transport lessens effectiveness and increases casualties."

16 August From Alexander (1692)

"Department in open battle at first. Boche trying desperately to escape east. All roads ambushed. Yesterday German losses 150, Maquis 2. When petrol arrives intend to liaison Maquis unit Revez."

19 August From Alexander (1693)

"Position here quieter. Boche trapped in Bourganeuf and Revez controls situation. Contacted Ellipse who orders us with Revez approval to north Dordogne where Maquis 4000 badly needs arms, training and liaison. Going there unless hear to contrary by second sked tomorrow."

24 August From Alexander (1694)

"Maquis harassing Boche road Perigueux-Coutras. Expecting attack Angouleme soon but need arms desperately. Convinced Maquis here so far comparatively neglected. Can do tremendous job - greatly facilitate American advance on important routes if given arms."

24 August From Alexander (1695)

"Please notify wives and families of following that they are okay. Forcevan, S.J. 27154, RCAF; Sgt E. Jonel, 999682, RAF; Sgt H. Blackett, RAF. They have been with Maquis since May 9."

26 August From Alexander (1696)

"Still nothing from you. FFI info here Bordeaux still held by Boche. Situation Angouleme area defended by three to four thousand Boche. Largest forces west Angouleme at Chateauneuf, Nersac, Hiersac, Mouthiers, Plassac. 800 Indians Braconne. Boche counter-attacking Dordogne FFI east to insure Bordeaux-Poitiers

(1690) C-1698/7	14 Aug 44	(1691) C-1764/19	15 Aug 44
(1692) C-1834/32	16 Aug 44	(1693) C-2076/56	19 Aug 44
(1694) C-2628/80	24 Aug 44	(1695) C-2630/33	24 Aug 44
(1696) C-2855	26 Aug 44		

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route. Try today establish unified command AS and FTP of operation. FFI very low ammo all kinds. Most urgent need bazooka. Please send us something if only 3 groups message. Getting desperate. No liaison with Americans west Angouleme. Where are they?"

29 August From Alexander (1697)

"Reinforcements arrived yesterday from Vienne, Haute Vienne. At meeting all chiefs decided common Hq distributions sectors Vienne, St Amant, Rochefoucauld, Haute Vienne to Prasac, Dordogne south to Charmant. Decided direct attack Angouleme impossible due Boche force estimated 2500. FFI missions constant raids routes south north. Press closest possible Angouleme. Sector follows Tursac attacked by Boche with infantry. Result Boche dead 20, including 2 lieutenant colonels whose papers indicate came from Anvers sector, 20 Russian prisoners. RR south cut 5 places. Braconne now held FFI. General Boche route north via Ruffec."

1 September From Alexander (1698)

"Unable contact officers as they now Angouleme. Indre long way from here. We are not in Creuse but near Angouleme. Just received by runner from Alsop as follows, North Dordogne FFI in east side Angouleme expect take town by tonight. Can we have air support on Nazi escape routes."

1 September From Alexander (1699)

"Angouleme fallen to FFI North Dordogne by magnificently audacious bluff. Spasmodic street fighting started 18 hours yesterday and town wholly ours this morning. 22 American prisoners freed. More details follow."

1 September From SFHQ to Alexander (1700)

"Imperative that you proceed to Indre in order to provide team Snelgrove SAS Suzanne a means of communications."

1 September From Alexander (1701)

"Amazed your message. Assume from route given and odd suggestions given for transport you consider us still in Creuse. FFI here just liberated Angouleme. Still big job to do as many Boche west of Angouleme and if serious ammo problem solved hope to push to Atlantic and cut all Boche escape routes from south. FFI most friendly despite lack parachutage. Feel we doing real job here and their only liaison Allies. Met colonel commanding region 5. Appreciates especially our influence towards unified command FFI. Transport problem terribly difficult. Boche taken all vehicles so local FFI naturally unwilling give us car never to see

(1697) C-3204/21	29 Aug 44	(1698) C-3488/19	1 Sep 44
(1699) C-3540/81	1 Sep 44	(1700) C-6426	1 Sep 44
(1701) C-3562/69	1 Sep 44		

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again. Would need written order Ellipse get transport here Indre. If seriously insist leave in middle of job here will get there somehow but would need week or more contact Ellipse and make trip. Hope message mistake thinking we Creuse and can continue work Angouleme area."

1 September From Alexander (1702)

"Urgent message Major Henry Cox. Convinced something seriously wrong as none of our messages have been answered your end and last message indicated you thought we still in Creuse. Our messages acknowledged but must be some mixup. Ask Ivor please read all messages sent to us since August 20, especially number 25 and send us instructions your signature. Team very worried."

3 September From Alexander (1703)

"We doubt that you realize exact situation. Who is Snelgrove? Is this 18 August order for Ellipse to go to Dordogne without SAS for an important mission. Bergamote has two operators and 7 radios responsible for SAS communications. Last known position of Ellipse was the Indre. We are the only team for the FFI Dordogne. Area full of activity against Boche. Have taken Angouleme; next objective Cognac with Ros FFI."

4 September From SFHQ to Alexander (1704)

"Being given situation in Dordogne you should continue your mission in that department."

8 September From Alexander (1705)

"Due our present position Cognac request all parachutage for us be dropped terrain Tranchee by Fleurac."

12 September From Alexander (1706)

"Rocheft taken yesterday without opposition. Details position general following next sked."

13 September From Alexander (1707)

"Important positions Boche this region - Royan 8,000 to 12,000 Boche; La Rochelle 12,000 to 18,000."

19 September From Alexander (1708)

"Have sent today all plans and information re V-4. Your address unknown. Have addressed it to Major Rafferty, U.S. Army, OSS, 70 Grosvenor Street, London, for Major Henry Cox, Baker Street."

(1702) C-3567/68 1 Sep 44	(1703) C-3701/11 3 Sep 44
(1704) C-4872 4 Sep 44	(1705) C-4192/10 8 Sep 44
(1706) C-4628/95/6 12 Sep 44	(1707) C-4674/8 13 Sep 44
(1708) C-282/53 19 Sep 44	

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JEDBURGH

Operations, Team Alexander (Cont'd)21 September From Alexander (1709)

"Suspension of arms at Royan extended up to Sunday, 24 September, 8 hours."

21 September From Alexander (1710)

"Launching platforms constructed by German soldiers May 43. Prisoners say V-4 used in Russia."

18 October From SFHQ to Alexander (1711)

"For operations against Germans in the west coast the newly designated commander is General deLarminat. Report to him and give him complete co-operation. He will make inspection tour starting 18 October."

3 November From Alexander (1712)

"Franklin wounded - in hospital. Am at Cognac. Ground ready for droppings or landings. Will be Paris Wednesday. Cable date and place of return."

3 November From SFHQ to Alexander (1713)

"Alsop left London yesterday 2 November at noon. Alsop will rejoin you very soon. Operations on Cognac cancelled for today. Bad weather. Hope for tomorrow."

6 November From SFHQ to Alexander (1714)

"Following instructions from General deLarminat concerning Jedburgh teams. Your mission is considered ended. However you are to remain until operations planned on Cognac are completed. Upon completion of operations American officer and radio will return to London. French officer will remain at disposal of General deLarminat and will be debriefed shortly by Colonel Carleton Smith who will arrive in few days."

9 November From SFHQ to Alexander (1715)

"Three Stirlings for you. Tomorrow RAF sending Hudson by day to collect parachutes of previous night drop."

11 November From Alexander (1716)

"Parachutage well received. Awaiting next. Ground and chutes ready for Hudson."

15 November From SFHQ to Alexander (1717)

"For Alexander - can you find out whether the Germans are occupying the airfields of La Rochelle and Rochefort; what sort of condition the fields are in; also, if there are any other landing strips in the vicinity their condition and used or not by the Germans. Also whether there are any airfields Germans are using."

(1709) C-456/36 21 Sep 44
 (1711) A-478 18 Oct 44
 (1713) A-1185 3 Nov 44
 (1715) A-1509 9 Nov 44
 (1717) A-1788 15 Nov 44

(1710) C-505/71 21 Sep 44
 (1712) A-1074/27 3 Nov 44
 (1714) A-1359 6 Nov 44
 (1716) A-1351/59 11 Nov 44

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MILITARY SUPPORT MISSIONS
as of August 18, 1944


FIGURE 62

By J. L. Q. NARA. Date 4/5/89

MILES	30	40	50	20	10	0	30	40 MILES
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
LEGEND:

- - O.G.
- - S.A.S.
- - JEDBURGH
- - SPECIAL MISSION
- - COUNTER-SCORCHING GROUP



By James NARA. Date 4/5/89

- - O.G.
- - S.A.S.
- - JEDBURGH
- - SPECIAL MISSION
- - COUNTER-SCORCHING GROUP



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Operations, Team Alexander (Cont'd)

From Report of Team Upon Return from the Field - 12 August to 26 Nov

Mission

The mission of team Alexander was to accompany half a troop of SAS; to be under the command of FFI mission Bergamote; to stiffen resistance and to assist in the organization and equipment of resistance forces; in particular to harass enemy movements on roads and railways Perigueux/Limoges/Chateauroux and Toulouse/Limoges/Chateauroux.

Departure

Team Alexander arrived at the SAS airfield with two other Jedburgh teams. We had been told in our briefing that we were to accompany a unit of 30 French SAS personnel to mission Bergamote in the Creuse. [Arriving at the airfield, it soon became apparent that no one had the faintest notion who we were or what to do with us and that furthermore no one was particularly interested.] We located the Lancaster at the last moment, and climbed in, putting on our parachutes after the take-off. The plane load consisted of 15 French SAS and the three members of team Alexander. It was decided that Alexander would jump first, with Alsop number 1, Franklin number 2, and Thouville number 3. We took off at about 2200 hours the night of 12 August. At some point over enemy territory we encountered flak, which the plane took violent action to avoid. It was probably this which caused the navigator to lose the other two planes in the flight and to mistake our DZ. We approached what the navigator mistakenly took to be our DZ at about 0230 hours in the morning of 13 August. The hole was uncovered and Alsop took his place as number 1. The plane circled the area for what seemed an interminable time - it was probably in the neighbor-

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hood of fifteen minutes. The dispatcher told Alsop that the usual system of dispatching would not be used (running in, number 1, go, and so on), but that Alsop should go when he saw the light. This resulted in a slight difficulty when someone lit a flashlight on the other side of the hole and Alsop immediately disappeared into the night, several kilometers from the false DZ. The dispatcher succeeded in stopping Franklin before he followed and Thouville and the SAS personnel jumped some minutes later. Thouville landed on some high tension wires, from which he cut himself down, and Franklin in a cemetery. No one was seriously injured, which was lucky since the DZ was designed strictly for the parachutage of material and not of men.

This was in the Foret St. Giles in Haute Vienne, some 60 kilometers from the correct DZ, where the remainder of the SAS unit was parachuted. Considering the fact that the reception committee was expecting gasoline, of which they were badly in need, and not totally unneeded parachutists, they were extremely hospitable and helpful. In one of their gazogenes, Captain Thouville set off in search of Alsop, who had in the meantime alighted in a tree some kilometers away. Thouville, after a long and fruitless search, was unsuccessful. Alsop, however, after some hours of lonely wandering, eventually found a Maquis gazogene, which transported him back to the local PC, an isolated chateau where a lucullan repast, the first of many, was in progress.

Haute Vienne and Creuse

We had been told in our briefing that the area to which we were going was swarming with Cossacks, all given to most unpleasant habits when confronted with Allied

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parachutists. Although the Cossacks were a myth, it was true that the Creuse which should have been our area was more strongly held by the Germans than the Haute Vienne, where we actually found ourselves.

At this time, and in the weeks which followed, the Germans were never in real and complete control over any of the departments of central and western France. In general, they held the main roads, the Routes Nationales, and the large and medium-sized towns. On the small roads, and in the villages the Maquis was, by and large, free to do almost as it wanted. It was always wise to get up-to-date information on where the Boche were before going anywhere, and crossing a Route Nationale was for some weeks a pretty nervy business, but even early in August it was possible with a little luck and a great deal of circumspection, to go almost anywhere in France, except of course into the towns. Large areas of every department were completely under the control of the FFI. The Germans ~~could~~, of course, if they ^{had been} ~~were~~ willing to devote considerable forces to the task and to suffer considerable casualties, ^{could} have retaken any of these areas but they found by bitter experience, notably in the Creuse, that the game was rarely worth the candle.

Haute Vienne was at this time very largely liberated, the Germans holding in strength only Limoges and the Routes Nationales which passed through it. At the PC to which we were taken, there were considerably more Anglo-American personnel than French, including the Jedburgh team of which Captain Charles Brown, Cav^{alry} (1718), was a member, an OG unit and Hamlet (1719), a British major who was the chief Allied representative in the department.

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We were nobly received by Hamlet and his mission, and liaison was immediately made by means of a doctor who was going to the Creuse with mission Bergamote, whom it was our first order to contact. With the SAS we arrived in the Creuse on the night of 15 August, traveling most of the night in an elderly gazogene truck, using full headlights except at various road junctions and in certain villages. It might be said here that the great need of the FFI all over this region of France at this time was gasoline, which London seemed to be very slow and reluctant to send. It is probable that most people in London failed to realize to what extent the FFI was organized, and to what extent its organization was dependent on gas. The Maquis was visualized as creeping about in the woods. In certain limited areas, and under certain circumstances, there was some creeping in the woods to be done, but by and large the FFI was motorized and in this whole area had been, to an ever increasing extent, since 6 June. But the only sources of gas were the Germans, who guarded it like liquid gold, and London, which was very niggardly. So at this period practically all transport was by gazogenes, which had a disagreeable tendency to stop at the wrong moment.

We had been given to understand in London that mission Bergamote might conceivably turn out to be the Gestapo in sheep's clothing. We arrived at their headquarters, about 15 miles east of Bourgneuf in the Creuse, to find the entire mission flourishing, and with the situation well in hand. They had, however, very recently had a tough time for about two weeks, when the Germans had decided to wipe out the Creuse Maquis. It had been officially stated that

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the Creuse Maquis was extinct, which the Germans, with typical respect for authority, continued to believe though the Maquis was killing several hundred of them every week. Mission Bergamote was the only Allied mission of the many with which we made contact in occupied territory which actually had full command of military operations. In other words, it was the mission rather than the local Maquis chiefs which made the final operational decisions. The Creuse was, probably for this reason, the only department we saw in which both the FTP and the AS or FFI acknowledged and respected a single unified command. The military situation was very well in hand. There were ambushes on every road leading out of Bourgneuf and Gueret, which were the main German strongholds. Largely because the Germans took so long to realize that the Maquis was not extinct, the Maquis fought some very successful actions, killing a surprising number of Germans with little cost to themselves. The second order in our briefing in London was to make contact with Ellipse, the DMR and Croc, his adjutant, which we did on 18 and 19 August. Ellipse gave us a new mission. That was to contact the Maquis leaders of Nord Dordogne, Rac of the Armee Secrete 5, and Louis of the FTP. Rac had his PC at Thiviers, and Louis at Excideuil. It was impossible to go directly due to enemy concentrations, so we were ordered to go on a very circuitous route via the Correze. A Bergamote gazogene took us as far as just south of Egleton, where a battle of some force was in progress. We slept that night in the woods. A German convoy spent the night in the same vicinity, but neither of us disturbed the other. Having made contact with the Correze FFI we were

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sent by Ellipse's written order on to Nord Dordogne the next day, in a car powered somewhat intermittently by alcohol. Arriving at Thivier, [headquarters of the non-communist Maquis,] we were told by an excited crowd that Perigueux, capital of the department, had just been liberated. We pushed on to Perigueux and found the whole town in a delirium, with dancing in the streets and spontaneous public demonstrations in every direction. We ourselves were very nearly killed with kindness.

Nord Dordogne

The next day at Rouffignac, south of Perigueux, we made contact with Rac and Louis. We were to lose contact with Louis after the fall of Angouleme early in September, but we worked closely with Rac right up to the end of our mission in the last week of November. We all agreed that Rac, who was a captain when we found him and is now a lieutenant colonel, was the most impressive character we met in France. He had been captured in 1940 and escaped after a few months to his native Alsace, where he immediately started resistance work. When it got too hot for him there, he made his way with his family to North Dordogne where the only resistance was the [communist] Maquis led by Louis. Rac started his own [non-communist] Maquis in opposition, [starting] with the usual six men and three pistols. When we met him, he had 2,000 men under arms and 4,000 others waiting to be armed. When we left him, he commanded a well-organized brigade of 3,800 men. Thin and awkward, strangely monosyllabic for a Frenchman, he always says, sometimes with embarrassing directness, exactly what he thinks and he always tells the truth. La Cravate, for which the most polite

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American equivalent would be "baloney", seems to be the most popular of Maquis pastimes - it was usually wise to divide any figure by between two and a hundred. But as far as we could tell, Rac was always strictly accurate, which was part of his strength. He was certainly not easy to get along with as the various colonels and generals who descended on us in October and November discovered, but he had the real quality of leadership. Regiment Rac, as his Maquis was called, had an immense esprit de corps and was easily the best disciplined and led of any FFI unit we saw in the field. Rac is only 28 years old, a regular army man.

Louis, the communist leader, was an ex-garage mechanic, forceful, genial, good company. He would have slit your throat with pleasure if it had been in the interests of the party, and he made no bones about it. But on the other hand he was friendly and jovial.

His Maquis was almost the precise equal of Rac's in numbers - from what we could see, slightly better armed. It was impossible to be sure, because, though Louis was always friendly, he was always also secretive and slightly suspicious - possibly because Thouville was a St. Cyr career soldier and Alsop an American, and hence a capitalist.

Rac and Louis, of course, profoundly distrusted each other. On several occasions it had almost come to open warfare between them and it was part of our mission, as given by the DMR, to bring them together and try to coordinate their efforts. It was not an easy job.

Angouleme

In the days which followed, the Germans frequently surprised us by their apparent stupidity, their inoffensive

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spirit, their inability to learn how to deal with the Maquis and the seeming utter confusion of their movements with some units pushing in one direction, and others in another.

Their numbers in our area varied greatly, from 20,000 to 45,000. At any rate, they always greatly outnumbered us and we continued to do them infinitely more damage than they did us.

We were, perhaps, ourselves a little stupid to be surprised, but we didn't get much general news and we failed to realize the enormous extent of the German catastrophe north of the Loire. With hindsight, it is easy to see that the bulk of the German forces in our area had one single objective - to get out of France at all costs and as quickly as possible. Other units were assigned the task of entering and holding in strength the west coast ports, Royan and La Rochelle, which accounted for the apparent confusion in movement. At any rate, though obviously with their superior numbers, training, and arms, the Germans could certainly have made it very tough for our FFI, they had neither the time nor the intention of doing so. Also, the local German commanders were certainly very confused. Constantly chased and harried by the Maquis demolitions, with units broken up and intermingled, and consisting in many cases of inferior or foreign troops, it is easy to see now why the Germans seemed on many occasions amazingly helpless against the FFI.

When we arrived in Perigueux, the Boche were a few kilometers west, especially in the area of Riberaac and Mussidan. Nontron was free. Our FFI and others from South Dordogne harried and badgered them to the limits of the department in many small engagements and ambushes, killing

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a considerable number, especially in one engagement near Torsac. About 27 August the FFI prepared to attack Angouleme, which vicinity was still held in strength by the Germans, with 22,000 men in the immediate area.

Louis took the area immediately east of the town, and Rac to the south and southeast. The mission had been doing all it could to get the two regiments to work together, but had had very moderate success until the arrival of elements from Haute Vienne and Vienne. Departmental jealousy is amazingly strong in this region of France, and the arrival of these foreigners had a cohesive effect on the two Nord Dordogne Maquis. For the first time Rac and Louis began to "tu-toi" each other and to have some liaison. A meeting was also held with the Vienne and Haute Vienne leaders and plans were laid to create a general command and active liaison between all units. The meeting broke up with many expressions of good will and much shaking of hands and the plans were immediately forgotten by all concerned.

In the meantime, organization of resistance within the town was going forward. Fifty men who knew the town well were sent in through the sewers. The cure of Torsac, a marvellous character, provided the chief means of transporting arms to the resistance movement within the town. Looking extremely solemn and chanting Latin incantations, he would lead a mournful funeral procession into the cemetery in Angouleme, where the coffin would be interred with much loud weeping. The coffin, of course, contained arms and would be disinterred during the night by the resistants.

An excellent coup was brought off under the leadership of Captain Ullman, Rac's intelligence officer, a former Paramount executive. He learned that 300 Italians were

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prepared to give themselves up with their arms (it was the arms which interested us) in front of the Caserne in Angouleme if we would come and fetch them. The Caserne is in Angouleme, but on the outskirts. The first night the Italians heard some shots fired and refused to enter the trucks, but on the second night they made it and Rac got a considerable store of arms in good condition, including two light anti-tank guns and half a dozen heavy machine guns.

On 30 August Rac and Louis advanced against light opposition to La Courrone and the suburbs of Angouleme and an attack the next day was decided upon. The attack started at about 5 o'clock the next afternoon. It was a very noisy, rather Hollywood battle. Any action in which the Maquis was involved was very noisy, especially in small arms fire, as when a Maquisard gets his finger round the trigger of a Bren he keeps it there till the last round is fired. The Germans were using a few mortars, too, with very little effect, but adding to the general din. Fire ceased at 8 o'clock for an attempted "pouparler" with the German commander. Thouville and Alsop found a woman in the outskirts who bravely volunteered to carry a note to the prefet for the commander - bravely since the Germans had ordered all civilians found in the streets at that hour fired on. The note was a call to surrender with his arms and a promise to treat all prisoners as prisoners-of-war if he left the thirty political prisoners he had in jail unharmed. (In Peregueux the Germans had shot all prisoners before evacuating.)

The note unfortunately failed to have any effect and Rac decided, against our advice, to continue on into Angouleme. We knew, of course, that the Germans were withdrawing from

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the town, but there were certainly plenty of them still there in the afternoon and we felt that the result of a continued advance by night would be confused and highly ineffective street fighting. Rac, however, was quite right. By that time the enemy was getting out as fast as he could. The advance began again at about 2000 hours against very scattered opposition, and by midnight the tricolor was flying above the Hotel de Ville, lit up by automobile headlights. Despite intermittent fire, which continued in fact for some days thereafter from Milice and Germans who had been left behind, a town-wide fete started. Slightly tipsy crowds, clad largely in night shirts and pajamas, paraded through the streets till well after dawn. Twelve American and ten English flyers and parachutists, left behind in the rush by the Germans, were discovered and royally feted; they were subsequently evacuated via Poitiers.

This action at Angouleme has been described at some length because it seems typical of the liberation by the FFI of many large towns. In actual fact, the Maquis moved in as the Germans were moving out. They harried the Germans, badgered them, killed a large number of them, and made them get out more quickly and in less well organized fashion than would otherwise have been the case. It is wrong to think that the Maquis did, or ever could, liberate a town in the way that a town is liberated by a regular army. This is not said in derogation of the work of the FFI which, considering its numbers and its arms and the fantastic difficulties under which it worked, did a quite incredible job in the areas of France which we saw. The individual Maquisard was a very brave man, though not by and large a

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well trained soldier, and he hated his enemy as intensely and with as much reason as any soldier in history. But he was not a regular soldier and we soon found that every time we tried to assess a situation in ordinary military terms we made a mistake in judgment.

Rac and Louis split up after Angouleme and team Alexander lost touch with Louis, who later moved part of his Maquis up to the La Rochelle front. We continued with Rac up till the end of our mission, late in November.

On the night of the attack on Angouleme, Franklin, who was alone in our PC, received a telegram from London. Since 12 August we had been sending London approximately a telegram a day, in English. In our later telegrams we had been asking for information and especially for parachutages. Both Louis and Rac, and above all Rac, were in need of arms to complete the arming of their armed battalions and to arm the men who were trained but for whom there were no arms. To all our telegrams we had received no answer whatsoever - we had received one telegram saying that our families were well. The cable which Franklin now received, in the temporary absence of Alsop and Thouville, indicated quite clearly that the sender thought we were still in the Creuse, which we had left some weeks before, having first cabled London to send us a message if they disapproved the step. The situation was finally straightened out, probably in large measure by a long telegram written by Thouville in French. All our subsequent telegrams were written in French, and some measure of understanding with London was established, although we never did receive any arms direct from London until the very end of our mission.

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Operations, Team Alexander (Cont'd)Cognac - Saintes - Royan

The fighting now developed into a chase, from Angouleme through Saintes and Cognac to Royan, where it came to an abrupt end. After Angouleme the bulk of the German forces pushed on west and north, in the direction of Chateauroux, with all possible speed. A smaller number went to reinforce the garrisons at Royan and La Rochelle, via Hiersac, Jarnac, Cognac, and Saintes. It was these with which Regiment Rac occupied itself, with certain other FFI units. Hiersac, Jarnac and Cognac were liberated with scarcely a shot fired. At Saintes there was an engagement when a Rac battalion under the command of Violette, an ex-airforce sergeant in his early twenties, surprised a German convoy of about 500 men on Route Nationale 728 which later received reinforcements. The fight lasted from 1630 hours till about 2200 hours on 4 September and was successful for the FFI. Only three Maquisards were killed, while the Germans lost ten, counted on the field, and one can allow for twice that number who were killed in the trucks or died later. Seven Boche trucks were taken. There were various other engagements in and around Saintes, as the FFI approached the German strength in the Royan area. It was claimed that the Germans left a total of 182 dead, but this seems exaggerated. Violette was credited with the liberation of Saintes, and when a parade was later held for General De Gaulle in the town, Violette received at least as many cheers as the General.

The next couple of weeks was devoted to feeling out the German positions, with reconnaissance and fighting patrols, before the fighting finally resolved itself into a rather mild and boring sort of line warfare. which it

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has continued to be up to the time of writing.

Up to the liberation of Saintes, team Alexander had been constantly on the move. Before joining Rac, we had done a fairly long tourist trip throughout the center of occupied France, and after joining him, we had fought across about a third of France on a circuitous route from Thivier to the sea. The first month or six weeks of our time in France was the really interesting and exciting part. After that our job became increasingly staff-officerish, despite occasional alarms and excursions, and we occupied ourselves largely with trying to get arms for Rac, which he needed increasingly badly, and with sending information about the German dispositions, and especially about the V-4 to London.

Royan

We all thought when we arrived at the Seudre that the show was about over and that the Germans trapped in the Royan area would surrender in a few days with the usual guarantees. We were in for an unpleasant surprise. We had no idea, just at first, that the Germans were so strong, so well entrenched, and so determined to hold out. Nor did we realize that it was part of the German general staff policy to hold the French ports at all costs. But when the German commander rebuffed all attempts to arrange a surrender and when the Germans got very nasty about any serious attempt to approach Royan, we realized what we were in for. In this initial period Rac held the whole stretch of the Seudre from Marennes on the coast to below Saujon, which we first took, and which was given up and retaken several times. By last accounts it was again in Rac's hands.

Throughout this whole period London had sent us nothing

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whatsoever and the arms situation, particularly in regard to munitions, became increasingly difficult. As I have already pointed out, the Maquis method of fire is far from economical, and our peregrination from Dordogne to the sea had cost plenty of ammunition. When we were chasing the Germans, we had been able to pick up a lot of German stuff to replace our expenditures; but now that we had suddenly found ourselves on a stable front, that source of supply was virtually cut off. Our greatest need was for .303, and getting, as usual, no help from London, Alsop and Thouville spent much of their time scurrying about the country to pick up what they could from agents and other missions. In dribs and drabs, from a mission Poitiers, from Camille, an agent in Angouleme, from Adiabatique, we managed to collect about a hundred thousand rounds of .303, plus a certain amount of other material, for Rac, in late September and early October.

One reason, I think, for the total lack of help from London was the fact that on the map of France, La Rochelle and Royan look like close neighbors, and Royan was included vaguely in "the La Rochelle area." Actually, although Thouville and Alsop did their best, we never received a single round of anything that went to La Rochelle. In fact, it was not till the very end, after Alsop had made a trip to London to beg for arms, that we received anything at all from our headquarters, except for two plane-loads to Camille earmarked for us.

It was during the last week in September that we made our first trip north of the Loire. We went to try to find gasoline and to see whether it was possible to get some of the German arms and munitions which had been taken from the big German pocket which had surrendered a few weeks earlier.

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The need for gasoline was very great. At Angouleme and Cognac we had taken several thousand litres of German gas, which kept us going for a few weeks. But by this time, except for the untrustworthy gazogenes, Regiment Rac, which now numbered about 3,800, was completely immobilized. At Rennes we got a requisition for 5,000 gallons of gas from the Brittany base section. Rac sent up 19 gazogenes to collect it - the sight of this unorthodox convoy amazed the Americans, but unbelievably enough all 19 got there and back after an epic journey. We were not so successful with the German arms. It was extremely tantalizing. The changed military situation had caused our main source of supply - the retreating Germans -- to dry up, and we were in real need of arms. Moreover at this time - it was before the arrival of Regiment Armagnac, with Jedburgh 1st Lieutenant Lucien Conein, Inf (1720) and other Maquis regiments - Rac, with 3,800 men was holding much the greater part of the line, and there were 8 to 10,000 German troops on the side. Rac was naturally eager to arm supplementary battalions, which he could easily have raised. In the meantime, there were piles of German arms and munitions rusting on the dumps, for which the American Army could have no possible use. But we couldn't touch them. There was, apparently, a general SHAEF order against giving further arms to the FFI, and, although the officers of the Le Mans base section wanted to help us, their hands were tied. Alsop and Thouville made a quick trip to Paris, to see Colonel William C. Jackson, GSC, of OSS headquarters there. He did his best to help us, but unfortunately the SHAEF order stood.

On our return to our sector early in October we found the situation somewhat improved, with the arrival of Regiment

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Armagnac and various other FFI units. The military situation remained almost unchanged, with us on one side of the Seudre, and the Germans on the other. The most lively point of dispute was the town of Saujon, since it controlled the water supply of Royan. German morale was definitely low, since rations were poor and their situation was ultimately hopeless, and a proportion of more than 60 percent were satellite troops. An American mission, headed by Major Alexander By Griswold of OSS had been sent to Bordeaux to try to arrange their surrender, but the German commander had stated flatly that he would surrender neither to the French nor to the Americans. The situation had, therefore, developed into a stalemate. Even with the arrival of reinforcements the FFI was not sufficiently strong to attack seriously, and fighting had simmered down to patrols and local engagements. Rac was still the largest FFI unit on the front, but the morale of his men had deteriorated. Our flight from Thivier to the sea had been as much fun as war can ever be - always on the move, doing the Germans some serious damage, with plenty of piquage (the Maquis word for loot). It had been exciting and exhilarating.

Now the troops, who were for the most part civilians with Stens or Jerry rifles, were confronted with a real Bore War, in highly uncomfortable conditions because of the bad weather and the marshes. Moreover, there were ugly rumors that the FTP was running the show back home in Dordogne. All the fun had gone out of it. Rac very sensibly started a system of rotation of his battalions, with one battalion at a time sent back to Dordogne for rest, refitting, and leave. [Finally,] W we still needed arms because for the past six

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weeks it had all been outgo and no income. So the mission decided to make one more trip north of the Loire, partly to look for arms and partly to take back the Polish prisoner who had given us practically all our information on the V-4 (which will be discussed later).

We left for Paris about the second week in October. Through OSS in Paris, Alsop was sent to London on 18 October. There, he explained the need for arms, repeated that we had received none of the arms sent to the La Rochelle area, and arranged for a final parachutage of seven planes. While he was in London, Thouville sent 1st Sergeant Franklin and Philippe de la Tousche, a Maquisard (and incidentally Thouville's brother who had been attached to our mission as DR) on a motorcycle for our sector to reestablish radio contact with London. They had a serious accident, caused by an unidentified United States truck. Franklin luckily escaped with abrasions of the face and a mild concussion, but de la Tousche was seriously hurt and is now in a clinic.

When Alsop went to London, he expected when he returned to the Royan area to be there several months. General de-Larminat had not yet come into the picture, except as a vague rumor, and Alsop expected that the siege of Royan would continue to be a strictly FFI show. He, therefore, thought that Lieutenant Braden, an assistant attache of the Embassy, who had had considerable battle experience might do a useful job in the sector training, leading patrols, and so on. EMFFI issued orders putting Braden at the disposition of team Alexander, the matter was cleared, or so we thought, through OSS and the Embassy issued an order putting him on TD with OSS. As it turned out, Jedburgh teams were recalled

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from the field at the request of General deLarminat almost as soon as we arrived back in France, so that we only had three weeks in the sector.

These last three weeks were largely devoted to receiving the parachutage of seven planes, in two flights, and in receiving two Hudsons which were sent to collect the parachutes. Because of the weather, they were delayed for ten days. We also succeeded, together with 1st Lieutenant Conein and his French partner, in bringing together Rac and the colonel of the Armagnac Regiment, who had had a misunderstanding.

On returning to London via Paris, Alsop left a detailed map of the German dispositions in the Royan area, including exact indications of the German defenses, with the Paris office of OSS. As of 26 November, the military situation was much as it had been for more than a month. The positions were still being held by the FFI, now composing seven different regiments to a total of approximately 12,000 men. The German troops were estimated at 11,000. The stalemate continued, with a good deal of patrolling by both sides, some shelling, but on the whole a completely static condition. This was not, of course, to be permanent. General deLarminat had set up his headquarters in Cognac and reinforcements of regular French troops were expected. Surrender by the German commander was hoped for, with a full scale attack as the alternative. If the Germans were determined to hold out, this attack would be no pushover. The German defenses were extremely serious.

The V-4

Probably the most important work of team Alexander in our three and a half months in France was in connection with

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the German secret weapon V-4.

On the night of 13 September, at which time the entire line of the Seudre was still held by Rac alone, Thouville, Alsop and Rac were in a forward command post in Saujon, at that time in Rac's hands. A Polish soldier in the German command of Royan came in to give himself up. Rac speaks German, being an Alsatian, and we began to interrogate the Pole on the spot. It soon became evident that he was a highly intelligent man, and that he had very complete information on the German dispositions, and also on a German secret weapon. We took notes on this information and sent a telegram back to London on the 14th. It seemed more than likely to the team that our intelligence services already had complete information on the weapon, so our first telegram was merely a very general description. It transpired, however, that this was the first London had heard of the weapon, and that they were vitally interested. An exchange of telegrams resulted, in which we gave the most complete description possible. We also had the Pole, who turned out to be an able draftsman, make detailed plans of the weapon, and dispatched an agent, with a covering letter from Alsop giving further details, to find a plane which could take the plans back to London. The agent finally discovered a plane in Biarritz, after some days of searching, and the plans should have been received in London towards the beginning of October.

The Pole was, throughout, our chief source of information on the weapon. A former Polish Army officer, and a highly intelligent man, he had been one of a section handling the V-4. We had vague confirmation of the existence of the

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weapon through other prisoners and agents within the town, but only the Pole, who had made very careful observations and who had seen the weapon fired, could give us detailed information. Copies of the plans he made under our supervision were distributed to other FFI regiments. The telegrams from London indicated a very real interest in the weapon, and since Alsop and Thouville were not trained interrogators, we began to feel that since the Pole was our only real source of information, he should be interrogated by someone with the proper technical background. For all we could judge, he seemed perfectly sincere, and his information accurate. Still, it did seem surprising that a weapon as effective as the one he described, which, according to his own account had been in existence for more than a year, should be first discovered at Royan, and should not have been used on D-day or on the western front. Accordingly, we decided to take him to Paris for further interrogation. About the middle of October he was interrogated by the Ordnance Intelligence of SHAEF. According to the expert, with whom I later discussed the weapon, it seems true beyond doubt that the weapon exists and that the information is accurate.

All the plans and specifications of the weapon were sent in by us and were confirmed in Paris, so it does not seem necessary to repeat them in detail in this report. In a general way, the weapon is anti-infantry, with a range of up to 2,000 meters. Its destructive effect is caused entirely by compressed air - it has no shrapnel effect at all. It can be used either for its blast effect or mixed with ignitable fluids for incendiary effect. It is effective to within 100 meters of the point of impact - the Pole saw a horse

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destroyed, limbs blown off and intestines hanging out, at what he judged to be more than 100 meters.

One explanation, for which we have no confirmation, of the presence of the weapon on such a minor spot as Royan was that Royan was an experimental station and that work on the weapon, which had been invented by a Frenchman, had not been completed. The fact that the firing platforms and the methods of aiming are so primitive would seem to be a confirmation of this theory. On the other hand, it was also said that the weapon had been used most effectively on the Russian front, and was discontinued only when the Russians threatened to use gas as a countermeasure.

It is obvious how enormously effective any weapon of this kind would be in close fighting. Since the effect is entirely by blast, a slit-trench or foxhole would be practically no protection whatsoever, and a trench is really the infantryman's only protection. Fortunately there appear to be bugs in the thing. If in an upright position, it is apt to go off of its own accord. The Germans were apparently all afraid of handling it. Also, the method of firing and aiming is pretty primitive. Nevertheless, according to the Pole, the German commander repeatedly said that the Germans would win the war with it, and it seems to us that it is definitely worth taking really seriously.

The Team

The three members of the team worked excellently together. 1st Sergeant Franklin acquitted himself extremely well, both technically and in every other way. He was always extremely willing and always kept his head in difficulties. On one occasion early on, when there was an alert

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at our PC, he made off immediately into the woods with all the codes and all the essential radio parts, which was exactly what he should have done. We had trouble with our Jedburgh set towards the end of August, but we found a B-2 and Franklin did an excellent job of keeping us in constant touch with London.

Thouville and Alsop worked extremely well together and never had a serious disagreement. Thouville had a difficult assignment in living up to his position as a regular army captain and a St Cyr graduate vis a vis the Maquisards, most of whom were armed civilians, ~~[and many of whom were Communists]~~. For his courage and his ability he earned the highest respect of all.

Thouville did a really remarkable job throughout. If any American decorations are to be given to French members of the Jedburgh teams, I feel strongly that Thouville deserves one. If, for an American decoration, it is necessary that he should have worked directly with the American forces, it may be pointed out that all the work on the V-4 was sent first to OSS and subsequently to United States Ordnance Intelligence for SHAEF. Thouville's real name is Capitaine Renee de la Tousche, and his military address, since he has now returned to RAC, is Regiment RAC, FFI Charente Inferieure, France. His home address is St Sever, Landes.

Operations, Team Anthony

TEAM ANTHONY

Jedburgh team Anthony was the thirtieth team to be dispatched to France from the United Kingdom.

Members of Team

[The members of team Anthony were:]

1st Lieutenant Mason B. Starring, Inf (U.S.) (1721),
code name "Nebraska" Caps

Captain C. Deprez (French), code name "Perth" Caps

1st Sergeant (then T/Sgt) John L. Bradner (U.S.) (1722),
code name "Pfennig" Caps

Area to Which Dispatched

Team Anthony was dispatched on the night of 14/15 August to the Saone et Loire area of France.

Background of Resistance in Area

The team was being dropped with half a troop of 3rd French Parachute Battalion to the Saone et Loire where they were to put themselves at the disposal of Tiburce (1723), an SFHQ organizer. He had several resistance groups in the area with great potentialities and had requested assistance in organizing, training and exploiting them to the fullest extent possible.

Purpose of Mission

Team Anthony was being dispatched to provide liaison between the SAS groups and the resistance groups, between London and the SAS groups, and to take part in action designed to harass enemy movements on roads and railways.

The team would report back to headquarters as soon as possible on the existing state of resistance organizations. They would arrange for establishing suitable dropping grounds for stores and bodies. They would attempt to keep the units small, about 100 men, when organizing the FFI groups. In all

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this they would avoid open offensive action with the enemy except for continuous attacks by small parties on rail, road and communications targets, until further orders were received from London.

Method of Dropping and Reception Committee

The team was being dropped to a reception committee arranged by the organizer Tiburce.

Communications

The team was dropped with a W/T set and a set of signals with instructions to establish contact with the Home Station as soon as possible after arrival in the field.

Finance

Each Jedburgh officer took 100,000 French francs and 50 American dollars. The W/T operator took 50,000 French francs and 50 American dollars.

Relations with Other Allied Units

Team Anthony was dropped to the agent Tiburce whom they would be responsible to while in the field.

Allied Forces, If Overrun. When overrun by Allied forces the team had instructions to report to the nearest Allied unit and ask for the intelligence officer. They would not divulge the nature of their work to this officer but merely ask him to forward them to the nearest SF Staff, who would identify them and pass them back to SFHQ, London.

Action

Upon Arrival in the Field. Immediately upon arriving in the field they would contact Tiburce who would inform them of the general resistance situation and arrange for the division of responsibility.

If Captured

The team took no cover story with it to the field. If

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taken prisoner they would be taken as soldiers in uniform performing their ordinary military duties. Every established law of warfare would apply to them. Therefore, they would give their name, rank and serial number only.

Information Provided to Team

The following information was provided to the team prior to its dispatch to the field:

1. Enemy order of battle
2. Allied Groups in the area
3. Resistance elements in the area

First Word from the Field

Team Anthony announced its safe arrival in the field by the following W/T message dated 15 August (1724):

"Arrived safely with SAS. Situation here perfect. Have met chiefs and will send requests after next meeting."

Summary of W/T Messages Exchanged

16 August From SFHQ to Anthony (1725)

"Delighted safe arrival. Congratulations to all concerned. Looking forward to more news."

17 August From Anthony (1726)

"Jed teams together by order of department commander. Perth commands battalion near. Require MGs, mortars, signal pistols, knives, binoculars for 2,000 men. Let us know when this can come."

17 August From Anthony (1727)

"Armored train moving always between Macon and Chalons at 6 miles per hour. Flak car in front and rear, engine in middle, 2 AA cars on each end of engine, 4 armored cars. Send planes to destroy. Have not received broadcasts."

19 August From Anthony (1728)

"For love of mike why not get on the ball. Expect attack soon. Air support desired. Blood plasma and field radio 538 needed urgently. Broadcasts impossible to receive. Send messages on regular sked."

(1724) C-1752/1 15 Aug 44
(1726) C-1898/3 17 Aug 44
(1728) C-2131/6 19 Aug 44

(1726) C-1465 16 Aug 44
(1727) C-1937/4 17 Aug 44

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Operations, Team Anthony (Cont'd)20 August From SFHQ to Anthony (1729)

"We are doing best to serve you. What chances have you of seizing and holding an airfield for 12 or 24 hours to receive a number of aircraft bringing heavy stores."

26 August From Anthony (1730)

"SAS and containers arrived safely night of 24."

27 August From Anthony (1731)

"Have liberated over 200 inhabited localities. Maquis holds area of more than 700 square miles here. Have established club for Maquis and Allied pilots here in our living quarters, Dubois Chateau."

28 August From Anthony (1732)

"Area Chauffailles, St. Gengoux, Charolles in our hands. Ask Air Force to bomb nothing in area as no Boche here."

28 August From SFHQ to Anthony (1733)

"Sending special aeronautical mission consisting two planes to Maquis in Ain. These planes breaking their journey several places. Can you give urgently ground on which they could land and provide them with 250 litres of petrol. Motor car petrol will do. We will do utmost to provide you with petrol by parachute but may not be able to do so before Saturday next. Planes will arrive Saturday next at dawn. Will send you lighting procedure when you accept this. They want to spend one day with you. Awaiting reply on your 1000 sked Tuesday as planes leave here Wednesday morning."

29 August From Anthony (1734)

"Accept mission. Need petrol if possible."

30 August From Anthony (1735)

"Paray Monial lousy with Boche collaborators. Pain in neck to us. Bomb the hell out of it."

30 August From SFHQ to Anthony (1736)

"Thanks for landing field. Please give dimensions. Is it one mile long. If so how wide. Reference Martre - Air Ministry insist that in addition to flak at Chalon there is flak on mobile platforms on railway lines. Cannot see possibility using this ground for landing."

(1729) C-1917 20 Aug 44
(1731) C-2937/18 27 Aug 44
(1733) C-3456 28 Aug 44
(1735) C-3317/24 30 Aug 44

(1730) C-2861/17 26 Aug 44
(1732) C-3104/20 28 Aug 44
(1734) C-3190/22 29 Aug 44
(1736) C-3936 30 Aug 44

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JEDBURGHS

Operations, Team Anthony (Cont'd)30 August From Anthony (1737)

"We can hold any length of time bridge at Marcigny starting 4 hours after receiving orders. There are no bridges erected by enemy. All bridges below Marcigny free at present. Germans passing and holding in force bridges at Digoin and Diou. Cannot destroy any bridge for lack of stores."

30 August From SFHQ to Anthony (1738)

"Sorry delay concerning alleged agent Gal. Understood from your number 10 you would hold him until arrival armies. Don't do so yet. We are making investigations but need more information - if possible, his various pseudonyms and for whom he says he works. Aeronautical mission mentioned our 12 are temporarily diverted other area. Will warn you when to expect them."

31 August From Anthony (1739)

"Made contact with 7th Army French colonel here at Cluny. Our first liaison with Allies."

31 August From Anthony (1740)

"All cars with white star on roof or hood are ours. Your only military objective is road between Macon, Chalons and Macon, Tournus, Paray, Chalons. Please don't shoot up our area. Locals killing our men too."

31 August From Anthony (1741)

"Field 625 yards long, 400 wide in most parts, at least 200 in others. Tell Air Ministry to get some guts. Welehore and Ian told Boches shot at U.S. troops. Sorry delay but may be too late for agent Gal. Local justice took him away. He may be alive. Never said I would hold him for armies."

1 September From Anthony (1742)

"Thank pilots for fine job under adverse conditions. Keep it up."

2 September From Anthony (1743)

"Report death of Lt. Louis Jean deLarme, lieutenant of Tiburce. Since D-day he has made 60 operations, wounded 26 different times, destroyed 7 bridges and 47 railway trains. Can he be decorated."

2 September From Anthony (1744)

"Political crisis nearing between FFI and FTP. FTP communists. Want to kick out Delaferthe, head of region. FTP anti-British and don't like Nebraska or Tiburce"

(1737) C-3341/26 30 Aug 44
(1739) C-3382/28 31 Aug 44
(1741) C-3399/27 31 Aug 44
(1743) C-3650/33 2 Sep 44

(1738) C-3937 30 Aug 44
(1740) C-3383/29 31 Aug 44
(1742) C-3509/30 1 Sep 44
(1744) C-3658/34 2 Sep 44

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because pro-British. Threaten to attack our parachute dropping and I think it was they who robbed St. Bonnet of containers. Colonel Ledon, head of FTP here and wants to get rid of Nebraska and Tiburce. We are trying to smooth things out but position touchy. Will keep you informed. Sure we can take care of whatever happens."

3 September From SFHQ to Anthony (1745)

"Had long and interesting talk with SAS Harrods. Much clearer picture of your setup in your department. Glad of your confidence you can avoid slipping into political cesspool. All your political information passed on to French here who are interested. SAS Captain Harrods may be able to drop back tonight if an operation to you is successful. Will warn you of presence of body by BBC message. Large night operation now impossible as all priorities have shifted northward with the battle."

4 September From Anthony (1746)

"Urgent need for air support tomorrow 4 September. Convoys south of Macon attack. North of Macon FFI attack. Do not attack anything in Macon or north of Macon."

5 September From Anthony (1747)

"7th Army troops passed through Macon yesterday. Maquis had taken the town 8 hours before."

6 September From Anthony (1748)

"As a matter of interest we are engaged by 3 trains troops south of Monteaux bridge. Perhaps you could send air support needed."

12 September From Anthony (1749)

"Skeds finished. Sked 13 September at 1000 hours GMT. After that all is over."

➤ Report of Team Upon Return from Field - 14 August to 12 September

Mission. To accompany a half troop of 3rd French Parachute Battalion; to contact French Section organizer Ditcher (1750) and provide liaison between SAS and resistance groups, SAS and London, and take part in action designed to harass enemy movements on roads and railways, in particular, Lyons - Nevers, Lyons - Dijon.

Briefing and Dropping. Were briefed the morning of 14

(1745) C-4744 3 Sep 44

(1747) C-3892/36 5 Sep 44

(1749) C-4597/38 12 Sep 44

(1746) C-3762/35 4 Sep 44

(1748) C-4038/38 6 Sep 44

(1750) War Diary Vol 3 p

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August. Left for airport at approximately noon of that day. Met the stick of SAS at airport and then went to Keeville airport from which we left England in a Stirling at 10:30 that evening. We were dropped at 1:30 at the correct spot and without any accident. One man of the SAS refused to jump and caused the pilot to circle the field to allow the Jed team to jump. The Jed team jumped in the following order: Number 9, Captain Deprez, Number 10, Lieutenant Starring, Number 11, First Sergeant Bradner. The men of the SAS preceded us. After the drop we were taken to a farm at Ameun at which place we met Tiburce and Jacquot.

First Contacts. After having met Tiburce and Jacquot we were told that there would be a meeting of the local chiefs the following night. We went to this meeting and met Captain Laurent, commander of the Regiment of Cluny, and his officers. We found that they were quite well armed but needed specialized equipment. It was only at the very end that we received any of this equipment. There were about 2,000 men in the area, all with officers and NCOs. They had already cut the railways to be cut in our zone and were in a position to attack the main road almost every day. That part of our mission seemed to be well taken care of. Two days later it was decided that Captain Deprez was to go to command a battalion at Charolle, that the radio of team Alan (1751) was to provide the needs of the SAS along with another radio of theirs all under the orders of Commandant Corman, SAS. Our radio was to provide for the needs of the Cluny area and for Tiburce, and 1st Lieutenant Starring was told to assist Tiburce. This was done under the orders of Tiburce. Our mission could still be done in this way and it seemed to be

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the most satisfactory way of doing it. The head of the department, Commandant de la Ferte, approved also as we had discussed this with him. Thus team Anthony was split up and remained so to the end. First Sergeant Bradner remained at the CP of Captain Laurent at Cluny and 1st Lieutenant Starring joined Tiburce.

Actions: Done in the Area and Miscellaneous Work. Jed Nebraska worked on the distribution of arms and munitions and the receptions of men and equipment. Also made a few recce of the main road Lyons/Chalons/Dijon, which was continuously attacked by the SAS of Captain Colcombe and by the men of Captain Laurent. Closer to Chalons this work was handled by Gougou and other units of SAS. In the west this was handled by men of Captain Deprez and Dieudonne. We had contact at all times with these different elements and at the same time with team Alan farther south, who ^{was} doing the same thing nearer Macon. This situation held forth until we were run over by the French armored division of De Lattre. Nebraska and Tiburce made several trips through all this region with no mishaps as there was always a chance of meeting Fritz along some of the roads.

Parachutings. SAS and equipment arrived safely the night of 24 August and went to work the next day. On the night of 26 August pilots reported that we were not on the field, but we were there. It must have been a case of navigation on their part. When the SAS of Lieutenant Rouen dropped they came to us without any warning as we were expecting 30 containers instead. This was a little dangerous as we always left the containers on the ground until daylight to pick them up. If the men had been hurt and not reported to us we would have never searched until the next morning. On

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the night of 1 September 1944 we received 18 planes with arms and equipment. The pilots are to be congratulated for this job. There was a bit of complication on this job as we heard that the FTP wanted to attack our parachuting. We had not given them much before as they demonstrated practically no desire to fight against the Boche. Tiburce and Nebraska went to see their leader Colonel Ledon and said that we were prepared to guard our material heavily. This did not seem to budge him so we said that if necessary we would demand action against him when the Allies came. He was then quite prepared to call off his attack and return in hiding with his men and arms. It seems that some of the elements of the FTP tried to steal some of the supplies dropped to Dieudonne the same night, but Captain Deprez managed to cope with the situation handily in that area. Even though we received many containers, we never received the medical equipment that we demanded the third day in and we also did not receive certain specialized equipment demanded.

Conclusions. On 4 September we went to attack Macon but arrived five minutes after the last German truck had left. This was due I think to bad information passed to us by men in the town. Macon was always a difficult nut to crack as the number of troops was always static, running from a division to seven or eight hundred men. Eight hours after we entered Macon the French Division entered. Tournus and Sennecy-le-Grand were taken the same time with fair losses to the Maquis of Captain Laurent. Four SAS jeeps were lost in Sennecy along with 12 of their men. The jeeps with 12 men attacked the town when there were 3,000 Germans in the town. They killed about 500, were finally torn out of their jeeps, and the majority dispatched with a ball through the brain.

Operations, Team Anthony (Cont'd)

Tournus was a much easier nut to crack. After this, things began to clear up until there was nothing left to do so we went to report in and eventually came back to London via Paris. A report by Captain Deprez will follow as he has some details of his area which we are not too well acquainted with.

Supplementary Report on Team Anthony by Captain Deprez

In France. We spent the day of the 15th contacting the different regional chiefs. It would appear from first insight that the department of Saone et Loire was completely organized. Jedburgh team arrived with a delay of about approximately three months.

There was a very extensive zone between Cluny, Charolles, and Saint Gengoux almost clear of the enemy. The Germans seem to use only certain axes for moving. The following instances:

Macon - Chalons

Paray le Monial, Montceau les Mines

Dijon - Guenguon, etc.

On these lines of communication they had static posts with garrisons protecting them. These existed at Macon, Chalons, Paray le Monial, Dijon, Montceau les Mines, Autun, etc.

On 16 August after agreement between Tiburce, the Departmental Commandant Ferrand, and Commandant Conan, SAS commander, I took over command of an FFI battalion which was almost completely organized. 1st Lieutenant Starring and First Sergeant Bradner remained with Tiburce.

On 17 August, the actual taking over of the battalion took place. This was the battalion of Sylla of the regiment of the Charollais and was quartered between that town and Palinges in the immediate neighborhood of a village called Martigny le Comte. This battalion was created by Dieudonne,

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a Canadian captain, who did most excellent work in this region.

It was composed of four companies uniformly armed. The equipment and clothing was rather poor but improved daily. The feeding was excellent as we were in a very rich part of France. Our transport problems were many but were overcome. Two companies out of the four were able to be transported by road, and after a few days we managed to get all four of them made mobile. Our greatest problem was petrol.

The operational sector which had been allocated to me was the following: Paray le Monial, Montceau les Mines, Montehauin, La Voie, Dijon, Paray le Monial - Montehauin. The road Dijon - Guenguon.

Activities. From 18 August onwards, the railway road was consistently cut between Paray le Monial and Montceau les Mines. On 19 August a small bridge near Paray le Monial was destroyed, and ambushes were arranged daily along the roads. The Boche, however, used to repair the cuts immediately. We attempted to derail a train but failed. Patrols were consistently on the alert along the line, and each train pushed ahead a small wagon with a fairly long arm. This small wagon set off the fog signals, and the train which was traveling very slowly stopped. As a result the traffic on the line was very slight, but the trains were still passing. Another fact we had to take into consideration was that there was an armored train very often on this line. In view of all these facts, I decided to attack certain of the static garrisons and to make far more important cuts.

On 25 August my battalion attacked the following posts:

La Gravoine - held by 25 Germans

Palinges - held by 40 Germans

Genelarol - held by 60 Germans

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We made a diversion on a train which was standing at Paray le Monial, and which was carrying troops and explosives.

Our first three attacks were most certainly successful. In the case of the first and second, by 9 o'clock in the morning the garrisons were completely destroyed or taken prisoner. In the third instance, resistance was more pronounced and thirty Germans took refuge in a large house in the center of the town, and held out until night. We were also counter-attacked by a detachment at Perrecy during the afternoon. We, however retaliated and counter-attacked and destroyed and dispersed the enemy. The garrison which had taken refuge in the house gave in towards 2130 hours. The result of all this - 150 Germans were either killed or taken prisoner. On our side we had 3 killed and about 15 wounded more or less seriously.

We effected important cuts during the day. Sections of rails were loosened, sleepers taken away over a distance of more than 300 metres. We also attempted to destroy a large stone bridge but were unable to do this owing to lack of explosives. On the whole we were satisfied with our work; in just over three days we interrupted all rail communications and 16 trains waiting in Paray le Monial station. We sent off most urgent requests for the RAF to attend to these but air support did not come.

Our attack on a train standing in Paray le Monial was less fortunate. A few minutes after we had started the operation the armored train came along with SS reinforcements. The commandant of the company endeavored to disengage, but we had seven wounded and ten prisoners who fell into the hands of the enemy. They killed off the wounded and shot the

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prisoners. The total casualties were 50 Germans killed and almost the same number wounded. We had 27 killed and 10 wounded. As a reprisal to the German conduct, I had 30 German prisoners shot and sent their identity papers to the Feldgendarmerie of Paray le Monial.

Despite our daily ambushes German convoys continued to use the road Paray le Monial, and Montceau le Mines. The Germans were using tanks for patrolling the route. There is one peculiarity about the disposition of this road. The canal runs alongside and at 3 kilometers to the north of Paray le Monial a small stream passes under the canal and the road and runs into the adjoining river. We were able to get hold of some explosive and a charge was put on the road along the canal dyke. This was successfully done and the canal completely emptied itself across the road and blocked it for about 20 metres to a depth of 6 metres.

This effectively stopped all traffic on this road. However, we barred, mined, and cut the route between Paray le Monial and Charolles. The only lines of communication now left in our sector which we had to deal with was Dijon-Guenguon and the cross-roads from Paray le Monial connected with it.

Continual ambushes were made by a company which I had detached to a neighborhood of Guenguon for this purpose. This company also has to its honor the cutting of the HT cable supplying the airfield of St. Yan. This airfield was due to be attacked on 25 August. This action was forbidden by the Departmental Commandant Ferrand, although at that period the chances of success were more than possible. It was attempted, however, by a battalion which came from the Loire a few days later. The Germans had since been alerted

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and retrenched themselves, and after a day's fighting the Loire battalion retired.

On 3 September the town of Paray le Monial was surrounded. That day there arrived from Charolles the French troops of General de Lattre de Tassigny. During the night German convoys attempted to escape but were attacked. On the morning of the 4th we entered the town.

On 5 September the 2nd battalion and part of the 3rd battalion were in difficulties at Montceau les Mines. We proceeded to reinforce them. Two German trains were blocked before Montceau. An engine had run into the first train and derailed it; after some fighting approximately 700 Germans gave in. The same day I sent two companies to Blauzy and gave the order for one of them to make contact at Montchanin with the enemy. They entered the town at 2100 hours and valiantly attacked enemy rear-guards.

Two more trains plus an armored train blocked near St. Berain to the north of Montchanin were attacked the following day by that company. The Germans retired into the woods where numerous prisoners were captured and a great number of stores and equipment was recovered from the trains. Events were now following fast. At 1800 hours I sent a company to le Creusot which the Germans had just evacuated. We gathered more prisoners in the woods where we had sent mopping up parties.

Lastly on 8 September, during the afternoon three companies of my battalion took part in the attack on Autun. The attack was organized by the FFI, 3 squadrons of the 2nd Dragoons, and some SAS.

As night came on, the attack was postponed until the following day. On 9 September at 0730 hours we entered

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Autun after feeble enemy resistance. The Guenguon company on the 8th and 9th attacked German convoys moving towards Autun near the town of Etang.

The department of Saone et Loire was completely liberated. A few isolated groups were in the woods, but they were speedily mopped up. The battalion was regrouped at Montceau les Mines. I formed in that town a detachment of about 150 men destined to work for the SAS battalion of Commandant Conan. The latter was due to move towards Alsace where different missions were entrusted to him between the enemy and the French lines. I was recalled by SFU Number 4 (1752) the day before they departed, my work being finished.

On the whole my work in the region was not purely Jedburgh work. When I landed the need was for action. There was no question of organizing. I was fortunate in finding the battalion which Dieudonne had armed and with this unit I hope I served a useful purpose. Had we been dropped two or three months earlier, we would have been a great help to Tiburce and Dieudonne.

In conclusion I should like to cite the following:

Captain Dieudonne
Lieutenant Levy Gaston
Sergeant Matua
1st Lieutenant M. B. Starring
First Sergeant Bradner
Lieutenant Savary.

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JEDBURGHS

Operations, Team BruceTEAM BRUCE

Jedburgh team Bruce was the thirty-first team to be dispatched to France from the United Kingdom.

Members of Team

[The members of team Bruce were:]

Major William E. Colby, FA, (U.S.) (1753), code name "Berkshire" *caps*

Lieutenant J. Favel (French), code name "Galway" *caps*

Second Lieutenant L. Giry (French), code name "Piastre" *caps*

Area to Which Dispatched

Team Bruce was dispatched on the night of 14/15 August to the Yonne area of France.

Purpose of Mission

Team Bruce was being dispatched to the Yonne area where the organizer Jean Marie (Donkeyman) (1754) controlled a powerful circuit here and in the neighboring department of Cote d'Or. The team was to assist this organizer in organizing and training his groups and to provide an additional link between them and London.

Method of Dropping and Reception Committee

The team was to be dispatched to a reception committee organized by Jean Marie.

Scale of Air Support Likely

Although the Yonne area would have the highest priority, the Air Forces were unwilling to fly to grounds north of a certain line during the non-moon period. Hence, there might be difficulty in keeping the team supplied.

Communications

The team was dispatched with a Jedburgh W/T set and instructed to establish contact with the Home Station as soon as possible after arrival in the field.

(1753) War Diary Vol 11 p 564
(1754) War Diary Vol 3 p

Declassified by 062147
Date 23 January 1979

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Operations, Team Bruce (Cont'd)Finance

Each Jedburgh officer took 100,000 French francs with him to the field. The W/T operator took 50,000 French francs.

Relations with Other Allied Units

Allied Forces, If Overrun. When overrun by Allied forces the team was to report to the nearest intelligence officer and ask him to forward them to the nearest SF Staff. This Staff would identify them and pass them back to SFHQ, London.

Action

Upon Arrival in the Field. Immediately upon arrival the team would contact Jean Marie who would inform them of the general situation of resistance in the area and agree with them on the division of responsibilities.

The team was to avoid all open offensive action with the exception of continuous attacks by small parties on rail, road and communications targets until they received orders from London.

As soon as the Allied armies approached to within 30 or 40 miles of the area the team was to recruit up to 15 volunteers who would be instructed to move towards the Allied lines gathering all possible tactical intelligence on their route. They would infiltrate into the Allied lines and ask for the intelligence division. When asked for a password, each volunteer would give 'Nancy'. Also, each volunteer would be furnished with a note in the handwriting of the senior member of the Jedburgh team.

If Captured. The team took no cover story to the field. If taken prisoner they would be taken as soldiers in uniform performing their ordinary military duties. Every established law of warfare would apply to them and they should, therefore, give their name, rank and serial number only.

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Operations, Team Bruce (Cont'd)Information Provided to the Team

The following information was provided to the team prior to its departure for the field:

1. OG, SAS and other Allied forces in the area.
2. Resistance movements in the area.

First Word from the Field

Team Bruce announced its arrival in the field in the following W/T message dated 17 August (1755):

"Burning train taken for committee. All equipment dropped in town. Send new radio. Are now with Roger. He concentrated in triangle inside Touchy to Aillant to Silan to Douchy northeast of Auxerre with 500 armed trained. Boche thick north and east of Auxerre whence men will come if arms."

Summary of W/T Messages Exchanged

18 August From SFHQ to Bruce (1756)

"Delighted to hear you at last. Sorry about bad dropping. Will send radio equipment same ground from night 19th. Your message somewhat mutilated. Who was arrested South Yonne and who is Nora whom you are trying to contact?"

19 August From Bruce (1757)

"Met Chevrier. Corrected impressions. Wide liaison in Yonne. He and Roger will coordinate through us."

19 August From Bruce (1758)

"Continued south Blemeau - 150 first rate armed. Could operate on Loire. 300 awaiting arms. Southeast St. Sauveur Captain Georges 2000 armed he says. North Coulanges 150 need arms."

19 August From Bruce (1759)

"Roger urgent need 1,000 arms, 2 million francs on his grounds. Men pouring in. Remnants 192nd Infantry regiment fleeing east. Our men anxious for big action."

21 August From Bruce (1760)

"Straight fighting job ahead. Sabotage platoon changed to heavy weapons. Need urgent for mortars, piats, bazookas instead of explosive. Still urgent need 1,000 arms for Roker men here unarmed. Piastre doing fine job under many difficulties."

(1755) C-1961 17 Aug 44
(1757) C-2111/3 19 Aug 44
(1759) C-2152/13 19 Aug 44

(1756) C-1690 18 Aug 44
(1758) C-2132/5 19 Aug 44
(1760) C-2299/15 21 Aug 44

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Operations, Team Bruce (Cont'd)22 August From Bruce (1761)

"Americans close. Plan to contact loyal division commander. Do we get orders for action of FFI of region from him. Travelers report Air Force target at south-east end of Chemois on Paris to Provins. Route east side of road just north of distillery. Heavy equipment and tanks under large sheds. Need medical supplies here."

26 August From Underfoot to Watermark (1762)

"Today Jed Bruce and Lt. Moulins representing Colonel Moreau, chief Nievre reported here. Organization around Bruce excellent position defend right flank as ordered Koenig. Request arms 1000 dropped to DZ west Auxerre. Could be day. Details radioed tomorrow night by Bruce. Group around Moreau also excellent position secondary defense line right flank. First priority Bruce, second priority Moreau. Jed Benby with Moreau. DZ may be arranged through him. Moreau requires arms for 1,000. Furnishing Bruce with radio replace his lost in dropping. Will send Bruce and Moulins back their organizations 27 August with complete orders instructions covering their regions."

26 August From Bruce (1763)

"Americans contacted and coordinating. Giving information, holding towns and acting local security. Auxerre, Avallon, Joigny held by FFI. Americans probably to move east so will use FFI to protect open flank. Continually attacking retreating groups of Germans. Seeing SF Detachment today."

27 August From Underfoot to Watermark (1764)

"These areas in enemy occupied territory below south flank and will remain so some time. Jed Bruce and others not overrun but infiltrated. These areas in path German withdrawal and well placed defend important points. Understand aircraft container shortage. Made request only after thought. We have not received authority issue captured arms. 3rd Army does not have proper authority issue captured arms."

27 August From SFHQ to Bruce (1765)

"Have received telegram from SF Detachment reporting Jean Marie and Roger in Aillant. Does this mean that Jean Marie now free?"

28 August From Bruce (1766)

"Jean Marie not yet in Aillant. Roger searching Paris today. Will inform. Contacted 3rd Army SF. Got radio and orders for Yonne and to pass to Nievre to protect south flank. Will set line east west on Auxerre using all Yonne FFI. Can drop any time for all Yonne on Rogers daylight ground by Aillant. Am checking Auxerre airport for Dakota today. Will arrange distribution to Yonne FFI."

(1761) C-2401/19 22 Aug 44
(1763) C-2827/33 26 Aug 44
(1765) C-6355 27 Aug 44

(1762) C-2897/167 26 Aug 44
(1764) C-3025/195 27 Aug 44
(1766) C-3044/24 28 Aug 44

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JEDBURGHS

Operations, Team Bruce (Cont'd)28 August From Bruce (1767)

"Auxerre airport perfect to receive Dakotas night or day. Being checked for mines and will be cleared immediately. Send 8 standard loads and 2 standard loads D. Will be distributed to defend Army's flank. Are moving to Auxerre to be with Chevrier."

29 August From Bruce (1768)

"Jean Marie not found. Chevrier attempting to get military action from him. Bad security - published orders giving flank location of 3rd Army. Will try to recall. Meeting FTP chief today who is dissatisfied with Chevrier. Galway to stay with Roger. Berkshire to be with Chevrier. Nicole to be liaison."

31 August From Bruce (1769)

"All Bruce now in Auxerre. Chevrier definite head of Yonne now. Getting urgent. Road National 74 north from Dijon has much German traffic. FFI needs money also."

1 September From Bruce (1770)

"3rd Army wants Loire bridges blown up. German defense too strong for FFI on La Charite - Nevers. Decide request air bombardments. Now need arms for 3,000 men with great demand for tank weapons. Can handle 10 Dakotas daytime, 5 Dakotas night."

2 September From Bruce (1771)

"Briare only bridge remaining over Loire north of La Charite exclusive. 3rd Army said leave it. Blown last night. Defense line now organized in battalion sectors. German motorized concentrations at Nuits Rivieres and Montbard on Route National 5."

2 September From Underfoot to Bruce (1772)

"Request full info French arms, ammo FFI your area have been issued from which dumps area Auxerre."

2 September From SFHQ to Bruce (1773)

"It is now urgent that you prevent all German transport going east or northeast by increasing activity ambushes and rail and road blocks."

3 September From SFHQ to Bruce (1774)

"Have heard rumor that Auxerre airfield is still mined. Let us know whether it can be used at once or when it will be ready."

(1767) C-3123/25 28 Aug 44
 (1769) C-3379/28 31 Aug 44
 (1771) C-3644/31 2 Sep 44
 (1773) C-6437 2 Sep 44

(1768) C-3218/26 29 Aug 44
 (1770) C-3536/29 1 Sep 44
 (1772) C-3677/150 2 Sep 44
 (1774) C-6456 3 Sep 44

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Operations, Team Bruce (Cont'd)4 September From Bruce (1776)

"Airfield perfectly safe. Drove all over it in heavy automobile."

5 September From Bruce (1776)

"Yonne can be considered liberated. Are working with Laurent and Crespin to send men into Mevre. Defense line now Cosne-Donzy-Entrains-Druyes-Avallon-Quarrelles-Tombes-Tonnerre. Germans inside are in hiding. FFI will need petrol."

6 September From Bruce (1777)

"La Charite bridge still exists. Camouflaged as though blown."

7 September From Bruce (1778)

"Ready for Engrais but need arms more than petrol. Fight between Waffen SS and Wehrmacht at La Charite. Bridge blown by Wehrmacht who are moving south to Nevers. SS still on left bank. La Charite occupied by FFI."

8 September From SFHQ to Bruce (1779)

"Are you in contact with Nicole. We understand she has returned to joined you."

9 September From Bruce (1780)

"In contact with Nicole. She still with Roger in St. Amand 19 kms northeast Cosne."

9 September From Bruce (1781)

To EMFFI Zone Nord from Wilson. Today 9th contacted Diagramme and Chevrier in Auxerre. Returning immediately to Col. Mayne to report their programme etc. Will continue effect close liaison between Mayne and Diagramme. Understand Louis Govryhier killed 4 days ago with 7 others. Result accident with mortar. No definite news of dungarees."

10 September From Bruce (1782)

"Is Dakota operation still on or definitely scrubbed."

14 September From Bruce (1783)

"All Germans gone from whole area. No further need of arms. Cancel Dakota operation. Are leaving radio for few days on tour of area."

(1779) C-3771/33 4 Sep 44
 (1777) C-4031/35 6 Sep 44
 (1779) C-6505 8 Sep 44
 (1781) C-4311/39 9 Sep 44
 (1783) C-4846/60 14 Sep 44

(1776) C-3916/34 5 Sep 44
 (1778) C-4081/36 7 Sep 44
 (1780) C-4312/40 9 Sep 44
 (1782) C-4348/41 10 Sep 44

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Operations, Team Bruce (Cont'd)17 September From SFHQ to Bruce (1784)

"Your team should get in contact DMR and make arrangements for him to take over your forces. You should return to UK earliest your mission now considered completed. Bring back detailed list of all your chief helpers and addresses where they can be contacted later. Before leaving put W/T material in secure place where it can be found later. For journey home get in touch with Major Alastair Hamilton, Hotel Cecil, Paris, who will make arrangements. Advise us probable date your departure from circuit."

21 September From Bruce (1785)

"Fighting all over here. FFI battalions from here being sent with General deLattre's unit."

22 September From Bruce (1786)

"Leaving circuit for Paris, 23 September. This is our last sked. Have conformed to your 24."

Report of Team Upon Return from the Field - 14 August to 14 September

Mission. To assist in the organization of FFI, to provide additional means of providing stores for FFI and to provide an additional link between London and FFI contacting Donkeyman in the Yonne.

Departed on 14 August 1944 from air base at Harrington in the plane named the "Slick Chick". At approximately 1245 hours the pilot announced that he was searching the "target area". Some minutes later he said that he saw the lights of the reception committee but was doubtful as to the correctness of the signal letter. He made another pass over the lights to check the signal letter. At the conclusion of this he was satisfied and the final run in was made. The team jumped in good order and with no hesitation, at approximately 1500 feet. While in the air the lights were seen to be one continuous flame in a straight line, obviously not separate bonfires. Lieutenant Favel considered it to be a village burned by the Germans.

Landing was made in gardens amidst houses adjacent to a main street. There were luckily no injuries to members of the

(1784) C-2045 17 Sep 44
 (1786) C-515/58 22 Sep 44

(1785) C-457/70 21 Sep 44

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team. Assembly was rapid and contact was made with civilians who were aroused by the noise of the containers falling among the buildings. These civilians informed us that we were in the town of Montargis which is located approximately 20 miles from the announced dropping zone. The civilians also informed us that there was a German garrison in the town nearby and advised that we depart. It was obvious from the scattered positions of the containers that we could not locate the radio nor our equipment without spending at least an hour or two searching, in which time a large crowd would be gathered and the Germans alerted, so we proceeded off to the southeast through the fields.

Just before daylight we hid ourselves in a small ditch alongside a wood and about 50 yards from a main road. We lay there all day and watched the Germans pass going to Montargis to assist in the search for us. We learned later that the Germans had thoroughly gone through the town of Montargis and the surrounding villages looking for us.

When dark came, we moved off on a compass bearing towards our safe house contact. A storm came up and it became necessary to attach ourselves to each other by means of our pistol lanyards. After several hours of struggling through the mud in this fashion we heard voices ahead of us. The lightning flashes revealed a lone house so the attempt was made to contact whoever was in it in the hope of receiving aid. Lieutenant Favel knocked on the door while the other two members of the party covered him. Our entrance was made and it was discovered that this was a resistance radio post with an operator who had come from London 8 days before. The name of this cottage was La Fourmilloire, north of Chateau Renard. A

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telegram was sent the following day on his radio announcing our position. The resistance units with which the radio operator was in contact provided on the next day a ride to our safe house. This safe house was given in the briefing at the last minute and as a result of a special request by the team. We contacted the safe house and were then passed on to one of the companies of Roger's (1787) circuit. These men passed us across several convoys to Somecaise where we contacted Roger.

Conversations with Roger at this time revealed the situation of the resistance in his command. There were small units scattered through the department who were being rapidly augmented by new arrivals responding to a call about 3 days before.

At that time he could command approximately 500 armed men in all. The tactical situation in the area was that the Germans had garrisons of about 500 in two or three large towns and were moving convoys through the department with very light guards. An order had been received from London, corresponding with our briefing, that attacks were to be stepped down and the FFI of the area to await the receipt of an order from London before rising in full force. There was no unified command in the department.

The location of units other than those of Roger was discovered and contact was made for the first time with Chevrier (1788). At this time there was a very wide bridge between Roger and Chevrier, based on a confusion of command. Roger had received orders from some unknown headquarters in Switzerland that he was commandant in the Yonne. Chevrier had received orders that he was in command from some headquarters in Paris. A complete lack of agreement was smoothed over by the offer of this team to serve as liaison between them, we at the same time determining

(1787) War Diary Vol 3 p
(1788) War Diary Vol 3 p

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to discover from London who actually was the commander. Chevrier's situation was that he had a very small personal unit which was still in the Maquis but that he had liaison with other sections of the department. Through this wide liaison, he was stronger politically as commander than Roger. Meetings with Chevrier gave the situation from his viewpoint in the department.

Georges, the department commander of the organization Maquis, had approximately 400 armed men in an area southeast of Auxerre. Vernouil, a young leader with very strong backing, had 600 armed men in the region of Quarre-les-Tombes. The FTP commanded by Yvon, had scattered units through the department amounting to about 300 armed men. All commanders could put many more men in the field as soon as arms were received.

Chevrier was requested to give us locations of dropping fields at our first meeting with him. As soon as liaison through the department gave this, they were immediately passed on to London, a request for arms for a specified number of men accompanying each field. London then sent back and asked for definite requirements of each field, which we gave them. Service started on these fields about a week or two later.

On 21 August we contacted Commissaire Lefevre of the organization Honneur de la Police who had come down from Paris to request a dropping on the city to support the embattled resistants in the Hotel de Ville. We questioned him and decided the idea was practical and sent a telegram to London requesting dropping night or day without signal on to the Ile-de-Cite of small arms and anti-tank weapons

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especially. We realized that this was an unprecedented idea but considered the publicity and morale effect extremely large and worth the chance of the operation. No reply was ever received from London.

During this period we were held to Roger by the lack of a radio of our own and especially of a radio which did not require frequently recharged batteries. Lieutenant Giry was working on Roger's set in cooperation and conflict with the operators under Roger. We had our own crystals which had been on our persons for the jump, so he made his own skeds. The traffic of all operators to be passed was tremendous but he managed to keep our contact of the highest order.

The other members of the team were helping in the training of the men on their new weapons and advising on the organization of the new companies. We also assisted as observers on some small operations against the enemy. Typical of these was one in which a German aircraft was grounded for lack of fuel and attacked by one of our companies. The Germans had sent a defense unit to the area so that a small-size battle raged for a time. The aircraft was actually shot up at close range but a withdrawal was necessary due to superior fire power. After the withdrawal the Germans burned the airplane. On the basis of these experiences it was concluded that while the FFI could do excellent work in actions in which they could be placed beforehand, fighting from that position and withdrawing rapidly, they should not be used on attacks against a firmly defensive and organized enemy. This is in conformance with the normal principles of guerilla warfare.

On about 22 August American armored units were reported at Courtenay so a decision was made to contact them and find

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out what the local commander wished the FFI of the area to do. We contacted G-2 and G-3 of the 4th Armored Division. We turned over to them an American P-38 pilot, Captain John Courtney, who had been shot down and was being repatriated by Roger. He had by this time been provided with civilian clothes and false papers. He was given to the American unit for transport back to his organization. Conversation with the G-2 and G-3 resulted in their requesting the local FFI to give information and act as local security around their out-post positions. Beyond this they had no idea of their role.

In conformance with the request for information we dispatched numerous liaisons to various towns looking for German concentrations. Ensign Peggy Knight, FANY (Nichole) (1789) and Mme. Raymond [see Appendix] did some very fine and very hazardous work in connection with this, pushing alone into heavily occupied towns such as Montargis. Large amounts of information were given to the American forces by the FFI of the area.

The movement of the American forces seemed to be towards the east and northeast so we decided that the mission of the FFI in the department of the Yonne was to secure the open right flank of the American forces and to push the Germans as far south away from this flank as possible. In conformance with this, harassing actions were increased on German troops, and towns were occupied and posts established to prevent or to give warning of any German movement towards the north. In pursuance of this plan and in the hope of receiving a daylight drop, Roger at this time moved to Aillant-sur-Tholon. Close contact was kept with the other resistance units of the department and with the American units in the neighborhood. Cooperation between the two enabled the Americans to pick up

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any German troops which they otherwise would not have heard about or been able to tackle. A typical incident of this was a German column fleeing from Montargis towards Auxerre, stopping during the day in the region of Somegaise and Les Ormes. This unit was far too strong for an attack by FFI so we requested C Troop of the 2nd United States Cavalry to make the main attack, the FFI to stay on the edges and pick up the gleanings. The FFI were also requested to stay to some extent out of sight so that the Germans could surrender to the American troops and could not fight to the end as they would if they saw the FFI. This column of about 1,000 to 1,500 men with artillery and horse transport was smashed almost completely, the remnants moving east in small scattered groups which were cleaned up by FFI further east. Much ammunition, material and about 100 horses were picked up.

The lack of definite orders from London made it advisable to contact a high American Headquarters to discover the mission of the FFI in the area. A trip was consequently made to the SF Detachment of the 3rd United States Army (1790). While there we discovered for the first time that Chevrier had been appointed official FFI chief of the department. We also got an order in General Patton's name (see Appendix) requesting the FFI of the region to defend his right flank. On our request and due to the importance of this mission, Colonel Powell (1791) of the SF Detachment radioed London and requested priority in arms for our area.

In several days all FFI units of the department were following his directions and a coordinated plan was in effect. The capital of the department Auxerre was occupied by Chevrier's troops on 26 August, and location in the capital also

(1790) War Diary Vol 5 p
(1791) War Diary Vol 11 p 15

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aided his command.

The war at this time was obviously moving past the area. The German troops in the region were in the process either of moving out or preparing to move out. German troops to the south and west were moving through the department towards the east and Germany. These troops had as their single aim the ambition to escape into Germany so there was no fear of their acting against the local resistance. For these reasons, the FFI were instructed to go ahead and attack as much as possible, even without having received the declenchment order from London. The Germans were then forced to move their convoys only in large units and on main roads with full security patrols, any small units or units on back roads being quickly cleaned up by the FFI. These large convoys moved at night only in deference to the strength of the Allied Air Force.

The other mission of the FFI aside from this harassing was the occupation of towns upon the withdrawal of the Germans. Sometimes this occupation occurred just after the withdrawal, sometimes just before, so that the FFI actually drove the Germans out. The advantage of this quick occupation was that the FFI then established a defense system with road blocks and barriers and denied the use of the town and of the routes passing through the town to German units coming along later. This forced the Germans to lose much time going around the centers of the FFI resistance. In the case of the FFI's driving out the more or less willing Germans, this also prevented the Germans from carrying out any intended demolitions.

A typical operation was the abandonment of the town of Mometeau with a large store of petrol. About 150 FFI occupied the town and established a defense in the direction of the Germans. Later the same day the Germans tried to return to

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the town to get some more gasoline, or to destroy it. Meeting the FFI they then attacked with approximately 200 to 300 White Russians, 2 or 3 mortars and machine guns. The FFI men, armed only with Brens as their heaviest weapons, held and prevented the Germans from recapturing this gas or destroying it. This gasoline ran the transport of the FFI of the department for the next month.

On about 30 August the commanders of units under Chevrier became sufficiently dissatisfied with his personality to commence an incipient revolt. They had the idea that at first they would run the department by a committee. We discouraged this idea as impractical in any military organization. Roger was then preliminarily chosen as intended chief. Then the group went to see Chevrier. Chevrier met this committee and by his political experience knew how to handle them so that the meeting ended with him as the head of a committee which would be the command of the department. What this actually meant was that he was the commander, and liaison between him and his subordinate chiefs was much improved by the daily meetings of these officers calling themselves the committee.

The command situation solved, the problem now became one of pushing Chevrier into making and especially executing a logical plan for the defense of the flank of the 3rd Army. A line of FFI occupied towns was established running from Briare-sur-Loire on the Loire river through Auxerre to Tonnerre. Along this line, all towns were occupied and positions established. Frequent checks had to be made to see that the plan was being carried out. After the occupation of the towns was secured, the commandment of sectors became the problem to organize. These towns were occupied by different sub-units

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each town being commanded by the company commander occupying. The chain of command from him went to his organization chief, then to Chevrier, with the result that reinforcements were criss-crossing all over the department and often messages had to go all the way to departmental headquarters for action by Chevrier himself. Chevrier was somewhat reluctant to divide the area into sectors in order to prevent the FFI from having an area of their own. However, commanders of areas were established at our insistence to command units of amalgamated characters, thus distributing the FTP. The American forces now became interested in the condition of the bridges over the Loire river. In pursuance of the mission of defending their flank and denying the Germans passage near their flank, it became necessary to blow the bridges. On 31 August in a meeting in Sens, Colonel Powell of the 3rd Army SF Detachment gave the order to blow the bridges as far south as possible. The units of the Yonne were given the mission of blowing these down to, and including, La Charite. Chevrier and Major Colby went down to all the bridges in our area. Those which were already blown were actually examined in order to be able to say definitely that they were out. Orders were given for the blowing of the bridge at Briare but soon after we left to go further south a counter order from the 3rd Army was received and it was not blown, as we discovered on our re-check later that night. We moved south and after a long and vigorous objection from a unit of the French FAS the bridge at Sancerre was blown. The area of La Charite at that time was heavily held by Germans, and as it was far too strong for attack by the FFI request was made for air bombardment of this bridge. The necessary arrangements were also started to bring a 120 mm. captured German gun near this bridge to blow it by artillery fire.

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The Air Corps claimed to have destroyed the bridge, the FFI of the region claimed there was no air attack on it, and the bridge still existed. The Germans remained in the vicinity of La Charite building up their force to collect a large unit before pushing east.

At this point the Yonne department was practically liberated and the defense line for the 3rd Army was pushed to the south along the line Cosne, Clamecy, Avallon and Tonnerre. The question became acute as to the employment of the troops of the Yonne since, to find Germans, they had to go into neighboring departments. The first troops which did this in the neighborhood of Cosne were covered by a personal intervention of our team and diplomatic smoothing of ruffled feelings. Our intention was to have Laurent as commander of region P.3, coordinate the use of our troops in the Nievre. Just at this moment Colonel Diagramme ~~(1792)~~ of mission Vervaine appeared in Auxerre with an appointment by General Koenig to the command of the region Morvan, comprising the departments of the Aube, Yonne, Nievre, Cote d'Or and Saone-et-Loire. It was obvious that with this command Colonel Diagramme was the man to handle the coordination for the use of our troops in the neighboring departments. Colonel Diagramme took this mission, ordered our troops in the departments, often without even informing the local commander that they were coming.

On 8 September the Germans left La Charite and destroyed the bridge when they left. The strength of the resistance to the north and their complete lack of information forced the Germans to take roads moving at least 25 to 30 miles south of the American out-posts of the 3rd Army. It should be noted at this point that had the FFI not been active the Germans could

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have interfered very strongly with the 3rd Army, as the flank guard at this moment consisted only of about one battalion of mechanized cavalry spread from Troyes to the Loire river. The Germans passed all their traffic through the Nievre, even the troops at La Charite making a wide detour to the south instead of taking the direct route east to Dijon, because that would have taken them through the area controlled by our troops. The work of our team at this point consisted of travel to make personal contact with local leaders of neighboring departments and searching for an area in which our troops could be used. This was handled in conjunction with Colonel Diagramme. Contact was then made with French armored units of the 7th Army when they took Dijon.

After the contact between the 3rd and 7th Armies, which occurred in our region, and with the help of the information which we passed directly from small units of one army to small units of the other army as to their mutual location, there were very few Germans left in the area. A few minor operations were organized to mop up some German stragglers hiding in the woods or filtering through in small groups at night. The units were then recalled into assembly areas for their formation and equipment in mobile battalions to accompany General Delattre, as infantry following his armored units to the north and east. This team advised in this work and helped in the organization and inspection until the order to return to England was received on the 21st.

During the last two to three weeks of the mission an abortive attempt was made to receive Dakotas. The handling of this operation by the London Headquarters was such as to destroy what faith we had in it. On 27 August, the day after Auxerre was taken, the airport there was inspected and

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measured and a telegram sent immediately saying that it was suitable for Dakotas and was being checked and would be cleared of any possible mines. This was done and the telegram sent announcing it clear. On 3 September we received a telegram saying that London had heard a rumor that the Auxerre Airport was mined and wanted us to check it. We immediately replied that we had driven all over it in an automobile, which we did on receipt of the questioning telegram.

On 5 September a long description of a strange system of lighting for Dakotas was received from London and acknowledged. We prepared for the reception on this standard. On 6 September London announced that they would not accept the operation without a trained man on the field, the trained man being Lieutenant MacCready of the 1st SAS, an officer who attended the same class in Dakota landings as Major Colby. During this time Lieutenant MacCready and Bruce were continually receiving conflicting messages concerning the letter to be used for recognition. New messages then came saying that normal Dakota landing lights would be used. On 7 September a message said, "Sorry so many alterations but this is final." After that the recognition letters changed twice. After a message from us in which we announced that Major Colby had been to the school, London finally agreed to his handling of it. Sometime later they asked if the area was safe for daylight Dakota operations, a statement which had been made in one of our first messages on the subject.

On 14 September we called the whole thing off as the arms would have been wasted had they been delivered to us.

Conclusions. Jedburgh mission Bruce can be considered a success. Numerous arms were received and distributed to the FFI of the Yonne. Close liaison was kept between the Allied

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High Command and the local Allied troops and the FFI of the region. Entering a region characterized by small disunited groups of resistance, the mission was instrumental in bringing together all forces under a single command.

There is little doubt, however, that far more work could have been accomplished had the mission been sent earlier. The necessary channels to pass through before setting in motion the delivery of arms consumed such time that the FFI of the region only reached its full power in the last week or two of the German presence in the area. Without endangering the existence of the resistance of the region, this full-scale attack on the enemy could have begun at least two weeks before, in which case numerous German columns would not have escaped to play their part in ^{later} today's battles. Had mission Bruce arrived two to four weeks sooner, this would have been possible.

Financial Statement

Received - - - - -	250,000	Francs
Expenditures - - - - -	226,630	
(About 75,000 Francs to agents and other assistants; remainder on food for team and Maquis and replacement of clothing lost on the drop.)		
Returned - - - - -	23,370	
By Major W. Colby - - -	8,090	
By Lieutenant J. Favel -	4,530	
By 2nd Lt. L. Giry - - -	10,750	

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Le General Patton, Commandant la 3 Armee Americains, en
 plaine accord avec le General Koenig, demande aux F.F.I. de l'
 assister en substance, ainsi qu'il suit:

MISSION: Assurer la protection du flanc droit de l'Armee
 Americaine en direction du Sud.

Zones: Loiret: Limite Est du Departement excluse.

Nievre: A l'Est: limite Est du departement inclue
 A l'Ouest: limite Est du Departement de la
 Nievre Exclus.

Yonne: A l'Ouest: limite Est du Departement Inclus

Les Lieutenant Colonels: Moreau pour la Nievre, Chevrier
 et Bardet pour l'Yonne fixeront chacun en ce qui les con-
 cerne les limites des zones d'action pour chacun des
 Maquis de leur departement, de facon a ce qu'il n'existe
 aucun trou.

EXECUTION: Dans la region ainsi fixee:

- 1/ Assurer la protection de toutes les voies de communi-
 cations par des postes et des patrouilles au moyen
 des Maquis existant sur place.
- 2/ Renseigner les troupes americaines sur tous les mouve-
 ments ennemis et les poches ennemies existant encore.
- 3/ Contenir les poches ennemies en gardant le contact.
- 4/ Aneantir les elements ennemis mais dans le cas seule-
 ment ou le succes est assure sans le concours des
 forces americaines.

LIAISONS: Etablir une liaison etroite entre:

- 1/ Entre les elements F.F.I. du Loiret et de la Nievre -
 du Loiret et de l'Yonne - de l'Yonne et Nievre avec
 Dijon (liaisons aetaolir par les Lieutenant Colonel
 MOREAU, CHEVRIER, BARBET, avec la Colonel MARC a
 Orleans et le chef F.F.I. de la region DIJON)
- 2/ Entre les Lnt. Colonel MOREAU, CHEVRIER, BARBET, et
 le Q.G. de la 3 Armes (Colonel POWELL) par un agent
 de liaison envoye tous les deux jours au Q.G. pour
 rendre compte des renseignements et operations prendre
 les ordres du General Koenig.
 Les chefs de departements utiliseront tous les elements
 existant dans leur departement a cette mission.
 Le lieutenant Colonel POWELL

Destinataires:

Lieutenant Colonel PIERRE/ Departement du LOIRET
 Colonel MARC

Lieutenant Colonel MOREAU/ Cdt. departement de la Nievre
 Lieutenant Colonel Chevrier/ Cdt. departement de l'Yonne

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Operations, Team Bruce (Cont'd)

True names and addresses of leaders of F.F.I. in department of Yonne:

Lt. Col. Chevrier, commanding:	Adrien Sadoul, 24 Place de la Carriere, Nancy, Mthe & Melle
Cmdt. Roger, commanding War Office regiment (Robert Jean Marie and Donkeyman)	Roger Bardet, 30 Rue Lammarcht Paris.
Cmdt. Serge, 2nd in command to Roger.	Jacques Adam, 30 Rue Lammarcht, Paris.
Cmdr. Georges, commanding regiment of organisation of the Maquis:	Cunin Bernard, Rue des Vassaules, No. 4, Troyes, Aube.
Cmdr. Vernouil, commanding regiment of Liberation movement.	Jean Chapelle, 58 Rue Mathurin Reignier, Paris 15.
Cmdt. Yvon, commanding F.T.P. of department.	Guy Charles, a Jonches par Auxerre, Yonne.
Cmdt. Max, 2nd in command to Yvon.	Rene Millereau, a Mailly-la-Ville, Yonne.

APPENDIX II

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GLOSSARY
of
CODE NAMES AND CODE WORDS

- | | |
|-------------|--|
| Achille | - Code name for a Maquis group leader; p.86. |
| Adiabatique | - Code name for Major Cesac, a non-American organizer and head of Maquis; p.242, 247, 279, 688, 816. |
| Agure | - Code name for Capt R.A. Rubinstein, Br, member of Jedburgh team Douglas; p.615. |
| Alabama | - Code name for 1st Lt Robert M. Anstett, CAC, member of Jedburgh team Harry; p.46. |
| Alain | - Code name for Capt of the FFI; p.203, 229. |
| Alan | - Cover name for Jedburgh team composed of: Capt S.N. Cannicott, Br, (code name "Pembroke") Lt A. Gairaid, Fr, (code name "Ariege"), S/Lt F. de Heysen, Fr, (code name "Kroner") p.783-794, 832. |
| Alastair | - Cover name for Jedburgh team composed of: Maj O.H. Brown, Br, (code name "Kent"), Lt R. Maitre, Fr, (code name "Donegall"), Sgt G.N. Smith, Br, (code name "Lincoln"), p.767. |
| Alec | - Cover name for Jedburgh team composed of: Lt. G.G. Thompson, Am, (code name "Cromarty"), Capt B. Allet, Fr, (code name "Oxford"), Sgt J. White, Am, (code name "Colorado"), p.652. |
| Alex | - Code name for FTP regional chief; p.88, 89. |
| Alexander | - Cover name for Jedburgh team composed of: Lt S.J. O. Alsop, Am, (code name "Rona"), Lt. R. Thouville, Fr, (code name "Leix"), Sgt N.E. Franklin, Am, (code name "Cork"); p.795-824. |
| Alexander | - Code name for French intelligence agent; p.372, 686. |
| Alfred | - Cover name for Jedburgh team composed of: Capt L.D. MacDougall, Br, (code name "Argyll"), Lt G. de Wavrant, Fr, (code name "Aude"), Sgt A.W. Key, Br, (code name "Wampum"); p.593, 595, 597. |

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JEDBURGHs

- Aloes Mission - Special EMFFI mission composed of Allied officers, Jedburghs, and FFI agents, sent into the field to set up resistance Hq in Brittany; p.149, 337, 338, 369, 388, 389, 398, 399, 407, 415, 417, 420, 433, 517, 518, 535, 546, 563, 575, 581, 582, 587, 588, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 612, 615, 616, 618, 621, 622, 628.
- Anachorere - Code name for Lt J. Ronglou, Fr, member of Jedburgh team "Douglas"; p.615.
- Andre - Military chief of the FFI; p.372.
- Andy - Cover name for Jedburgh team composed of: Maj R. Parkinson, Br, (code name "Fife"), Capt J. Vermeulen, Fr, (code name "Carlow"), Sgt R. Loosmore, Br, (code name "Lundy"); p.81, 273, 451-468, 634, 640.
- Anic - Code name for Maquis regional commander; ;.163, 202, 234.
- Anthony - Cover name for Jedburgh team composed of: Lt M. B. Starring, Cav, (code name "Nebraska"), Capt C. Deprez, Fr, (code name "Perth"), Sgt J. Bradner, Am, (code name "Pfennig"); p/825.
- Antoine
@ "St. Paul" - Code name for F-Section British agent and organizer of Ventriloquist circuit; p.272, 279, 290, 633, 665, 667, 668, 669, 672, 682, 716, 719, 750, 756, 758.
- Aporte - Code name for Maj K.D. Bennet, Br, leader of Jedburgh team "Daniel"; p.581.
- Ardeche - Code name for Capt P. Charron, Fr, member of Jedburgh team "Gilbert"; p/408.
- Ariege - Code name for Lt. A. Gairaud, Fr, member of Jedburgh team "Alan"; p.783, 787.
- Argentier - Code name for Capt P. De Schonen, member of Jedburgh team "Daniel"; p.581.
- Armand - Code name for organizer of F-Section circuit "Spiritualist"; p.768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 776, 780, 781.
- Arran - Code name for Capt V.A. Gough, Br, leader of Jedburgh team "Jacob"; p/764.

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ASF	- Army Service Forces
Aubrey	- Cover name for Jedburgh team composed of: Capt G. Marchant, Br, (code name "Rutland"), Lt J. Telmon, Fr, (code name "Kildare"), Sgt I. Hooker, Br, (code name "Thaler"); p/768-782.
Barbier	- Code name for member of the FFI; p/476, 477.
Baron	- Code name for non-American agent; p/455, 749.
Barthelemy	- F-Section organizer; p/452.
Basil	- Cover name for Jedburgh team composed of: Maj T.A. Carew, Br, (code name "Sutherland"), Capt Raincourt, Fr, (code name "Ambleve"), Sgt J.L. Stoyka, Am, (code name "Ore"); p.591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 599.
B/C S1	- Broadcast communications signal.
BD equipment	- Battledress equipment.
Beigne	- Chief of regional ORA; p/188.
Benjamin	- Cover name for Jedburgh team composed of: Maj A.J. Forrest, Br, (code name "Stirling"), Lt P. Marchand, Fr, (code name "Ulster"), S/Lt J. Camouin, Fr, (code name "Serre"); p.113.
Benoit	- Code name for Col Bertrand of the FFI; p.460, 632, 635, 638, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 646, 648, 649, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 674.
Berkshire	- Code name for Maj W. Colby, FA, leader of Jedburgh team "Bruce"; p.840, 844.
Blaise	- Code name for non-American agent; p.774.
Blondel	- Code name for member of the FFI; p.499.
BOA	- Bureau d'Operations Aeriennes (Nord); p/108, 110, 156.
Boulaya @ "Berthelot"	- Code name for French agent; p.592, 593, 596, 597, 599, 600, 601.
Bourgoin	- Code name for French Maquis Comdt; p.410, 446, 470, 620, 652, 653.
Boursier	- Code name for 1st Lt Shirley R. Trumps, Inf, leader of Jedburgh team "Ronald"; p/606.

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- Boutton - Code name for Lt J. Dartigues, Fr, member of Jedburgh team "Ronald"; p/606.
- BRAL - Bureau Renseignements Action Londres, French resistance organization.
- Brian - Cover name for Jedburgh team composed of: Maj F. Johnston, Br, (code name "Illinois"), Capt R. Francotte, Fr, (code name "Orkney"), Sgt N.A. Smith, Br, (code name "Ura") p.592, 596, 598, 599, 601.
- Bullbasket - Code name for SAS party dropped into France with team "Hugh"; p.46, 92.
- Burgamotte Mission - RF-Section Allied-Maquis mission in France; p.641, 651, 759, 760, 795, 796, 797, 798, 800, 802, 805, 806.
- Butch - Code name for Lt-Col Serge Obolensky, AUS, leader of OG "Patrick"; p.76, 81.
- Canelle Mission - EMFFI mission in France; p/783, 784, 785, 786.
- Camille - Code name for French agent; p.816
- Carlow - Code name for Capt J. Vermeulen, Fr, member of Jedburgh team "Andy"; p.451, 455, 456, 464, 465, 466, 468, 661, 662, 663.
- Carnavon - Code name for Capt J. Kerneval, Fr, member of Jedburgh team "Felix"; p.361.
- CDL - Comite de Liberation (French resistance organization; p.202.
- Cecil - Cover name for Jedburgh team composed of: Maj D.J. Nielson, Br, (code name "Delaware"), Capt A. Frayan, Fr, (code name "Lys"), Sgt R. Wilde, Br, (code name "Centavo"); p.113.
- Centime - Code name for 2/C1 R. Legrand, W/T operator of Jedburgh team "Harry"; p.26, 109, 110, 112, 114, 135.
- Chabanne - Code name for member of French Maquis; p.321.
- Charente - Code name for Capt E. Marchant Fr, member of Jedburgh team "Hilary"; p.541.
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|---------------|--|
| Chaussade | - Code name for French agent. pp.195, 200 |
| Chevrier | - Code name for French agent. pp.842, 844, 845, 849, 850, 851, 854, 855, 860, 861. |
| Christopher | - Cover name of Operational Group dispatched to the Poitiers area of France on 3/4 Sept 1944, p.635. |
| Claude | - Code name for French agent, pp.789, 793. |
| Cluny Mission | - Allied mission into France, p.791. |
| Collet | - Code name for French agent, p.197. |
| Colon | - Code name for FFI regional chief. pp.667, 668 |
| Colorado | - Code name for Sgt J. White, Am, W/T operator of Jedburgh team "Alec". p.665 |
| Compte | - Code name for member of Armee Secrete. p.90 |
| Conan | - Code name for French agent. pp.597, 598, 600 |
| Connaught | - Code name for Lt G. Baraud, Fr, member of Jedburgh team "Jacob". pp.764, 767 |
| Cork | - Code name for Sgt N.E. Franklin, Am, W/T operator of Jedburgh team "Alexander". p.795 |
| Cottin | - Code name for General Cochet, FFI. pp.203, 212, 222, 223 |
| Croc | - Code name for member of Maquis and organizer. pp.89, 90, 91, 95, 283, 455, 456, 463, 464, 465, 796 |
| Cromarty | - Code name for Lt G.G. Thompson, Am, member of Jedburgh team "Alec". pp.665, 675 |
| Crown | - Code name for Capt.W.R. Crawshay, Br, leader of Jedburgh team "Hugh". pp.17, 80, 81, 85, 94, 104, 295, 458, 662, 712, 721, 741 |
| Daniel | - Cover name for Jedburgh team composed of: Maj K.D. Bennett, Br, (code name "Aportre"), Capt P. de Schonen, Fr, (code name "Argentier"), Sgt R. Brierley, Br, (code name "Florin"). pp.367, 581-589 |
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| Daries
• Michaud | - Code name for departmental chief of French resistance organization.
pp.196, 198, 200, 203, 212, 213, 222, 229 |
| Darol | - Code name for non-American agent.
p.109 |
| David | - Code name for FFI regional chief.
pp.392, 393, 497, 594, 599 |
| Delaferthe | - Code name for member of the FFI.
p.829 |
| Denby | - Code name for Capt D.D. Guthrie, Br, leader of Jedburgh team "Harry".
ppl, 26, 110, 111, 112, 843 |
| Deneville | - Code name for French patriot. pp.390, 391, 395 |
| Dennis | - Code name for British agent. pp.475, 476, 477, 478 |
| Descarvet | - Code name for member of the Maquis.
p.212 |
| Diagramme | - Code name for member of the FFI.
pp:109, 110, 122, 124, 215 |
| Diametre | - Code name for FFI regional chief. p.455 |
| Dickens | - Code name for SAS party. pp.491, 493, 689 |
| Die | - Code name for member of the French Maquis. p.212 |
| Dieudonne | - Code name for French agent. pp.832, 834, 839 |
| Dime | - Code name for T/3 W. Zielski, Am, W/T operator of Jedburgh team "Horace".
p.512 |
| Dingson | - Code name for member of British SAS party. pp.323, 326, 361, 558, 559, 606, 615, 617, 618, 622, 623 |
| Ditcher | - F-Section circuit. pp.597, 830 |
| DMR | - Delege Militaire de Region
(Military delegate of the region) |
| Domigny | - Regional commandant of French resistance group. pp.139, 147 |
| Donkeyman | - F-Section circuit. p.840 |

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- Dordogne - Code name for 2nd Lt J. Deschamps, Fr, member of Jedburgh team "Guy". p.469
- Dorset - Code name for Maj C. Ogden-Smith, Br, leader of Jedburgh team "Francis". pp.382, 385, 388
- Doubloon - Code name for Sgt N. Wood, Br, W/T operator of Jedburgh team "Gilbert". p.408
- Douglas - Cover name for Jedburgh team composed of: Capt R.A. Rubinstein, Br, (code name "Augure") Capt J. Ronglou, Fr, (code name "Anachore") Sgt J.D. Raven, Br, (code name "Half Crown") pp.615-628
- DR/JED - SFHQ symbol for Chief of the Jedburgh Section. p.15
- Dronne - Code name for Capt A. Dhomas, Fr, member of Jedburgh team "Guy". pp.469, 472
- Du Fouet - Code name for member of French resistance group and inspector of Maquis. p.115
- Duplix - Code name for Maquis group leader. p.86
- Durance - Code name for Capt G. le Zachmeur, Fr, member of Jedburgh team "Francis". p.382
- Durant - Code name for Commandant Boucher, regional FFI chief. pp.287, 351
- Duret - Code name for member of Armee Secrete, French resistance group. p.749
- DZ - Dropping Zone
- Eclipse - SI Mission. pp.79, 248
- Edward - Code name for British officer organizing resistance. pp.88, 92, 760.
- Egalite - Code name for French resistance group. pp. 73, 78
- Ellipse - Code name for a French military delegate of the region. pp.88, 91, 270, 272, 279, 283, 291, 305, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 461, 462, 463, 465, 631, 632, 633, 640, 641, 643, 644, 645, 658, 659, 662, 664, 686, 688, 689, 692, 706, 719, 720, 742, 746, 758, 759, 761, 795, 796, 798, 800, 806, 807

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| Emile | - Code name for French patriot, pp.592, 593, 594, 597, 599 |
| Eminence | - Code name for Col Roland of the FTP. pp.242, 244, 245, 246, 250, 260, 262, 506 |
| EMFFI | - Etat Majeur Forces Francaises de l'Interieure. (Headquarters of the French Forces of the Interior). |
| Essex | - Code name for CQMS T.S. Menzies, Br, W/T operator of Jedburgh team "Julien", p.710 |
| Etoile Mission | - SAS mission, pp.589, 590, 603 |
| Faust | - F-Section agent, p.304 |
| Felix | - Cover name for Jedburgh team composed of: Capt J. Marchant, Br, (code name "Somerset"), Capt J. Kerneval, Fr, (code name "Carnavon"), Sgt P.M. Colvin, Br, (code name "Middlesex"), pp.138, 140, 147, 148, 361-381, 484, 667, 668 |
| Fernand | - Code name for British agent, pp.160, 161, 323, 324 |
| Fife | - Code name for Maj R. Parkinson, Br, Leader of Jedburgh team "Andy", pp.451, 455, 456, 468, 661, 662, 663 |
| Florin | - Code name for Sgt R. Brierley, W/T operator of Jedburgh team "Daniel", p.581 |
| Fonction | - French DMR, pp.162, 165, 173, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 197, 199, 202, 210, 211, 212, 235, 237, 242, 246, 475 |
| Fourche | - Code name for Allied agent, p.455 |
| Fournier | - Code name for British SAS officer, pp.496, 595, 600 |
| FN | - Front National (French resistance group) |
| Franc | - Code name for Capt L. Legrand, Fr, member of team "Hugh", pp.17, 79, 83, 84, 85, 94, 274, 662, 746 |
| Francante | - Code name for French agent, p.599 |
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JEDBURGHs

- Francis - Cover name for Jedburgh team composed of: Maj C. Ogden-Smith, Br, (code name "Dorset"), Capt G. le Zachmeur, Fr, (code name "Durance"), Sgt A.J. Dallow, Br, (code name "Groat") pp. 382-407, 411, 412, 413, 421, 424, 425, 426, 427, 432, 607, 608, 713
- Francis - Code name for member of the FFI. p.390
- Francois - Code name for member of French resistance organization. pp.146, 289, 365, 370, 373, 645, 798
- Frank - Cover name for Jedburgh team composed of: Capt A. Massoni, Fr, (code name "Dumbarton"), Capt I. Isaac, Br, (code name "Westmorland"), Sgt T. Henney, Br, (code name "Cheshire") pp.244, 260, 501, 510
- Frederick - Cover name for Jedburgh team composed of: Maj A.W. Wise, Br, (code name "Kinross"), Capt P. Aguires, Fr, (code name "Vire"), 1st Sgt Robert R. Kehoe, Am, (code name "Peseta"), pp.137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 157, 323, 328, 336, 361, 362, 364, 365, 369, 380, 382, 408, 444, 469, 512, 517, 541, 558, 581, 583, 586, 761
- Frontal - Code name for non-American agent, p.242
- F-Section - A tripartite organization and branch of the Western European Section controlled entirely by SOE/SO independently of the FFI
- FTP - Franc Tireurs et Partisans (French resistance organization)
- Gaiety - Code name for non-American agent, p.110
- Galway - Code name for Lt J. Favel, Fr, member of Jedburgh team "Bruce", p.840
- Gapeau - Code name for Lt P.E. Dupont, Fr, member of Jedburgh team "Harry", pp.26, 110, 114, 115
- Gavin - Cover name for Jedburgh team composed of: Capt W.B. Dreux, Inf, (Code name "Sixpence"), Cmdt D. Jeanclaude, Fr, (code name "Shilling") S/Lt G. Masson, Fr, (code name "Half-penny"), pp.366, 373, 444-450, 469, 470, 472, 474, 475, 490

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- George - Cover name for Jedburgh team composed of: Capt Paul Cyr, Inf, (code name "Wigton"), Capt P. Erard, Fr, (code name "Save"), 2nd Lt C. LeJeune, Fr, (code name "Rupée"), pp.39, 155-264, 323, 324, 361, 382, 408, 444, 469, 512, 541, 558, 559
- Gerald - Cover name for Jedburgh team composed of: Capt J. Knerly, FA, (code name "Suffolk"), Capt J. Beaumont, Fr, (code name "Norfolk"), Sgt B.E. Friele, Am, (code name "Selkirk") pp.558-580
- Germinal Mission - F-Section Allied mission to wind up resistance in France, p.705, 706
- Gilbert - Cover name for Jedburgh team composed of: Capt C. Blathwayt, Br, (code name "Surrey"), Capt P. Charron, Fr, (code name "Ardeche"), Sgt N. Wood, Br, (code name "Doublooh") pp.330, 333, 336, 385, 388, 389, 392, 396, 397, 398, 408-443, 517, 606, 607, 608, 609
- Giles - Cover name for Jedburgh team composed of: Capt B.M. Knox, Inf, (code name "Kentucky"), Capt P. Lebel, Fr, (code name "Loire"), L/Sgt G.H. Tack, Br, (code name "Tickle"), pp.409, 412, 421, 424, 425, 426, 427, 431, 433, 445, 469, 512, 525, 526, 541, 547, 606, 607
- Girond - Code name for Capt A.A. Trofimov, Br, leader of Jedburgh team "Guy", p.469
- Godfrey - Covername for Jedburgh team composed of: Lt J. Forbes, FA, (code name "Rhode Island"), Lt J. Morhange, Fr, (code "Roscommon"), Sgt F. Hanson, Am, (code name "Roxburgh"), p.787
- Goodfellow - Code name for member of SAS party, p.599
- Goujeard - Code name for French resistance leader, p.504
- Graffier - Code name for DMR, p.474
- Grandjean - Code name for regional Maquis commander, p.116
- Gregory - Cover name for Jedburgh team composed of: Maj K.D. Bennett, Br, Capt P. de Schonen, Fr, Sgt, R. Brierley, Br, pp.582, 589-605

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- Grillette - Code name for French patriot, pp.196, 197, 200, 228
- Groat - Code name for Sgt A.J. Dallow, Br, W/T operator of Jedburgh team "Francis", p.382
- Grog - Code name for SAS party, pp.361, 383, 409, 559
- Group GDNRJ - Signal code
- Guy - Cover name for Jedburgh team composed of: Capt A.A. Trofimov, Br, (code name "Gironde"), Capt T. Thomas, Fr, (code name "Dronne"), S/Lt J. Deschamps, Fr ("Dordogne"), pp.366, 373, 448, 469-490
- Half Crown - Code name for Sgt J.D. Raven, Br, W/T operator of Jedburgh team "Douglas", pp.615, 624
- Halfpenny - Code name for 2nd Lt G. Masson, Fr, W/T operator of Jedburgh team "Gavin", p.444
- Hamish - Cover name for Jedburgh team composed of: 1st Lt Robert M. Anstett, CAC, (code name "Alabama"), Lt L. Blanchere, Fr, (code name "Louisiana"), 1st Sgt L.J. Watters, Am, (code name "Kansas"), pp.46, 50, 54, 73, 79, 80, 81, 87, 88, 89, 92, 99, 101, 105, 265-298, 629, 631, 634, 635, 639, 640
- Hamlet - Code name for non-American SFHQ organizer, pp.82, 104, 451, 685, 687, 688, 690, 797, 798, 804, 805
- Harold - Cover name for Jedburgh team composed of: Maj V.E. Whitty, Br, (code name "Ross"), Lt P. Rimbaut, Fr, (code name "Tyrone"), Sgt H. Verlander, Br, (code name "Sligo"), pp.244, 260, 491-511
- Harrods - Code name for SAS party, pp.597, 598
- Harry - Cover name for Jedburgh team composed of: Capt D.D. Guthrie, Br, (code name "Denby"), Lt P.E. Dupont, Fr, (code name "Gapeau"), 2/C1 R. Legrand, Fr, (code name "Centime"), pp. 26, 46
- Hauteur - Code name for FFI agent and DMR pp.161, 165, 173, 175, 176, 177, 179, 180, 181, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 197, 198, 199, 210, 235, 237, 242, 246

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- Hector - Code name for French organizer.
pp.370, 372, 451
- Henry - Cover name for Jedburgh team composed of: Lt R.E. Moore, Inf, (code name "New Mexico"), Lt. S. Montcler, Fr, (code name "Anglesey"), Sgt V.M. Rocca, Am, (code name "West Virginia")
p.595
- Heric - Code name for FFI agent and commandant
p.231
- Herve - Code name for non-American organizer.
p.372
- Hilary - Cover name for Jedburgh team composed of: Lt P.H. Chadbourne, Inf, (code name "Nevada"), Capt E. Marchant, Fr, (code name "Charente"), S/Lt R. Pariselle, Fr, (code name "Kupek").
pp. 327, 329, 344, 345, 421, 512, 513, 518, 541-557, 607, 608
- Horace - Cover name for Jedburgh team composed of: Maj J. Summers, Cav, (code name "Wyoming"), Lt C. Levalois, Fr, (code name "Somme"), Sgt W. Zielske, Am, (code name "Dime").
pp.327, 344, 354, 355, 421, 512-540, 541, 542, 546, 608
- Hubert - Code name for member of Armee Secrete, (French resistance group).
pp.749, 750, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760
- Hugh - Cover name for Jedburgh team composed of: Capt W.R. Crawshay, Br, (code name "Crown"), Capt L. Legrand, Fr, (code name "Franc"), C.C.R. Mersiol, Fr, (code name "Yonne").
pp.17, 64-89, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 265, 274, 275, 276, 277, 281, 292, 293, 295, 452, 456, 457, 458, 459, 634, 644, 651, 662, 664, 721, 723, 746, 760
- Ian - Cover name for Jedburgh team composed of: Maj J. Gildee, FA, (code name "Oklahoma"), Capt Y. Delorme, Fr, (code name "Maine"), Sgt L. Bourgoïn, Am, (code name "Mayo").
pp.299-322, 452, 492, 829
- Isaac Mission - RF-Section Allied mission. p.108

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- Ivor - Cover name for Jedburgh team composed of: Capt J.H. Cox, Br, (code name "Monmouth"), Lt Y.M. Dantec, Fr, (code name "Selune"), Sgt R. Loosmore, Br, (code name "Lundy"). pp.73, 81, 97, 101, 270, 271, 272, 273, 290, 291, 292, 457, 468, 629-664, 671, 678, 800
- Jacob - Cover name for Jedburgh team composed of: Capt V.A. Gough, Br, (code name "Arran"), Lt G. Baraud, Fr, (code name "Connaught"), Sgt K. Seymour, Br, (code name "Skye"). pp.764-767
- James - Cover name for Jedburgh team composed of: Lt J.K. Singlaub, Inf, (code name "Mississippi"), Lt D. Leb, Fr, (code name "Michigan"), Sgt A.J. Denneau, Am, (code name "Massachusetts"). pp.651, 742-763
- Jean - Code name for military chief of region. p.370
- Jean-Bari - Code name Maquis leader. p.203
- Jean-Marie - Code name for organizer of F-Section circuit "Donkeyman". pp.840, 841, 843, 844
- Jedburgh - British and American code name for specially trained 3-man team to work with resistance units behind the enemy lines
- Jockey - Code name for F-Section circuit. p.111
- Joseph - Code name for agent of the Maquis. p.212
- Julien - Cover name for Jedburgh team composed of: Maj A.H. Clutton, Br, (code name "Stafford"), Lt J. Brouillard, Fr, (code name "Vermont"), CQMS T.S. Menzies, (code name "Essex"). pp.73, 75, 80, 97, 101, 105, 278, 294, 710-741
- Kansas - Code name for 1st/Sgt L.J. Watters, Am, W/T operator of Jedburgh team "Hamish". pp.46, 50
- KDG - King's Dragoon Guards - British regiment
- Kentucky - Code name for Capt B.M. Knox, Inf, member of Jedburgh team "Giles". p.323

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|---------------------|--|
| Kildare | - Code name for Lt J. Telmon, member of Jedburgh team "Aubrey". pp.768, 770, 771 |
| Kinley | - Code name for chief subdivisionnaire of the FFI. pp.178, 188, 196, 197, 198, 200, 203, 212, 213, 214, 235 |
| Kinros | - Code name for Maj A.W. Wise, Br, leader of Jedburgh team "Frederick", p.33 |
| Kroner | - Code name for Sgt I. Hooker, Br, W/T operator of Jedburgh team "Alan". pp.783, 787 |
| Kupek | - Code name for S/Lt R. Pariselle, Fr, W/T operator of Jedburgh team "Hilary". p.541 |
| Lash | - Code name for Jedburgh exercise, commencing 31 May 1944 and ending 8 June 1944, of a plan for Jedburgh teams to contact a resistance group and using it to attack enemy rail communications and other targets as indicated through W/T at later time. p.13 |
| Le Chat | - Code name for French resistance group leader. p.372 |
| Lee | - Cover name for Jedburgh team composed of: Capt C.H. Brown, Cav, (code name "Pice"), Lt N. Viguiet, Fr, (code name "Sous"), S/Lt A. Chevalier, Fr, (code name "Reis"). pp.104, 683-709 |
| Leix | - Code name for Lt A. Thouville, member of Jedburgh team "Alexander". p.795 |
| Lemniscate | - Code name for DMR French resistance group. pp.108, 115, 125 |
| Lescat | - Code name for agent of French Maquis. p.212 |
| Ligne | - Code name for French patriot. pp.592, 595, 596, 597, 624 |
| Lionel
@ Edouard | - Code name for Allied agent. pp.457, 650 |
| Loire | - Code name for Capt P. Lebel, Fr, member of Jedburgh team "Giles". p.323 |
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- Louis - Code name for member of French resistance group. pp.114, 202, 234, 479, 481, 482, 484, 807, 808, 810, 811, 813
- Louisiana - Code name for Lt L. Blanchere, Fr, member of Jedburgh team "Hamish". pp.46, 265
- Loyton - Code name for SAS party. pp.766, 767
- Lundy - Code name for Sgt R. Loosmore, W/T operator of Jedburgh team "Andy". pp.451, 455, 465, 466, 468
- Lysander - British aircraft
- Maine - Code name for Lt Y. Delorme, Fr, member of Jedburgh team "Ian". pp.54, 304, 306
- Mandinaud - Code name for member of the Maquis. pp.316, 317, 321
- Manometre - Code name for French agent. pp.744, 746
- Maquis - Name given to French guerrilla bands. Originally was given to high ground in South Eastern France covered with scrub growth in which French guerrilla *bands* operated and from which they took the name
- Marcel - Code name for FFI leader. pp.373, 566
- Marie-Therese - Code name for FFI agent and liaison. pp. 234, 452, 713, 715, 716, 720, 741
- Marksmen - F-Section circuit. pp.590, 591
- Marrionneau - Code name for FFI leader of Corps Franc. pp.225, 231
- Mary - Code name for French liaison agent. pp. 174, 175
- Massachusetts - Code name for Sgt A.J. Denneau, W/T operator of Jedburgh team "James". p.742
- Maurice - Cover name for Jedburgh team composed of: Capt C.M. Carman, Cav, (code name "Utah"), Lt H. Dumesnil, Fr, (code name "Virginia"), Sgt F.J. Cole, Am, (code name "Georgia"). p.113
- Maximum - Code name for non-American agent. pp.766, 767

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| Mayo | - Code name for Sgt Lucien Bourgain, Fr, W/T operator for Jedburgh team "Ian." p.54 |
| ME/65 | - Cover name for Milton Hall, Jedburgh training school in Peterborough, England |
| Mechalis | - F-Section organizer. p.242 |
| Michaud
② "Daries" | - Code name for departmental chief of French resistance organization. pp.188, 195, 196, 213 |
| Michel | - Code name for member of the FTP |
| Michigan | - Code name for Lt D. Leb, Fr, member of Jedburgh team "James". p.742 |
| Michonneau | - Code name for French resistance leader. p.504 |
| Middlesex | - Code name for Sgt P.M. Colvin, Br, W/T operator of Jedburgh team, "Felix". p.361 |
| Mississippi | - Code name for Lt J.L. Singlaub, Inf, leader of Jedburgh team "James". pp.742, 745 |
| Mitchell Plan | - Capt M. Millett's mission into France to prepare for reception of Jedburgh teams there. p.12 |
| Monmouth | - Code name for Capt. J.H. Coxe, Br, leader of Jedburgh team "Ivor". pp.629, 635, 640, 643, 650, 651, 652, 654 |
| Monarque | - Code name for non-American agent. p.83 |
| Moraglia | - Code name for French agent. pp.495, 497, 498, 508 |
| Mossy | - Code name for dropping ground. p.140 |
| Nebraska | - Code name for Lt M.B. Starring, Cav, leader of Jedburgh team "Anthony". pp.825, 829, 830, 832, 833 |
| Nevada | - Code name for Lt P.H. Chadbourne, Inf, member of Jedburgh team "Hilary". p.541 |
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- Nicholas - Cover name for Jedburgh team composed of: Capt J.C. Maude, Br, (code name "Leicester"), Lt H. Puget, Fr, (code name "Brecknock"), Sgt M.A. Whittle, Br, (code name "Northumberland"). pp.593, 594, 595, 597
- Nicolas - Code name for French agent of the Maquis. p.212
- Nicole - Code name for French agent. pp.844, 845, 853
- Noizet - Code name for French Maquis member. pp.212, 223, 228, 229
- Norfolk - Code name for Capt J. Beaumont, Fr, member of Jedburgh team "Gerald". p.558
- OG - Operational Group composed of specially trained volunteers officers and enlisted men, dispatched on missions of sabotage and guerrilla fighting
- Oklahoma - Code name for Maj John Gildee, FA, leader of Jedburgh team "Ian". pp.54, 304, 306
- Olive - Code name for French agent. pp.85, 86
- OP - Observation point
- ORA - Organization de la Resistance dans l'Armee. (French resistance organization composed mainly of members of Giraudist groups and the old Armee d'Armistace. p.188
- Orcia - Code name for French agent. pp.595, 596, 597, 598
- Orgate Mission - Special EMFFI Mission sent into the field to set up resistance in SE zone of France and act as liaison with SF Detachments, composed of Allied officers, Jedburghs and FFI agents. pp.594, 625, 626, 627
- Oxford - Code name for Capt B. Allet, Fr, member of Jedburgh team "Alec". pp.652, 665, 671, 672
- Pablo - Code name for member of the FFI. p.228
- Pair - Code name for French agent. p.108

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- Pascal - Code name for French patriot. pp.590, 593, 595, 597, 598, 599, 600
- Patre - Code name for non-American Allied W/T operator. p.455
- Patrick - Cover name for Operational Group dispatched on 14/15 and 15/16 August 1944 to the Indre department of France. p.81, 456, 458, 651
- Patrick - Code name for member of French Maquis. pp.749, 750, 759
- Paul - Cover name for Jedburgh team composed of: Maj E. Hood, Br, (code name "Shropshire"), Lt F. Cormier, Fr, (code name "Durthe"), Sgt K.J.W. Brown, Br, (code name "Limerick"). pp.599, 600
- Pauline
② Genevieve
② Marie - Code name for Miss P. Witherington, French agent. pp.88, 92, 741
- Pembroke - Code name for Capt S.N. Cannicott, Br, leader of Jedburgh team "Alan". pp.783, 785, 787
- Perth - Code name for Capt C. Deprez, member of Jedburgh team "Anthony". pp.825, 827
- Peruvier - Code name for Allied non-American W/T operator. p.455
- Peseta - Code name for 1st/Sgt Robert R. Kehoe, Am, W/T operator of Jedburgh team "Frederick". p.33
- Pfennig - Code name for Sgt J. Bradner, Am, W/T operator of Jedburgh team "Anthony". p.825
- Philip - Code name for Jedburgh team composed of: Capt J. Derouen, Fr, (code name "Kintyre"), Lt R.A. Lucas, Inf, (code name "Caithness"), Sgt G. Grgat, Am, (code name "Leinster"). p.635
- Plastre - Code name for S/Lt L. Giry, Fr, W/T operator of Jedburgh team "Bruce". pp.840, 842
- Pice - Code name for Capt C.H. Brown, Cav, leader of Jedburgh team "Lee". pp. 683, 688, 689

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- Pierre - Code name for non-American agent. pp.163, 228
- Planette - DMR of the FFI. pp.590, 766, 767
- Pound - Code name for Sgt E.B. Esch, Am, W/T operator of Jedburgh team "Ronald". p.606
- QSA3 - Communication signal. p.151
- Quentin - Cover name for Jedburgh team composed of: Capt. W.S. Fenton, Br, (code name "Cornwall"), Lt J. Lassere, Fr, (code name "Wicklow") Sgt R. Dawson, Br, (code name "Merioneth"). pp.244, 260
- Quinine - Cover name for Jedburgh team composed of: Maj R. McPherson, Br, (code name "Anselme"), Lt M. Bourdon, Fr, (code name "Aristide"), Sgt O. Brown, Br, (code name "Felicien"). p.654
- Rac - Code name for member of the FFI. pp.807, 808, 810, 811, 812, 813, 815, 816, 817, 818, 821
- Rado - Code name for RF-Section agent. p.326
- Rateau - Code name for RF-Section agent. pp.326, 392, 425
- Ratissoire - Code name for French agent. pp.108, 130
- RC - Reception Committee
- Reis - Code name for S/Lt A. Chevalier, Fr, W/T operator of Jedburgh team "Lee". p.683, 688, 689
- RF Section - Section of the Western European Directorate dealing with the original, independent French resistant groups which maintained direct liaison with BCRA (French Central Office of Information)
- Renandin - Code name for member of the FTP. p.641
- Revez - Code name for non-American agent. p.645
- Richard - Code name for F-Section agent. p.88
- Robert - Code name for leader of a Maquis group. pp.86, 101, 102, 178, 197, 285, 289, 292, 293
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- Rocket - Code name for non-American agent.
p.109
- Roger - Code name for member of the BOA.
pp.474, 842, 843, 852, 853, 861
- Rolland - Code name for Chief of FTP of region.
pp.88, 91, 95, 96
- Rona - Code name for Lt S.J.O. Alsopp, Am,
Leader of Jedburgh team "Alexander".
p.795
- Ronald - Cover name for Jedburgh team composed
of: Lt S.R. Trumps, Inf, (code name
"Boursier"), Lt J. Dartigues, Fr,
(code name "Boutton"), Sgt E.B. Esch,
Am, (code name "Pound").
pp.336, 337, 398, 415, 420, 429, 517,
563, 606-614
- Ross - Code name for Major V.E. Whitty, Br,
Leader of Jedburgh team "Harold". p.491
- Rossignot - Code name for French patriot.
pp.479, 527
- Rousseau - Code name for member of the FFI. p.229
- Rupee - Code name for 2nd Lt C. Lejeune, Fr,
W/T operator of Jedburgh team "George".
pp.39, 241
- Rupert - Cover name for Jedburgh team composed
of: Lt R.A. Lucas, Inf, (code name
"Caithness"), Capt J. Derouen, Fr,
(code name "Kintyre"), Sgt Grgat, Am,
(code name "Leinster"). p.593
- Rutland - Code name for Capt G. Marchant, Br,
leader of Jedburgh team "Aubrey".
pp.768, 770, 771
- RV - Abbreviation for rendezvous
- Salesman - F-Section circuit. pp.683, 684, 685
- Samson - Code name for non-American agent.
p.689
- Samuel - Code name for F-Section British agent.
pp.85, 86, 306, 307, 451, 452, 497, 498,
504, 505
- Samwest - SAS base. p.323
- Sandra - Code name for regional commander of
the Front National and chief of
German controlled police in Nantes.
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| SAS | - Special Airborne Service. British Army Airborne Force for special missions |
| Save | - Code name for Capt P. Erard, member of Jedburgh team "George". pp.39, 241 |
| Selkirk | - Code name for 1st/Sgt Berent E. Friele, Am, W/T operator of Jedburgh team "Gerald". p.558 |
| Selune | - Code name for Lt Y.M. Dantec, Fr, member of Jedburgh team "Ivor". pp.629, 635, 640, 643, 645, 652, 653, 654 |
| Serpolet | - Sub-mission of the "Orgeot mission". p.624 |
| SFHQ | - Special Force Headquarters - Joint SOE/SO headquarters in SHAEF |
| SHAEF | - Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force |
| Shilling | - Code name for Maj Jeanclaude, Fr, member of Jedburgh team "Gavin". p.444 |
| Shinoile Mission | - RF-Section mission and sub-mission of the "Orgeot mission". pp.241, 244, 245, 246, 249, 260, 262, 263, 500, 501, 510 |
| Shipwright | - F-Section circuit. p.306 |
| Skye | - Code name for Sgt K. Seymour, Br, W/T operator of Jedburgh team "Jacob". pp. 764, 767 |
| Sixpence | - Code name for Capt Dreux, Br, leader of Jedburgh team "Gavin". p.444 |
| Sligo | - Code name for Sgt H. Verlander, Br, W/T operator of Jedburgh team "Harold". p.491 |
| Snelgrove | - Code name for SAS party. pp.799, 800 |
| Socrate | - Code name for regional Maquis commander. p.120 |
| Somerset | - Code name for Capt J.J. Marchant, Br, leader of Jedburgh team "Felix". p.361 |
| Somme | - Code name for Lt G. Levalois, Fr, member of Jedburgh team "Horace". p.512 |
| Sous | - Code name for Lt N. Viguiet, Fr, member of Jedburgh team "Lee". pp.683, 688, 689 |
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- Spartan - Code name of General Headquarters exercise of a simulated invasion of the Continent of Western Europe in which agents and Jedburghs participated, and which was held between Salisbury Plain and Huntington from 3 March to 11 March 1944 p.x
- Spur - Jedburgh exercise of an ambush of a German General Staff by partisans staged for General Koenig on 24 and 25 April 1944
- Stafford - Code name for Maj A.H. Clutton, Br, leader of Jedburgh team "Julien". p.710
- Stanley - Cover name for Jedburgh team composed of: Capt O. Craster, Br, (code name "Yorkshire"), Lt R. Carliere, Fr, (code name "Meath"), Sgt E.J. Grinham, Br, (code name "Worcestershire") p.635
- St Paul - F-Section British agent and organizer of "Ventriloquist" circuit. p.652
- Stockbroker - F-Section circuit. pp.591, 592, 594
- STS-6 - British operational and para-military training school utilized by SF Dets Nos 13 and 14
- STS-40 - Jedburgh training school at Gumley Hall, Lancashire, England
- STS-45 - Jedburgh training school at Fairford, Gloucester, England
- STS-51 - Parachute training school
- STS-54 - Training area
- Suffolk - Code name for Capt Stephen J. Knerly, FA, leader of Jedburgh team "Gerald". p.558
- Surcouf - Code name for member of the FFI, pp.86, 88, 89, 90, 91, 94, 95, 455, 637, 644, 721, 723, 735, 746
- Surrey - Code name for Capt C. Blathwayt, Br, leader of Jedburgh team "Gilbert". p.408
- Tainchebraye
© Trouvere - Code name for regional commander of BOA. pp.161, 162, 174, 175
- Tanguy - Code name for FTP leader. pp.475, 477, 478, 479, 481, 483, 484
- Telemetre - Code name for non-American agent. p.109
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| Temporal | - Code name F-Section organizer.
pp.241, 243 |
| Thaler | - Code name for Sgt I. Hooker, Br,
W/T operator of Jedburgh team "Aubrey".
pp.768, 771 |
| Theodore | -- Code name for non-American agent. p.634 |
| Theodule | - Code name for French agent. pp.590,
593, 595, 596, 597, 599, 600, 601 |
| Thiery | - Code name for French resistance
regional commander. pp.147, 154, 566 |
| Tiburce | - Code name for non-American agent.
pp.826, 829, 830, 831, 833, 839 |
| Tickle | - Code name for L/Sgt G.H. Tack, Br,
member of Jedburgh team "Giles". p.323 |
| Tilleul Mission | - RF-EMFFI mission. pp.742, 743, 744,
745, 747, 762 |
| Timothy | - Cover name for Jedburgh team composed
of: Capt L. Ambel, Fr, (code name
Nesque"), Lt R.D. Munding, FA, (code
name "Marcelin"), Sgt D.A. Spears,
Am, (code name "Escaut") (Lt Heyns,
Inf, -code name "Dyle"-) pp.624, 625 |
| Todt Organization | - German military and civilian construc-
tion and engineering organization. p.122 |
| Tony | - Cover name for Jedburgh team composed
of Maj R. Montgomery, Inf, (code name
"Dollar"), Lt M. Devailly, Fr, (code
name "Ecy"), Sgt J.E. McGowan, Am,
(code name "Quarter"). pp.245, 260,
494, 495, 497, 499, 508 |
| Toto | - Code name for British officer. p.791 |
| T Plan | - Triangular Plan. SOE/SO plan to
penetrate Central Europe through the
Mediterranean, involving SO in
Washington, Algiers and London |
| Triangle | - Code name for French DMR. pp.305,
495, 497, 498, 499, 508 |
| Troubadour | - Code name for non-American agent.
pp.83, 250 |
| Trouve | - Code name for leader of Maquis. p.203 |
| Tyrone | - Code name for Lt P. Rimbaut, Fr,
member of Jedburgh team "Harold". p.491 |
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Underfoot	- Cover name for 21st Army Group. p.111
Uriage	- Code name for member of the FFI. p.235
Vaudel	- Code name for Lt Col Felix, French DMR. pp.211, 212, 213, 225, 226, 234, 236, 237, 248
Vega	- Code name for non-American agent. p.83
Ventriloquist	- F-Section circuit. p.734
Vermont	- Code name for Lt J. Brouillard, Fr, member of Jedburgh team "Julien". p.710
Verneuil	- Code name for Regional Maquis commander. pp.120, 124, 132, 851, 861
Vervaine Mission	- EMFFI mission. p.856
Verry	- Code name for French agent. pp.316, 317, 321
Violette	- Code name for French agent. p.814
Vire	- Code name for Capt P. Aguirec, Fr, member of Jedburgh team "Frederick", p.33, 142.
Wallace	- Code name for non-American agent. p.599
Wash 18115	- British code name for SAS party. p.140
Watermark	- Cover name for SFHQ. pp.112, 143
Welchore	- Code name for non-American agent. p.829
Wigton	- Code name for Capt Paul Cyr, Inf, leader of Jedburgh team "George". pp.39, 155, 156, 241
Wyoming	- Code name for Maj J. Summers, Cav, leader of Jedburgh team "Horace". p.512
Xavier	- F-Section British agent. pp.161, 197, 198, 203, 593, 595, 771, 775
Yaco	- Code name for regional Maquis chief, pp.165, 177, 178, 183, 204, 206, 207, 209, 212, 232
Yalelock	- Cover name for Special Force Detachment No. 12 p.143
Yonne	- Code name for C.C.R. Mersiol, Fr, W/T operator of team "Hugh". pp.17, 85, 110

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| Yves | - Code name for regional chief of the FFI. p.370 |
| Yvon | - Code name for member of the FTP. p.851 |
| Zelandais | - Code name for non-American agent. p.110 |
| Zero | - Code name for regional chief of resistance. p.201. |

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HOLD FOR COL J. FREEMAN LINCOLN

427878

~~SECRET~~

Declassified by 062147
date 23 January 1974

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By <i>SDC</i>	NARA Date 9/5/89

VOL. 4 JULY, AUGUST, SEPTEMBER 1944

JEDBURGHS

Operations, Team BenjaminTEAM BENJAMIN

Jedburgh team Benjamin was the thirty-ninth Jedburgh team to be dispatched to France from the UK.

Members of Team

The members of team Benjamin were:

Major A. J. Forrest (British), code name "Stirling"

Lieutenant P. Marchant (French), code name "Ulster"

2nd Lieutenant J. Camouin (French), code name "Serre"

Area to Which Dispatched

Team Benjamin was dispatched on the night of 20/21 August to be Meuse area of France.

Purpose of Mission

Team Benjamin was being dispatched to assist in organizing the FFI in this region. They would provide an additional means of delivering stores to the resistance groups and an additional link between London and these groups.

Method of Dropping and Reception Committee

The team was to be dropped to a reception committee arranged by the organizer Planete. ()

Scale of Air Support Likely

There would be on difficulty in supplying the team with the arms and material it required but it was advised that eight days should be allowed for delivery.

Communications

The team was dropped with a Jedburgh W/T set and instructed to contact headquarters as soon as possible after arriving in the field.

Finance

Each Jedburgh officer took 100,000 French francs to the field. The W/T operator took 50,000 French francs.

() War Diary Vol 3 p

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JEDBURGHs

Operations, Team Benjamin (Cont'd)Relations with Other Allied Units

Allied Forces, If Overrun. When overrun by Allied forces the team was to report to the nearest intelligence officer and ask him to forward them to the nearest SF Staff. This Staff would identify them and pass them back to SFHQ, London.

Action

Upon Arrival in the Field. The team would contact the FFI chief immediately upon arriving in the field and learn from him the general situation of resistance in the area. They were to avoid all offensive action since their mission was to be one more of preservation rather than of destruction.

If Captured. The team took no cover story to the field. If taken prisoner they would be taken as soldiers in uniform performing their ordinary military duties. Every established law of warfare would apply to them. Therefore, they would give their name rank, and serial number only.

First Word from Field

Team Benjamin announced its arrival in the field in the following W/T message dated 21 August: ()

"Benjamin team and Tipperary arrived okay. Argens and Lancashire still being searched for in woods. Majority of containers dropped in trees. Stores in process of being collected. Meeting Rotation today."

Summary of W/T Messages Exchanged22 August From Benjamin ()

"Argens and Lancashire found. Both teams now together in small local maquis near DZ in hands of Chef of Secteur de Clermont. Only Bernard set available. Ours smashed. Using both plans however. Tally of stores still being made."

() C-2270/16 21 Aug 44

() C-2342/12 22 Aug 44

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JEDBURGHs

Operations, Team Benjamin (Cont'd)27 August From Benjamin ()

"Urgent - can you confirm dropping our parachutists southeast of STE Meneshould last two nights. Reply after noon."

29 August From Benjamin ()

"On JOJO 30s operation send for us 2 planes with 2 loads A and B. 1 jeep to enable Benjamin's move to east. 5 complete Jed kits with carbines. 1 Jed set and 2 silent stens for Benjamin. All stores including containers if possible to be marked to prevent mixup with SAS stores."

30 August From Benjamin ()

"Have contacted first elements of Americans going to Clermont. We have not been able to occupy the city for a long period because of our poor supply of arms. Two bridges intact - no mines or charges."

2 September From Underfoot to Watermark ()

"Have contacted Jed team Benjamin at Epernay. Overrun by American troops 31 August."

5 September From Benjamin ()

"Since last contact overrun by Americans 31 August. Maquis occupied Biesme Valley and towns of Lesislettes and Clermont en Argonne. In clashes with Boche. Argens, Lancashire, Serre and Stirling wounded. First 2 evacuated by Yanks. Last two not serious. Lost Jed set which accounts for silence and all remaining kit."

5 September From Benjamin ()

"On 2 September contacted 11 SF Detachment American 3rd Army. Were given new set and outline of new mission, namely protection of right flank of 3rd Army St Dizier area. Mission entails three essential requirements none of which can be met by Army. First, transport; second, resupply of personal kit and arms; third, supply of arms including heavy weapons. Unless you can parachute above we are jinxed from the start. Can you help?"

5 September From Benjamin ()

"Reference FFI matters. Planete reported okay in Nancy. Aubusson with American 5th Division. Rotation presumed okay - location unknown. Agneulen, chef depart-ments Meuse and adjoint Docteur Couve arrested Clermont 25 August. Confirmed that Saulnier real name Francois Bugrandru, chef Boa Meuse, arrested in same coup. These arrests cut us off completely from FFI resources in most critical period."

() C-2923/12 27 Aug 44
() C-3343/81 30 Aug 44
() C-3933/37 5 Sept 44
() C-3942/21 5 Sept 44

() C-3215/48 29 Aug 44
() C-3648/183 2 Sept 44
() C-3938/47 5 Sept 44

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JEDBURGHS

Operations, Team Benjamin (Cont'd)6 September From SFHQ to Benjamin ()

"Received cable from 3rd American Army 5 September stating you are wounded and now in Epernay. Please clarify matter. We are asking American Army to supply arms for mission area of St. Dizier."

9 September From Benjamin ()

"Epernay is furthest point reached by us on our way back to contact SF Detachment 3rd Army after being overrun. We are waiting here before leaving on new mission in Haute Marne for transport, arms and kit. Americans cannot supply above. We are still waiting to know if you can drop us same as it is useless to leave for new expedition with nothing. Please answer earliest."

12 September From Benjamin ()

"Moving Tuesday to Montier en Der to contact Pedlar for information and choice of operational zone in Haute Marne as soon as this is done. Will send it and details of load. Are RAF prepared to carry out day ops in Haute Marne."

15 September From Benjamin ()

"Have moved south, contacted Pedlar. Operating with him in mopping up in Andelot area east of Chaumont. Thanks for kit received by us. No further ops for Benjamin needed just now."

18 September From Benjamin ()

"Haute Marne now clear. Pedlar mission completed. Told by 3rd Army to report back Verdun tomorrow for new mission. Now collecting arms in St Dizier area for future re-allocation to unarmed groups."

21 September From Benjamin ()

"By order 11 SF Det concentrating surplus arms in dump at Nancy to be held at disposal of 3rd Army for FFI ops in eastern areas. Consider advisable that well guarded dumps be constituted in view of potentially dangerous community designs on merchandise of that nature."

21 September From SFHQ to Benjamin ()

"Agree with your 31. Should coordinate guarding of arm dumps with 3rd US Army. When your mission finished, return UK via SF Staff channels."

21 September From Underfoot to Yalelock ()

"Jackson from Powell - we do not need complete Jed

() C-6483	6 Sept 44	() C-4302/7	9 Sept 44
() C-4552/17	12 Sept 44	() C-4869/50	15 Sept 44
() C-225/30	18 Sept 44	() C-426/2	21 Sept 44
() C-2777	21 Sept 44	() C-495/31	21 Sept 44

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JEDBURGHS

Operations, Team Benjamin (Cont'd)

teams. Specifically we would like to have Major Forrest of Jed Benjamin, Captain Waller of Jed Bernard, Major Nielson of Jed Cecil, Captain Denby of Jed Harry and Team Maurice intact. Delay their departure to England if you can until after their conference with you."

22 September From Benjamin ()

"Radio operator wounded. Ask the Central Operator to put 14 on all sked."

27 September From Benjamin ()

"Winding up mission. Close down radio skeds. Cable us through Paris."

Report of Team Benjamin and Bernard Upon Return from the Field -

20 August to 2 October 1944

1. Mission. To contact the FFI in the Meuse department, and help in training and organizing Maquis groups for action against the enemy. The teams were briefed together on 17 August 1944, and the briefing was good, but not over-comprehensive; in particular no information was given at all on the existing state, numbers or location of Maquis, and few contacts were given with the FFI in the department. There was also some difficulty in obtaining suitable maps. Apart from this, everything went well and we should like to express our appreciation to the brief officers for their patience.

2. Departure. After a false start on the night 19/20 August, the two teams were dispatched to the field in two aircraft on the night 20/21 August 1944. It is unnecessary for us to enlarge upon the regrettable circumstances which attended our departure from Fairford aerodrome as this forms the subject of a full report made by our accompanying officer, Captain Murray. We should, however, like to confirm this report and stress that last-minute hitches of this nature due to lack of efficient staff work are calculated to spread despondency

() C-559/32 22 Sept 44

() A-272/49 27 Sept 44

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Operations, Team Benjamin (Cont'd)

among departing personnel.

Fortunately morale was sufficiently high and neither of the teams objected to being dropped without trained dispatchers.

We should like before passing on to commend Captain Murray's courageous decision to accompany the Bernard team, and see their operation through to its final conclusion.

The navigation of both crews was excellent and took us straight to the DZ, despite a moonless night and the dangers of Allied AA Fire. The reception committee was almost entirely to blame for the bad drop which took place, and which resulted in 5 men out of 6 landing in a wood, as well as 16 packages, and most of the 33 containers. The reasons for this were that:-

a. The DZ was most definitely not suitable for dropping men, (or stores for that matter) being small, almost entirely surrounded by dense woods, and in very broken country, with high hedges, humps, and wire fences on its allegedly "open" surface.

b. The lights were placed a bare 100 yards from the edge of the wood so that the pilots were manifestly unable to see them until they were right on top of them.

It turned out later that the reception committee which was pitifully small (about 15 men) had been instructed a few days previously to find a DZ at all costs and had never received any detailed instructions on the carrying out of a parachute operation.

The net result was that 2 days and 3 nights were spent rounding up and collecting the stores and parachutes,

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Operations, Team Benjamin (Cont'd)

most of which were elegantly draping the topmost branches of the highest trees. During this time a fair proportion of personal equipment was lost to the depredations of the local inhabitants. And the enemy, who had inopportunately moved some troops to within 350 yards of the DZ at the last moment, sent a reconnaissance aircraft over the wood on the day after the operation. They were left in no doubt as to the cause of all the disturbance.

3. Initial Contacts. We were received on the field by the "Chef de Secteur" of Clermont-en-Argonne - Commandant Laure, alias Dulac, who had just taken to the Maquis with his men, numbering about 15, (acting as reception committee); by the BOA chief of the Meuse department, Francois du Grand-Rue, alias Saulnier and by Dr Jouve alias Jeannin, 2nd in command of the "Chef Departmental". We were taken by them on the morning of 21 August to the camp, which was situated about 2 miles from the DZ on the edge of the Foret d'Argonne and about 3 miles south and southwest of Clermont-en-Argonne. During the course of the day they gave us an outline of the state of resistance in the area. We were joined at the camp during the day by Captain Prato and Sergeant Bassett who had been temporarily lost in the woods. W/T contact with England was established on emergency channel at 0630 hours. The general impression we gained was at first not very clear as Dulac was only a "Chef de Secteur" responsible for the small area round Clermont while Saulnier had only very recently taken over control of the operations bureau in the Meuse. Matters there were alleged to have been left in a somewhat confused state by his predecessor. We were told that we should

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have to await the arrival of the chef departemental of Meuse - Agnelet, who alone knew the exact locations of Maquis in the department - and of the assistant to Planete, Rotation, who was best qualified to give us details of the FFI setup, after which we would have to see Planete's chief of staff Colonel Ambusson, for the integration of military operations.

It was found that the Benjamin Jed set had been irreparably damaged. This had unfortunate repercussions on our mission as our original intention had been that the Benjamin team would cross over to the eastern sector of the Meuse as soon as all the necessary contacts had been made, leaving the western sector to Bernard. Instead we were forced to reconsider this plan and decided to stay together as a twin Benjamin - Bernard team until a separate W/T set could be received for Benjamin.

On the evening of the 22nd we were visited by Rotation who was primarily responsible for wireless communications in the region, but who was nevertheless able to give us some guidance on the general set-up in the department. He advised us to wait and see Agnelet before arranging the next moon's program of parachutages, which would include the parachuting of replacement of W/T equipment and kit after which the 2 teams would be able to split up to their respective areas.

It was only on 23 August that Colonel Ambusson and Agnelet arrived. It appeared that neither of them were in the least clear as to who we were or what we had come to do. They had been told to expect a "Renseignement" mission and at first took us for such. However, we explained the object of our mission and they were thoroughly satisfied to learn that teams had

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at last been sent to them as the Meuse department had been neglected for so long. As a result of the deliberations which followed we obtained the following picture of the situation in the department.

4. State of Resistance in Meuse. The DMR Planete was absent in Nancy organizing a large-scale military operation in the Vosges, to which any harassing activity on our part in the Argonne, and eventually the Cotes de Meuse (eastern Meuse) areas would be a useful adjunct. Existing maquis were as follows:-

a. FFI Troops.

Approximately 100 men each in areas STE Meneshould, Clermont, Ardennes, Spincourt, Tranchee de Chalongne, Triaucourt, 300 at St Mihiel.

b. FTP.

40 Stenay, 200 Spincourt, 50 Souilly

Troops 40 northwest St Mihiel plus 600 Sedentaires for whole department.

c. 3000 Russian miners, Bassin de Briey, and scattered Poles and Yugoslavs.

The location of these Maquis confirmed our decision that an eastwest division of spheres of activity between Benjamin and Bernard was the best solution.

In view of the urgency of the situation it was decided to carry out six priority parachute operations at the beginning of the moon, three in the Bernard sector, west of the Meuse, and three in the Benjamin sector east of the Meuse. These operations were to replace our lost kit, and enable us to arm a nucleus of about 200 men in each sector: furthermore one of the Benjamin operations would carry a new W/T set to enable

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Benjamin to work independently. In the meantime, it was arranged that Jeannin, Agnelet's Assistant, would go and warn the St Mihiel maquis (eastern Meuse) of Benjamin's arrival and arrange for their transport across the Meuse valley in civilian clothes.

At the same time orders were to be issued to the FTP maquis at Souilly, commanded by Commandant Joly and the Triaucourt maquis, to report to our arms dump forthwith and join forces with us.

On the following day, however, most of these plans were completely upset by a sudden and quite unexpected raid by the Gestapo and Milice on the nearby town of Les Islettes. Posing as FFI maquis who wished to be put in contact with the local resistance chiefs, they succeeded in bringing off a "coup de filet", as a result of which Saulnier, the operations chief of the Meuse, his younger brother Henri, who was one of our couriers, Agnelet, and his assistant, Jeannin, were all arrested, together with several maquis and sedentaires officers who were on the point of joining the maquis. Vague news of enemy movements had reached our ears earlier in the day, and we led a patrol in the morning to evacuate as many arms as possible from the dump in case the enemy should find and attack it. A skeleton guard was left with instruction, that should the enemy arrive in the area in force they were to retire to the neighboring woods and observe the enemy's movements without giving away the site of the dump by showing themselves. The dump was sufficiently well camouflaged to pass unnoticed even at a very short distance.

Unfortunately the enemy arrived in afternoon in force

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(about 150 lorryborne men led by an SS captain), straight onto the site of the dump, whose location must have been revealed by one of their captives. The guard in these circumstances opened fire and managed to extricate themselves without loss after having killed the German captain.

By an unfortunate coincidence an FTP patrol from Souilly which had arrived on the scene with a few sedentaires in order to be issued with arms in conformity with our previous instructions blundered into the arms of the Germans; in the running fight which ensued they managed to kill 7 Germans for the loss of ten of their own men.

This double operation by the enemy placed us in the unenviable position of having to move camp at short notice that same night. The arrests left us in no doubt that the enemy knew of our whereabouts, a circumstance which must be attributed to the lack of security on the part of the locals among whom the parachute operation had caused somewhat of a sensation.

The maquis had by this time been enlarged by a few dispersed elements who had managed to elude the enemy in taking to the maquis. The force moved westward by stages to a new site the other side of the Biesme valley, a process which took 3 days, as progress was extremely arduous in very dense forest and endangered by the presence of a large enemy ammunition dump which barred our path. During this time reconnaissances were made with a view to keeping in touch with enemy movements and endeavoring to estimate the exact harm done by the Les Islettes arrest, since we did not then know their extent.

It was only on 28 August that we received confirmation of Saulnier's arrest which in effect meant that our parachute program for the September moon would have to be revised since

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he had been captured with all the known DZ's on him. Further information told us of Jeannin's probable arrest and the disappearance of Agnelet, so that in effect all our immediate contacts with the local FFI were severed in one swoop. A further reconnaissance was made by Commandant Dulac in order to find a suitable new DZ for an emergency operation by which arms could be received to replace those lost at the dump as well as a second W/T set for Benjamin which would enable them to make a dash across to their own sector.

On 29 August contact was made with an SAS reconnaissance party led by Major Rooney (JoJo 30), and it was discovered that he was expecting an operation on the same DZ as the one chosen by us. In consequence we decided to pool our 2 operations. Unfortunately SAS cancelled this dropping at the last moment.

At this stage we heard that American troops were nearing our sector. We received a message from England instructing us to send a party of guides through the lines to meet them, which we did. They took with them such information on the enemy as we possessed, for which the forward American troops, were, so we learned later, apparently very grateful.

On 30 August we led three offensive patrols along the Ste Menchould - Les Islettes - Clermont road with the object of engaging the enemy as he pulled out, and preventing the destruction of the railway tunnel and bridges at Ste Menchould.

The Ste Menchould patrol led by Captain Marchant and Commandant Dulac entered the town, killing an SS dispatch rider and 3 others, and established contact with the local FFI force, numbering about 80 armed men led by M Canone. Together they had hoped to seize the town, or negotiate its

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surrender before the entry of the Americans, but the local forces were cut off from our patrol as they were trying to join it with the result that our men, who had only numbered 8, were forced to retire under artillery and mortar gun fire from tanks hastily brought up by the German command.

The 2nd patrol meanwhile reached the tunnel about 2 miles away only to find that the German guard had left a few hours previously. An inspection of the tunnel did not reveal any charges or ignition systems except for a very worn length of Bickford safety fuse which had already been cut.

The 3rd patrol, which went to Les Islettes, found nothing to report.

On the next day, 31 August, American troops were reported to be patrolling in the Biesme valley a few miles away from the Maquis. Captain Prato led a patrol to Futeau, in the valley, where he encountered a small body of the enemy in a farm: in the engagement which ensued Captain Prato was wounded in the hip, one of his men was killed, and another received wounds from which he subsequently died. A relief patrol was sent out as soon as the news reached the maquis; by the time it arrived an American recce unit had already reached Futeau and Captain Prato was in the process of being evacuated to the rear in an American ambulance. The enemy patrol escaped but was captured by the maquis a few days later during the mopping up operations in the area.

The maquis moved down into the Biesme valley on the same day and occupied the local villages, including Les Islettes, which was entered on 1 September. The force, now numbering about 100, moved into Clermont on the 2nd from where mopping up operations were undertaken, resulting in the capture or killing of a total of about 50 enemy stragglers.

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We decided to leave the area under the command of Commandant Dulac and move eastwards in the hope of being able to cross the Meuse river and continue our mission among the maquis in the eastern areas of the department. We set forth on the night of 31 August, and arrived outside Verdun only to find that American troops were already well over the Meuse. There was no point in pursuing them any further and we retraced our steps next morning with a view to contacting SF Detachment at American XX corps for fresh orders. On our way back we were ambushed by the enemy outside the town of Clermont-en-Argonne which they had reoccupied during the night in great strength. All our party, which included 4 maquis bodyguard, were wounded with the exception of Captains Marchant and Waller. Sergeant Basset's wound was sufficiently serious to require his evacuation to the rear which was accomplished that same evening by the Americans. In the course of these proceedings we lost the truck in which we were travelling which contained our one and only W/T set, together with all our remaining kit, one set of crystals (Benjamin), and 90,000 francs.

We also became temporarily separated from Captain Waller who after the ambush was interrogated by a forward regiment headquarters and later reported to Army headquarters. As we were now without any means of communication and attempts to contact SF representatives were abortive, both at Division (on the same day) and XX Corps (on the following day), we decided to contact 3rd Army headquarters. We were given their alleged location, which was well to the rear on the road to Paris, and arrived in Epernay on 2 September, only to be joined the next day by Captain Waller, who informed us that he had already contacted Army headquarters which was now forward near Chalons.

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We reported there on 3 September to Colonel Powell of the 11 SF Detachment (), and asked for a fresh mission and a new W/T set. We were given the latter, and told to wait a few days for the former until the situation had become clearer on the army's south flank along the Loire, where there might be mopping up to be carried out in the St Dizier area. We spent the next few days reequipping ourselves and obtaining MT for the coming mission. We also tried, but failed, to enter in contact with Pedlar () in order to obtain information on the situation in our next proposed area of operations. We did however contact Silver Smith who gave us Pedlar's address in Montier-en-Der for future reference, and was most helpful in helping us to reorganize and resupply ourselves. During this time we arranged for the transfer of Captain Prato from a civilian hospital in Rheims, where he had inadvertently been placed, to the 34th US Evacuation Hospital, whence he was evacuated to UK at about the same period as Sergeant Bassett.

On 12 September, acting on instructions from SF Detachment 11, we moved down to contact Pedlar in the Chaumont area, where operations were being undertaken against the retreating enemy. We assisted Pedlar in a daylight parachute operation. on 22 Gargonille on 13 September and received replacement of kit and a new Jed set. After the fall of Chaumont we assisted Pedlar in the winding up of his mission and the demobilization of his men. We reported back to SF Detachment 11 and on 18 September were given the job of concentrating surplus parachuted arms in a central dump at Nancy; this was completed by the 22nd. Although we were anxious now for an attachment to FFI "groupes francs" operating with the American army with a view to eventually operating with them in Germany, this project

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fell through. We returned to UK via normal SF channels on 2 October 1944.

Conclusion. We were of course sent much too late - about 2 months too late. In any circumstances this would have been regrettable. In our particular case it was all the more regrettable as the department to which we were sent - the Meuse - had unquestionably been very much neglected by London. They had only received one stores operation since 1940, and few agents seemed ever to have taken any interest in the department. The result was that the temperature of the resistance was on the whole low and the organization weak and unequal to the task of maintaining itself in an area densely occupied by the enemy.

Increased enemy activity against local resistance prior to our arrival, coupled with a certain reluctance on the part of sedentaires to take to the maquis, owing to the general state of dispiritedness caused by London's neglect of their case, undoubtedly increased our difficulties. The sensation made up of mingled consternation and enthusiasm which our arrival caused in this almost virgin territory undoubtedly hastened the general abandoning of all caution at a time when the enemy were waiting to strike their final blow against resistance in the area. The damage done to the organization by the mass arrests at Les Islettes on 24 August could have been mended. But mending takes time in conditions where it takes 3 days for a message to be sent 10 miles and 3 more days for an answer to be received. An time was what we lacked. Had there been a month more at the minimum, and preferably two, these and many other difficulties could have been overcome and more useful results could have been achieved.

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Commendations. We should like to single out the following people who among so many others risked their lives to help us during our mission:

Mr Revaux: of Auzeville, near Clermont-en-Argonne, Meuse who acted as our guide throughout and without whose unselfish devotion our maquis would undoubtedly have starved more than once. His house and all his belongings were burnt by the enemy as a result of the arrests of 24 August at Les Islettes.

Mme Revaux: His wife, who was with her husband the main-spring of resistance in the Clermont-en-Argonne area, and who took to the maquis with us when her house was destroyed.

Commandant Laure - alias Dulac: of Clermont-en-Argonne, chef de Secteur, who was responsible for grouping the maquis in our area.

Lieutenant Francois du Grand-Ru: Chef BOA of Meuse, arrested at Les Islettes on 24 August, and probably deported to Germany.

Henri du Grand-Ru: His younger brother who acted as our courier, also arrested.

Docteur Jouve, alias Jeannin: arrested and shot by the Gestapo after having been tortured.

Lieutenant Michel Ruffin: of Clermont-en-Argonne, one of our "Trentaine" leaders whose tireless devotion and courage were a great example to his men.

Lieutenant Georges: another "Trentaine" leader who despite great hardships suffered while he was POW in Germany took to the maquis and followed us to the end. Personally killed 19 Germans during mopping up operations in the course of which he was wounded.

Mr Jacquemin: Who harbored 2 "C" agents - "Cobaye" and

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"Tetra" throughout the critical days 24 August - 31 August.

Financial Statement

Received ---- Benjamin -----	250,000 Frs
Bernard ---- (Captain Waller) --	100,000

Expenses

Food etc for Maquis -----	80,000
Food for group while in Maquis -----	4,000
Purchase of 3 bicycles -----	6,000
Purchase of 3 car tires -----	1,500
Purchase of 1 truck -----	25,000
Purchase of 1 Hq truck -----	35,000
Car repairs -----	2,200
Team expenses (food, lodging and clothing) -----	22,000
Private expenses -----	3,500
Lost through enemy action -----	90,000
Charities to villages which suffered through enemy action-----	30,000

Total -----	299,200
Returned -----	50,800

350,000 Frs

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TEAM ALFRED

Jedburgh team Alfred was the forty-first team to be dispatched to France from the United Kingdom.

Members of Team

The members of team Alfred were:

Lieutenant G. deWavrant (French), code name "Aude"

Captain L. D. Macdougall (British), code name "Argyll"

Sergeant A. W. Key (British), code name "Wampus"

Area to Which Dispatched

Team Alfred was dispatched on the night of 24/25 August to the Oise area of France.

Purpose of Mission

Team Alfred was being dispatched to assist in the organization of the FFI, provide additional means of delivering stores to the FFI, and provide an additional link between London and the numerous resistance groups.

Method of Dropping and Reception Committee

The team was to be dropped to a reception committee organized by the agent Pasteur ().

Scale of Air Support Likely

It was anticipated that whatever supplies the team required would be furnished to them, but they were advised to allow eight days for delivery whenever possible.

Finance

Each Jedburgh officer took 100,000 French francs. The W/T operator took 50,000 French francs.

Relations with Other Allied Units

Allied Forces, If Overrun. When overrun by Allied forces the team was instructed to contact the nearest intelligence officer whom they would ask to pass them to the nearest SF Staff.

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This Staff would identify them and pass them back to SFHQ, London.

Action

Upon Arrival in the Field. Upon arrival in the field the team was to contact the FFI chief, Dupont, who would inform them of the general situation of resistance in the area and put them in touch with the representative of the D.M., Mortemort, and the adjoint, Cosinus.

The team would report back to headquarters on the organization, strength and state of armament of the resistance groups. They would submit dropping grounds for both arms and men. Their mission was to be one of preservation rather than destruction, hence they would avoid open offensive action.

If the team found itself within 30/40 miles of the battle zone it would recruit 15 volunteers to move towards the Allied lines gathering all possible tactical intelligence on the way. They would contact the intelligence branch of the unit. When asked for a password, they would give "Nancy" and a specimen of their handwriting.

If Captured. The team took no cover story to the field. If taken prisoner they were taken as soldiers performing their ordinary military duties. Every established law of warfare would apply to them. Therefore, they would give their name, rank and serial number only.

Information Provided to Team

The following information was provided to the team prior to its dispatch to the field:

1. Enemy order of battle in the area.
2. Resistance elements in the area.

First Word from the Field

Team Alfred announced its safe arrival in the field in the

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following W/T message dated 25 August ():

"Arrived safely with all containers and packages. Nothing further to report at moment. Thank RAF for excellent job of work."

Summary of Messages Exchanged

26 August From Alfred ()

"Have contacted Chef FFI departmental. Five to six thousand partisans in area poorly organized but very enthusiastic and demand arms and yet more arms. 400 of total armed in area Compiègne Clermont. Area Beauvais destitute of arms."

27 August From Alfred ()

"Ref proposed drop on Moulin last night - waited until 0330 in vain. Surprised that we were not informed of same. Troops in area completely disorganized and making for Lille via Moldidier. Nothing we can do to aid them on their way due to lack of arms."

28 August From Alfred ()

"Enemy has destroyed runways and installations of Creil airdrome. Is also constructing anti-tank defenses in front of Janville on side of Montlondon traversing RN 32 and railway line of Oise. At same point enemy has prepared to destroy the bridge and also has in mind flooding of area by blocking river Arronde."

28 August From Alfred ()

"Have sent 5 information gatherers towards Allied lines. Two left Beauvais in direction of Magny and three Creil for Meaux. Others will follow."

28 August From Alfred ()

"Information - each side of road St. Just des Marais to Savignies west of Beauvais is mined with trip wire type mines in Bois du Parc near Ferme du Groschont. Near same Ferme is battery of field guns well camouflaged."

29 August From Alfred ()

"Enemy preparing to destroy bridge on Oise at Creil. FFI insufficiently armed to prevent same. Demand immediate arms and if possible group SAS to help them."

30 August From Alfred ()

"40 tanks all Calibre hidden in LaCrois St. Quen village due south Compiègne. Well camouflaged positions each side. Another 3 in Verberie further south on same road. Actually area Compiègne Clermont tank infested. All movement done by night."

()	C-2783/10	25 Aug 44	()	C-2858/11	26 Aug 44
()	C-2948/14	27 Aug 44	()	C-3092/16	28 Aug 44
()	C-3095/18	28 Aug 44	()	C-3098/19	28 Aug 44
()	C-3194/21	29 Aug 44	()	C-3307/24	30 Aug 44

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30 August From Alfred ()

"Enemy preparing destroy bridges Oise at Compiene. FFI can prevent same if arms arrive in time on following ground."

30 August From SFHQ to Alfred ()

"Would like you to take all possible steps on receipt this message to preserve following Somme bridges from enemy demolition. All bridges Amiens area. Also at Moreuil, Boves, Fiquigny, Conde, Longpre. Try to keep bridges in state of preservation for about 4 days. This target of highest importance. Can drop arms to you from low flying typhoons if you need them."

31 August From Alfred ()

"Being overrun in offing in few days. Could do lot of damage if only had arms. Very disappointed lack of cooperation in this respect."

31 August From Alfred ()

"FFI in area received order to march on Clermont. Unable to do so due lack of arms. Can you do necessary and drop load Stens, Brens and necessary ammo."

Report of Team Upon Return from the Field - 24 August to 27 September

Sent to London in great haste morning of 9 August, team Alfred was prepared from then on to leave for France. However, it wasn't until 23 August that after a somewhat hurried briefing we left for out point of departure.

Left same night about 2300 hours and were over DZ Moulin two hours later. Weather extremely bad - heavy storm and after great difficulty packages and containers dropped. Pilot gained height for dropping of team but lost lights, and as the wind was too violent, returned to base.

Left following night and after a fifty minute search for Moulin made perfect dropping in midst of RC who gave team very warm welcome indeed. Packages and containers rapidly collected and hidden in nearby quarry. (Must state here that RAF crews and liaison staff were excellent and gave us every assistance).

() C-3339/25 30 Aug 44 () C-4032 30 Aug 44
 () C-3393/26 31 Aug 44 () C-3374/27 31 Aug 44

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Packages and containers dropped previous night arrived safely, but the Jed set and team's personal equipment which was taken to a village twenty kilometers away was not recovered until much later - most personal kit not recovered.

However, we had taken precaution of taking a spare Jed set with us on the second trip and used this for first contact. Passed rest of night with chief of resistance of La Neuville Roy, small village near DZ.

Following morning Lieutenant DeWavrant went to Clémont and met Commandant Dupont-Montura who commanded all FFI in Oise area. He explained the situation in the department thus - great number of volunteers, practically no organization to speak of, and, above all, no arms. Commandant Dupont gave as a rough estimate 400 men armed in department, but the armament consisted mainly of old rifles and sporting guns. Also these 400 men were not organized but were spread throughout the department. He also gave the figure of 5000 as the number of men who could be armed for future operations.

First obstacle to a rapid organization of these forces - liaison and communication. All cars etc. had been stolen by the enemy - all villages occupied by the enemy, who at this moment seemed to be in a complete state of disorganization.

Finally, an arrangement was arrived at where we were to arrange for droppings of arms etc. to sectors the most organized and, therefore, the most suitable. Also Commandant Dupont promised to assemble and dispatch a few partisans on an information-gathering trek towards the Allied lines.

During this time we tried to contact London by wireless with no result on day sked but successful on evening sked.

Next morning our farm was taken over by the enemy and we

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had to leave rather hurriedly by rear entrance - finally "holed up" in small wood about 2 kilometers from Cressonsacq.

On 26 August Lieutenant DeWavrant met M. Montreuil, the person responsible for the center sector of the Oise. The department was divided into three sectors: West Beauvois, Center Clermont, and East Compiègne. Montreuil demanded arms for the defense of the bridges on the Oise. During the sharing-out of material parachuted with us we had made provision for this, but his share wasn't adequate enough for the task. The same night we waited until 0330 hours for planes, which although announced by BBC message never turned up. The following morning an "agent de liaison" came to us with news of five parachutists at Francieres and Captain Macdougall went and contacted five SAS who had been parachuted "blind" after having searched in vain for our lights. Strangest of all, the plane which dropped the 5 SAS did not drop its load of 20 containers.

Very much the same thing happened the following night, 27 August. RC convoked by BBC message waited until 0230 hours when a storm broke out and they left. The containers were dropped 15 kilometers from the DZ Moulin and were whisked away by a group of FTP in the area. Incidentally, this group of FTP recognized the authority of EMFFI but had no communication with same.

On 28 August we were forced once more to change our headquarters due to unwelcome attention of the enemy, who had a suspicion of our presence in the vicinity. This time we moved to a cave in a small wood which had been dug and utilized by French artillery in the last war. The same night we received our first message from London which demanded exact map references of DZs Dos, Creme, etc. These map references had already been sent to London headquarters by Pasteur and accepted; this was .

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ascertained later from EMFFI Oise area, who were quite certain about it all. This caused a delay of 4 days and hindered our prospects of doing something useful.

We still hoped, however, to receive arms in time and messages were dispatched on 29 - 30 August giving new DZs pertaining to groups reasonably well organized and capable of doing something if only they had the necessary arms etc., namely group led by Cure Le Fevedic of Francieres group from La Neuville Roy commanded by M. Buquet who spent two years in captivity in Germany and who joined the resistance movement immediately on his release. A few more information-gatherers were dispatched round about this time to Creil and Senlis, places still held by the enemy.

Whole area round about occupied by enemy these past five or six days, who appeared to be disposed to stay there. All this led us to hope that arms might yet arrive in time. Anyway, hoping for the best, we organized two ambushes utilizing the groups of Francieres and La Neuville Roy, old French rifles, shot guns and all! However, at 1100 hours a message from London arrived demanding that we do our best to safeguard all bridges over the Oise, to which we promised to do the necessary.

At the same time the BBC announced the taking of Beauvais by British and Clermont by Americans (occupation of Beauvais confirmed by "agent de Liaison", but Clermont not actually taken until 2330 hours same night.)

The order regarding bridges on the Oise was urgent but it did not concur with our own arrangements for the two ambushes prepared for the following night. (Practically all enemy troop movement was by night). We compromised, however, and split the team up, Lieutenant de Wavrant and Sergeant Key, remaining with

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ambushing party, while Captain Macdougall, carrying letter of introduction to chiefs of resistance at Amiens, made his way to the Somme taking with him the radio by means of horse and cart. (Truly an optimist). He got as far as Ferrierel, arriving there simultaneously with an armored column of Americans, where he contacted G-11 in hope of finding a more rapid means of transportation. The G-11 was quite willing to provide same, but as we were preparing to set off, news came through that Amiens had fallen to the British. Captain Macdougall therefore remained at Ferrierel and tried to contact London in vain.

The other member of the team had had better luck; one of the ambushes turned out to be an amazing success. At Francierel an enemy convoy was completely disorganized for a period of several hours and several of the enemy killed at the small cost of one killed and one wounded FFI.

The second ambush wasn't quite so successful at night, but the following morning, 1 September, a small party of enemy escorting 30 American prisoners was attacked and destroyed by FFI. The Americans were liberated and escorted to the nearest American lines.

The Americans had now arrived in force in the area, particularly tank and engineer units; nevertheless, all the Germans had not gone. There still remained isolated elements who were well-armed and quite prepared to fight to the last man. This was demonstrated on several occasions when they simply refused to surrender to the FFI and had to be wiped out to the last man.

All the following week was taken up in patrolling woods, paths, etc., in search of these isolated groups, many of which proved to be a mere figment of imagination on some people's part.

At the request of the chief of resistance in the Clermont

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sector we prepared a parade in Clermont in honor of a citizen of that town who had been a member of the resistance and who had been murdered by the Gestapo a few weeks previously in his own home.

Also a search was instigated near Cheil for the body of a Captain Orion, one of the chiefs of the resistance, who had disappeared about 30 August and who was suspected of having been murdered by the SS. His body was never found.

As already mentioned, on 1 September we had lost wireless contact with London and were awaiting further orders.

Lieutenant de Wavrant was then charged by Commandant Dupont to prepare a list of proposed citations for the department of the Oise. We also paid courtesy visits to families who had lost or had wounded sons in the FFI.

During the time that Lieutenant de Wavrant prepared his list of citations, Captain Mai paid a visit to the north of France in order to thank the people who had helped him so much in 1940-41 (people who sheltered him etc. after his escape from the Germans). He also dispensed a little justice by having the person who told them and other British soldiers arrested by FFI.

On its return team Alfred made its way to Paris, where it stayed three days. Finally flew home, reaching Hendon on 27 September. Reported to EMFFI following morning.

This was the tale of the team Alfred, not a very glorious one but not through any fault of the team. If we had been dispatched when we were first "alerted" some two weeks previous to our actual departure (team was "alerted" and "briefed" on 9 August but did not leave until 24 August) we could have done something really useful.

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JEDBURGHS

Operations, Team Alfred (Cont'd)

Financial Statement

Captain L. D. Macdougall

Received - - - - - 100,000 Francs

Expenditures

Cost of living in Oise area - - - - 10,000
 Cost of motorcycle - - - - - 20,000
 Cost of repairs, petrol - - - - - 10,000
 Paris expenses (4 days) - - - - - 15,000
 Donated to isolated members FFI
 and to people who aided my escape
 in 1940-41 - - - - - 20,000
 Odds and ends for which I cannot
 account - - - - - 9,000
 Total 84,000 Francs

Returned - - - - - 16,000 Francs

Lieutenant G. de Wavrant

Received - - - - - 600,000 Francs

Expenditures

Given to Etat Major FFI of Oise - - 400,000
 Given to assist immediate families
 of wounded or killed FFI - - - - 45,000
 Liaison and information - - - - - 35,000
 Payment of requisitions made by FFI
 immediately after liberation - - - 20,000
 Transportation of FFI on various
 occasions - - - - - 15,000
 Purchase of a car - - - - - 15,000
 Food and lodging - - - - - 12,000
 Purchase of civilian clothes - - - - 5,000
 Total 547,000 Francs

Returned - - - - - 53,000 Francs

Sergeant A. W. Key

Received - - - - - 50,000 Francs

Expenditures

General expenses of living, food etc 8,000
 Cost of living in Paris - - - - - 6,000
 Gift to S/Sgt D. Foden, RAAF living
 in hiding in same village - - - - 5,000
 Lost with all personal kit including
 all identification papers - - - - 17,000

Returned - - - - - 14,000
 Total 50,000 Francs

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JEDBURGH

Operations, Team ArnoldTEAM ARNOLD

Jedburgh team Arnold was the forty second team to be dispatched to France from the United Kingdom.

Members of Team

The members of team Arnold were:

Captain M. Coudray (French), code name "Sussex"

Lieutenant J. H. F. Monahan (British); code name "Londonderry"

Sergeant A. de Ville (British), code name "Escudo"

Area to Which Dispatched

Team Arnold was dispatched on the night of 24/25 August to the Marne area of France.

Purpose of Mission

Team Arnold was dispatched to assist in the organization of the FFI. They were to provide additional means of supplying stores for the FFI and additional links between London and the FFI. They were to contact and work with Pedlar () or Diplomat when they arrived in the field.

Finance

Each Jedburgh officer took 100,000 French francs with him to the field. The W/T operator took 50,000 French francs.

Summary of W/T Messages Exchanged

Team Arnold's wireless set was destroyed on the jump. As a result the team had no direct contact with headquarters.

30 August From Arnold via Thrifty ()

"All our region freed by American troops. They ask instructions. Answer by Nick."

17 September From SFHQ to Arnold ()

"For all - your mission now considered completed. Make arrangements with DMR to take over your forces and return to UK earliest. Put all W/T material in safe place for later collection. For passage home contact Major Alastair Hamilton, Hotel Cecil, Paris, who will make arrangements. Advise us probable date of departure your circuit."

() War Diary Vol 3 p
() C-3372/A-2807/15 30 Aug 44
() C-2042 17 Sept 44

Declassified by 062147
date 23 January 1979

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18 September From Underfoot to Watermark ()

"Jed Arnold mission completed. Will arrive Paris 20 September for return UK."

20 September From Yalelock to Watermark ()

"Jed Arnold here. We will get orders to return Sergeant de Ville to UK at once. Captains Monahan and Coudray request 5 days leave to visit Coudray's parents in Normandy."

Report of Team Upon Return from the Field - 24 August to 28 September

We left England on the night of 24 August and were dropped in civilian clothes in the Marne department near Epernay. In this parachuting operation the crystals of our wireless were lost; throughout our mission we had no direct contact with London. Our uniforms were also lost; these we managed to replace, subsequently, except in the case of Sergeant de Ville who remained in civilian clothes throughout the mission.

Leading units of the American 3rd Army overran the area on 28/29 August. On 2 September we left for St. Dizier and Montier-on-Der in the east of the department. We remained in this area until our mission ended on 19 September.

This report will be divided into two parts, the first dealing with events of Epernay, the second dealing with St. Dizier and Montier-on-Der. A wireless report by Sergeant de Ville is also included.

IN THE AREA OF EPERNAY.

1. The Parachuting Operations. We left from Tarrant Rushton airdrome (38 Group) at 2230 hours, 24 August; the operation was carried out by two Halifax aircraft carrying 30 containers besides ourselves and our personal kit. We were dropped at 0030 hours on 25 August near the village of Igny-le-Jard southwest of Epernay and were met by the reception committee, arranged and attended by Nick (Major Boddington)(). The operation went very smoothly.

() C-194/45 18 Sept 44
 () C-401/70 20 Sept 44
 () War Diary Vol 3 p

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The work of the pilots and navigators was extremely accurate; no opposition was encountered; and there was no delay in finding the DZ. We were then conducted by two guides to a safehouse. This was a hunting lodge (Mortgrange) in the center of a large, privately-owned wood. The occupants were a gamekeeper (M. Charles Pierre who was one of our guides) and his family. They received us extraordinarily well.

2. Meeting with Major Boddington. Later that morning Major Boddington, having distributed the containers' contents, came to Mortgrange. He brought with him M. Jean Lemonier whom he proposed to "attach" to us. He recommended M. Lemonier as having worked invaluable with him in the Aube and the Marne and said he had gained much personal authority in this area (west of Epernay) as a resistance leader. M. Lemonier remained with us from then until our departure from France and rendered us great service. Major Boddington reported that one package had not been found on the DZ. This was the package of the 3 legbags containing our personal arms, maps, uniforms and crystals for the wireless; it was never found. Major Boddington said he would send a message to London asking for crystals and more money for us. These were not sent.

3. Projected and Actual Military Operation. The following plan of campaign was then agreed upon with Major Boddington:

a. We should take charge of this area west of Epernay (between Epernay and Dermans).

b. We should send off agents with information to the American lines. Four such agents, already chosen by Major Boddington, were sent on 26 August.

c. We should take charge of a parachuting operation expected in the area by Major Boddington. The BBC message for this operation was passed but the operation did not take place.

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d. That in view of the probable proximity of the American forces, we should form a Maquis as soon as possible. Some 200 men had been armed as a result of the parachuting operation by which we had arrived; after the next operation it was hoped that we would be able to form a Maquis with some 400 armed men.

On 27 August, in the course of a tour of the local villages to see the resistance leaders, an event took place which changed this plan. While we were at the village of Cerceul a German of the Todte Organization was shot and killed by the village's resistance group. (This unfortunate occurrence had, fortunately, small results. The enemy burned down a barn in the village where they found some arms, but otherwise took no reprisals.) In the circumstances we decided that the Cerceul group should initiate a Maquis then and there. On the same day, while we were on our way to join them, we were seen and fired on by the enemy and had to hide our rucksacks and escape.

The Arrival of and Assistance Given to the American Forces.

We passed that night 27 August at the village of Try near one of the Marne bridges. In the morning we saw the enemy in all sorts of horse drawn vehicles withdrawing over the Try bridge. The American arrival appearing to be imminent, we gave the order for the resistance groups to gather at Try. An advance unit of the American 7th Armored Division arrived during the morning and, failing to cross the Try bridge (which was blown up at the last moment), came under very heavy and effective fire from the opposite bank of the Marne. Our FFI forces helped the Americans by putting out a flank guard, recovering their wounded and firing on the enemy on the opposite bank. The American unit, having sustained very heavy losses, then withdrew. We withdrew with them.

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At Conde-en-Brie we made contact with the G-2 of the 7th Armored Division and gave detailed information (supplied by M. Lemonier) on the German defenses across the Try bridge. This information was asked for to assist an attack across the Marne at that point. The attack, however, did not materialize.

5. Arms Recovery. The next 4 days, 29 August to 2 September, were spent in:

a. Trying to recover arms from the local resistance groups. At the same time it was realized that with a number of Germans still hiding in the numerous woods, the villages could not be deprived of all arms. Some of the arms collected by us were taken to Montier-en-Der; most of the remainder were subsequently given to those members of the FFI in this Epernay region who volunteered for further services with the regular armed forces.

b. Attempting to prevent any over-zealous "collaborator hunting". There was, however, little of this. The liberation in this area passed with notable tranquility.

The instance of the village of Chene-la-Reine may be quoted as typical of the problems now encountered. The resistance group of this village told us that they had been ordered as reinforcements for the Americans to go to Reims; this order appeared to be frivolous rather than serious and we insisted that the group would be much better employed in protecting their own village. Nevertheless, they departed for Reims and that same night some Germans came from the local woods into Chene-la-Reine looking for food. The task of protecting the village had to be given to a group from another village, Igny-le-Jard.

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JEDBURGH3

Operations, Team Arnold (Cont'd)IN THE AREA OF MONTIER-EN-DER AND ST. DIZIER

1. On 2 September, with Major Boddington, we left for Montier-en-Der. We were told that many Germans were still at large in that region and that considerable mopping up operations would be required. However, after spending 24 hours with the Maquis newly reorganized by Major Boddington at Montier-en-Der, it was decided that there was no work for us to do there. By agreement with Major Boddington, we therefore left for St. Dizier to assist the FFI of that town, i.e. by liaison with the American forces, by supervising their work of mopping up, and by helping to organize them where necessary.

2. At St. Dizier. The following was the situation at St. Dizier. In this town was the headquarters of Lieutenant Meurey (Francois Jardin), the FFI chief of the northern area of the Haute Marne. In St. Dizier there were two companies of the FFI, one formed by the Front National, the other of no particular political tinge. The former was the less well organized and the less reliable; both had fought well in the time immediately preceding the Americans' arrival. The central command over the two companies was painstakingly unpolitical and was extremely sound. Relations with the FFI at St. Dizier quickly became friendly and helpful; work consisted in supervizing the patrols of the groups in out-lying villages who continued to bring in German prisoners, and in helping to regulate slightly disordered forces of the FFI at Joinville, whose two companies came under the orders of St. Dizier.

Contact was also made with Colonel de Grouchy (Michel) the chief of the FFI in the Haute Marne department, whose headquarters were at Aubrieve and still unliberated. An officer from Colonel de Grouchy's headquarters (Sub-Lieutenant Gerard), who was making

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a tour of the area, promised that, on his return to Aubrieville, he would send details of the German defenses around Chaumont.

These were subsequently received and forwarded to the 2nd French Armored Division. Sub-Lieutenant Gerard's information was timely and accurate.

3. Situation at Chaumont. On 8 September the FFI at St. Dizier received a warning order from Generatrice (Military Delegate to the Region) to prepare to move south. The military situation to the south was that Chaumont and Chatillon-sur-Seine and the main connecting roads were still enemy-held, and it was feared that the enemy might try to break out to the north or northeast, thus causing some inconvenience to the communications of the 3rd Army. We therefore went to SF headquarters at 3rd Army () for more specific orders and, if possible, for arms. Third Army ordered us to take all possible forces down to the Chaumont area to prevent any break out by the enemy to the north; they also sent a message to London on our behalf asking for a parachuting operation for arms (also for crystals and our personal equipment) in order to assist in this task. On our return that night to St. Dizier we found that one of the town's two companies had already been ordered south by Major Boddington. This company left next day.

On 11 September we left for the Chaumont area with a further half company from St. Dizier, and a half company from Joinville. The situation then was that the FFI from St. Dizier, Montier-en-Der, Bar-sur-Aube and Juzonnocourt held the villages on the road between Juzonnocourt and Bologne. Bologne, some 10 kilometers north of Chaumont, was the nearest point to the enemy. It was held by the St. Dizier groups, also by a troop from the 2nd French Armored Division. This troop was replaced on 10 September by an

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anti-tank troop from the same Division.

These FFI groups, it should be noted, were poorly armed and poorly clad and trained, and had been experiencing much difficulty in carrying out the task of regular infantry. Losses, however, had been slight.

4. The Liberation of Chaumont. On 13 September the French Artillery shelled the road between Bologne and Chaumont. The Cure of Brothenay (a village between Chaumont and Bologne) arrived in Bologne to say that the road was clear of Germans. We suggested to the commander of the local "groupeement tactique" of the 2nd French Armored Division that we might undertake a reconnaissance of this road; the suggestion was accepted and a reconnaissance was made. No enemy was encountered. Chaumont was found to have been liberated earlier on the same day by units of the 2nd French Armored Division coming from the southwest. Following this reconnaissance, units from the same Division entered Chaumont from the north. It was discovered that the Germans had all gone by the road leading towards the southeast. Thus there was no question of their menacing the lines of communication of the 3rd Army to the north.

On 14 September the FFI were withdrawn to their respective towns or villages.

5. The Parachuting Operation and the End of the Mission. On 19 September we left for Paris where we received permission to visit Captain Coudray's family in Normandy. We returned to Paris on 24 September and left by aircraft for London on 28 September.

COMMENTS

1. We were sent far too late. Four days before the liberation were wholly inadequate for organizing and arming the FFI in a region where they were little organized and very scantily armed.

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The parachuting operation requested for us by the 3rd Army also took place too late to be of any use.

2. In spite of requests by Major Boddington and the 3rd Army on our behalf, no replacement of personal equipment and no crystals for our wireless were sent. Our inability to transmit to London was a considerable inconvenience in our work.

3. Though we were dropped in civilian clothes we were given neither photographs nor false papers. The omission of at least photographs was grave; papers could have been obtained in France but, we were told, not photographs. We had been told in London that such photographs would not be necessary for us but this view was not endorsed by the FFI and agents with whom we worked.

4. We submit a report of the German atrocities in the villages of Robert-Espagne, Bourey and Couvenges. We went to Robert-Espagne on 15 September; there was clear evidence that the village had been burned down, house by house.

CITATIONS BY CAPTAIN MONAHON

1. Captain M. Coudray (Captain M. de Carville) of the French Colonial Infantry. He volunteered for and undertook a mission of being parachuted behind the enemy lines to work with the FFI. During the mission (24 August to 19 September) his conduct was consistently resourceful and courageous. In particular he volunteered for, and undertook, a personal reconnaissance of the area between Bologne (a village 10 kilometers north of Chaumont) and the town of Chaumont on 13 September. At the time of his reconnaissance it was not known that the enemy had withdrawn from the area.

2. M. Jean Lemonier, Barberey, St. Sulpice, Aube. Having undertaken dangerous work for the FFI in the Aube Department (the demolition of electrical and factory installations and the transporting of arms) he came to the Marne Department where he

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recruited and organized resistance groups in the area west and southwest of Epernay. During the month of September he worked tirelessly with Jed team Arnold () in the regions of Epernay, St. Dizier and Chaumont and rendered the greatest possible service to that team.

3. M. Charles Pierre, Troissy, Marne. He gave refuge to American airmen who had been obliged to descend by parachute in the region, and received at considerable risk to himself, the Jed team Arnold in his house on 25 August.

4. Four Members of the FFI of the Region of Dormans. (The names and addresses can be supplied by M. Jean Lemonier). They crossed the German lines between Epernay and Chateau Thierry on 27 August in order to carry information to the American forces.

5. The Cure of Brothenay, Haute Marne, and a young man (a member of the Defense Passive of Chaumont) who accompanied him. On their own initiative, they crossed the German lines between Chaumont and Bologne on 13 September although the area was being shelled by artillery; they brought to the 2nd French Armored Division precise information about the German forces in Chaumont.

6. Sub-Lieutenant Gerard of the headquarters of the FFI of Haute Marne. Several times he crossed the German lines between Chaumont and St. Dizier and by means of a personal reconnaissance, obtained on 10 September very accurate information about the German defenses in the region of Chaumont. This information was given to the 2nd French Armored Division.

Wireless Report

Dropping operation went successfully with no damage to set. Unfortunately, one package lost contained the crystals. This was not serious as we contacted through agent's set; and as we were

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quickly overrun there was little importance for our plan. I worked scheds for agent on plans Pedlar and Thrifty, also listened to broadcast messages and BBC personal messages. Transmissions by Jed set from Chaumont area were all good strength and successful. The radio including spare receiver and one Eureka were left in Paris. No crystals were sent to us though asked for.

Financial Statement

Received - - - - - 250,000 Francs

Expenditures

On Maquis - - - - -	70,000
Personal living expenses	
in the field- - - - -	90,000
Expenses on car - - - - -	60,000
Payment of M. Jean	
Lemonier (our agent)- - -	30,000
Total	250,000 Francs

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JEDBURGHES

Operations, Team Archibald

TEAM ARCHIBALD

Team Archibald was the forty-third team to be dispatched to France from the United Kingdom.

Members of Team

The members of team Archibald were:

Major A. du P. Denning (British), code name "Cumberland"

Lieutenant A. Montlac (French), code name "Montgomery"

Master/Sergeant Roger L. Pierre (U.S.) (), code name "Sen"

Area to Which Dispatched

Team Archibald was dispatched on the night of 25/26 August to the Meurthe et Moselle area of France.

Purpose of Mission

The task of team Archibald was to liaise with the FFI chiefs and help them in training and organizing Maquis groups. They would provide additional means of delivering stores to the FFI and additional links between London and numerous resistance groups in the area.

Method of Dropping and Reception Committee

The team was to be dropped to a reception committee organized by Cardiode. ()

Scale of Air Support Likely

There would be no difficulty in supplying the team with the arms and material it would require. However, they were advised that eight days should be allowed for delivery.

Communications

The team was dropped with a W/T set and instructed to contact the Home Station as soon as possible after arrival.

Finance

Each Jedburgh officer took 100,000 French francs. The W/T operator took 50,000 French francs.

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() War Diary Vol 3 p

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Operations, Team Archibald (Cont'd)Relations with Other Allied Units

Allied Forces, If Overrun. When overrun by Allied forces, the team was instructed to contact the intelligence officer of the nearest formation. They would ask him to put them in contact with the nearest SF Staff, who would identify them and pass them back to SFHQ, London.

Action

Upon Arrival in the Field. Upon arriving in the field the team was to contact Planete (), the FFI chief, who would be able to inform them of the general situation of resistance in the area and put them in contact with the nearest groups.

They would report to headquarters as soon as possible on the organization, strength and state of armament of the groups and submit possible dropping grounds for both arms and men. The team's mission was to be one of preservation rather than destruction. Therefore, open offensive action was to be avoided unless otherwise ordered by SFHQ.

If the team found itself within 30/40 miles of the battle zone, they would recruit 15 volunteers to move towards the Allied lines gathering all possible tactical intelligence enroute. When contact was made with the Allies, the team would get in touch with the intelligence officer. When asked for a password they would give "Nancy" and, in addition, a specimen of their handwriting.

If Captured. The team took no cover story to the field. If taken prisoner they would be taken as soldiers in uniform performing their ordinary military duties. Every established law of warfare would apply to them and they would, therefore, give their name, rank and serial number only.

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First Word from Field

The first word of team Archibald's arrival in the field was contained in the following W/T message from Careful dated 26 August ():

"Jed Archibald landed last night."

Summary of W/T Messages Exchanged

29 August From Archibald ()

"Message 2 sent by agent Bruno. Message 1 cancelled. Unable to contact Planete. Hope contact Alastair tonight. Maquis active. Sabotage urgently requires arms, money to maintain morale. Borrowing 500,000 francs from Planete. Send messages Aline on our skeds."

30 August From SFHQ to Archibald ()

"Delighted to hear. Understood your W/T equipment lost. Presume Bruno lent you set. Let us know when you contact Planete. Weather preventing operation for armament but your area high priority."

30 August From Archibald ()

"Heavy two-way convoys road Nancy - Epinal. Jerry very busy in Charmes. Taking Junkers aero engine from factory to station."

4 September From Archibald ()

"Contacted Rupert. Using his set. Contacted Glancy. Can't contact his departmental chief. Urgent send ammo asked for by us and Bruno. Contact daily U. S. recce unit. Hold Charmes and bridge. 80 Jerry, 18 prisoners. Attacked by panzers Sunday. Montlac wounded - leg smashed. Denning bullet through thigh but okay. Our dead 10. Tank battles likely today. Artillery pieces on train few miles east of Bayonne. Engine good target."

9 September From Underfoot ()

"Denning of Jed Archibald by radio line from 4 Armored Division states has lost set. His eastern grounds impossible. Can hear BBC messages. Urgently needs ops - first choice, ground Chandernager, second Castor. Says SAS his area received parachutage first night after landing while he has nothing. Result low morale his groups. He stated he wanted his grounds serviced west of river Query. We have picked up several Jeds without prior knowledge their location. He is west of Moselle and south our troops."

() A-2140/67 26 Aug 44
() C-6389 30 Aug 44
() C-3822/9 4 Sep 44

() C-3177/4 29 Aug 44
() C-3305/7 30 Aug 44
() C-4210/169 9 Sep 44

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11 September From SFHQ to Archibald ()

"American Army requests urgently preservation bridges Moselle between Epinal and Charmes inclusive."

13 September From Archibald ()

"Contacted 3rd Army. Have mission to defend flank of U. S. Army and mopping up Jerry left in area. Urgent have arms. 3000 men unarmed. Can take daylight drop on Chandernagor with Eureka."

15 September From Archibald ()

"For Captain Francis. Squealer and Fontain here in civilian clothes. They cannot proceed as no one knows Justin. All their equipment left behind. They await orders here."

16 September From SFHQ to Archibald ()

"Owing to military operations Justin prevent making contact. Are instructing him anew to meet Squealer and Fontain at Floremont."

20 September From Archibald ()

"Have seen Planete. He states urgent have day ops."

23 September From Underfoot to Watermark ()

"Following relayed for Jed Archibald. Police commissioner Vandromme of Nancy has helped us a lot and now wants news and address of his son, Robert Vandromme, born 29 October 22 at Colmar, Haut Rhin. Son left for U.K. June 1940 as quartermaster aboard the Courbet. Last news 23 March 44 by BBC message."

23 September From SFHQ to Archibald ()

"Sorry cannot serve ground as 3rd Army is to furnish arms from captured stocks. Contact 3rd Army for details."

25 September From Tapdance Blue to Watermark ()

"Jed Archibald anxious about daylight drop. Is policy send nothing more?"

27 September From Tapdance Blue to Watermark ()

"Seen Archibald. He is disgusted with lack of support. Boche active in area. Not sufficient captured arms."

28 September From SFHQ to Archibald ()

"Your ground refused by RAF. Too close to lines of battle. Send new ground soonest 15 kms west of Franconville. May be able serve five planes day op."

() C-1168 11 Sep 44
 () C-4880/20 15 Sep 44
 () C-368/30 20 Sep 44
 () C-3089 23 Sep 44
 () C-843/7 27 Sep 44

() C-4681/15 13 Sep 44
 () C-1959 16 Sep 44
 () C-655/11 23 Sep 44
 () C-742/3 25 Sep 44
 () C-3646 28 Sep 44

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14 October From Watermark to Yalelock ()

"In Sept 3rd U.S. Army agreed we should parachute arms to Jedburgh Archibald working in contact with Planete. Since this time have been endeavoring obtain ground acceptable to Air Force. Have now received acceptable ground from Archibald. Archibald repeats request for arms for 1000 men to be infiltrated behind enemy lines. In view time interval advise if 12 AG still approve this plan. If so we will ask authority from SHAEF for necessary sorties."

14 October From SFHQ to Archibald ()

"Waiting answer SHAEF. Meantime figure coordinates your pinpoint. Do not tie up town distance."

17 October From Watermark to Yalelock ()

"Have now seen Colonel Powell who informs us he supplied Archibald with 500 arms required this area. Will not apply SHAEF for sorties unless you have more recent information which contradicts situation as given by Powell."

20 October From SFHQ to Archibald ()

"If you consider your mission completed, please return U.K. via Paris. Will not send any arms as stated."

31 October From Watermark to Yalelock ()

"Ref your message concerning Jed Archibald. Please advise OSS; 3rd Army to send team Jed Archibald immediately to U.K."

Report of Team Upon Return from the Field - 25 August to 31 October

Mission. To assist in the organization of the FFI; to assist in providing stores for the FFI; and to provide additional link with London and the FFI contacting Planete.

Briefing. Briefing was very sketchy. Most information was based on experience of 6 months previously. This was not really necessary as mission Pedagogue () (Colonel Buckmaster's section) was already in area. This fact was not given us in our briefing. Neither were we told that we would take a large sum of money for Planete and Maximum (). Pedagogue was not informed that we would be dropped into his area, nor did he know what Jeds were to do.

() C-4813/4814 14 Oct 44	() A-342 14 Oct 44
() A-398/399 17 Oct 44	() A-558 20 Oct 44
() T-30 31 Oct 44	() War Diary Vol 3 p
() War Diary Vol 3 p	

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We eventually left London after 14 days tedious wait for weather, operational fatigue (and planes generally), on 25 August and arrived at Harrington in time to be fitted with chutes and the take-off at 2045 hours. We arrived in France at 0110 hours on the 26th after a trip without incident. The lighting was the three bonfires in a triangle type, which appeared to be little known by pilot, who made his two runs from different directions. Denning landed in the trees as first run was across wind.

We were met by two groups FFI that of Captain (later Major) Noel of the Maquis in Charmes Forest with 60 armed men, two lorries and a private car, and that of Captain Dudo with 60 unarmed men who lived at home. A delightful argument ensued after a very enthusiastic welcome. Dudo wanted the arms for his men to hide under their pillows or some such good hiding place but didn't want the parachutists. Captain Noel willingly accepted the responsibility of conducting us some 40 kilometers to his Maquis but rather naturally wanted some arms for his trouble. (He had 180 men in the Maquis, 100 unarmed, Captain Dudo had no Maquis.) Assuming the role of Solomon, I decided to divide the spoils. Unfortunately, Captain Noel's choice of containers gave him 9 rifles, about 15 Stens, and 2 Brens, mostly unserviceable owing to the collapse of the containers on landing. The explosive he took was put to very good use during the next few days. Small packets being dropped into petrol tanks of German ammunition lorries with 12 hours delays, and rail, telephone and canal communications being cut. The collapse of containers and packages due to parachutes being torn and in some cases not properly attached was very common in all our drops. Much

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ammunition and many arms were rendered useless.

The package containing the Jed set and Cumberland's (Denning's) rucksack was lost and not found for two days. Search was rather restricted during the day time as there was a German headquarters of some 60 men 500 yards from the dropping ground. When found the set was a complete write-off. On 26 August Denning enciphered a message of some length asking for arms, medical supplies, a wireless set and carbines which was dispatched to M. Bruno, alias Careful of mission Pedagogue, for transmission to London. In due course Bruno confirmed having had message acknowledged. Major Denning spent remainder of the day as armorer, with a Yugoslav captain who did remarkable work with hammer, cold chisel and pliers changing some 80 of the damaged arms into serviceable weapons, though perhaps not quite with Hythe methods. Runners were sent off all over the region to make arrangements for our initial contacts.

Drops of one or two planes were received every other night including 10 SAS (1 major, 1 lieutenant and 8 men) under Peter who were to join Loyton. We took advantage of their presence to use their Jed set. Presumably this direct contact was responsible for London not replacing the original sets.

During the week a "friend at Court" was able to warn us that a Boche Division was due to attack the Maquis at 5 o'clock. He was unable to state whether that evening or next morning. Germans estimated our strength at 20 Allied officers and 2,000 well-armed men. In fact, there was only one Jed team, 300 armed and 250 unarmed men.

We decided to move to Le Menil Mitry (behind the German

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Division) leaving 150 armed men in the area in view of expected drops.

During the packing up of stores etc. Planete, who had twice asked us to deliver the Frs. 35,000,000 to Gestapo and Wehrmacht ridden areas, arrived in the Foret de Charmes to collect his money. Denning had informed London that he would borrow Frs. 500,000 from Planete to assist the Maquis who were seriously in debt, so took this opportunity to discuss finance with Planete. The latter, having heard the needs of Captain Noel, informed the Jeds that money would come in due course but refused to lend the Frs. 500,000 or pay Captain Noel then. Later Frs. 200,000 were received, far short of requirements. Weeks later Denning managed to get a further Frs. 500,000 for the immediate needs of the group before the French government took over.

When approached on the subject of manpower etc. in the region, Planete informed the Jeds that his departmental chief, known successively as Georges, Bayon, Bataille, Bourgeois, would make the necessary contact and give all information in due course. This chief contacted us only after the region was liberated, though a statement giving the manpower situation but no contacts was received a day or two later. Montlac and Denning decided to concentrate on arming the Maquis Noel - the only active Maquis in the southern part of the department. Their intention was to move east and north as soon as stores arrived for this Maquis in sufficient quantities. This intention was not put into effect till quite late owing to both being wounded.

The move to Le Menil Mitry was highly successful. The Boche launched a fierce attack on an empty forest but burned

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the village of St. Remy as some Milicien had denounced the villagers for aiding the Maquis. The SAS were a pillar of strength to the 150 men left behind. Peter, the major, decided to continue to St. Die some days later when he heard the Americans were at Toul. He was jokingly threatened by Captain Marceau, FFI that he couldn't leave without getting some arms. He immediately coded a message for London and told Captain Marceau to be on ground at 0100 hours when we would receive two planes, without BBC warning. Jed stock slumped heavily when the planes arrived. The SAS had given 10 hours notice for 2 planes, Jeds 10 days for nil.

Denning decided to contact Bruno, alias Careful of Pedadogue, when once the Maquis was established in its new quarters. This entailed a very exciting ride in a civilian car, which fortunately was very fast. While being pursued by a patrol of some 30 cyclists and an armored car, the vehicle was called upon to halt by 5 Feldgendarmes but naturally did not do so, mowing down 2 or 3 and receiving many bullet holes in the windows and coachwork.

Much useful information of the area was gathered from Bruno and contact remade with London. Bruno and Denning decided that the Maquis Noel was really worth aiding and agreed to back each others requests for arms. Unfortunately Bruno was called to Nancy by his superiors and we were unable to continue our cooperation.

During the afternoon of 2 September Captain Montlac (Montgomery) mounted an operation against a large German depot at Tantonville, which he was informed was to be destroyed by fire. His force hit a Boche convoy from Tantonville at

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Crantenoy, 80 Jerries killed, 19 prisoners including O.C. depot who had broken all promises to the civilians of Tantonville, firing on women and children and on the firemen. Denning later ordered these prisoners to be conveyed to the Americans under escort. They attempted to escape and were eventually shot. The Maquis suffered 10 killed and several wounded including Captain Montlac.

Denning meanwhile had decided to contact the Americans who were reported 35 kilometers away. The information given them, the 42nd Cavalry, was greatly appreciated. Speculation was however rife in United States quarters as to the meaning of the password and slips of paper with our code phrase and signature. No one had any information on this subject.

After leaving the United States Forces, the car containing Captain Noel and Denning ran into trouble and Denning was slightly wounded in the thigh. Next morning, 3 September, he was informed of Captain Montlac's wound and decided to return to the United States Forces to arrange the evacuation of Montlac and other wounded. The colonel commanding the 42nd Cavalry had moved nearer the Moselle and agreed willingly to evacuate our wounded. On return to Le Menil Mitry, Denning found he was unable to evacuate wounded to the United States Forces as they had been transferred to Luneville hospital during the day as unfortunate civilians who had been caught between German and terrorist fire. The United States colonel had also said he hoped to cross the Moselle next day and to be in Luneville next night but needed bridges over the Moselle. The only ones between Nancy and Charmes which were not heavily mined and defended were those in the town of Charmes and Langley. The Maquis took the town of Charmes

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that night, killing some 40 Germans. Unfortunately the United States advance was held up some 10 days at this period and after 4 days intense fighting against infantry and armored cars, the Maquis were forced to withdraw when attacked by over 400 infantry and 9 tanks. The Maquis left 10 dead and some wounded in Charmes hospital, but it is highly probable that the enemy suffered over 500 casualties. The town of Charmes was sacked by the Germans. The FFI wounded had their bandages torn off and were murdered "to show what happened to terrorists". We were unable to save these bridges when the Americans really wanted to cross the Moselle owing to overwhelming strength in fire power of the enemy. The bridge at Charmes actually was blown while the United States Forces were crossing.

During the 10 days hold-up of the United States Forces the area east of the Madon and west of the Moselle was 'no-man's' land. Each tank patrol had to be treated with suspicion as enemy and American patrols followed each other, sometimes within minutes of each other. Information was collected at my headquarters and passed on daily to United States and French liaison officers.

Jed team Philip () passed through the area during this time calling at the Maquis headquarter at Le Menil Mitry. Captain Derouen of this team agreed to take over the north of the department owing to Denning's inability to move about easily. He was informed that it would be impossible to pass through the Foret de Haye which was known to be heavily occupied by Boche. He left one afternoon and was apparently ambushed later that day. We were unable to maintain contact with him as instructed.

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This team was very keen to get on with the job, but appeared to me to be too impetuous, tending to subject the FFI to unnecessary risks.

During the week an urgent request from the Americans for assistance to hold a bridge over the Madon was received via a gendarme on a motorcycle. 160 men immediately left for Haroue and took up positions according to the United States captain's plan of campaign. The United States light tanks and armored cars left at about 60 miles per hour at the first anti-tank shell, leaving the FFI in position. All Germans on foot were killed and a very orderly withdrawal under intense armored car fire was carried out. One or two wounded FFI were left behind and later found with their heads crushed in probably by rifle butt.

East of the Moselle the enemy had returned in force and movement, which had been easy enough at the end of August and beginning of September, was now practically impossible, and for 2 or 3 days before the Americans crossed the Moselle we were unable to pass new information to them. Though we insisted that it was almost impossible to cross at Flavigny the United States Forces attempted the operation and were thrown back. They eventually got three companies across at Lorey, St. Mard, and Velle and asked for FFI assistance for the night. Captain Noel's Maquis now numbered 1100 well armed men. So Denning took over 4 coys, sending one each to Lorey, St. Mard and Velle and one to Domptail, 1100 yards in front of United States positions. This village was known to be cleared of enemy during the day but SS and parachutists in the area attempted to re-enter during the night. They were successfully driven off without loss to FFI.

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Captain Noel now formed a mobile group and a static force. The mobile group moved with the Americans, the static force remained for mopping up and police work. The mobile group of some 800 successfully fought several battles alongside the Americans. The Americans who were attacking Luneville had insufficient infantry to guard their lines of communication and called upon the Maquis for assistance when a German force worked its way behind their forward units at Mont sur Meurthe. 600 men were dispatched immediately and successfully warded off this threat to the United States lines of communication. A further alert at Blainville sur l'Eau resulted in the unfortunate killing in the dark of two FFI by United States patrols.

When United States Forces entered Luneville they called on the local FFI to assist them in clearing out Milice and German patrols. There were no FFI in the town so 300 men from Noel's group were sent. They scrapped well for 48 hours and were dismissed by local sector leader and departmental chief "because they were not in their own sector".

While moving with and ahead of United States Forces Denning contacted Captain Monarque (BOA) who was with a Maquis at Clezentaine and delivered arms for 100 men to him.

Squeaker and Fontaine reported to him at Bayon and London was asked for instructions. He eventually contacted Justin in Nancy.

At this point Denning contacted Planete again, met Lieutenant Carroll, Lieutenant l'Herault () of 3rd Army. The arms taken to Nancy by Carroll from Colonel Powell's () stock were not used for combat but to arm the FFI policing Nancy.

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() War Diary Vol 11 p 15

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With Lieutenant l'Herault, SF liaison officer with United States 79th Division, Denning contacted the general commanding the division and laid plans for the FFI battalion to go forward with the division, being fed and equipped by the United States Forces. Planete was enthusiastic about this move. The negotiations were rather prolonged owing to red tape and fell through when the French authorities decided that all FFI should be incorporated in the French Army before continuing to fight. American CIC picked up Denning for having a false identity card and conducted him to Paris for identification.

On return Denning was asked by Planete to stay on and organize the Noel battalion. While waiting for Planete's return from Paris and London, Denning contacted sector leaders of Blamont and Baccarat, also Maquis leader of Cirey. Conditions became so impossible that FFI activity, other than information service, was instantly and ruthlessly quelled. Reprisals, shootings, burning and deportations became too common to attempt to arm any men further east.

Captain Gunlac of 3rd United States Army G-2 was endeavoring to arrange a mission through the enemy lines to obtain information. He asked Denning to stand by to use his W/T set and operator for this task. G-2 Army was enthusiastic but plans were cancelled when present large scale offensive was launched.

The last ten days or so were spent trying to obtain provisional release of M. Loisy of Forcelles St. Gorgon and M. Bachy of Maxeville Nancy. Both had harbored M. Bruno (alias Careful of Mission Pedagogue). M. Loisy had also taken care of Denning during three days. Though the French BSM agreed

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that they had both done excellent work and risked their lives in the Allied cause, the Bureau would not release them, pointing out that they were not arrested only detained. This did not prevent them living in prison cells.

In spite of the lateness of arrival in the area, we successfully armed 1600-1800 men, accounted for 450 Germans for certain and probably 200-300 more. Maquis losses were 38 killed, 42 wounded.

Financial Statement

Received by Major Denning - - - - - 100,000 Francs

Expenditures

Food and lodging - - - - -	15,000
Purchase of food for maquis- - - - -	15,000
Tires and car repairs- - - - -	23,000
Debt paid for Pedagogue- - - - -	5,000*
Gifts to distressed families - - - - -	15,000
Sundry expenses- - - - -	5,370
Total	78,370
Returned - - - - -	21,630

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JEDBURGHS

Operations, Team Basil

TEAM BASIL

Jedburgh team Basil was the forty-fourth Jedburgh team to be dispatched to France from the UK.

Members of Team

The members of team Basil were:

Captain R. Raincourt (French), code name "Ambleve"

Captain T. A. Carew (British), code name "Sutherland"

Technical Sergeant John L. Stoyka () (US), code name "Ore"

Area to Which Dispatched

Team Basil was dispatched on the night of 25/26 August to the Doubs area of France.

Purpose of Mission

Team Basil was being dispatched to the SFHQ organizer, Ligne, () who controlled a number of maquis groups in the Doubs region. The team would assist him in organizing the FFI in this area. As such they would provide additional means of delivery of stores and an additional link between London and the FFI groups.

Method of Dropping and Reception Committee

The team was to be dropped to a reception committee organized by Ligne.

Communications

The team was dispatched with a Jedburgh W/T set and instructed to establish contact with the Home Station as soon as possible after arriving in the field.

Finance

Each Jedburgh officer took 100,000 French francs with him to the field. The W/T operator took 50,000 French francs.

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() War Diary Vol 3, p

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Operations, Team Basil (Cont'd)Relations with Other Allied Units

An Allied Mission. Should an Allied Mission be dispatched to this area at a later date, it was possible that the team might be placed under its command.

Action

Upon Arrival in the Field. As soon as the team arrived in the field, it would contact Ligne who would be able to inform them of the resistance groups in the area and decide with the team on the division of responsibilities. Open offensive action was to be avoided with the exception of continuous attacks by small parties on rail, road and communications targets.

If Captured

The team took no cover story to the field. If taken prisoner they would be taken as soldiers in uniform performing their ordinary military duties. Every established law of warfare would apply to them. Therefore, they would give their name, rank and serial number only.

First Word from Field

Team Basil announced its arrival in the field in the following W/T message dated 28 August: ()

"Arrived safely, radio and all. All personal equipment had not arrived. Please replace. Position of maquis - three to four thousand available in 6 days. 1000 men already in maquis instructed and organized but less than 300 armed. Extremely urgent to have arms and equipment for another 500 men. Maquis are well trained, led and disciplined. Possibilities in area are enormous."

30 August From Basil ()

"Circulation on routes in our region actually face. Require urgently 2 containers of supplies. Possibility of harassing Germans on route 83 and on departmental routes towards Doubs."

() C-3063/A-2324/2 28 Aug 44 () C-3270/12 30 Aug 44

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2 September From SFHQ to Basil ()

"For all the chefs of the region. The Germans are proceeding with all means of transport to the departments of Jura and Cote D'or in order to evacuate their men. Do everything possible to hinder them."

2 September From Basil ()

"Information received from good source - concentration of 40 tanks in Dijon, Gray and Vesoul area. 40,000 men marching from Dole to Besancon yesterday 1 September. Enemy seen to be forming lines of resistance."

3 September From Basil ()

"It has been arranged that team Basil operates for Groupement Frontiere aided by team Norman. The area is under the direct command of the group sohas not been subdivided. Team Basil is working in close collaboration with Albert of SOE to avoid conflict and duplication. It is requested that London insure that military instructions for Groupement Frontiere are sent to us only."

4 September From SFHQ to Basil ()

"Any day expect Army and maquis reinforcements moving through your area and converging on Pascals plateau at east of Pont de Roide. Of course yourmen may join in."

8 September From Basil ()

"We have lost our first set of cipher books. Your 57 was indecipherable. For this reason please recode and send again."

8 September From Basil ()

"Had long discussion with General Duval tonight. Enemy intention thought to hold line Besancon, Belfort. American 6th Corps will attempt cross Doubs tomorrow. 3rd French Division moving from Maiche Pont de Roide Montbelliard in attempt turn Belfort east."

10 September From Basil ()

"Mission over and finished her4 Maquis leaders playing politics. Our team has become separated and we are out of touch with one another. Send instructions as to steps to be taken. This message is from Sergeant Stoyka."

12 September From Basil ()

"Theodule is here. The 12 French officers have been

() C-4594 2 Sept 44	() C-3654/19 2 Sept 44
() C-3665/17 3 Sept 44	() C-4885 4 Sept 44
() C-4224/32 8 Sept 44	() C-4165/31 8 Sept 44
() C-4364/23 10 Sept 44	() C-4526/40 12 Sept 44

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dropped at Le muy. One has broken his leg and has been taken to the hospital at Salin Les Bains. The other 11 are at the disposal of Orcia. I have found my French officer but the other is still at large. An unconfirmed report states that he has joined a battalion of American infantry. Norman team is in Morteaux."

12 September From SFHQ to Basil ()

"Thanks for replying promptly. What has happened to Paul. Has he abandoned Robe plan. Are you using his set. Is Norman radio of Orcia. Has his set pegged out. There should have been 14 aspirants on Lemuy. Hope two two have not got lost. Sorry about Degourvilles leg. Plane arriving Amberieur from Wednesday, being received by Xavier who is sending back passengers. For your return, you can come back that way but try and contact missing Jed officer before doing so. Theodule and Martin should return when military duties finished. Arrange for disposal of W/T and Eureka in safe house. Should appreciate message from Theodule giving us his intended movements and requirements."

15 September From Basil ()

"Missing Jed officer contacted and safe. 14 aspirants did come but two have taken French leave."

15 September From SFHQ to Basil ()

"For Theodule - Excellent idea you return England at once to give us latest situation whole of your area. Can get you back within week. Take Dakota arriving Sunday morning Amberieux airdrome organized by Xavier. Telling Xavier to give you first priority on plane. Are organizing supplies Valdahon. Thoroughly approve you working with Basil. We have cancelled Paul's plan having had no traffic for week and having twice asked Basil news of Robe plan without receiving reply. Suggest Paul returns with you for rest after his excellent work. He can stay England or return according to decisions we will make together."

15 September From SFHQ to Basil ()

"Keep together now. Give names of two French leavers from aspirant party. Are you in touch with Norman. Have not heard from him for a week. Suspect his set broken."

16 September From Basil ()

"Norman says he is in radio contact with you and receives QSL but no answers to his questions. How soon will you use Dakota field at Waldahon. Clothing and mortar demand is urgent. Please parachute if you cannot use Dakota field in next day or two. Theodule says he may not be able to take the Sunday plane but will try to get away on Monday or Tuesday. Know nothing of aspirant leaders."

() C-1253 12 Sept 44
() C-1816 15 Sept 44
() C-31/46 16 Sept 44

() C-4889/45 15 Sept 44
() C-1628 15 Sept 44

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Operations, Team Basil (Cont'd)18 September From Basil ()

"Theodule returning to London within a few days. When do you expect to be able to send our clothing and mortar. That should finish our Jedburgh mission. Heavy rains have made Ivre unsuitable temporarily for Dakotas. Made contact with Cubitus missions."

20 September From Basil ()

"Work here now finished. Request permission to wind up and return. We do not wish to join the wandering Jeds association at Besancon."

21 September From SFHQ to Basil ()

"If there is room you should also return by plane from Amberieu. If you miss plane return via Paris where you should contact Colonel Jackson, 79 Champs Elysees. If Carew has not yet rejoined you, leave address for him and instructions to return."

24 September From Basil ()

"To the best of our knowledge Theodule is in London by now for we bid him adieu almost a week ago. Am winding up here and preparing to return."

24 September From SFHQ to Basil ()

"Theodule and Paul arrived safely yesterday. Expect to see you soon. Amberieu service not working for the moment. Best way out is via Paris where you should report to Colonel Jackson, 79 Champs Elysees. Possible way out via Lyon where Storrs organizing Hudson operation."

Report of Team Upon Return from the Field - 25 Aug to 28 Sept 1944

Team Basil left Milton Hall on 25 August 1944. Arrived at Harrington about 2000 hours. Baggage less legbag had been previously sent on.

We were fitted with our 'chutes, boarded the 'plane and left immediately. Captain Carew asked to check that baggage and radio were aboard. He was assured that they were, and anyway there was not time to check up. We left at 2146.

The journey took 5 hours. We were twice under AA Fire.

The field and reception committee were eventually reached. The letter was unidentifiable. The pilot assured us that we were in the right spot so we decided to jump after making six

() C-206/47 18 Sept 44
 () C-2778 21 Sept 44
 () A-77 24 Sept 44

() C-375/50 20 Sept 44
 () A-17/60 24 Sept 44

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circuits, still without the correct letter. We had asked the pilot to make sure that he dropped us above 600 feet. In spite of that we estimated he dropped us at 300 feet. Sergeant Stoyka was stunned, and Captain Raincourt broke a finger.

We were received by 3 FFI officers, and a representative of BOA. The reception committee was composed of boys of 18 years old and men of 55. On checking the baggage we found that no personal baggage and no radio were dropped. We had only what we stood up in and our pistols.

We were taken to Granger - Maillot and suffered from excessive hospitality.

The next day we set out to find a Radio. We found an agent's set - Mark BII, in working order. Sergeant Stoyka, in spite of not having seen one before, managed the next day in making contact with London. (We still had our own crystals shared out between us, although half were broken.)

On 26 August we contacted Lagarde (Orcia), Colonel of Groupement Frontiere, and later Bonlaya Chief of Region D 2. Later we toured the Maquis groups. Only 300 out of 2,000 were armed, and then with a collection of which the British museum would have been proud. There were some stens, a few Brens, 2 Bazooka, and 1 Piat, and some grenades, Ammunition for all was very low.

A message was sent immediately to London asking for sufficient armament for 500 men at least. The message was received, but no action was taken, nor were we told that no action would be taken.

On 26 August, the FFI were arranging with some Russians to hand over to us a horsedrawn convoy of food and arms and

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for them to join us. The arrangements did not work out. A small engagement ensued in which a dozen limbers and horses were captured containing some arms, some food, and a few clothes. Eleven German prisoners were taken. A German infantry unit on hearing of the affair moved down into Ornans, and started to deploy against us. We refused to "accept battle", and retired well into the woods in great haste with our booty. The German commander sent an ultimatum to us to return prisoners and booty or he would raze Ornans and shoot 200 hostages. Commandant Bernard and Captain Dudieux went to see the German commander taking with them a German prisoner who assured the Germans that he was being well treated. Eventually the German commander agreed to call off all reprisals without the Maquis having to surrender any equipment or prisoners.

The evening of 27 August we installed ourselves at Clucy near Salins. On the 28 we contacted Theodule () a British agent who was doing more or less the same work as us with the same group. He had great knowledge and influence in the area and resented our coming.

In the evening we received the dropping of Team Norman. ()

Ligne contacted us on the 28th and appointed us to Colonel Lagarde, Groupement Frontiere. Colonel Lagarde entrusted us with the work of 3rd Bureau (Operations) for the whole Groupement.

29 and 30 August: We agreed on a division of labor between Theodule, Norman and ourselves.

The arrangement was that Theodule reverted more to his intelligence work, etc. Norman was to help us and take over some of our work in the Groupement on the Swiss Border. We

() War Diary Vol 3 p
() See p this Vol

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sent a further demand for arms and boots, which was ignored by London.

31 August: We moved to Supt near the headquarters of Lagarde, and of Theodule, with whom by now we were in agreement and on good terms. Our position before this was very tricky but happily we now saw eye to eye. In pursuance of Colonel Lagarde's request that we occupy ourselves with 'operations', we started the coordination of ambushes, preservation of bridges etc; also, the introduction of agents into German held towns and garrisons to ensure sound information on their defense and dispositions therein. Captain Raincourt and Captain Carew divided the task into two sections:-

By Captain Raincourt; All premeditated attacks on Enemy. He had as his staff four FFI Capitaines.

By Captain Carew; Small routine ambushes etc, and giving advice on setting thereof. Instructions in general and in particular small arms instruction.

This system worked very well.

1 September: An American liaison officer of OSS from General Patch's headquarters turned up having come by road (which by this time we had cleared and now controlled). We gave him as much information as we could and promised him that no bridges would be blown by the enemy. As it turned out, we were eventually able to fulfil that promise. A conference was held as to what future aid the Maquis would give the army when they arrived. Those present were Colonel Lagarde, Theodule, and team Norman. Captain Foulke, (the American officer, OSS) was told he could promise at least 400 men, well

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armed with respect to small arms only, to the infantry commander when he reached our area.

Colonel Lagarde requested Captain Raincourt to prepare an attack on Monthe, which was being garrisoned by the enemy. By 4 September, Captain Raincourt had complete information on the garrison. At noon the "seige" was started with a company of Tirailleurs Algerion and 3 companies of FFI. This was the FFI's first big scale attack.

All roads were cut and the escape to the frontier was securely guarded.

The attack went in at about 1600 hours. German resistance was strong, and only after 2 hours hard fighting was the garrison taken. Over 120 prisoners and many killed; our losses were slight. Unfortunately Colonel Lagarde was unable to reach Monthe in time for the attack, but he was well pleased with the result.

The next day the RTA set off to attack Pontalier, 24 kilometers to the north. Captain Raincourt went off with them to coordinate the FFI part with the attack. The FFI had difficulty with transport but managed to get to Pontalier by 0500 hours. The attack was put in at 0800 hours. Pontalier was ours by mid-day, after the usual incidents that go with every fight. The FFI throughout fought with courage and determination. This Sous Groupement remained in Pontalier as Police etc, and Captain Raincourt set up his headquarters there.

On 4 September, Captain Voirin took over the administration of Salins, which the enemy had vacated under threat of heavy ambushing some days before the Allies arrived. Captain Voirin's 2 i/c Captain Patoar previously known as Captain "Charles"

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took over active command of Sous Groupement "R" deployed around Salins. He mobilized three companies instantly, and provided transport for them. Captain Carew was asked by Captain Patoar to join him. The offer was accepted. This battalion operating with Salins as a base reorganized from a guerrilla force into a regular infantry of the line unit. The next day they found themselves fighting at the side of the 3rd Spolus and later 3 RTA. Captain Carew for the next 8 days took on the job of (to use a sporting metaphor) "coach", with Captain Patoar as "captain". The system worked very well, and the two worked always in the closest of collaboration. Colonel Lagarde later confirmed Captain Carew's position and asked him to stay on as long as possible, with 1st Battalion of Regiment Franche-Comte as it had then become. The 1st Battalion fought in nearly every action up to Pont le Roide. There they earned the praise and approbation of the General himself. The Battalion did not fight as a complete Battalion but each company was allotted to a parent company of 3rd RTA. The Battalion fought with spirit and determination; occasionally they faced hunger, cold and rain, as they were without greatcoats or blankets. They reflected the spirit of their leaders, Captain Patoar, Lieutenants Devik, De Camp, the Doctor - (whose name escapes me,), and his nurse, Christine, who was herself always there working and seemed never tired.

On 13 September, our parent regiment was withdrawn from the line for a rest. The FFI Battalion took advantage of this and themselves took up residence in a convent. The hospitality of the nuns was of the very best. We then reorganized the unit and had a redistribution of arms. This being done, Captain

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Carew returned to Pontalier to rejoin Captain Raincourt. Captain Carew found that in spite of the youth of the officers of the FFI they did their job well, although unorthodoxly. They were quick and willing to take advice, and learned the lessons of experience quickly. What they lacked in training they made up in versatility.

Meanwhile at Pontalier on 8 September Lieutenant-Colonel Broad, and Commandant Mord, of Special Forces arranged with Lieutenant-Colonel Lagarde and under the approval of General Duval, formed the 1st Regiment Franche-Comte. It was decided to demand arms and equipment of London. Team Basil carried out the operation.

A dropping of 1200 containers eventually took place. It is pointed out that this type of operation is difficult even in liberated country. The parachute ground was 8 kilometers long. It took 36 hours to collect the containers. This gives great opportunities for pillage etc, by civilians. On receipt of these arms an "establishment" was worked out, and the Regiment of 4 Battalion was formed up in the barracks of Valdahon. Captain Raincourt and Captain Carew carried out a course of instructions for officers. Captain Carew's experience in the field with the 1st Battalion was invaluable for this work.

Escaped POW's from Switzerland became a drag on the team, so we set up a small organization to look after them and pass them on as soon as possible.

20 September: Captain Ambel and Lieutenant Masson, asked us for facilities to entering Switzerland to get round behind the German lines. Luckily we had already established these

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contacts and they were introduced without much delay. By 24 September, we were no longer working on our original mission. With permission from London, we decided to wind up.

We left for Paris on 26 September, arriving that night, and left for London on 28 September.

General Remarks.

1. Briefing. Was poor considering the information London must have had, e.g. Theodule a British agent was working on Jed lines with the Maquis with whom we were dropped. His character was such that we found it difficult at first to see eye to eye with him. Luckily it worked out all right, but he could have caused, and nearly did cause, the complete failure of our mission.

2. Parachuting. 1,200 containers were received long after the allies had passed through, which was a grandiose, but in reality a pathetic, gesture.

3. London's failure to respond. We received QSL to all our messages, but never any indication of whether our requests would be answered. In actual fact they never were. London instead expressed verbose sympathy for casualties which only wasted our time deciphering.

4. Radio. Sergeant Stoyka's operating, and work was of the highest order under difficulties throughout.

Radio Report by W/T Operator

When we had landed on the dropping ground, we found that our Jed set had not been dropped with us. When we finally found it at a place about thirty miles away, it was smashed to pieces and no two parts were together.

A day later we obtained a fairly good B-Mark II Set, and

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this was the one we used during our stay in the field.

The operation of this set was satisfactory considering the fact that the tubes were weak. There was always quite a lot of QRM on my regular skeds but the emergency sked was always very clear.

Because we had a B-II, it was not always possible for me to come up on my regular sked. This was because it was necessary for us to have electricity and the Germans turned it on and off at various intervals. To counteract this, I used the emergency sked quite extensively.

Once, I was DFed by three enemy planes which kept circling over the house from which I was transmitting. Of course, I stopped sending and waited until they left. After they had gone, I wanted to send my message, but they had cut the power off. We managed to keep transmitting by using our auto battery but when the car was being used, this was not possible.

I could always hear the broadcast but it was so smothered with QRM that after a while I did not even attempt to listen.

A couple of times the Germans cut off the power just as I was in the middle of my sked which was rather inconvenient because it left the base operator in a spot as he suddenly could not hear me.

The base operators I worked to were all OK and several were exceptionally "on the ball".

In the beginning I missed some messages on the broadcast because we had no radio at that time.

The antennas I used were sometimes not of the regulation types but often consisted of a short wire slung up in my room but as the Home Station could hear me all right I left it like

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that. I put it up in my room because it was so easy to yank down in a hurry if we had to leave unexpectedly.

When I had sent my last message telling Home Station we were coming back, I did not keep anymore skeds.

Financial Statement

Sergeant J. Stoyka Received -----	50,000 Frs
Expense	
Food -----	15,000
Transport -----	5,000
Lodgings -----	10,000
Bribes -----	16,000
Total -----	46,000
Returned -----	4,000
	50,000 Frs
Captain Raincourt Received -----	100,000 Frs
Expense	
Food and lodging -----	35,000
Purchase and maintenance of car -----	25,000
Gifts to prisoners from Switzerland -----	15,000
Various expenses -	
secretarial, pay for the maquis etc. ---	12,480
Total -----	87,480
Returned -----	12,520
	100,000 Frs
Captain T. Carew Received -----	100,000 Frs
Expense	
Food and entertainment of	
maquis for propaganda -----	40,000
Tires and upkeep of cars -----	20,000
Payment of personnel -----	20,000
Money given to lost waifs and strays	
of Allied Armies and escaping prisoners	8,000
Sundries -----	800
Total -----	88,800
Returned -----	11,200
	100,000 Frs

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JEDBURGH

Operations, Team AlastairTEAM ALASTAIR

Jedburgh team Alastair was the forty-sixth Jedburgh team to be dispatched to France from the United Kingdom.

Members of Team

Major O. H. Brown (British), code name "Kent"

Captain (then Lieutenant) R. Maitre (French), code name "Donegall"

Sergeant G. N. Smith (British), code name "Lincoln"

Area to Which Dispatched

Team Alastair was dispatched on the night of 24/25 August to the Vosges region of France.

Purpose of Mission

Team Alastair was being dispatched to assist in the organization of the FFI; to provide additional means of delivering stores to the FFI; and to provide an additional link between London and the FFI groups. They were to contact Planete () upon arriving in the field.

First Word from the Field

The following W/T message dated 1 September was the first word from Alastair after arrival in the field ():

"Regret silence. Contacted Planete. Morale good. Arms nil. Plan as follows...can take over department with sufficient arms. Send 3 aircraft to 14 grounds 1 night. Names of grounds to follow."

Summary of Messages Exchanged1 September From Alastair ()

"Give signal for general rising. Tell Sarco work through FFI."

1 September From Alastair ()

"Will seen Planete about 59 men."

() War Diary, Vol 3, p () C-3579/34 1 Sep 44
() C-3522/11 30 Aug 44 () C-3580/21 1 Sep 44

Declassified by 062147
date 23 January 1979

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4 September From Alastair ()

"Send 59 men on ground Rotation. At same time send arms to all other grounds."

4 September From Alastair ()

"Send arms. Tomorrow will liberate whole department, destroy escaping Boche. Send 1 Vickers to each ground."

4 September From SFHQ to Alastair ()

"Ask American army to supply you with arms and ammunition taken from the enemy."

4 September From Alastair ()

"Daylight operation already agreed by Planete on 5 grounds and number of planes agreed. Must take plane Wednesday 6 September. We will take over department on Thursday. Please advise action taken."

5 September From Alastair ()

"If you did not intend to give us any support why did you send us. There are no Americans here so can get no arms at all. For Gods sake do something."

6 September From SFHQ to Alastair ()

"Due to circumstances and reasons beyond our control it is impossible to send you operations at present. Planete was notified. Operations still on programme but we do not know when they will take place. Sorry."

7 September From Alastair ()

"Whole department ready. Will now fight without arms. 25,000 organized army."

9 September From Alastair ()

"Situation very difficult. Have lost everything except what we stand up in. Boche burnt farm in which was all our stuff. Hun very active. Maquis have not enough arms to defend themselves with. Please send at least something now."

10 September From Alastair ()

"Trains of tanks signalled line Epinal St Die today or tomorrow. Send aircraft. Boche in possession of ground Chatilain."

() C-3789/3 4 Sep 44	() C-3792/6 4 Sep 44
() C-6459 4 Sep 44	() C-3788/19 4 Sep 44
() C-3901/32 5 Sep 44	() C-6488 6 Sep 44
() C-4088/24 7 Sep 44	() C-4297/27 9 Sep 44
() C-4383/27 10 Sep 44	

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11 September From SFHQ to Alastair ()

"Urgent from American Army. Request that bridges Moselle between Charmes and Epinal inclusive be preserved."

11 September From SFHQ to Alastair ()

"Good news. Starting Tuesday night for you and Rotation 3 airplanes on each of following grounds - Fleche, Coupole, Berlingot, Baraque, Siecle, Restaurant, Anatomie, Saltimbanque, Crevasse, Barbiche, Donon and Mirliton. Having some equipment for you sent from ME65. Take good note of Chatelain. Send us urgent coordinates asked for in our last message. Doing our damned best to help you."

12 September From Alastair ()

"Area full of Boche, especially Remiremont. Tanks and vehicles well camouflaged under trees on road station to town. Please bomb."

13 September From Alastair ()

"Send arms for grounds mentioned as soon as possible. Use BBC phrase Sottise. Will send coordinate soon other grounds as soon as possible. Liaison difficult confined to walking. Boche everywhere. May be contemplating defense of Moyelle between Epinal and Bussang. Beware Ack Ack Epinal and arches. Do not send equipment yet. All we want is uniform, walking kit, musette bag, boots, sleeping bag, carbines, automatics, knives and ammo."

15 September From Alastair ()

"Grounds for which you wanted coordinates are reserved for Alsace. We do not know them. Ground Rotation is compromised. Send arms urgently ground Perfecture."

16 September From Alastair ()

"Hold up operations Chatelain until confirmed. Germans attacking them tomorrow. Aircraft would be useful."

19 September From SFHQ to Alastair ()

"Sending ops on Anatomie, Barbiche, Berlingot and Baraque tonight. We do not know when General LeClerc enter your district. Will not be able to serve Chatelain and Lorgnette for they are not homo yet. Again get in touch with Rotation urgent."

19 September From Alastair ()

"Urgent send arms for 400 men to Chatelain and for 600 men to Lorgnette immediately. Will then liberate valley Remiremont-Jarmenil. Please advise us when General LeClerc will enter this district. Will attack 24 hours before."

() C-1167	11 Sep 44	() C-1111	11 Sep 44
() C-4574/72	12 Sep 44	() C-4682/42	13 Sep 44
() C-4862/80	15 Sep 44	() C-41/10	16 Sep 44
() C-2325	19 Sep 44	() C-237/26	19 Sep 44

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Operations, Team Alastair (Cont'd)19 September From Alastair ()

"Many Russians among defending troops. Will surrender to Americans but not to French troops. Can you drop leaflets telling them to do so."

20 September From SFHQ to Alastair ()

"All set to drop leaflets on Russians. Give us exact position where these would do most good."

24 September From SFHQ to Alastair ()

"Jed team Jacob reduced to Captain Gough. Is in northeast of St Die with Maximum, chief ops region. Have no news for over a week from them as region is infested with Boche. Maquis there are small groups of 200. Jed Jim is in your area at the mill at Eloyes."

25 September From SFHQ to Alastair ()

"Carry on which Captain Banbury since mission looks good. As long as you feel you can be real help to him, carry on Oliver."

26 September From Alastair ()

"Resistance east of area Epinal with exception of possible Borpoy. 600 in area Salles believed to be in W/T communication with London. Please communicate the following orders - first, that they recruit 50 men capable of guiding Allied armies to German border; second, that they split group into dispositions of 30; third, that they do not attack until ordered to do so. Our work now finished. Intend return London immediately."

Report of Team Upon Return from the Field - 24 August to 26 September

Mission. To contact Colonel Maximum () and work under his orders with the maquis in the area northeast of St. Die and possibly in Alsace.

Briefing. We were originally alerted on 8 August and arrived in London on 11 August where we were handed over to Lieutenant Wastin, our briefing officer. He, in his turn, handed us over to Lieutenant Deranger who gave us a very full briefing on the area of St. Die and descriptions of the various maquis whom we were likely to meet in that area and their state of armament which was virtually nil. We were also given the password,

() C-243/12 19 Sep 44	() C-2512 20 Sep 44
() A-79 24 Sep 44	() A-91 25 Sep 44
() A-244/38 26 Sep 44	() War Diary, Vol 3, p

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should we be, by any chance, dropped away from the reception committee.

We were first alerted to go on 12 August but just as we were getting into the car the operation was cancelled for that night. We actually did not get away until 24 August having managed to get one foot in the plane on 23 August. The reason for our delay was given as two-fold:-

(1) That Jedburgh team Jacob, who was supposed to be laying on a reception for us had encountered trouble and were, in fact, having a battle on our proposed dropping ground. ()

(2) That, as yet, the chiefs in the region had not agreed on the date of our arrival nor given us a dropping point. We received no further briefing, either as to change of dropping ground or change of mission, and on the morning of 23 August I went over to EMFFI Headquarters where I discovered that we had a completely new dropping ground 30 kilometres to the west of the one on which we were previously to have been dropped. As it took me the best part of two hours to glean even this meagre information I had no time to check up on where our mission had been changed to, and proceeded to the aerodrome (Harrington). The only personnel whose names we were given on the other side were (a) Planete, the D.M.G. of the area, and (b) Colonel Maximum, whose job was not given us.

Dispatch and Arrival. We took off from Harrington aerodrome at 2059 hours on 24 August, after a false start on the 23rd. Before departure we had agreed with the pilot the order of dropping which was as follows:

1st Run: Containers, 3 members of the team and 2 personal packages.

2nd Run: Remainder of the packages.

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The navigator then showed us the route we were to follow and the ground on which we would be dropped, and informed us that we should be dropped at 1010 hours. The dispatcher then went over the whole of the drill with us and we were eventually airborne in great spirits.

The pilot arrived over the dropping area at exactly the time he said he would, saw the lights straight away, and we commenced dropping on the first run.

The dropping did not take place quite as scheduled. Captain Maitre, who was No. 1, unfortunately hesitated because he said he saw the containers going past the hole just as the dispatcher said "Go"! The dispatcher then gave him three more "Gos", which I do not think he heard as it was not until I gave him a kick that he really realized he had to go, and then jumped. This meant that it was impossible to jump more than Captain Maitre and Sergeant Smith on the first run, and I was held back for the second run. This, unfortunately, caused me to have a very bad drop. The pilot, believing that he only had packages left in the plane, came down to what must have been about 400 feet and did not de-accelerate at all in dropping, the result being that I got a considerable buffeting, both feet in the rigging lines, and took a number of panels out of the chute. One of the maquis who was running to assist me, at the last moment, in order to avoid me, lay flat on his stomach, whereupon I sat rather heavily on him, saving myself a considerable amount of discomfort, but rendering him unconscious for two days.

The plane only managed to get 3 other packages out with me and eventually dropped the whole of the load in four sticks. I would like here to express our gratitude for (a) the excellent

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way in which we were treated at the aerodrome, and (b) the excellence of the crew on the operation. We all had complete confidence in the dispatcher and the pilot dropped his load in four runs and each time came straight over the lights and dropped the first package dead over the center light. The result of this was that everything in the plane was found in a circle of 250 yards diameter.

Reception. The reception was about the most frightening thing that one could ever experience. As I started my descent, I noticed little lights all over the place and a noise which I am sure could be heard at least a kilometer away. It turned out that we had been received by a reception committee of 500 men, which was a maquis which had only been mobilized the night before in the expectancy of receiving sufficient arms for the whole group on the night we were dropped. All that they actually received was the contents of the 12 containers in our plane which was a ridiculous load -- 8 containers of sabotage equipment and 4 containers of arms. This situation was for all a pretty poor start as they had been led to expect by the BBC message that there would be two aircraft arriving that night on that ground which they confidentially expected would be full of arms, and to receive 8 containers of sabotage equipment which, to say the least, were only a damn nuisance, and only 4 containers of arms, did not increase their confidence in the people who were coming to help them. What happened to the second plane which was supposed to drop on our ground I do not know. It left 6 minutes before us with a French officer on board and 12 containers; but if it did arrive anywhere, it certainly did not arrive on our ground. However, a plane did arrive which dropped 10 SAS who were supposed to have been

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dropped on a ground 25 kilometers away. It was also supposed to have dropped 24 containers for the maquis, but these were not dropped.

Immediately after landing we were taken to a nearby farm where we were given something to eat and drink. Here we met a Commandant Etienne who turned out to be the Adjutant to Commandant Didier, who was the departmental chief. The only reason for his presence on the ground was that, being a new maquis, he wanted to see that they did not make a complete bungle of the thing.

When all the containers had been collected and put into two trucks, we proceeded with them and the maquis to a nearby wood, having asked Etienne to put us in touch with the Departmental Chief at the earliest opportunity. In conversation with Etienne we discovered that team Jacob had already gone off with Colonel Maximum on the mission for which we had originally been briefed. He also told us that the whole department was in process of being organized into fighting groups and, having lost our original mission we decided that the best plan was to work with the Departmental Chief. I would like to state here that it would have helped us considerably had we been told by London that Commandant Didier and Commandant Etienne did, in fact, exist.

Accomplishment of Task. At 7 o'clock on 25 August we were contacted by the leader of the maquis to which we had been dropped. We changed into civilian clothes and were transported in an open truck with no papers into the town of Rambervilliers where we were divided into two, Captain Maitre staying at one house and Sergeant Smith and myself at another, where we were to await a liaison with Commandant Didier. This time we were slightly handicapped as, owing to my dropping accident, I

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was unable to walk for the first two days.

This maquis to which we had been dropped, and who were doing liaison duties for us, were extremely careless, and as there were quite a large number of collaborators in the town, including one in the house next door to us and one in the house opposite, I was not at all happy about our position and on the second day I insisted that we were moved somewhere else, as quite a lot of people were beginning to know of our presence even if they did not know who we were.

We moved that night to St. Benoit, and learned later the following morning that the Germans had sent a patrol to search the house. We stayed at St. Benoit for a further two days. This time we were in an unused house in the middle of the village, stuck in one room with the blackout up which we could not remove even by day because it would have shown that somebody was in occupation. At the end of this time we were anything but at the top of our form, especially since reports were coming in all the time that the Germans were reinforcing the district.

On the morning of the 5th day we were moved again, this time to a house at Moussoux, a village near Epinale, where we were at last to have contact with Commandant Didier. As a matter of interest, we had a bit of luck on this run. I had noticed that when we started there was a considerable number of German troops on the roads as we went by, and I pleaded with the driver to go as fast as he could. Just south of Rambervilliers we passed another truck and about a kilometer and a half behind that we went through a German control post. At this time we were still without papers. The truck behind us which we had passed was stopped by the control post and actually we were the last vehicle in the department

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to go through a control post unchallenged.

After our arrival on the farm at Moussoux we met Commandant Didier, Commandant Etienne and several of the leaders of the various maquis in the department. At the conference with Commandant Didier I outlined the following plan to him which he accepted:-

(1) To have a concentrated night dropping operation where we would serve 14 grounds with 3 aircraft all on the same night. The reason behind this was that the Germans had now reinforced the area quite considerably and we did not want to have dropping operations night after night and thus enable the Boche to concentrate his forces against a single maquis.

(2) Not to increase the strength of any of the present maquis and, in fact, to send back those unarmed men who could return home for the moment. All effectives were to be warned that they were to stand by and that they would be called out to the maquis according to the number of arms which were dropped on their particular ground.

(3) That, after the night dropping had taken place, the armed men should then be placed in the neighborhood of the daylight dropping points to act as a protecting body.

(4) To call for the daylight operations which had already been agreed between Planete and London.

(5) After the daylight operation, to call out all the FFI and start general guerrilla activities 48 hours after the daylight dropping.

The completion of stage (5) of the plan would have left us with an effective of 25,000 armed men. The plan as regards the 3 members of the team was to leave Captain Maitre at the farm to act as intermediary between Commandant Didier and myself.

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Sergeant Smith and myself were to be accommodated in separate farms close to each other on the edge of the forest near Elloyes. This plan, however, had to be abandoned as, during the conference, an agent liaison had warned us that the Boche were watching the area, and the evening before Sergeant Smith and I had left, somebody suddenly came in and said that the Germans were actually watching the farm itself. Under the circumstances we decided that it would be best for the 3 of us to leave as quickly as possible, and the new arrangements were that Captain Maitre should now go to the mill at Elloyes while Sergeant Smith and I still held to our original plan. Before we left the farm we had our first radio communication with London, outlining the plan we had made at the conference. During the journey from the farm to the area of Elloyes there was one incident which was a good warning to us. We had to use the bridge at Jarneuil, and as I was rather suspicious that this bridge would be guarded, and sent the guide over the bridge first and told him to return if it was not guarded. If it was guarded he was to continue on his way and we would swim across ourselves later. He came back and the four of us crossed the bridge, Captain Maitre and Sergeant Smith having the radio set on their backs. We noticed a building just the other side of the bridge and I inquired of the guide what this was, and he told me that this was the local Estaminet and also informed me that the guard was inside. Just as we got to the other side of the bridge we heard somebody come down a path and a German officer with a girl friend passed 5 yards in front of us. I quote this incident mainly for the lesson that it taught us, which was never to believe anything what the members of the Resistance told us from the point of view of danger. They are so used to seeing the Germans all over the place that they forget

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that, whereas they themselves can pass without trouble, 3 odd people, none of whom have papers, one of whom cannot speak French, and two of whom have wireless sets on their backs, cannot pass quite so easily.

Having arrived at our various abodes, the time pass reasonably quietly for a week as we were waiting for a reply from London as to our plans. The first answer which we received was that it was impossible to send us anything by night - in the words of the telegram - "owing to unforeseen circumstances and situations beyond our control." We then received a message to say that the daylight operations were now cancelled owing to the fact that Planete had not complied with some of the conditions under which the operations would be undertaken. By this time, the area was extremely heavily occupied by the Germans. They had stopped all civilian motor transport, it was impossible to travel by bicycle because you were merely stopped by a German soldier and the bicycle pinched, and we were therefore reduced by moving by foot, which meant that liaison with the departmental chief ceased altogether and we became completely out of touch with all the departmental chiefs. I still hoped at the time to be able to regain contact with the departmental chief and therefore for a week did nothing as regards organizing that particular area for fear of being at variance with the plans of the whole department. During this time Captain Maitre had managed to install himself in Elloyes and was taken on the strength of the village. This meant that his safety in the village was assured but, on the other hand, had the inconvenience of meaning that he could not leave the village for any considerable time, which meant that, henceforth, his only use was that of liaison, which had ceased. Sergeant Smith and I however, owing to being

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in outlying districts and also to the fact that Sergeant Smith could not speak French, were virtually in hiding. The Germans at this time started searching in various places as they had an idea that 3 of us were somewhere in the area. This meant that our method of living was to sleep at the farm, but to leave it an hour before dawn, remain in the forest during the day and return an hour after dark. At times, when we had reason to believe that the Germans were considering searching in the night as well as during the day, we had to spend the whole night out.

One incident there which happened to me was that the farmer came back from Elloyes, saying that he had heard that the Germans were thinking of searching at night and suggested that we should spend that night in a hangar full of straw in the middle of a field about 500 yards from one of the roads. We obediently got into our hangar and went up the far end and covered ourselves completely in straw. During the early part of the night I had heard convoys going down the road and at about 1 o'clock in the morning I suddenly heard the marching of feet and what must have been about 15 men stopped outside the hangar in which we were sleeping. Four of the Germans then proceeded to enter the hangar and remove straw which they passed down to the others who carted it away. We were wondering all the time whether they would remove sufficient straw so that they would eventually uncover us. However, after about 20 minutes they pushed off and left us in peace. Sergeant Smith also had several experiences much the same, probably his best being when he was stopped by a German officer and asked for a light. Fortunately, the German officer asked him in German and he managed to make signs that he could not understand him. The German then made a sign to him showing him what he wanted. He lit his cigarette with a Ronson lighter

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and all passed well. This was of no importance but it may be of interest. One night when I was in my billet asleep I had no reason to believe that the Germans were completing a search of the area but I just could not sleep during the night and I had a feeling that Sergeant Smith was in danger. This feeling became so strong that I could not stand at any longer. At 5 o'clock I got up and got hold of the farmer's son and told him to run down to the farm at which Sergeant Smith was staying and tell Sergeant Smith to take all his equipment and everything he had got and the boy would help him to clear off into the woods. Though I think the son thought I was crazy, he ran all the way there and Sergeant Smith got out of the house at 6:30 in the morning. At 7 o'clock the Germans arrived and searched the whole building, finding nothing. I mentioned this because, on four different occasions, for no reason at all, I seemed to have some sort of hunch which told me to do something, and in each case we avoided some danger.

At the time we arrived at Elloyes, there existed a maquis of roughly 400 men in the forest north of Jarneuil. This 400 consisted of 150 armed and 250 unarmed men. The Germans who, through the lack of security of the resistance throughout the department, had a pretty fair idea of (a) where all the maquis were, and (b) their approximate strength, moved another division of SS troops in, with the sole task of attacking the maquis north of Elloyes on a Saturday morning and dispersed them all. This occasion was one which is now the subject of an enquiry by the departmental chief. The head of the maquis was warned the night before these troops had moved into the area and that an attack was likely in the morning. He received a further warning in the morning that German patrols were moving up towards the forest. Upon receiving this information he took his bags,

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handed over the command to a lieutenant, and descended down to the village. His excuse for doing so was that he had a rendezvous with me, which was completely false. The maquis in their battle fought with extreme bravery but very little skill. The result of the battle was 100 Germans killed, 100 wounded. The maquis casualties were 10 killed. About 15 wounded had to be left behind, and when the maquis returned next morning found the Germans had massacred the lot. The large number of German casualties can be accounted for by the fact that Spitfires spotted the Germans moving up the side of the mountain and attacked them causing about 50 percent of the casualties.

At the end of the fortnight it was quite obvious that liaison with the departmental chief was not going to be gained, and I decided to work out my own salvation in one particular corner. By this time we had allocated the remnants of the Maquis north of Jarneuil as follows:- 40 well-armed men, lead by Lieutenant Roman, in the forest east of Elloyes, and a further 100 armed and still under the leadership of the old leader - a Commandant Achille - in the forest at Val d'Ajol, 10 kilometers south of Remiremont. I went to see both the leaders of these maquis and made the following plans with them:-

(1) That the two elements of maquis remaining-

(a) The 40, 6 kilometers, east of Elloyes, and

(b) The 100, south-east of Remiremont-

should remain in place and should receive stores for 400 at

(a) and 600 at (b).

(2) That these stores should be dropped 48 hours before the Americans tried the crossing of the Moselle.

(3) That the elements of the maquis in the should be warned that they were to report to the maquis when ordered to

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do so.

(4) That the mayor, or some other suitable leading citizen, should be detailed to warn these members of the maquis when to turn out. The plan was that the night before the general attack on the Moselle, the maquis should divide as follows:-

- (a) A group of 200 to attack and take the town of Elloyes.
- (b) That 400 of the maquis of Remiremont should take that town.

The remaining 400 to be divided into one group of 200, who would take a bridgehead on the Moselle at its most fordable point, and a further group of 200 should undertake general guerilla warfare throughout the remainder of the length of the Moselle between Elloyes and Remiremont. This plan, however, could not be carried out owing to the refusal of EMFFI to send us arms. We were therefore reduced to our 40 men at Elloyes with whom we first of all helped the Americans get their bridgehead with general guerilla warfare in the mountains. Once the Americans made their crossing, we used the maquis as guides and "Agents devant Renseignants." This, together with local patrol duties, was our chief task until the time I left.

Wireless report of team Alastair. Due to the fact that we were moving most of the time it was found practically impossible to keep sked times as laid down. It was impossible to use the radio at all for the first four days due to the proximity of the enemy.

I finally contacted home station on the evening sked of 31 August strength 4's. Then again the next day I contacted him. After that I did not head the home station for eighteen days. I worked all the times on the emergency frequency. A message was sent informing home station of the existing conditions.

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Next evening I contacted the home station but signal was very weak. It remained weak all the time from then onwards. Fading and interferences was the main reason for the weakness. Broadcasts were exceptionally good all the time.

The emergency was always reliable. Standard of operating from home station was poor.

Suggestions for further operations

All messages sent blind should be repeated in broadcasts.

A different type of generator for the set is needed as the existing one is far too noisy.

All radio equipment was left in Paris at H.Q. there.

W/T Equipment lost on Operations.

(1) Extra receiver complete - burnt when our equipment was 30 August.

(2) Receiver lost when accident occurred on road Vesoul - Lyon during return trip 30 August.

(3) 3 Crystals lost - frequencies unknown. 30 August.

(4) Aerial gear lost same time.

(5) Some silks lost same time.

Remainder left in Paris at H.Q.

Financial Statement

Received by Major Brown - - - - - 100,000 Frs

Expenses

Handed to Maquis at Eluys - - - - -	15,000
Handed to M. Hocquant for relations	
of dead in Maquis - - - - -	10,000
Clothes and material bought at Epnal -	4,000
American uniform bought in Paris - -	2,500
Living expenses Vosges - - - - -	11,000
Unaccounted - - - - -	7,736
Total - - - - -	50,236

Returned - - - - - 49,764

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Received by Captain Maitre - - - - - 100,000 Frs

Expenses

Given to Chief of Maquis of Rambeuillers
 in order to provide needs of fami-
 lies of maquis - - - - - 15,000
 Given to M. Hocquaux (Eloyer) for family
 of Eloyer killed - - - - - 10,000
 Living expenses during the mission - - 20,000
 Given to two agents dispatched at St.
 Die to obtain information - - - - 10,000
 Given to various persons for services
 rendered - - - - - 10,000
 Purchases of cigarettes and soap - - - 3,000
 Total - - - - - 68,000

Returned - - - - - 32,000

Received by Sergeant Smith - - - - - 50,000

Expenses

Gift to families of maquis killed in
 action - - - - - 10,000
 For clothing bought - - - - - 4,800
 To maquis for food - - - - - 10,000
 To personal keep while away from maquis 20,000
 To Frenchmen who guided and worked with
 me in absence of Major Brown - - - 3,000
 Total - - - - - 47,800

Returned - - - - - 2,200

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TEAM BRIAN

Jedburgh team Brian was the 47th Jedburgh team to be dispatched to France from the United Kingdom.

Members of Team

The members of team Brian were:

Major F. Johnston (British), code name "Illinois"

Captain R. Francombe (French), code name "Orkney"

Sergeant N. A. Smith (British), code name "Lira"

Area to Which Dispatched

Team Brian was dispatched on the night of 27/28 August to the Doubs area of France.

Background of Resistance in Area.

Team Brian was being dispatched to the Doubs region where the agent Pascal () had already organized some resistance groups with great potentialities. However, he required assistance in organizing and training these groups.

Purpose of Mission.

Team Brian was being dispatched to assist in the organization of the resistance elements. It would provide additional means of delivering stores to the field and an additional link between London and the FFI groups.

Method of Dropping and Reception Committee

The team was to be dropped to a reception committee organized by Pascal.

Communications

The team was dropped with one Jedburgh W/T set and instructed to establish contact with the Home Station as soon as possible after arrival in the field.

Finance

Each Jedburgh officer took 100,000 French francs with

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him to the field. The W/T operator took 50,000 French francs.

Relations with Other Allied Units

Operational Groups. If the team encountered any OG groups, they were to assist them as far as possible with their mission, but they would not come under their command.

Other Jedburgh Parties. There was no Jedburgh party in this area now. There was a possibility of one being dispatched in the near future. In this case it would not be connected with team Brian but would be responsible to Pascal. However, if team Brian felt another team could be used in this area one would be dispatched, if possible. The two teams would agree on division of responsibilities but both would be directly responsible to SFHQ.

An Allied Mission. There was no Allied Mission in this area at present. Should one be dispatched at a later date, it was possible that the team might be placed under its command.

Allied Forces, If Overrun. When overrun by Allied Forces, the team was to report to the nearest intelligence officer and ask him to forward them to the nearest SF Staff. This staff would recognize them and pass them back to SFHQ, London.

Action.

Upon Arrival in the Field. The team was to contact Pascal upon arriving. He would inform them of the general situation of resistance and put them in touch with the nearest resistance groups. All open offensive action was to be avoided except for continuous attacks by small parties on rail, road, and communications targets until such time as orders were received from London.

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If Captured. The team took no cover story to the field. If taken prisoner they would be taken as soldiers in uniform performing their ordinary military duties. Every established law of warfare would apply to them. Therefore, they would give their name, rank and serial number only.

Information Provided to Team.

The following information was provided to the team prior to its dispatch to the field:

- A. OG and other Allied Forces
- B. Resistance elements in the area

First Word from the Field

Team Brian announced its arrival in the field in the following W/T message dated 28 August ():

"Arrived safely. Intend contact Pascal, later today. West was thick with men."

Summary of W/T Messages Exchanged

28 August From Brian ()

"Pascal contacted. All radio equipment destroyed in drop, although chutes opened. Am liaising with SAS."

30 August From Brian ()

"Am still using Pascal's radio. New one for me urgent."

31 August From Brian ()

"Daily attacks on transport by FFI. Yesterday village of Pont de Roide attacked. Casualties - enemy 15 prisoners, 20 killed or wounded. Own troops 4 killed, 5 wounded. Vital you send arms soonest."

1 September From Brian ()

"All we want now is the material. Pascal intends keep us with him at present. Definitely know Dakota procedure--thought Hudson the same. Have been unable to erect landing ground owing to enemy activity. Will do it soonest."

() C-3053/69 28 Aug 44	() C-3141/7 28 Aug 44
() C-3309/42 30 Aug 44	() C-3430/33 31 Aug 44
() C-3497/24 1 Sep 44	

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1 September From Brian ()

"Heron, British agent of French Section who was taken prisoner 20 months ago while working with Hedgehog and Lion joined us today. Anxiously awaits instructions. Remembers old codes, etc. Chief at War Office was Richards."

2 September From SFHQ to Brian ()

"Please give us safe house or rendezvous with password for special American Mission called Uncle Sam who wants to pass through your region on its way north."

2 September From SFHQ to Brian ()

"Heron identified. Richards gives him choice of attaching himself to Pascal if both agreeable or of going into Switzerland for rest cure if he feels he needs it. There is no immediate hurry for him to come home."

4 September From Brian ()

"Heron prefers stay with us. If this okay. Send him full kit and uniform also our new Jed set. Getting desperate. Pascal extending controlled area south. Reinforcements including senior officers arriving. Apart from landing ground operations and awaiting stores, little work to do. Require more activity as explained to Ligne. This area already well organized and staffed. Many DZs available. Offers ideal base for airborne division. Any offers."

5 September From Brian ()

"Sitrep--enemy from reliable sources. 400 SS troops in barracks at Leval Dahonb. Boche preparing major defenses around Belfort. Anti-tank and artillery emplacements along Hericourt Thyetupes, 8 miles south of Belfort."

5 September From SFHQ to Brian ()

"Wireless was on one of planes which failed to arrive 31st. Sending again soonest. Thanks for DZ. Will check and get in action. You can expect any day arrival of reinforcements. Both Maquis and regular army coming from Pontarlier area."

5 September From SFHQ to Brian ()

"Special mission of one SAS council with Major Morel and Captains Kilmartin and Partal is leaving for Theodule, Lons de Saunier Tuesday morning. Expect soonest. Okay for Heron to stay with you. Will notify authorities concerned. For Martin - agree you take active part in operations provided Brian is willing carry all traffic together with operator of Jed team Henry being sent you soonest. Sort it out with Pascal and keep us informed."

- | | |
|------------------------|------------------------|
| () C-3496/32 1 Sep 44 | () C-4597 2 Sep 44 |
| () C-4633 2 Sep 44 | () C-3842/48 4 Sep 44 |
| () C-3888/50 5 Sep 44 | () C-4929 5 Sep 44 |
| () C-120 5 Sep 44 | |

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5 September From SFHQ to Brian ()

"You can expect arrival of special coordinating mission consisting of Colonel Broad of SAS and Major Morel and others soonest. Coming to you overland from Alfred or Theodule. Jed Cedric coming to you as from tonight on Chamesol."

6 September From SFHQ to Brian ()

"Considering German advance air force find it inadvisable fly by day but willing to send 10 aircraft to you by night tomorrow."

6 September From Brian ()

"Now SOS. Our plateau being heavily attacked by tanks and infantry. Send air support."

8 September From Brian ()

"Have taken prisoner Gerald Percy Sandys Hewitt, an Englishman who has been doing same work as Lord Haw Haw from radio Paris. Has promised me a written confession including names of associates. Broadcast under the name of Mikoh. Birth certificate number 260 issued in Paddington in sub district of St. John. Born 9 February 1900. Has British passport. Await your orders re disposal."

9 September From SFHQ to Brian ()

"Hang on to Haw Haw until you can deliver him over to military police British or American. Jed Henry trying again tonight. What is situation of wireless sets. Try to give us details of German pockets of resistance to your southwest. Sending you team of 5 cutthroats for odd mopping up operations."

11 September From SFHQ to Brian ()

"Give us report on military situation your immediate area and possibilities of maquis troops being usefully engaged in future operations in your area. Won't send cut throats."

15 September From Brian ()

"From Mission Etoile - Your 14 aspirants should be told to report to Boulaya who badly needs officers. Send them to Valdahon. New figures regarding Romans and Chabot do not agree your previous signal. Please give final and definite figures. Large discrepancies this sort most confusing and irritating to command to which these men be attached. Look forward receiving jeeps. All east 2 should be armed. Tell us by return

() C-134 5 Sep 44	() C-6481 6 Sep 44
() C-4027/4 6 Sep 44	() C-4230/41 8 Sep 44
() C-792 9 Sep 44	() C-1094 11 Sep 44
() C-4914/13 15 Sep 44	

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when to expect them. Dakota could easily land by daylight. There is no maquis in Le Russey. These grounds used to supply Pascals groups therefore no point sending Jed Henry this team anyway passing south Belfort via Albert Swiss contacts tonight. Have given spare Jed set to Henry. Send by Dakota B-2 set for Gregory. Will contact Saturday Swiss SR officer in view exploring possibilities moving north through Switzerland."

15 September From Brian ()

"French troops and FFI have taken Pont de Roide and Autechaux."

16 September From Brian ()

"Pascal says he has already confirmed receipt of 1 million francs. From Etoile - Saw General Eager this morning. Extremely satisfied with Abel's work. Abel took village of Accolans morning 15th, took prisoners and held village until arrival advance American elements. Villerge and Lisle sur LeDoubs occupied by Americans. Enemy resistance north and east of Lisle sur LeDoubs. Lure still occupied. Is being attacked today. Harrods arrived this afternoon. Jeeps still enroute. Deeply distressed news Roque Brune. Pascal instructed by General meet Howard to work with 9th French Division."

16 September From SFHQ to Brian ()

"Concerning Hewitt. Would like him handed over as soon as possible to the military authorities. Advise us immediately to which unit you hand him over. We also want from him anything and everything which you can get from him in the way of confession. If for some reason you have difficulties and you cannot hand him over to the military we leave you to dispose of him as you think best."

17 September From Brian ()

"Re Hewitt. Hope to send him to you by next Dakota. Confirm if you agree."

17 September From SFHQ to Brian ()

"Re Hewitt. Do not send Hewitt out by Dakota. but hand over to military authorities and tell us to which unit."

18 September From Brian ()

"Re Hewitt. Have now arranged for him to be sent to 7th Army through French 3rd Division 20th September. Between us have a conclusive statement of his activities in past 4 years. All documents will travel with him."

() C-4907/23 15 Sep 44
() C-1936 16 Sep 44
() C-2086 17 Sep 44

() C-4982/22 16 Sep 44
() C-77/15 17 Sep 44
() C-202/64 18 Sep 44

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21 September From SFHQ to Brian ()

"For Pascal and Martin. There is now a plane leaving from Amberieu on Monday 25th and you should return by this. At airport contact CO and ask for Colonel Xavier or his replacement who is probably Paul. Boulaya who is in London nominates Franconte to take your place. For Jed Brian - if you wish to stay together to help Franconte, that is all right. Radio contact should be maintained. If Johnson wants to return, he may do so by plane. Gather that FFI units will be disbanded in regular fashion by Boulaya on his return acting on orders from high authorities."

22 September From Brian ()

"Many thanks and heartiest congratulations to RAF on last night's Valdahon job. Best yet. 6 arrived Brian."

25 September From SFHQ to Brian ()

"Note Johnson and Heron will continue work with Etoile. Understand from Gregory Pascal's work handed over to Captain Polytk until Franconte ready to take over. Very pleased Pascal and Martin on way back."

29 September From Brian ()

"From Etoile - Captain Jack is sending two men north of Montbeliard tomorrow to report on German defenses there. Report will be forwarded you soonest."

30 September From SFHQ to Brian ()

"Will be very interested receive reports of German defenses at Montbeliard. By all means send copies of these reports to Army Corps liaison and 7th Army."

5 October From SFHQ to Brian ()

"Cannot understand what kind of identity cards are needed are agents mentioned your 60. Surely Milou and Vivanti have necessary military identity papers. Your message somewhat mutilated so please repeat names of first two agents mentioned."

7 October From Brian ()

"Re my 60 the names of agents - 1st Lt. L. Heron, 2nd Lt. Marc Schorp known as Marc to you. All four agents require General Koenig special identity cards. None of them are in possession of any type of identity paper whatsoever."

7 October From SFHQ to Brian ()

"Please give us your present location and if you can estimate how long you expect to stay there. Do

() C-2781 21 Sep 44	() C-564/35 22 Sep 44
() A-94 25 Sep 44	() A-300/82 29 Sep 44
() No. 29 30 Sep 44	() No. 32 5 Oct 44
() A-416/20 7 Oct 44	() C-1028 7 Oct 44

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Operations, Team Brian (Cont'd)

you move around very much. Presume you follow advance of armies. Considering sending a Jed team to Mulhouse area to help resistance there and would like to give them direct radio communication with you or Gregory if suitably located as well as with London. Would you are to this? Please answer by return."

8 October From Brian ()

"My present locality Sanceylekr and 12 kilos south-east of Clervalat. Present am static as information re Montbeliard is brought here. Will always be near French Army Corps Headquarters. Consider your suggestion very sound. Gregory now with me. Can guarantee to work your plan. Anticipate Gregory can be used exclusively on this plan in the near future."

8 October From Brian ()

"What are chances of a daylight operation in this area. I intend to see 7th Army tomorrow to try to arrange a central ammunition depot for all FFI groups who are working with regular army troops."

9 October From SFHQ to Brian ()

"Present possibilities of daylight operation are nil but are trying for near future. Meanwhile will send night operations to Chantrans if weather favorable. Can you tell us number of FFI groups in your area and approximate strength these groups."

9 October From SFHQ to Brian ()

"Very sorry but new restrictions on frequencies make direct contact between you and Jed Julian in Mulhouse area impossible. Therefore ignore references to plans, crystals, transmitter, etc. Will make arrangements here for re-transmitting cables between you and Julian via London without delay."

12 October From Brian ()

"Am most distressed at speed at which Alsations are being armed. What is cause of hold up."

12 October From Brian ()

"Am attempting to prevent Germans from blowing bridges at Montbeliard by arranging to have connecting wires cut and attaching an electric detonator to loose ends. Can you suggest anything more subtle. Am also trying to find arms and pass them through to 150,000 maquis in Montbeliard area. Marc has volunteered to go and take command. We will have wireless communication with him."

() A-424/26 8 Oct 44
() C-1035 9 Oct 44
() A-456/49 12 Oct 44

() A-427/36 8 Oct 44
() C-1038 9 Oct 44
() A-457/62 12 Oct 44

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Operations, Team Brian (Cont'd)12 October From SFHQ to Brian ()

"Very sorry about Alsations but blame the weather. Both Chantrans and Eysson operations ready but held up because of bad weather."

13 October From SFHQ to Brian ()

"Reference method prevention bridge demolitions--experts cannot suggest anything better. Well done."

17 October From Brian ()

"All members Etoile Mission except Lira and Selfar in Paris. Have seen the 1st French Army today re Alsations. Am trying to arm at least two companies with captured German arms. Am setting up an information service on enemy intelligence."

18 October From Brian ()

"Am in close liaison with General Moll of 1st French Army."

21 October From Watermark for Action Dant Red ()

"Awaiting your authority before continuing supplies to Jed Brian. Further requests received from the field and later information indicates these requests backed by 1st French Army Corps. Until your decision is given, unable to give instructions to Jed Brian."

22 October From Brian ()

"For Morel. Your son last seen with maquis group in Correze area about 4 weeks ago. Now believed to have joined regular army at Clermont Ferrand under name of Raoul."

22 October From Dant Red to Watermark ()

"If 1st French Corps back Briens request for stores, get them to obtain permission from 1st French Army and 6th Army group for necessary supply dropping operations to be carried out. This should not be difficult."

22 October From Brian ()

"Snow due to start this area ten days time."

22 October From Brian ()

"Marc left for Montbeliard three days ago with necessary material for preventing bridges being blown. Will ask him chances of also saving Peugeot works at Kochaux and of blowing up Peugeot rail siding if Boche have not yet moved the important machinery there."

()	A-312 12 Oct 44	()	C-1056 13 Oct 44
()	A-509/70 17 Oct 44	()	A-575/90 18 Oct 44
()	B-4392 21 Oct 44	()	A-716/34 22 Oct 44
()	B-3092/224 22 Oct 44	()	A-731/71 22 Oct 44
()	A-732/99 22 Oct 44		

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Operations, Team Brian (Cont'd)

22 October From Brian ()

"Regret to say Jack Robin has been arrested by Swiss police. Will signal full details when available."

23 October From SFHQ to Brian ()

"Have now received reply from military authorities who say that requests for further dropping operations must be made by you to 1st French Army Corps and 6th Army Group. Regret cannot do better but suggest you get French Army to make immediate application. Morel will bring you equipment you require. This is only method until operations to you are approved. Hope he gets to you before the snow arrives."

25 October From Watermark to Dant Red ()

"Brian reports 25 October that heavy artillery in area Arcey P28 Montbeliard and Rambervillers has been withdrawn to Belfort. Maximum enemy strength in this area 1800."

26 October From Brian ()

"Pascal left without doing proper handover. Saw his deputy Captain Polyte yesterday and discovered that only 800,000 Francs had been given to him. No trace of over a million Francs and valuable jewelry previously captured from Gestapo. Apart from 800,000 above there was no handover either in respect of material. More money required urgently. Please inform Etoile."

28 October From Brian ()

"Army Corps and Army quite unable to assist. Will try army group tomorrow for a most important dropping operation to Marco in Montbeliard. He has a hundred men concentrated there who are very short of ammunition for Bren guns and are almost starving. Detailed arrangements for this drop must be made by me as I have radio contact with Marco."

29 October From Brian ()

"Information re the Venin a little obscure. He is not arrested. Re money am now in urgent needs more money for domestic purposes at present. Point out Francombe left us with his share of the money. Morel did not turn up in Paris and Heron unable to contact remainder mission Etoile so returned here. Hope that everything you send us arrives intact here."

1 November From SFHQ to Brian ()

"You will receive visit of Rotation emissary from Planete. He will meet you at Sancey Le Grand Thursday

() A-738/37	22 Oct 44	() C-1088	23 Oct 44
() B-4550/51	25 Oct 44	() A-232/78	26 Oct 44
() A-912/57	28 Oct 44	() A-914/94	29 Oct 44
() A-1087	1 Nov 44		

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Operations, Team Brian (Cont'd)

morning, 2 November. Probably will want to discuss Alsatian situation with you."

2 November From Brian ()

"In addition to locations of large dumps of munitions and petrol following report received. At Hericourt large number of gas masks have arrived. Commander of depot says they will shortly be used for gas as a new weapon in Tuik area. Have asked for specimens mask and location of dump."

2 November From Brian ()

"Resulting interviews with Army group, following is re dropping operations. First no drops on Allied occupied territory. This applies to Alsatians. Second dropping operations will only be carried out to FFI groups in enemy occupied territory who have a specific task. Requests for such drops must come from a high French military authority. Have fixed all this for Mont Beliard group and hope authority should reach you soon. Suggest only method now left to arm Alsatians is for you to transport their material by sea to any French port. I will guarantee to get it from there to the Alsatians. Saw 2nd Corps re ammunition for their FFI battalions. They are worse off than 1st Corps who only have two days reserve. At least 40 tons of British arms and ammunition must be sent to 1st Army soonest. Why not by road. If you agree will send you percentages required."

3 November From SFHQ to Brian ()

"Congratulations on result of negotiations. We will try to get authority. .Regret no hope of supplying Alsatians by sea or 2nd Corps as supplies behind the lines completely controlled by military authorities. Send soonest particulars Montbeliard reception and ground. Can you give us information concerning present location Jed team Alan with whom we have lost contact. Last reported attached to two combat command, 1st French Armored Division somewhere in Belfort area. They have British W/T and we are anxious to know why no contact can be made."

7 November From Brian ()

"Ask Planete emissary to meet me at Sancy le Grand, Thursday, 9 November. Have arranged important conference for him at Besancon. What are the ages of the six operators being sent by you to Planete. Etourneaus failed to get out of Belfort. His wife was caught with all his cipher and he returned. Have not had contact with him personally."

7 November From SFHQ to Brian ()

"Montbeliard refused because flak but suggest you should use Luxeuil airfield which is in our possession."

() A-1054/40 2 Nov 44
() A-1191 3 Nov 44
() A-1410 7 Nov 44

() A-1068/70 2 Nov 44
() A-1207/99 7 Nov 44

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Operations, Team Brian (Cont'd)

Telling Planete to send emissary meet you Thursday at Sancey. Six operators not being sent by us. Ask his emissary for their ages. If all Etourneaus ciphers are taken both he and you will have to be given new ones in due course. Give us any further news you may have concerning him."

8 November From Brian ()

"Will see 1st Army again re arms for Alsations. It will be a tragedy if they are not armed as they were promised the arms before they left Switzerland. Hope to give you news of Jed Alan in near future."

10 November From Brian ()

"Heron has been recalled to Paris. This leaves self and Lira to carry on. Would like to see Morel to discuss potentialities of Brian. Consider that after fall of Montbeliard we can be of little further assistance in this country as French SR appear to have things well organized in other sectors and anything we could do would be superfluous. Heron will see you in London to give full picture."

11 November From Brian ()

"At Morvillars ten kilometers northeast of Montbeliard several reinforced concrete ramps in construction and almost complete. These ramps are built on an incline and have rails mounted on them. One of them has foundation 7 meters deep. These are now ripe for bombing."

11 November From SFHQ to Brian ()

"Colonel Vernon of EMFFI, Paris going Monday or Tuesday to Sancey le Grand to meet you. Requests that you get Captain Giles to attend meeting."

11 November From Brian ()

"Material sent via Morel arrived just in time. Many thanks. Unable to give anything to Milou or Vivanti. Both very disappointed."

12 November From Brian ()

"First Army Corps agree most important to arm Alsations. To whom is application made to supply material by sea. We know the normal channels but would like to have the special circumstances explained to the deciding authority. Assured that Paris are dealing with requests ammunition for British arms in this sector. Can you do anything to expedite the arrival here."

() A-1255/100 8 Nov 44	() A-1316/25 10 Nov 44
() A-1349/6 11 Nov 44	() A-1643 11 Nov 44
() A-1357 11 Nov 44	() A-1378/46 12 Nov 44

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Operations, Team Brian (Cont'd)13 November From SFHQ to Brian ()

"Delighted to hear you have received material from Major Morel. Sorry about Canadiennes but regret there is nothing we can do from here. Suggest you discuss all questions of material, clothing and supplies for Alsations at meeting with Colonel Vernon and the others as they may be able to help."

15 November From SFHQ to Brian ()

"For Colonel Vernon - Jed Julian did not leave this morning. Postponement due bad weather. Hope for tomorrow 16th. Still waiting confirmation re communication with Marc."

17 November From Brian ()

"Please tell us where Milou and Vivanti are now and exactly what they are doing. Unless they are indispensable they should go to Paris to be decommissioned from the British forces and transferred to the French. Please let us know what they will do."

23 November From Brian ()

"Milou and Vivanti left for Paris the day before your telegram arrived which is all a part of our special quick service. Will stay here a few days to tie up loose ends. Hope to bring back the special wireless which we had in Montbeliard."

23 November From Brian ()

"Before closing down feel this is an opportune moment to express on behalf of Lira and self our gratitude to all your end. Please convey our thanks to all the W/T operators, cipher staff and all the other boys and girls in the back rooms who have worked with us and helped us in many ways. Once more thanks."

23 November From Brian ()

"Saw Planete Monday. All he wants from me are the crystals. These can be given to Morel in Paris if you agree, which I doubt. Hope to arrive Paris Saturday night."

23 November From SFHQ to Brian ()

"Have received cable from Planete stating he okays your closing down. Before coming back to UK you are to get in touch with Planete at Nancy. Second, go to Paris at Les Invalides to see Colonel Vernon. Third, report to Major Alastair Hamilton, Hotel Cecil, Paris, concerning your return to UK."

() A-1701 13 Nov 44
() A-1394 17 Nov 44
() A-1676/12 23 Nov 44
() A-2036 23 Nov 44

() A-1805 15 Nov 44
() A-1669/26 23 Nov 44
() A-1683/12 23 Nov 44

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23 November From SFHQ to Brian ()

"This is our last message to you. Will close down plan after Monday unless you reply to contrary. Confirm."

24 November From SFHQ to Brian ()

"Have already explained position to Planete re crystals. He will not require yours so bring them back with you. Will be seeing you soon."

Report of Team Upon Return from the Field - 28 August to 29 Nov 44

Mission.

1. To assist Pascal in the organization of the FFI in the Doubs.
2. To provide additional means of delivering stores to the FFI.
3. To provide an additional link between London and the FFI.
4. To find landing grounds for DC 3 landing operations.

Dispatch.

At 0010 hours on 28 August the team was dropped to a full reception committee at Montechroux. The order of dropping was Francomte, Smith, Johnston.

The following morning Pascal, an American agent now commanding the group, was contacted and arrangements made for us to visit his battalions and inspect the defenses of the Fort De Lomont, an important feature which he had been ordered to hold.

As the Jed set had been completely destroyed on landing, arrangements were made to use Pascal's set for our skeds.

Organization on Arrival.

As a result of the reconnaissance, the following appreciation was made as to the potentialities of the group:

Own Troops.

() A-2108 23 Nov 44

() A-2145 24 Nov 44

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Armed - 1200

Trained but unarmed - 1000.

Available at 24 hours notice 4000.

Enemy. The enemy had approximately one battalion at Pont De Roide (approximately 3 miles south) and another at Audincourt (to the north). Patrols were carried out by these troops, circulation by us in the valleys was possible but the greatest care had to be taken.

Defences. Adequate with the exception of anti-tank defenses which were very weak owing to shortage in Piats and also that the men, including Pascal had no faith in the bazooka. The defenses were modified and individual positions for anti-tank weapons chosen. We also persuaded the group that the bazooka was an efficient weapon when handled properly. A message was then sent demanding the necessary arms and ammunition for the group.

Command. Pascal had control of the group which was well officered. He tried to do much too much of the administrative and less important work himself with the result that it was frequently difficult for anyone to find him at his headquarters. An effort was made to try to relieve him of some of these duties, but this proved difficult as he was a man of strong character who preferred to do the work himself. As a result of the above it was decided that the team could best be employed:

1. Finding Dakota grounds.
2. Finding supplementary dropping grounds.
3. Visiting battalions and carrying out instruction in weapon training.
4. Assisting the communications of the SAS as well as Pascal.
5. Providing arms for the groups in the area.

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A discussion was held with Pascal with a view to clarifying exactly our position and to decide if we could more usefully be employed with some of the FFI groups in the vicinity, who were not easily controlled owing to the difficulties in communications. Pascal decided that he required us with him to assist him in making plans for attacks on troop concentrations and enemy lines of communications, etc.

On 31 August Lieutenant Crowley (Heron) () was brought to our Headquarters where he was interviewed by Major Johnston. After receiving confirmation as to his identity from London he was taken on as part of the team. This officer was of great assistance both in assisting communications and in liaison duties.

A full reconnaissance was made on 3 September on the landing ground at Blamont, northeast of Pont De Roide. This Dakota ground was ideal and the necessary information sent to London. At a later date another landing ground was found in the Pierre Fontaine area. Unfortunately neither of these grounds were used.

A reconnaissance of the power station just south of Pont De Roide was made on 5 September by Major Johnston with a view to seeing what preparations had been made. Arranged with the chief electrician that he should report to our Headquarters as soon as the enemy started preparing for its demolition.

No demolitions were carried out on this power station.

While on this reconnaissance Pascal decided to carry out an attack on the bridge at Lisle-Sur-le-Doubs, in the hope that he could hold it until the regular forces arrived.

This attack was carried out by two companies of the Corps Francs assisted by the SAS. Captain Francombe also went on this attack. In its initial stages the attack succeeded but

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the enemy had time to call up reinforcements and our troops had to withdraw under heavy mortar and machine-gun fire, when Francombe was wounded. After this time Francombe was "Hors de Combat" as far as the team was concerned, but Heron was an able assistant.

An elementary principle was overlooked, i.e., when irregular forces are operating with regular troops, the plan must be coordinated and liaison established between the two forces. In this case the attack was put in three days too early.

On 6 September the enemy put in a determined attack from three directions on the Fort De Lomont, with armored vehicles, half track vehicles, and infantry, with SP guns in reserve. At this juncture a French flying column was only sixteen kilometres away at St. Hippolyte, but it was not certain that they would be able to get through to give us support. A signal was therefore sent demanding air support as the paths leading up to the plateau were narrow and afforded a good bombing target. At 1800 hours a section of the flying column arrived with guns and two tank destroyers. The enemy withdrew as soon as fire was commenced with the guns. I therefore cancelled the air support.

Gerald Percy Hewitt was caught by FFI guards near the Swiss frontier coming from Switzerland on 8 September and was brought to our Headquarters and interviewed. He first stated that he was an Englishman who had escaped from the Germans. He wanted to be taken to the nearest British Unit where he had important information. Major Johnston did not believe the story and after two and a half hours interview he broke down and confessed all. He later made a written confession which he signed. Acting on orders from London he was later sent to

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American 7th Army via French Securite Militaire at Maiche.
A copy of his confession was also give to Colonel Broad
(Etoile)().

We moved our Headquarters to Sancey Le Grand on 12 September where we established a permanent Headquarters for Mission Etoile, who had lost their Jedburgh team owing to casualties and who were obliged to travel about dictating policy to groups who had already been overrun etc.

Our mission now included the arming of the Group Mobile D'Alsace, and the organization of an information service on intelligence received from behind the German lines. To assist me in this task the following officer were incorporated into the team:

Lieutehant Milou
Lieutenant Vivonte
Lieutenant Schorpp
Captain Gilles
Jack Robin (Weil)

It was decided that, in order to get the maximum value out of the information service, the closest liaison must be set up with French 1st Army and French 1st Army Corps, a complete understanding was reached with the formations concerned and I was able to take reports almost daily to 1st Army Corps where the 2ieme Breau gave me questionnaires on information required and kept me informed on the general tactical situation.

On 12 October it was decided that the Maquis group in Montbeliard had great potentialities in assisting the forthcoming attack on the Belfort Gap. I, therefore, went to 1st Army Corps and gave them all available information on the Montbeliard group, including the fact that there was a wireless set there, with which I had direct communication.

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I suggested that we could try to save the bridges of Montbeliard but asked to have our actions controlled and coordinated by 1st Army Corps. I saw the senior staff officers of 2ieme and 3ieme Bureau who gave me instructions that the Montbeliard group should, (a) Try to prevent the destruction of the bridges in Montbeliard, (b) Organize teams of men to lead their infantry and tanks through the minefields, and (c) Continue with our information on enemy dispositions which was proving to be most accurate and of the greatest value.

They had, by this time, full confidence in our mission and promised to give me warning as to the date of renewing the offensive, so that I could put our plans into operations.

I appreciated the fact that the best method of saving the bridges was to sabotage the electrical initiation systems in such a way that the fault would not be detected by the Germans. I saw Lieutenant Schorpp, who had volunteered to go to Montbeliard that night, and briefed him as to his mission, I instructed him in the method of organizing a reception committee and gave him the necessary materials for his task. Two days later he left for Montbeliard.

On 17 October I contacted Etourneau, an agent who was trying to get into Alsace, without success. I made the necessary contacts for him and later arranged a special wireless plan with him, so that any information of an urgent nature for 1st Army could be passed to me without delay. I maintained liaison with this agent and at a later date when his wife had been captured with all his codes by the Gestapo, I gave him one of my own codes.

Shortly after this time it became apparent that there were no adequate second line supplies to maintain the FFI

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groups who were now fighting with 1st Army Corps. I, therefore, went to the Headquarters of General Moll and later to 2nd Army Corps, where I was able to get a full picture of the deplorable state of replenishment of British arms and ammunition.

The first message from Schorpp showed that there was a group of 150 FFI in Montbeliard who were trained but were very short of ammunition and food. I, therefore, went to 6th Army Group to try to arrange for a drop to this group and also to get authority for further drops to the Alsatian group, and drops to establish a British ammunition depot for 1st French Army. Various promises were made but no further drops were received.

All that was requested for the Montbeliard group was one aircraft to drop the necessary supplies. If this drop had been granted the group would have been able to delay the withdrawal of the enemy considerably and would have inflicted heavy casualties.

I consider that the policy whereby authority for dropping operations could only be obtained from SHAEF, through the normal channels, was quite unworkable. There were other groups one of which numbered 500 men to the north of Montbeliard for whom I was unable to obtain supplies owing to this policy.

When the attack on Belfort was commenced the Montbeliard group cut the initiation systems and held off the German repair squads with machine gun fire until the arrival of the regular troops. They succeeded in saving all the main bridges in their area, and lead the infantry through the minefields. They also succeeded in saving the post office by placing dummy detonators in the charges, and passed on my orders for

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similar action to the groups to their immediate north and northeast. Immediately prior to the offensive, I maintained a daily liaison with 1st Army Corps and the action of these groups was coordinated into the main plan by that Headquarters.

General.

Until being overrun, daily attacks were made on German transport on the road Pont De Roide - Montbeliard - Belfort. Three attacks were made on the garrison at Pont De Roide. One attack was made on Audincourt; One attack on the bridge at Lisle-sur-le-Doubs. Approximately 2000 men of the group Lomont were armed. Approximately 250 men of the Groupement Mobile D'Alsace were armed. In addition German arms were supplied to these and other groups.

After being overrun I made an effort with Colonel Fournier, Commanding the region, and also with 1st Army to try to have arms and ammunition withdrawn from groups in the south and issued to the groups in my region who were actively engaged in fighting the enemy. I was unsuccessful in this mission. I am still unable to understand the policy whereby large numbers of arms and ammunition were allowed to lay dormant while FFI groups in the front line were desperately short. At the same time I asked if steps could be taken to unify the types of arms in each group i.e. one group completely armed with German rifles and machine guns, another with English arms another with Russian arms. Action was taken by First Army on this subject.

There were still German dumps of munition and arms dispersed in our area but no action was being taken by higher authority for their collection. I therefore travelled about the country finding these dumps and distributing the arms to the various groups for whom I was responsible. I found one

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very large dump at Valdahon and reported its existence to Colonel Boaluyer who arranged for it to be collected by 1st Army and distributed by them.

Owing to the fact that the groups were not well trained in reception committee work it was necessary for Heron or myself to attend all receptions.

The French Service Speciaux was most helpful and liaison was established with them at frequent intervals.

Only information of strategical importance was sent to London. These included locations of important excavations and workings suspected of being V1 and V2 sites. Also the location of a large store of gasmasks at Hericourt. From information received I suspected that the gas masks were of a new design, presumably for a newly invented gas. I, therefore, asked Schorpp to try to get a specimen and send it back to me for examination by experts. The dump was well guarded and he was unable to get a specimen.

In addition to the intelligence service in the Montbeliard area, a further twelve agents were recruited so that information could be supplied and the Maquis groups controlled as far as Mulhouse. These agents however were not employed owing to the difficulties in passing back information quickly without wireless sets, and because, by the time the necessary false papers had been obtained, the offensive was about to commence.

For this type of work German-speaking Alsations are still available from the Group Mobile D'Alsace, and facilities are available to pass men through Switzerland into Germany.

The wireless set used in Montbeliard was made by a Swiss amateur. It worked perfectly at a range of sixteen miles for one month at two skeds a day. I brought the set back to this

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country for examination by experts.

I would like to express my gratitude to the French Military authorities for the way I was accepted and for the interest taken by them in my mission. In particular, I mention the following who gave me every assistance in my mission and with whom I worked in close harmony:

Colonel Nadau - 2eme Bureau lere Corps d'Armee.

Commandant Simoneau - Directeur des Services Speciaux
lere Armee.

Radio Report by Sergeant Smith

The first contact with London was made on the morning of 29 August at 1030 hours.

The last radio contact was on 23 November. During the three months all skeds worked without notable difficulty except for strong bursts of interference on the evening sked, on even days at 1800 hours. After moving our position on 13 September this trouble ended.

Main Frequency Receiving

This frequency seemed better in the morning sked, or at night than in the afternoon when other stations were very powerful.

Alternate Frequency Receiving

Had need to use this only one time and never heard home station so cannot say as to its usefulness.

Sending Frequencies

These frequencies seem to have been quite good except for odd spells of interference, atmospherics, and for the greater part all work was carried out on the main frequency.

Emergency

Both these frequencies were very good indeed although the day frequency was much better than the night one, which

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is to be understood. At night when calling on emergency it was not unusual to call for fifteen minutes before contact was made. This was due to the fact that the home station had much interference at night.

Broadcast.

Both frequencies very good. The signal "no message for you" was understood every night without difficulty.

General

As all the work was done on B-2 with the exception of several skeds worked on Jedburgh set, I cannot compare the two sets, but the B-2 was the ideal set in conditions where the operator is alone for long periods.

On the whole, the skeds and contacts were made without undue bother and communication was always kept up.

The base station operators deserve many congratulations for their great assistance and understanding.

The Jedburgh set was completely destroyed on landing. The reason for this can only be attributed to the fact that the set was very badly packed as the parachute opened and the wind was not excessive.

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~~SECRET~~

JEDBURGH VOLUMES ARE TO BE COMPLETED LATER
HOLD FOR LT COL J. FREEMAN LINCOLN

~~SECRET~~

427878

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date 23 January 1979

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JEDBURGHS

Operations, Team JudeTEAM JUDE

Jedburgh team Jude was the thirty-second Jedburgh team to be dispatched to France from the United Kingdom.

Members of team

The members of team Jude were:

Captain W L O Evans (British), code name "Glamorgan"

Captain J Lavisme (French), code name "Rence"

Sergeant A E Holdham (British), code name "Guinea"

Area to Which Dispatched

Team Jude was dispatched on the night of 14/15 August to the Loire (Rhône) area of France.

Background of Resistance in Area

Well organized resistance groups existed in the departments of Saône et Loire, Rhône and Northern Loire. In view of the importance of the communications leading north and northwest from Lyons, it had been decided to stiffen these resistance groups by parties from 3/French Parachute Battalion SAS, to which the team was to be attached.

Purpose of Mission

Team Jude was being dispatched to provide liaison between SAS and the resistance groups and SAS and London. Also, they were to take part in action designed to harass enemy movements on road and railways, particularly through Lyons and St Etienne.

Method of Dropping and Reception Committee

The team was to be dropped with half a troop of 3/French Parachute Battalion to Mission Gingembre. ()

Communications

The team was dropped with a Jedburgh W/T set with instructions to establish contact with the Home Station as

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soon as possible after arriving in the field.

Finance

Each Jedburgh officer took 100,000 French francs with him. The W/T operator took 50,000 French francs.

Relations with Other Allied Units

SAS. The team would be attached by mission commanders and organizers to the SAS units in order to provide communication and liaison with resistance. However, they were being dispatched to the FFI mission Gingembre under whose command they would come in the field.

Allied Forces, If Overrun. When overrun by Allied forces, the team was instructed to report to the nearest intelligence officer. They would disclose no details of their work to this officer but merely ask him to pass them back to the nearest SF Staff. This Staff would recognize them and pass them back to SFHQ London.

Action

Upon Arrival in the Field. Upon arriving in the field the team was to put itself at the disposal of the head of mission Gingembre and carry out its mission according to his instructions.

If Captured. The team took no cover story to the field. If taken prisoner they would be taken as soldiers in uniform performing their ordinary military duties. Every established law of warfare would apply to them. Therefore, they would give their name, rank and serial number only.

Information Provided to Team

The following information was provided to the team prior to its departure:

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1. Enemy order of battle in the area.
2. Resistance movements in the area.

First Word from Field

Team Jude contacted headquarters on 15 August announcing its arrival. The message, however, was not decipherable.

Summary of W/T Messages Exchanged

16 August From Jude ()

"Information is 1200 armed men in department. 5,000 unarmed in Lyon. 2000 men unarmed. Needs are brens, plats, 2-inch mortars, rifles, carbines, explosive. Boche 5000 in Lyon, 300 in Villefrance, 300 in Chazelles, 300 in Bourgouin. All Boche movements very badly restricted owing part activities FFI which virtually control region."

17 August From Jude ()

"We are 20 kms SW Vaugneray. Require for Gingembre for next month 2000 planes."

17 August From Jude ()

"Field hospital here. 100 beds, 4 doctors. 6 doctors waiting call. Need 3 medical panniers. SAS sabotage group in position commending ops."

18 August From Jude ()

"All gendarmes of Lyon disarmed Tuesday."

19 August From Jude ()

"Last night SAS cut only rail left out of Lyon station. Only road open enemy is road northeast Lyon. Re last night SAS okay but they and containers badly dispatched. Radio contact very bad except Secours."

19 August From Jude ()

"Have found 36 containers after last night. No packages. Still want sack for Rence."

27 August From Jude ()

"Six planes okay last night. Have 118 large containers, 10 small. Hope more later. Still need bazooka, plat, rifles. Hun engaged southwest north Lyon. Strong guerrilla activity outskirts Lyon."

() C-1851/3	16 Aug 44	() C-1966/10	17 Aug 44
() C-1967/7	17 Aug 44	() C-2031/11	18 Aug 44
() C-2124/12	19 Aug 44	() C-2156/6	19 Aug 44
() C-3016/12	27 Aug 44		

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30 August From Jude ()

"Received on Rainette 2 planes, 30 container large and 18 small. Tell all planes this region our cars on minor roads. They are marked, do not shoot. Hun often Red Cross on his cars but Hun cannot use minor roads."

30 August From Jude ()

"Aircraft bombing Maquis transport on small roads--22 killed, 40 wounded, 3 marked trucks this afternoon American aircraft."

1 September From Jude ()

"Have need of following medicines urgently - insulin, catgut, silk horsehair, needles, anaesthetic, local and general, blood. Also 3 further medical planners. Now have 3 hospitals."

3 September From Jude ()

"Received all containers and packets Vihaigrette night 2/3. Two containers damaged. 1 packet burned. Attacking Lyon today."

5 September From Jude ()

"Occupied Lyon yesterday. A light isolated resistance. Contacting intelligence 7th Army Group this evening."

9 September From Jude ()

"HQ SAS to McLeod from Nairn. Conan is regrouping all SAS units from Saone et Loire and Rhone departments and putting them at disposal of General Denattrelet Assigny. Best elements FFI will also be attached. No jeeps now available to join Abel from Conan. Please instruct whether Fournier available rejoin Conan."

11 September From SFHQ to Jude ()

"Nairne from McLeod. You have twice received orders to send jeeps to Abel. Comply forthwith and furnish explanation as to why not sent some days ago. Fournier not available. Give location of place where regrouping taking place and date on which expect to be completed. Confirm departure of jeeps."

13 September From Jude ()

"SAS left Lyon this morning, regrouping place unknown. Have contacted 4 SFU who are passing message on through 7th Army."

() C-3296/29	30 Aug 44	() C-3340/52	30 Aug 44
() C-3585/18	1 Sept 44	() C-3729/3	3 Sept 44
() C-3885/77	5 Sept 44	() C-4293/18	9 Sept 44
() C-6522	11 Sept 44	() C-4728/9	13 Sept 44

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Operations, Team Jude (Cont'd)

(The team returned to the UK on 22 October and on 7 November received instructions to return to France to direct one more course at the Ecole des Cadres FFI de St Genis Laval.)
Report of Team Upon Return from the Field - 14 Aug to 22 Oct 44

Mission - To contact Mary and to place ourselves at his disposal and secondly, to provide a wireless link with the SAS who were dispatched with us.

Departure - The departure was well arranged and worked well as far as timings etc, went. Arrangements for carrying personal stores and equipment were good.

Dropping - Parachute jumps for all three were very good.

Reception Committee. As a result of a misinterpretation of the BBC message to Mary there was a reception committee of 2,000 with a 100 vehicles and innumerable farm carts on the ground. That is to say, in the BBC message, it was said that there were 40 friends arriving, being in actual fact SAS. The word "friends" was interpreted to mean aircraft. The whole area of 20 kilometer each side of the reception committee ground was cleared of Boche and guarded.

We as a Jed team were not given container space in the aircraft on account of the fact that the SAS needed all the space available in the 4 aircraft allotted. Of the 4 planes which left England, one did not drop. The cause is believed to be: Too many fires owing to SAS containers and leg bags which exploded and burned; Too many torch lights showing owing to badly disciplined reception committee (in all cases where SAS dropped on our area grounds there was the same story of containers and leg bags burning. This was not the case as far as other reception committees went.)

Contacts. As far as contacts etc went, we made them all

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as given and at all times had the fullest cooperation and assistance possible. These were:

Mary, Delege Militaire Departemental Rhone (Mission Gingembre).
Polygone, Delege Militaire National
Carre, Delege Militaire Regional R 1
Charles-Renri SAP South French
Fouchet, Chef Militaire South French
Darciel, Chef Militaire R 1
Descours, Bayard Chef Militaire Duvercors

Activities. Our activities included SAS liaison, supply and cooperation.

SAS. At all times the radio was left at an advanced headquarters together with a small garrison where it would be easily available to SAS; the same thing applied as regards stores, as a small reserve was available. We sent their messages for them, and had our own reception committee's to receive their stores. We endeavored at all times to keep track of all the activities of their various small groups, in order to pass on information. On several occasions, owing to the absence of the SAS leader, we have given directives and orders to the SAS for example -

1. For the reconnaissance prior to the attack on Chazelles.
2. Gave orders for the interception and destruction of an enemy column which had left Chazelles for Rives de Gier.
3. Sent a stick of SAS to take an enemy patrol which was at St Martin le Cote.
4. We supplied the materials to the SAS in order to form a sabotage company of Maquis with the sabotage stick under the command of Lieutenant Hourst.
5. Reconnaissance and organization of an ambush which was made on the Lyon, Roanne road.
6. Re-equipped the SAS with clothing, arms and stores

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before they left us in order to rejoin their battalion in the field further north.

Organization, instruction and arming of Maquis to 3,000 men.

When we arrived in our area, although there was quite a considerable number of men in the Maquis, the number of well organized and reasonably armed Maquis was very small. This meant that on arrival, our first duty was, under the orders of Mary, to organize and arm them with the material we received; secondly, to instruct those people lacking the necessary knowledge for their work both as soldiers and as saboteurs. We chose the most likely as leaders and directed the units to their fighting dispositions.

Hospitals. When we arrived there was one small field hospital in existence of 100 beds. It was badly placed in relation to the actual scene of operations, being too far away.

It was necessary, therefore, to organize something of a more satisfactory nature. Together with a doctor who was in the Maquis, we gave each unit in the field medical orderlies and doctors as considered necessary, organized on a basis similar to the army. That is first aid, evacuation to an advanced hospital which we formed at St Marten en Haut with doctors we recruited, afterwards to one of two hospitals further back for more serious cases, ie. St Symphorien sur Coise, and St Foy de L'Argentiere which we formed in the same way, where we had three surgical teams of doctors etc, capable of performing serious operations.

We also formed a convalescence center at St Martin en Haut and Chamausset.

Such as was lacking in the way of medical supplies, we

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endeavored to supply by our deliveries, and in the case of equipment we had the things necessary brought in from St Etienne. We found a young English priest who was hidden in the region and had him visit the units in the field and the hospitals.

Establishment and Organization of Chain of Liaison and Chain of Supply and Distribution for all Reception Grounds in Our Area

As regards liaison, we found that things seemed to move very slowly as far as the passing of information was concerned, especially in respect of reception committee grounds. We decided, therefore, to organize a chain of young girls and boys with their bicycles and in some cases motorcycles, in order to carry messages. In each Maquis we left a courier of this description for work with us, and in our headquarters we had a courier for each Maquis.

With the assistance of telephone workers found in the Maquis, we switched the telegraph lines in our area, and made ourselves an independent telephone unity. In the later days, we established a secret and direct line from ourselves into Lyon itself.

In each village we organized a force of Home Guard for the purpose of warning us, by day or night, of anything extraordinary which may have happened.

We arranged a permanent reception committee for each of our grounds, with transport, for the receiving, checking and distribution of material.

Liaison and Cooperation (Radio and Reception Committee with SAP. Immediately after our arrival in France, we contacted SAP (French unit of BCRA trained primarily for radio and reception committee work), and found in them a willingness

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to cooperate, which was extremely useful.

In certain cases, where owing to weather or topographical conditions, our set was inadequate, we were always given full facilities to use their radios and in one case had a message sent on their link. As far as equipment went, in the way of Eureka and 'S' phone, which we did not possess, they were always more than anxious to assist.

We found they had worked, in conjunction with Mary, a BBC system of warning of deliveries. This enabled us to ask for warning of our deliveries in the same way over their broadcasts, which saved a quite considerable amount of coding for messages, both in London and in the field.

As far as the actual receptions went, they were always willing to turn out and assist us receiving, checking and distribution, and when necessary we could always count on being able to borrow their truck and chauffeur when we were short of transport.

In the same way, we did all in our power to help them, and endeavored to return service for service. We helped them in their receptions, with petrol and transport where possible, and with food clothing and shelter.

Instruction for Reception Committees Outside Our Area. On our arrival in the field, we found that SAP were the only people who were capable of laying on a reception committee and that there was, owing to the fact that only one unit of them existed in the area, a grave shortage of trained personnel. As it was impossible for us at that time actually to concern ourselves with reception committees outside our region, owing to travel difficulties and pressure of other work, we contacted the

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people concerned and instructed them in the work, in particular Isere and Loire. We also endeavored, with some measure of success, to tighten up reception committee discipline as regards: fires and flashlights; disposition of personnel; the collection of containers; camouflage; distribution.

Liaison with and Advice for Agents Working At Lyon. During our stay in the Maquis we found a constant stream of agents, working in or near Lyon, passing by our headquarters. In some cases they had information to pass on, and in all cases they wanted it. We endeavored to assist in every possible way.

As soon as possible after our arrival we called and organized a conference with the chief civilians of Lyon; for example, the people concerned with the provision of food and clothing for the population, provision of petrol, chief of the telephone and radio services, chiefs of rail services, water board, public works and police, in order to give instructions regarding their future individual activities as regards their work, and especially for the protection by each one of his service. We indicated the measures by which they could counter the sabotage activities of the enemy. We told them what they had to do before we took decisive action, and also when the time was ripe, what they were to try and do when the enemy looked like being forced out.

The final result was that when we entered Lyon all services were in working order except for half the radio station blown, and owing to our instructors not being obeyed, all but one of the bridges. The one bridge was protected as laid down.

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We had another conference with the chief agents of Lyon and passed on the same instructions, and we also supplied them with a small number of arms in order to assist them, especially in view of the importance of saving the bridges.

In the later days, when the shortage of arms looked like having disastrous effects, we took from a factory at St Etienne, 2,000 sporting guns with cartridges and distributed them both to agents and our own people.

The passing of arms etc, for distribution by agents into Lyon just prior to the attack on the town. The instructions which we gave to agents regarding the prevention of sabotage of the bridges in particular were not carried out except in one case (Pont du Change). This bridge was protected in accordance with our instructions and in consequence was not blown by the enemy.

We have, wherever circumstances allowed it, taken actual part in sabotage operations on railway lines, telephone lines and roads, and have participated in ambush attacks on and the destruction of enemy columns. We participated in the attack on Lyon and after Lyon fell, arrested and handed over a minimum of 10 Gestapo agents.

After contact with 4 SFU () (Jedburgh reporting center for Algiers) acting under the orders of Mary, we started an Officers training school at St Genis Laval and have run one course at the school.

Wireless Report. The set worked very well on reception and on making contact with London on the whole. In the region of Larajasse near St Symphorien sur Coise the conditions were bad, i.e. signal strengths 2's and 3's and nil for contact with London.

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In the region of St Foy de L'Argentiere conditions were very good, signal strengths 5's in and out. The region of St Genis Laval - excellent. The region of Croix Rousse, Lyon - excellent. Center of Lyon bad.

The reasons for bad contacts were mostly on account of the frequencies. For example, No 6426 and 6768. These frequencies worked better late in the evening, i.e. 1900 hours than morning 1000 hours.

Broadcasts were received well at both times at night. The emergency link worked very well.

The impressions of working to us were, firstly, that some operators at base were slow in replying and call signs were not clear and distinct. Other operators were very good. The emergency operators worked very well at all times.

The set seem very good except for the mentioned fault, i.e. crystals. We had good results with 4 feet of earth wire and 40 to 50 feet of aerial.

Conclusions. On the whole the mission has given all the satisfaction we can desire after having waited a long time to get into France to do our work. We have always found with the FFI the finest enthusiasm and cooperation possible. We have only 3 suggestions to make:

1. We were sent on our mission at the very least 6 weeks late.
2. Our brief was lacking information and as a result of this we left England without any stores or arms for the Maquis.
3. Our requests for arms and stores were not always met and as a result we had our difficulties magnified.

We would have been able, if these 3 conditions had been

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fulfilled, to have taken Lyon much earlier and multiplied to an extremely large extent the number of casualties, i.e. enemy killed, wounded and prisoners, than was actually the case.

Political Notes. In all cases while we worked with Colonel Mary and the officers mentioned there was definitely no political question or interruption. The morale was excellent and the one idea behind all activities was to defeat the enemy in the field.

Financial Statement

Received ----- 250,000 Frs

Expenses

Transport - Petrol, repairs, replacements,	
service - - - - -	79,000
Clothes - replacements and washing- - - - -	19,000
Gifts for services etc. (priest loan of	
farm carts, doctor, wounded American	
airmen) - - - - -	54,000
Food - - - - -	39,000
Unaccounted- - - - -	14,055
Total - - - - -	205,055
Returned - - - - -	44,945

250,000

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JEDBURGHS

Operations, Team Andrew

TEAM ANDREW

Team Andrew was the thirty-third team to be dispatched to France from the United Kingdom.

Members of Team

The members of team Andrew were:

Major A. Coombe-Tennant (British), code name "Rupel"

Lieutenant E. D'Oultrement (Belgian), code name "Demer"

Sergeant F. Harrison (British), code name "Nethe"

Area to Which Dispatched

Team Andrew was dispatched on the night of 15/16 August to the Ardennes region of France.

Purpose of Mission

Team Andrew was to be dispatched to assist in the organization of the FFI in the Ardennes region. They were to provide additional means of delivering stores to the FFI and additional links between London and the FFI. They were to contact mission Citronelle () and carry out their mission in cooperation with them.

First Word from the Field

The first word of team Andrew's safe arrival was contained in the following W/T message dated 19 August from Watermark to Underfoot ():

"Mission Citronelle reports 18 August safe arrival Jed Andrew."

Summary of Messages Exchanged

25 August From Andrew via Olympia Noir ()

"Drop also on Tourbillon crystals and transmitter and new kit for Nethe, 1 container carbines, 200 overalls denims. Following wanted earliest next moon 2 class A loads on Etape, 2 on Arbalette, 1 on Cavalcade, Cabaret, Baionnette, Coqueluche, Serpentin, Seducteur. Above for satellite groups. Prisme wants carbines. Can these replace rifles in standard loads. Now have S-phone."

() War Diary Vol 3 p () C-1881-1886 19 Aug 44
() C-3737/A710/6 25 Aug 44

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Operations, Team Andrew (Cont'd)

9 September From Olsen to Watermark ()

"From Hornaday. Jed team Andrew, Arnaud alias Maury, Pearaon alias Lievre, Tiedre alias Layton all here. Major Combe-Tennant and Lt. D'Oultrement going Belgium to join their regiments unless you want them London. Will contact Varicose to get instructions. They want Sergeant Harrison return London. Send instructions on all."

10 September From Uppermost to Watermark ()

"Coombe-Tennant and D'Oultrement, ex-Jed Andrew passed to 1 SF."

12 September From Olsen to Watermark ()

"What do you want to do with Sergeant Harrison of Jed team Andrew."

13 September From Watermark to Olsen ()

"Send Sergeant Harrison of Jed team Andrew back to UK. Give ETA and place."

Report of Team Upon Return from the Field - 15 August to 16 Sept

We were alerted on 8 August 1944 and travelled to London for briefing on the 10th. We were instructed to get in contact with mission Citronelle in the Ardennes and assist them in organizing and providing additional means of delivering stores to FFI. The Maquis in that area were only 150 strong, having lost 200 men in a recent engagement.

We were dropped on the 15th along with 2 French officers on a similar mission. There were also 10 Belgian SAS on an independent mission. The journey itself was rather rough and we all felt pretty rotten, otherwise everything went off okay. There was no flak.

Our order of jumping was: 1, Major Coombe-Tennant; 2 and 3, the French officers; 4, Sergeant Harrison; 5, Lieutenant D'Oultremont. I remember seeing the reception lights on leaving the plane but an exceptionally strong wind caused me to drift into a valley of considerable depth. I made a rather bad landing on a slope, but recovered and endeavored

() C-4272/99 9 Sep 44
() C-4579/49 12 Sep 44

() C-4389/33 10 Sep 44
() C-1347-1350 13 Sep 44

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to pull my chute out of its entanglement with a tree. Failing to do this, I started to walk in the direction, or what I thought was the direction, of the RC. I discovered the morning after that I had been walking round in circles. I was unable to contact my officers, so decided to find a safe house as soon as dawn provided a little light.

I found a farm round about 9 a.m. and after keeping it under observation decided to ask for food. After showing EMFFI identity card I was able to procure food and sleep in the loft till the following night. After the food I sent all the men I could find to look for my officers. The officers joined me at the farm about 8 p.m. all okay. One of the men had previously brought in the major's sack, but in spite of continual search neither my radio nor my personal and operational kit could be found.

We decided to sleep that night about a mile from the farm in a wood. We stayed there for two days; eventually a maquis lieutenant joined us about 72 hours after the drop, and we started immediately for the maquis headquarters. Six hours later after a rather roundabout route we arrived at the Maquis camp. There we met the personnel of mission Citronelle, the colonel (French), a British and American captain, and about eight French lieutenants. After that there were a lot of discussions in which I took little part. I gathered, however, they were desperately short of ammunition and arms, having been attacked only a week before.

Our first big problem in the Maquis camp was communication. The small pack which I had strapped to my back contained two of the one-time pads and all the crystals, maps, etc. These were taken from me at the last minute by airborne personnel at the airdrome and strapped to one of the containers. Their

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reason was that the pack was too bulky. This made communication pretty hopeless. We were fortunate in having the Citronelle operator and his set, who endeavored to send two messages in our code sending a further message explaining the procedure. This failed to enlighten London.

After two or three days waiting we decided to send all our messages through Citronelle in their own code. After a further few days we received an answer to the effect that London had received and understood messages through Citronelle. Meanwhile the Major spent one day on a complete reconnaissance with the French colonel and several officers.

The main reason for this was to check on the dropping zones, there being two. On their return I heard that one of the grounds was fit for containers only, whereas the other was suitable for both.

On the eighth day the Belgian Maquis, whose camp was about 5 miles east of us, sent an SOS to the effect that after attempting to ambush a German convoy the Germans were putting up some resistance and as one of the trucks had got away they needed reinforcements in case of additional trouble.

We set out immediately. On reaching the area we found not only the Belgian Maquis gone but also all but one truck of the convoy. This was guarded by six Germans. We attacked and killed the Germans, losing one French lieutenant and set fire to the truck. Later, after our return, we were surprise-attacked by a large enemy patrol, losing one French lieutenant and 18 Maquis. The Colonel and Lieutenant D'Oultremont were wounded by shrapnel fire.

After an hour and a half, we decided things were getting too hot, so we slowly withdrew into the heart of the forest.

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There we counted wounded and dead. We learned later that the Germans had lost 53 men in the battle.

We moved northwest and travelled all that day with the wounded on stretchers. One died on the way. We reached our new camp and the wounded were tended by two civilian doctors who came up from the village. We slept till two the next morning then moved out again to an area 2 miles from the French-Belgium border. There we stayed for a week keeping as quiet as possible owing to the fact that our ammunition was by this time at a dangerously low level.

On our third day at our new camp the BBC message came through indicating that the next dropping would be the following night (full moon). We assembled the following night, waited from 11 o'clock to 2:30 but no aircraft came. Our reserve ground, however, had a busy time with (the number of planes I am not sure of) quite a lot of badly-needed equipment dropped about midnight.

We returned to camp and continued for the next few days to lie low. News was coming through of the great advance of the Americans in their drive through France. We decided to pack up and meet them half way if possible, assist them in their advance towards and beyond Charleville.

We marched to the nearest village by night and were told the Germans had evacuated. The Americans had reached Charleville but Germans were reported to be holding a bridge on the eastern outskirts. Our plan was to go and remove that opposition and if possible hold the bridge for the Americans.

We reached Nouzonville outskirts only to discover that Charleville was liberated and that the Germans were fleeing in disorder to the Belgian frontier. We carried out an ambush which was wholly successful, killing about 80 to 100

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Germans. The next day we marched into Nouzonville, the village being completely free from Germans, and from there to Charleville.

The Americans then drove us direct to Paris, where we stayed at an American Hotel from which Major Coombe-Tennant and Lieutenant D'Oultremont left for Brussels to join their respective regiments. I flew to London on 16 September.

Financial Statement by Sergeant Harrison

Received - - - - - 50,000 Francs

Expenditures

Hotel bills - - - - -	10,000
Cigarettes - - - - -	1,000
Sundries - - - - -	3,000
Captured by enemy in jacket pocket	1,650
	<u>15,650</u>

Returned - - - - - 34,350

The officers of the team have rejoined their regiments in Belgium and no account is available yet.

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JEDBURGHS

Operations, Team Augustus

TEAM AUGUSTUS

Jedburgh team Augustus was the thirty-fourth Jedburgh team to be dispatched to France from the UK.

Members of Team

The members of team Augustus were:

Major John H. Bonsall, FA (US), () code name "Arizona"

Captain J. Dechville (French), code name "Herault"

Technical Sergeant Robert E. Cote (US), () code name "Indiana"

Area to Which Dispatched

Team Augustus was dispatched on the night of 15/16 August to the Aisne area of France.

Purpose of Mission

Team Augustus was to be dropped to the organizer Cardioide () whom they would assist in training and organizing the maquis in this area. The team would provide an additional means of delivering stores to the FFI and an additional link between London and the FFI groups.

Method of Dropping and Reception Committee

The team was to be dropped to a reception committee organized by Cardioide.

Scale of Air Support Likely

There would be no difficulty in supplying the team with the arms and material it would require to carry out its mission. However, it was warned to allow eight days for delivery.

Communications

The team was dropped with a W/T set and instructed to contact the Home Station as soon as possible after arriving

() War Diary Vol 11 p 563
() War Diary Vol 11 p 608
() War Diary Vol 3 p

Declassified by 062147
date 23 January 1979

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JEDBURGHs

Operations, Team Augustus (Cont'd)

in the field.

Finance

Each Jedburgh officer was dispatched with 100,000 French francs. The W/T operator took 50,000 French francs.

Relations with Other Allied Units

Allied Forces, If Overrun. When overrun by Allied forces, the team had instructions to report to the nearest intelligence officer and ask him to forward them to the nearest SF Staff. This staff would identify them and pass them back to SFHQ London.

Action

Upon Arrival in the Field. When they had arrived in the field, the team would contact the FFI chief, who would inform them of the general situation of resistance in the area and put them in touch with the nearest groups. All open offensive action was to be avoided since the team's mission was to be one of preservation rather than destruction.

If Captured

The team took no cover story to the field. If captured they would be taken as soldiers in uniform performing their ordinary military duties. Every established law of warfare would apply. Therefore, they would give their name, rank, and serial number only.

First Word from Field

Team Augustus announced its arrival in the field in the following W/T message dated 17 August: ()

"Augustus all well. Reception perfect."

Summary of W/T Messages Exchanged

19 August From Augustus ()

"Contact made with regional chief. Awaiting departmental

() C-1883/10 17 Aug 44

() C-2082/2 19 Aug 44

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JEDBURGHS

Operations, Team Augustus (Cont'd)

leader before forming definite plans. Circulation difficult due to lack of false papers which we are obtaining soon. Unable to find one panier containing S-phone, rucksack and receiver. Badly dropped."

20 August From Augustus ()

"Attended conference today with leaders. Ready to start operations immediately in entire Aisne department. Existing organization and leaders appear excellent. Aisne situation report - men now armed and trained, north zone - 700; Center - 300; South - 100. Cadre not armed in north zone - 1500; center - 3000; south - 400. Am moving headquarters to center."

20 August From Augustus ()

"Request as second priority permission to arm zone west and north border of Aisne. Existing groups good. Tremendous possibilities. Liaison good."

21 August From Augustus ()

"Seven trains Germans equipment 1 ack ack train stopped between Soissons and Fismes. Line cut. Request bombing soonest possible."

22 August From Augustus ()

"Heavy Boche traffic men and material between Paris and Reims via Soissons and Fere en Tardenois. Essential RR line be cut by bombing. Sgt Bennett RAF Holme, safe."

22 August From Augustus ()

"Have complete German plans demolition Port Havre dated May 44 and plan for defense camouflage pill boxes. Attack sites etc around tunnel of Vauxaillon. Impossible to cable. Request pick up on ground Bierlot."

24 August From Augustus ()

"Line Soissons Villers Cottezet blocked by derailment. Bercy and Vierzy salvage difficult. Traffic jam probably. 24 wagon munition train at Lamotte between Attichy and Rethondes. 800 trucks being loaded on trains at Vic-sur-Aisne. Supply train at Ambleny between Vic-sur-Aisne and Soissons. 2 wheat trains, 1 train of 29 petrol wagons at Crouy. Boche evacuating Crouy and Chateau Thierry. 51 pilotless bombs destroyed last night at St Maximum near Creil. Area Soissons-Reims-Chateau Thierry much Boche traffic at night headed northeast. Troops completely disorganized. Incapable of self defense against force."

() C-2232/31	20 Aug 44	() C-2240/6	20 Aug 44
() C-2387/13	21 Aug 44	() C-2470/23	22 Aug 44
() C-2388/22	22 Aug 44	() C-2713/5	24 Aug 44

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JEDBURGHS

Operations, Team Augustus (Cont'd)

25 August From SFHQ to Gramme ()

"In order to obtain the Havre documents which Augustus has secured we will try an operation on the 28th on Bleriot."

25 August From Augustus ()

"Impossible to form maquis now due to one, too many Boche; two, lack of good hiding areas; three, very few arms. When arms arrive groups will assemble immediately and fight as guerrillas. All organized in groups with local leaders. Majority men trained. Heraut inspecting Chateau Thierry groups today. Urgent unless arms arrive very soon. Very little can be done. Ask second load be sent 2 days after first. Details later. Boche planes fly area Soissons only dusk and dawn and very low."

26 August From Augustus ()

"Boche digging defensive positions without mines on Aisne between bridges Gambetta and Villeneuve. Several artillery batteries North Aisne bank between Cuffies and Pasly."

30 August From SFHQ to Augustus ()

"Have received order from Army commander for FFI to take all possible steps to preserve following Somme bridges from enemy demolition. All bridges Amiens area, also at Moreuil Boves Fiquingy Conde Longpre. You should attempt to preserve these bridges for about four days after receipt this message. This is important task. Count on you for fullest cooperation. If you need arms can drop from low flying typhoons."

16 September From SFHQ to Augustus ()

"Your mission is ended. You should return to London, all three, by way of Paris where you will see Captain Prevost who will make arrangements."

Report of Team Upon Return from the Field

All three members of team Augustus were killed on 30 August. A detailed report made by Major William T. Hornaday () follows:

() A-7364 25 Aug 44	() C-2711/36 25 Aug 44
() C-2898/17 26 Aug 44	() C-4031 30 Aug 44
() C-1951 16 Sept 44	() War Diary Vol 11 p 106

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JEDBURGHS

Operations, Team Augustus (Cont'd)

HQ & HQ DETACHMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY
(FORWARD)

23 October 1944

SUBJECT: Jed Team Augustus

TO : CO, Jed Section, SFHQ (via channels)

1. In compliance with instructions set out in your letter of 17 October referring to the above subject, I made a trip on Friday, Saturday, and Sunday to Soissons, St Quentin, Laon, and Reims to investigate the missing Jed Team Augustus. I learned that all members of this Jed team were killed by German Forces at the village of Barenton-sur-Serre on the night of the 30 August 1944 at about 2245 hours.

2. I was shown the graves in the cemetery of the little church in this village in which all three members of the team are buried. It should be recorded that as one stands looking across the grave facing the wall around the churchyard from inside the churchyard, Major Bonsall is buried in the middle, Sergeant Cote is on the viewer's right, and the French Officer, Captain Delvichi @ Captain Dechville, the French member of the team, is on the left.

3. A report was written by Lieutenant Seigneur, the Chef de le Zone Sud of the Bureau des Operations, Aeriennes, who is now on duty with the 2eme Bureau Headquarters at St Quentin, of the investigation of the death of the members of the team. Lieutenant Seigneur was the French officer who worked most closely with the Jed team Augustus. A report of the activities of Jean-Pierre, who also worked with the team Augustus, and a report of the activities of Costeaux, Gaston, the member of the BOA who received the Jed team at the time of their dropping and who worked some with the team thereafter gives additional information.

4. It should further be recorded that information revealed by the investigation in addition to that in Lieutenant Seigneur's report shows that at the time of the shooting of the members of the team they were dressed in civilian clothes and carried false French cartes d'identites on them. In the captured German car in which they were riding they had their weapons, their radio, and all of their equipment. No member of resistance groups who had worked with the Jed team saw the bodies or made personal identification. Identity was established by the identity cards which were still in their pockets and by tracing back the movement of the team at the point where they had obtained the German automobile and German horse. The Maire of the village Barenton-sur-Serre and the people of the village buried the members of the team, and as soon as identity was established, a force of resistance

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JEDBURGHS

Operations, Team Augustus (Cont'd)

personnel formed a special guard of honor and a military funeral ceremony was held at the grave. It is my understanding that this was done while Germans still occupied the surrounding country. Further details about this ceremony can be had from Lieutenant Seigneur. Gaston Costeaux accompanies me during all of the investigation and led me to the different places concerned in the investigation. We made efforts to locate Fontaine @ M Brigout, to whom the identity cards and photos of the three were given, at St Quentin but he could not be found. Costeaux agreed to follow this down and to try to obtain the identity cards and photos to turn in to the WE/SO Section, addressed to Lieutenant-Colonel Paul Vanderstricht at 79 Ave Champs Elysees, Paris. Lieutenant Seigneur advised that Jean-Pierre is now in England and that Fontaine may have sent the identity cards and photos to him there.

5. Arrangements were made also for Lieutenant Seigneur, Gaston Costeaux, and Jean Plantier who is at present a member of the FFI in training in the Caserne at La Fere (Aisne) and who worked all the time with Sergeant Cote assisting in the operating of the team radio, the coding and decoding of messages, all to write as full reports as possible of the activities and accomplishments of the team and the members of resistance in the territory who worked with the team to the end that the American Government can give proper credit to all those who assisted them in their official duties; and to send those reports addressed to Lieutenant-Colonel Paul Vanderstricht at 79 ave Champs Elysees, Paris, for forwarding to proper headquarters. Gaston Costeaux lives at the village of Braine between Soissons and Reims in the Department of Aisne.

6. Flowers were purchased by members of my party making the investigation and were placed on the grave of the members of the team. It is suggested that proper thanks should be given to the Maire and the residents of the village of Barenton-sur-Serre for the tender and respectful care they gave to the bodies of the members of the team.

7. It should be noted at this time that the graves are unmarked and it is doubtful if any identification tags or any means of identifying the bodies were buried with them. For this reason it is suggested that the matter be called to the attention of the proper Graves Registration personnel for immediate action.

For the Commanding Officer:

WM. T. HORNADAY
Major, Infantry
Chief, CI Section

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JEDBURGH

Operations, Team Bunny

TEAM BUNNY

Jedburgh team Bunny was the thirty-fifth Jedburgh team to be dispatched to France from the UK.

Members of Team

The members of team Bunny were:

Captain J. Radice (British), code name "Peso"

Lieutenant M. Gerville (French), code name "Yen"

Sergeant J. Chambers (British), code name "Drachma"

Area to Which Dispatched

Team Bunny was dispatched on the night of 17/18 August to the Haute Marne area of France.

Purpose of Mission

Team Bunny was dispatched to the Haute Marne area to assist in the organization of the FFI, to provide additional means of delivering stores to the FFI, and to provide an additional link between London and the FFI. They were to contact the organizer Ovale () upon arrival and work with him in carrying out their mission.

First Word from Field

Team Bunny announced its arrival in the field in the following W/T message dated 18 August ():

"Excellent reception after good trip. Gausse contacted. Enthusiastic welcome. Champagne breakfast at farm. Now in wood near Auberive 16 kms southwest Langres. Transported in four truck convoy. Peso slightly damaged left knee - walkable. SAS party hope contact soon. Thanks excellent show from your end."

Summary of W/T Messages Exchanged

20 August From Bunny ()

"Contacted SAS - found them about to move. Also 2 resistance leaders from Langres. Contacted Victor, leader maquis Vivey 6 kilometers south Auberive. Raymond another maquis contact."

() War Diary Vol 3 p
() C-2191/22 20 Aug 44

() C-2047/99 18 Aug 44

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JEDBURGHS

Operations, Team Bunny (Cont'd)

20 August From Bunny ()

"Area encouraging. Most impressed by maquis chiefs. Groups small and well organized. Many requests arms but need more details. Taking no action until contact Colonel of department FFI. 200 Langres police likely join us soon."

21 August From Bunny ()

"Making 2 small maquis into 1. Already have a vehicle. List of armaments tomorrow. Train load of petrol at Andilly 40 MM east of 0340, 18 MM north 5320. Attacking soon. Hopes of 3rd battalion, 1st French Regiment and also all Langres gendarmerie joining us soon."

21 August From Bunny ()

"Fruitless attempt made by maquis to recruit from 1st Regiment of France. Night 21 fire opened from their barracks Humes. Not returned. No casualties."

22 August From Bunny ()

"Hold 100 kms plastic, 7 petrol lorries, 3 diesel, 5 cars. Expect immediate order arms 1500 men near future. Speed delivery will be essential."

22 August From Bunny ()

"Lieutenant Gerard EMN maquis wishes inform mission Isothrope, Algiers, that he unable to return his district owing lack mean of transport."

24 August From Bunny ()

"Germans withdraw from south and west. Several fights on the roads of withdrawal yesterday. A small group attacked garrison of Lorgeau 10 kms south of Langres of about 200 Germans. At least 10 killed. Peso wounded. Bullet in knee. Doctor here."

24 August From Bunny ()

"Peso wound serious. Possible bones smashed. Non-operational for at least 6 weeks. Is it possible for a plane to take him out."

26 August From Bunny ()

"Germans withdraw on Dijon - Langres. Large activity of maquis Tuesday. Twelve men with Yen attacked German post. 10 Germans killed. Peso in a Langres hospital. Wound most serious. Send weapons soon and cigarettes."

() C-2219/38	20 Aug 44	() C-2315/23	21 Aug 44
() C-2488/77	21 Aug 44	() C-2456/1	22 Aug 44
() C-2533/7	22 Aug 44	() C-2600/69	24 Aug 44
() C-2634/11	24 Aug 44	() C-2856/88	26 Aug 44

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JEDBURGHS

Operations, Team Bunny (Cont'd)

27 August From Bunny ()

"Peso died today."

28 August From Bunny ()

"BBC message Trimegiste for dropping of arms. Rail-
way Langres-Chatillon blown up in 2 places on Recce
yesterday. A car near Langres destroyed. Killed 50
Germans."

1 September From Bunny ()

"Assignment carried out of sending personnel in
direction of St Dizier, Bar sur Aube and Chatillon with
requested information. Maquis occupy Auberive and
Arcenbarrois. 100 Germans, 4 patriots killed - 5 wounded.
Need arms urgent."

2 September From Bunny ()

"Tonight large engagement between Maquis Aube Jive
and strong convoys coming Langres. Convoy turned back
with heavy losses. 12 patriots wounded."

5 September From SFHQ to Bunny ()

"Congratulations for action against convoy."

7 September From Bunny ()

"Do not understand cancellation of operation on
Creature because numerous parachutages were carried out
on 5 September. Guerrilla operations are continuing.
We work in liaison with SAS. Have had contact with Americans
region Bar sur Aube. All goes well. Send arms."

7 September From SFHQ to Bunny ()

"Can you furnish complete details on the death of
Peso. Congratulations for your good work."

9 September From Bunny ()

"Blew up 3 TP carriers and DRS Chatillon-Chaumont
road. 100 Germans dead. No SAS casualties."

9 September From Bunny ()

"Yen wounded in left knee. 1 bone fractured. Doctors
attending him. Attacked convoy yesterday on Chatillon-
Chaumont road. SAS there. Also at least 100 German
dead."

- | | | | |
|---------------|-----------|---------------|-----------|
| () C-2974/9 | 27 Aug 44 | () C-3097/64 | 28 Aug 44 |
| () C-3491/81 | 1 Sept 44 | () C-3637/37 | 2 Sept 44 |
| () C-119 | 5 Sept 44 | () C-4071/12 | 7 Sept 44 |
| () C-454 | 7 Sept 44 | () C-4256/20 | 9 Sept 44 |
| () C-4260/90 | 9 Sept 44 | | |

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JEDBURGHS

Operations, Team Bunny (Cont'd)

9 September From SFHQ to Bunny ()

"Sorry to hear Yen wounded in left knee. Hope his case not serious. Keep us informed his condition and give him our best wishes."

9 September From Bunny ()

"Peso shot in knee by rifle. Contacted gangrene. Leg amputated but infection worse. Operation undergone at Langres hospital. Buried at Langres cemetery. All personal papers at Langres hospital."

10 September From Bunny ()

"Action for 2nd SAS Robey. Large German troop concentrations at Dienay. Can you send fighters. Bombers too inaccurate. Also evacuating troops from Chatillon along road Ruzenay crossroads."

11 September From Bunny ()

"Action for 2nd SAS Robey and all concerned. German elements are moving northeast up a corridor formed in north by Chaumont, Neufchateau, Nancy. In south by Bescancon, Belfort, Mulhouse. Le Clerc moving east up to wedge and Yanks along bottom. Yanks prodding Chatillon. Nobody concerned about entering inwards of corridor. Bauduin and mobile FFI will push up from south. Plan told in Paris is for Le Clerc to keep going to Nancy and curve south. Therefore repeat urgency of jeeps and 2 guns for operations in a chaotic area. This was suggested by Joinville so that I might help."

11 September From Bunny ()

"Received 4 planes last night. Thanks. Urgently need mortars, more brens and grenades. Send another load soon. Missing some wonderful targets."

11 September From Bunny ()

"Yen improving a little but suffering from severe shock. Was lying in a field for 6 hours before he could be reached."

11 September From Bunny ()

"Information reliable 1200 hours. 2000 enemy troops at south road junction Dijon-Langres-Faylbillot. Barracks in citadel, 2000 meters south in Langres 2 building Leon east of Barracks inside citadel wall not occupied. For SAS Robey rifles. Send Jedburgh urgent. Otherwise cannot move east."

13 September From Bunny ()

"Langres taken by French troops and FFI."

() C-791 9 Sept 44	() C-4258 9 Sept 44
() C-4360/98 10 Sept 44	() C-4425/3 11 Sept 44
() C-4466/18 11 Sept 44	() C-4467/71 11 Sept 44
() C-4506/89 11 Sept 44	() C-4729/13 13 Sept 44

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JEDBURGHS

Operations, Team Bunny (Cont'd)

14 September From SFHQ to Bunny ()

"Air Ministry refuse to make ops on Creature as it is in combat area. Do utmost for latter."

15 September From Bunny ()

"Yen now at Dijon hospital. Finished here. Returning home."

Report of Team Upon Return from the Field - 17 Aug to 15 Sept 1944

Mission: Team arrived in London on 14 August, briefed same day. Mission was to organize and arm maquis groups in Haute Marne area and contact Colonel Reid for his disposal.

Dropping: The team was dropped to reception committee at Coordinates Mich 03E 0320 77N5280 on 18 August at 0120 hours.

Order of exit: The team jumped in the following order: Captain Gerville, Sergeant Chambers and Captain Radice. The reception was well laid on. Several trucks were at the dispersal zone which picked up all our kit. Two other planes arrived after us and dropped supplies for the maquis. We were then taken to a farm at the Foret de Formant and warmly welcomed.

First Contacts: We first contacted a Maquis Captain, after a few hours several other leaders come, one by the name of Raymond.

Method of Movement: Movement was all done by car or truck. All kit was left by the woods except for arms, maps and small pack. Team did not move about much.

Casualties: When visiting the French Colonel, the truck carrying Captain Radice, Captain Gerville and Captain Max with a few men, passed through a small village and was attacked by a small garrison. Enemy casualties not known. Captain Radice was wounded by a rifle bullet that hit his left knee. He

() C-1610 14 Aug 44

() C-4897/76 15 Aug 44

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Operations, Team Bunny (Cont'd)

was brought back to the farm and a Doctor was sent for . While in the truck a tourniquet was placed on the leg of Captain Radice which I believe was not removed for about an hour. It was the cause of the infection. He was taken the next day to Langres Hospital and had his leg amputated but the gangerien had become worse and eventually caused his death. He was buried at Langres Cemetery.

Miscellaneous: When we first arrived at the farm, the maquis group consisted of about 45 men with arms. We were told to expect more men each day and after a week the group was about 200 strong. They knew little or nothing about the stripping, cleaning and general maintenance of weapons, so we set about instructing them.

The maquis was formed into small groups of 20 men under the command of an NCO. Each group was given a number for identification. One or more of these groups would be sent out each day in cars and trucks for ambushing along roads and shooting up of Germans generally. On 30 August the maquis occupied the village of Auberive.

During the night of 2/3 September four German trucks attacked the pass through the village. A fight started which lasted for two hours. The Germans lost two trucks, one machine-gun, one sub-machine-gun and three dead. Maquis losses were five wounded.

With the assistance of a small SAS group, the maquis attacked the petrol dump at Foulain, 10 kilometers southwest of Chaumont, and destroyed 800,000 litres of petrol and took away 4,000 litres with them. Several Germans were killed and two maquis wounded.

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JEDBURGHS

Operations, Team Bunny (Cont'd)

On 8 September Captain Gerville went, with a small SAS group to lay an ambush on the Chatillon-Chaumont Road. Four German TCP with DR's came along. We were not going to attack because the ambushing force was too small. One German DR spotted the ambush and therefore we had to open fire. The first two trucks were completely destroyed and a third damaged. The fourth was around the corner and could not be fired upon. During the withdrawal of our party, Captain Gerville was hit by a burst of machine-gun fire. An SAS Sergeant who was near him was certain he was dead and therefore left him. In the evening a party was sent out to find his body. He was found in a bush where he had dragged himself. He was brought back to Auberive and given medical attention. A bullet had hit him in the left knee and he was also suffering from severe shock. When Langres was occupied by the French Army and FFI, he was taken to hospital there and a few hours later was sent off to the hospital at Dijon.

Although 14 planes were asked for by us, we received only four and they arrived rather late. Had arms arrived sooner a great deal more good work could have been done by our group. We were overrun by the French 7th Army on 14 September and I sent a message to say I was returning to England. The maquis loaned me a car to get to Troyes. After that I managed to get a lift from Troyes to Nogent. At Nogent I had to hire a car which brought me to Paris. I spent the whole of the next day trying to find the SF Headquarters in Paris.

Radio Report. On the whole I was very pleased with the wireless and have no complaints to make. My signals were QSA 45 out and incoming QSA 3 owing to QRM and jamming. The

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JEDBURGHS

Operations, Team Bunny (Cont'd)

emergency link worked extremely well and traffic passed very quickly.

Financial Statement

Sergeant J. T. Chambers Received ----- 50,000 Francs

Expense

Repairs and wheels for car -----	10,500
Food and accommodations at farm -----	5,000
Maquis for travel and clothes -----	15,000
Stolen -----	10,000
Taxi from Nogent - Paris -----	5,000
Four days in Paris -----	3,950
Total -----	49,450
Returned-----	550

The British officer of this team was killed and the French officer was severely wounded and has not returned to the UK, so no further details are available.

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JEDBURGH

Operations, Team Arthur

TEAM ARTHUR

Jedburgh team Arthur was the thirty-seventh Jedburgh team to be dispatched to France from the UK.

Members of Team

The members of team Arthur were:

Captain Cecil F. Mynatt, FA (US), () code name "Connecticut"

2nd Lieutenant L. Hache (French), code name "Smabrere"

Technical Sergeant Albert V. Bacik (US), () code name "Millieme"

Area to Which Dispatched

Team Arthur was dispatched on the night of 18/19 August to the Cote D'Or area of France.

Purpose of Mission

Team Arthur was dispatched to work with Ovale () in organizing the FFI in this area. They would provide additional means of delivering stores to FFI and an additional link between London and the FFI.

Method of Dropping and Reception Committee

The team was to be dropped to a reception committee organized by the SFHQ agent Ovale.

Communications

The team was dropped with one W/T set and instructed to establish contact with the Home Station as soon as possible after arrival.

Action

Upon Arrival in the Field. Immediately upon arriving in the field the team would contact Ovale who would inform them of the general situation of resistance. The team would put itself at Ovale's disposition and agree with him on the

() War Diary Vol 11 p 571
() War Diary Vol 3 p

() War Diary Vol 11 p

Declassified by 062147
date 23 January 1999

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JEDBURGHs

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division of responsibility.

The team was to avoid open offensive action with the exception of continuous attacks by small parties on rail, road, and communications targets at all costs until such time as they received orders from London.

If Captured. The team took no cover story with it to the field. If taken prisoner they would be taken as soldiers in uniform performing their ordinary military duties. Every established law of warfare would apply to them and they should, therefore, give their name rank and serial number only.

First Word from the Field

The Arthur announced its arrival in the field in the following W/T message dated 20 August ():

"Dropped by mistake on ground not suitable for personnel. Mynatt wounded. Will probably be x-rayed this evening. Contact with FFI yesterday with Ovale. Paul arrived safely on safe land. Lost musette."

Summary of Messages Exchanged

21 August From Arthur ()

"Contacted Ovale moving to Saone et Loire soon. Sending most important messages for Ovale at sked time."

22 August From Arthur ()

"Skirmish with Boche forces us to move bit back at same stand. Need 2 torches, 3 marlins MGs immediately our present ground Anicroche. Certain Boche jamming regular frequencies. Boche nervous - patrolling roads in force."

24 August From Arthur ()

"Yesterday 500 Boche attacked in all day fight. Beaten off. Losses slight. Russian Boche deserting to maquis. They say Germans evacuating towns. Say Yanks at Montbard. Can hear guns here. Maquis plan attack Dijon tonight. Mynatt can walk."

()	C-2243/8	20 Aug 44	()	C-2397/2	21 Aug 44
()	C-2520/6	22 Aug 44	()	C-2642/3	24 Aug 44

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Operations, Team Arthur (Cont'd)

1 September From SFHQ to Arthur ()

"For Ovale. We are expecting to send you 50 parachutists in the Cote d'Or. Are you able to receive them and on what ground."

2 September From Arthur ()

"Received your 1 of the 1 September for Ovale. Very difficult to send it quickly. Am 100 miles from him. It would be easier to send by radio directly to him or to Paul. Here we don't need any parachutists. I have 200 men if you are ready to arm them."

3 September From Arthur ()

"Partisans keep coming to camp needing arms very badly. Please send immediately."

3 September From Arthur ()

"Ovale asked me to equip and arm another maquis situated eastwards from Autun. 200 armless men. Possibility 400 crack officers. Will send dropping points later."

7 September From Arthur ()

"Myself and 5 others are operating in area of forest of Geeps against the Germans moving along the roads Chateau Chinon, Autun and Luzy Autun. The position of the maquis in this area is serious for not only can they not attack the Germans but also they cannot prevent him leaving the roads and towns and fleeing to the hills from which they will be very difficult to extract. Armed they will be of great assistance to me and so if it is at all possible, I would welcome any arms they might receive from England."

11 September From SFHQ to Arthur ()

"Urgent. Send immediately exact location of your team as Jed Connecticut would like to join you."

11 September From Underfoot to Watermark ()

"Have contacted Captain Mynatt of Jed team Arthur suffering from fractured spine. Taken to 12th Evacuation hospital. Will arrive UK via normal Evacuation channels. Other 2 members of team still in field. Location unknown."

18 September From Arthur ()

"Ovale is sending us to Paris. This is my last message before returning to London."

() C-6416 1 Sept 44	() C-3656/18 2 Sept 44
() C-3716/12 3 Sept 44	() C-3710/13 3 Sept 44
() C-4106/17 7 Sept 44	() C-6517 11 Sept 44
() C-4501/54 11 Sept 44	() C-177/14 18 Sept 44

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Operations, Team Arthur (Cont'd)

Report of Team Upon Return from the Field - 18 Aug to 18 Sept 1944

Mission: The team was sent to the Cote D'Or in order to assist Captain Ovale in arming the Maquis, and as a supplementary line of communication with London.

Journey: We left England on 18 August at 2230 hours. Team Paul () and our team Arthur were due to be dropped on the same ground. Team Paul was dispatched correctly on ground "Anicroche", whereas we were dropped in error on "Imprimerie." The letter which was being flashed was incorrect in our case. No preparatory orders were given for the jump, and the dispatcher did not assist the first member of the team, who was jumping with a leg bag, and may have been the reason for a faulty departure. He landed on the ground with the leg bag still attached. The W/T Operator, who jumped second, arrived quite safely. Captain Mynatt was wounded in the back, his chute having functioned badly. Some of his rigging lines were knotted in several places, two were broken, and one panel of the canopy was torn. All our equipment was safe except for one haversack which was lost. We were obliged to wait two hours for a lorry which came to fetch our wounded partner. This was due to the fact that we were not expected on this ground, which was only used for equipment, owing to the proximity of a railway line and a electric line running near. Lieutenant Nicolas received us very well at Echalot. The following morning a doctor came to see Captain Mynatt, who was ordered to remain in bed.

First Contacts: On the 19th we had our first contact with Notaire of Boa, who agreed to warn Ovale of our arrival so that we could meet him.

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During the first days that we awaited Ovale, the Lieutenant Hache went to Avost to visit the team Paul and two Maquis. On 20 August we had our first contact with London, with considerable interference. On 22 August Ovale came to see us at Echalot, and spoke of sending us to Saone et Loire, and agreed to arrange for our journey. In the meantime he asked us to remain patient, and hoped that Mynatt would be well enough to go with us.

On 23 August the activity of German patrols increased, a few ambushes having taken place with the enemy near where we were staying, and in view of the state of Captain Mynatt we decided to leave the village and go to a Maquis 3 kilometers away.

On 24 August we received three Russian Deserters.

On 25 August Ovale sent for us. Lieutenant Hache went to see Ovale to explain that Mynatt was unable to move, and that it would be necessary to have him x-rayed. Under the circumstances it was decided that Lieutenant Hache and W/T operator Bacik would leave and Mynatt remain with team Paul, with the intention of joining up again as soon as possible. This he was unable to do. Before leaving Lieutenant Hache insisted on obtaining from Ovale a list of DZ's of the Region in which he would be working, but his insistence was in vain. This accounted for him having submitted a ground "Beret", whereas this had already been accorded the name of "Max." Our telegrams No: 8 and 12, refer. Lieutenant Hache also insisted that Captain Mynatt should not be moved until he had been x-rayed. This was not adhered to. Lieutenant Hache and Bacik moved from Echalot on the 27th to their new

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terrain which was 180 kilometers away. Our itinerary was mostly along minor roads, and by-ways, avoiding main roads and railways. The journey was without incidents.

We contacted Captain Georges on 28th at the Chateau de Franay. From him we learned that the situation in Saone et Loire in the north was as follow:-

There were two Maquis of 150 to 200 men, armed with 1 Bren, 15 Stens, and 8 Rifles. One was in the forest of St Prist, and the other near Epinac. It appeared that we had all the organizing to do, but were fortunate in having some good officers. We hoped to double the strength of these Maquis as soon as we are able to increase the armament.

Zone of Action. On 28 August we recce a dropping ground, and sent cables to London asking for armament. On 29 August we visited the Maquis of Captain Maurice in the forest of St Prist, and returned to our command at Franay.

Lieutenant Mario, Captain Georges, and Abbe Turiquet, armorer of the Maquis, left for Avost. During the journey their car was attacked by a German convoy and the three occupants were wounded. The Germans finished off Captain Georges, who was wounded in the legs and Lieutenant Mario wounded in the chest. They carried away the Abbe to Autun. Our Resistance Forces at Autun obtained the name of the German SS officer, who murdered our two friends. He was bragging of having killed "two Terrorists." Lieutenant Kerber of the Maquis Maurice at Autun can give all required information in this case. We heard of this event at 2130 hours, and a party brought in the body of Captain Georges, which was given burial at the Maquis.

That evening we left Franay for security reasons and

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joined Maquis Maurice.

Lieutenant Hache undertook a series of visits to the neighboring Maquis: Camp of Frachot Maquis of Captain Louis and Anost Camp Maquis Dede.

Captain Louis set up telephonic communication with us, and promised to send us some arms. London still sent no reply to my requests. It was impossible to collect arms from Frachot. German convoys were now moving ceaselessly along the roads which separated us.

On 3 September, during reconnaissance, we discovered containers which had been dropped. These were near a lorry which was on fire. Despite the Germans passing in the vicinity, a Maquis group collected the containers, and the following day we distributed the arms. We now owned 6 Brens, 45 Stens, and 30 Rifles.

On 5 September, we sent a party to reinforce the Maquis Marequard, near St Leger.

Two Diesel lorries and their trailers are captured; they had important telephone equipment, 1500 liters of petrol, and 200 liters of gas-oil, plus some arms and ammunition. The evening of 6 August the St Leger group attacked another German convoy. The booty was an 8 ton lorry full of food stuff, and a light car, plus some arms and ammunition. We captured one prisoner and one German wounded. Our losses during these actions were nil.

London had promised an operations, but withdrew the promise. During the evening 6 SAS cars came into our Maquis. Our camp was well equipped, all roads to it being barred, and sentries posted.

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Next day Lieutenant Mylock and his SAS decided to remain and work with us. The other three cars moved further on.

We attempted an ambush near Chateau Chinon, but the Germans got to know of it, and took precautions. On 8 August there was a reconnaissance on the Luzy Autun roads, and that evening an ambush was more successful. One lorry was on fire, and several other were abandoned by the enemy, as we heard from civilians the next day. The morning of 8 August we heard from Avost that the FFI of Montceau were marching on Autun. That afternoon we moved on Autun to participate in the action. With the SAS we reached Autun at 1900 hours. We found French tanks in action and we liaised with them. Captain Maurice went to the command post of the colonel. A first attempt was made during the morning by the FFI of Montceay. The enemy took 25 FFI prisoners and shot them at once. The tanks attempted to enter Autun. The German anti-tank guns, however, forced them to retire. The colonel, who was in charge ordered us that night to retire, the attack being due to take place the following morning.

The following morning we heard from our people inside Autun that the Germans had evacuated the town towards Beaune during the night.

On 11 And 12 August we took over the arms of 3,400 prisoners.

On 13 August Hache and Bacik liaised with Ovale at Dijon, where it was decided that we should return to Paris. On 14 August the team left Autun for Dijon, where they would leave a few days later for Paris with Lieutenant Cormier.

W/T Communications. Our operator Bacik deserves high praise for his calmness in all circumstances, and his devotion to duty. Thanks to him our W/T communications were excellent but useless, as we were completely abandoned by London. Our

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relations with the SAS were very good; Lieutenant Mylock worked with us, and insisted that London should supply our Maquis with arms, in order to encourage the excellent officers and young men. The presence of the SAS was help for all the men of the Maquis who felt that they were being helped. Owing to the lack of arms, we were unable to do even a small part of what should have been possible, if our requests had been acceded to.

Conclusions. Deprived of equipment by London, we did not realize hopes of action which we had been led to foresee. We can only hope that in any future tasks that must be accomplished in any scene of operations greater vision will be possible, and that those who will be sent to the field will not be left without help and will be sent at a more propitious time and not at the last minute, as we were in France.

W/T Report. The frequencies assigned for us to pick up home station were just fair, that is, main and alternative frequencies. We could use them only 50% of the time, due to higher power stations operating close to these frequencies. QRM^o use quite bad also.

The "emergency frequencies" were excellent at all times. We received their QSA 4 to 5. As far as the emergency was concerned, it could not have been better.

The "broadcast frequency" was fine also. QSA 3 to 4 always not trouble receiving traffic from them. The "radio operators" at home, emergency, (broadcasting) did a very fine job. They were very considerate and helpful.

The equipment turned out to be much better than expected. It was durable, operated very nicely. In short I found the equipment was just suited for the job and could not have been

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beaten under any conditions.

* * *

Supplementary Report

Purpose of Report:

Team was separated on 27 August because Captain Mynatt was unable to travel. He remained in Cote D'Or area and Lieutenant Hache and Sergeant Bacik went by auto to another area 180 kilometers to the south.

Action:

After the other two members of the team left on 27 August, I remained in the house of a local Maquis leader in the village of Eschelot. Several doctors examined me and said I would be unable to move for some time. On 29 August Ovale moved me to a farm 15 kilometers away which was the Headquarters of the Jed Team Paul.

I remained at this farm several days and discovered that I could move, about very well. With Major Hood, leader of Team Paul, I visited Captain Pietsch, () another Jed, who had dropped with an OG group ().

Ovale had arranged to send me back to my team at this time, but when I reported for transportation he said that my team had been overrun by the Americans and there would be no point to my rejoining them. Feeling that I could accomplish nothing with Paul, I asked his permission to join the OG group in the hope of seeing a little action. He assented to this and I joined them.

Captain Pietsch, who was arranging jobs for the OGs moved them several times. After three false alarms they attempted an attack on a group of Germans in woods south

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of Dijon. I understand that this attack was made without Pietsch's knowledge or consent. Approximate date of this operation was 11 September.

On a patrol action in this attack I fell off a stone wall and reinjured my back, and also received several mortar splinters in the back which were not discovered until I took my next bath, two weeks later at the hospital.

Lieutenant Larsen of the OG was killed in this action.

Major Davis, () SF Detachment No 11 was in this area and I rode with him to 3rd Army headquarters, some 100 miles away.

At 3rd Army headquarters I discovered that my team had not been overrun as reported. SF headquarters consented to let me try to make my way back to the team if I got a medical OK. At 12th Evacuation Hospital my back was x-rayed and it was discovered that I had a fractured spine and I was hospitalized on 13 September. (approximate date)

I had been rebriefed by Army personnel and I left my equipment (rucksack, carbine, etc.) with SF Detachment 11, 3rd Army.

On 18 September I was evacuated by air to UK.

On 15 October I was reassigned from Detachment of Patients to OSS and reported to London for duty.

Conclusion:

We were dropped at least a month too late to accomplish the maximum amount of assistance. Requests for arms, etc were apparently ignored by London and did nothing to promote relations between resistance groups and Jeds. London did not take trouble to send arms or excuses.

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The dispatcher on our plane could have been better drilled. He did not offer to assist Lieutenant Hache through the hole with leg bag. Plane was much too low, French claimed it was between 200 and 300 feet.

The officers of the OG group, with three exceptions, did not seem to have sufficient training.

Emergency frequencies on radio were good but normal frequencies were hopelessly jammed.

Financial Statement

Lieutenant Hache ----- received -----	100,000 Frs
Expense -----	55,100
Returned -----	44,900
Sergeant Bacik ----- received -----	50,000 Frs
Expense	
Food and Hotel for 30 days -----	3,850
Returned -----	46,150

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Operations, Team Timothy

TEAM TIMOTHY

Jedburgh team Timothy was the 59th team to be dispatched to France from the United Kingdom.

Members of Team

The members of team Timothy were:

Captain L. Ambel (French), code name "Nesque"

1st Lieutenant Robert G. Munding (U.S.) FA ()
code name "Marcelin"

1st Lieutenant R. E. Heyns (U.S.), Inf () code
name "Dyle"

First Sergeant Donald A. Spears (U.S.), () code
name "Escout".

Area to Which Dispatched

Team Timothy was dispatched on the night of 10/11 September to the Amiens area of France.

Background of Resistance in Area

An Allied Mission was being dispatched to eastern France to take into account local conditions and the needs of the present situation. This mission, known as Orgeat (), was formed and trained ready to be sent to the field. The mission was made up of seven independent detachments. Team Timothy was to be attached to the section known as Sanfoin which was to be attached to the headquarters of the organizer Ligne ().

Purpose of Mission

Team Timothy's assignment was to provide a communications link between Sanfoin and the other sections of Mission Orgeat, and between the Mission and London headquarters.

Communications

The team took one Jedburgh W/T set with it to the field and were instructed to establish contact with the Home Station as soon as possible after arrival.

Declassified by 062147
date 23 January 1979

() War Diary Vol 11 p 579
() War Diary Vol 11 p 620
() War Diary Vol 3 p

() War Diary Vol 11 p 576
() War Diary Vol 3 p

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Operations, Team Timothy (Cont'd)

First Word from Field

Team Timothy announced its arrival in the field in the following W/T message dated 11 September ():

"Sanfoin via Timothy. Complement of Sanfoin arrived safely."

Summary of W/T Messages Exchanged

13 September From Timothy ()

"Contacted Soris 11th. Mission will be set up at Besancon with Bartholet."

16 September From Timothy ()

"Contact established with Ligne. Information received indicates that parachuting to non liberated region extremely hazardous. Investigating possibility of infiltrating agents to Ligne or through Switzerland."

16 September From Timothy ()

"German units on front very mixed. Following units identified." (The rest of the message was undecipherable.)

(Several messages from Timothy were received but were undecipherable.)

16 September From SFHQ to Timothy ()

"For Barthelet. You must regularise present FFI organization with Ligne to avoid FFI discontent. Would like you to decide on one or more of the three following solutions: First: Return to their homes of members after disposition of arms. Second: their utilization as local police but with strong cadre and strict discipline, and responsible to a chief. Third: constitution of mobile groups on a military basis and at the disposal of regular armies."

16 September From SFHQ to Timothy ()

"For officers of Armistice army decide in accordance with their activities during the fighting. Entirely exclude last-minute workers who came to get a uniform. Total troops at Roman is two thousand."

18 September From Timothy ()

"Colonel Stevens left Besancon for London by plane today Monday 18th."

18 September From SFHQ to Timothy ()

"Telegrams for the most part undecipherable. Cables half English, half French incomprehensible. Wish you to repeat and confirm by Jim, if possible."

() B-1153/1 11 Sep 44	() B-1245/3 13 Sep 44
() B-1417/5 16 Sep 44	() B-1426/6 16 Sep 44
() B-3316 16 Sep 44	() B-3313 16 Sep 44
() B-1549/22 18 Sep 44	() B-3406 18 Sep 44

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19 September From SFHQ to Timothy ()

"For Sanfoin. Mission Pavot wishes us to communicate to you the following cables that we have sent to Pascal "Commandant Schnitzer of Dannemarie between Belfort and Altkirch with overseer Boeglin and 20 men has gone Belfort area to make liaison with resistance to betray them to Germans. Unable to inform Sainfoin as out of touch so can you warn resistance." Relay the message to the 7th Army."

19 September From SFHQ to Timothy ()

"For Sainfoin. Stevens arrived. Has given resume of Mission situation. There is possibility of liaison by radio with Seventh Army in Alsace but on reduced scale. Consequently Sanfoin will join Seventh Army as Message Center for liaison Pavot and eventually Alsace with two radio personnel and Colonel Robert if he so wishes. Abel and Masson will remain if their mission via Switzerland possible. All other radio personnel with crystals plans and maximum amount material together with all American and British personnel will return London immediately by plane or go to Paris reporting to Colonel Jackson 79 Champs Elysees."

21 September From SFHQ to Timothy ()

"What is the position of two Frenchmen to be sent to Delle region? What is position negotiations with Switzerland? At the moment deal entirely with this question."

22 September From Timothy ()

"Intended to apply to Timothy and Barnes only. Recent information indicates radio may be of service but officers not needed."

22 September From SFHQ to Timothy ()

"Your messages arriving extremely corrupt. Please send all in English or all in French. Have asked Army Group if they agree your employment as per your number 2. You must take orders from them through 4 SFU as you are in their area."

22 September From SFHQ to Timothy ()

"Here is decision. Lt Barnes should return to Paris, 79 Champs Elysees to Captain Higgins. Ambel and Masson infiltrate to Switzerland. Jeds Timothy less Ambe and Douglas will return to London. Peignot with Jed Jim will be main transmitter with 7th Army. For Missions Thym and Serpolet - Fay, Gantois, Astier will return Invalides, Paris. Camp and Thornton to Paris, 79 Champs Elysees. Gellard to Paris SFHQ, Hotel Cecil."

() B-3464	19 Sep 44	() B-3457	19 Sep 44
() B-3549	21 Sep 44	() B-1736/72	22 Sep 44
() B-3584	22 Sep 44	() B-3606	22 Sep 44

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(More messages were received from Timothy that were undecipherable)

23 September From SFHQ to Timothy ()

"Most your messages still extremely corrupt. Transmit via Jim."

23 September From Timothy ()

"Retreating Germans are deporting all men over 14 years of age. Captured prisoners belong to newly formed regiments. Very young troops from Luftwaffe with a cadre of old officers. Morale still good."

24 September From Timothy ()

"An order formulated during my absence causing confusion as to present situation and possibilities of Sanfoin Mission, Thym and Serpolet. Is it necessary to return American officers as instructed. Would stress importance of keeping Sanfoin team."

24 September From Timothy ()

"Sanfoin via Timothy. Impossible to make liaison by radio with Pavot for 14 days. Please let us know if mission Pavot is still where they were so we may contact them."

24 September From SFHQ to Timothy ()

"Received your message but regret we are unable to give you information requested for we know no organization in that region. We are asking Commandant George, Chef of the Alsatian refugees in Switzerland to return to Besancon and give you all known contacts in the region indicated."

24 September From Timothy ()

"Sainfoin via Timothy. Without direct liaison with the Maquis at Belfort for a month. Belfort region guarded well and inaccessible."

(No more decipherable messages were received from Timothy.)

Report of Team Upon Return from the Field - 10 Sept to 24 Sept 44

Mission. The team was attached to mission Sainfoin, a part of mission Orgeat whose mission was to provide intercommunication for the FFI in the D2 area, i.e. the Jura and Doubs and to organize an information service for the Third Army as it advanced. A part of this mission was attached to Third Army

() B-3625	23 Sep 44	() B-1806/14	23 Sep 44
() B-1814/75	24 Sep 44	() B-1861/32	24 Sep 44
() B-3687	24 Sep 44	() B-1952/14	24 Sep 44

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Operations, Team Timothy (Cont'd)

headquarters to receive the information first hand. The briefing given us was incomplete as no definite scheme for operation had been evolved before leaving.

The Dropping. The first attempt on the night of 9 September was a failure as the reception committee did not flash the correct signal. The crew was excellent and the dispatcher the best. However, none of the personal packages of the team were in the plane as they had not been sent from the packing station, though the team had been alerted for 3 weeks at this time.

The second attempt was successful in that the load was dropped but the dispatcher was green and messed up the dispatching drill so that the stick was very sloppy. More important though was that we were dropped way below minimum dropping height, estimated from the ground and by the jumpers to be less than 200 feet, which resulted in 1st Lieutenant Heyns breaking his right ankle and badly spraining his left. The reception was excellent and we were well taken care of.

Situation. We found on arrival that the area had been cleared of Germans for a number of days so we sent a message back requesting that the rest of the mission, some 14 men, not be dropped the next night as had been planned.

The mission Sainfoin then moved to Besancon to be in contact with D Region headquarters, i.e. Colonel Ligne - this, however, was not possible so we contacted Colonel Bartholet who was commanding D2 area and who was in charge of the FFI battalion acting as infantry for the tanks of the French Armored Division in the area. Colonel Stevens (British) who with Colonel Robert (French) headed the mission, contacted SFU4 () with Seventh Army and found out that the mission

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could no longer fulfill its original intention and that we should return to London. A plan was put forward at this time by the American officers of the team and by Lieutenant Barnes of the mission to arrange a dropping on the other side of the lines. This was not practicable as the pilots available were not trained in this work, and also as no reception committee was available. Accordingly, Colonel Stevens arranged for Captain Ambel, of this team, and 2nd Lieutenant Masson, a French radio operator, to pass through Switzerland into Southern Alsace in the area of Achen. This was arranged and Captain Ambel and 2nd Lieutenant Masson left about 19 September with a radio. Nothing further has been heard from them. Captain Ambel also had the mission of sending back information by courier and radio.

As Colonel Stevens had an opportunity to return to London, he did so, endeavoring to arrange a drop for the mission from London or failing that to have the mission recalled. In the meantime Colonel Robert had decided he could be of some use by gathering information, though for whom the information was required it was never quite clear. For this purpose he organized a headquarters at Besancon and installed 1st Lieutenant Heyns with his broken leg as headquarters officer. 1st Lieutenant Munding and Lieutenant Barnes were used to obtain and maintain vehicles and to maintain contact with Seventh Army and VI Corps. The rest of the mission, which had arrived contrary to our orders on the same terrain 14 days after the last German had left the area, was sent to various units in the line to collect information from them. This system failed for various reasons. Seventh Army and VI Corps told us that they were information-gathering not disseminating units, and for the units in the line, the only

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information that they could get was from the army itself and therefore was merely a poor duplication of the army intelligence service. An attempt was made for the Jed teams with the line units to contact London to get information as to conditions ahead of the division, but as London did not have any information on the area we were, as Colonel Head of the SFU4 said, "Flogging a dead horse."

Orders came on 23 September from London stating, "American and British personnel with radios and complete plans return to London, French to les Invalides in Paris, and Colonel Robert to General Koenig." Colonel Robert wired for confirmation of this message saying that it was ambiguous and also that he did not take orders from London only General Koenig. Three days later London repeated the orders in detail, and still Colonel Robert wished to stay on saying that London did not realize what an excellent job he was doing. This team with Lieutenant Barnes, however, felt that the orders were definite enough, and there was no reason for remaining any longer so returned to London reporting to Colonel William C. Jackson, FA () in Paris. By order of Colonel Robert our codes and crystals and radio plan were left behind.

At Digon our transportation and complete equipment were stolen by the young FFI and we were forced to continue our journey with the Air Corps.

First Sergeant Spears is commended for the excellent radio work he did under very trying radio conditions, the large amount of traffic from all the French officers in the area necessitating his being continually at his radio for two weeks with no relief.

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JEDBURGHS

Operations, Team Timothy (Cont'd)Radio Report by 1st Lieutenant Spears

My Jed set was damaged slightly on dropping and after trying, without success, to contact London, I set up a B2 suitcase set which had been dropped with the mission Sainfoin.

From that time on I used the B-2 exclusively and with good results.

On the whole, radio contact was very difficult, due to excessive interference. This necessitated very lengthy schedules, as some days I had a considerable amount of traffic to pass. Often, both the home station and myself had to employ all of our all of our alternative frequencies to complete a sked.

The emergency link was the only answer to our problem and without it I would have been unable to get them on several different occasions.

On my regular skeds and the emergency, signal strengths were usually threes or fours, with a lot of Q.R.M. at all times.

The broadcast always came in QSA-5 but only once did I receive a message by broadcast.

The home station operators were excellent. On several different occasions I had to work on them for two and three hours at a time, but always found them very patient and considerate.

Upon arriving in London and reading all the traffic sent in by me, I was very disappointed to find the mutilations so great. A lot of our encoding was done by a French woman who spoke some English, with the aid of one of our party who spoke a little French. Perhaps that would account for some of the errors, but certainly not all of them. I am perfectly willing to accept blame for bad operating as I realize some of it must

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have been my fault. However, if possible, I should like to hear the opinion of the home station operators.

Financial Statement

Lieutenant Heyns - Received 100,000 Frs.

Expenses

Car, battery, tires, misc. repairs ----	35,000 Frs.
Hospital and service at Pontalier -----	8,000
Transportation of equipment from Pontalier to Besancon -----	3,000
Gasoline -----	15,000
Food, billets, miscellaneous expenses -	25,340
Total -----	86,340 Frs.
Returned -----	13,660 Frs.

Sergeant Spears - Received 50,000 Frs.

Expenses

Transportation -----	10,000 Frs.
Food and lodging -----	15,000
Destroyed by fire when house in which I was billeted was set afire, with other articles of equipment belonging to myself and Lt. Heynes -----	15,000
Miscellaneous expenses -----	5,500
Total -----	45,500 Frs.
Returned -----	4,500 Frs.

Lieutenant Mundinger - Received 100,000 Frs.

Expenses

Paid to Ambel -----	50,000 Frs.
Cars and living expenses -----	29,630
Total -----	79,630 Frs.
Returned -----	20,370 Frs.

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JEDBURGH

Operations, Team Henry

TEAM HENRY

Jedburgh team Henry was the 57th team to be dispatched to France from the United Kingdom.

Members of Team

The members of team Henry were:

1st Lieutenant Raymond E. Moore (U.S.), Inf.()
code name "New Mexico".

Captain S. Montcler (French), code name "Anglesey".

Technical Sergeant Vincent M. Rocca (U.S.)()
code name "West Virginia".

Area to Which Dispatched

Team Henry was dispatched on the night 9/10 September to the Belfort area of France.

Purpose of Mission

The team was dispatched to assist in the organization of the FFI, to report on the state of resistance, to submit grounds for re-supply and to recruit volunteers to take information to the Allied lines. In case of hurried German withdrawals through this area, it was anticipated that the FFI, if suitably organized, would be able to help considerably in preventing demolitions and protecting installations vital to a rapid Allied advance and quick restoration of French industry. Team Henry was to assist in preparations for such an event.

Communications.

The team took a Jedburgh W/T set with it to the field with instructions to establish contact with the Home Station as soon as possible after arriving in the field.

Finance

Each officer of the team took 100,000 French francs with him. The W/T operator took 50,000 French francs.

() War Diary Vol 11, p 578
() War Diary Vol 11, p 618

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Operations, Team Henry (Cont'd)

Relations with Other Allied Units

The team was being sent to work with the resistance groups in the Belfort area of France, but at all times it would remain under the command of EMFFI headquarters.

Action

Upon Arrival in the Field. Immediately upon arriving in the field the team was to contact the local FFI chiefs and circuit organizers and assist them in the organization and development of the FFI groups. It was to be explained to them that the northeast of France was of first priority now and that every attempt was going to be made to equip and arm this area as quickly and as fully as air limitations would allow.

First Word from Field

Team Henry announced its arrival in the field in the following W/T message dated 10 September ()::

"Henry arrived okay. Have contacted Brian. Think we shall contact Pascal today. Transmitter broken. Badly packed. Please drop another. We have a receiver."

Summary of W/T Messages Exchanged

11 September From Henry ()

"We have contacted Pascal. Anglesey is going to contact Bulaya, chief FFI area. Will you or not send a well packed radio immediately in care of Brian. Without Jed set it will be impossible to work Belfort."

12 September From Henry ()

"Have contacted Francois, chef EM of Boulaya. Have contacted Colonel Benlin, Sous Chef FFI zone Belfort Montbeliard. We will work with him and Pascal. Benlin Hq is at occupied Pont de Roide. We will be useful in this zone for about 8 days. How many packages dropped with us. All cigs lost in packages. Need some for our work. What about that radio."

13 September From Henry ()

"Have seen everyone here but still no work for us. Pascal wants to do everything himself. What is left Brian does. Give us that radio and a good contact close Belfort."

() C-4375/1	10 Sep 44	() C-4468/20	11 Sep 44
() C-4551/69	12 Sep 44	() C-4654/72	13 Sep 44

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Much can be done there. Boche have strong anti-aircraft defense at Montbeliard, Edille and Croix. 30,000 in Belfort."

13 September From Henry ()

"Pascal has given this information. Boche are established on the line Delle, Hussurel, Chalon Villars, Giromagny, Offemont. They occupy the ports of Roppe and Rudolphe. Many supplies are carried on the railroad La Chapelle Chaux. There are 8000 Boche in Montbeliard. Many anti-tank guns at Maroux. Brian now has a Jed set. Will not give us one. You know don't you that this place was overrun before we arrived. We have done nothing at all. Funny war."

13 September From SFHQ to Henry ()

"20 packages were dropped with you. Sending a new radio equipment on tonight's Chamesol operation. When you have radio suggest to Pascal you move to Le Russey maquis where arms are being dropped but we can get no confirmation. This area might be used for arming Alsatian refugees who propose coming in from Switzerland and moving towards Alsace. Would like to know what is going on at Le Russey. Name of chef is Redmond. Is in contact with Berne."

14 September From Henry ()

"Saw Pascal. Not going Le Russey. Going northwest of Hericourt, Aith, Milon and Vivanti. Details later."

17 September From Cape ()

"From Anglesey. Without news of West Virginia and New Mexico. Have you had contact with Henry since Thursday, the 14th. If so, from what place and when."

21 September From SFHQ to Henry ()

"What is your present position. Wish you to return soonest. If you can make it go to Amberieu airfield, contact C.O. and ask for Col. Xavier or his replacement. Explain you have been instructed to return on plane leaving Monday, 25th. If this not possible, go to Paris and get in touch with Colonel Jackson at 79 Champs Elysees. Please keep us informed your movements. Have not heard from you since 14th. In any case acknowledge receipt these instructions. Are Milou and Vivanti still with you. Don't want to abandon them. They should eventually make their way to London either via Amberieu or via Hotel Cecil at Paris."

21 September From Henry ()

"We have a contact who thinks he can get us through east or northeast of Belfort named Rene Magin who wants

() C-4693/51 13 Sep 44	() C-1377 13 Sep 44
() C-4802/7 14 Sep 44	() A-4868/44 17 Sep 44
() C-2780 21 Sep 44	() C-508/52 21 Sep 44

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Operations, Team Henry (Cont'd)

a radio. We know nothing about him. The contact says there is a maquis in Belfort but where or what it is he does not know. Anglesey wants to go on this info. New Mexico will go in civies if London can give us some decent contact. Can do job. If not tell us to return London."

22 September From SFHQ to Henry ()

"Situation Belfort too uncertain. Also we have no safe contacts there. Unless you get further first-rate line to Belfort and work in conjunction with senior officer, you had better all come home as already directed. If you decide contrary give us name of senior officer."

23 September From Henry ()

"Coming home via Paris. Milou received orders himself from London."

Report of Team Upon Return from the Field - 9 Sept to 26 Sept 1944

Departure. We left the drome at 2200 hours by Liberator. The order of drop was: first run, containers and men; second run, packages. The journey last about 3 hours and was uneventful. The order of dropping was Captain Montcler, Technical Sergeant Rocca and 1st Lieutenant Moore. We all arrived safely on the ground near the fires and easily found reception committee, particularly Major Johnson of team Brian. () Our arrival had not been foreseen and was expected the previous night. An artillery duel seemed to be in progress over our heads between the French and Germans, whereas we had thought during the whole of our trip that the Allied forces were 15 kilometers more to the south instead of being in the neighboring villages. We were taken to a house in the village of Montecheroux.

Sunday, 10 September. The day was spent making contact with the officers of the FFI group belonging to Pascal () and collecting our packages. One of the packages was missing containing 3 haversacks, also our W/T set was broken. This

() C-2843 22 Sep 44
 () p this volume

() C-609/13 23 Sep 44
 () War Diary Vol 3, p

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made us furious because the reason for the damage to the set was lack of packing. We had handed in one of our sleeping bags to be used as packing, which they had rolled up tightly and placed next to the set. Result, we were stuck at Montecheroux awaiting arrival of a new W/T set. In the meantime we used the B-2 set belonging to team Brian whose Jed set had already been broken under the same conditions. We met Captain Francomte who was wounded during a reconnaissance which he had undertaken with the FFI in the region of Isle-sur-Doubs. We sent a message to headquarters requesting a new set.

Monday, 11 September. We managed to contact Colonel Pascal, le Commandant Francois and le Commandant Beulin.

1. Contact with Pascal. Having given him a summary of our situation and spoken of Belfort, Pascal informed us that it was extremely difficult to pass through the lines, particularly for 1st Lieutenant Moore and Technical Sergeant Rocca whose French was not fluent. As an instance he stated that even his agents were arrested and this was the case with a woman. Our chance of success 2 out of 10 and in this region. Every village was occupied by the Germans and he had no knowledge of any Maquis groups in that territory. Further, as he already had team Brian he had nothing to give us here in the way of work, particularly as our radio was broken.

2. Contact with Francois. Commandant Francois was chief of staff of Colonel Boulaya, commanding the FFI of the region D-2. He posted us to Commandant Beulin and promised to send us a car. Personally he had no information on the region of Belfort.

3. Contact with Beulin. He was FFI chief of the sector Belfort-Montbeliard and was assisted by Lieutenant Bougler.

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They remained together when at Pont-de-Roide in the occupied zone. He told us the same as Pascal, that he was without contact with his region and that they were leaving that night for Pont-de-Roide.

Tuesday, 12 September. Wishing to contact Commandant Beulin in Pont-de-Roide for further information, Captain Montcler made a reconnaissance to the advanced posts of the FFI with Lieutenant Gerard. They did not get the salvo which they expected, the district seemed to be absolutely dead and silent. One of the arches of the bridge had been blown and seemed to indicate a partial evacuation of the town by the Germans. During the afternoon 1st Lieutenant Moore and Technical Sergeant Rocca also went into the region and to the Pont du Couront, afterwards going further down assisting in taking the town of Pont-de-Roide with the Allied troops. After this Captain Montcler endeavored to contact Commandant Beulin with Lieutenant Gerard to obtain some information on the Belfort zone.

Wednesday, 13 September. As Commandant Beulin was definitely cut off from the Belfort zone and Pascal was unable to give us any work, we sent a message to London requesting a W/T set and some contacts in the Belfort zone, the latter point was not answered.

Thursday, 14 September. Team Brian, who had been able to get their set from Pascal, passed it on to us. We had just received a message about Le Russey and went to see Pascal. He told us there was nothing there for us but spoke of a zone which might be more interesting near Hericourt and attached to our team Milou and Vivanti who were familiar with the region and the inhabitants. We were under the impression that

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there was a Maquis there, whereas the information given by Pascal was that there was (a) A drop ground for arms to the northwest of Hericourt; (b) The names of 3 persons who were to be found in 3 villages on our route; and (c) The name of a man in Hericourt (Aimable). Captain Montcler, after another interview with Milou and Vivanti, decided that it would be advisable to have some more information before leaving. We agreed that the following morning we would go down to Maiche to see the S.R.D'Armee in order to obtain, if possible, some idea of the Allied intentions in our zone, because the point where we could hope to form a Maquis was situated at 13 kilometers to the front (the Allied were at Villersexel and at Lure) so that to be sent to the Allied lines did not seem to be a suitable objective. We estimated that it would require a minimum of 5 days before we could receive any arms if all went well.

Friday, 15 September. We did not contact Milou and Vivanti as arranged and heard that they had gone to reconnaissance to Switzerland. 1st Lieutenant Moore and Technical Sergeant Rocca went to Besancon in order to gain a little more information.

Saturday, 16 September and Sunday, 17 September. At Besancon 1st Lieutenant Moore saw Colonel Stevans of the Mission Sainfoin () who informed him that he thought of going into the Belfort zone passing through Switzerland, this after having established sure contacts. He stated that we could accompany him. 1st Lieutenant Moore also contacted the Seventh Army at Sorans where he heard that it was impossible to pass through the zone of Villersexel and that it was far too late for that region.

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Monday, 18 September. Vivanti, having return from Switzerland, told us that it was too late for Hericourt, which corresponded with our news from Besancon, and that he and Milou had received another mission from London.

Tuesday, 19 September and Wednesday, 20 September. Unable to work at Montecheroux the team left for Besancon, having bought a car at Maiche. Hoped to see Colonel Stevans in order to accompany him through Switzerland. At Besancon we heard that Colonel Stevans was in London and that the Sainfoin Mission was being recalled. We saw Colonel Robert who had been with Colonel Stevans, who informed us that Commandant Beulin just had a message in which a Mr. Rene Maguin of Mont-Beliard requested a contact with London. We hastily decided to go and see Commandant Beulin who was at Saint Hippelyte.

Thursday, 21 September. Commandant Beulin had effectively received a message dated the 13th from Mont-Beliard and originated by M. Rene Maguin who appeared to have taken command of the FFI in that region. He had been requesting a contact with London and delivery of arms at 3 points already known. We could give him the contact with London and went to see Lieutenant Dureux at Villars-les-Blainont who was in relation with the Swiss and slightly with our lines. He informed us that it was rather late to pass through because the Germans had just started their patrols by the Gestapo and the Gendarmes. However, he could endeavor to do something about it. He had just had a message from M. Maguin informing him that he had seven companies well-armed and well-officered in the region north-northeast of Belfort and was still requesting arms. The message was dated the 19th, having been delivered by woman messenger. We required new false identity papers and

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for Besancon in order to get them. On our arrival there we received instructions to return to London and sent a message giving our present situation.

Friday, 22 September. We had our false identity papers prepared while awaiting a reply from London about returning, and Captain Montcler with Colonel Robert went to see the commandant, chief of the Alsace section. As a result of all this and all the information they had on the zone, we considered it was rather late to attempt a penetration of the German lines. In view of this and the message we had received, we left that night for Saint Hippolyte in order to inform Commandant Beulin that we were returning to London.

Saturday, 23 September. Commandant Beulin saw various people and attempted once more to pass through Switzerland, but owing to the lack of contacts we still decided that it was advisable to return. The following remarks apply to our decision. In his message of the 13th Mr. Maguin stated that he had no arms, whereas his message of the 19th stated that he had seven companies armed and well-officered, which proved that the arms which he had asked for had arrived. Further, in the case of information it would have been necessary to have communicated through London for Besancon which would have meant a great delay.

Sunday, Monday and Tuesday, 24 to 26 September. We returned to London via Paris having been obliged to abandon our car owing to two tire bursts and finishing up by hitch-hiking with only our haversacks as luggage. In this manner we arrived in Paris in the middle of the night in a lorry which was going to Lyon station. One of our haversacks was opened and a large sum of money was lost on the lorry during our moving about.

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1st Lieutenant Moore informed the Military Police of this fact. On Tuesday we emplaned at Orly, arriving at 11 o'clock the same night.

Communications. Cipher, excellent. W/T very good except for air frequency which Home Station frequently asked us to change. The operators were good.

Conclusion. We were dropped too late. We should have been there at least two weeks earlier. We felt this as soon as we arrived and of course conditions were not improved by the damage to our W/T set which immobilized us for the first five days.

Financial Statement.

Received - 250,000 Frs.

Expenses

Living expenses - - - - -	75,000 Frs.
Purchase of a car - - - - -	25,000
Lost in a musette container	
	<u>90,000</u>
Total	190,000
Returned	<u>60,000</u>

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JEDBURGH

Operations, Team Edward

TEAM EDWARD

Jedburgh team Edward was the fourth Jedburgh team to be dispatched to Holland from the United Kingdom.

Members of Team

The members of team Edward were:

Captain McCord Sollenberger, Cav (U.S.)()

Captain J. Staal (Dutch)

Technical Sergeant James R. Billingsley (U.S.)()

Area to Which Dispatched

The team was dispatched on 17 September to the Nijmegen and Arnhem area of Holland.

Purpose of Mission

Team Edward was being attached to the headquarters of the Airborne Corps to provide liaison between these forces and the local population and also an additional communications link with England.

Communications

The team was being dispatched with a Jedburgh W/T set and instructed to establish contact with the Home Station as soon as possible after arrival in the field. Team Edward was to have a 24-hour plan which would be worked by two operators.

Finance

The team took 10,500 Guilders with it to the field.

Action

Upon Arrival in the Field. The team would come under command of Airborne Corps headquarters while in the field. They would advise the commander of this unit of the possibilities of using resistance groups for the carrying out of specific tasks in support of operations, and they would

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establish contact with resistance groups to insure that their services would be available for such undertakings.

The team would maintain liaison between the Airborne forces and SFHQ in London. Also, they would assist in the identification of members of recognized resistance movements when they were overrun.

First Word from Field

Team Edward announced its arrival in the field in the following W/T message dated 17 September ():

"Arrived safely. No contact yet with resistance."

Summary of W/T Messages Exchanged

18 September From Edward ()

"Contacted Clarence who lost set and whose George wounded in leg and Harry wounded in hands but walking. Edward contacted SVB leader resistance Groesbeek. Strength 300. Some employed by ground forces. Population cooperates excellently. All near Orange."

18 September From Watermark to Edward, Clarence, Daniel and Claude ()

"SAS propose drop small recce party code name Timon to Jed Dudley 9½ kms NW Almelo Victor 21 night 18/19 with 24 cans. Party will be Belgian plus one Dutch sergeant."

18 September From Watermark to Edward, Claude, Clarence and Daniel ()

"Bomber command are at present refusing to accept any night ops to Holland during non-moon period. This being taken up on high level. Will keep you informed. 38 Gp are prepared do night ops Holland and are in fact doing some tonight but their very heavy other commitments make them uncertain factor."

18 September From Edward ()

"Most urgent. Corps needs information concerning military situation Arnhem. Watermark ask Claude for latest details and send us all information already available."

18 September From Edward ()

"Arranged for activities to be directed as per ."

() B-1508/99 17 Sep 44	() B-1527/41 18 Sep 44
() B-3366/7/8/9 18 Sep 44	() B-3370/1/2/3 18 Sep 44
() B-1544/16 18 Sep 44	() B-1544/16 18 Sep 44

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instructions. Effective strength 200. Sets led internal strife at town hall mass meeting. Detention of collaborators well organized. Members act as guides and collect information for forward troops."

19 September From Watermark to Edward, Claude, Daniel, Clarence ()

"Report from FD reliability unknown states that following signals are being used by Germans in connection parachuting agents behind Allied lines. Ground to air green; air to ground red - followed immediately by parachutist."

19 September From SFHQ to Edward ()

"SHAEF FWD message 15233 of 18 September to SHAEF mission Belgium reads 'Use of Belgian resistance over frontier. Supreme Hq view is that if 12th Army Group wish to use resistance troops in this way they will have considered and accepted all implications such as supply, armament and responsibility for their behaviour in accordance with rules of war.' Consequently this Hq does not wish to interfere. Reference your query about arms for gendarmerie, air supply is not authorized. It should be understood that Commander Johns is solely concerned with clearing up resistance organization and is not empowered to advise on questions relating to liberated manpower."

19 September From SFHQ to Edward, Claude, Daniel, Clarence ()

"Draughts sigs 19 September. Railway strike Holland progressing well."

20 September From Edward ()

"Nine resistance groups in Market area doing excellent work and Corps Hq delighted. Reserve groups are giving first class tactical information not otherwise obtainable. They are well organized in Nijmegen, Arnhem and Malden area and being used extensively for guide purposes and guarding prisoners."

20 September From SFHQ to Edward ()

"Inform Clarence wireless set is being sent him by air today addressed to the Dutch officer Clarence, SFHQ Liaison Mission, 82 U.S. Airborne Division."

20 September From SFHQ to Edward ()

"Following message has been sent to all Dutch agents in field 'Prince Bernhardt entrusts leadership action under his command to triangle OD-RVV-KP. In places where leadership is insufficient, triangle should improve this by nominating local leadership'"

() B-3428/9/30/31 19 Sep 44	() B-3443 19 Sep 44
() B-3451/4 19 Sep 44	() B-1625/62 20 Sep 44
() B-3480 20 Sep 44	() B-3490 20 Sep 44

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20 September From Watermark to Edward ()

"Dudley reports they are today sending messenger to Allied Hq in Arnhem. Claude not come up yet so this information passed to you. Am also trying pass it by Airborne channels."

21 September From Edward ()

"Coordinated Civil Affairs and Clarence's activities. Underground telephone vital info of 1st Division to Corps. Through resistance much intelligence obtained. Contact Daniel tomorrow to link up areas. No contact with Claude yet. Population magnificent. Collaborators rounded up by resistance."

21 September From Edward ()

"Contacted Daniel at Eindhoven this morning. No resistance contacted by them. Passed on your message to them for action. They lost crystals. Main activity collecting intelligence. Arranged with G-2 10th Group Daniel to be withdrawn as soon as flanking corps reach ahead of them. Underground telephone channels still main intercom with 1st Division, Arnhem. Hope to contact Northaw mission today."

22 September From Edward ()

"Have through underground secret telephone established contact Utrecht, Amsterdam and all main towns in west. Will develop this further and place at disposal of 2nd Army as scope for Airborne Hq too big. Telephone report from Amsterdam states Germans blowing and burning Coen harbor and petroleum harbor. No contact with Claude yet but hope to soon. Armor near Arnhem. Owing to uncertain situation of use of resistance in Nijmegen area had conference with civil affairs. Policy decided resistance under Burgomasters as soon as fighting ceases for civil use but military use always priority through local submission."

22 September From Edward ()

"Underground telephone net from Nijmegen turned over to 30 Corps who will pass it on to 2nd Army on arrival."

23 September From Edward ()

"Ram from Mills. Saw BGS at Corps yesterday with Staal. BGS agrees our mission now completed with arrival 30 Corps in area. Resistance here fully organized and not in need of stores. Suggest I return next week via Varicose to whom I will give facts of situation here. Please signal your approval. Staal wiring separately ref possible Jed mission in northern Holland for his original team on which he is very keen."

() B-3491	20 Sep 44	() B-1665/62	21 Sep 44
() B-1705/69	21 Sep 44	() B-1754/76	22 Sep 44
() B-1755/33	22 Sep 44	() B-1799/16	23 Sep 44

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23 September From Edward ()

"As result of conference civil affairs arranged for Clarence to assist in organizing armed group of fighting resistance. Total strength expected to be approximately 400. Intention to be used by 30 Corps for mopping up operations of isolated pockets."

23 September From Edward ()

"Consider mission completed on establishment contact Claude. Hope to do so tonight. Request urgent reply to suggestion use of Jed Edward in north Holland. Possibilities Overyseldrente seem promising but recall London and redropping must be done very quickly. Team keen to go and confident of success after experience of Dutch resistance."

24 September From Edward ()

"Spent night in most forward position south bank of Roine near Driel to contact Claude and bring set but crossing impossible. Knottenbelt of Claude slightly wounded while with Division headquarter. Jed Claude was in town Arnhem - entire force reported eliminated by enemy action. Have not much hope for them but will find out at earliest possible moment. Clarence okay. Will contact Daniel tomorrow. Purple heart for Slingsley who was wounded in eye while diving into foxhole."

25 September From Edward ()

"Contacted Daniel at Veghel yesterday. Wilson doing good work with 101 Div. Mainly collecting intelligence from civil population. Dubois considered unsatisfactory by them. Not trained as Jed. Resistance contacts by Daniel almost nil."

25 September From Edward ()

"Member KP Utrecht reported here. Information on enemy passed on. KP Utrecht active - 60 members. Contact address garage Van Veen. Ask for him. Group has arms and explosives. Am passing instructions to disrupt enemy rail transport by agent of mission headquarter."

25 September From Edward ()

"Contacted 3 members KP Kesteren bringing valuable information enemy dispositions Tiel area. Sending them out again tonight on false papers for more information specified by Airborne Hq. Also instructing Utrecht KP through them. KP Kesteren strength 25 men. All instructed to work on intelligence only. Rail traffic stopped completely."

() B-1625/23	23 Sep 44	() B-1801/17	23 Sep 44
() B-1853/19	24 Sep 44	() B-1886/23	25 Sep 44
() B-1884/21	25 Sep 44	() B-1894/49	25 Sep 44

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Operations, Team Edward (Cont'd)

26 September From Edward ()

"First British Airborne Division withdrawn from Arnhem. Jed Claude team missing. Knottenbelt last seen night 25 September north bank Rhine. Am checking his arrival in Nijmegen. Will inform."

26 September From Edward ()

"At meeting OSS met district leader of east Brabant, OD leader OSS and leaders two KP independent groups. Coordination of resistance activities in OSS arranged. KP groups strength 40 were sent for harassing action in Maas and Waal area. All armed with captured enemy arms. On OSS strength 100 men partly armed. No more arms needed."

26 September From Edward ()

"Team Edward returning Brussels soonest after closing up present commitments. Will ascertain from Clarence and Daniel and inform you today total number returning."

Report of Activities on Operation Market - 17 Sept to 28 Sept

Introduction. The airborne forces engaged in the air landings and bridge assaults near Arnhem, Nijmegen, Grave and Son, known as operation "Market", consisted of the 1st Airborne Division (British), the 82nd Airborne Division (U.S.A.) and 101st Airborne Division (U.S.A.) under command of British Airborne Corps. To these forces a mission was attached known as the Dutch liaison mission. The mission was composed of the following personnel:

- | | |
|---|-------------|
| Captain J. Staal (Royal Netherland Army) |) Mission |
| IC Mission |) Head- |
| |) quarters |
| Captain McCord Sollenberger (US) USA liaison) |) "Edward" |
| |) with air- |
| Captain R. Mills (British Army) British |) borne |
| liaison |) Corps |
| |) Head- |
| 2nd Lieutenant L. Willmott (British Army) |) quarters |
| W/T Operator |) |
| |) |
| Technical Sergeant J. Billingsley (US) |) |
| W/T Operator |) |

() B-1933/25 26 Sep 44 () B-1931/28 26 Sep 44
 () B-1935/26 26 Sep 44

Operations, Team Edward (Cont'd)

Captain A. J. Bestebreurtje (Royal Nether-	) Sub
land Army)	) Mission
	) "Clarence"
Lieutenant G. Verhaeghe (US)()	) ()
	) with 82nd
Technical Sergeant Beynon (US)()	) Airborne
	) Division
	) U.S.A.
 Captain J. Groenewoud (Royal Netherland	) Sub
Army)	) Mission
	) "Claude"
Lieutenant H. A. Todd (US)()	) ()
	) with 1st
Technical Sergeant C. A. Scott (US)()	) Airborne
W/T Operator	) Division
	) (British)
Lieutenant Knottenbelt (Royal Netherland	)
Army)	
 Major Wilson (British Army)	) Sub
	) Mission
Lieutenant Dubois (Royal Netherland Army)	) "Daniel"
	) ()
Sergeant Mason (British Army) W/T Operator	) with 101st
	) Airborne
Sergeant Fokker (Royal Netherland Army)	) Division
	) U.S.A.

The purpose of the mission was to establish contact with the Dutch underground movement and through liaison with them, to further the air operation. The headquarter mission attached to Corps Headquarters had as main task the coordination of the work of the sub-missions with the Division, while in the Division the sub-missions were to work closely together with the G-2I and G-2 Ops of the Divisional Headquarters.

The mission assembled complete, with the exception of sub-mission Clarence, at Airborne Corps headquarters, Moor Park, for a coordinating conference where the general rules and policies to be followed by the mission were laid down in accordance with the terms of the briefing for the operation. In the following report no reference will be made to the detailed work of the sub-missions as this will be given

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in the sub-missions separate reports.

Activities During Planning. In the days preceding D-day for operation Market the Headquarters Mission was stationed at Moor Park and was fully employed by staff officers in procuring local intelligence of geographical nature and, through the Dutch information offices, intelligence on the military ground situation. Much valuable information was thus procured for Corps Headquarters. The Headquarters Mission also established with intelligence officers and civil affairs officers a more clearly defined field of activities for the whole liaison mission. These activities were designed to:-

1. Further the success of the operation through employment in the military field of local Dutch resistance forces as required by the local commander.
2. Provide intelligence on various levels from local resistance groups inside the air head and from resistance groups infiltrating into the air head from outside.
3. Assist in vetting of resistance members who were to be used as guides, guards, patrols and in any other field of military activity.
4. Provide labor from resistance sources for all work of a military nature, e.g: landing strips.

All these detailed activities together with detailed policies as laid down in various conferences with BGS Corps G-2 Ops Corps and G-2 I Corps were communicated to sub-missions.

Operation Market. On Friday 15 September the full complement of mission Headquarters assembled at Harwell Transit Camp, in readiness for the operation.

On Saturday, 16 September, briefing for operation Market took place and a talk was given by the leader of the mission

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to the officers of Corps Headquarters on the activities of the mission and the expected activities and response of Dutch resistance. The glider placed at the disposal of the Mission Headquarters was packed, and included a jeep and trailer placed at the disposal by SAS. All members of the Mission Headquarters were to travel in this glider except the mission commander who was to travel in the glider of the G-2 I.

H-hour and D-day for Mission Market were at 1120 hours on 17 September, when take off from Harwell Transit Camp took place. On the journey over no fighter or flak opposition was encountered and at 1410 hours a perfect landing was effected at the landing zone near Groesbeek. On landing the mission made its way along a pre-determined route to an assembly point from where they proceeded with Corps Headquarters to the headquarter area. Enemy opposition to landing was slight. Some prisoners were taken. First wireless contact with London was made at 2000 hours and message Number 1 sent. Later that night the first contact was made with local resistance in Groesbeek and the strength established at 300. No immediate use was made of these resistance forces owing to the uncertain military situation. Cooperation of the population on the whole was very good.

On D + 1 the Mission Headquarters moved with Corps Headquarters to a new area in the middle of woods. A reconnaissance was made in Groesbeek to acquire German transport for Corps Headquarters. This was not successful. On a visit to the village of Malden. Resistance there was contacted and a meeting with resistance leaders of the OD of Malden,

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Heumen, Overasselt and Mook arranged. A reported underground telephone communication with Arnhem was investigated but proved unsuccessful. Telephone communication was established with the center of Nijmegen which was in enemy hands and valuable information on the local military situation, defenses of the railway and road bridge across the river Waal was obtained and passed on to Corps Headquarters. At the meeting with the underground leaders certain undesirable influences from outside appeared to have intruded. In consequence, at a mass meeting at the town hall in Malden some 200 members of the resistance group were addressed, their activities with the forces of the 82nd Division organized and internal strife settled. Contact was made with the Sub-Mission Clarence, which lost its set. Lieutenant Verhaeghe was wounded and out of the battle, Captain Bestebreurtje wounded but still active. Liaison between sub-mission Clarence and Mission Headquarters was to be maintained through Captain Sollenberger. 50 orange arm bands were released to resistance at Malden for use of vetted members while action as guides, DR's, guards and patrols at disposal of local commander.

On D + 2 in liaison with Clarence, a meeting of resistance leaders in the district of Nijmegen was held, and various activities of resistance in the assault on the bridge across the Waal organized. Contact was made by underground telephone with the center of Arnhem which was in enemy hands and through this the first contact with the first British Airborne Division was made. Messages and instructions from Airborne Corps Commander to first Divisional Commander were passed through this channel and important military intelligence

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reported to Corps Headquarters. In another move Corps Headquarters took up a position south Nijmegen.

On D + 3 in the link up with 30th Corps, which was established firmly on that day, the CRE 30th Corps was brought in contact with the chief engineer of water-works and ferries in Nijmegen through underground channels. Very detailed information on possibilities of river crossings and bridges in the Nijmegen area was obtained in subsequent conferences. In a conference with civil affairs officers the division of activities of resistance in the military and civil field were laid down and Clarence's activities coordinated accordingly.

Again vital information through underground telephone was obtained from 1st Airborne Division on Arnhem, this still being the only link of communication with 1st Airborne Division. At this stage contact was made with sub-mission Daniel who reported to Mission Headquarters at Nijmegen and again Daniel's activities were laid down to conform with the activities of the Nijmegen area of the mission and the ground situation. Daniel reported little resistance activity in Eindhoven area. A signal office was established by Headquarters Mission in the St Anna hospital at Nijmegen and two girls, members of the resistance, were employed for code and cipher work. Headquarters Mission on that day had made contact with Daniel and Clarence but not with Claude. Signal traffic was very heavy and requests had to be sent to London to reduce traffic to absolute essentials.

Mission Headquarters furnished 100 workmen for the construction of an air strip near Malden. Approximately 250 turned up.

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On D + 4 renewed contact with Daniel at Eindhoven and had discussion with G-2 on 101st Airborne Division USA where it was arranged that Daniel should be withdrawn as soon as 12th Corps and 8th Corps had reached ahead of the 101st Division. Daniel's main function seemed to be to collect local intelligence from the population. A certain amount of arms were obtained for Clarence for use with resistance groups on specified tasks. A group of approximately 100 men was directed from Malden to Nijmegen to work on the new air strip.

Through underground telephone with Elst, obtained eye witness report of the landing of the Polish Parachute Brigade and the enemy reaction. In the power station at Nijmegen an information center was established with contact by underground telephone with Amsterdam, Etrecht, Rotterdam, The Hague, Arnhem, Elst, Geertruidenberg and Zwolle. This net of underground telephone communications supplied such a quantity of high level military information that it was turned over to 30th Corps and 2nd Army, who established an information center with one officer from 21 Army Group, from 2nd Army and 30th Corps together with a Dutch liaison officer and interpreter.

On D + 5 contact was made with Captain Strutt of Number 1 detachment 2nd British Army. At the request of 30th Corps, conveyed through the civil affairs officer arrangements were made for Clarence to establish an armed resistance force of approximately 300 men for mopping up operations. As no contact had been made yet with Claude we tried to cross from Nijmegen to Arnhem which proved to be impossible due to very strong enemy action. An attempt to reach Oudenhoff R V also failed.

On D + 6 in consultation with BGS 30th Corps, it was laid

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down that resistance within the 30th Corps area would not carry arms in any large groups. This was a matter of policy of 30th Corps and may have had as result the fact that Dutch resistance forces were never incorporated in the armed forces of the country.

With great difficulty, we managed to cross from Nijmegen to the south bank of the river Rhine opposite of the position of the 1st Airborne Division with which no contact had been made yet except through the underground telephone. The whole area was under heavy fire and a crossing to the 1st Division proved impossible. As Claude was attached to 1st Brigade of the 1st Division who were in the town of Arnhem contact with them was impossible.

On D + 7 liaison was maintained again with Daniel at Veghel. The leader of resistance at St Oedenrode was met and all his members were already employed by airborne forces. Three members of the KP at Kesterem who had come through the enemy lines brought valuable information on enemy dispositions at Tiel and along the river Waal. They were sent out again through the lines for more and specified information and instructions to the KP at Kesterem for action in their area. The strength at Kesterem was 25 men. A member of the KP at Utrecht passed through the lines supplying military intelligence from his area. Of the area Utrecht an officer of the Dutch intelligence service reached us via a rendezvous at Oudenhoff in the Resse-Bemmel area. He had a network of 30 wireless sets and information offices spread over the country and we provided him through Corps Headquarters with a set to contact these. All information obtained from these people was immediately passed on to Airborne Corps Headquarters and 30th Corps.

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On D + 8 reported telephone call from Deventer to OSS was investigated without result. Local resistance in OSS was contacted and a meeting with burgomaster, leader of the resistance E. Brabant, OD and KP leaders of the local organization was arranged.

On D + 9 at the meeting in OSS friction between OD and KP was straightened out. KP was sent to the line of Maas and Waal in a batch of approximately 40 men with specific instructions as regards sabotage and attacks on enemy communications and the reporting back of intelligence. One agent was sent to Utrecht to contact KP there and to pass on orders for action against the enemy. Strength KP Utrecht approximately 60 men. We searched for sub-mission Claude among the evacuees and the 1st British Airborne Division from Arnhem and traced Lieutenant Knottebelt who was wounded. As regard the other members of sub-mission on Claude it was established that they were missing after their action with the 1st brigade of the 1st British Airborne Division.

On D + 10 left from Nijmegen for Number 1 SF Detachment () 2nd Army Headquarters, where we reported and went on to Brussels from where on D + 11 the Mission Headquarters was evacuated to the United Kingdom. Before leaving Nijmegen instructions were given to Daniel to report to Number 3 SF Detachment () with 21st Army Group in Brussels and arrangements were made with Clarence to remain with 82nd Airborne Division until the termination of the military operations of this division in that area.

General Observations. On the whole it can be said that the mission filled a very useful purpose. In the planning

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stage they produced information to which the forces did not have access. During the operation their liaison with Dutch resistance resulted in much information being passed on and many tasks being done by members of resistance groups, thereby relieving many men for fighting jobs at a time when every man needed in the battle.

Resistance in Holland seems to be well organized in almost every town in comparatively small parties or groups and when a town had been liberated the attitude of the population was such that it was difficult to distinguish between genuine active resistance members and friendly civilians. Cooperation between various resistance groups was found to be unsatisfactory on various occasions and the mission organized the resistance under one head leadership in many places.

It seems desirable that a definite policy be laid down as regards arming Dutch resistance and the use of them, as in many cases contradictory opinions were encountered and in some cases misunderstandings occurred. The very efficient organization of the rounding up of collaborators was left in most cases to the OD who seemed to be in a position to avoid indiscriminate arrests. It was found necessary in the later stages to add to the orange arm band an official stamp which was repeated on the identity card in order to be able to identify genuine resistance members. A certain amount of enemy infiltration in resistance organizations was found to be existing even after the liberation of an area and through counter intelligence activities approximately 10 enemy agents were detained.

Communications. Mission Headquarters landed with one Jed set and one B-2 set, With the latter set initial communication

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was made immediately and maintained for 24 hours a day throughout the duration of the mission. All the Jedburgh sets with sub-missions were lost on landing. The total traffic by mission Headquarters was 28 messages out and 48 messages in.

Wireless Report by 2nd Lieutenant Wilmott, W/T Operator

Working with a B-2 set the whole of the wireless communication between Edward and London worked perfectly. At the beginning traffic from London was very heavy and to a certain extent unnecessary as London was repeating to us everything we sent to them. But after a few days this ceased. The Jedburgh sets on this operation did not show up very well but most of them were lost on landing. The B-2 set took a lot of knocking about and still remained in perfect working order. The B-2 set was left in Nijmegen with sub-mission Clarence to keep in wireless communication with London. Sergeant Billingsley is a very reliable wireless operator who understands his work; he can be relied upon to perform good work under the most trying conditions.

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JEDBURGHS

Operations, Team Graham

TEAM GRAHAM

Jedburgh team Graham was the eleventh Jedburgh team to be dispatched to France from North Africa.

Members of Team

The members of team Graham were:

Major M G M Crosby (British), code name "Huge"

Captain P Gouvet (French), code name "Crispin"

Area to Which Dispatched

Team Graham was dispatched on 12/13 August to the Basses Alpes region of France.

Purpose of Mission

Team Graham was being dispatched to the Perpendiculaire () circuit to stimulate and sustain guerrilla warfare in the Basses Alpes region.

Method of Dropping and Reception Committee

The team was to be dispatched to the field by a Dakota operation flying from Italy.

Summary of W/T Messages Exchanged

Team Graham went to the field by Dakota on the understanding that the W/T operator would follow by parachute. The Allied invasion, however, prevented this parachute operation, so that the team had no direct radio contact with headquarters.

Report of Team Upon Return from the Field - 12 Aug to 25 Sept 1944

Briefing. Team was given a general brief to stimulate and maintain guerrilla activity in the Basses Alpes, and if required or thought fit on arrival, to operate also in the southern part of the Hautes Alpes, the east of the Vaucluse and the north of the Var and Alpes Maritimes.

This brief had of necessity to be on very general lines

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as regards area, as owing to medical reasons neither Captain Gouvet or myself could jump, and we therefore had to be landed in the Vaucluse. This left us the problem of finding our way across to our main area... a problem which might prove insolvable.

At the time of briefing there was a change over taking place in the regional and departmental organizations in the R-2, and as a result, our mission became slightly modified. The new DMR, Colonel Cloitre, and the new Chef Regional, Colonel St Sauveur, were due to leave Algiers at about the same time as ourselves, and we were therefore put, to all intents and purposes, at the disposition of Colonel St Sauveur while still in Algiers. We were therefore to act under his orders from the moment of arrival.

It was decided that 1st Sergeant Adams, our W/T operator, would be dropped in to us after our arrival in our area of operations, so as to facilitate our movement across country. As we had orders to travel light, he was to bring with him the main part of our kit. We were to pass a message by any available means giving our location and a ground for his arrival as soon as we had reached our area.

Departure. Captain Gouvet and I left Algiers by plane for Corsica on 29 July and were given to understand that a Lysander operation was planned for the night of 31 July/1 August, to ground Spitfire north of Apt in the Vaucluse. Colonel Cloitre and a somewhat numerous entourage arrived in Corsica next day, and when the operation was mounted all planes were taken by him and his 'staff'. On 31 July, the date on which the operation was to be mounted, I was recalled urgently to Algiers for 'further briefing'. I reached Algiers on 1 August

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and discovered that the reason for my recall was because it was thought that I had not received a "country section brief". After talks with Lieutenant Commander Brooks Richards, he realized that I had already been given all the required information and I left for Corsica on 2 August.

The operation of 31 July/1 August had only proved semi-successful. Owing to the ground being camouflaged with lavender, the pilots thought that it was too small. As a result, the RAF refused to fly further operations until an expert (a sergeant) had been sent in, although Faisceau, who had come out the same night, assured the authorities that the ground was over 2000 yards long, and that everything was in order.

This caused a further delay, and on 6 August we left by plane for Italy, as it had been decided to fly us by Dakota from there. An attempt was made that night - the 13 passengers including Colonel St Sauveur - but owing to bad weather the landing could not be made and we returned. We left again on the night 8/9 August and landed successfully after circling and showing landing lights, etc for over an hour. We were met and taken to a Maquis organized by Archiduc. The Germans had seen the plane and arrived on the ground a quarter of an hour after our departure. They made some attempt to follow us, but not succeeding, contented themselves with shooting two men from an adjacent farm.

Action after Arrival

After arriving at the Maquis, four days were wasted while the new "chefs" held discussions with everyone and appointed new departmental chiefs, etc. During this time, despite repeated requests, it was impossible to make any movement

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to a more active area. Finally, Colonel St Sauveur appointed us as mission to Noel, chef FFI Basses Alpes, and on the night of 14 August moved to a maquis in the Basses Alpes, north of Cereste. Noel was too elusive to be found, so after sending various couriers to tell him where we were, we decided to work with this Maquis until such time as he appeared.

On the morning of 15 August we carried out some instruction in explosives and arms, the men being well organized but badly in need of training. When the news of the southern allied landing came through, we helped mobilize the Maquis and on the evening of the 15th placed men in ambush positions on all roads in the sector to prevent all enemy movement.

On the morning of 16 August, since there were no Boche in the area, we descended to Cereste. After organizing a large road block and preparing demolitions of rocks etc for blowing in case of arrival of the enemy, we established ourselves in Cereste. Noel appeared that evening, but was as always extremely vague and went off to see St Sauveur. During the next two days we covered all the area of the Basses Alpes west of the river Durance and made certain that all roads were held in many places, and that any enemy movement would be virtually impossible. General mobilization in this area, which was virtually liberated, had been called, and the Maquis with which we were working had grown from 60 to 250 - all armed.

On 19 August news came that the Americans were moving up the Durance and I went across to contact them and give them the picture. I finally contacted General Butler's force at Sisteron and agreed to look after the district west of the

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Durance to protect the flank of their extenuated lines of communication. I then found Noel and fixed up with him to take over all military activities in said area.

During this time, many rumors had reached us of the re-occupation of Apt (Vaucluse) by the Boche. On one occasion I took a lorry and a dozen men to go and look for these Boche, who were, as usual, entirely imaginary.

On 22 August while returning from a visit to Noel at Digne, I heard once more that the Boche had retaken Apt, and were moving on Cereste. Returning immediately I found that this time the rumor was true, except that the enemy had merely occupied Apt and blocked all roads without advancing on Cereste. As no action had been taken, and as this was liable to become a threat to US lines of communication, I took the law into my own hands and mobilized a large force of FFI from surrounding areas. By evening I had gathered an army of some 600/700 armed and lorried FFI at Cereste. In the meanwhile, a light American recce force had arrived at Cereste, having heard the rumor of the German 'attack'. I had by this time sent light forces to occupy delaying positions on the Apt - Cereste road in case of an enemy advance, the forward position being 2 kilometers from Apt. The recce unit, commanded by a sergeant, was not too keen to go too close to Apt. The Boche were reputed to have there 6 Tiger tanks, 15 armored cars and 12 lorries of infantry, also 88 and even 105 mm guns and Anti-Tank guns. However, having given orders to assemble all available men to attack Apt next day, the US personnel ran me back to the CP of the advance battalion. which had arrived at a point some 25 kilometers southeast of Cereste. There I was taken to the Division headquarters,

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where I persuaded them to send a coy of infantry and four tanks to support our attack. They promised to attack next morning at approximately 0900 hours, having arranged to meet me near Apt at 0700.

At 0300 hours I moved the majority of my forces to cover all approaches and exits from Apt except the Apt - Avignon road which it was agreed should be covered by a party from Pertuis. They had orders to get in position by dawn and lie low until the action by the tanks down the main road should start. The Pertuis contingent was covering the main line of withdrawal.

Unfortunately, the American forces who started to arrive at 0700 hours required six hours personal recce before attacking - not believing, as usual, that there were really any FFI to do the job, and not relying on our reports regarding terrains, etc. Naturally, the Boche saw their activity which was far from hidden and, just before we attacked, all withdrew from the town towards Avignon. The force from Pertuis, who had orders to cover this road, had decided that it was too dangerous to approach nearer than some 4 kilometers from it, and therefore let the whole German column pass. The actual force of this column proved to be approximately: 1 Mk IV tank, 10 armed cars, 8-10 lorries of infantry (200-250 men) 2 88 mm guns and some light Anti-Tank guns.

The entry into the town was made by 120 FFI whom I had kept as infantry to support the tanks. These were followed by the tanks. The triumphal entry into the main square was somewhat spoiled by the simultaneous arrival of a Boche car and m/c combination which opened fire on the crowd, without casualties however. The car escaped, but was subsequently

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liquidated, and the three men with the m/c were liquidated immediately. Small rearguard actions continued to take place during the next two hours as scattered German units appeared in the town, but casualties on our side were light.

Next morning I received an urgent message from Noel, reporting a large German force had crossed the Col de Larche and were advancing on Barcelonnette, and asking me to see Army headquarters and attempt to get regular troops to deal with the matter. After a hurried trip to Army headquarters, I went to Barcelonnette where I contacted Captain Halsey. Captain Gouvet and myself went forward to make a recce of the position, but later in the afternoon, while waiting for our car to fetch us from Condamine (the forward position) we were shelled out of the village. Being completely alone, we decided to walk back. Enroute we were met with considerable small arms fire at the village of Jausiers and took to the mountains to attempt to reach Barcelonnette, I took a party of ten men together with Sergeant Major Fernandez and went by roundabout routes over the mountains into Italy to attempt to bring back a prisoner for identification and to collect all information possible. Owing to complete lack of the cover that I had been told I would find, I was unable to get on the the main road and collect a prisoner, so I contented myself with continuing the bluff that we had been playing on the Boche for a week, and made my patrol out to be really strong. By using American dollars in a village and talking of a force of over 100 Americans and British with French guides, we even got the villagers to the pitch that they thought sheep on distant crests were our reinforcements. As there were some known Fascists in the village, I feel sure this information must have

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caused the Boche to reflect somewhat!

Having given my report to the colonel in charge of the American troops that had arrived in the area during my absence, I returned to SFU 4 () to report to them and the army.

As nothing further was left to be done of any use in the area, I reported my mission completed.

Comments on Report

1. On the whole the Maquis I met were well armed but untrained. There was no time to train them.

2. Little real results were achieved as no enemy were stationed in our region and none passed through. We were too late to move to another region.

3. Regular forces would never believe in the strength of the FFI, and valuable time was lost as a result.

4. Briefing was full but out of date as far as targets were concerned.

5. The chef departemental, Noel, to whom I was attached was more interested in "defiles" than real work and hated action.

6. My wireless operator never was able to come and our kit was parachuted to the Arlege, without warning, where it was nearly all stolen by the Spaniards.

There is only one conclusion to make - that practically all difficulties would have been overcome if all teams had been sent in at least one month before D-day in the south. We were too late to do any real good.

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JEDBURGHES

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Financial Statement

Major Crosby -----received ----- 100,000 Frs

Expenses

Advanced to Captain Mawer -----	10,000
Food etc for Maquis -----	15,000
Personal living expense -----	20,000
Entertainment for FFI, etc -----	8,000
Car repairs -----	3,000
Miscellaneous -----	5,000

Total -----	61,000 Frs
Returned -----	39,000 Frs

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JEDBURGH

Operations, Team EphedrineTEAM EPHEDRINE

Jedburgh team Ephedrine was the twelfth team to be dispatched to France from North Africa.

Members of Team

The members of team Ephedrine were:

1st Lieutenant Lawrence E. Swank, CE, (US) ()
code name "Gantor"

Lieutenant L. Rabeau (French), code name "Julien"

Corporal J. Bourgoin (French), code name "Leon"

Area to Which Dispatched

Team Ephedrine was dispatched on the night of 12/13 August to the Jockey () circuit in the Savoie region of France.

Purpose of Mission

Team Ephedrine was being dispatched for the purpose of stimulating and sustaining guerrilla warfare on rail and road routes in the Savoie area and to harass and delay enemy movement by every possible means. Particular attention was to be paid to liaison with Italian resistance groups on the frontier. Coordination of French and Italian efforts was to be attempted.

Communications

The team was dropped with one Jedburgh W/T set and instructed to establish contact with the Home Station as soon as possible after arrival in the field.

Finance

Each Jedburgh officer took 100,000 French francs and 50 American dollars with him. The W/T operator took 50,000 French francs and 50 American dollars.

Relations with Other Allied Units

Other Jedburgh Parties. If there was a specific assignment

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Operations, Team Ephedrine (Cont'd)

in the area for another Jedburgh team, the team was to inform headquarters.

Allied Forces, If Overrun. When overrun by Allied forces or on cessation of hostilities, the team was to report to the headquarters of the nearest Allied unit and ask for the intelligence officer. They would disclose nothing of their work to this officer but merely ask him to forward them to the nearest SF Staff. This Staff would identify them and pass them back to SFHQ.

Action

Upon Arrival in the Field. Upon arriving in the field the team was to contact the chief organizer of the area, known as Roger (). He would furnish them information regarding resistance groups in the area. He would also put them in touch with the chief resistance leader in Savoie.

The team in cooperation with the resistance leaders was to develop guerrilla tactics on enemy lines of communication. The leadership of the guerrilla bands was to be left to resistance forces. In some cases the team might have to assume leadership itself, but it was not to engage personally in coup-de-main tasks of a hazardous nature since their real mission was to sustain guerrilla warfare.

Information Provided to Team

The following information was provided to the team before its departure:

1. Topography of the region.
2. Enemy troops in the area.
3. Disposition of Allied troops.
4. Target intelligence.

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First Word from Field.

Team Ephedrine announced its arrival in the field in the following W/T message dated 13 August ():

"Perfect landing. Still collecting containers and equipment. Awaiting Roger who returns today or tomorrow. If you get this, the Jed set works. Germans in this area are big towns only. Will send further information when verified."

Summary of W/T Messages Exchanged

13 August From Spoc to Ephedrine ()

"Delighted to contact you. Block all passes and routes on Franco-Italian frontier at once if you are in a position to do so."

14 August From Spoc to Ephedrine ()

"Report received today that Roger arrested by Gestapo. No details yet, but will advise later."

14 August From Ephedrine ()

"We are leaving for Savoie this evening with mission Progression. Roger arrested the 13th at Digne."

15 August From Ephedrine ()

"Gantorkilled on way to Savoie. We are continuing with mission Progression."

18 August From Spoc to Ephedrine ()

"Shocked to hear of death of Gantor. Please send details."

20 August From Spoc to Ephedrine ()

"No German armored divisions in northwest Italy. Fascist and police units in Turin with one German infantry division reported moving west from Alexandria."

23 August From Ephedrine ()

"Arrived Montricher PC Commandant Maurienne. Boche column and 150 trucks moving toward Mecenis."

() No 1	13 Aug 44	() No 1	13 Aug 44
() No 2	14 Aug 44	() No 3	14 Aug 44
() No 4	15 Aug 44	() No 5	18 Aug 44
() No 6	20 Aug 44	() No 8	23 Aug 44

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24 August From Ephedrine ()

"Boche burning villages taking hostages in order to force their way between St Jean, Maurienne and Moxane. Maquis not able to work in these conditions. Please send air support."

25 August From Ephedrine ()

"In reprisal defense Maurienne 5 villages burned. Maquis demoralized. Will take action if help comes. Gantor killed accidentally by Egrappoir. Bullet in his lung."

3 September From Ephedrine ()

"Maurienne freed up to St Michel by FFI."

4 September From Ephedrine ()

"Received your 9, 12, 14, 15. We are continuing to harass the enemy between St Michel and the frontier with FFI. Boche have caused great destruction but around 300 dead and 50 prisoners in 10 days."

Report of Team Upon Return from the Field - 12 Aug to 8 Sept 1944

Training

Our training lasted 7 months and I think that all together it was pretty complete. However, greater practice in driving cars, in reconnoitring enemy units, and a basis of the German language would have been a great help.

Mission and Contact

In May 1944 the team was sent to North Africa to be parachuted into Southern France. Our final mission was given to us at the beginning of August and may be summarized thus:-

1. To prevent the Germans using the routes of communication in the Tarentaise and Maurienne valleys.
2. To harass the enemy by all possible means wherever he was encountered.
3. To assist the local Maquis and to pass on to them the orders of the Allied headquarters.
4. On arrival we should have contacted Lieutenant Colonel

() No 11 24 Aug 44
 () No 18 3 Sept 44

() No 12 25 Aug 44
 () No 19 4 Sept 44

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Roger and obtain from him all information necessary for the successful completion of our mission. The briefing which we had received was not very detailed, but I think it all depended on our contacting Roger.

Parachutage

We left Blida on 12 August 1944 at 2030 hours, in a Liberator and were dropped about midnight on a ground 6 kilometers west of Seynes les Alpes, about 100 kilometers as the crow flies from our sector. The landing was without incident, despite the slope of the ground and the height from which we were dropped. A few minutes later on the same ground arrived the Progression mission and 4 BCRA officers (Appui, Egrapoire, Carriere and Marabout) all destined for Savoie or Haute Savoie. Fifty containers and many packages also arrived. As the SAP only expected 3 bodies and 10 containers, a certain amount of confusion ensued. I noticed that the parachutes of a dozen containers did not open, mostly American containers. Also certain C type containers opened in the air, probably due to a fault in the system of fastening them.

Contact

We made contact with the chief of the reception committee, Barault, and asked to be put in touch with Lieutenant Colonel Roger, for whom we waited on the field until the evening of the 13th. Unfortunately we learned during the afternoon that Roger had been arrested in the neighborhood of Digne. As a result we found ourselves without contacts.

On receiving message No 1, I decided to set out in the direction of the Col de Larche, but happened to run into Pauline () during the morning of the 14th and so changed our plans. She gave us a picture of the situation, and we

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decided to set out all together, (Progression, Ephedrine and the 4 French officers) in a truck for Guillestres by way of the Col de Vars.

We left Seynes on the afternoon of the 14 August with our baggage and personal arms. Some of the containers were to be sent the next day.

Death of Gantor

About 1900 hours we went through Barcelonnette without incident. Such information as we could get about the location of the Germans was contradictory so every one had his arms ready. About 2100 hours, when the truck was about 1 kilometers from St Paul, I heard a shot and saw that Gantor had been hit. After cutting away his clothes, someone put a dressing on his wound and he was taken to a room in the Hotel de Vars. He had lost much blood, and despite two shots of morphine, was in great pain. He had been hit from the front by a bullet which entered the right armpit and probably touched the point of the shoulder before emerging in fragments under the right shoulder blade. The nearest doctor, that is to say one from Barcelonnette, promised to come as soon as possible. In view of the insecurity of the place, it was decided about 2300 hours that the truck must go on and take Gantor to a safe place as quickly as possible. Carriere, who had some medical knowledge, was left with the wounded man. About midnight the doctor arrived, gave him another injection and said that he could do nothing for the moment but that he would come again if necessary the next day. About 2 o'clock Gantor slowly sank into unconsciousness and died. He was buried incognito on Sunday, 15 August, after a religious service at the cemetery of St Paul in the presence of the

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whole population of the village. His grave is in the north-west corner of the cemetery opposite the only vault in the place. His personal affairs, (wallet, watch, and ring) were brought to me by Carriere and were given to 1st Lieutenant Charles Gennerich () of the American Army. I wish to pay homage to the unselfish devotion of 1st Lieutenant Swank.

Circumstances of the Accident

The accident happened in the following circumstances: Egrappoir (sub Lieutenant Hook BCRA) had a Lee Enfield rifle, which he had loaded and, according to his statement, had put on safety. After Barcelonnette he put the gun among the baggage on the floor of the truck, pointing towards the rear where Gantor and Dalmatique were sitting. After a corner Marabout leaned on the end of the rifle which caused it to go off. The bullet hit Gantor in the shoulder. Eggrapoir is entirely responsible for this accident, as he had laid down his weapon and put it on the floor among the packages and various things which were strewn on the floor of the truck, in a dangerous position. For another thing, a similar accident had happened to him the previous evening luckily without serious consequences.

The rest of the Journey

After this accident the journey was without incident as far as Bramousset (10 kilometers east of Guillestre) and then to Vallouise, where we arrived on the 17th at about 1000 hours with some of the material which had been parachuted at Seynes. In Vallouise I contacted Jedburgh team Novocaine, () and left on the 18th at about 1530 hours with a mule train, intending to go to Monestier les Bains by way of the Col de L'Eychaudas. In the course of this crossing, which was particularly tiresome, Gantor's and Leon's operational equipment was abandoned by

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a muleteer at the tail of the column because of the breaking of a strap. These things were pillaged and the money stolen during the night by someone unknown. A complaint was lodged with Captain Pellegrin, 2eme bureau Briancon, and the following people are suspected:

M Rouse Clovis, living in Puy St Andre.
M Rolland of Chambrandt Par Eychauda.
M Gustave Raymond of Villars.
M Garnier, a wood seller at Vallouise.

All those people were in the valley of Vallouise and could certainly give information on the question. I think that 250,000 francs were taken. On arrival at Casset on 19 August at about 4 o'clock I put at the disposal of Captain Blachere, chief of the Maquis of the Monetier, about 200 kegs of explosive so that he could blow up the road between Lauteret and Le Casset. The operation was carried out on the night of 19/20 August and held up convoys going to Briancon for 24 hours. Continuing on our way, we arrived on 20 August in the Nevache valley, on the 21st at the Camp des Rochilles, and about mid-day on the 22nd we reached Montricher where we met Captain Villon, commander of the Maquis of Maurienne. Eggrapoir, Marabout, and Carriere continued their journey to Haute Savoie. Appui was sent as instructor to a near-by Maquis, and the Progression Mission and ourselves decided to remain at the headquarters at Montricher.

Situation in Maurienne

The position in Maurienne was that the valley was strongly held by the Germans (600 men with artillery and mortars) who had fortified certain points and held the forts and works. The Maquis was weak and little armed.

There were some sedentaires with Lieutenant Lebloud to

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the east of St Michel de Maurienne; 50 under the command of Lieutenant Schneider between St Michel and St Jean; 600 men and 20 Russians under the command of Lieutenant Villars at the Camp des Rochilles; 100 men in the environs of Albiez les Vieux (10 kilometers south of St Jean) with Lieutenant Michel; 200 to 250 men between St Jean and Aiguebelle, of which 150 were FTP under the command of Lieutenant Samuel. Sole command was exercised by Captain Villon, an active officer and a good organizer, who obviously lacked sufficient means of liaison and therefore was not able to keep his lieutenants well in hand. The morale of these troops was good but the encadrement a trifle weak. Their clothing was bad, their armament disappearing, and the supply of ammunition very small (200 rounds per machine gun average). Also, the Maquis were troubled by the food problem, always a sore point in mountain country, seeing that the Germans held the rich valleys and the essential ways through.

Maurienne had received in April a drop of 30 containers, a large part of which had been taken by the Germans. There were also some arms (10 M Gs and about 50 rifles) which had been dropped in the Col des Saisies at the beginning of August 1944. I think that in a mountainous area which is occupied, only small drops of a few containers on different grounds can be made with profit and success. Otherwise, it is very difficult when communications are precarious to distribute supplies in a relatively short time (2 to 3 weeks). Anyway, the very small quantity of heavy arms dropped in the Maurienne did not make it possible for the Maquis to struggle successfully against an enemy with artillery and mortars.

Journal from 22 August to 8 September

As I said, on the evening of 22 August, I turned over

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to Captain Villon the arms received and he decided to begin guerrilla activity on the convoys which were going up the Maurienne towards Italy. The 23rd and 24th were spent in attacks on these convoys with the following results:-

	<u>Germans</u>	<u>Vehicles</u>	<u>Maquis</u>
Area La Saussa	60 - 70 killed 5 prisoners	9	1
Montricher	25 - 30 killed 3 prisoners	4	2
Pontamafrey	10 killed		
Argentine	3 officers 4 NCO's 12 men		2

In reprisals the Germans burned the villages of Montvernier, Villarclement, Villargoudrau, Le Bochet, L'Aires, St Etienne and St Marie de Guines, Hermillon, and many farms. Also, they shot 30 hostages and women were violated, particularly at St Julien. General Bade, who commanded the Afrika Corps is entirely responsible.

Appeals for reinforcements, munitions and most particularly heavy arms were sent in messages No 13, 14, 15, 16 & 17. In face of the severity of the reprisals and to avoid the destruction of more important towns, the order to cease the attack was given on the morning of 25th. During the week 25 August to 31 August no vigorous action was taken. About 27 August special engineer units and SS troops began to burn the factories and prepare demolitions of the bridges. In other parts light units attacked the Maquis of Beaune, Albiez, Pontamafrey with considerable artillery strength, and in some cases succeeded in dispersing the Maquis. I went to Lauteret and then to Briancon on the 29th in an endeavor to get American reinforcements, but could get no satisfaction because of the weakness

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of the American elements there and the attack the Germans had made on Briancon.

Major Dalmatique went to Tarentaise on the 30th, also to get reinforcements. On 1 September a company of the Gresivaudom Maquis were reported at Glandon and other FTP elements were reported lower down the valley. A combined attack on St Jean was planned for the 2nd. This attack was not able to free the region as the forces involved were too small, but it did help to hasten the departure of the Germans on the night of 2/3 September. They profited by the very heavy rain and withdrew as far as St Michel, after having blown up all the bridges. For the fighting of the 2nd I can only give the results of the Montricher sector, where I was myself: 16 men killed, 5 prisoners, 2-105 filed guns and 1-37 damaged, and 13 trucks damaged or destroyed. The attack could not be pushed home because of the bad weather, and particularly because of the lack of munitions, (24 rounds for 3 MGs in the Montricher group). The bombing by mortars only wounded one man, but it destroyed a number of chalets and set fire to the forests. During 3 September contact was maintained and on the 4th "Stephan" company came from Oisans and, supported by the local Maquis, seized the Fort du Telegraphe.

An FTP battalion came from Haute Savoie, under the orders of Commandant Planche, to St Michel. On the evening of 5 September, I made contact with Commandant Clement, commander of a battalion of 5th Tirailleurs Marocains, who with the support of a group of artillery with 105s took part in the operations. On 8 September mission Ephedrine went to Grenoble and contacted 4 SFU () and remained in that town.

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Comments

1. The primary mistakes which prevented team Ephedrine from achieving their objective fully were the late dispatch and the drop at a point so far from their area of action. These two points are too evident to call for further comment.

2. We were never kept in the picture of the intentions of the High Command after D-day. In consequence, we could not always direct our activities in the right direction at the proper times.

3. Our zone of action was far too big, considering the difficulties of movement and liaison in a mountainous enemy-occupied area.

4.. Radio communication with Algiers were always so slow.

5. It was really necessary to have a means of wireless communication between neighboring Jeds. This would have facilitated intelligence and the sending of reinforcements.

6. The work of the Jeds was spoiled from the time of training to the end by the lack of permanent unified command. There were many mistakes in Jed organization, but the prime one was in the command. I mean the command by nations, which complicated enormously cooperation among the Jeds.

Radio Report

1. Comments by Captain Rabeau

a. Codes. The vocabulary is very good, fast enough and simple. Playfair is excellent for finding out the destination. WOK is slow and rather tricky, particularly if the reception of a message has not been perfect.

b. Radio. In a mountainous area the Jed set is much the best, because it is lighter and it is difficult to

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carry a BMK 2 on a man's back.

The skeds were too short. It would have been better to have had two daily, of an hour each, instead of 6 half hour ones as up to 20 minutes were lost in making contact each time.

c. Radio Operator. Bourgoin is one of the best Jed Operators.

2. Technical report by Corporal Bourgoin, W/T operator

a. Training. Excellent from the wireless point of view, but rather long. (6 months) Not sufficiently comprehensive in weapons training and demolitions. Cipher. Use of Vocabulary very good, and better than the poem (WOK).

b. Drop. Apparatus damaged or deteriorated as a result of a rather bad drop. Too much material to be carried in mountainous country.

c. Technical. Jed set much better than BMK 2 in mountains. The B-2 is too heavy and difficult to carry with its clumsy accumulators. The generator is too weak and easy to break. Telescopic aerials are not necessary.

d. Traffic. Skeds were too frequent and not long enough. Base should be at the disposition of outstation and not vice versa. Great difficulty in transmitting, as a result of the momentary loss of the Jed Set, (3 weeks), and the accumulators of the BMK 2. The BMK 2 could never be used except in the valleys near electric cables. Hence difficult contacts QSA 1 and 2. Base operators were excellent. Frequently skeds did not begin on time. Broadcasts were unreadable because of jamming by powerful transmitters.

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Operations, Team Daniel II

TEAM DANIEL II

Jedburgh team Daniel II was the third Jedburgh team to be dispatched to Holland from the United Kingdom.

Members of Team

The members of team Daniel II were:

Major R. K. Wilson (British)

Sergeant G. W. Mason (British)

Attached to Team

Lieutenant Du Bois (British)

Sergeant Fokker (Dutch)

Area to Which Dispatched

Team Daniel II was to be dispatched on 17 September to Nijmegen - Arnhem area of Holland.

Purpose of Mission

Team Daniel II was to be attached to the 101st United States Airborne Division to provide liaison between the airborne forces and the local population. They would also provide an additional communications link with London.

Communications

The team was being dispatched with one W/T set and instructed to establish contact with headquarters as soon as possible after arrival in the field.

Finance

Team Daniel II took 5,000 Guilders with it to the field.

Relations with Other Allied Units

Team Daniel II was being sent to the field with the 101st Airborne Division which was a sub-mission of the Airborne Corps headquarters known as "Edward". The team would be under

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command of the Airborne Division while in the field.

Action

Upon Arrival in the Field. As soon as the group had become established, the team would advise the commander as to the possibilities of using resistance groups from the carrying out of specific tasks in support of Allied operations in Holland. It would establish contact with resistance groups in order to ensure their cooperation for the carrying out of such tasks as might be assigned to them.

Information Provided to Team

The following information was provided to the team prior to its departure to the field:

1. Dutch resistance organizations in the area.
2. List of rendezvous and contacts.

First Word from Field

Team Daniel II's W/T set was smashed on the drop and the team had no contact with headquarters while in the field. The first word of the team was received in the following messages dated 21 September from Edward ():

"Contacted Daniel at Eindhoven this morning. No resistance contacted by them. They lost crystals. Main activity collecting intelligence. Arranged with G-2 101st Daniel to be withdrawn as soon as flanking corps reach ahead of them. Underground telephone channels will maintain intercommunication with 1st Division Arnhem."

Report of Team Upon Return from the Field - 17 Sept to 27 Sept 1944

Joined the 101st Airborne Division United States Army on 12 September at Greenham Lodge, Newbury. The team was present at divisional briefing on 15 September; left Welford Airfield, 10 miles northwest of Newbury, about 1050 hours, 17 September. Lieutenant du Bois flew in plane 2 with General Taylor, GOC 101st Airborne Division. Major Wilson in plane

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6 Divisional Headquarters, Sergeants Mason and Fokker in plane 9 Divisional Headquarters, all in first wave. The trip was uneventful until 1320 hours, when fairly intense flak was encountered. Planes 6 and 9 were hit and on fire, but both sticks jumped safely at 1326 hours. All members of the team made good landings.

Radio equipment was packed in one pannier, and one leg-bag, which was treated as a package with parachute attached. These were door loads in plane 9, and were to have followed the stick out, but owing to this plane being on fire at the time of the jump, it is doubtful if they were in fact put out. At any rate, no trace of either package was ever found, though the DZ was searched on one occasion before the enemy occupied it, and thoroughly afterwards. The remainder of the team's personal kit was scheduled to come in by glider on the second lift. Some of this arrived satisfactorily, but the spare radio set and most of the personal kit of the team failed to show up owing to loss of so many gliders on this lift. There was a good deal of shelling, principally 88's, of the area around the DZ, but the team successfully arrived at the divisional collecting area some 2 hours after the drop. Lieutenant du Bois was attached to General Taylor as interpreter and liaison officer, and was with the General continuously for the first two days. Major Wilson and the Sergeants remained generally at Divisional CP. In the region of Son, where the CP was established for the first 3 days, there were little or no resistance contacts, but a great deal of important information was obtained from civilians with the help of the team.

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In the Saint Oedenrode area to the north of Son, where 506 Parachute Regiment dropped, considerable help was afforded by members of a resistance organization called KP, who met the troops on their DZ and led them to the bridges over the river, and gave them full dispositions of German tanks and troops in the area. It is the opinion of the Divisional Staff that the operation of securing the bridges at St Oedenrode was very materially assisted by these members of KP. A search was made for the W/T Set during the late afternoon of the 17th without success. On 18 September, about 1000 hours, bodies of German troops infiltrated into the DZ from the west and after stiff fighting were repulsed, but the enemy continued to be in this vicinity for the next 48 hours.

The bridge at Son had been blown up around mid-day of the 17th. During the night of 18 September, Royal Engineers put in a Bailey Bridge, and the leading elements of the Guards Armored Division crossed about 0700 hours on the 19 September, and by 1600 hours a large proportion of the Division had passed through Son on their way north. At about 1700 hours the bridge and village of Son were attacked by four Merk V tanks, supported by Infantry; they advanced from the east on the south side of the Willhelmina Canal. There was considerable shelling of the town of Son and one tank got within 100 yards of the bridge before being knocked out by a six pounder. The divisional CP was hit a number of times and casualties were sustained by the divisional staff.

During this time Lieutenant du Bois was with the troops which drove off the tanks on the south side of the canal. The rest of the team took part in the defence of the CP. The enemy attacked again at about 0800 hours on the morning of the

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21st from the same direction, but was repulsed after cutting the road and destroying a number of British vehicles. The team again took part in the defence of the town and the bridge.

On the afternoon of the 21st, Major Wilson visited team Edward () which was with Airborne Corps Headquarters at Nijmegen. The road was at this time completely open from Son to Nijmegen, but bodies of German troops were in the vicinity of Uden, and considerable difficulty was experienced in returning. During the night of 21/22 September divisional CP moved to Saint Oedenrode. Contact was made here with the KP, who were very few in numbers, there being only eight original members in the area, but excellent people. It was noticeable about this period that numbers of young men had provided themselves with German or American arms, and an armband with the letters PAN on it. This appears to have been a spontaneous body which arose after the original American occupation. They appeared to have no organization or leaders and were entirely self-constituted. They spent most of their time roaming about the streets with occasional spells of pilfering from the farmers and civil population. These people gave a good deal of trouble to the police and such members of the civil administration who were trying to function. They did not interfere with the American or British troops. I understand that measures have now been taken for their suppression.

On the 22nd the enemy put in an attack with a newly-formed Panzer Brigade from the east and cut the road between Uden and St Oedenrode. Lieutenant du Bois was at this time at Uden organizing the KP in that town. He was cut off from

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the Division for some 48 hours.

On the 23rd St Oedenrode was heavily shelled and attacked from the west by a well organized German force consisting of parachute troops with numerous self-propelled guns and a few tanks. The attack was repulsed on the outskirts of the town.

On the 24th the road between St Oedenrode and Vechel was reopened, and Divisional CP moved to Vechel. The members of the team met again at this town. Contact was made with the KP in Vechel, who were well organized and well led, though their original members numbered only 15. They had recruited a number of good people since the American occupation, and the organizations was functioning well. Contact was also made here with the Orde Dienst. This body consisted of the more solid type of citizen and is not military. It was formed to assist and take over the civil administration on occupation by Allied troops. In Vechel they have very good relations with the KP and functioned very well.

About this time there were over 400 prisoners of war which had been taken by the Division and housed in a factory building in Vechel. The road had been cut again to the south and some difficulty was found in sparing sufficient American personnel to guard these prisoners. On General Taylor's orders, Major Wilson took over the task of guarding these prisoners of war, the guards being provided by the KP. As soon as the road was again open, these prisoners of war were evacuated in small batches with KP guards as far as Saint Oedenrode. Lieutenant du Bois returned to Uden where the state of affairs as regards the resistance movement was not

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JEDBURGHS

Operations, Team Daniel II (Cont'd)

on a good basis. The KP and OD in Uden were at loggerheads and both parties were very little use to our own troops. However, Lieutenant du Bois succeeded in straightening matters out and putting things on a fairly sound basis before the team left. He also took part in the close and confused fighting around Uden.

In Vechel it was found that a number of irresponsible individuals had acquired American or German arms and were a certain amount of nuisance. By the time the team left these were being suppressed and their arms collected by the KP, who made every endeavor to cooperate with the American authorities.

General Taylor had issued an order that all American arms were to be collected and handed back to the Division, and this was being prosecuted with energy by the KP. There was considerable shelling of the town during this period with many civilian casualties and some destruction of British vehicles.

Rations were pretty short during this period. The team lived largely on captured German rations. There was just sufficient ration of captured bread to feed the prisoners of war. The civilian population was short of food, but the distribution of this in Vechel was well organized by the OD.

On the evening of the 25th, orders were received from Airborne Corps for withdrawal of the Team to London, subject to the consent of 101st Division. The Division agreed to this, and on the 26th the road to the south being open again, the team left Vechel in a captured car for Brussels. On the way out the team very nearly entered the German lines in the region of Tournhout, but got away safely via Bourg-Leopold to Brussels, where they reported to Number 3 SF Detachment,

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Authority NND 843091

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21st Army Group Headquarters on the evening of the 26th. On the orders of Lieutenant Colonel M A W Rowlandson (SOE), Major Wilson and Lieutenant du Bois made a personal report to Prince Bernhard.

The team left Brussels at about 1800 hours on the 27th and landed at Greenham airfield about 2000 hours and thence proceeded by train to London.

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